

Cooperation between law enforcement and prison authorities in counterterrorism cases: unravelling expectations and proposals to strengthen cooperation

Abstract

This paper will focus on exploring why cooperation on counterterrorism between law enforcement and prison authorities is necessary within the criminal justice framework to address violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. While recommendations predominately focus on the essential cooperation between police investigators and the prosecution authorities, the objective of this paper is to highlight the need to engage prison authorities within this framework. Although incarceration after conviction may conclude a part of an investigation and bring some degree of closure to the victims, the process does not end for the convicted person, nor his/her family or the broader community. It is particularly important to acknowledge that what occurs outside correctional institutions has an impact on developments inside the correction facility and vice versa. Investigations continue post-incarceration, while prison facilities can serve as either an incubator for violent extremism or a safe space to implement deradicalisation initiatives for successful rehabilitation and reintegration.

Because of this, it is necessary that police and prison authorities establish and maintain contact and cooperation to ensure the safety of the broader community, the individual in custody, prison officials, the broader prison population, visitors, etc.

As with any partnership, perceptions and expectations exist between authorities, which can either encourage and facilitate constructive cooperation or limit contact. If the latter, negative perceptions and unmet expectations will further inhibit these two very important actors within the criminal justice framework from meeting their respective objectives. Therefore, the aim of this study is to identify prevailing perceptions and expectations through empirical research, while providing recommendations to facilitate and strengthen cooperation between two institutions, which, in some instances, could not be further apart.



Counter-Terrorism
Centre of Excellence



UNODC

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

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1. INTRODUCTION

Preventing and countering the threat of violent extremism and terrorism in Eastern Africa, and the rest of the continent, increasingly demands dedication and specialisation as the nature of the threat evolves. Violent extremism and terrorism acts as a threat to life, property and social development of Member States. **To counter this threat, the international community and the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the UN General Assembly, through its resolutions, conventions, protocols, strategies and action plans, require Member States to amend and/or develop new legislation, establish and enhance the capabilities of specialised units, and provide upon request assistance to Member States.** This is necessary in order to facilitate the creation of structures to enable cooperation within and between countries on sharing of intelligence and ensure that perpetrators are held accountable. To facilitate this, affected Member States are to develop, equip and train specialized units within their security apparatus to implement a human rights compliant criminal justice approach to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism. Thus, African Member States, with the assistance of donors and institutions, have directed attention and resources towards law enforcement capabilities. A positive development, following the hard approach as part of the declared War on Terrorism (WoT) following 9/11, is the move towards a softer approach in preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism. This approach entails the use of pro-active intelligence in preventing attacks, identifying and intercepting suspicious activities and persons, as well as using reactive intelligence in the investigation of terrorism-related offences.

While the value of intelligence is unmistakable, developing intelligence capabilities to use intelligence for its intended purpose is by no means a straightforward task. While each Member State has its own intelligence capabilities to keep tabs on foreign and domestic threats and enemies, directing the focus of intelligence towards active investigations intended to be used in court proceedings often becomes more challenging

than expected. This is particularly due to the nature of clandestine collection and the potential infringement of basic human rights and civil liberties as codified in legislation. Simultaneously, the legal standard in presenting intelligence as evidence in legal proceedings poses further challenges, often resulting in friction between intelligence agents, investigators and prosecutors. Hence, the complexity of ensuring a successful prosecution, whilst presenting intelligence to meet the legal standard of acceptable evidence, has been the focus of many capacity building requests.

Prison authorities are a critical component in the criminal justice system, yet often overlooked. Police officers' access to suspects once arraigned is relatively less than prison officers, who spend the majority of their time with individuals in detention (as they serve their sentences or while they are on remand). The mandate of police officers and prison officials differs, which may create differing perceptions and expectations of the counterpart and officers representing these different institutions. These expectations may further impact expectations of initiatives undertaken to foster a better relationship between police and prison authorities in the sharing of information and the collection of intelligence behind prison walls.

In the EAPCCO region, the debate continues on how investigators may gather new or additional information from prison officers about an individual who is on remand or convicted. Despite the primary focus on sharing intelligence between security agencies in preventing and countering terrorism in and between countries, the question remains as to what extent police and prison officials share crime-related information in general or on more specific information regarding intelligence on terrorism. The study intends to determine the level of interaction between police and prison officials. This study will therefore investigate the potential of intelligence and information sharing measures and policies required to facilitate interaction and cooperation between police investigators and prison officers, while identifying opportunities and challenges that may hinder interaction and



cooperation. The overall aim of this study is to inform policy makers of potential opportunities and challenges, while providing assistance in developing effective coordination mechanisms to enhance intelligence sharing between law enforcement and correctional institutions.

During the UNODC Training Workshop on *Strengthening Inter-Agency Cooperation Between Law Enforcement and Prison Services*, held in Kampala, Uganda, from 22 to 24 January 2020, both police and prison authorities expressed a common need regarding enhancing information-sharing on violent extremist offenders. However, representatives from both institutions held respective perceptions on the type of information that needs to be shared, as well as individual expectations of what each authority would get out of enhanced cooperation. From the perspective of law enforcement, the main need for improved information sharing was to assist police officers to enhance investigation capabilities and prevent violent extremism-related offences from collecting information from within these facilities. On the other hand correction officials mainly focused on being better informed to protect prison officers, the facility, and broader prison population against security-related challenges violent extremist offenders may present. Recognising the overlap in expectations in being better prepared to address security challenges, there was also a difference. Most critical and worth noticing from listening to prison officials relates to the relationship officials establish with 'clients' in the execution of their mandate. The associated concern on the part of correction officers is that if they are seen as an extension of law enforcement by constantly collecting information, it would place the lives of prison officials at risk, who need to build a relationship with prisoners to effectively manage the prison.

Hence, the main objective of this research project is to investigate the prospect of sharing information and/or intelligence among police

investigators and prison officers in the criminal justice system before and after conviction, through:

- 1. Providing insight into the mandates and existing legal instruments that support effective intelligence sharing among police investigators and prison officers;**
- 2. Assessing expectations of officers from both police and prison authorities when the sharing of information is being referred to;**
- 3. Unpacking the potential challenges hindering intelligence sharing among police and prison officers; and**
- 4. Exploring the opportunities for effective intelligence sharing among police investigators and prison officers.**

The research results presented in this paper will lead to recommendations as a conclusion. The methodology will be explained briefly and providing insights into the respective samples, and concise reference will be made to the primary mandate of police and prisons within the criminal justice framework and the broader UN recommendations to counter and prevent violent extremism. Thereafter the paper is divided in two parts. The first part centres on the perceptions, expectations and factors that negatively influence information sharing, by examining law enforcement and correctional institutions in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda respectively, in order for senior officials and policy makers representing the two institutions in the each country to be informed of the unique challenges and opportunities that exist within their jurisdictions. The second part of the paper will focus on constructive initiatives to create an information-sharing environment, by introducing procedural and environmental factors that may have a positive outcome towards cooperation and the sharing of information. This section makes reference to research findings from the perspective of police and prisons and not individual countries.

2. METHODOLOGY

This research project was initiated by EAPCCO Counter Terrorism Center of Excellence (EAPCCO CTCoE), and the UNODC Regional Office for Eastern Africa (ROEA), with the support of the Inspector Generals of Police (IG) in Kenya and Uganda, the Directorates of Criminal Investigation and the Director Generals of Prisons. Two questionnaires were developed for each of the samples, reflecting the different perspectives, especially where perceptions and expectations were measured. A Likert scale was used to measure attitude or the degree to which participants agreed or disagreed with options presented. This method also generated standardised, quantifiable, empirical data that allowed opportunity to present comparisons between the two samples and between the respective countries. Both questionnaires made provision for opportunities to provide additional information and/or different opinions on the majority of questions. 48 law enforcement officers and 47 prison officers in Kenya participated in the study. Researchers also made use of focus group discussions (FGD) while visiting facilities across the country to further build trust in order to incorporate as many perspectives as possible.

In addition to the field research, the CTCoE in partnership with UNODC ROEA, organized a hybrid online and in-person training workshop on *Strengthening Cooperation between Police and Prison Authorities in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism*, held 9 to 13 November 2020 for practitioners from Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. The main objective of this workshop was to enhance knowledge and strengthen the capacity of intelligence officers, investigators and prison officials to support intelligence-led terrorism investigations by effectively sharing information.


During this meeting, participants were asked to complete the two questionnaires used for data collection, to which an additional 14 police and 7 prison officials in Rwanda, as well as 8 police and 7 prison officials in Uganda, shared their opinions. Although above mentioned samples in Rwanda and Uganda are considerably smaller than the sample in Kenya, the authors decided to include the results as part of the research findings.

2.1 Background of respondents

Recognising that both male and female holding facilities were visited in Kenya, close to half (47%) of respondents representing correction facilities were women, while the majority (83%) of the police sample in Kenya were men. The police sample in Uganda was composed of a majority (62%) of women police respondents, in contrast to only 14% representation in the prison sample. All respondents in the Rwanda prisons sample were men, while 80% of respondents representing the police were men.

The majority of respondents representing all samples have completed, or are in the process of completing, tertiary degrees up to PhD levels (in the case of Kenya). An important consideration is the fact that officers were attracted to specialised units that increase dedication and professionalism as a workplace by allowing officers to choose where they want to be. This dedication also serves to prevent being influenced or later radicalised into violent extremism, since work satisfaction and believing that the officer plays an important role protecting the community are positive indicators. However, dedication alone cannot protect officers against all strategies used by violent extremist offenders to entrap and exploit officers.

Prison



Police

● Women ● Men

During the *Strengthening Cooperation between Police and Prison Authorities in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism* training workshop in November 2020, individuals representing police and prison authorities from Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda participated. Furthermore, the study also includes the views of high-ranked officers who participated in the

workshop. Additional respondents from Kenya were identified through snowball sampling during CTCoE-led fieldwork.

The majority (59%) of respondents have between five to twenty years of experience, with the majority (23%) holding between five (5) to six (6) years.

FIGURE 1
Qualifications of respondents




FIGURE 2
Position within respective units (Police)




FIGURE 3
Position within respective units (Prisons)





FIGURE 4
Experience in the department or unit



3. CRIMINAL JUSTICE FRAMEWORK: DEFINING ROLES AND MANDATES

The importance of police and prison cooperation is highlighted in the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the UN Secretary General's PVE Plan of Action, the Madrid Guiding

Principles (2015) and its Addendum (2018), as well as relevant Security Council Resolutions. These international instruments highlight the following core principles:



Any person who participates in the **financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts** or in supporting terrorist acts should be brought to justice.



Law enforcement, intelligence, counterterrorism entities, etc., have access to relevant information, as appropriate, about suspected terrorists.



Domestic information sharing within criminal justice systems needs to be improved to effectively monitor terrorist groups.



The **importance of comprehensive, whole-of-society approaches** to the prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration of persons associated with terrorism should be emphasised.



The **role of prisons as potential incubators of radicalisation and recruitment into violent extremist organisations** needs to be recognised; although prisons can at the same time serve as places where violent extremist offenders can be rehabilitated to be successfully reintegrated back into their respective communities.



Potential risk of recidivism justifies the continuous monitoring and working with VEOs after being released. To achieve this, law enforcement, intelligence agencies and other government departments need to be involved in this process. Considering the emphasis is on preventing, attention needs to be directed to *if, when* and *who* should be involved in this process, but also how monitoring occurs, including *how* former offenders are being treated during the monitoring process (emphasis by authors).

While both agencies form part of the criminal justice system, police and prisons have very different mandates that need to be acknowledged and respected for cooperation to be successful. The mandates of each are codified in the respective constitutions and legal frameworks of individual countries; however, the broad role and mandate of each can be summarized as follows:

Police agencies are tasked with ensuring public safety by preventing, detecting, and investigating criminal activities, including terrorism. Investigating a criminal offence requires investigators or detectives

to build a case that meets standards for successful prosecution to bring those convicted to justice.

Prisons, as an extension of the criminal justice system, are mandated to protect society by confining offenders in a controlled environment to promote their rehabilitation and to allow for offenders' reintegration back into society. Secondly, prisons are mandated to proactively manage the offender population to ensure the safety of prisoners, staff and the broader public while securing operations. While initial steps are taken to avoid recidivism, through rehabilitation

and/or deradicalization programs, closing the loop – offending, conviction, punishment and rehabilitation – occurs when the individual is released into an environment where the potential for reoffending is assessed and managed. The latter is however not the responsibility of police or prisons alone and requires careful management through institutions, such as a Parole Board, which is required to include other governmental agencies such as social services and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Depending on a case-by-case approach in which risk to both the community as well as the offender is analysed, responsible agencies need to facilitate reintegration of the former offender back in communities of origin or alternatively facilitate the resettlement of the individual; especially when the life of the person is at risk, should the person be released back into the same community.


Prior experience in cooperation within and between agencies

None of the above mentioned can be successfully achieved without the assistance and participation of other agencies, departments and institutions, in which the sharing of information forms a foundational base for each. Considering the central role which law enforcement plays in the criminal justice framework, **the majority of respondents representing Kenya (81%), Uganda (100%) and Rwanda (100%) have prior experience cooperating with other agencies outside the police.** While all prison officials in Uganda indicate that they had previously cooperated with agencies, 75% of respondents in Rwanda and 58% of prison officials in Kenya had prior experience. Upon closer investigation into the level of cooperation within police and prisons respectively, it is noted that within the Kenya police sample, there is no difference between inter- and intra-agency cooperation. Similarly, all respondents in Uganda (both police and prisons samples) express the same level (100%) of prior experience. However, the Kenya prisons sample expresses relatively limited (61%) experience in intra-departmental cooperation in comparison to other countries – only 3% more than cooperation with other agencies and departments. This indicates that police and prison

officers in Rwanda and Uganda have interacted and cooperated with other agencies, while prison officials in Kenya do not express the same level of experience. Developing relations and building trust requires time and commitment, while positive experiences act to reiterate the need and value of cooperative efforts, in order to further encourage inter- and intra-agency cooperation.

Regarding prior experience cooperating with other agencies and departments, the different samples were asked to indicate their level of experience with domestic, neighbouring and international agencies. Figure 5 presents with whom police officers in the three countries have previously cooperated. A higher percentage reflects more experience. Kenyan police officers have the most experience (70%) in working with other domestic intelligence agencies and higher experience in interacting with investigators at prisons (63%) and prisons intelligence officers (41%) than foreign intelligence agencies (33%) and foreign prison authorities (22%). Importantly, considering the transnational nature of terrorism-related investigations, 44% of officers in Kenya have previously cooperated with neighbouring intelligence agencies and prison authorities. Respondents representing the Ugandan police express a higher overall level of cooperation with listed agencies, with the exception of prison investigators (63%) and prison intelligence officers (88%). Police officers in Rwanda indicated that all respondents engaged with both investigators and intelligence officers at prisons domestically, while only 25% interacted with neighbouring intelligence agencies and 33% with neighbouring police agencies. While police officers in the respective countries express a range of experiences in cooperating with national counterterrorism agencies, and investigation and intelligence units within prisons domestically, it can be perceived that there is a need to enhance interaction especially with police, intelligence and prison agencies in the region. It is especially in this regard where the EAPCCO Secretariat and the CTCoe support the facilitation of interaction, e.g. when regional and subregional capacity building initiatives are conducted. The expectation is that introduction, initial contact and engagement with counterparts in neighbouring countries, where it is expected that information sharing is limited, will enhance likelihood of subsequent interaction, including cooperation, sharing and requesting information and assistance.

FIGURE 5
Police prior cooperation experience




Determining whether police officers in all three countries recall various levels of prior experience cooperating with domestic, neighbouring and foreign security agencies, Figure 6 reflects on how many instances these interactions were high in value. It is expected that the value – positive or negative – will impact future interactions and the willingness to continue interaction or cooperation within and between different actors. In other words, if there is no value in cooperation, its potential and sharing of information will diminish. Evaluating interaction with prison intelligence officers in Kenya, 52% of police officials classified the interaction as very valuable (11%) and prison investigators at 63% (7%). In addition to cooperating with domestic prison officials, Kenyan police officers also identified the value of interacting and cooperating with foreign prison authorities. The value of interaction with foreign law enforcement agencies increased by 19% and 13% with foreign intelligence agencies, while a decreasing trend is

identified in the value of cooperation with other intelligence agencies (-22%), neighbouring police agencies (-15%), and with the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) (-10%).

Within the police sample in Uganda, the value only increases in reference to prison investigators (13%) and remains neutral in dealing with foreign law enforcement agencies (88%). A difference of -38% is identified in cooperation with prison intelligence officers and -13% with reference to cooperation with foreign prison authorities. In comparison to Kenya, the largest decline in value in Rwanda is recorded in relation to cooperation with prison intelligence officers (-62%), followed by cooperation with other domestic intelligence agencies (-48%), while the value of cooperation with foreign prison authorities increases by 30% to 43%. The greatest increase in the value of the occurrence of cooperation is in relation to neighbouring police agencies (67%).

FIGURE 6
Value of cooperating with other agencies (Police)




Similarly to Ugandan police respondents, prison officials in Rwanda recall higher than average cooperation with 100% interaction with the NCTC, police investigation and intelligence officers, and other intelligence agencies domestically. Recognising that corrections forms the last link in the criminal justice system, officers confirm that although there is not a formal communication framework in place (at the time of the CTCoE/UNODC workshop in November 2020); instead, police officers provide information on request to prisons regarding individuals convicted on terrorism-related offences, as well as those on remand. Consequently, higher interaction on the part of prison officials is a requirement when conducting risk and vulnerability assessments for the individual in custody. It is important to note that at the time of writing, the Ugandan police and prison authorities developed a formal framework through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to provide clear guidelines and liaison structures to facilitate future cooperation.

Unlike in Uganda, where Ugandan prison officials are included in this process, Rwandan representatives at the CTCoE/UNODC workshop in

November 2020 explained that, under the authority of the Minister of Justice, justice sector coordination meetings are being conducted through an already operational MoU. Since the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, the country took all necessary steps to adopt new legislation and develop new structures to facilitate cooperation within the security apparatus in the country as well as with other countries, including Uganda and Kenya. According to the respondents, cooperation with police investigators and intelligence, as well as neighbouring prison authorities is the highest (60%). Cooperation with other listed agencies is positioned at 25%, with the exception of foreign prison authorities, with which no cooperation is recalled.

Kenyan prison officials have limited interaction with foreign law enforcement agencies and prison authorities (13%), and foreign intelligence agencies (19%). Cooperation with police investigators (61%) is slightly higher than with police intelligence (53%) and other domestic intelligence agencies (37%). Although the lowest of the three countries, 45% of Kenyan prison officials recall interaction with neighbouring prison authorities.


FIGURE 7
Prisons prior cooperation experience



Applying the same formula as with police cooperation described above – measuring prior cooperation experiences by the value associated with cooperation between other agencies – prison officials in Kenya depict a decrease in value in interactions with police investigators (-11%) and intelligence agencies (-15%); the only two agencies where value decreased. In all other interactions, the value increased to as high as 29%, as the value associated with interacting with foreign law enforcement agencies. Prison officials in Uganda express a more negative value projection regarding all agencies respondents’ interactions. An exception recorded is that with neighbouring intelligence agencies, where the value increased

by 10% and foreign law enforcement agencies and with foreign prison authorities where the value in relation to interaction remained neutral. For Rwanda, a different picture emerges, as prison officials express an overwhelming increase in interaction with neighbouring police agencies (75%), foreign law enforcement agencies (63%) and foreign prison authorities (43%). Since the value of interaction and cooperation with domestic security agencies are particularly important, it is worth noting that the value cooperating with the NCTC increased (42%), police investigators (30%) and other domestic intelligence agencies (13%) but decreased when cooperating with police intelligence (-23%).

FIGURE 8
Value of cooperating with other agencies (Prisons)



Focusing on the relationship between police and prisons in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda, as well as the value of cooperation, a concerning trend emerges related to the negative value experienced by both police and prison officials in relation to cooperation on intelligence. This negative trend is present, with the exception of Kenyan police officers in its interaction with prison intelligence. In relation to cooperation between police investigators with prison investigators, only Rwanda police officers reflected an increase in value. Officials participating in the study, on part of prison officials in Kenya, and especially Uganda, refer to a considerable decrease in value when cooperating with police investigators. From the above analysis, strengthening cooperation with the emphasis on value is necessary especially in Uganda, followed by Kenya. Recognising the above various degrees, first to interact and secondly, the value of interacting or cooperating with other non-police and prisons agencies within respective countries provide the following important take away points: the level and range of interaction between police and prison agencies, within the three countries (domestic) differ considerably, even before being analysed within the broader region. This calls for more in-depth investigation – beyond the focus of this study – into legislation, structures and initiatives to facilitate and guide interaction and cooperation, as well as an analysis into appropriate variables to determine potential success.

Regional coordination through EAPCCO and regional capacity building initiatives for police

officers have played a positive role to enhance cooperation between law enforcement agencies in the region. This is especially visible when compared to more severe fluctuations regarding cooperation with intelligence agencies and prison authorities. A potential explanation can therefore partly be found in the absence of a regional intergovernmental institution for prison officials, leading to very limited opportunities for cooperation beyond the immediate environment prison officials interact in. It is however not only the structure, but also the value associated with interacting that needs to be evaluated. **Recognising that police and prisons report to different management and ministries, a potential starting point to enhance interaction between police and prison authorities may be to include prison officials in national, sub-regional and regional capacity building initiatives** (to be discussed later in the paper).

Understandably, it is not only opportunities, but also a necessity which drives interaction and cooperation. The argument may therefore be that police investigators and intelligence agencies operate in a broader geographical framework than prison agencies, recognising its mandate and the need associated with cooperating. This is however only partly true since prison agencies require information to guide analysis, interaction, placement and future deradicalisation efforts, especially for individuals in custody that operated beyond the custodian country.

4. PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS ON THE TYPE OF INFORMATION TO BE SHARED

The identified decrease in value when cooperating with intelligence, followed by investigation units within both police and prisons, especially in Uganda and Kenya, is important to examine further. This section will highlight the most critical perceptions and expectations respective authorities may have when discussing cooperation. This section is based on the assumption that if asymmetrical or disproportionate expectations exist(s) within a partnership, these expectations will have an impact on future interaction within and between agencies, units, departments, etc. If there is no or limited value (established in the previous section) in the partnership and expectations from the other party are not being met, cooperation can be assumed to decrease. The central challenge is that if the other party is not aware of these expectations, initiatives cannot be put in place to address or discuss disproportionate expectations. **Without any concrete action, intentions to cooperate or enhance interaction will continue to exist without following through by way of actual implementation.** This section will hence identify perceptions of police and prisons and examine expectations each authority holds of the other institution.

It is recognized that there will be differences in expectations, especially as officers participated in the study in individual capacity and thus do not represent the entirety of their respective departments. However, despite this caveat, the analysis provides valuable insights into the opinions and expectations of operational officers.

The perceptions and expectations are presented by first analysing the circumstances under which police and prisons need to interact with the other, and next, by presenting the type of information the respective counterpart would want to receive.

4.1 Circumstances under which police and prisons should cooperate

Respondents, representing the two samples, were asked to shed light on the circumstances under which the other expected to be informed during the various phases in which interaction may occur: pre-detention, during detention and post-detention.

The probability that both police and prison officials have prior experience in the recruitment strategies of violent extremist offenders as witnessed inside prisons (by prison officials) and outside prisons (by police officers) serves as a good starting point to initiate the sharing of information.

Prison officials are clear on the type of information they require from police officers – with particular reference to individuals on remand and/or convicted – while greater clarity is required on the value prison officials can add to police intelligence and investigations (see Figure 10). Furthermore, although police officers may not see the value in sharing information with prison officials while investigations are ongoing, the possibility exists that prison officials may add value to ongoing investigations. For example, the investigation may be linked to an individual already in custody and through interactions with prison officials' additional information, which could be beneficial to the investigation, may become available.


A similar trend is identified regarding informing police officers when prison officials uncover information pertaining to a plot against a violent extremist offender in custody in Uganda and Rwanda. Considering that the plot may originate outside prison, not informing police investigators limits the potential evidentiary value beyond the reach of prison investigators. Additionally, knowing that his/her life may be in jeopardy may potentially encourage the violent extremist offender to inform

on current members. While respondents generally underestimate the value of information sharing in relation to the movement on the part of police (with the exception of Rwanda), prison officials from Kenya and Uganda overestimate the need to share information. (See 5.3 for further clarification on when a prisoner is moved and after release.)

While the investigation is ongoing, police officers are in a better position to inform holding facilities of changing family conditions. Similarly, after conviction, informing prison officials of conditions regarding the family members of the convicted (such as if they have been radicalised or committed crimes) may assist in the investigation as well as create favourable circumstances to assist and work with the person on remand. Police officers in Kenya and Uganda underestimate the value

of sharing information with detention facilities. After conviction, the roles change and information received from social services, visitation logs and other interactions with family members may support or obstruct deradicalisation efforts. Contact with families, especially if communication has decreased or stopped since the person was radicalised into violent extremism, often plays a critical role in the deradicalisation and later the reintegration process. However, the family may also have a negative influence in the deradicalisation process, in which case specific steps need to be taken to manage future interaction with these family members. Depending on the situation, the detainee's contact with family members as part of a larger investigation, may assist intelligence and investigation officers.

FIGURE 9
Under what circumstances should the police interact with prisons




In contrast to underestimating the value of sharing information in Kenya, prison officials overestimate the value of sharing information with police officers. The opposite is accounted for in Rwanda, where prison officials underestimate and police officers

overestimate the value of sharing information. Prison officers in Uganda underestimate sharing of information on broad trends and when the individual is still held on remand, but overestimate sharing of information after conviction.

FIGURE 10

Under what circumstances should prisons interact with the police



Understanding and rectifying differences in expectations, and uncovering the value that enhanced cooperation will bring to fulfil the overall mandate of each agency (as briefly discussed earlier), begins with the creation of a platform to openly share and discuss these needs and expectations. This paper presents individual perceptions of police and prison officials in the three countries, and it will be an important step to generate institutional discussions around this topics.

4.2 Police sharing information with prison officials

Police officers were asked to indicate the importance of sharing information by indicating importance on a list of potential areas prison officials may consider relevant to an individual on remand or convicted violent extremist offender. Utilising the same list, prison officials were asked to rate the value of sharing information pertaining to the different topics to fulfil its mandate. While it is important to note that all topics listed are equally relevant in the categorisation process between low, medium and high-risk suspects/offenders that will have a direct impact on the operations in prison, this analysis will focus on the perception on the part of police officers to share detailed

information and the expectation on the part of prison officials to receive relevant information from the police. These perceptions and expectations are presented graphically, and underestimated and overestimated outcomes in Kenya, followed by Uganda, are elaborated on.

In Kenya (see Figure 9), police officers underestimate the needs of prison officials in relation to the following topics; which are categorised and presented in order of difference between perception and expectation:

1. If the person in custody cooperated with police: 20% of officers underestimated the potential value in the categorisation between (low-, medium- or high-risk) individuals.
2. Violent tendencies of the individual being transferred into the custody of prison officials (18%). It is important to note that prison officials identified information regarding whether the person poses a violent threat to others in custody as well as to staff, as the most important topic.
3. Treatment of the person in custody while in police custody (17%). Only 48% of police officers regarded information pertaining

to prior treatment as important to share. From the perspective of prison officials, prior treatment has an impact on attitude towards prison officials as well as being detained.

4. Potential for the person to be deradicalised (12%). While prison officials will conduct their own evaluation, the level of radicalisation and the potential to be deradicalised will assist officers in their approach, and special measures that need to be put in place to further the potential for deradicalisation.

5. The level of radicalisation manifested in the person in custody (10%). Considering the police officers knowledge, through


their investigation and interaction with the detained individual, information pertaining to involvement, including position and role in the organisation, are critical in the classification and placement processes.

6. Information on the crime the person in custody is accused of being involved in or convicted for (7%). Likely the most obvious factor in the all-inclusive vulnerability and risk assessment, information on the offence may also facilitate cooperation between prisons and the police in the future, when prison informants come forward with information and/or additional information come to light while in custody.

On the contrary, police officers overestimated (73%) the importance of sharing information regarding the risk of the person in custody to be manipulated by others (11%). Understandably, an estimate of

the potential of the individual to be manipulated or further radicalised will have a direct impact on the placement and conditions under which the person will be detained.

FIGURE 11
Perception and expectations on sharing information with prisons in Kenya



04. Perceptions and expectations on the type of information to be shared


Cooperation between law enforcement and prison authorities in counterterrorism cases: Unravelling expectations and proposals to strengthen cooperation

In Uganda (see Figure 10) a larger margin is identified between perception on the part of police officers on the type of information prison officials

require or expect to receive from police officers, in relation to the following topics:

1. If the person in custody cooperated with police (-53%)
2. Treatment of the person in custody while in police custody (-40%)
3. Potential for the person to be deradicalized (-30%)
4. Information on the crime the person in custody is accused of being involved in or convicted for (-28%)
5. Reasons for joining the violent extremist organisation (-25%)
6. Ability of the person in custody to manipulate others (including prison officials) (-18%)
7. Psychological problems/challenges police officers are aware of (-18%)

FIGURE 12
Perception and expectations on sharing information with prisons in Uganda




Predominately underestimating and not meeting the expectations of prison officials has a direct (negative) impact on both the type of information being provided and also the value of what is shared. In other words, even if information is shared, it will not be detailed enough to address what it is required. Consequently, the perceived value of the partnership, or need to cooperate, decreases.

4.3 Prison officials sharing information with police officers after conviction

Cooperation cannot be facilitated by only one party, and the benefits of sharing information need to be valued by all parties. Within the framework of prison-police cooperation in Kenya, police expectations to have a position on the parole board

were not met by 8%. However, it is important to note that during the workshop in November 2020, authorities in both Kenya and Uganda indicated that parole is not used as it should be and that the utilization of parole needs to be revisited. In both Kenya and Uganda, police officers expected to be involved in the placement of convicted violent extremists. While no policy or structural framework is established to facilitate the process, police officers from both intelligence and investigation perspectives may have information at their disposal that could add value in informing the decision. For example, police officers may investigate a case where the placement of a violent extremist in a particular holding facility may have a positive or negative impact on the outcome of the investigation. Additionally involvement in developing a risk assessment of a detainee is another aspect where a difference of 19% is identified between prison perception and police expectation.


FIGURE 13
Perception and expectations on sharing information with the police in Kenya



In the case of Uganda, the perception on the part of prison officials of what police officers may expect was met except for the involvement of police officers in conducting the vulnerability assessment and in deciding which facility the person will be placed. Notably, expectations on the risk assessment are accounted as being met.

Topics and circumstances presented throughout this section provide a valuable framework to facilitate future cooperation and sharing of information between police and prison authorities.

FIGURE 14
Perception and expectations on sharing information with the police in Uganda



5. ESTABLISH AND ENHANCE POLICE-PRISONS COOPERATION

The first step in establishing successful cooperation is to create an environment that will facilitate and encourage interaction, by identifying and addressing challenges that may prevent cooperation. While the previous section identified perceptions and expectations that can be conducive for cooperation, this section will commence by identifying factors – institutional, procedural and personal – that may obstruct cooperation, and present potential solutions. The second part of this section is based on empirical results and is concluded with recommendations. **It is important to note that the percentages provided in each section refer to respondents who estimated the importance of cooperation at levels above 70% in playing a role in taking a particular position.**

5.1 Factors preventing cooperation

The discussion below presents the most prominent factors that may prevent the sharing of information within institutions and between countries. The majority of respondents, representing both police and prisons in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, recognise the need to share information. However, when discussing factors that may prevent the sharing of information, 57% of police respondents in Kenya, followed by 33% in Rwanda and 31% in Uganda account for not seeing the importance, while 31% in Uganda, 29% in Kenya and 22% in Rwanda do not recognise the benefit that sharing of information will have on their investigations. Within the prisons sample, 50% of officers in Rwanda, 31% in Kenya and 17% in Uganda did not recognise the importance. None of the prison

officials in Rwanda and Uganda recognised the benefit of sharing information with police officers.

When determining whether a culture of information sharing exists, respondents were asked if they are, first, allowed to share information, and secondly, if they are comfortable in approaching their commanding officers to acquire permission to share information. Regarding the former, 59% of Ugandan police officers indicated that they are not allowed to share information, and 38% felt uncomfortable approaching commanding officers to ask for permission to cooperate with prisons. From the perspective of Ugandan prison officers, 33% of officers were not allowed to share information, while 17% felt uncomfortable to request permission to be allowed to interact. In Rwanda, 33% of police and 25% of prison officials did not want to approach the commanding officer, and 50% of prison and 20% of police officers specified that they are not allowed to interact. Not being allowed by commanding officers played a larger role (59%) in preventing Kenyan prison officials from sharing information with police officers, while 25% of police officers expressed the same limitation in cooperating with prison officials.

Factors that may prevent the sharing of information



Not seeing the importance



Not recognise the benefit

Workplace culture barriers to information sharing



Not allowed to share information



Uneasy to request permission



Lastly, only 19% of police officers in this country felt uncomfortable to request permission to interact from a commanding officer, while 38% of prison officials expressed being uneasy to approach a commanding officer to request permission.

Not being trained to interact with law enforcement agencies is accounted for by 67% of Ugandan, 50% of Rwandan and 34% of Kenyan prison officers. With reference to the respective police samples, 57% of Ugandan, 27% of Kenyan and 25% of Rwandan representatives recognised a lack in training as an important factor preventing the sharing of information.

Personnel can be overwhelmed by responsibilities, e.g. current case load, that sharing information may not be on the officer's list of priorities; which is indicated by 72% of police in Uganda, followed by 38% in Kenya and 33% in Rwanda. Within the prisons sample 72% of officers in Kenya, 50% in Uganda, and 25% in Rwanda indicated feeling overwhelmed.

The absence of an established culture of information sharing may also be institutional, due to the classification of information as 'secret', as referred to by 78% police officers in Uganda, 71% in Rwanda and 69% in Kenya, whereas 73% of officers in Kenya, 60% of officials in Rwanda and 43% in Uganda considered 'confidential' classification as a factor preventing sharing of information. Supporting the position of police officers in Uganda, 83% of prison officials in Uganda considered information classified as 'secret' and 'confidential' as preventative factors. 78% of prison officials in Kenya regarded both classification categories as factors preventing cooperation, followed by 50% of Rwandan prison officials. Understandably, due to the sensitive nature of counterterrorism investigations and the overall protection of personal information, structures and directives need to be in place to protect the unsanctioned distribution of information that may place the investigation and the lives of people being referred to at risk. Unfortunately, classification may also be used as an 'excuse' not to share information.

Fear that information may end up in the wrong hands closely relates to trust, for which 43% of police officers in Kenya, 41% in Uganda and 33% in Rwanda do not trust prison officials in their

respective countries. Lack of trust is also a factor preventing sharing of information according to 50% of prison officials in Uganda, 41% in Kenya and 25% in Rwanda. None of the prison officials in Uganda regarded lack of trust as a factor preventing the sharing of information however, while 17% of respondents regarded corruption in the Ugandan Police Force as a factor. The perception of corruption in prisons, according to 53% of Ugandan police officers, 33% of police officers in Kenya and 29% in Rwanda, is more prominent.

While classification is identified as the most important factor, 69% of police officers in Uganda, followed by 57% in Kenya, and 50% in Rwanda referred to the negative impact that not having a policy in place will have on sharing information. Structures to facilitate sharing is closely associated with policy, and according to 56% of officers in Uganda, 44% in Rwanda and 43% in Kenya, not having a structure in place to enable sharing information will prevent cooperation.

Recognising that policies and structures can be established to facilitate cooperation, and that similar vetting procedures and provision of security clearance can be implemented, factors related to personality and inter-personal challenges remains most challenging to address.

Not getting along with counterparts is raised by 43% of Kenyan police and 42% Kenyan prison officials, 42% of Ugandan police (none amongst the prison sample) and 25% of Rwandan prison and 22% of the Rwandan police sample as particularly important. Additionally, the perception that prison officials are 'too friendly' with violent extremist or terror suspects served as an important factor amongst 44% of Ugandan, 33% of Rwandan and 29% of Kenyan police officers. Additionally, 44% of prison officials in Kenya and 17% in Uganda (none amongst the prison sample in Rwanda) identified negative treatment at the hands of police officers, which contributes to radicalisation, as a factor preventing the sharing of information.

Due to the fact that working in silos occurs in all sectors, departments and units, an information-sharing culture needs to be established and nurtured within respective agencies and countries. The discussion above identified the most prominent factors preventing information sharing, but does not conclude the discussion.

TABLE 1

Factors that may prevent the sharing of information with prisons from the perspective of police officers

 Kenya	 Uganda	 Rwanda
 Information classified as 'confidential'	 Not allowed by the commanding officer	 Information classified as 'secret'
 Information classified as 'secret'	 No structure in place to share information	 Information classified as 'confidential'
 Not allowed by the commanding officer	 Information classified as 'secret'	 No policy in place to share information
 No structure in place to share information	 Do not trust prison officials	 No structure in place to share information
 No policy in place to share information	 Do not think it will benefit my investigation	 Do not trust prison officials
 Time due to caseload	 No policy in place to share information	 Time due to caseload
 Do not trust prison officials	 Do not see the importance to share information	 Do not see the importance to share information
 Do not think it will benefit my investigation	 Time due to caseload	 Treatment of terror suspect/convicts by prison officers (too friendly)
 Do not know the officials	 Do not get along with prison officials	 Do not want to bother commanding officer with a request
 Do not get along with prison officials	 Not trained to engage with prisons	 High-level of corruption in prisons
 Not trained to engage with prisons	 Do not know the officials	 Not trained to engage with prisons
 Treatment of terror suspect/convicts by prison officers (too friendly)	 Treatment of terror suspect/convicts by prison officers (too friendly)	 Do not think it will benefit my investigation
 High-level of corruption in prisons	 Do not want to bother commanding officer with a request	 Do not get along with prison officials
 Do not see the importance to share information	 Information classified as 'confidential'	 Not allowed by the commanding officer
 Do not want to bother commanding officer with a request	 High-level of corruption in prisons	 Do not know the officials

TABLE 2

Factors that may prevent the sharing of information with police from the perspective of prison officials

 Kenya	 Uganda	 Rwanda
 Information classified as 'secret'	 No policy in place to share information	 No structure in place to share information
 Information classified as 'confidential'	 Information classified as 'confidential'	 Information classified as 'secret'
 Time due to caseload	 Information classified as 'secret'	 Information classified as 'confidential'
 No policy in place to share information	 Not trained to engage with police	 No policy in place to share information
 Not allowed by the commanding officer	 No structure in place to share information	 Not allowed by the commanding officer
 No structure in place to share information	 Time due to caseload	 Do not know the officials
 High-level of corruption in police	 Do not trust police officials	 Not trained to engage with police
 Do not know the officials	 Do not know the officials	 Do not see the importance to share information
 Treatment of police officers reason for radicalisation	 Do not get along with police officials	 Time due to caseload
 Do not get along with police officials	 High-level of corruption in police	 Do not get along with police officials
 Do not trust police officials	 Not allowed by the commanding officer	 Do not trust police officials
 Do not want to bother commanding officer with a request	 Do not want to bother commanding officer with a request	 Do not want to bother commanding officer with a request
 Not trained to engage with police	 Do not think it will benefit my investigation	 High-level of corruption in police
 Do not see the importance to share information	 Treatment of police officers reason for radicalisation	 Treatment of police officers reason for radicalisation
 Do not think it will benefit my investigation	 Do not see the importance to share information	 Do not think it will benefit my investigation

6. RECOMMENDATIONS TO FACILITATE AND ENHANCE INFORMATION SHARING AND COOPERATION

Perceptions, expectations and factors that in one way or another negatively influence information sharing have been identified. Therefore the last section will focus on constructive initiatives to create an information-sharing environment, which takes into account procedural and personal factors that influence cooperation and the sharing of information. Furthermore, while the paper presented research findings making reference to Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda, the following guidelines are from the perspective of police and prisons respectively. While the focus remains exclusively on police and prisons, the respective authorities need to consider including other agencies and departments in implementation,

as the following recommendations are equally applicable in other areas.

Culture of information sharing

Developing a culture of information sharing takes time and dedication, for which it is important to investigate the institutional history of cooperation regarding each agency and identify and highlight periods in which institutions successfully interacted and cooperated with each other. If identified periods contributed to conflict or negative institutional memories and perceptions, addressing applicable challenges is an important initial step. This includes:

1. Understanding mandates and circumstances within each agency. This plays a more prominent role for the police (90%) than prisons (66%), as it relates more to the mandate of the 'other' than own institutional mandate.

- i. One of the first steps is to **facilitate discussions regarding the role and function of prisons on information gathering, and its responsibility to its clients** (in this case, violent extremist offenders). While police and prison officials who participated in the study are familiar with the mandate of the police, the main objective for prison officials to gather information and parameters for sharing information with police officers is understood less. For prisons, its mandate entails protection of personnel, prisoners, visitors, and the broader public from internal and external threats to life and property. Order and security are critical components to effectively manage a prison. While all prison

personnel have a responsibility to maintain its security, there is a need to develop and enhance intelligence capabilities. Yet, there is a concern that this responsibility should not place the security of personnel and prisoners in further jeopardy by creating the impression that prison officials constantly gather information to be used against prisoners. Despite the need to build trust between prison officials and prisoners, prison authorities recognise and request assistance to establish and enhance prison intelligence.

- ii. Secondly, **guidelines on the type of information police expect to receive from prisons need to be developed**, especially regarding how to measure the value of information from every source, including what is provided by informants, and recognising that the trustworthiness of the source is critical in classifying its value.

2. Creating a conducive environment for information sharing rests on two main principles:

i. **Establishing mutual trust.** In social science, especially in reference to relations within and between countries, scholars' argue that trust is 'a complement to governing institutions and not a substitute' and that in the absence of trust agreements, including MoUs, and/or legislation, it is difficult to facilitate cooperation. While a framework is critical, sharing information and intelligence in the absence of an established level of trust, is problematic. In reference to the data presented in this study, 94% of police and 78% of prison respondents concurred that trust should be a priority.

ii. **Utilising external circumstances in reference to mutual urgency.** 92% of police and 78% of prison respondents made reference to eminent urgency and purpose (78% of prisons and 74% of police respondents) to enhance cooperation. Being confronted with an eminent threat affects change by creating a sense of urgency. In other words, urgency counters complacency and postpones action orientation. Therefore, with reference to data presented in this study, an increase in the realisation that sharing information/intelligence is critical - for immediate security or achievement of a mutual objective, for example, to prevent an attack or save lives. This realisation should assist in overcoming the apathy that may exist in one or both agencies.

Organisational and procedural initiatives

Considering that in-principal cooperation between law enforcement and corrections may exist in Member States – often based on ad hoc requests – integrating corrections as a full-fledged member within the criminal justice framework against violent extremism and terrorism requires

an understanding of what respective partners expect to receive from the cooperation. However, understanding the role and mandate of each party needs to be advanced by establishing and maintaining procedural and operational structures. To move forward in facilitating and strengthening cooperation between police and prisons the following actionable steps are being presented:

1. **Develop clear policy directives.** Considering the international framework and guidance (presented in Section 1), and recognising that each respective agency acknowledges the importance of sharing information, an alternative is to develop and implement an MoU to create and facilitate a strategic and cooperative partnership between police and prisons. Establishing and implementing policy directives is recognised as the most important step by prison authorities (93%), with the agreement of 86% of police respondents. In addition, this framework needs to make reference to the following initiatives so that momentum can be facilitated and maintained:

i. Need to **establish a central authority to coordinate cooperation** (89% of prison and 81% of police respondents).

ii. **Establish a clear line of communication** (as proposed by 92% of prison and 81% of police representatives).

iii. Nominate and task **dedicated commanding officers within both institutions with specific responsibilities** (85% of police and 68% of prisons respondents) to facilitate and maintain the process, while it needs to be supported by representatives in respective prisons and counterterrorism police units. Although not a prerequisite, 66% of police and 48% of prisons representatives make reference to the positive role personal relations can play, when founded on mutual respect and professionalism.

¹ Cook, Karen S., Russell Hardin, and Margaret Levi. Cooperation without trust? Russell Sage Foundation, 2005; Raymond, Leigh. "Cooperation without trust: Overcoming collective action barriers to endangered species protection." Policy Studies Journal 34, no. 1 (2006): 37-57; Xueting, Yan. "Strategic cooperation without mutual trust: a path forward for China and the United States." Asia Policy 15, no. 1 (2013): 4-6.

Counterintelligence

Considering the sensitive nature of classified information, and recognising that information sharing will not occur without specific steps to

safeguard unauthorised access and the integrity of information, the following inter-related steps were noted as areas of priority (by percentage indicated for respective agency):

- 1. Involve counterintelligence to ensure that necessary steps are taken to safeguard information** and officers are trained and monitored to prevent unsanctioned access to information: supported by 84% of police and 73% of prison representatives.
- 2. Vetting of both police and prison officials that will have access to classified information:** 83% of police and 73% of prison respondents.
- 3. Establishing a secure line of communication** between police and prison officials: 81% of police and 72% of prison respondents.
- 4. Conduct periodic security clearance of police and prison officials** to proactively identify officers that may present a security risk: 78% of police and 73% of prison respondents.
- 5. Regular polygraph tests to be conducted** in combination with security clearances: supported by 60% of prison and 56% of police respondents.

Capacity building

It is important to note that while individuals representing prisons place the emphasis on

organisational and procedural steps as presented above, police representatives focus on capacity building to facilitate and strengthen cooperation, with particular focus on:

- 1. Training on deradicalisation strategies:** supported by 95% of police and 81% of prison respondents.
- 2. Training on crime and prison intelligence:** 94% of police and 83% of prison respondents.
- 3. Training on radicalisation strategies, the process, vulnerabilities and signs** to facilitate proactive initiatives: 94% of police and 71% of prison respondents.
- 4. Training on initiatives to: introduce and strengthen cooperation, interact with agencies with different mandates and priorities, communication skills, interpersonal relations, etc.:** supported by 94% of police and 75% of prison respondents.

A recommendation, following the CTCoE/UNODC training workshop on *Strengthening Cooperation between Police and Prison Authorities in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism*, held 9 to 13 November 2020, encouraged participants to share training initiatives with a focus on strategic information and intelligence sharing. Recognising

constant changes in the threat of violent extremism and terrorism, as well as new developments in radicalisation and recruitment strategies into violent extremist organisations, discussing these developments will assist both intelligence and investigating officers, whilst also assisting the development of deradicalisation strategies.



Focus on the benefits of cooperation and partnership

Cooperation will further:

- 1. Boost staff morale and productivity in both agencies, by breaking down possible institutional and unfounded perceptions by correcting misinformation.** Consequently, perceptions of inferiority that often exist between organisations can be eliminated, even though this requires increased effort and time commitment.
- 2. Advance achieving common goals of police and prison agencies,** including enhancing public trust in the criminal justice system through crime reduction and implementation of tailored deradicalisation strategies, which will have a positive impact in preventing and countering violent extremism.

Establishing and maintaining a partnership

It is evident that both police and prison representatives express a positive attitude and indicate a need to establish and enhance the

partnership between the respective agencies. However, a difference between acknowledging the need and implementing requirements is identified. To achieve the objective, the following basic steps need to form the foundation:

- 1. Define goals;**
- 2. Specify the means by which goals are to be achieved;**
- 3. Identify and secure resources needed to implement means;**
- 4. Define procedures needed for effective implementation;**
- 5. Define tasks and assign responsibilities for accomplishing implementation.**

In summary, traditionally, the first step is to establish a committee that is tasked with developing the foundation upon which cooperation is built. To ensure long-lasting success it is essential to promote a constant and reoccurring revision and development of procedures and structures established, in response to changing circumstances and/or challenges.

Further, the agencies need to be creative and adaptable. For this reason, the study did not solely approach decision-makers or high-ranked officers in both institutions, but also included rank-and-file members and their view on cooperation and partnership for the following reasons:

- 1. Irrespective of policy and structures, the willingness to cooperate rests with individual officers.** For directives to be implemented and followed, it is critical that all members are convinced of its mutual benefit, in this case both command and operational officers.
- 2. Junior officers need to be encouraged to be creative in maintaining cooperation,** as it often comes down to a personal connection (within the accepted organisational framework).
- 3. Maintaining partnerships requires constant attention and the ability to monitor and adopt new approaches as required,** based on the situation on the 'ground' at any given time. It is therefore critical to enquire and focus on the experiences of those on the forefront of cooperation with the other.
- 4. Maintaining momentum remains a prominent challenge to any partnership,** as organigrams constantly evolve with officers transferred, while the environment in which the partnership exists changes equally.

Enhance understanding through research

Overcoming prevailing perceptions, identifying challenges and capitalising on opportunities is challenging if the extent of differing perceptions and challenges are not recognised. For this reason, the objective of this study is to enhance understanding of the expectations police and correctional agencies have regarding what cooperation should be in practice, and the benefits that each expect to gain.

Removing barriers that prevent the sharing of information between and within agencies, includes identifying and addressing challenges, which requires a separation between policy and the human factor. While the former requires an analysis and appreciation of the different mandates each have and the role that confidentiality of information plays, the second refers to an understandable reluctance to share

information and intelligence with individuals outside the organisation. Nonetheless, there is an equal inherent reluctance to share information within an organisation and members within the same unit. Recognising the operational necessity for related precautions, which are referred to as 'compartmentalisation' in intelligence circles, the same principle has led to serious intelligence failures in the past. A potential solution is to develop very specific and clear institutional and operational guidelines to facilitate cooperation between the different mandates and jurisdictions, including the setting in which it is operationalised and the purpose of sharing information and intelligence.

While recognising and understanding unique circumstances that vary from agency to agency and country to country, evidence-based research on contextual experiences may introduce new and tailored solutions.



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06. Recommendations to facilitate and enhance information sharing and cooperation

Cooperation between law enforcement and prison authorities in counterterrorism cases: Unravelling expectations and proposals to strengthen cooperation