

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME  
Vienna

Final Independent project evaluation of  
**Project Childhood – Protection Pillar**

XSPT 33  
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, Viet Nam

June 2014



UNITED NATIONS  
New York, 2014

This evaluation report was prepared by an evaluation team consisting of Ms. Asmita Naik. The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process of projects. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html>

The Independent Evaluation Unit of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime can be contacted at:

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  
Vienna International Centre  
P.O. Box 500  
1400 Vienna, Austria  
Telephone: (+43-1) 26060-0  
Email: [ieu@unodc.org](mailto:ieu@unodc.org)  
Website: [www.unodc.org](http://www.unodc.org)

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<b>ACRONYMS</b>	<b>DEFINITIONS</b>
AFP	Australian Federal Police
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development, used interchangeably with DFAT to refer to the same entity
CLP	Core Learning Partner
CSETT	Child Sexual Exploitation in Travel and Tourism
DFAT	Australian government Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade, used interchangeably with AusAID to refer to the same entity.
DFID	UK government Department for International Development
FANC	Foreign Anti-Narcotic and Crime Community
HE	His(Her) Excellency
HQ	Headquarters
IEU	Independent Evaluation Unit of UNODC
IFE	Independent Final Evaluation
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organisation
IPEC	International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MTR	Mid-term Review
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
PDR	People's Democratic Republic
PIDD	Project Implementation Design Document
QAI	Quality at Implementation reports
ROSEAP	Regional Office for South-East Asia and Pacific of UNODC
TOR	Terms of Reference
TOT	Training of Trainers
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WVA	World Vision Australia

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is a final independent project evaluation of UNODC Project Childhood – Protection Pillar (XSPT33), a USD\$ 4,012,200 initiative, implemented in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam by UNODC, in partnership with INTERPOL. The project is funded by the Australian government Department of Foreign Affairs and trade (DFAT) (USD\$ 3,962, 200) and the UK government Department for International Development (DFID) (USD\$ \$50, 000) and began with an inception phase from November 2010 to September 2011, followed by an implementation period ending in June 2014. It involves work with law enforcement agencies in the four project countries to protect children by strengthening law enforcement responses to the sexual abuse of children by travelling child sex offenders. The project forms part of a wider DFAT initiative on combating child sexual exploitation in travel and tourism (CSETT) which includes a Prevention Pillar implemented by World Vision Australia. UNODC’s Protection Pillar consists of four main outcomes:

Outcome 1 - Legislation: Legislative frameworks relevant to combating travelling child sex offenders and protecting victims are enhanced / improved

Outcome 2 – Training: Informed and capable front-line law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges

Outcome 3 – Cooperation: Enhanced cooperation between criminal justice agencies within and across borders with respect to combating travelling child sex offenders and protecting victims

Outcome 4 – Operations: Expert investigations carried out, offenders identified, investigated and (as appropriate) arrested and prosecuted, and child victims appropriately supported.

The evaluation covered the full inception and implementation period as stated above and was carried out in May 2014 by one evaluator assisted by several interpreters. It involved a field visit to all four project countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, Viet Nam) comprising of interviews and group meetings with all core project stakeholders (54 persons) namely, national counterparts, DFAT, INTERPOL, World Vision Australia and UNODC staff alongside a documentary review of over 100 documents (Annex III). The evaluation gathered qualitative data and also verified the process and method for the project’s quantitative data collection. Both sources are used in making this assessment of project performance.

This is an ambitious project which tackles a complex social problem in four countries; it aims for deep policy and institutional change within a restricted time frame and budget. There are important achievements from the two and a half year implementation period but as the project faced various constraints and challenges, there are unsatisfactory outcomes as well. The findings by evaluation criteria are as follows:

Design: the genesis of the project was a timely synergy in the growing interest of key stakeholders in these issues. The multi-faceted approach of the protection component was appropriate and aimed to tackle the issue from different and complementary angles - legal reform,

enhanced capacity and operational activities. Project stakeholders recognise that some shortcomings in project planning and design appear to have undermined optimal progress.

Relevance: the project is undoubtedly of high relevance. The situation analysis carried out at project inception shows the occurrence of CSETT in project countries and highlights a lack of capacity among national authorities for tackling this problem. The project's relevance could have been further enhanced had the project emphasised key aspects of the specific nature and pattern of offending in the sub-region to national stakeholders. Going forward, a more persuasive evidence base will be necessary to convince legislators and policy-makers on the need for action.

Effectiveness:

There is good progress on outcomes 1, 2 and 3. With regards to legal reform (outcome 1), the project could have done little more within the time available to advance matters given the inherent complexity in achieving change at this level. The executive authorities have accepted the need for revisions and are in the process of putting the issue before the legislatures in each country. The project has raised the awareness of core national counterparts and laid the ground work for future capacity building (Outcome 2). However, dissemination of training has not reached front-line officials in substantial numbers; 799 law enforcement officials participated in a pilot training; and the training of prosecutors and judges is just starting up. Nonetheless, foundations are in place for the project to disseminate and institutionalise capacity building on CSETT in project countries and beyond. The project has facilitated increased cooperation both within and between project countries (Outcome 3). National stakeholders welcome the establishment of the Regional Legal Research Group and express frustration that it has temporarily stalled due to external factors. The 1<sup>st</sup> Southeast Asia Working Party of the INTERPOL Specialists Group on Crimes against Children was held in Bangkok in March 2013 under the auspices of the project and proved a useful forum for national stakeholders to benefit from regional and international learning.

INTERPOL implemented outcome 4 under the oversight of UNODC with the aim of building the operational capacity of teams in identified hotspots in order to impact on investigations, arrests and prosecutions. Minimal and inadequate progress has been made given that USD\$ 634,838 was expended on this objective as of November 2013. Hot spots were identified but operational plans for building the capacity of law enforcement teams were not developed and implemented. Nevertheless, there remains widespread agreement about the importance of INTERPOL's role and institutional expertise on the operational side of CSETT.

DFAT's hope of having joint activities across both the Prevention and Protection Pillars was beset by challenges which impeded effective coordination. Still, there were recognised successes in cross-pillar work, namely the community policing activity in Thailand. Other cross-cutting objectives such as gender and human rights were well-integrated into project implementation, for example, through segregation of data collection according to gender, through reference to key human rights treaties, as well as stand-alone initiatives such as a training programme on gender issues. The project's partnerships and cooperation with national counterparts was strong and it also helped to build bridges within and between countries.

Sustainability: Sustainability is not yet assured. In relation to each outcome, the national authorities are not yet at a stage to continue this work without further technical support and funding. This is causing much concern among national counterparts. It is premature to expect sustainability at this stage.

Impact: The project has laid the basis for legal reform, institutionalising capacity building and improving coordination but its work is far from complete. There appears to be some individual

level impacts such as increased personal knowledge, awareness, and understanding. It is too early to talk of impact and lasting social change as a result of this project.

Efficiency: The pace of implementation is seen as slow, including by national counterparts in each country. Various external and internal factors have impeded the project. External factors include political instability and crisis; dependency on the pace of national authorities in taking action; and lack of human resource capacity in project countries which affected staff recruitment. Internal factors include unrealistic design; inadequate staffing structure; unclear working partnerships; strained relations between project signatories; and gaps in management capacity and strategic oversight. Factors which facilitated project implementation include, technical knowledge and dedication of project staff; harmonious operation of the project team; positive approach to building national ownership and engagement; and a comprehensive M&E system.

Overall, while the project faced numerous difficulties, these should not overshadow the tangible inroads made in changing the policy environment on CSETT within a short space of time. The project has suffered from overly high expectations, partly of its own creation, and partly arising from DFAT's independent priorities and interests which have, by default, led to a sense of disappointment. Putting aside the original design, plans and unrealistic hopes, the actual result of the project so far is an initiative that is half way through its natural life; the foundations have been laid for strengthening the legal system; and improving implementation of legal protections through enhanced capacity and coordination. A further period is required to embed these changes in national policy and action in order to see improvements in the handling of CSETT crimes.

Key learning for UNODC is around project design and management. Firstly, UNODC does not have the institutional capacity to manage sub-contracting relationships as shown by the problems in the agreement with INTERPOL. Secondly, UNODC project design and start-up/inception capacity requires improvement to ensure that commitments made to donors are realistic and workable. Thirdly, UNODC management structures and headquarters processes appear not to have supported the project well. For example, there was a need for more guidance on UNODC procedures as well as the handling of external partnerships.

Recommendations relate to the setting up of a future phase since the project is at an end. It is evident that the project requires a further phase as it is in mid-flow. A future phase will require a stronger evidence base on CSETT, as well as public awareness-raising activities, and collaboration with other organisations if the intended goal of changes in law and policy is to be achieved. Improvements in the knowledge, attitude and behaviour of professionals working in the criminal justice field will be aided by the further dissemination of the project's training products. Cooperation both internally and at the regional level is an ongoing necessity. Planning for a future phase should be premised on ensuring adequate staff capacity in project and grant management, as well as the establishment of a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system from the outset. Further explanation of the recommendations is given in the 'Recommendations' section at the end of the report.

# SUMMARY MATRIX OF FINDINGS, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings <sup>1</sup>	Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)	Recommendations to UNODC <sup>2</sup>
<b>Key recommendations</b>		
Initiative is in mid-flow and ending it now would be premature	Based on interviews with national stakeholders, project outcomes have not reached fruition – ground work laid for legislative reform, capacity building and cooperation but not yet complete.	1. Continue the project for a further phase as part of UNODC's regional strategy and with a clearer and more refined focus on the combating of child sex offences.
Nature and pattern of CSETT in the region needs to be further understood and evidenced.	Based on interviews with national stakeholders who still appear to have a limited understanding of the problem and/or call for more evidence to help them persuade policy-makers.	2. Strengthen the evidence base on CSETT to better understand the nature, pattern and prevalence of the phenomenon by carrying out further research studies.
Training programme is not yet institutionalised or rolled out to substantial numbers of law enforcement officers.	Project data shows numbers reached and interviews with national stakeholders confirm institutionalisation requires further steps.	3. Institutionalise, disseminate and diversify training for relevant professionals based on the existing project curricula.
Regional legal research group is a useful forum for learning and sharing between countries as they work on legislative reform. However, there is a need to ensure that such a forum leads to practical results and that	Interviews with national stakeholders who participate in this forum.	4. Support the continuation of the regional legal research group as a way of facilitating learning and exchange between project countries on legal reform.

<sup>1</sup> A finding uses evidence from data collection to allow for a factual statement.

<sup>2</sup> Recommendations are proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a project/programme; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. For accuracy and credibility, recommendations should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions.

national authorities take increasing responsibility for it.		
The project has a comprehensive M&E system but it was developed too late in the project to help measure progress from the start or to guide key project decisions. In addition, the system could be developed further in the next phase.	Project documents.	5. Plan the monitoring and evaluation system in advance to ensure that it is operational and able to measure project effectiveness and impacts from the outset.
The project did not carry out public awareness-raising in this phase as this aspect came under the work of the Prevention Pillar. This is an important dimension in a future phase.	Project documents	6. Carry out public awareness-raising activities through media campaigns and other activities led by law enforcement agencies.
The project cooperated with other agencies working on child sexual abuse but perhaps not to the extent possible, probably because this component came under the Prevention Pillar. This is an important dimension for future work.	Project documents	7. Increase collaboration with other organisations working in CSETT in order to benefit from the longstanding work of more specialist organisations and so that UNODC can bring its own unique expertise to addressing the issue.
The project's performance was influenced by UNODC's internal capacity to design and manage projects and grants.	Project documents and interviews	8. Improve staff capacity in project and grant management through current restructuring efforts and by increasing internal training opportunities.
<b>Important recommendations</b>		
There are no lower category recommendations. As a final evaluation, all recommendations are intended to give suggestions for future direction.		

# I. INTRODUCTION

## Background and context

The tourism sector has played an important role in the economic development and growth of many countries in the Greater Mekong Sub-region. However, the economic growth arising from tourism has not always translated into better opportunities for children who live in tourism areas. Children found in these areas, for example, children employed in entertainment establishments, children living or working on the street – are at greater risk of being exploited. Unfortunately, the economic and social issues in the sub-region have created an environment ripe for ‘sex-tourism’ and among this, of heightened concern, ‘child sexual exploitation in tourism and travel’ (CSETT). The four project countries face a common challenge; they are exposed to this problem in different ways and to different degrees but all lack the resources and know-how to tackle it effectively.

The scale of the challenge is shown by basic socio-economic indicators which highlight the size of the population in each country and the corresponding low level of national resource as well as the complexity and difference in the legal and political systems:

- Population size<sup>3</sup>: 177 million total in all four project countries (Cambodia – 15 million; Lao PDR – 7 million; Thailand – 65 million; Viet Nam – 90 million);
- GDP per capita<sup>4</sup>: US\$6000/year average across all four project countries (Cambodia – US\$ 3000; Lao PDR – US \$ 3000; Thailand – US\$ 14,000; Viet Nam – US\$ 4000);
- Political and legal systems. Cambodia and Thailand are constitutional monarchies. Lao PDR and Vietnam are republics. All four countries follow a civil law system but each has its unique elements.

Project Childhood was designed as two separate but inter-related ‘Pillars’ – namely the Prevention Pillar and the Protection Pillar to address the problem of CSETT. World Vision was selected by Australian authorities to implement the Prevention Pillar - and UNODC, in partnership with INTERPOL, was selected to implement the Protection Pillar. Funding agreements were signed with UNODC on (10 June 2010) with a total budget of AUD\$4 million and with World Vision on (15 January 2011) with a total budget of AUD\$3 million.

World Vision has been working with Governments of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam (Ministries of Tourism) and communities in these countries (to prevent children from becoming victims of sexual exploitation in tourism by raising awareness and building community resilience). Through the use of public campaigns, training and telephone hotlines it is expected that participating governments, communities, and tourism industries will become more aware of

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<sup>3</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_population](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population)

<sup>4</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_GDP\\_\(PPP\)\\_per\\_capita](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita)

the vulnerabilities of at-risk children to sexual exploitation in tourism and to take more effective preventative measures.

UNODC, in partnership with INTERPOL, has been working with law enforcement agencies in the four project countries (Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of Justice, Ministries of Public Security, Ministries of Interior, Royal Thai Police, Thailand Courts of Justice, Prosecutor Offices, and Judiciaries) to protect children through strengthening law enforcement responses to sexual abuse of children by travelling child sex offenders. The Protection Pillar consists of four main components and expected outcomes:

- Component 1 - Legislation: Outcome - Legislative frameworks relevant to combating travelling child sex offenders and protecting victims are enhanced / improved
- Component 2 – Training: Outcome - Informed and capable front-line law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges
- Component 3 – Cooperation: Outcome - Enhanced cooperation between criminal justice agencies within and across borders with respect to combating travelling child sex offenders and protecting victims
- Component 4 – Operations: Outcome - Expert investigations carried out, offenders identified, investigated and (as appropriate) arrested and prosecuted, and child victims appropriately supported.

The Protection Pillar underwent a six month inception phase from November 2010 to April 2011, and in May 2011 a draft Project Implementation Design Document (PIDD) was submitted to AusAID (now Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade-DFAT). The PIDD incorporated detailed activities that had been undertaken during the inception phase to inform year 1 operations. The PIDD was subject to an independent review and the findings highlighted areas requiring further improvement and clarification before DFAT approval. These included the hiring of technical specialists to undertake a period of further research focusing on gender issues, institutional capacity building and legal analysis. The PIDD was finalized in September 2011; the Protection Pillar received approval of the PIDD from DFAT in December 2011 and began implementation of approved activities in January 2012. Table 1 below shows the disbursement history of UNODC and INTERPOL.

**Table 1 Disbursement history**

<b>UNODC</b>			
Overall Budget USD (June 2010 – June 2014)	Total Approved Budget (June 2010 – June 2014)	Expenditure in USD (Aug 2010 – Dec 2013)	Expenditure in % (Aug 2010 – Dec 2013)
US\$ 3,683,000*	US\$ 4,012,200	US\$3,591,894	90%

\*(2010 AUD\$-USD\$ currency exchange rates)

<b>INTERPOL</b>			
Overall Budget USD (June 2011 – June 2014)	Total Approved Budget (June 2010 – Dec 2013)	Expenditure in USD (June 2010 – Nov 2013)	Expenditure in % (June 2010 – Nov 2013)
US\$ 1,000,000	US\$ 767, 136**	US\$ 634,838	83%

\*\* (Included in UNODC's Total approved Budget)

## Purpose of evaluation

The final independent project evaluation was required by UNODC rules and regulations, and also the funding agreement with the Australian Government. It is intended to support learning about what has worked well and what has not, and will help inform UNODC and its partners about what, if anything, might be usefully done in the future to continue to build the capacity of law enforcement agencies in the sub-region to help protect children from sexual abuse, including from travelling child sex offenders. The evaluation is thus both summative and formative, and provides findings and recommendations on the scope of any possible future support that UNODC and/or other development partners might usefully provide. The evaluation also supports accountability and transparency objectives. Particularly, the evaluation independently assesses:

- The quality of the original design, its relevance to the identified needs of partner countries, and its continued relevance during project implementation;
- The efficiency of project implementation, including with respect to both UNODC, INTERPOL and partner government mobilisation and management of resources;
- The effectiveness of the project in terms of achieving its planned objectives, including outputs delivered and contribution to outcomes;
- The likely overall impact of the project and the sustainability of benefits arising from the project;
- Whether or not there were unanticipated results, either positive or negative, arising from project implementation; and
- Opportunities for future support by UNODC and/or other development partners, including possible focus of a follow-up phase of support.

The evaluation also specifically addresses gender equality and human rights issues relevant to the project. The main evaluation users include UNODC Project Managers in the Field and HQ, INTERPOL, the beneficiary Governments (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam) and the donor (Australian Government). The evaluation TOR listed the questions to be addressed (see annex I). The evaluator reviewed these during the inception phase and maintained them as part of the evaluation framework with the explicit caveat that it would not be possible to address all the questions, nor to address them in equal depth (see inception report for more details). This was in part due to time constraints since it was not feasible within the hour or so available for each evaluation meeting to cover all the issues listed. Also, as an independent evaluation, it was necessary to maintain an open approach which allowed issues to arise organically, rather than to be overly prescriptive.

The TOR required the evaluation to be carried out by one expert evaluator. The evaluator was not to act as a representative of any party and to remain independent and impartial. The evaluator was not to have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the project under evaluation.

## Evaluation methodology

The evaluation took a qualitative approach in order to facilitate a deep and rounded insight into the functioning of the programme. The evaluation did not collect new quantitative data or do a statistical analysis but used qualitative and quantitative data collected by the project itself (e.g. pre and post training questionnaires and KAP surveys) after verifying the process and method. The evaluation primarily draws on its own original data in reporting and in arriving at conclusions. Other internal and external analyses of project performance (i.e. independent mid-term evaluation and project progress reports) are used to cross-check the evaluation's own findings.

As a final independent evaluation, it aims to give an overall strategic analysis of project performance taking into account actual implementation, constraints and opportunities. This process is distinct from the project's internal monitoring. The evaluation is not bound by the project's own log frame, indicators and data when making an assessment and descriptive details of project outputs and activities are not recounted at length. The findings are analysed and presented in line with UNODC's standard evaluation template; although this does not always help the narrative flow and leads to some unavoidable repetition<sup>5</sup>. The evaluation does not carry out a quality assurance of specific project products e.g. training manuals, legal analyses as this would require additional time and a specific methodology and assessment matrix. Instead any conclusions on 'quality' are based on the perceptions on interviewees. The evaluation also assesses its findings against a rating table used by the donor to facilitate comparisons with previous reporting (Annex V).

The evaluation triangulated its findings by drawing on several different sources as well as types of information. This approach offered various opportunities for triangulation; by comparing information from the same type of source (e.g. independent mid-term evaluation with project progress reports or counterparts between different countries); or between sources (e.g. confirming project reports of progress with national stakeholder interviews). All findings were confirmed but in order to safeguard confidentiality, sources are not attributed but referred to in general terms.

The project itself was responsible for selecting evaluation contributors as the evaluator was not involved in the preparatory stages. There was no sampling as the evaluation invited all project stakeholders to contribute i.e. 46 core learning partners (CLP) in each of the four countries; UNODC; project counterparts – INTERPOL and WVA; and DFAT. The schedule was already near final by the time the evaluator came on board but there was an opportunity to review and comment on any essential changes.

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<sup>5</sup> It was also not possible to keep to the size limits set out in the IEU guidelines; the report was around 30 pages long as stipulated but became longer when inserted in the template; it was also not possible to keep annexes to 15 pages since the TOR alone was longer than that.

The main elements of method included:

- Preliminary **desk review** of all relevant project documentation,(annex III) as provided by UNODC and also independently accessed by the evaluator (e.g. from the web or through other professional contacts/sources)
- **Ongoing email and phone communication** with stakeholders as required, including with respect to organizing and confirming all field work arrangements, meetings, etc with UNODC
- **Field work plan/evaluation methodology/evaluation instruments** in the form of an inception report was prepared and submitted to IEU for clearance in line with the Guidelines for Inception Report prior to the commencement of field work.
- **An initial set of meetings and interviews** with the project management team and other UNODC staff at the Regional Office in Bangkok.
- **Face to face interviews** with key project stakeholders and beneficiaries in each of the four participating countries, both individually and (as appropriate) in small groups. Some contributors were consulted by skype/phone or by email questionnaire.
- **Observation of activity and inspection of relevant administrative records** as appropriate
- **Process tracing** – a research approach based on process tracing, a qualitative research approach used in case study research to investigate causal inference, was used in relation to outcome 1 to assess attribution and compare UNODC’s contribution to legal reform vs. other factors.
- **Outcome mapping** - this methodology was used to understand the social change aimed for by this project by considering the theory of change and collecting data on changes in order to assess the initiative’s contribution to results.
- **Case studies** – field visit to all four project countries involved understanding and comparing progress in each country in order to arrive at general conclusions and observations.
- **Ongoing review of relevant project documents** during the course of and after the evaluation visit. Over a 100 documents provided to the evaluator.
- Preparation of an **Aide Memoire and Presentation of preliminary evaluation findings** at a meeting with the UNODC regional office and facilitation of discussions to help confirm validity of these findings as well as the identification of possible practical recommendations for follow-up
- **Full analysis of data collected**
- **Draft evaluation report** based on IEU Guidelines for Evaluation Report and Template submitted to the project manager for review of factual errors or omissions;
- **Final evaluation report prepared** following feedback from UNODC.

In conducting the evaluation, the evaluator took account of the UNODC Evaluation Norms and Standards. As an independent evaluation, the project and evaluator placed particular emphasis on safeguarding the impartiality of the process, for instance, confidentiality and non-attribution of

individual contributions, ensuring project staff were not involved in evaluation meetings or in managing translations; and ensuring the evaluator was assisted by an external interpreter.

### *Evaluation instruments*

The evaluator used two semi-structured data collection tools (Annex II) (questionnaire 1 for key informants and questionnaire 2 for national level beneficiaries) which were adapted to different interviews and groups discussions. The key questions remained similar across all stakeholders to ensure consistency in questioning with the aim of fostering reliability in evaluation findings. The questions were couched in a broad and open way with flexibility built-in to follow-up with specific questions. The responses then matched up in analysis to the evaluation issues raised by the evaluation TOR. The aim was to ask questions in a user-friendly way without ‘leading’ interviewees to specific responses. The evaluation instruments were translated and shared in advance with respondents to help them prepare. Most national stakeholders were well prepared having considered the questions in advance and prepared written responses.

### *Evaluation limitations*

The evaluation faced a number of constraints. Inevitably, as in most real world development evaluations, time, resource and language imposed certain limitations on the degree of scientific rigour that could be pursued in carrying out the evaluation exercise. Nonetheless, such evaluations can still produce credible assessments of use in understanding past performance and planning for the future. As noted earlier, the expectations of how much the evaluation could cover needed to be adjusted to allow sufficient freedom to focus on emerging issues on the ground.

One particular consideration was the need to safeguard the impartiality and independence the evaluation judgement in the face of the extensive previous internal and external reviews. In particular, the implementing agencies disputed a number of findings of the MTR commissioned by DFAT. The final evaluation was cognisant of issues that had already been raised but kept an open mind by pursuing an open line of questioning (Annex II). The role of the final evaluation is not to validate or build on previous findings but nonetheless a reasoned explanation is always given in cases where the final evaluation arrives at a different conclusion from the MTR.

Other constraints include delays in hiring the evaluator, with the official contract issued many weeks after work had started. The evaluation was under-budgeted for an expert independent evaluation. There were insufficient days and overall time frame for analysis, report writing and reflection. The evaluator dealt with this by working extensively after-hours during and after the field visit but merging the research and analytical processes to such a degree was not helpful. Given time constraints, it was necessary to be selective in reviewing the 100+ documents that were provided; and to reduce time spent on editing and refining the report.

## II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

### Design

The genesis of the project was a timely synergy between the growing interest of key stakeholders in these issues. The idea of the project was initially suggested by INTERPOL to UNODC following the case of a high profile foreign sex offender and in fact the first version of the proposal was developed by INTERPOL. The suggestion came to the attention of UNODC ROSEAP which took over the drafting of a proposal which included the development of law and policy, capacity building of law enforcement officials as well as hands-on operational work (to be managed by INTERPOL).

Concurrently, AusAID commissioned an NGO called Childwise in 2009 to undertake research on this subject with a view to supporting work in this area, especially from the perspective of apprehending Australian sex offenders. AusAID was interested in a holistic programme which covered different dimensions of the problem and opted for a two pillar approach to address both the protection and prevention side. UNODC/INTERPOL were asked to work on the Protection Pillar and the prevention side was put out to tender which was won by World Vision Australia. The title 'project childhood' came from UNODC/INTERPOL's proposal and was used to embrace the whole initiative. The project countries attended a UNODC partnership forum in January 2010 and signalled their interest in the initiative, although participants who attended were not necessarily those who were subsequently involved.

The whole initiative including UNODC/INTERPOL's proposal underwent an AusAID peer and independent review process which according to the MTR identified the following concerns: (1) the project is inherently subject-specific contained under the canopy of child protection, and under the umbrella of child trafficking, while conflating the two; (2) although there are regional elements in the Protection Pillar, the project is not a regional program, but is a multi-country project that focuses only on some of the Mekong sub-region countries; (3) the design over-emphasizes cross-border approaches for the Protection Pillar rather than an emphasis on an in-country focus; (4) the design is actually two stand-alone projects with limited conceptual links between the two; (5) one organization cannot implement the two Pillars (because advocacy in the Prevention Pillar is considered to be a 'soft' approach to child protection while law enforcement in the Protection Pillar is considered to be a 'hard' approach, and hence two organizations are implementing the Project; (6) there are two discrete performance assessment log frames with no collective performance criteria; and (7) there is limited focus on the travel and tourism sector, focusing primarily on the child in the Prevention Pillar and the law in the Protection Pillar.

The proposal was reworked through the inception phase and some of the concerns above addressed:

- Conceptual focus of the project (point (1) above) was placed on child sexual abuse and exploitation rather than just CSETT and a distinction made with trafficking (see section on 'Relevance' below)

- Regional/national balance (points (2) and (3) above) was better secured in practice with a strong focus on in-country work in outcomes 1, 2, 4 and outcome 3 covering both in-country and regional perspectives.
- Overall DFAT structure of 2 pillars (points (4) to (7) above) was not something UNODC could address alone. This continued to be a fault-line in the DFAT ‘programme’ as is discussed under ‘Effectiveness – Cross-pillar’ section below.

The overall design of the protection component was multi-faceted and rightly looked at tackling the issue from different and complementary angles, legal reform, implementation through enhanced capacity as well as operational activities. But the design was premised on unrealistic expectations which did not take adequate account of the scale of the challenge; the population size of each country; the low levels of economic development and the complexity of the legal and political systems. The wording of the log frame set up outcome indicators that were not achievable within the envisaged time frame – this wording was adjusted to the extent possible when the M&E specialist came on board in 2012. The proposed inception period (variously mentioned as 3 or 6 months in the project document) was not long enough to establish operational capacity, to develop partnerships with governments, or to complete the list of tasks required by the donor. The staffing structure was insufficient to meet the needs of the project (see discussion under ‘Efficiency’ below). In relation to outcome 4, operational component, the capacity of INTERPOL to deliver and of UNODC to supervise was not identified by any side and led to considerable problems in implementation (see ‘Effectiveness – Outcome 4’ below).

## Relevance

***Relevance** of a project or programme is the extent to which its objectives are consistent with recipient needs, as well as UNODC mandates and overarching strategies and policies. [Evaluation TOR]*

The project is undoubtedly of high relevance. The situation analysis carried out at project inception shows the prevalence of CSETT in the project countries and highlights a lack of capacity among national authorities responsible for tackling this problem. The Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) surveys carried out by the project and administered to 392 police officers in 2013 confirm low levels of understanding among front-line officers as some survey respondents agreed with statements which said that ‘naughty’ children can be subjected to abuse, or that it is acceptable to have sex with a child if the family and/or child consents. National counterparts confirm the relevance of the project to their contexts given the occurrence of CSETT and the alignment with national policies and commitments.

Strong buy-in from national counterparts is in evidence; seen by their willingness to engage, take initiatives and make in-kind contributions to project activities. UNODC brought added value through its legal expertise and relationship with justice and law enforcement agencies. Many other organisations work on the issue of child sexual exploitation but UNODC used its leverage to mobilise a wider cross-section of government agencies, to make unique legal recommendations, for instance on sentencing guidelines, child pornography, internet crimes etc. and to add its weight to others making recommendations on international standards, for instance, on defining the age of a child in national legislation.

Counterparts welcome the spotlighting of an issue which is often overshadowed by the attention given to trafficking in the region. For instance, in Cambodia and Thailand the work falls under anti-trafficking laws and/or structures. While there may be some overlap in cases where child

victims of trafficking suffer abuse, the numbers of children who are sexually abused and have not been trafficked are likely much higher. Emphasising the ‘trafficking’ element may risk crimes against non-trafficked children going unrecognised. Where possible, it is worth maintaining a separation between the issues or at the very least a conceptual distinction in places where both issues come under the same structures for pragmatic reasons. The MTR’s suggestion that CSETT should be situated under existing trafficking frameworks would not be helpful to this issue.

Although the problem is well-recognised, some aspects of the nature of the phenomenon among national counterparts are not fully appreciated, even at project end. Senior interviewees actively involved in the project still tend to identify the perpetrators as western male sex offenders. This misses the bulk of travelling offences which according to the project’s situation analysis occurs at the hands of situational offenders from neighbouring Asian countries or from other parts of the same country. This stereotype is also reinforced by the records of cases kept by INTERPOL which involve Western offenders, most likely because their own governments are investing in tracking them down. The KAP survey asks whether abusers are mainly foreigners or local but does not disaggregate by place of origin.

The Project Implementation and Design Document (PIDD) noted the sensitivities around these issues among national counterparts in acknowledging local and regional offenders. This was also confirmed by interviews with UNODC staff and international experts. Plus there was the conceptual issue of artificially segregating CSETT from other forms of CSE<sup>6</sup>. The project therefore tried a more holistic approach focusing on child sexual abuse in general and with regards to CSETT specifically, it intended to move from an initial focus on preferential to situational offenders as the project went on. It is not evident that this happened in practice. The project’s relevance would have been enhanced further if its awareness-raising and training activities made a point of driving home the true nature of the problem facing the region.

The project’s situation analysis provided a sound starting point but there is a need to deepen the understanding of the nature and pattern of offending by people from the region, to ensure that ‘Western’ concepts are not inappropriately transplanted into this context. Anecdotal information, for example, suggests that Asian offenders are less likely to use grooming as a technique or the emergence of new places of origin of offenders which are not mentioned in the situation analysis. The MTR, like this final evaluation, found interviewees emphasising their learning about internet-related crimes, and while these may be emerging issues, it is worth considering whether they should take greater prominence in awareness-raising over the more commonplace forms of abuse occurring in the region.

The project’s situation analysis was not published but a more persuasive evidence base will be necessary to convince legislators and policy-makers to amend legislation and to ensure sufficient resources are available to implement the law going forward. For instance, some legislators have already questioned the ‘harmfulness’ of child pornography leading to suggestions from national stakeholders about the need for more visible campaigns and lobbying, for instance, highlighting the abuse behind the images, including of children from the region. In other countries, national stakeholders also stressed the need for a solid evidence base.

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<sup>6</sup> The evaluation report notes this distinction but uses the terminology CSETT throughout the report for ease of reference.

The DFAT QAI reports refer to the lack of research and understanding of CSETT in the region on a number of occasions and call for more statistical back-up. The project sees this as a ‘hidden’ problem which cannot easily be quantified. There is a similar challenge in documenting many such social phenomenon; in the case of CSETT, it is partly ‘hidden’ but also partly visible but not seen or identified as a problem by local law enforcement. In any case, the project will need to grapple with the challenge of producing credible research in order to push this issue forward despite sensitivities at government level. The Prevention Pillar has commissioned research exploring certain angles of the problem, for instance, the perspective of regular tourists<sup>7</sup>. UNODC produced some unpublished research on the issue, for instance, an analysis of media reports, or cases of child sex offenders.

In terms of UNODC itself, the project was always relevant to its work in the region and also in keeping with UNODC’s global strategy, such as the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice resolution 16/2. The issue is now more deeply embedded in the new regional strategy 2014-17 under a specific component on ‘Combating child sex offences’. The component now so defined brings a sharper focus and a better fit to UNODC’s mandate rather than a wider notion of ‘childhood’ which could be seen as covering a multitude of issues which other more specialist organisations like UNICEF are better placed to address. The redrawn concept is the result of an internal process leading to the development of the current regional strategy and better emphasises the added value that UNODC can bring to this field through its access to government officials dealing with justice and law enforcement – a unique contribution that few other organisations are able to make.

The project aligns with the donor, DFAT’s commitment to promoting human rights and child protection. It also complements the investigative efforts of the Australian Federal Police in child sexual exploitation cases committed by Australian nationals and resonates with the concerns of the Australian tax-paying public which finds this crime morally repugnant. However, the project is unlikely to benefit from further Australian funding as it no longer fits under DFAT’s current regional strategy which is consolidating support to programmes on trafficking and safe migration and is unlikely therefore to benefit from future funding.

## Effectiveness

*Effectiveness is the extent to which a project or programme achieves its planned outcomes.  
[Evaluation TOR]*

### (i) Outcome 1

The project has made sound progress and could have done little more within the time frame available to advance legal reform further. UNODC produced a legal analysis of the legislative gaps and provisions in the four project countries and facilitated discussions within government on the recommended changes. The executive authorities have accepted the need for legal amendments and are now in the process of putting the issue before the legislatures in each country.

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<sup>7</sup> ‘Child safe tourism; the tourist perspective’, 2012, World Vision Australia, <http://www.wvi.org/asia-pacific/publication/child-safe-tourism-tourist-perspective>

In Viet Nam and Lao PDR, the proposals have undergone thorough review by various ministries. In Viet Nam, this was backed up by a government survey to confirm the existence of the problem. Both countries are now ready to start drafting legal amendments/instruments. In Viet Nam, the intervention is timely as it coincides with the revision of the penal code. In Lao PDR, new legislation is on hold until 2016 and an executive order is being considered as an interim measure.

In one country, the matter has already come up before the legislature but discussions are stalled partly because of the political crisis but also because the project needs to make a stronger case to legislators about the need for legal reform. Officials are considering alternative strategies, for instance, creating specific legislation (as compared to amending the penal code) will face less resistance but will be less easily implementable since it will be less well known. In Cambodia, UNODC has supported the adoption of two proclamations (defining the responsibilities of tourism and interior ministries; and the functioning of adult entertainment centres) through financial support and facilitation, alongside other actors such as World Vision. This contribution was recognised by various interviewees though notably, some key national counterparts were unaware of or did not acknowledge the significance of UNODC's advisory work on these and other legal amendments.

Irrespective of the differing political systems and balance of power between the executive and legislature in project countries, legal reform is a long and complex process anywhere in the world and may realistically take years (**see annex VI which looks at the process in Viet Nam and the various contributing factors involved in achieving reform**). From the perspective of an international development project such as this, it is a considerable achievement to have persuaded national authorities to consider its proposals and to have set up national structures for doing so.

UNODC's standing with governments, its access to officials and expertise in working on norms and standards have helped this process. UNODC was skilful in identifying entry points and government partners. Participants for events were chosen with care; interviewees commented on the good blend of expertise as well as high-ranking officials at meetings which resulted in rich discussions, not just about what to amend but the optimal strategy for doing so. UNODC's representations to legislators in one country were seen as credible and giving weight to points being made by national advocates.

Part of the time taken to progress this objective is due to the project approach of building ownership. The legal analyses, for example, were signed off by the government in each country after long periods of consultation to and from UNODC and different government agencies. For instance, UNODC prepared a paper on legal provisions on 'grooming' in several western countries in response to a request from the Thai government for more clarifications.

The project's efforts to build ownership were mostly well-received and the participatory way of working from the start through the identification of needs was appreciated. Although some national stakeholders said they were waiting for UNODC to take action and did not always feel supported as they did not have plans themselves. This suggests that it is not always easy to find the right balance, and know when it is better to intervene to push things forward or to stand back and let national stakeholders take the lead. The progress of this outcome is also now linked to outcome 3 since the revision of legal provisions is to be discussed jointly in the regional legal research group (see outcome 3 below) and has suffered some delays.

The legal analysis gives a full analysis of the gaps in national legislation as compared to international standards. Other agencies like UNICEF also work on the area of legal reform but national stakeholders in all countries say that UNODC has made a distinct contribution through its recommendations on child pornography, grooming, sentencing guidelines and so on. As the MTR points out, a detailed explanation of specific child sex tourism laws as adopted by Australia and New Zealand is not included. The MTR also notes the challenge ahead in crafting balanced legislation which does not undermine the rights of young people. As interviewees also express an interest in knowing how countries with more developed child protection systems are dealing with these issues, the next stage should involve a consideration of both good and bad international practice. The MTR also suggests that the discussion of extradition/mutual legal assistance treaties is redundant but from the point of view of the final evaluation, it seems worth putting these issues before the national authorities for them to decide for themselves.

## *(ii) Outcome 2*

The project has raised the awareness of core national counterparts and laid the ground work for future capacity building but dissemination of training has not yet reached front-line law enforcement officials in substantial numbers or extended to prosecutors and judges. The project reached the following number of beneficiaries:

- The 3 to 5 day police training curriculum was delivered in a Training of Trainers (ToT) session to 44 officers in July 2013 and then subsequently contextualised in each country and piloted at 12 training events by 22 police trainers to 799 police officers in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam.
- 1 day programme on gender issues developed on the request of the Cambodian authorities and delivered to 99 trainees in 2013 (and further rolled out to 64 trainees without UNODC support)
- Course on computer facilitated crime by the International Centre for Missing and Exploited Children (ICMEC) delivered to 32 police officers from Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam and 28 prosecutors and judges from Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam.
- In total, the project organised 101 workshops and events of different types involving 4047 participants, although it is not known how many of this number are unique participants.

The project's training activities resulted in the increased capacity of participants. Evaluation interviewees say they know more about investigative techniques such as gathering digital evidence, the issue itself (how grooming works), international standards (e.g. differing views on corporal punishment) and practice in other countries. Some drew inspiration from being involved in the process and solidarity from knowing they had the backing of an international organisation.

This finding is backed up by the project's own pre and post training questionnaires which show that trainees in the pilot police trainings mostly demonstrate a clear positive learning gain - a very small number did not and a few scored lower in the post than in the pre test. There is considerable

variability in the average percentage learning gain by course and by country<sup>8</sup> and it is for the project to explore what the reasons for this might be e.g. the calibre of the participants, the quality of the training, the content not being pitched at the right level, too much material for the participants to absorb etc. The project has not tracked change in behaviour and attitudinal change as yet.

The main issue is whether the project might have been more effective in the sense of training greater numbers of front-line officials if it had taken a different approach. The project decided to develop a substantial curriculum based on a highly participatory approach by national counterparts. The rationale was to develop something long-lasting and in-depth rather than the typical ad hoc and superficial trainings that had taken place before. This process inevitably took time as Police Technical Working Groups were set up in each country to advise at every stage; the process took from October 2011 with the training needs assessment; followed by the curriculum development; ToT in July 2013; contextualisation in each country from March 2013; and piloting from April 2013 (Thailand only) and then from August 2013. After piloting, the emphasis continues on institutionalising this in national pre and in-service training provided by police academies (see 'Sustainability' section). There was no plan or obligation for ToT trainers to carry out further trainings, for instance in the work place, though some chose to do so, for instance one of the Thai trainers. The diversion of funds from outcome 4 may lead to such follow-up. The project intended to develop curricular for prosecutors and judges as well but it was not possible to make much headway on this; some national stakeholders said it would have been more effective to run the training of all these groups in tandem.

Building ownership was a positive aspect but as pointed out under outcome 1, the project might reflect on how this was done, whether it could have speeded things along in any way, for instance by taking on more responsibility for contextualising the text since UNODC already had much of the necessary information through previous consultations with the working groups, the situation and legal analyses etc, although it is acknowledged that national officers were involved in this aspect. Also the gender manual prepared for the Cambodian police (at their request) seems to enjoy considerable ownership from the authorities without a long consultative process of development.

Another possible way of saving time was to build more on existing training materials, such as those listed in the training assessment bibliography, rather than embarking on a new package. The MTR was critical of the project for duplicating previous work on police training on CSE and child-friendly investigation techniques by UNICEF Viet Nam. The Vietnamese government initially wanted the curriculum combined with UNICEF's curriculum. A parallel training was carried out in Lao PDR by UNICEF also. The contents appear similar but UNODC's modules go more into investigative techniques, such as securing crime scenes. The MTR also questioned the production of a generic regional module as being of little use at country level. However, a centralised training template adaptable to different contexts is necessary in order to ensure standardisation as well as efficiency, both in terms of cost and time. The modules have now been modified for use in each country by national stakeholders.

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<sup>8</sup> For instance, 15% increase in Viet Nam, compared to as much as 104% increase in a course in Lao. The results for improved knowledge among trainee trainers attending the ToT is more similar but appears relatively low, ranging from 35% in Thailand to 25% in Lao.

The question is whether the decision to go for a specialised detailed curricular spread over multiple days was the right one. The level of awareness among law enforcement officials was and still is very low - officers cannot even identify the problem, let alone know how to investigate it. An in-depth curricular appears to go beyond this level of need. Nor does it fit with the likely time availability - as the MTR points out, time and resources available for national police training are very constrained; the evaluation learnt that there may only be a couple of hours spare for specialised training in some place. The project, in its response to the MTR, says that such courses typically last far longer and cites examples from several developed countries but this doesn't take account of the resource availability in low-income countries for longer courses.

The project received positive feedback on its training from trainers and trainees. Responses also indicate that the curricular is too long even for 3-5 day training programmes. Some evaluation interviewees said the curricular wasn't so easy to adapt, even for people who have been on the ToT. The police technical working groups in some places have made the curricular shorter, more practically oriented, and less theoretical. The curricular is designed to be broken up and used as separate modules but the project may need to do more to show how this can be done in practice. Also bearing in mind that in a ToT model, understanding of how the modules work would diffuse as training cascades down the chain.

The establishment of a substantial formal curricular took longer at each stage – in consultation, development, writing, reviewing, translation, contextualisation and delivery. The project approach was based on a training needs assessment endorsed by all four countries and overseen by the working groups which included members of police academies. However, there were other considerations to take into account as well, including actual knowledge levels, the obligation of the project to deliver within set timescales, external constraints, dependency on national counterparts etc. The MTR's idea about the development of CSETT training elements that could more easily be integrated into existing training on child protection, gender-based violence etc. is a sensible suggestion but appears rejected by the project in its response to that review.

In retrospect, the project might have considered a twin track approach, a starter package – something short, self-contained, self-explanatory and versatile - while working on a more in-depth curricular as a follow-up. A lighter touch 'guide' capable of delivering key messages in a short time frame would have tackled basic awareness; been useful for different outlets such as formal pre-service and in-service police training, as well as ad hoc seminars and meetings; been amenable to different providers such as civil society groups; and have been ready more quickly, since existing manuals would have been sufficient.

It's worth noting that the project ran a series of meetings and seminars, some of which appear to have been very effective. For instance, various interviewees remarked on how effective the seminar in Luang Prabang, Lao PDR was. The problem was brought to life by talks from *tuc tuc* drivers and hotel owners with first-hand knowledge, resulting in project counterparts who were better informed about the true nature of the problem as compared to others met by the evaluator. Such meetings could for example have been systematised and held more widely.

The project now has comprehensive and authoritative content in place from which it can develop derivatives. It will arrive at the same place eventually but the cost has been the numbers of frontline officers trained under this phase of the project. The project believes effectiveness should not be measured by numbers alone; but numbers, ownership and institutionalisation need not be mutually exclusive. The KAP surveys show that the main barrier at present to tackling these crimes is lack of awareness of the problem or private settlements where abuse has occurred. A

strategy aimed at reaching larger numbers with key information should take priority. It is not clear that the project is taking account of this; as it plans to develop further curricular going beyond the ‘foundation’ level in the next phase.

A clear training strategy from the outset might have better helped weigh up these considerations and in fact AusAID’s response to the PIDD gave much food for thought on training, as did the project’s own situation analysis. The project appears to have taken the criticism of the training approach in the MTR to heart; the training strategy appears more of a rebuttal rather than a forward looking document focused on how best to make the most of what has been produced so far.

### *(iii) Outcome 3*

The project has facilitated increased cooperation both within and between project countries. Internally, cooperation meant joint meetings and working groups involving different government ministries and departments including justice, law enforcement, social affairs etc. In Viet Nam and Lao PDR, inter-ministerial committees were set up in line with standard administrative procedures for projects accepted by the government. The project regards the Vietnamese project management committee as a model of internal coordination.

The increased national coordination was welcomed by interviewees in all countries. Interviewees in Lao PDR said this is the first ever inter-departmental group on a child protection issue with such a broad based membership of government agencies. Even in Cambodia, where the project falls under existing forums on human trafficking, the project is seen as enhancing cooperation on the specific issue of CSETT by some stakeholders, for instance by supporting increased coordination between the ministries of interior and tourism on their respective responsibilities. There have been cross-departmental workshops in Thailand as well as collaboration through a private group in Facebook and online chat rooms.

At civil society level, although the project itself did not have a responsibility for coordinating the sector, it collaborated with a number of NGOs over meetings, training and advisory services. These partnerships worked without a formal agreement as compared to the contractual relationship with INTERPOL under outcome 4 which proved problematic. The project was not closely engaged with the full range of organisations involved in CSEC but this is likely because this aspect fell under the domain of the Prevention Pillar and World Vision Australia. In 2013, the project along with other agencies supported a meeting of the Mekong Children’s Forum in Viet Nam. The evaluator did not have a chance to meet any representatives from UNICEF and the Australian Federal Police and is therefore not able to comment on those relationships.

The project has also spurred regional cooperation between the four project countries. A regional legal research group was initiated by the Vietnamese government and formally established in August 2013; it has met twice so far to establish its remit and modus operandi. There is much support from all government stakeholders for a regional forum to share information and learning. Interviewees said it was very helpful to come together and cooperate with other countries and the high-ranking officials participating in the forum were able to make a very positive contribution to the discussions. Members will be tasked to collect evidence-based research to support the drafting of laws on sexual abuse and exploitation.

A third planned meeting to be held in Bangkok has been postponed due to the political crisis in Thailand causing much frustration among government participants who say that UNODC should have been more flexible about holding the meeting elsewhere. The delays have caused them problems in scheduling diaries and obtaining permissions to travel; and most are concerned about insufficient progress before the end of the project. UNODC says it could not hold the meeting elsewhere as it was agreed the meeting would be held on a rotational basis between project countries (Thailand was unable to host due to the crisis and Lao PDR was also not ready). DFAT and UNODC have signed a no-cost extension for one month and the meeting has now been scheduled to take place in Lao PDR on 30 June. UNODC might have considered alternatives earlier e.g. hosting the meeting in a third country; holding a video conference; securing written agreements for members to proceed with their respective tasks and so on.

The MTR questioned the need for this forum and the balance of regional vs. in-country work especially since cross-border offending is limited and the project countries have different legal systems making it difficult to harmonise approaches. DFAT/MTR team and UNODC appear to have a different understanding of what ‘regional’ means. In fact the UNODC regional office is involved in many such ‘regional projects’ on specific topics and concerning multiple countries in Asia Pacific; cross-border activity is not a pre-requisite and the goal is not necessarily a regional agreement. The intent is more often for countries to share experiences and learn from one another; countries who are at different stages of experiencing the same problem can take preventive action. As one national participant put it, despite different legal systems, participants can benefit from exchange and legal discussions as they can discuss what needs to be done and then consider the specific technicality of how to do so in their own countries. The project is well-balanced; most focus is internal with some opportunities for regional and international exchange.

National counterparts also say that the group acts as a gentle form of peer pressure, encouraging national stakeholders to keep up with other countries, and gives participants weight and backing to lobby for changes back home. The emphasis on the adoption of regional instruments in the project’s initial legal analysis may be misplaced given the character of the problem; the main value in this forum is as a time-bound entity for peer learning and sharing while legal changes are brought about at national level. In due course, the group could be merged with relevant fora in ASEAN, though at the moment, such avenues would not meet the specific and detailed needs of project participants.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Southeast Asia Working Party of the INTERPOL Specialists Group on Crimes against Children was held in Bangkok in March 2013 and involved 190 delegates from 29 countries. It was seen as valuable by attendees from all countries and especially Thailand, as it gave exposure to new ideas and international experts, and access to information that could not be acquired anywhere else. Some were able to make contacts and networks which led to tangible opportunities for further study and learning. Police representatives from the project countries were involved in planning the meeting, project countries led workshops, and the event was co-hosted by the Royal Thai Police. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography speaking at the meeting recognised it as a commendable example of international and intersectoral cooperation. The MTR questions the value of this meeting but the final evaluation sees the potential for an inbuilt sustainability mechanism given the proposal of turning this into a permanent INTERPOL forum which is being put before the organisation’s annual regional meeting in Singapore in 2014. The project gained kudos by hosting this meeting at relatively little cost to itself since most of the attendees were self-funding, and the event was co-hosted by the Thai government.

(iv) *Outcome 4*

This is the least effective outcome of all with little progress having been made. The aim of this objective was to supplement the higher level policy work with on the ground investigations and case handling. Implementation was charged to INTERPOL as the organisation with the experience of this type of police work with oversight by UNODC as the grant-holder. Key activities carried out under the component include an analytical report on the use of Green Notices in December 2013; training in 2013 on the use of the Victim ID Lab; identification of one hotspot per country, and follow-up mentoring support in Viet Nam through two follow-up meetings in 2013. According to UNODC's response to the MTR, INTERPOL has provided an international operational perspective on police responses to combating travelling child sex offenders including advice to UNODC technical assistance components, many useful contacts and ideas.

INTERPOL was involved in a liaison and observation role in the investigations of a small number of cases. However, the important pro-active work identified in the PIDD and needed for bringing to light the larger problem of local and regional offenders was not done. Ultimately, most activities envisaged under this component did not happen i.e. preparing and implementing detailed operational plans, building operational capacity within teams in all identified hotspots and impacting on investigations, arrests and prosecutions in all target locations. This is a significant failure given that USD\$ 634,838 was expended on this component by November 2013. INTERPOL did not deliver what it was funded to do, and UNODC did not exercise sufficient oversight, either to ensure delivery or to halt objective 4 at an earlier stage. It was left to the MTR to show that this objective was far from on track, following which DFAT took the decision to stop funding this component, and allow remaining resources to be shifted to the institutionalisation agenda under outcome 2.

National stakeholders in all countries were unaware of operational activities being carried out. Viet Nam mentioned that the provision of equipment was very useful but too limited; an activity which actually comes under objective 2 but mentioned here by national counterparts since INTERPOL was involved in its implementation. The INTERPOL regional meeting discussed under outcome 3 was a success. For the most part, national stakeholders were not overtly critical though a couple of interviewees expressed dissatisfaction at the lack of progress by INTERPOL. Despite disappointing progress, most stakeholders see a value in this component and the role of INTERPOL.

Interviewees from all sides (UNODC, INTERPOL and DFAT) acknowledge weaknesses and point to the following reasons:

- Lack of staff capacity at INTERPOL is recognised by all sides as a key reason in terms of staff numbers, skills, knowledge and expertise. INTERPOL only had one international staff position which was occupied by a subject matter specialist. The role also required key experience in project management (as noted in the job description) and international development in order to be executed properly. Senior management oversight and support to the position from INTERPOL headquarters was also lacking and acknowledged as a weakness by INTERPOL itself. There were no local staff and UNODC national staff sometimes had to step in to help.

- UNODC as the primary grant holder of DFAT funds was obliged to oversee and monitor INTERPOL’s work as a sub contractor. Whilst both agencies had embarked on this in a spirit of partnership, the delicacy of the situation was compounded by the fact that INTERPOL had conceived the project idea in the first place. UNODC did not monitor effectively, thus creating an uneasy institutional relationship - project and regional-between UNODC and INTERPOL.

UNODC also lacked the skills both at the institutional and individual level to manage an implementing agency; it does not sub-contract much as an organisation and basic errors were made by the Regional Office in the grant agreement (e.g. wrong end date) which took months to resolve by UNODC Headquarters, Regional Office and INTERPOL. So despite a robust legal agreement being in place, UNODC was not assertive enough in keeping INTERPOL on track.

Insufficient assessment was made by both sides at the design stage of INTERPOL’s capacity to carry out work on international development projects of this type; or of UNODC’s capacity to manage grants and implementing agencies. Nor did AusAID’s own proposal review process pick up on this issue. As such, no alternative arrangements were considered.

- UNODC bureaucratic processes. INTERPOL says it was delayed by UNODC processes e.g. requests for equipment (this comes under outcome 2) had to go through UNDP offices, this took a long time and would have been more efficiently done through INTERPOL’s own systems.
- Project planning is also put in question. INTERPOL says that outcome 4 was contingent on progress on the other objectives i.e. laws in place, capacities built etc. and that it actively contributed to other objectives in the meantime - though this is disputed by other interviewees who say it did not make much in the way of meaningful contributions. The list of events shows that INTERPOL contributed to 10 out of 101. INTERPOL argues that its work was halted for 6 months while the MTR was in progress and then discontinued altogether just when operational activities were becoming feasible. There is some merit in this as better sequencing of components would have helped implementation, and particularly if the training under outcome 2 had been expedited, it could have dovetailed into work with operational units on the ground. However, the proposal and PIDD gave clear outcomes and approaches, and sufficient scope for INTERPOL to take the initiative and progress this objective in an independent way.

The project recognises, in its final progress report, the difficulty in establishing clear synergy and focus between components 1 to 3 and the operational work of component 4; that the partnership would have benefitted from closer collaboration; a better understanding of donor accountability; and increased INTERPOL human resources.

#### (v) *Other outcomes*

- **Cross pillar**

There were some successes in joint work between the Protection and Prevention Pillars, most notably, the joint work with the Royal Thai Police to establish community police teams across 40

targeted pilot locations to identify and investigate child sexual abuse cases. Another example is from Cambodia where both pillars have supported the work on the Joint Prakas mentioned under Outcome 1 and collaboration over the Children's Forum in Viet Nam.

On the whole though, this outcome has been beset by challenges in establishing effective coordination. This aspect was reviewed in-depth by the MTR and is therefore not considered in as much detail. While the idea of a coordinated approach on prevention and protection made conceptual sense and had potential benefits in terms of shared resources, avoiding duplication and collaboration on advocacy, training and legislation, it did not work well in practice.

The main reason for this is that a joint approach was not in-built into the project design. Both UNODC and World Vision Australia were commissioned separately by DFAT to implement their proposals. They were aware of each other's work but not the expectation of close coordination since this was not in the grant agreement and almost seemed to come as an afterthought from DFAT. When DFAT became aware that coordination was not happening as a matter of course, it sought to improve matters by bringing in facilitators who held a joint workshop in late 2011. While this provided some temporary relief, once the facilitators were gone, the challenge of having two organisations work together with different ideologies, approaches, stakeholders, work plans, schedules proved insurmountable. Following the MTR, the donor decided not to require cross-pillar coordination and the planned second project coordinating committee meeting was cancelled by DFAT. UNODC efforts in trying to make the cross-pillar coordination work were much recognised by various interviewees.

DFAT found management of this aspect highly complicated and requiring intensive efforts. It now recognises this was an unrealistic expectation. The hope of joint activities needed to be buttressed by the project design, for instance, through the introduction of a coordination structure to over-arch both pillars, or by contracting one organisation only as the grant-holder and allowing them to sub-contract others, or introducing conditionality to the payment structure etc. DFAT's own peer review of the proposals foresaw that this might be a problem. National stakeholders also noticed these difficulties, and called on both Pillars to coordinate better.

For UNODC, the efforts to agree a joint activity plan consumed much energy in the first 18 months. The requirement to progress joint pillar work distracted from other outcomes at a critical time just as activities were starting up and direction needed to be set. The disappointment on the part of the donor on the lack of coordination also tended to overshadow tangible achievements being made under the two separate pillars. This was particularly the case, as DFAT's Quality at Implementation Reports, scored and assessed both pillars together until UNODC asked for some differentiation. Although a good idea, in retrospect, the stress on joint work by the donor was unrealistic and also unfair given that both organisations had been contracted separately, and without ensuring the proper structures were in place to facilitate this coordination.

- **Unexpected outcomes**

The project reports some unplanned positive outcomes such as the production of a 1 day gender training package at the request of the Cambodian authorities (see below); the use of the police training package by the Cambodian military police; the establishment of the regional legal research group.; the development of a curricular on child victims and witnesses in collaboration with UNICEF, the agreed proposal by project countries to establish the INTERPOL Southeast Asia Working Party; and the computer-facilitated crimes course by ICMEC.

## Cross-cutting issues

**Gender** - Gender has been well-addressed by the project. This was a key priority for the donor who required a gender strategy during the inception phase. This helped strengthen the project's consideration of gender issues. Key interviewees in all countries made reference to gender issues in interviews without prompting which indicates that awareness has been raised. An extra component on gender was added to the police training curriculum. The project has systematically collected gender disaggregated data and included gender-related questions in its research e.g. KAP surveys. Despite efforts, participation in project activities has not reached equal numbers due to lack of women in law enforcement. The project is also supporting a UN Inter-agency study on violence against women and children.

The project developed a gender mainstreaming training course at the special request of the Cambodian National Police for training female commissioners, some of whom had no background in police work and doing jobs as diverse as cashiers. UNODC's pedagogical approach and methodology was much appreciated by national authorities who see the ToT model as more effective than the previous approach of sending out centralised trainers around the country. The National and Regional Project Managers received a Royal award from the Cambodian government for this work. The main challenge for the Cambodian National Police is to find extra funding to carry out more training sessions.

**Human rights** - the project itself addresses a key child rights issue and makes reference to international human rights instruments. Project documents take account of inequalities in their analysis, for instance both the situation analysis and police training curricula discuss vulnerabilities of children in different types of circumstances. As the national curricula are not in English, the evaluator could not tell if the contextualisation of the modules at country level took account of human rights issues and especially the situation of minority groups.

## Partnerships and cooperation

The project's approach to partnerships and cooperation was very positive in some respects but also faced a number of challenges. Partnerships and cooperation with government counterparts worked very well. As described under 'Effectiveness' (outcomes 1, 2 and 3), the project adopted a participatory strategy of building ownership which was well-received by counterparts resulting in active engagement. The project also stimulated cooperation between national counterparts as discussed under 'Effectiveness – Outcome 3'. On the other hand, partnerships with project signatories, namely DFAT, INTERPOL, and World Vision Australia were more strained (see 'Efficiency' and also 'Effectiveness - cross pillar') due to challenges in managing the partnerships and joint implementation. The project also collaborated with a number of civil society organisations (see Outcome 3). Please refer to other parts of the report for more extensive discussions of these points.

## Sustainability

*Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of a project or programme are likely to continue after its termination. [Evaluation TOR]*

Sustainability of project benefits is not yet assured. The outcomes have not progressed far enough within the short implementation period of 2.5 years to guarantee sustainability into the future.

Outcome 1 – once legislation is amended it will form a sustainable legal framework but at this stage it is not clear whether the proposed amendments will go through. As explained under outcome 1, the project countries have arrived at the stage where legal provisions need to be drafted and put before the legislature. Without further funding and technical support, it seems unlikely that this work can progress further. The project has gone as far as it could in the time available.

Outcome 2 – There is evidence of sustainability at individual level but not institutional level. Individual participants on the project's training courses have gained knowledge and skills that will be sustained through their professional careers. There has been very limited follow-up to the ToT and pilot training in 2013 in terms of ad hoc work-based trainings.

At an institutional level, the project's police training programme is intended to be absorbed into national police training at police training institutes. Sustainability was questioned by the MTR. The project reports that it is not able to ensure the full institutionalisation and implementation of training curricula in all national police academies, but that other options are being considered including using selected parts as complementary materials for existing training courses, use curricula for special training events, or having the whole curricula adapted and institutionalised at a future date. Efforts are being made to use the curricula as a global resource. UNODC HQ has already funded some work on developing a victims and witnesses training module and there are plans for inclusion in UNODC's e-learning programme. INTERPOL is also interested in using the curricula as an e-learning resource.

Challenges in institutionalisation include limited time and space in national training programmes; the need for official approval to facilitate adoption into national training; and, in some project countries, the proliferation of institutes offering these courses. The aim of institutionalisation was there from the outset and members of the police technical working groups included staff from police academies. However, the needs assessment did not consult police academies in detail in all project countries to see what kind of material could fit existing programmes. The way the curricula has evolved requires further adaptation to fit into existing programmes. Again, it is too ambitious to expect the project to achieve more as penetrating national systems takes time and persuasion. One external interviewee commented on the comparison with ARTIP which has achieved institutionalisation, and recognised that it has taken 11 years to do so and with the benefit of trafficking being a higher profile issue with much international focus. By contrast, the project has been carried out in a truncated time frame, especially for such a taboo subject which has less resources and priority.

Outcome 3 – the regional legal research group was launched so recently that there are no prospects of it sustaining without further funding and technical support. National counterparts are certainly very interested but feel the initiative is too early to run on its own. The personal networks and contacts developed through the project are definitely seen as sustaining. The

INTERPOL Southeast Asia working party meeting offers a genuine prospect of institutional sustainability as part of the global Specialist Group on Crimes against Children which exists in other parts of the world, Africa and the Middle East and according to INTERPOL is known to be a successful model for intelligence sharing, lesson learning and best practice. There is an interest from UNODC and INTERPOL to pursue this idea beyond the life of the project.

Outcome 4 – there was insufficient progress on this outcome to talk of sustainability.

Overall the implementation period of 2.5 years is far too short to embed and sustain the types of high level institutional benefits that the project aims for. There is some sustainability of individual benefits but achieving and maintaining national level changes takes time. While the project is unlikely to have achieved more sustainability, better planning and fore-thought might have edged sustainability further.

A sustainability plan was prepared at the request of the donor in 2011. There was no explicit exit strategy in the PIDD; a draft exit strategy is mentioned for the first time in September 2013 in response to the MTR. The project appeared to take decisions e.g. approach to training, without an end in sight or to consider the implications of mobilising government agencies and then leaving the high and dry – many national counterparts expressed worry and concern about the project ending prematurely.

The sustainability strategy focuses on building ownership and participation but does not place enough emphasis on ensuring that national stakeholders, as low income countries, have the resources and capacity to assume responsibility, not simply the interest. For instance, having finalised products such as legal provisions drafted or training materials that can be directly assimilated, would be easier for national counterparts to ‘own’ and take forward.

Given the precarious nature of funding for development projects, it would have been wise to diversify the funding base to avoid over-reliance on one donor (DFAT who can now no longer support the project) and to ensure discrete achievable outcomes within the given time frame. One interviewee said it was a design issue which could have been addressed through a more phased approach with self-sustained components as well as better integration with country office programmes instead of ambitious high level interwoven outcomes all managed under a vertical structure from the regional office. This highlights the need for a more flexible model which is less vulnerable to the loss of funding.

A further phase is required to embed outcomes. In the interim while new funding is awaited, it is necessary to consider how components can be continued and managed in meantime i.e. how the regional and country offices can integrate this work into their wider programmes.

## Impact

*Impact is the positive and negative longer-term change(s) produced or likely to be produced by a project, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended, after the project was implemented.[Evaluation TOR]*

Based on the progress in relation to outcomes and the sustainability of benefits (discussed in the previous section), it is too early to talk of impact or lasting social change as a result of this project. The project has made significant progress on legal reform, in preparation for

institutionalised capacity building and in improved coordination but its work is far from complete; and it is not known if any of these elements will come to fruition without further support from UNODC.

- Outcome 1 - changes to law and policy take years to achieve and moving beyond that to look at the implementation of those changes is a much longer vision.
- Outcome 2 - the evaluation received anecdotal feedback suggesting a lasting effect in terms of increased personal knowledge, awareness, understanding at individual level as well as tangible follow-on action, for instance, a law enforcement official in Bangkok said that the training sessions had led to more concerted action by immigration authorities including the revocation of passports by foreign offenders, an impact that could directly be linked to the project. There was also confirmation from two separate sources that the project, had impacted the Royal Thai Police in a positive way through the training of trainers who would be able to pass their knowledge and skills on to others.
- Outcome 3 - coordination needs to continue if it is to have lasting change
- Outcome 4 - has not got off the ground enough to make a long-term difference.

A proper assessment of impact would also require comparable baseline and end line data from the project which does not exist.

## Efficiency

### *(i) Pace of implementation*

The pace of implementation comes up as an issue; national stakeholders in all countries expressed concern at the rate of progress, for instance one said, that project implementation took so long from one activity to another that they felt nothing significant had been achieved. Some external factors as discussed in the previous sections impeded progress such as the political crisis in Thailand affected the regional legal research group under outcome 3; and the progress of Thai legislation under outcome 1. The project needed authorisation from government authorities which sometimes took months, for instance in Thailand, obtaining a signed letter of agreement took about a year as project staff went back and forth between ten government departments only to eventually find that the government did not sign such agreements.

Working in five different languages was a challenge as faced by all regional projects in the Mekong sub-region. There was also the awkwardness of a team of female staff having to broach the issue of sexual abuse and exploitation with mostly male national counterparts. The project's approach of consultation and building ownership among government agencies was inevitably time-consuming and the project sought to approach this with sensitivity. It naturally took time to engage with national authorities since they already had work plans and priorities in place before they were approached by the project. While building ownership was a positive strategy, the project might want to consider whether it always found the right balance as discussed earlier.

Annex VI sets out the and some key milestones in the project to examine the causes of internal delays. Project implementation began around September 2011 making for an implementation

period of 2.5 years to date. Prior to that there was an inception phase of over a year. UNODC bureaucratic procedures were typically slow but they are not wholly to blame. Staffing the project with qualified personnel took time, although the search for suitable candidates started well in advance (notices issued a year before), UNODC obviously could not commit to a contract without the funds being in place and then it took time for the regional project manager to work out notice, relocate internationally etc which meant an effective start date of November 2010. There were inevitably further delays in the recruitment of suitably qualified national staff due to external skills shortages which meant it was a further 6 months, August 2011, before all country staff were in place. The Lao PDR office suffered particular delays and activities were on hold as no-one was there to head up the project.

During this period, the project worked on the PIDD and responded to donor comments on cross-pillar combined activities; gender strategy; sustainability strategy; clarification of the scope etc. Consultation with the donor over drafts and obtaining final approvals also took time. As the official project start date was August 2010, the project was already behind schedule by the time regional staff arrived in November 2010 and the rest of the staff were in place in summer 2011, thus highlighting the need to agree realistic start dates.

### *(ii) Staff*

The constraints suffered by the delays in recruiting staff are mentioned above. In addition, sufficient staff positions were not planned for which put added pressures on the staff who were there. The regional office only had three staff; one regional project manager with a project assistant in Bangkok with the responsibility for project management. There was a heavy reliance on external consultants to bring in technical support; seven consultants were recruited over a period of 400 working days from 2010-2013. This created a lot of administration in hiring and monitoring the work of many different people and diminished the time available for technical issues as administrative tasks took precedence.

The Thai national project officer had double responsibilities at national and regional level, and there was only one national project officer in Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam until project assistants for these countries were recruited in 2013. The project also benefitted from five volunteer interns who did substantial tasks. In addition, a number of key staff were new to the UN system and international projects of this type and had to learn the UNODC system of project management. The weight of administrative tasks left insufficient time for focusing on strategy. All in all, staff were very over-stretched and habitually required to work long hours.

A better model would have been to have two staff at regional level – a project management specialist in overall charge with experience in starting up, managing and monitoring projects of this type in UNODC, and a thematic expert based in-house, who could back up the regional manager as necessary and assume most of the tasks that were outsourced to consultants (e.g. situation analysis, gender, training, legal analysis) so that consultants could be used in a much more limited way for short term expert advice to be implemented by the project technical staff. Cost-wise this would have made sense.

On the positive side, the staff team itself has been a greatly facilitating factor and can be credited with driving forward progress on the project in the face of considerable constraints. There was much commendation for UNODC project staff from a variety of external stakeholders, for being

very cooperative and amenable to work with, taking initiatives, being skilful and committed.. The team also worked harmoniously together and the quarterly coordination meetings which rotated round project countries helped foster a common approach and team spirit. A positive outcome is the capacity development of staff under the project especially on management, monitoring and evaluation. National staff appreciated the way they were empowered by regional management to take the lead.

### *(iii) UNODC management*

This leads to the question as to whether there was enough oversight and support from the wider regional programme to the project especially given that key staff were new to working in the UNODC system. More support, for instance, on managing the relationship with INTERPOL may have improved the performance under that objective. It seems that there were limited mechanisms under the previous regional programme to provide this kind of support. The new programme 2014-17 has given the issue a clearer priority as part of the regional strategy. In addition the reform of the regional office into a cohesive programme model will help unify planning, funding, monitoring and evaluation and help find synergies between different areas of work and avoid the isolation of projects. Technical support from UNODC headquarters came late, for instance, recently the project has drawn on support from the Justice Section on issues like mutual legal assistance and extradition. Such expertise might have been available in the regional office itself but the way the regional programme was structured meant such links were not being made. UNODC administrative and bureaucratic procedures were found to be slow and a hindrance to effective programme delivery, for instance, long delays in issuing consultancy contracts. This was anticipated in the design though more time needed to be factored in for this.

### *(iv) Donor relations*

Both the donor and UNODC reported challenges in project administration. Project staff expressed the view that they found it initially a challenge to understand donor expectations and to meet information and reporting requirements. Staff say they felt deflated and nervous when engaging with donor representatives who were disappointed in the project and critical about lack of progress. No allowances seemed to be made for external constraints and challenges. Staff say that this sense of nervousness has significantly decreased in the last year as the donor eventually recognised and understood the challenges faced by the project team.

From the donor's perspective, the overall structure of two pillars was difficult to manage and very labour intensive. The donor was looking at the issue from a different vantage point, from the macro perspective of the two pillars combined and different ideas of progress and expectations. In fact, in a number of instances, the donor provided useful reflection and technical feedback, for instance, comments on the PIDD. Other questions too were fair enough to raise as highlighted elsewhere in this report. Even the MTR, despite being heavily disputed, helped resolve some issues such as the cross pillar work, outcome 4, as well as stimulating further work on sustainability e.g. for the training programme. It is also the case that UNODC (project and regional management) could have been more assertive in explaining its position to DFAT.

### *(v) Cost efficiency*

Overall the project has been cost effective given the scale of the social problem it was trying to tackle in four countries with a limited operational budget of USD 100,000/per year per country. The cost efficiency of specific components and activities is more of a mixed bag with some examples of efficient use of resources e.g. the INTERPOL SE Asia working party meeting as mentioned before. The project countries have also made in-kind contributions amounting to USD\$ 30,000 which is a good achievement for an international development project. On the other hand, outcome 4 has been highly inefficient, as little can be seen for nearly \$700,000 of expenditure.

### *(vi) Monitoring and evaluation system*

The project has a sophisticated monitoring and evaluation system. The framework comprises of log frame, system for recording and analysing workshop and training reaction data; KAP surveys; participatory reviews; capacity building of staff during quarterly project meetings; and other tools to help reflect on progress for donor reporting. The project benefits from the support of a M&E specialist who came on board in February 2012 and helped to systematise basic procedures to make them more results focused and to speed up the process for collecting, recording, sorting and reporting data through the use of an electronic data base instead of the previous manual system. The systematic data collection and analysis is in-depth and searching with much thought going into the design of questions and responses e.g. pre and post training questionnaires. The process was verified by the evaluator and the project's data accepted as part of this evaluation. The MTR also confirmed the quality of the M&E framework. It noted that there were no targets and that attitudinal and behavioural change is not tracked.

The monitoring and evaluation framework has been highlighted by IEU HQ as a model good practice for possible replication by other UNODC programmes. The document itself both describes the system and also acts as a training guide as it includes a set of standard M&E tools. The system has been effectively tailored to the needs of staff, a number of whom were new to the UN system and M&E. It is rigorous but accessible to those with little knowledge of monitoring. Project staff find the system easy to use, and also rewarding, as the M&E system helped them to track progress and see the effects of their work which they found very satisfying.

The only drawback is that the M&E framework was not finalised until late 2012. Ideally the M&E framework should have been developed first and included the situation analysis/baseline as part of its work. The situation analysis was done before the M&E expert came on board. The KAP surveys were done later on and can be useful for future planning but they were not done early enough for the design of this project. Until the M&E specialist came on board, the project made do with the M&E system outlined in the proposal and PIDD and kept basic data. The wording of the log frame was amended by the M&E specialist to the extent possible while remaining faithful to original commitments.

### III. CONCLUSIONS

This is an ambitious project which tackles a complex social problem in four countries; it aims for deep policy and institutional change within a restricted time frame and budget. There are important achievements from the two and a half year implementation period but acknowledged disappointments too and the project faced various constraints and challenges. The findings by evaluation criteria are as follows:

Design: the genesis of the project was a timely synergy in the growing interest of key stakeholders in these issues. The multi-faceted approach of the protection component was appropriate and aimed to tackle the issue from different and complementary angles - legal reform, enhanced capacity and operational activities. Key stakeholders agree that some shortcomings in project planning and design appear to have undermined optimal progress.

Relevance: The project is undoubtedly of high relevance. The situation analysis carried out at project inception shows the occurrence of CSETT in project countries and highlights a lack of capacity among national authorities for tackling this problem. The project's relevance could have been further enhanced had the project emphasised the specific nature and pattern of offending in the sub-region. Going forward, a more persuasive evidence base will be necessary to persuade legislators and policy-makers of the need for action.

Effectiveness:

Outcome 1: there is sound progress towards legal reform and the project could have done little more within a short time frame to advance matters given the inherent complexity in achieving change at this level. The executive authorities have accepted the need for revisions and are in the process of putting the issue before the legislatures in each country.

Outcome 2: The project has raised the awareness of core national counterparts and laid the ground work for future capacity building. Dissemination of training has not reached front-line law enforcement officials in substantial numbers or prosecutors or judges. Nonetheless, foundations are in place for the project to disseminate and institutionalise capacity building on CSETT in project countries and beyond.

Outcome 3: The project has facilitated increased cooperation both within and between project countries. The establishment of a regional legal research group is welcomed by national counterparts but the process has been temporarily stalled due to external factors, much to the frustration of a number of government counterparts. The 1<sup>st</sup> Southeast Asia Working Party of the INTERPOL Specialists Group on Crimes against Children was held in Bangkok in March 2013 under the auspices of the project and proved a useful forum for national stakeholders to acquire regional and international learning.

Outcome 4: This is the least effective outcome of all. INTERPOL was sub-contracted by UNODC to build the operational capacity of teams in identified hotspots and impact on investigations, arrests and prosecutions. Minimal and inadequate progress has been made given that USD\$ 634,838 was expended on this objective. Nevertheless, there remains widespread agreement about the importance of INTERPOL's role and institutional expertise in strengthening operational capacity on CSETT.

Other outcomes: DFAT's aim of having joint activities across both the Prevention and Protection Pillars was beset by challenges and effective coordination could not be established. Still, there were some recognised successes in cross-pillar work, namely the community policing activity in Thailand.

Cross-cutting issues: Gender and human rights are well-integrated into project implementation, for example, through segregation of data collection according to gender, through reference to key human rights treaties, and through stand-alone initiatives such as a training programme on gender issues.

Partnerships and cooperation: the project's approach to cooperation with government worked well as a result of its policy of engagement and ownership. Relations with other project signatories were more problematic due to challenges in managing partnerships and the joint implementation of activities. There was cooperation with other groups working in the sector.

Sustainability: Sustainability is not yet assured. In relation to each outcome, the national authorities are not yet at a stage to continue this work without further technical support and funding. It is unrealistic to expect too much after such a short implementation period.

Impact: It is too early to talk of impact and lasting social change as a result of this project. The project has laid the basis for legal reform, institutionalised capacity building and improved coordination but its work is far from complete. Some evidence of individual level impacts such as increased personal knowledge, awareness, and understanding is visible.

Efficiency: the pace of implementation is seen as too slow, including by national counterparts in each country. The official project start date was August 2010, followed by an inception period of a year which involved refining the project design and other start up measures, and implementation from September 2011 onwards for a period of 2.5 years. The various external and internal factors which impeded the project can be summarised as follows:

#### *External*

The political instability and crisis in Thailand led to some delays. In addition, the project's participatory approach was dependent on the pace of national authorities in taking various steps. The human resource capacity in project countries also affected the ability of the project to recruit suitably qualified staff.

#### *Internal*

There were various issues with design/planning. Firstly, the design itself was unrealistic design and underestimated the time needed to establish operational capacity, develop partnerships with governments, while at the same time over-committing what could be delivered by project end. The staffing structure in both UNODC and INTERPOL was inadequate and made it a stretch for

staff to deliver on agreed objectives. In addition, the overall DFAT initiative encompassing both Protection and Prevention Pillars was premised on expectation of joint activity even though this was not explicitly planned for at design stage and proved to be an unrealistic hope. The working arrangements between UNODC and INTERPOL were not developed on the basis of an adequate assessment of the capacity of each partner to fulfil their respective role in the agreement. Although all of these issues were inherent in the original design, they were not addressed in the inception phase and the development of the PIDD.

The implementation period also witnessed a number of challenges. Project signatories – DFAT, INTERPOL, UNODC and WVA - agree there were strained relations between them – as they struggled to implement a problematic design. UNODC management – both project and regional – did not assert itself sufficiently, for instance by dialoguing with DFAT about its expectations and administrative requirements; and by agreeing a workable arrangement for overseeing INTERPOL’s execution of outcome 4. It was not until the DFAT MTR that these issues were brought into the open and addressed. In particular, new staff at UNODC were not backed up and guided sufficiently at project start-up on operational steps, external relations and so on. Headquarters and Regional Office procedures, for example, on processing contracts with staff, consultants and sub-contractors, were too slow and bureaucratic. Specialist technical back-up from headquarters did not come in until at a very late stage. Moreover, the project was not always strategic enough. It was not sufficiently mindful of the final outcomes required, risks to implementation, and the feasibility of different approaches within the given time frame when deciding on its training approach, for example.

There were also various factors that facilitated the implementation of the project, namely, the technical knowledge, dedication and cooperative approach of project staff was commended by many interviewees. The project team also worked in a harmonious and supportive way as a whole and an unexpected outcome was the increased staff capacity at all levels. Building national ownership and engagement was well done by the project and resulted in national stakeholders being receptive and enthusiastic about the project’s ideas, willing to take action themselves and to provide in-kind support. The project may want to consider this aspect more and see if it was possible to build ownership more effectively. The M&E system, although developed late in the day, brought an objective measure of progress which helped bring more focus to planning and also more reward as staff could see the concrete results of their work. The project’s attention to detail, while a not very visible aspect of its approach was also a factor in successful outcomes. For instance, interviewees commented on the skilful selection of participants for workshops and trainings which was based on carefully developed criteria and an appraisal of counterparts.

Overall, while the project faced numerous difficulties, it is important not to let these overshadow the tangible inroads it has made in changing the policy environment on CSETT within a short space of time. The project has suffered from overly high expectations, partly of its own creation, and partly arising from DFAT’s independent priorities and interests which have, by default, led to a sense of disappointment. Putting aside the original design, plans and unrealistic hopes, the actual result of the project so far is an initiative that is half way through its natural life, the foundations have been laid for strengthening the legal system; and improved implementation of legal protections through enhanced capacity and coordination. A further period is required to embed these changes in national policy and action in order if improvements in the handling of CSETT crimes are to be seen.

## IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

This section suggests recommendations for UNODC which can be of use in the design of a future phase since the project is nearly at end. Lessons learned discussed in the next section should also be taken into account.

### **1. Continue the project for a further phase as part of UNODC's regional strategy and with a clearer and more refined focus on the combating of child sex offences.**

The foundations have been laid but more time is needed to build on steps taken so far to reform the law and improve implementation of the law through better capacity and coordination. To stop now would leave the initiative half way before it has come to full fruition. UNODC is aware of this and has migrated this work into its regional strategy 2014-2017 under a clearer and more refined area of work on 'Combating child sex offences'. This better captures UNODC's area of expertise in justice and law enforcement. It is worth keeping a special focus on CSETT as the inter-country dimension also lends itself to UNODC's expertise as an international organisation. UNODC plans to expand to other beneficiary countries. It could also consider drawing on the support and funding of a wider set of donor governments which identify themselves as countries of origin for travelling child sex offenders. The next phase should build on the lessons learned from this phase (see section on 'Lessons learned').

### **2. Strengthen the evidence base on CSETT to better understand the nature, pattern and prevalence of the phenomenon by carrying out further research studies.**

Further research is required to understand the nature, pattern and prevalence of CSETT, the profile of offenders and the vulnerabilities of victims in project countries. Policy-makers in project countries are likely to ask for this before committing resources to tackling this problem, and also to ensure that any solutions are properly tailored to the needs of the region rather than being imported from elsewhere. UNODC can learn from the experiences of organisations like ILO which have developed methodologies for research on hard to reach groups, including children in the worst forms of child labour (which includes commercial sexual exploitation).

### **3. Institutionalise, disseminate and diversify training for relevant professionals based on the existing project curricula.**

The project should continue its efforts to institutionalise the police training curricula in formal training schemes. Even once approval is received from national authorities, diligent efforts and technical support are necessary to ensure that the contents are integrated in the optimum way possible taking into account the time and resources available in national training programmes. In addition, a shorter and truncated 'guide' for raising awareness of key messages through more informal workplace seminars and meetings cascaded down through the ToT network would also be useful. Fresh thinking on how to improve the user-friendliness and accessibility of the existing materials would be useful, for instance, even the word 'curricula' has connotations of academia

and theoretical/abstract study which may not be accessible to everyone. The indications in the training strategy to look at using the materials in other ways and to migrate the curricula into UNODC's e-learning are positive. Further training should learn from lessons in this phase i.e. respond to actual needs (based on a KAP survey); be realistically tailored to fit in with typical training programmes at national level in terms of time and ease of integration; take a twin track approach, start with a modest effort which addresses key needs and roll out quickly, while exploring deeper needs.

**4. Support the continuation of the regional legal research group as a way of facilitating learning and exchange between project countries on legal reform.**

The regional legal research group should continue as a way of learning and exchange as project countries work to amend the legislation in their respective jurisdictions. The early emphasis in the project legal analysis on regional agreements does not seem relevant. The new phase should plan to support this group for a limited period, with practical targets and a phased approach so that project countries assume increasing responsibility for planning and funding over the course of the project. This way, project countries can choose to maintain the project beyond the next phase or integrate with existing structures in ASEAN and other regional fora.

**5. Plan the monitoring and evaluation system in advance to ensure that it is operational and able to measure project effectiveness and impacts from the outset**

The project already has an M&E system in place. The key point is to ensure that this is operational from the outset of the next phase. Useful additions would be a consideration of the 'theory of change' to think through the ultimate goal and what needs to happen to achieve this. This would be a useful exercise since the project is coming from a partial perspective as there were elements in the Prevention Pillar which were outside the project's remit but necessary to its success. It would also be helpful to plan for impact measurement from the start and ensure that a suitable baseline is established from which comparable data can be taken at the end. The KAP survey that has already been done can show impacts on those individuals if they are subsequently tracked. However, impacts at other levels (prevalence of the issue, institutional level etc.) would require different methodologies.

**6. Carry out public awareness-raising activities through media campaigns and other activities led by law enforcement agencies**

In the next phase, the project could consider wider awareness-raising, media campaigns etc. This was part of the Prevention Pillar work in this phase but wider awareness is necessary to achieving institutional change. Such campaigns could be led by enforcement agencies.

**7. Increase collaboration with other organisations working in CSETT in order to benefit from the longstanding work of more specialist organisations and so that UNODC can bring its own unique expertise to addressing the issue.**

The project collaborated with other organisations in this phase but its scope was perhaps limited since this was the domain of the Prevention Pillar. In a future phase, the project needs to work more extensively, especially with organisations that have expertise in this field, such as ECPAT. The subject may be new to UNODC but many agencies have worked on CSETT for years. See

for example, recent action by organisations on CSETT in relation to the World Cup in Brazil<sup>9</sup>. Despite being new, UNODC is able to bring added value to this issue.

**8. Improve staff capacity in project and grant management through current restructuring efforts and by increasing internal training opportunities**

Project performance could have been improved through increased staff capacity within UNODC on project design, planning and management, including grant management. Some of these matters are now being addressed through the re-structuring of the regional office. However, there is no training modality for implementation of projects with grants. UNODC occasionally trains on project management and M&E. UNODC HQ should consider cascading training on grant management in line with similar trainings on evaluation, procurement etc.

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<sup>9</sup> Huffington Post, ‘Brazil's Churches Fight Against Child Sex Tourism Ahead Of World Cup’, 31 May 2014, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/31/brazil-church-sex-tourism\\_n\\_5420683.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/31/brazil-church-sex-tourism_n_5420683.html)

## V. LESSONS LEARNED

Both the donor and UNODC reported challenges in project administration. UNODC does not have the institutional capacity to manage sub-contracting relationships as shown by the challenges in the agreement with INTERPOL. It was not able to assess INTERPOL's capacity sufficiently, or to plan, guide and monitor its activities. Other more flexible arrangements are needed to work in coordination with others. UNODC's experience under this project shows that good cooperation with civil society organisations does not depend on a funding agreement.

UNODC project design and start-up/inception requires improvement to ensure that commitments made to donors are realistic and workable. A more stringent internal appraisal system for proposals would help to pick up and plan for issues that are not identified in donor feedback. Start dates in particular should coincide with the arrival of project staff to avoid misconceptions on the part of the donor that the project started earlier than it did. A reasonable inception period should always be factored in taking into account time for obtaining government agreements and other start-up activities such as staff recruitment, setting up the M&E system (including the baseline), gender and human rights strategy etc. The staffing structure should be adequate for the task required and utilise the skills of staff properly – in this situation, the regional office needed two staff, a project management specialist in overall charge, and a thematic sector expert – instead of one staff and outsourcing key technical tasks to multiple consultants.

UNODC management structures and headquarters processes appear not to have supported the project well. It has largely been left to struggle alone. This has resulted in considerable pressures on staff and an initiative that is half-complete, partly due to a lack of careful planning as well as other constraints. If similar issues are arising in other projects, this may risk giving negative impressions to external parties about UNODC's work.

The project approach of enabling country staff to take the lead was positive; it resulted in good partnerships with national counterparts, and built the capacity of national staff. The team worked in a harmonious way, partly because of this approach but also due to the positive tone set by regional project management, despite external and internal pressures.

The approach to building partnerships with national authorities was also constructive. As food for thought, rather than a lesson learned, the project may want to reflect more on what 'ownership' means and how best to achieve it as highlighted in various places in the report.

# ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE EVALUATION

## 1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

### (a) Overview of the project

<b>Project number:</b>	<b>XSPT 33</b>
<b>Project title:</b>	Project Childhood Protection Pillar – ‘Enhancing law enforcement capacity for national and transnational action to identify and effectively act upon travelling child sex offenders in the Mekong’
<b>Duration:</b>	4 years (from August 2010 to July 2014)
<b>Location:</b>	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, Viet Nam
<b>Linkages to UNODC/ROSEAP Regional Programme outcomes (2013-15)</b>	Sub-programme 4 - Criminal Justice Systems Outcome 2: Children in contact with the law better served and protected by criminal justice institutions
<b>Link to UNODC Thematic Programme/Medium Term Strategy</b>	UNODC Strategy 2012 – 2015 (Sub programme 4: Justice)
<b>Executing Agency:</b>	UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific in partnership with INTERPOL
<b>Key Partner Government Organizations:</b>	Cambodia: Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice Lao PDR: Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Justice Thailand: Royal Thai Police and Ministry of Justice Viet Nam: Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Justice
<b>Total Approved Budget:</b>	US\$ 4,012,200
<b>Donor:</b>	Australian Government and UK DFID
<b>Project Manager/Coordinator:</b>	Margaret Akullo, UNODC Project Coordinator

<b>Type of Evaluation (final):</b>	Terminal evaluation
<b>Time period covered by the evaluation:</b>	November 2010 – May 2014
<b>Geographic coverage of the evaluation:</b>	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam
<b>Core Learning Partners (entities):</b>	As above (see Key Partner Organisations) plus UNODC, INTERPOL and the donor

### (b) Project design and scope

Project Childhood was designed as two separate but inter-related ‘Pillars’ – namely the Prevention Pillar and the Protection Pillar. World Vision was selected by Australian authorities to implement the Prevention Pillar - and UNODC, in partnership with

INTERPOL, was selected to implement the Protection Pillar. Funding agreements were signed with UNODC on (10 June 2010) with a total budget of **AUD\$4 million** and with World Vision on (15 January 2011) with a total budget of **AUD\$3 million**.

World Vision has been working with Governments of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam (Ministries of Tourism) and communities in these countries ( to prevent children from becoming victims of sexual exploitation in tourism by raising awareness and building community resilience. Through the use of public campaigns, training and telephone hotlines it is expected that participating governments, communities, and tourism industries will become more aware of the vulnerabilities of at-risk children to sexual exploitation in tourism and to take more effective preventative measures.

UNODC, in partnership with INTERPOL, has been working with law enforcement agencies in the four project countries (Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of Justice, Ministries of Public Security, Ministries of Interior, Royal Thai Police, Thailand Courts of Justice, Prosecutor Offices, and Judiciaries) to protect children through strengthening law enforcement responses to sexual abuse of children by travelling child sex offenders. The Protection Pillar consists of four main components and expected outcomes:

- Component 1 - Legislation: Outcome - Legislative frameworks relevant to combatting travelling child sex offenders and protecting victims are enhanced / improved
- Component 2 – Training: Outcome - Informed and capable front-line law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges
- Component 3 – Cooperation: Outcome - Enhanced cooperation between criminal justice agencies within and across borders with respect to combating travelling child sex offenders and protecting victims
- Component 4 – Operations: Outcome - Expert investigations carried out, offenders identified, investigated and (as appropriate) arrested and prosecuted, and child victims appropriately supported.

Further details of the Protection Pillar’s planned outcomes, including supporting outputs and indicators of achievement, are provided in the project’s logical framework matrix and other supporting documents. Details of all key project documents to be referenced during the evaluation are provided at Annex 1.

This final Independent Project Evaluation is focused on assessing the work and achievements of the Protection Pillar only. It will nevertheless also assess the extent to which the Protection Pillar has, or has not, effectively collaborated with the Prevention Pillar in order to support synergies of effort between the two pillars.

The Protection Pillar underwent a six month inception phase from November 2010 to April 2011, and in May 2011 a draft Project Implementation Design Document (PIDD) was submitted to AusAid (now Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade-DFAT). The PIDD incorporated detailed activities that had been undertaken during the inception phase to inform year 1 operations. The PIDD was subject to an independent review and the findings highlighted areas requiring further improvement and clarification before DFAT approval. These included the hiring of technical specialists to undertake a period of

further research focusing on gender issues, institutional capacity building and legal analysis.

The PIDD was finalized in September 2011, the Protection Pillar received approval of the PIDD from DFAT in December 2011 and began implementation of approved activities in January 2012.

### **(c) Project achievements to date**

Since implementation commenced, the project has prepared six-monthly and annual progress reports for both UNODC and DFAT. These, as well as other supporting documents, provide details of project achievements from the perspective of the implementation team (UNODC / INTERPOL).

It is the task of the independent evaluation to help review and verify whether or not these reports / documents accurately reflect what has / has not been achieved.

A mid-term independent evaluation of the project was conducted by the Australian Government (using two independent consultants) in August / September 2013. This also provides a reference point for the terminal evaluation. However, it should be noted that some key findings of this evaluation have been disputed by the UNODC project implementation team. A detailed written response to the draft evaluation report is available. As at the time of preparing these TOR, the Australian government has yet to provide its formal response to the evaluation report and to UNODC's written response.

### **(d) Summary of main challenges faced during implementation to date**

From the perspective of the UNODC project implementation team, the main challenges faced during project implementation have included the following:

- Clarification of donor expectations and meeting their information and reporting requirements
- Timely recruitment of project staff
- Clarification of partner government expectations and priorities, identification of key partner implementing agencies, appointment of government counterparts and building local commitment to and ownership of project objectives, given that the initial design was significantly donor driven
- Establishing coordination and cooperation arrangements with the (separately designed, contracted and managed) Prevention Pillar
- Clarifying, negotiating and adapting the project's initial planned focus on travelling child sex offenders only, so as to include child sex offences more generally
- Clarifying the scope and practical work focus of the Operational Component, understanding how INTERPOL intends to implement the planned work, and determining how INTERPOL and UNODC can most effectively cooperate
- Meeting government partner expectations in four different countries within the limited available budget

Assessing how these challenges have been managed and addressed by UNODC, INTERPOL, World Vision, DFAT and project implementing partners will be an important element of the independent evaluation.

## 2. DISBURSEMENT HISTORY

### UNODC

Overall Budget USD (June 2010 – May 2014)	Total Approved Budget (June 2010 – May 2014)	Expenditure in USD (Aug 2010 – Dec 2013)	Expenditure in % (Aug 2010 – Dec 2013)
US\$ 3,683,000*	US\$ 4,012,200	US\$3,591,894	90%

\*(2010 AUD\$-USD\$ currency exchange rates)

### INTERPOL

Overall Budget USD (June 2011 – May 2014)	Total Approved Budget (June 2010 – Dec 2013)	Expenditure in USD (June 2010 – Nov 2013)	Expenditure in % (June 2010 – Nov 2013)
US\$ 1,000,000	US\$ 767, 136**	US\$ 634,838	83%

\*(Included in UNODC's Total approved Budget)

## 3. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The final Independent Project Evaluation is required by UNODC rules and regulations, and is also a requirement of the funding agreement with the Australian Government.

The evaluation aims to support learning about what has worked well and what has not, and will help inform all core learning partners (Annex 3), including UNODC, about what, if anything, might be usefully done in the future to continue to build the capacity of law enforcement agencies in the sub-region to help protect children from sexual abuse, including from travelling child sex offenders. The evaluation will thus be both summative and formative, and provide findings and recommendations on the scope of any possible future support that UNODC and/or other development partners might usefully provide.

The evaluation will also support accountability and transparency objectives.

Particularly, the evaluation seeks to independently assess:

- The quality of the original design, its relevance to the identified needs of partner countries, and its continued relevance during project implementation;
- The efficiency of project implementation, including with respect to both UNODC, INTERPOL and partner government mobilisation and management of resources;
- The effectiveness of the project in terms of achieving its planned objectives, including outputs delivered and contribution to outcomes;
- The likely overall impact of the project and the sustainability of benefits arising from the project;
- Whether or not there were unanticipated results, either positive or negative, arising from project implementation; and
- Opportunities for future support by UNODC and/or other development partners, including possible focus of a follow-up phase of support.

The evaluation should also specifically address gender equality and human rights issues relevant to the project.

The main evaluation users include UNODC Project Managers in the Field and HQ, INTERPOL, the beneficiary Governments (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam) and the donor (Australian Government).

#### 4. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The key questions that need to be answered by the evaluation include, but are not limited to the following:

##### 4.1 Relevance and quality of design

*Relevance of a project or programme is the extent to which its objectives are consistent with recipient needs, as well as UNODC mandates and overarching strategies and policies.*

*Design of a project or programme assesses the extent to which:*

- *The logical framework approach was adopted, with measurable expected objectives at the country and regional levels, outcomes and outputs, performance indicators, including gender equality and human rights, targets, risks, mitigation measures and assumptions.*
  - *An appropriate participatory needs assessment and context analysis took place*
- To what extent was the design based on an appropriate needs assessment and a context analysis?
  - To what extent is the project aligned with the policies and strategies of the partner countries and UNODC?
  - Were key partner agencies / officers appropriately involved in the project design?
  - Was the design the most appropriate way to meet the needs identified?
  - Was the design clear and realistic, and did it provide a sound basis to guide implementation?
  - To what extent are the objectives of the project still valid according to the current situation/environment, including with respect to the new UNODC regional programme (2014-17)?

##### 4.2 Efficiency

*Efficiency is a measure of how resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into outputs.*

Considering the project background, context, current situation/environment and other influencing factors as necessary:

- To what extent were the resources and budget managed and converted to outputs in a timely and cost-effective manner?

- To what extent has UNODC's management, monitoring and coordination of the project been efficient and appropriate, including with respect to how UNODC Field Offices and HQ resources have been used to support implementation?
- Has the project management team made timely adjustments to work plans and budgets in response to changes in the situation/environment in order to maintain efficiency?
- What, if anything, could the management team have done differently to implement the project more efficiently?

#### 4.4 Effectiveness

**Effectiveness** is the extent to which a project or programme achieves its planned outcomes.

- Were the original project outcomes (or as adapted and approved during implementation) achieved, and if so to what extent?
- What other 'results' (not in the original plan) have been achieved?
- What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the outcomes?
- How satisfied are the stakeholders with their involvement in this project, and what evidence is there of their ownership / commitment to supporting the outcomes?
- What, if anything, could the management team have done differently to make the project more effective?
- Which areas of work / outcomes show the most potential in terms of being the possible focus for any future support?

#### 4.5 Impact

**Impact** is the positive and negative longer-term change(s) produced or likely to be produced by a project, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended, after the project was implemented.

- To what extent has the project contributed or is likely to contribute to protection of children from sexual abuse by travelling child sex offenders and/or more generally?
- To what extent has the project influenced institutional capacity and performance improvements within key partner agencies?

#### 4.6 Sustainability

**Sustainability** is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of a project or programme are likely to continue after its termination.

- To what extent are the project results (outcomes and impact, if any) likely to continue / be sustained after the project has finished?
- Is stakeholders' engagement likely to continue, be scaled up, replicated or institutionalized after external funding ceases?

#### 4.7 Partnerships and cooperation

*Partnerships and cooperation is a measure of the level and quality of UNODC cooperation with partners and implementing partners (e.g. donors, Governments, other relevant UN agencies etc)*

- To what extent have partnerships and cooperation been sought and established (including with Prevention Pillar, INTERPOL, other UN agencies) and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance?
- To what extent have key partners (primarily key government counterparts / agencies) been involved in the planning and implementation of the project?
- What evidence is there of partner cost sharing and local commitment to / ownership of project activities and objectives?
- What are the main factors that have influenced participation and non-participation of key partners?
- What, if anything, could have been done differently to better promote effective partnerships and cooperation?

#### 4.8 Cross cutting issues

- To what extent has the project effectively addressed gender equality issues in the context of promoting a more effective law enforcement response to child sexual abuse cases
- To what extent has the project promoted UN human rights principles, including with respect to the rights of the child?

#### 4.9 Lessons learned and best practices

- What lessons have been learned from project implementation that should be factored in to the design and management of any future phase of support for this kind of work?
- Have any best practices been employed / developed during project implementation that could be usefully shared with other practitioners in this area of work?

### 5. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation will be participatory, involving the project's core learning partners (CLP). These include the key partner government agencies and individual counterparts that the project has worked with in the four target countries. The evaluation will also engage with and seek the views of the donor, those responsible for managing the Prevention Pillar, and other agencies and projects working in the sub-region on related child protection issues (e.g. UNICEF, AAPTIP, and other INGOs).

Effective facilitation of interviews, group discussions and the conduct of an online questionnaire will therefore be key. The evaluator will also be expected to triangulate data sources and collection methods to support the validity of the information being generated through the evaluation.

It is anticipated that the evaluation will be conducted by **one independent consultant**, and will involve visits to each of the 4 participating countries. The project management

team will provide the necessary logistical support in terms of organizing meetings, travel and accommodation in each country visited, and any necessary interpreter services.

In addition to soliciting the views of key stakeholders, the evaluation will source information from key project documents, including the progress reports prepared by the project management team.

The evaluation will be conducted in 5 main phases, namely: (i) preparation; (ii) field work; (iii) presentation of preliminary findings and feedback; (iv) report writing (first and final drafts); and (v) presentation of findings and recommendations to stakeholders.

The main elements of method will therefore include:

- Preliminary **desk review** of all relevant project documentation,(Annex 1) as provided by UNODC and also independently accessed by the evaluator (e.g. from the web or through other professional contacts/sources)
- **Ongoing email and phone communication** with stakeholders as required, including with respect to organizing and confirming all field work arrangements, meetings, etc with UNODC
- Preparation and submission of a (updated) **field work plan/evaluation methodology** in the form of an inception report to IEU for clearance, in line with the Guidelines for Inception Report to be found on the IEU website <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations-step-by-step.html>, to be submitted through the application of Independent Project Evaluation in ProFi, at least one week prior to the commencement of field work. This will include a draft online survey using an appropriate online survey tool such as Survey Monkey
- **An initial set of meetings and interviews** with the project management team and other UNODC staff at the Regional Office in Bangkok. Field work arrangements, the schedule of planned meetings and the scope of the online survey will be further discussed and confirmed. The on-line survey will then be sent out to identified respondents.
- **Face to face interviews** with key project stakeholders and beneficiaries in each of the four participating countries, both individually and (as appropriate) in small groups
- **Physical inspection of facilities/equipment and relevant administrative records** as appropriate
- **Ongoing review of relevant project documents**
- Preparation and submission of an **Aide Memoire** to UNODC prior to completion of all field work
- **Presentation of preliminary evaluation findings** (based on the Aide Memoire) at a meeting in the UNODC regional office in Bangkok and facilitation of discussions to help confirm validity of these findings as well as the identification of possible practical recommendations for follow-up

- **Final reflection on and analysis** of all available information
- **Preparation of the draft evaluation report** (based on Guidelines for Evaluation Report and Template Report to be found on the IEU website <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations-step-by-step.html> ) The evaluator submits a draft report to the project coordinator for review of factual errors or omissions and the evaluator incorporates the necessary changes regarding factual errors and comments received and finalizes the evaluation report.;
- **Preparation of the final evaluation report**, following feedback from UNODC on the first full draft, and submission to UNODC; and
- Presentation of final evaluation report with its findings and recommendations to the target audience, stakeholders etc at a meeting arranged by UNODC.

A job description for the international evaluator is provided at Annex 2.

In conducting the evaluation, the evaluator needs to take into account the UNODC Evaluation Norms and Standards. The IEU website includes all norms, tools, guidelines and templates for the evaluation process that are to be used for the evaluation (<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations-step-by-step.html>)

## **6. TIMEFRAME AND DELIVERABLES**

The evaluation is scheduled to take place between March and June 2014. In order for this timeline to be met, UNODC will need to approve the TOR and then identify and contract the independent consultant by mid February 2014.

It is important that key government counterparts in each of the four participating countries are kept informed of progress and timing. They should also be provided with a chance to comment on / input to the evaluation draft TOR.

The evaluator will have overall responsibility for the quality and timely submission of all deliverables as specified below. The exact timings are indicative at this point in time:

1. Inception report containing a refined work plan, methodology and evaluation tools (in line with norms, tools and guidelines of IEU and to be cleared by IEU).
2. Aide Memoire (c 10 pages), containing a summary of work undertaken and preliminary findings in terms of project relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and partnerships. By end of April 2014.
3. Presentation of preliminary evaluation findings to UNODC (and other CLP as appropriate), and solicitation of feedback. By end of April 2014.
4. Draft evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation policy and guidelines (c 30 pages, plus annexes). By mid May 2014.
5. Final evaluation report, taking into account UNODC management response (c 30 pages plus annexes. By mid June 2014.
6. Presentation of final evaluation findings and recommendations

UNODC guidelines and formats for evaluation reports are referenced at Annex 3.

Tentative Date	Deliverables
March 2014	Field work plan and methodology paper in the form of an inception report + draft on line survey questionnaire
April 2014	Aide Memoire and appropriate presentation materials (e.g. PPT slides)
April 2014	Draft report
May 2014	Final report

## 7. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

This evaluation envisages **one expert evaluator** to undertake the exercise.

The evaluator shall not act as a representative of any party and must remain independent and impartial. The evaluator must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the project under evaluation.

The evaluator is contracted by UNODC. The qualifications and responsibilities for the evaluator are specified in the job description attached to these Terms of Reference (Annex 2).

The evaluator is expected to have at least degree level educational qualifications in an appropriate discipline, 10 years relevant work experience and excellent English language speaking and writing skills.

## 8. MANAGEMENT OF EVALUATION PROCESS

The independent evaluation will be carried out following UNODC's evaluation policy and United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards. The evaluator will work closely with UNODC's Independent Evaluation Unit.

### The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU)

The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) provides norms, tools and templates for the different stages of the evaluation process. IEU also advises on evaluation matters and is involved in the process described in the Roles and Responsibilities table for Independent Project Evaluations (to be found on the IEU website, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/index.html>). IEU clears the final Terms of Reference and the final inception report. Furthermore, IEU assesses the final evaluation report. IEU supports the process of issuing a management response, if needed, and participates in disseminating the final report by posting it on the evaluation website.

### Project Manager

- Responsible for the provision of desk review materials to the evaluator
- Reviews and comments on the evaluation workplan and methodology
- Liaises with the CLPs and UNODC country offices and helps organize stakeholders meetings and field work logistics, including in-country travel, accommodation and interpretation services as required

- Reviews the draft evaluation report, provides comments and develops an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations (as appropriate)
- Assesses and comments on the final evaluation report

#### **Core Learning Partners (CLPs)**

- Key agencies and individuals are identified and selected by the project manager in consultation with the National Project Officers
- CLPs review and have opportunity to comment on the draft TOR
- CLPs facilitate and attend meetings, respond to questions and provide access to relevant information
- CLPs are provided opportunity to comment on the draft evaluation report
- CLPs further disseminate and apply (as appropriate) the key recommendations / follow up actions contained in the final evaluation report

#### **The Evaluator**

- Carries out the desk review
- Provides methodological evaluation quality assurance throughout the evaluation process and inputs
- Develops the work plan and evaluation methodology in the form of an inception report ,
- Conducts the evaluation process and carries out the evaluation tasks
- Undertakes appropriate qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis, (including triangulation of data)
- Ensures that all aspects of the terms of reference are fulfilled
- Prepares an Aide Memoire on completion of field work
- Presents preliminary findings prior to departure for home base
- Drafts an evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation policy
- Finalises the evaluation report on the basis of inputs/feedback received

All tools, norms and templates to be used by the evaluators during this independent project evaluation can be found on the IEU website: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations-step-by-step.html>

The evaluation team will be briefed on the project by the UNODC Project Coordinator upon the team's arrival to the region. The essential project documents will be sent to the evaluator in advance to allow for preliminary familiarization with the project subject and preparation of the inception report.

UNODC Project Coordinator and the project staff will provide necessary logistical and administrative support during the expert's field visits. Office space and required equipment will be provided by the relevant UNODC Project Office. UNODC Project Coordinator will make the following arrangements:

- manage the time table of meetings with the relevant stakeholders;
- provide interpretation for meetings with local stakeholders, as/when required;
- put at the disposal of the evaluator(s) all necessary documentation for conducting the evaluation.

A preliminary list of Core Learning Partners (key individuals to be engaged in and consulted during the evaluation process) is provided at Annex 3.

## 9. PAYMENT MODALITIES

Consultants will be issued consultancy contracts and paid in accordance to UNODC rules and regulations. Payment is correlated to satisfactory deliverables reviewed by the Project Manager and IEU.

### Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) and Terminal:

- 75 % of daily subsistence allowance and terminals shall be paid in advance, before travelling. The balance shall be paid after the travel has taken place, upon presentation of boarding passes and the completion of travel claim forms.

### Consultancy Fee:

- The first payment (25 per cent of the consultancy fee) upon receipt of the Inception Report;
- The second payment (25 per cent of the consultancy fee) upon receipt of the Draft Evaluation Report;
- The third and final payment (50 percent of the consultancy fee, i.e. the remainder of the fee) only after completion of the respective tasks, receipt of the final report and clearance by IEU/UNODC.

## ANNEX II. DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

### Questionnaire 1: Key informant interviews<sup>10</sup>

#### Final Evaluation: Project Childhood Protection Pillar

##### **Background Information**

This is a final evaluation of the Project Childhood Protection Pillar which is being implemented by the UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific in partnership with INTERPOL. The programme runs from November 2010 to May 2014 and works in four project countries - Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam - with Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of Justice, Ministries of Public Security, Ministries of Interior, Royal Thai Police, Thailand Courts of Justice, Prosecutor Offices, and Judiciaries. It was set up with the aim of “Enhancing law enforcement capacity for national and transnational action to identify and effectively act upon travelling child sex offenders in the Mekong”. The Protection Pillar consists of four main components and expected outcomes:

Component 1 - Legislation: Outcome - Legislative frameworks relevant to combating travelling child sex offenders and protecting victims are enhanced / improved

Component 2 – Training: Outcome - Informed and capable front-line law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges

Component 3 – Cooperation: Outcome - Enhanced cooperation between criminal justice agencies within and across borders with respect to combating travelling child sex offenders and protecting victims

Component 4 – Operations: Outcome - Expert investigations carried out, offenders identified, investigated and (as appropriate) arrested and prosecuted, and child victims appropriately supported.

The evaluation is being carried out by an independent consultant, Asmita Naik, who may be contacted at [asmitanaik.consultancy@gmail.com](mailto:asmitanaik.consultancy@gmail.com) or [asmita.naik:@outlook.com](mailto:asmita.naik:@outlook.com)

##### **Evaluation Questions**

The list below comprises 11 main evaluation questions which you are requested to answer. In addition, each main question is accompanied by a subset of prompts based on the questions listed in the evaluation terms of reference. You may wish to answer some or all of these.

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<sup>10</sup> Individual and group meetings with UNODC staff; international partners and collaborators, donor, researchers/experts/consultants.

**It would be helpful to the evaluation analysis if you could refer to the evaluation question number when giving your response to the evaluator.**

1. What is your role and involvement in the project? (Briefly describe)
2. How **effective** is the project? What has the project achieved?

Consider for example:

- 2.1. Were the original project outcomes (or as adapted and approved during implementation) achieved, and if so to what extent?
- 2.2. What other 'results' (not in the original plan) have been achieved?
- 2.3. What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the outcomes?
- 2.4. How satisfied are the stakeholders with their involvement in this project, and what evidence is there of their ownership / commitment to supporting the outcomes?
- 2.5. What, if anything, could the management team have done differently to make the project more effective?
- 2.6. Which areas of work / outcomes show the most potential in terms of being the possible focus for any future support?
- 2.7. Is there any way in which it has not met expectations? What has the program not achieved?
- 2.8. Have there been any unintended consequences of the program (both positive and negative)?

*Cross-cutting issues*

- 2.9. To what extent has the project effectively addressed gender equality issues in the context of promoting a more effective law enforcement response to child sexual abuse cases
- 2.10. To what extent has the project promoted UN human rights principles, including with respect to the rights of the child?

3. Is the project **relevant**?

- 3.1. To what extent was the design based on an appropriate needs assessment and a context analysis?
- 3.2. To what extent is the project aligned with the policies and strategies of the partner countries, UNODC and the donor?

3.3. Were key partner agencies / officers appropriately involved in the project design?

3.4. Was the design the most appropriate way to meet the needs identified?

3.5. Was the design clear and realistic, and did it provide a sound basis to guide implementation?

3.6. To what extent are the objectives of the project still valid according to the current situation/environment, stakeholder priorities, including with respect to the new UNODC regional programme (2014-17)?

4. What is the lasting **impact** of the project? Will the activities of the project or its effects continue once the project has finished? If the project has led to any changes, are there any other factors or organisations that might have contributed to these changes?

Consider for example:

4.1. To what extent has the project contributed or is likely to contribute to protection of children from sexual abuse by travelling child sex offenders and/or more generally?

4.2. To what extent has the project influenced institutional capacity and performance improvements within key partner agencies?

5. Is the project **sustainable** and if so, in what way?

Consider for example:

5.1. To what extent are the project results (outcomes and impact, if any) likely to continue / be sustained after the project has finished?

5.2. Is stakeholders' engagement likely to continue, be scaled up, replicated or institutionalized after external funding ceases?

6. How **efficient** has the project been? What factors have helped or hindered the project in its implementation? This includes internal issues such as management, resources, relationships, program design/planning, monitoring and evaluation as well as the external context - policy, politics, socio-economic issues; partnerships and relationships with external organisations etc.

Consider for example:

6.1. To what extent has UNODC's management, monitoring and coordination of the project been efficient and appropriate, including with respect to how UNODC Field Offices and HQ resources have been used to support implementation?

6.2. Has the project management team made timely adjustments to work plans and budgets in response to changes in the situation/environment in order to maintain efficiency?

6.3. What, if anything, could the management team have done differently to implement the project more efficiently?

***Partnerships and cooperation***

6.4. To what extent have partnerships and cooperation been sought and established (including with Prevention Pillar, INTERPOL, other UN agencies) and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance?

6.5. To what extent have key partners (primarily key government counterparts / agencies) been involved in the planning and implementation of the project?

6.6. What evidence is there of partner cost sharing and local commitment to / ownership of project activities and objectives?

6.7. What are the main factors that have influenced participation and non-participation of key partners?

6.8. What, if anything, could have been done differently to better promote effective partnerships and cooperation?

7. What **lessons learned** are there from project implementation that should be factored in to the design and management of any future phase of support for this kind of work?

8. Have any **best practices** been employed / developed during project implementation that could be usefully shared with other practitioners in this area of work?

9. Do you have any **recommendations for future** work in this area?

## ANNEX III. DESK REVIEW LIST

The documents include, but are not limited to:

### 1. PROJECT DESIGN and RELATED DOCUMENTS

- Original Project Design Document
- Donor approved Project Implementation Design Document
- Revised Logframe / Results Matrix (from M&E system document of Feb 2013)
- UNODC Strategy 2012 – 2015: Work of the standing open-ended intergovernmental working group on improving the governance and financialsituation of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.  
[http://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/UNODC\\_2012 - 2015 Resolution ECOSOC merged.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/UNODC_2012_-_2015_Resolution_ECOSOC_merged.pdf)
- UNODC and the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Position Paper.  
[http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/UNODC Human rights position paper 2012.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/UNODC_Human_rights_position_paper_2012.pdf)

### 2. GRANT AGREEMENT

The documents include, but are not limited to:

- UNODC Financing Agreement with DFAT
- UNODC Grant Agreement with INTERPOL

### 3. TECHNICAL PAPERS and PRODUCTS

- Legal analysis report
- Police training report
- Gender strategy
- M&E system
- Training Curriculum
- KAP survey summaries
- Training / workshop summary data

### 4. PROGRESS REPORTS & REVIEWS

The documents include, but are not limited to:

- UNODC Semi Annual Progress Reports and Annual Progress Reports for 2011, 2012 & 2013.

- Reports to DFAT 2011, 2012 & 2013.
- DFAT Quality At Implementation (QAI) reports 2012 & 2013
- Mid-term evaluation draft report and UNODC and INTERPOL response (2013)
- Mid-term evaluation final report and DFAT Management response (2014)

## ANNEX IV. EVALUATION CRITERIA RATINGS

<b>Evaluation Criteria Ratings Project Childhood – Protection Pillar</b>		
<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Rating</b>	<b>Explanation</b>
Relevance	5	Project is very relevant in terms of the prevalence of the problem and the needs and interests of national authorities. The project might have made itself more relevant by exploring the nature and pattern of child sex offending in the region more specifically.
Effectiveness	4	This average score is broken down as follows: outcome 1 (5); outcome 2 (4); outcome 3 (5); outcome 4 (2); cross-pillar (4 – taking into account design flaws and recognition of UNODC efforts by stakeholders); human rights (5).
Efficiency	3	The project was affected by numerous internal and external constraints which impeded optimum performance. On cost efficiency, while the project does very well overall on a limited budget, the lack of progress under outcome 4 is a significant waste of resource.
Monitoring & Evaluation	5	The M&E framework is of very high quality but the system was developed too late to be of sufficient use in guiding the project and in measuring progress.
Sustainability	4	The project is working on highly sustainable approaches in terms of legal reform and capacity development but these take a long time and it is too early to expect the project interventions to be sustainable. The project could have done more to plan ahead for sustainability and exit.
Gender Equality	5	With the encouragement of the donor, the project has addressed gender well through its activities and in a standalone training programme.
Risk Management	3	Risks to project implementation were not sufficiently considered when planning or making choices in project approaches or activities e.g. training (outcome 2), regional legal research group meeting (outcome 3), operational activities (outcome 4).
Impact	4	It is too early to assess impact at an institutional level. Some anecdotal evidence of impact on individuals is available. The project M&E is not set up to measure impact in a systematic way.

<b>Evaluation Criteria Ratings Project Childhood – Protection Pillar</b>		
<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Rating</b>	<b>Explanation</b>
Lessons/ Learning	3	Overall the project has had insufficient time to reflect and make adjustments during implementation as it was always behind schedule from day one.

### Rating scale

<b>Satisfactory</b>		<b>Less than satisfactory</b>	
<b>6</b>	Very high quality	<b>3</b>	Less than adequate quality
<b>5</b>	Good quality	<b>2</b>	Poor quality
<b>4</b>	Adequate quality	<b>1</b>	Very poor quality

## ANNEX V. CASE STUDY ON VIET NAM LEGAL REFORM

### **Expeditious progress but change is still a long way off....**

The project's efforts in Viet Nam to improve legislation relating to CSETT are progressing well. There are various factors that have contributed to this. The project's intervention was timely; the government is in the process of reviewing the penal code so this is an opportune moment for making proposals. In addition, the climate is receptive to protection issues of this type. The work of many organisations over the years on trafficking, child protection and related matters has led to a culture of increasing concern over such issues which the project has benefitted from. Previous work by UNICEF Viet Nam, for example, on training of law enforcement officials on child sexual exploitation and abuse has helped pave the way. In addition, UNICEF's legal review makes similar recommendations on legal amendments to UNODC though evaluation interviewees confirm that UNODC's legal analysis makes some new and unique points, especially in relation to sentencing and computer-related crimes.

Some of the government's own administrative procedures have aided effective implementation, for instance, the acceptance of a project requires the establishment of an inter-ministerial committee which helps internal coordination; another example is that proposals to amend the law need to be evidence-based. Aside from these external facilitating factors, the project's has been responsive in moving the process forward. The project's technical expertise; it's approach to building ownership; and readiness to assist have gained the confidence of the national authorities. Both UNODC and the national authorities have worked efficiently and in unison to move the agenda forward:

2011-12 – Government of Viet Nam approves project and sets up an inter-ministerial project management committee.

2012 - UNODC legal analysis and recommendations accepted by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ).

2012 – As a result of this, MOJ survey in 9 provinces/cities to assess the impact of the implementation of the current Penal code provisions relating to child sexual abuse. Following this and various consultations, recommendations made for the amendments of the relevant Penal Code provisions, for example, harsher sentences for offenders who sexually exploit and abuse children; criminalisation of sexual intercourse offences when committed against children aged between 16 and 18 years of age.

2013 – This influences amendments with respect to two different legal statutes. Firstly, the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs includes UNODC's legal analysis report's recommendations in the proposed amendments on the Law on Child Protection, Care and Education. These recommendations include the unification of the two definitions of child and juvenile as a person under 18 years of age; adding legal liability for a person, who violates responsibility on protection, care and education for children with special circumstances, including children being sexually abused; and, clarifying the definition of child sexual abuse. A process for drafting the law has been initiated which will include UNODC, World Vision and other agencies.

Secondly, some UNODC recommendations are considered as part of the Penal Code amendment process under the framework of the Viet Nam National Assembly Legislative Programme (2012-2015). These include recommendations such as providing a clear definition of obscenity against children, adding measures to protect child victim/witness during

criminal proceedings, adding aggravating elements for child sexual abuse offences, adding new offences related to child pornography, for example using a computer, telecommunications or internet to commit a crime, abusing tourism activities to commit crime.

2012- Government of Viet Nam initiates the regional legal research group involving all project countries.

Despite this expeditious progress, legal reform is still some way ahead. The political system of Viet Nam is defined by a single party socialist republic framework where the President of Viet Nam is head of state and the Prime Minister is the head of government, in a one party system led by the Communist Party of Viet Nam. Executive power is exercised by the government and the President of Viet Nam. Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly. The Judiciary is independent of the executive.

The process for creating or amending legislation in Viet Nam is set down in a statute related to the issuing of legal documents which specifies that the lead agency, the MOJ for the penal code and the Supreme People's Procuracy for the criminal procedure code, must consult different ministries (around 21 in this case). In accordance with the procedure, the MOJ carried out a survey to examine the need for a change in the law and reviewed international experience. A drafting team was established to identify gaps and to develop specific draft articles. The proposal is then put to the public, experts and organisations for consultation including through an online process for obtaining public comments. The comments are reviewed and taken into account in the next draft which goes before a review committee. The MOJ gives final approval before submitting it to an inter-ministerial committee comprising of 21 ministries which decides whether the proposal should go before the National Assembly. Once at the National Assembly, the proposal goes to a sub-committee for detailed review, after which a standing committee will decide whether to put the proposal on the National Assembly agenda. The National Assembly meets twice a year; it will consider the proposal at the first session, give feedback to the MOJ for further revision; before taking a decision in its second session. If a law is approved by the National Assembly, it is issued by the President.

Changes to the law will likely take a few years; time for internal consultations and research within government (the responsible ministries) before the proposal arrives on the working agenda of the National Assembly. Once there, it depends how much receptivity there is to the idea – some proposals may be in line with international law but are not widely recognised at national level, and assembly members may take much lobbying and persuasion to vote in favour of reform.

The UNODC proposals are at an early stage in the process – they are still being reviewed and consulted on within government. Moreover, their fate is tied to the outcome of the broader revisions to the penal code, criminal code and law on child protection, care and education. Although this is advantageous as these are the main statutes of the land which bodes better for implementation; it will also lead to delays which are not directly related to the project's proposals. The legal and policy reform process is complex and multi-faceted; many factors play a part in leading to a change in the law. The project has made a constructive and informed contribution to the process but change is still a long way off.....

## ANNEX VI. CHRONOLOGY

<b>Date</b>	<b>Activity</b>
2007	2007 – INTERPOL raises issue with UNODC (as a result of the Christopher Paul Neil case - <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/08/1">http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/08/1</a> )
2008-9	UNODC and AusAID discussions
2009	AusAID asks UNODC to submit its proposal, not through a bid process but a peer review in 2009-10
Sept-Oct 2009	Regional Project Manager job advertised
Jan 2010	UNODC partnership forum held as AusAID wanted engagement with national counterparts (INTERPOL joined in)
April 2010	Shortlisting for Project Manager Job
April to May 2010	Political instability in Bangkok
May 2010	Written test for Regional Project Manager position
June 2010	Interview for Regional Project Manager Position
June 2010	AusAID agreement signed, with clause that it goes live within 60 days.
Aug 2010	Project goes live but not same as signature date. AusAID think the project is live but there is no-one in post
Aug 2010	Regional Project Manager selected, asked to start immediately in September but needs to give notice and relocate, November agreed as official start date but some work done beforehand.
Sept 2010	Regional Project Manager signs contract and attends meeting in Lyon with INTERPOL
1 Nov 2010	Regional Project Manager and Thai national staff start work in Bangkok
Nov 2010 to May 2011	1st draft Project Implementation Design Document (PIDD): submitted to AusAID May 2011 (within 6 months as per agreement)
Dec 2010	Thailand Project Assistant hired
Dec 2010 to March 2011	Situational Analysis carried out (Vacancy for Consultant drafted and advertised December 2010 and consultancy started late Dec - March 2011).
2011-2013	UNODC Quarterly, Semi Annual and Annual Reports (2011-2013) - 3, 6 and 12 monthly. This included editing information submitted by the project team including INTERPOL before submission to AusAID and UNODC.
Feb 2011	Cambodia national staff hired
Feb 2011	Viet Nam government endorsement
June to Sept 2011	2nd Project Implementation Design Document (PIDD): Following 1st review by AusAID, 2nd draft submitted to AusAID September 2011 (date agreed with

	donor)
Aug 2011	Lao PDR and Viet Nam national staff hired
Sept to Dec 2011	FINAL review of Project Implementation Design Document (PIDD) by AusAID: AusAID approval received in December 2011 for live implementation in January 2012.
October 2011	Training needs assessment
November 2011	Cambodia government endorsement
Feb 2012	M&E Strategy - Information used from Project Document and slightly updated during PIDD period above. Consultant recruited Feb 2012 to strengthen M&E framework.
April 2012	Thailand government endorsement
June 2012 to Feb 2013	INTERPOL Grant Agreement (addressing irregularity issues)
Aug to Dec 2012	Gender Strategy - Information used from Project Document and slightly updated during PIDD period above. Worked on strategy between August - December 2012. Gender Specialist recruited August 2012 till July 2013/25 working days-Last input March 2013). Gender strategy approved by AusAID December 2012.
Dec 2012	Thailand Project Assistant resigns
Jan 2013	CAM, LAO and VN Project Assistants hired
Jan 2013	National Officer vacancy advertised to focus on cross pillar activities as emphasised by donor
Jan-Apr 2013	No Project Assistant in Thailand
April 2013	National Officer recruitment completed but withdrawn as recruitment of new staff suspended due to development of new Regional Programme
May 2013	Lao PDR government endorsement
May 2013	Thailand Project Assistant hired

## ANNEX VII. BREAKDOWN OF EVALUATION CONTRIBUTORS

The table below gives a breakdown of evaluation contributors by country and by organisation/department.

	UNODC	International (DFAT, INTERPOL, WVA, experts)	Government – police and security departments	Government – justice and attorney general departments	Government – other departments	Civil society	
Regional Level	4	8					
Cambodia	1	1	4	2			
Lao PDR	1			4	3		
Thailand	1		6	2	1	2	
Viet Nam	2	2	4	4	2		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>54</b>