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Final Independent Project Evaluation of the

**Precursor Control in Central Asia
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and
Azerbaijan**

RER/E29

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Project AD/RER/00/E29 “Precursor Control in Central Asia” (hereafter referred to as Project E29) is a project within the Sub-regional Law Enforcement Program co-ordinated by the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA) in Tashkent. It responds to the requirements of Article 12 of the 1988 United Nation Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (hereafter referred to as the 1988 Convention) which requires signatory countries to prevent the diversion of chemicals which can be used for the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. Project E29 initially covered the countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and was later extended to include Azerbaijan. Project E29 was launched in May 2000 with a budget of \$5,000,000.

This is the final Independent Project Evaluation. A mid-term Independent Project Evaluation was conducted in 2005 and the findings of that report, along with the achievements to date of Project E29, resulted in significant changes being made. As specified in the Terms of Reference, this final evaluation considers the period from the mid-term evaluation until the present.

The logic for launching Project E29 was two-fold: firstly, although they were all signatories to the 1988 Convention, none of the Central Asian (CA) countries had in place the necessary arrangements to meet their obligations under Articles 12 (namely, to require industry to register and account for their use of the controlled chemicals, to create a regulatory mechanism to identify diversions of the chemicals into illicit use, and to investigate such diversions.) This created a regional weakness, posing a risk, which could be criminally exploited. Secondly, there was reason to believe that precursor chemicals were being trafficked into Afghanistan via the ‘Northern Route’ through the Central Asian countries; this was the criminal threat that could indeed exploit that risk.

Initially, the objective of Project E29 was to “*reduce the volume and extent of illicit manufacture of heroin in Southwest and Central Asia*” through the establishing / strengthening of the mechanism of precursors control. This was to be achieved through efforts in two distinct but complimentary areas; in legislation / regulation, to create administrative mechanisms for preventing the diversion of specified chemicals from international trade and from domestic manufacture and distribution; in Law Enforcement theme to create the capacity to investigate and prosecute any such mis-use in the countries of the region. By the time of the mid-term Independent Project Evaluation, the legislative / regulatory theme had been achieved, and it had become apparent that the beneficiary countries considered several of the project activities to be redundant. Henceforth, the project focussed on the law-enforcement theme.

Project E29 has approached capacity building through a range of activities designed to improve individual performance, Agency performance and cooperation and information sharing between Agencies and between countries. Furthermore, Project E29 has attempted to

broaden regional cooperation by initiating activities specifically designed to integrate neighbouring countries such as China, Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Russian Federation.

As described in the original project document, the availability of precursor chemicals in Afghanistan, coupled with the low level of seizures in Central Asia was taken to indicate a lack of capacity in the face of a real threat. Actual seizures have not shown an overall increase, nor have they been widespread and frequent; instead, they tend to be spectacular but isolated. Given the extensive efforts made by Project E29 to build capacity in Central Asia, and the willingness of the Beneficiary Countries to prioritise the combat against precursor trafficking, it may be that seizure levels are 'normal' and the threat is not as great as originally suspected. A very common opinion held by operational officers who were interviewed was that precursor chemicals are primarily entering Afghanistan via China, Iran and Pakistan. Other research and intelligence confirms that these routes are indeed active, although not to the exclusion of the Central Asian routes under discussion here¹.

What is clear is that there is now a greater awareness of the significance of precursor chemicals in the overall heroin trade, and of the impact that precursor interdiction and investigation can have on the trade. Project E29 efforts in both the legislative/ regulatory area, and within law enforcement have ensured that the necessary elements are now in place to provide an effective response to the problem of precursor trafficking.

MAJOR FINDINGS

(a) Relevance:

Before Project E29 the Central Asian region exhibited a number of weaknesses which collectively created a risk of precursor trafficking; none of the five Central Asian countries had the legislative and regulatory measures needed to meet their obligations under Article 12 of the 1988 Convention. Their law enforcement agencies did not have any specific awareness of the importance of precursors to the heroin trade, nor did they have the capacity to interdict and investigate illicit trafficking activity.

All the Central Asian countries shared the problems of long porous borders 'defended' by a plethora of non-integrated agencies rather than 'policed' within an integrated border management (IBM) approach. Furthermore, although all the Central Asian countries share a common history, their law enforcement profile shows little appetite for open and proactive regional cooperation. Rather, it is one based on individual countries, or even agencies, working alone and closely protecting their own operational information. This approach is unsuitable for tackling a regional, cross-border crime problem.

Hence, given that Project E29 was conceived to deliver improvements in all of the above areas it could be seen to have been relevant to the needs of the region. Note should however be made of the fact that project design was not preceded by a full 'scoping' or threat assessment of the situation which would have helped to ensure 'realism'.

From the outset, the objective of Project E29 was to "reduce the volume and extent of illicit manufacture of heroin in Afghanistan" by strengthening border control in the Central Asian countries. The underlying premise was that it was the importation of precursor chemicals through Central Asia that facilitated the Afghan production, and that if this supply could be interdicted by better border control then the manufacture volume would be reduced. Given that there are other supply routes into Afghanistan the objective of the project was not entirely

¹ Including information published by the Paris Pact, and discovered during Operation TARCET.

realistic; Indeed, the original E29 project plan states that “*convincing evidence may be seen in recently discovered attempts to smuggle acetic anhydride into Afghanistan from every direction*”. Hence, better Central Asian border control might have led to a short-term reduction, but a longer-term reduction would only be achieved if the borders controlling all routes into Afghanistan were similarly controlled.

(b) Efficiency:

The planning documentation for Project E29 shows the logical way in which objectives, activities and finances are inter-linked to one another. This creates the basis by which project implementation and management can be done efficiently.

Project E29 progress reports have provided the means to track activity at the macro-level, and ensure that resources are being used efficiently such that all planned activities are adequately resourced across the whole time period. But there has been little post-activity reporting from which efficiency indicators such as ‘value for money’ can be identified.

Project E29 has made good use of ‘donations in kind’; trainers and venues provided ‘free of charge’ is an efficient way of delivering activities in project. This can also be an effective means of ensuring the ‘local familiarity’, which is mentioned below as an effectiveness factor.

(c) Partnerships and cooperation:

Several other UNODC projects overlap with Project E29². Cooperation between them appears to have been appropriate to gain efficiency savings, whilst also avoiding contradictions or duplications. The downside of this is that from the recipient’s perspective the individual projects tend to lose their ‘visibility’ and become subsumed under a general guise of ‘UNODC assistance’.

There was not an explicit strategy for partnerships and cooperation, and such cooperation that has occurred was ‘opportunistic’ nature. Nevertheless, when such cooperation does grow up ‘organically’ it is important for the involved projects to embrace it and this has indeed occurred.

Although Project E29 aimed to improve regional interaction with INCB, in particular the PICS system, it does not appear that this has been very successful. INCB reporting shows a poor level of participation within the region, to the detriment of statistics, which are sorely needed in the region. The reasons for this under-reporting are not made clear in the INCB reporting. The evaluation did uncover any evidence-based reasons to explain this failing.

(d) Effectiveness:

Whilst Project E29 did achieve its individual outcomes, these have not delivered the overall objective “to reduce the volume and extent of illicit manufacture of heroin in Southwest and Central Asia. This is not because the outcomes were in any way inappropriate, but simply because the overall objective was too grand to be achieved on the basis of these outcomes alone. Furthermore, it was not realistic when one considers that the Central Asian routes are not the only ways for precursors to reach Afghanistan, meaning that any shortfall in that respect could be fulfilled via China, Pakistan or Iran.

The collective activity of Project E29 has been very effective in raising awareness of the importance of policing precursor chemical trafficking as an element of an integrated approach

² For example, Project RER/F60 ‘Computer Based Training’ Project RER/H22 ‘CARICC’, Project KYR/ G64 ‘Kyrgyz Drugs Control Agency’, Project TD/TAJ/03/H03 Tajik Drug Control Agency and Project XAC/I97, the so-called “NATO / Russia Council Project”

to reducing heroin trafficking. This newfound awareness has in turn created the appetite for increasing capacity.

Capacity building efforts depend on effective communication, which requires a combination of language and ‘local familiarity’ such that a relevant message can be imparted by the trainer and understood by the trainee. Accordingly, the use of Russian or Turkish trainers within Project E29 has been regarded as the most effective means of delivery. A similar familiar language requirement also attaches to the effective use of equipment that is supplied; instructional literature must be in a language the recipients can understand. Whilst this has generally been the case, examples were cited where effectiveness was compromised because the user manuals were in Arabic³.

If project activities are delivered in isolation from one another they may lack the synergy that leads to real operational improvement. Operation TARCET is universally praised as an effective way of avoiding this by integrating activities like training, operational planning and execution, and regional coordination into one extended event. Overall effectiveness is still challenged by ‘agency greed’, which hampers a balanced delivery of capacity building across all agencies to the detriment of nationwide capability.

(e) Impact:

Interviewees were unanimous in saying that the biggest impact of Project E29 is the simple fact that Central Asian law enforcement agencies are now aware of the importance of precursor chemicals, and the need for them to be effectively policed; this is an awareness which by their own admission was simply not present beforehand.

There has not been a reduction in the volume of heroin manufacture in Afghanistan, which ultimately was the impact Project E29 sought to create. But, given that precursors can be supplied to Afghanistan by other routes, there is no guarantee that a stronger precursor control mechanism in Central Asia would have achieved this. Any attempt to look for more specific indicators that precursor control has indeed been strengthened, i.e. statistics for prevented diversion attempts and for seizures of illicit chemicals, is also problematic; the overall availability of statistics is poor; where they are available they relate to seizures of illicit chemicals but not to prevented diversions, and the seizure figures are not impressive; but of course if the prevention regime is effective, there is less opportunity for illicit seizures to be made anyway.

Many activities in Project E29 have been delivered at the actual border crossing points, so Customs and Border Service personnel should have been able to benefit individually and collectively from these activities. However, there is still a clear separation between Customs and Border Guards, both in terms of their physical positioning and their operational responsibility. This meant that the training was not always delivered to mixed groups from both agencies. Given that effective border management requires good cooperation and coordination between the agencies involved; such joint training would have produced a greater impact. Hence this can be seen as a missed opportunity, although all interviewees claimed that this was not the case.

Project E29 has played its part in improving international cooperation, particularly through activities like Op TARCET, and has also lately made efforts to integrate China and Russia into these joint activities. CARICC is key to sustained international cooperation in the region and if it were to initiate a precursor initiative this could have strategic and operational benefits.

³ Precursor Test Kits provided to Kyrgyzstan Customs Service.

(f) Sustainability:

There is the danger that when Project E29 stops the precursor awareness that it has created could again fade into the background, particularly as new and different initiatives come along. There is no explicit sustainability plan in the prodoc to prevent this from happening. Hence, wherever possible all other heroin related UNODC projects should contribute to maintaining precursor awareness. Likewise, the future Regional Programme must ensure that the current discussions about including a precursor element do in fact become a reality.

Handbooks and posters are a good way of maintaining general awareness of precursors, as well as reminding staff of the specifics of precursor control. A continued effort should be made to ensure the ongoing distribution (and updating) of such aide-memoire material.

A major challenge for sustainability is the problem posed by the frequent rotation of trained staff. This problem is endemic in Central Asian law enforcement agencies. Too often, officers are redeployed shortly after completing the training meaning that the effect of the training is lost. Furthermore, even though training raises the capacity of individual officers, and perhaps of the immediate front-line units that they work in, it does not increase the overall capacity of the agency in a sustainable way. Hence train the trainer type events are preferable in terms of supporting sustainability, but that was not always the case in Project E29.

(g) Human rights and Gender:

Nothing within the project has any implications for human rights and gender, nor was any evidence seen to indicate that human rights or gender have been an issue during any part of the implementation of the project.

HR and gender were not mainstreamed in the project documentation, nor was data showing the breakdown of trainees provided to the evaluation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

UNODC Project Managers should ensure that training is provided by trainers familiar with the local situation and languages (i.e. from Russia and Turkey) as this facilitates a closer and more realistic contact with students, than is the case with trainers who come from altogether different areas and thus cannot empathise with local requirements (i.e. EU or USA). When planning training events, Project Managers should aim to include a 'Train the trainer' element such that students can subsequently cascade the training amongst their colleagues. This increases the numbers of officers trained, and to some extent counteracts the negative impact occasioned by the frequent rotation of trained staff.

When planning new projects, UNODC staff should think carefully about which agencies they need to work with in order for the project to achieve its objectives. The PM should through consultation systematically map out the agencies that need to be considered in each of the beneficiary countries. The result of this brainstorming including a systematic mapping of all such agencies should then inform the strategic approach to be taken, together with the recipient governments, to ensure that all the required agencies are included. These agencies should then be explicitly mentioned in the project plans, event invitations etc. This will help to avoid the problem of 'agency greed' by taking the decisions about participation out of national hands.

Activities like Operation TARCET should be recognised as good practice and should be continued. The Regional Intelligence Working Group on Precursors (RIWG-P) provides a platform for such activities, in terms of the planning and targeting functions it could perform,

but these would still need to be activated, implemented and coordinated through a body with the appropriate operational coordination profile at international level- i.e. CARICC. CARICC may not currently take the initiative in this way because of the absence of specific budget through which they could fund, and thereby encourage, such activity. UNODC ROCA and the CARICC Project Manager should seek to grasp this opportunities in their ongoing work.

The Central Asian countries should more fully participate in the work of the International Narcotics Control Board. Currently, they do not provide seizure figures to the Board, nor do they access the PICS database where such data is stored. Whilst it may be beyond the scope of Project E29 to overcome this shortcoming, UNODC ROCA should nevertheless use every means and opportunity to encourage deeper participation with the INCB systems.

Some form of pre- and post-training testing of students should always be carried out to establish the extent to which the training has improved their knowledge. A student perspective on the effectiveness of training should also be obtained after the event through the use of anonymous evaluation forms. As well as evaluating performance this also provides the means for making future improvements to training activities and delivery approaches. All Project Managers should ensure this always done.

As a project comes to an end, consideration should be given to how the results it has achieved can be sustained into the future. Some form of ‘sustainability plan’ should be created. Realistically, this will only be effective if it can rely upon other projects to create this effect; because once a project is closed it has no manpower or budget of its own. Providing appropriate guidance and relevant material will be needed to facilitate the sustainability efforts of other projects. Without these, it is likely that their own workload and their lack of specific knowledge will mean that the staff of other projects will not be effective in aiding sustainability.

LESSONS LEARNED

‘Local’ trainers who have a realistic and first-hand appreciation of the realities of life and work in Central Asia are preferable to ‘international’ trainers who come from more distant climes where the experience, operational resources and crime phenomena are so different from that pertaining to Central Asia that they do not readily engage local students.

‘Train the trainer’ activities do more to increase capacity and overcome the rotation problem than simple student training events.

If the decision about national participation in an event is left to a national coordination point or lead-agency, there is a danger that they will not necessarily share the participation across all national agencies involved in fighting precursor trafficking, but rather they will tend to favour their own agency to the disadvantage of others, and to the wider national effort.

Activities like Operation TARCET, which are jointly planned and repeated over time, are greatly appreciated by the Beneficiary Countries because they provide benefits in terms of individual training, inter-agency cooperation, regional coordination as well as concrete operational results.

SUMMARY MATRIX OF FINDINGS, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings ⁴	Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)	Recommendations ⁵
Key recommendations		
<p>Three of the four recommendations made by the mid-term evaluation have been well incorporated into the ongoing work of Project E29. The fourth, relating to effective use of the National Database System, needs further attention.</p>	<p>Desk review; Interviews; Observation.</p>	<p>The <u>future</u> ROCA Regional Programme, which is currently under development, should continue to push the concept of Intelligence Led Policing, and highlight the potential value of tools like the NDS for guiding an ILP approach.</p>
<p>An adequate regulatory and legislative framework is now present in each Central Asian country such that the obligations imposed under Articles 12 of the 1988 Convention can be met.</p>	<p>Desk review; Interviews.</p>	<p>Insofar as no changes are made to the 1988 Convention, no action is required. However in the event that e.g. new chemicals are added to the Annex, national mechanisms would need to be updated; in the absence of a specific precursor related responsibility in ROCA the AOTP should be tasked to monitor this.</p>
<p>The project has had a significant success in raising awareness in Central Asia of the importance of, and the danger caused by trafficked precursor chemicals.</p>	<p>Interviews.</p>	<p>UNODC ROCA should continue to promote the problem of precursors to ensure that this awareness is not lost and the issue is not allowed to go ‘off the radar’.</p>
<p>Activities like Operation TARCET, which combined joint-planning, targeted training and joint-action is regarded as having been a success and of great significance in raising the CA capacity to deal with precursor chemicals</p>	<p>Interviews.</p>	<p>UNODC ROCA should aim for more regional activities like Op TARCET to be held, preferably using CARICC as the initiating and coordinating body, although external funding is likely to be required in order to ensure full participation.</p>

⁴ A finding uses evidence from data collection to allow for a factual statement.

⁵ Recommendations are proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a project/programme; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. For accuracy and credibility, recommendations should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions.

<p>Individual Competent Authorities do not take a ‘national view’ towards ensuring an equal spread of project resources across their country, but prefer to retain all the benefit for their own Agency where possible.</p>	<p>Interviews.</p>	<p>Project Managers should target the specific agencies they wish to work with. This should be done in a systematic way e.g. through training needs analysis, and discussions with recipient government. The project documents should explicitly name all agencies to be included, such that this decision is not left to a national coordination point, or a ‘lead agency’ that then decides for them.</p>
<p>International cooperation amongst Central Asian countries works well when specific events that require or promote it are organised, but on a day-to-day basis it is not fully developed.</p>	<p>Interviews.</p>	<p>UNODC ROCA should continue to seek opportunities for joint activities that involve inter-action between operatives at the working-level rather than just at a management level. This will help to lay the foundations for future improvements in day to day work in border interdiction and investigation.</p>
<p>The intelligence-led policing approach is not really utilised in relation to precursor diversion. The inadequate availability of statistics does not currently make full ILP an option.</p>	<p>Interviews.</p>	<p>Legal restrictions which place the Prosecutor in a central position of authority over investigative decision making mean it is difficult to see how ILP can currently be fully implemented. The regulatory arm should be encouraged to share statistics with the investigative side as a start for showing the potential of this approach; the Paris Pact is a suitable platform through which to promote this information sharing approach in the region</p>
<p>There is no explicit ‘exit strategy’ by which the future effort against precursors is guaranteed or described in a ‘sustainability plan’.</p>	<p>Desk review.</p>	<p>UNODC ROCA should include precursor elements in the new Regional Programme, which is currently being scoped, and also seek opportunities to cover precursor elements in other UNODC projects.</p>
<p>Important recommendations</p>		
<p>Central Asia may actually not be a primary route by which precursor chemicals reach Afghanistan, but</p>	<p>Interviews.</p>	<p>UNODC ROCA should share this hypothesis with Project Managers running activities in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan</p>

rather that they are now being trafficked from China via Iran & Pakistan.		to qualify whether it is indeed valid, and if so use it as potential guidance for their own precursor control activities.
The quality and relevance of training delivered by Project E29 is held in high regard, but there are concerns that insufficient officers are actually trained such that their unit/agency as a whole can be effective with new techniques.	Interviews.	All UNODC Project Managers should attempt to include a 'Training of Trainers' aspect in all training activities. This will ensure that the new skills that are imparted during the training can be cascaded down within the agencies from which the trainees attend.
Particularly for 'on the spot training' every effort should be made to use trainers who are from, or are familiar with, the region rather than those from areas where the environmental factors are substantially different.	Interviews	UNODC ROCA Project Managers should attempt to use Russian or Turkish speaking trainers wherever possible to ensure that the training is delivered effectively through the establishment of a good connection with students.
CARICC continues to be viewed as an asset with unrealised potential, but which must start to deliver soon or risk becoming irrelevant, or even usurped by another regional body.	Desk review; Interviews.	UNODC should discourage moves to upgrade the Regional Counter Terrorism Centre in Tashkent to give it an additional role in countering organised crime.
The Regional Intelligence Working Group for Precursors (RIWG-P) is a well-regarded forum, which seems to deliver benefit to the participants.	Interviews.	ROCA should encourage a closer cooperation between RIWG-P and CARICC such that proposals by the former can be planned and executed by the latter. External financing would help to overcome resistance.
The constant rotation of staff within the Competent Authorities undermines the ongoing effectiveness of training provided by the project.	Desk review; Interviews.	External actors like ROCA cannot change this long-standing regional approach to staff deployment, but they can mitigate its effects; the use of more train-the-trainer events can help to lessen the impact, and Project Managers can see assurances that the staff they train will stay in post for an agreed time period after the training finishes.
Handbooks & posters are an effective means of raising and maintaining awareness	Interviews ⁶ .	UNODC ROCA should continue to supply handbooks and posters, always in the

⁶ Azerbaijan Customs Service was particularly proud to show off their handbooks which had been translated into the Azeri language.

and of assisting operational activity.		local language if possible. These should be updated if new chemical threats emerge.
Although the Paris Pact and the INCB maintain seizures databases (DMP & PICS) the CA countries do not take advantage of the data held therein.	Desk review; Interviews.	UNODC ROCA, together with Paris Pact, should continue to encourage the greater utilisation of statistical data by emphasising their contribution to the intelligence led policing approach.
Human Rights and Gender is not mainstreamed in Project E29.	Desk review.	UNODC ROCA PMs should ensure that the special requirements for HR & G are always considered in all projects, such that project activities can be appropriately and fairly implemented in this regard.

I. INTRODUCTION

Background and context

Project AD/RER/00/E29 “Precursor Control in Central Asia” is a project within the Sub-regional Law Enforcement Program co-ordinated by the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA) in Tashkent. Project E29 was launched in May 2000 in response to the requirements of Articles 12 of the 1988 United Nation Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which requires that

The Parties shall take the measures they deem appropriate to prevent diversion of substances in Table I and Table II used for the purpose of illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, and shall co-operate with one another to this end

Although all 5 of the Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, were already signatories to the 1988 UN Convention Against illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, UNODC was aware of the fact that within the Central Asian countries ‘*the measures they deem appropriate*’ were not in fact adequate to ensure that they could indeed meet the obligations of the Convention.

According to international good-practice, these measures comprise three elements: the legal obligation for industrial users of the controlled chemicals to properly register and account for the manufacture and movement of the chemicals, a regulatory mechanism by which this registration is practically facilitated such that any attempts at diversion can be identified, and a law enforcement component which is empowered and capable to investigate such diversion under the penal code. The ongoing absence of appropriate measures thus created a clear risk that Central Asia was a ‘weak spot’, which could be exploited by criminal groups who wished to traffic precursor chemicals into Afghanistan.

At the time, it was assessed that Central Asia could be a key transit region for the supply of precursors into Afghanistan. The so-called ‘Northern Route’ through Central Asia has for a long time been well known amongst professionals involved in policing heroin trafficking as the way by which processed Afghan heroin was delivered to the Russian market. Russia was also identified as a source-country in which precursor chemicals needed for heroin processing, particularly acetic anhydride, could be obtained on the ‘black market’. Hence, the premise was formed within UNODC ROCA that the Northern Route was being used in reverse to transport precursors into Afghanistan; i.e. this threat would directly act upon the risk identified above.

Hence Project E29 was conceived to nullify the risk factors, such that the perceived threat would not in fact become a dangerous reality. In the course of doing so, Project E29 would also contribute to the broader regional objectives of improving border management and encouraging intelligence-led policing, both of which are key shortcomings in the region.

Thus, in its first iteration, Project E29 was to work in two distinct but related areas; Firstly, in the area of legislation / regulation whereby the appropriate administrative mechanisms for preventing the diversion of specified chemicals from international trade and from

manufacture and domestic distribution would be implemented; Secondly, in the Law Enforcement area a capacity to investigate and prosecute any such mis-use would be created in the countries of the region. This was contained within an overall objective to “reduce the volume and extent of illicit manufacture of heroin in Southwest and Central Asia.” To achieve the objective, Project E29 was designed to achieve the following 6 Outputs:

1. Chemical control legislation/regulations in Central Asia improved and finalized
2. Chemical Control Office/Department established and operational in all of the Central Asian Republics
3. Chemical investigation groups established and operational in all of the Central Asian Republics
4. Mobile road-block’ units established and operational in all of the Central Asian Republics
5. Seized chemicals destroyed or disposed of in appropriate manner.
6. International Seminar on Chemical Control Problems in Central Asian and concerned countries held and “Support Group” of Central Asian and concerned countries formed in the pursuit of chemical control objectives and coordination of the actions.

The outputs were to be achieved through a variety of different activities, including consultancy to review the precursor control situation in Central Asian countries; consultancy to assist with the drafting and implementation of legislation and regulations for the import and export of chemicals; the supply of vehicles and equipment to locate, test and identify chemicals; training in the use of new equipment; expert mentoring and study visits to provide ‘hands-on’ experience for control and investigative staff; and creating mechanisms, or providing opportunities for greater cooperation amongst the agencies and countries in the region.

One of the first substantive activities conducted under Project E29 was the Central Asian Conference on the Diversion of Chemicals into Illicit Drug Traffic held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in November 2000. During this conference Output 2 (establishment of Chemical Control Department) and Output 4 (establishment of Mobile road block units) were found unnecessary since respective Governments preferred to strengthen existing regulatory and law enforcement bodies involved in precursors control rather than establish new ones. Output 3 (establishment of Chemical Investigation Groups) was also seen as unnecessary by most of the countries.

This reasoning, compounded by the inability to recruit a project co-ordinator due to a the lack of funding, led to the project being scaled back and re-focused on the key requirements as identified by an international consultancy mission which was conducted from 11 June – 13 July 2001. This provided an assessment of the major requirements in technical assistance, an identification of the training and equipment needs and an elaboration of practical recommendations on project implementation.

To reflect this, a Revision 1 was made to the project plan in April 2004, and thereafter the project was to have a more specific focus on the Law Enforcement theme, through pursuing the following new outputs:

- Enhance the capacity of regulatory personnel;
- Enhance the capacity of Customs and Border Service personnel;
- Enhance the capacity of law enforcement investigators and scientific staff;
- Enhance cooperation between the Central Asian countries.

Collectively, this was designed to foster a regional approach to precursors control by creating a closer working relationship between regulatory and law enforcement elements and by involving neighbouring and other countries in precursors control activities. The overall

objective would be to block the diversion of precursor chemicals from licit trade and the smuggling of these substances through the region to prevent their use in the illicit manufacture of heroin in Afghanistan.

Revision 1 also extended the lifespan of Project E29 for a further three years up to December 2006 and downsized the original project budget in accordance with the changed priorities and funding prospects.

Project E29 was then subject to a mid-term Independent Project Evaluation in autumn 2005. The recommendations of this evaluation are shown at Annex II. The evaluation effectively confirmed that the changes made in Revision 1 were entirely justified and appropriate, finding that the legislative / regulatory theme did not require further attention as its elements had either been achieved or found to be redundant, whilst the Law Enforcement theme still required considerable work in order to achieve the capacity foreseen within the original project plan, and to create additional capability in newly identified areas.

As defined in the Terms of Reference (ToR) the current final evaluation addresses the period since this mid-term Independent Project Evaluation took place; i.e. autumn 2005 to the present day.

During this period there have been a further 5 revisions to Project E29. Each revision has amended the aims or deliverables of the project and in parallel extended the lifespan of the project and adapted the budget:

- Revision 2 (July 2006) which aimed to “*develop synergies between the different partners and to provide a solid foundation for the effective cross border coordination and speedy exchange of information and intelligence to conduct intelligence-led investigations and operations*” and to this end again re-formulated the outputs.
- Revision 3 (August 2007) designed to “*further develop measures to support improved law enforcement operations against illicit smuggling of precursors in the region*” although without making any further changes to the outputs.
- Revisions 4 (April 2009) and 5 (May 2010) which extended the duration and increased the budget without making any substantive changes to the content
- Revision 6 (May 2011), which was made necessary due to the inclusion of Azerbaijan in the project, and to bring the project plan into line with the newly introduced UNODC, project terminology. It took the opportunity to consolidate all aims and activities into one outcome “*Relevant competent authorities control, detect and interdict the smuggling of precursors even more effectively*”.

Evaluation Methodology

This evaluation has been conducted in compliance with UNODC guidelines for Independent Project Evaluation⁷ according to the methodology outlined in the Inception Report submitted to UNODC ROCA on 10th October and reviewed and cleared by the Independent Evaluation Unit, which outlined the following methodology:

- A desk review of the project plan and project revision documents which were supplied by the acting Project Manager, and can be found listed at Annex IV under the first sub-

⁷ See <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>

heading “Project (Revision) Documents”, resulting in a preliminary analysis in form of an inception report to guide the evaluation;

- Discussions with UNODC staff members in the ROCA, Tashkent office, these being staff who are involved with the management or implementation of Project E29, or with other similar projects that are in some way connected to, or have cooperated with Project E29;
- A second desk review of the progress report documents (Annual & Semi-Annual) which were supplied by the acting Project Manager, and can be found listed at Annex IV under the second sub-heading “Progress Reports”;
- A field mission was conducted to Central Asia from 13-24 October during which all the agencies participating in Project E29 were visited. Interviews were held with the 39 persons listed at Annex III. The questions that formed the basis for the interviews in line with the TOR and inception report are listed at Annex II. Not every person was necessarily asked every question due to the fact the different profile of each person meant that not all had the requisite knowledge, experience or involvement with Project E29 to be able to answer adequately. Indeed a number of interviewees apologised at the outset that they had not had any dealings with Project E29 at all, but rather they had recently rotated into a post which had been identified as a suitable respondent for the interview. This ‘rotation’ problem is highlighted in other places in the report.

The persons who were interviewed are listed at Annex III, and in broad terms fell into the following categories:

- UNODC staff members working in the region and having some involvement in the management or implementation of Project E29, or of associated projects
 - Operational managers in the competent authorities in the beneficiary countries that have benefitted from activities carried out under Project E29, and/or from materiel supplied by the project;
 - Training academy managers in the competent authorities in the beneficiary countries that have been involved in the delivery or hosting of activities carried out under Project E29;
 - International Relations Officers / National Coordinators in the relevant ministries in the beneficiary countries that have facilitated national level involvement in the activities carried out by Project E29;
 - International civil servants from outside of the UN system who are engaged in operational or capacity building projects that have some connection or cooperation with Project E29.
- A third desk review of the other relevant documents which were supplied by the acting Project Manager, and can be found listed at Annex IV under the third sub-heading “other documents”;
 - After the field mission was completed, telephone interviews held with other persons whom it had become apparent had the potential to add to the evaluation, either because they had previously worked on Project E29, or because they worked on another project or in another role that was closely linked with Project E29;

- After the field mission an analysis was made of the publicly available reports and databases that are compiled by the two main international institutions in the field of precursor control, INCB & EMCDDA;
- After the field mission, attempts were made to hold telephone interviews with donor representatives. Canada was interviewed but interviews with other donors for various reasons could unfortunately not be undertaken.

Limitations to the Evaluation

As it turned out, a significant number of the persons who were put forward for interview during the field mission were not ideally suited to the requirements of the evaluation; Given the long life of Project E29 it is inevitable that few if any officers would have stayed intimately connected with it throughout the project lifespan. This problem only became apparent during the interviews, which often began with the interviewee apologising for the fact that although Project E29 fell in their area of responsibility, they had no personnel knowledge of it at all, usually because they had only recently rotated into their current post and had had no previous contact with Project E29. In addition, several of the interviewees occupied administrative or liaison functions from which they do not have detailed knowledge of the operational activity in the front-line units, nor the extent to which Project E29 activities have been helpful in increasing capacity.

This, primarily undermined the effort to ascertain the effectiveness and impact of the activities delivered by the project on the basis that information by which to assess these criteria is normally best provided by persons who have been active in the operational areas addressed by the project activities.

Once this problem became apparent, interviewees were reminded of the requirements of the evaluation such that they could better prepare themselves. Given that interviews were taking place in the interviewees regular place of work they were often quickly able to equip themselves with internal reports on the project activities, which had been prepared by operational staff, or by their predecessors. Whilst clearly not as good as first hand knowledge, this second hand information did facilitate the basic needs of the evaluation.

None of the interviewees were able to provide any detailed statistics about seizures of precursor chemicals that have been made during the lifespan of Project E29.

This very issue is picked upon by INCB who in their 2013 report emphasises the importance of this shortcoming stating that *“there is a lack of basic information about incidents involving precursors, particularly in East and South-East Asia; the extent and depth of investigations into such incidents in those countries with significant illicit methamphetamine manufacture remain unclear. To address the situation, the authorities of the countries and territories concerned need to do more to increase cooperation and share pertinent information at the national, regional and international levels with a view to supporting investigations of incidents involving precursor chemicals and to preventing diversions of such chemicals.”*⁸

⁸https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/TECHNICAL_REPORTS/2013/PARTITION/ENGLISH/ar/PRE2013_E_ActionInternational.pdf

II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

Relevance

The extent to which the projects objectives are consistent with the recipients needs.

The broader UNODC strategy in the region has always had a focus on controlling heroin production in, and trafficking from Afghanistan. Given the fundamental role of precursor chemicals in this process, Project E29 was in line with the overall strategy. Although it is not explicitly stated in the original project plan this is perhaps because the strategic setting was not an aspect of project planning at the time it was drafted. Subsequently, it is mentioned in Revision 2 (dated 2nd July 2006), which states that Project E29 is “*in line with UNODC’s regional strategy for West and Central Asia*”. Similarly Revision 3 (August 2007) holds that “*the context of this project is in line with the UNODC Strategic Programme Framework (SPF) for Central Asia for 2008-11*”. Precursor control remains relevant and is one of the elements under consideration for inclusion in the new Regional Programme currently under development.

All five Central Asian countries were signatories of the 1988 Convention⁹ but had not yet had the means to implement the necessary legislative and regulatory measures through which they would be able to comply with the requirements of Article 12 of the Convention. Project E29 addressed this shortcoming by helping to create the necessary capacity in the Central Asian countries. Although the law enforcement agencies in the region had a long experience of combating heroin trafficking, there had never been any specific focus on precursors. Project E29 aimed to ensure that precursor chemicals were taken into account in the daily operational work. Hence, Project E29 set out to build capacity to interdict and investigate the illicit trafficking of precursor chemicals. Long porous borders and a lack of integrated border management are issues common to all Central Asian countries. They are also issues that undermine effective policing of regional crime problems. The activities that Project E29 has delivered have also helped, albeit indirectly, to strengthen these areas, through common training and shared best practice that help to create networks and build trust.

Finally, interviews with the beneficiary countries showed that it was recognised that they were inadequately equipped to meet their obligations under the 1988 Convention, and were keen to rectify this. When offered the opportunity to participate in Project E29 they all readily agreed. None of them have subsequently left the project, so this can be taken as an indication that the countries themselves considered Project E29 to be relevant to their needs.

In retrospect, the evaluation shows that that Central Asia and the Northern Route were indeed of central importance in the supply of precursors into Afghanistan. Given that this was the main premise upon which Project E29 was initiated, the opinion currently expressed from within the UNODC Afghan Opiate Trade Project¹⁰ is contradictory as it implies that the

⁹ Parties to the Convention since: Azerbaijan 1993, Kyrgyzstan 1994, Uzbekistan 1995, Tajikistan 1996, Turkmenistan 1996 & Kazakhstan 1997.

¹⁰ Presentation “Trends in Afghan Opiate Trafficking, 2014” given by Hayder Mili, Programme Officer, UNODC Afghan Opiate Trade Project, UNODC HQ, Vienna

initial grounds for launching the Project were invalid, because regarding acetic anhydride shipments to Afghanistan, the Northern Route was “negligible since 2000”.



Slide included in the presentation “Trends in Afghan Opiate Trafficking, 2014” given by Hayder Mili, Programme Officer, UNODC Afghan Opiate Trade Project, UNODC HQ, Vienna

Efficiency

How well inputs are converted into outputs

Good project planning documents are of fundamental importance in ensuring efficiency; it is essential that they clearly specify what is to be done, and what resources are available to do this. They should provide both the means of planning what is to be done, and monitoring the implementation of what is subsequently done. The documents of Project E29 meet this requirement; the “objectives, outputs and activities” section gives the broad-brush outline of what the project will attempt to achieve, the work plan specifies in more detail what the activities are and when they are scheduled to occur, whilst the budget sections set out in detail how the finances are to be allocated across the various cost centres and activities¹¹. Clear correspondence between these three elements is further essential in order for the logic of an activity specified in the work plan can be identified, whilst the financing for it can be seen in the budget document. In reality this is not the case as the budgets are broken down by expenditure type (e.g. “international experts”, “study tours” etc) rather than by specific activity (e.g. “Training seminar for the personnel of the chemical investigation groups) but the

¹¹ Although the precise naming of these three sections is not consistent over the entire 14 year lifespan of the project, these three essential elements are always present in one name or another. This somewhat complicates the analysis of the documents, but does not undermine their validity as planning tools.

evaluation shows that the three elements do correspond to one another such that the overall logic of the aim-activity-finance relationship can be identified.

In addition to know what was planned, any consideration of efficiency also has analyse what was actually achieved. By way of monitoring implementation, an account of actual delivery was provided by the Semi-Annual and Annual Progress Reports, which were published in July and January respectively. Again, clear correspondence between the planning documents and the progress reports both in terms of format and content would be essential; the former makes interpretation simpler, whilst the latter specifies what has been achieved, or not, as the case may be. The Progress Reports meet this requirement and give a clear overview of what was achieved during each reporting period, broken down according to the objectives or outcomes that they supported.

An impressively high level of implementation activity has been delivered each year, as indicated in Annex V. In the absence of specific qualitative data such as ‘post-activity debriefing reports’ it is not possible to comment upon the actual efficiency of each activity in terms of such criteria as ‘value for money’, ‘best use of time’, ‘best means of delivery’ etc. Similarly, quantitative data was not provided about the numbers of students trained the agencies they represented, gender, rank, assignment etc. As a result, it is not possible to ascertain how balanced the ‘coverage’ was of each activity.

The project was managed from within the Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA). There was a designated Project Manager (PM) who worked under the guidance of a designated senior manager who had extensive law enforcement experience. For the last year of Project E29 there was however no longer such a senior manager in ROCA to advise the PM. These two factors probably contributed to the absence of an ‘exit-strategy’ for Project E29 by which sustainability could have been better ensured. Project support functions (financial administration, logistics etc) were however available in the ROCA to maximise implementation of the project activities.

A number of activities have taken advantage of ‘donations in kind’ whereby Project E29 finances the attendance of the trainees at an event, whilst the ‘donor’ provides the trainers and the venue free of charge. A good example of this are the many training events held at TADOC in Turkey. Overlaps with other projects can pose questions of efficiency, particularly if there is duplication of the same effort in different projects, a failure grasp opportunities to achieve economies of scale amongst project, or divergence between project activities. None of the respondents interviewed raised any efficiency concerns of this nature, but rather highlighted instances of good co-working between projects which is covered in more detail in the section “Partnerships and cooperation” below

Partnerships and cooperation

The extent to which the projects achieved synergies with other related endeavours

The UNODC approach to project delineation appears to the outsider to be based more on the needs of internal financial management and donor requirements than upon a logical approach to comprehensive capacity building. Hence, some projects focus on a specific theme (e.g. improved border management), others on a particular beneficiary agency, whilst some take more of a regional approach. Accordingly, a certain activity could potentially be delivered by a number of different projects, and a particular beneficiary can be involved in a number of different projects. The former creates the danger of duplication or overlapping, whilst the latter can mean that recipients don’t so much identify with individual projects, but see it more as a general provision “by UNODC”.

Combating heroin trafficking is one of the primary activities of UNODC, particularly in the ROCA area. Hence, many of ROCA projects contain objectives, beneficiaries and activities that are in common with those of Project E29. The Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries is the ‘highest level’ initiative against heroin in the ROCA area, and as such all other heroin related projects must be in compliance with it. The nature of the UNODC project planning and approval process and the availability of project documentation ensures that this is achieved.

Thereafter, during project implementation there is no explicit managerial mechanism for inter-project coordination such that with regard to substantive content consistent approaches can be assured, good practice shared, conflict or duplication avoided. Rather, this is achieved through the personal oversight of ROCA management and their interaction with the different project managers. Whilst the current management structure does ensure coordination from the financial and logistical perspectives, as mentioned previously, the ongoing absence of a senior manager with specific law enforcement experience and responsibility within ROCA means that coordination from a substantive law enforcement perspective is undermined.

The following are examples of what could be termed ‘overlap management’¹²;

- Project RER/F60 ‘Computer Based Training’ has acquired a module to train front-line staff on the location and identification of precursors which has been translated into the Russian language and installed in a number of training establishments as a joint venture with Project E29;
- Project RER/H22 ‘CARICC’ has played a leading role as the host, planning facilitator and coordination centre for the various Operations TARCET that have been conducted during the period, and has subsequently performed a similar role with the RIWG-P, again in conjunction with Project E29;
- The two very similar projects KYR/G64 ‘Kyrgyz Drugs Control Agency’ & TD/TAJ/03/H03 Tajik Drug Control Agency have established the national agency which is competent for dealing with precursor chemicals;
- Project XAC/I97 (the so-called “NATO / Russia Council Project”) provides an ongoing means by which NATO funding is used to finance the attendance of Central Asian officers at Russian training establishments. The Project Manager circulates the annual work plan for the NATO / Russia Council activities to the other Project Coordinators and invites to participate on a co-financing basis in any activities which also fit in with their objectives. Project E29 has taken advantage of such opportunity on a number of occasions, in particular in joint training events held at the FSDC training school in Domodedovo, Russian Federation.
- The Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries does not explicitly target precursor diversion, but it does include a number of measures that could contribute to it, for example forensic evidence, facilitation of controlled deliveries etc. No specific examples of inter-project cooperation were cited, although numerous mentions were made of the importance of including a precursor’s element in the new RP which is being launched in 2015.
- The Paris Pact Initiative (PPI) has the prevention of precursor diversion as the 3rd of its 4 pillars. The PPI partners are encouraged to enhance cooperation in a number of areas within the scope of Project E29, including information exchange, investigative techniques, forensic examination and promoting Op TARCET.

¹² Deliberately focussing management attention on those areas where the interests or activities of several projects overlap. In this way, the potential for synergy is identified in advance and worked towards, through planned communication and ongoing joint planning and co-financing. Conflict or duplication is also avoided in this way

- The European Commission funded project “ ‘Heroin Route II – Information Networks’ has not to date had any direct cooperation with Project 29, but does intend in future to integrate precursor control elements into its activities, albeit from an intelligence sharing, rather than an operational, perspective.

There has also been some cooperation with other capacity building efforts delivered from actors outside of the UNODC system. Such cooperation was not achieved through an explicit partnerships strategy, but rather the evaluation shows it to have grown organically as both sides identified opportunities for cooperation during informal contacts. OSCE has been a partner worthy of particular mention because of the way that it has been prepared to provide the financing for ‘joint ventures’ whilst relying on Project E29 to provide the subject-matter expertise. This approach also brings efficiency benefits to the UNODC efforts. The experience with the European Union funded Border Management Programme for Central Asia (BOMCA) has been less positive; there have been instances where a BOMCA activity created a clash of dates, or even directly replicated an event held by Project E29. Efforts were made from within Project E29 to improve coordination with BOMCA through the advance sharing of proposed annual work plans, but this offers no guarantee of success when the other party is determined to proceed as planned. Several interviewees mentioned that this in-fighting between ‘providers’ damages the credibility of both parties in the eyes of the beneficiaries.

As stated in the evaluation ToR, one of the initial activities of Project E29 was to encourage a greater participation with International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). One of the key resources that INCB provides is the Precursor Incident Communication System (PICS) which as the name implies is a central platform through which information about incidents involving precursors (attempted diversions, seizures etc) can be shared in a secure manner. The accumulation of data allows INCB to compile informative reports, but is also a resource available to its member states through which they can monitor trends and developments, and potentially situate their own precursor incidents within a wider regional context. This has clearly not been achieved and according to the latest reports registration with the PICS system is poor Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have not registered at all, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan have registered but used it only once, whilst Kazakhstan has used it between 2-20 times¹³.

The donor representatives interviewed were generally satisfied with the implementation of Project E29, although all admitted that they had little personal knowledge of the actual practical delivery or effects of the project, having been only recently associated with the project and from a largely administrative perspective. One major donor expressed dissatisfaction with an ‘unauthorised use of donation funds’. Clearly, in order to avoid jeopardising future donations, any limitations set by donors on the use of their funds should always be respected.

Effectiveness

The extent to which the desired outcomes are achieved.

It was universally acknowledged that the different activities delivered by Project E29 had contributed to raising the skill levels of individual officers in regard to policing precursor offences. A number of interviewees were keen to emphasise that perhaps of greater

¹³https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/TECHNICAL_REPORTS/2013/PARTITION/ENGLISH/ar/PRE2013_E_Extent.pdf

importance was the way that the collective effect of all Project E29 activities had led to an overall increase in awareness of the importance of precursors.

Offering an evaluation of the concrete effectiveness of the training activities is, somewhat problematic due to a shortcoming in the available data. Although information was made available about how many training events had been delivered, this was not complemented with any demographic data about the participation in each event¹⁴. Furthermore, the absence of any systematic “before and after” testing of students, means that it is not possible to say in objective terms what the immediate effectiveness of the training was. Finally, the absence of comparative operational data from the front-line units within which trainees were employed meant that it was not possible to ascertain an actual improvement in operational effectiveness, which might be attributable to the training provided.

Another softer indicator of the effectiveness of a given activity is to canvas the opinion of the participants. Particularly with training events, feedback from students reveals if the course was appropriate to their needs and delivered in such a way that they benefited from it. Although student course-evaluation forms from some training events have been seen by the evaluation, this was not a standard procedure for every training event.

Given that effective training relies heavily on good communication between trainer and student, the extent to which a common language facilitates or complicates delivery is an important criterion. Many interviewees were of the opinion that too often training was delivered via an interpreter, rather than by trainers who spoke a language that students could understand (i.e. Russian, Turkish or even Persian). It was felt that this was not so problematic during formal classroom instruction, but had a negative impact during on-site training where success often relies upon a closer dialogue between trainer and student. Furthermore, it was felt that trainers with a common language are also more likely to empathise with the realities of working in Central Asia. Conversely, trainers from the ‘abroad’ are considered to lack sensitivity towards the local situation, or tend to speak about problems, experiences or approaches that are simply alien to local people. The language issue also applies to the instructional literature that accompanies any equipment supplied by the Project. Whilst there was universal appreciation for the Precursor Test Kits (PTK) that had been supplied by Project E29, there was criticism that in some instances the user-guides were written in English or Arabic. The result was that the local users were unable to understand them, and thus unable to effectively use the equipment¹⁵.

In all Central Asian countries the responsibility for the control of precursors is spread amongst a variety of different agencies, both administrative and law enforcement. To achieve its overall objectives, Project E29 has to ensure that all involved agencies are equally, or adequately, able to benefit from what the project delivers. This is complicated by the fact that Project E29 communicates via a National Coordination Point, rather than directly with the agencies themselves, and thus has no direct control over which agencies benefit from which activities. A problem has occurred in the countries with an officially designated ‘primary agency’ for drug control¹⁶, whereby the other law-enforcement agencies are not notified of, or selected to participate in, project activities. Because Project E29 documentation tends to

¹⁴ i.e. numbers of students, which agency they represented, their gender, rank, work assignment etc

¹⁵ An amusing anecdote which quite nicely illustrates some of the problems of project implementation was supplied by the Kyrgyz Customs service who described, with the appropriate irony, how they had been unable to make direct use of the PTK supplied to them because they had to pay Customs import duties on the equipment, and the payment was delayed due to the paperwork ‘getting lost’.

¹⁶ For example, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan where a Drug Control Agency that reports directly to the President / Prime Minister is in a sufficiently strong position that it can monopolise participation in project activities.

refer to beneficiaries on a country- rather than an agency basis, it means there is no mechanism for managing such ‘agency greed’.

The project plan (and with it the objectives, outcomes and outputs) changed many times during the life of Project E29. On a number of occasions, the rationale for changing the plan was that some of the planned outputs were no longer relevant or required. In other instances, change was necessitated by the addition of new beneficiary countries, changes to budget, or internal changes to the UNODC project style. Again, this highlights the need for clear and comprehensive scoping of the situation before a project is launched. Consequently, these numerous changes make it somewhat difficult to identify which outcomes were achieved/not achieved, and what outputs were implemented/not implemented.

In its final iteration¹⁷, the project plan had one sole Outcome, and this was to be achieved through the realisation of three outputs. The wording used to describe these is vague;

- Outcome: “detect and interdict the smuggling of precursors even more effectively.”
- Output 1: “Officers.... are provided with necessary skills”
- Output 2: “China and Russian participate in coordinated activities”
- Output 3: “advanced investigative techniques are facilitated”

Accordingly, it is impossible to say in absolute terms to what extent these are achieved. All will have been done to a certain extent, but it is simply not possible to quantify that any further.

The mid-term evaluation recommended the creation of a regional operation to enhance information exchange and effective targeting, and this was eventually realised through Operation TARCET. This has been perhaps the most effective initiative within Project E29¹⁸ as evidenced by the fact that every interviewee, even those who apologised for their lack of knowledge about Project E29 had heard of Op TARCET. Its effectiveness lay in the way that it skilfully combined planning, training and operational elements, integrated all the Central Asian countries into these elements, and promoted the use of CARICC as the coordinating body; the very role for which it was established, but one which it often seems reluctant or unable to fulfil.

Another effective mechanism, which Project E29 has brought about, is the Regional Intelligence Working Group on Precursors (RIWG-P). To some extent, it replicates the information sharing and network building aspirations of Op TARCET, but whereas TARCET was implemented as a short-term ‘big-hit’ activity, RIWG-P is an ongoing forum that meets periodically to share information and propose operational activity. RIWG-P lacks the ‘operational arm’, which Op TARCET did have, but its link back to the member states competent authorities provides the means by which an operational activity proposed by the RIWG-P can be accomplished. Indeed, given that CARICC participates in, and sometimes hosts, the RIWG-P meetings it creates another opportunity for CARICC to execute its regional coordination role.

Mobile Precursor Teams (MPT) were established in all the Beneficiary Countries in 2009. Project E29 equipped them with vehicles; communications means (radios) and precursor testing equipment. These were greatly appreciated by the recipients who felt that the initiative gave good visibility to Project E29. It was not however clear if effort was also made, through training or process development, to ensure that the MPT would be effectively deployed and

¹⁷ Revision VI dated 5th May 2011.

¹⁸ Operation Trans-shipment was the predecessor to TARCET, and Operation Padmena is the successor. Both have similar profiles and objectives to TARCET. Trans-shipment occurred before the timeframe of this evaluation, whilst Padmena was still ongoing at the time of the field mission and thus no final debrief is yet available.

utilised. Interviewees were positive about the impact of the MPT but could not provide any statistical support for their views.

The small precursor handbooks and larger wall posters that have been distributed seem to have been effective in maintaining general awareness and helping to identify whether suspect chemicals that have been found are indeed precursors. The evaluation shows that these handbooks & posters have not been universally distributed such that they are widely available within every operational unit that might benefit from them. A more complete distribution would thus increase effectiveness.

Impact

The change, both positive and negative, produced by or likely to be produced by the project.

All projects hope to achieve a positive impact with regard to their primary objective, whilst avoiding any unintended negative impact. Impact is both the most important indicator of the success of a project, and the most difficult to gauge. This is because it can be difficult to know what impact the project set out to achieve, or because the wording of the intended impact does not easily lend itself to measurement. Impact can also be any negative, or unintentional, consequences that the project brings about.


Although the precise details have changed during successive project revisions, the overall aim of the Project E29 during the time period of this evaluation¹⁹ has always been to “*reduce the volume and extent of the illicit manufacture of heroin in Afghanistan through the strengthening of precursor control mechanisms in the Central Asian countries*”. In fact, there is no evidence to show that the volume of heroin manufactured in Afghanistan has reduced during the lifespan of the project. But, given the potential for precursors to be supplied to Afghanistan by other routes, there is no guarantee that a stronger precursor control mechanism in Central Asia would indeed cause a reduction in Afghan heroin manufacture. Hence the wording of the aim creates some difficulty in identifying where indicators of impact should be sought. It is therefore tempting to use seizure figures as the primary indicator of impact, but this again is an erroneous assumption. High seizure figures might be indicate an improvement in interdiction by law enforcement, but it could also simply reflect an overall growth in trafficking; conversely, whilst low seizure figures might be thought to indicate a deterioration in law enforcement interdiction, they may in reality be an indication that the trade has for some reason reduced drastically or moved elsewhere. Alternatively, it could also be the case that a strong regulatory system, which makes diversion from the licit trade harder to achieve, will perversely have a negative impact on law enforcement seizure figures. As noted in the INCB 2012 report “*the amount of acetic anhydride in shipments that were either stopped or suspended or identified as suspicious through the PEN Online system was nearly double the amount actually seized by law enforcement authorities*”²⁰. Whilst this is a comment relating to the worldwide situation rather just Central Asia, it does highlight this important dilemma.

In general, statistics on precursor seizures in the region are disappointing. Firstly, the general availability of seizure figures themselves is not good. Representatives of both CARICC and ROCA lamented the availability of seizure statistics. This has had a negative impact on the quality of project reporting, which in turn hampered the desk review process. Secondly, such figures that are available indicate that seizures are ‘occasional and spectacular’ rather than

¹⁹ From Project Revision 1, dated April 2004 onwards.

²⁰https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/TECHNICAL_REPORTS/2013/PARTITION/ENGLISH/ar/PRE2013_E_Extent.pdf

widespread and frequent. This observation is independently confirmed by the INCB who state in their annual report for 2013 that “*despite some recent successes, the amount of acetic anhydride seized in countries in the region, particularly in countries neighbouring Afghanistan, remains low considering the amount of heroin illicitly manufactured in the region, and that indicates that there is a need for further investments to increase the capacity for border interdiction*”²¹. The map illustrating the data makes dismal viewing.



Map 1. Acetic anhydride: seizures reported by to INCB by Governments, 2008-2012, and notable transit routes, 2008-2013²²

If the Afghan heroin production figures are not directly relevant, and the Central Asian precursor seizure statistics are inadequate, then other indicators of impact need to be used. The obvious approach is to look for impact indicators in each of the four specific areas which make up a precursor control mechanism, and within which capacity had to be enhanced, namely regulatory personnel, customs and border service personnel, law enforcement investigators and international cooperation. One complication in this approach is that the Progress Reports are often non-specific about who the exact recipients of an activity were, using phrasing like “*109 officers of Central Asian law enforcement agencies*”. Hence, an exact breakdown of participation between Drug Control Agencies, Ministry of Interior, Customs Service, Border Guard etc is not possible.

Given the achievements of the first phase of Project E29 the specific legislative and regulatory aspects have not required a great deal of further attention during the period under evaluation. Most of the Central Asian countries combine the regulatory function and the

²¹https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/TECHNICAL_REPORTS/2013/PARTITION/ENGLISH/ar/PRE2013_E_ActionInternational.pdf

²²https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/TECHNICAL_REPORTS/2013/PARTITION/ENGLISH/ar/PRE2013_E_Extent.pdf

primary investigative responsibility within one agency²³. This agency therefore tends to benefit from activities launched in furtherance of both the ‘regulatory personnel’ and the ‘law enforcement investigators’ objective. The operational commanders who were interviewed indicated their satisfaction with the activities that their staff had benefited from, but were not particularly specific about the exact nature of the impact that resulted, beyond vague words about ‘operational improvements and more successes’.

Within the overall law enforcement effort against drug crime in the Central Asian countries, there is no strict delineation between the competencies of the different agencies. One gets the impression that the lead in any investigation is decided on a case-by-case basis rather than according to any fixed protocol, and in this respect the circumstances by which the investigative opportunity came to light seems to be all-important. This seems to be even more the case with precursor trafficking than it is with drug trafficking. Hence, inter-agency cooperation is an important factor and one, which Project E29 might have done more to foster. Many activities in Project E29 have been delivered at actual border crossing points from which it becomes clear that Customs and Border Service personnel must be the beneficiaries thereof. Although they are both located at border crossings, there is still a clear separation between Customs and Border Guards, both in terms of their physical positioning and their operational responsibility. One would presume that such a lack of integrated border management would inevitably create efficiency and effectiveness shortcomings, although all interviewees claimed that this was not the case. Law enforcement investigators from the Ministry of Interior / Police gave the impression that they considered themselves to be a secondary priority for Project E29 activities. Some felt that the DCA exploited its role as national contact point to concentrate all the benefit with its own agency alone. Others felt that Project E29 was specifically a Customs & Border Guard project and therefore ‘not for the police’. More effective communication by Project E29 with all beneficiary agencies could perhaps have ameliorated this situation, but the beneficiary countries did not always permit such direct contact with individual agencies.

Indeed within Ministry of Interior / Police there seemed to be an attitude that precursor chemical control was not actually a matter for them to deal with; not even a ‘drug trafficking’ matter in fact.

Activities like Op TARCET have been effective in driving improved international cooperation, and the many joint trainings and seminars that have been held have created the trust-based networks that facilitate further cross-border interaction. In the latter years of Project E29 efforts have also been made to integrate China and Russia into these joint activities, recognising the significance that these countries have in the overall precursor trade. CARICC is perhaps the key to sustained international cooperation in the region and creating an ongoing precursor initiative, perhaps linked with the developmental work of the RIWG-P, would be a good development for both CARICC and the region at large.

Although it is not an issue that is easily subject to a quantitative measure, the evaluation shows that the biggest impact that Project E29 has had has been in raising awareness of the importance of precursor chemicals as an area for law enforcement attention. Numerous senior officers described how prior to Project E29, attention was primarily given to the outward trafficking of Afghan opiates, without any attention at all being given to inbound precursors; not because of conscious policy but simply because they were unaware of the significance of precursors, and the impact that could be made to heroin trafficking by interdicting them.

²³ i.e. The Kyrgyz Drug Control Agency, the Tajik Drug Control Agency and the Turkmen State Service on the Protection of a Healthy Society.

Sustainability

Sustainability concerns measuring whether the benefits of the project will continue after the project itself ends.

The legislative and regulatory mechanisms that were put in place in the first phase of Project E29 are now fully embedded within the agencies or institutions that house them. Indeed, they have now been operational on a continuous basis since 2005 and in that respect have already demonstrated sustainability. There is no sustainability plan as such, but the issue of precursor control is identified as one element for the future Regional Programme, which is currently under development.

A major challenge for sustainability is the problem posed by the frequent rotation of trained staff. Indeed, the experience of previous project evaluations in the region has shown that this is an endemic problem within Central Asian law enforcement. Although Project E29 sets itself targets for the percentage of officers who should be trained in each agency, this is only relevant if once trained they stay in the role where they can utilise the new skills they have learned. Too often, they are redeployed shortly after completing the training meaning that the effect of the training is lost. Requests for external training to be provided by any project usually reflect the fact that such training is not available locally, i.e. it is not on the curricula in the local training academies, and their instructors do not have the knowledge, experience or facilities to provide this training. Accordingly, even though training raises the capacity of individual officers, and perhaps of the immediate front-line units that they work in, it does not increase the overall capacity of the agency in a sustainable way. Furthermore, staff rotation is a frequently cited problem, the net result of which is a constant diminution of officers who have been trained for the role they are currently deployed in. Including a train-the-trainer element in each training course is an effective way to increase sustainability, firstly by providing an in-house resource by which the new knowledge or skill can be cascaded down to a much wider group of trainees, and secondly because having a greater pool of trained officers is effective in countering the rotation problem and sustaining the new operational capacity that results from the training.

This latter issue is an endemic problem in Central Asia and one that challenges the sustainability of all ROCA projects. For this reason it should be foreseen in advance, and explicit measures should be put in place to ensure sustainability even under such circumstances. This requires that the original project documentation should give consideration to sustainability measures, and subsequent project revisions should further enhance these in the event that such staff rotations are indeed occurring. This has not been the case in Project E29.

Human rights and Gender:

The principle of human rights and gender is to ensure that in the broader sense a project does not have any negative consequences for human rights or gender, and in the narrower sense to ensure that project activities are evenly and equally distributed without discrimination.

Precursor trafficking and the specific activities delivered within Project E29 do not have any obvious implications for human rights and gender. Human rights and gender was not mainstreamed in the project documentation. The project activities were aimed at the agencies or units that could benefit operationally from the new skills and knowledge imparted by the activity. Project E29 would advise the beneficiary countries of these target groups, including the profile of individual officers who should attend. The final choice of which participants would actually attend an event always lay with the beneficiary countries.

No data was provided about the breakdown by gender of the students who attended training events. Human rights and gender were not mainstreamed in the training. The evaluation showed that any concerns about the appropriateness of individual attendees related to their professional competence, experience and assignment, not to their gender.

It was however noteworthy, that a significant number of interviewees who were put forward by the beneficiary countries were female.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Project E29 has assisted in creating a legislative and regulatory framework that meets the international standards required for controlling the licit trade in precursor chemicals that is in compliance with Article 12 of the 1988 Convention. This was recognised in the mid-term evaluation, and it remains valid to this day.

Prior to Project E29 there was very little awareness of the contribution that precursor chemicals made to the heroin trade. Not surprisingly, the consequence of this was that combating precursor trafficking was not seen as part of the law enforcement effort against heroin. Project E29 has now created and maintained an awareness of the importance of precursor control amongst law enforcement officers in Central Asia. This awareness has created the appetite for the various capacity building activities delivered by the project, and has also established precursor control as an important element to be included in other ROCA projects.

Despite all the activities of Project E29, seizures of precursors still remain at a low level. This should not be taken to indicate that the project has failed, as other possible explanations exist; one is that the threat of precursor diversion and trafficking in Central Asia, which the project was launched to counter, was not as high as was thought at the time. Another is that a strong regulatory mechanism means that less illicit chemicals enter the black market where they then become vulnerable to seizure. The opinion of most of the officers interviewed, which admittedly can be self-serving, is that precursor chemicals are entering Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan, and there is further intelligence and logic to support this view²⁴.

The availability of good statistics upon which to base analyses and implement intelligence-led policing remains inadequate. This applies to statistics about the licit use of chemicals in the countries, about attempts to divert precursor chemicals from licit to illicit use, and about interdictions of illicitly trafficked chemicals. Either statistics are not being compiled, or the staff are not sufficiently aware of what could be available, or state secrecy rules prevent a full exploitation (and discussion) of statistics. This is a problem for internal use by national law enforcement agencies and means that their contribution to the broader collation of statistics by regional or worldwide institutions is inadequate. This is due to the fact that countries in the region have not yet fully incorporated the concept of intelligence-led policing which has at its heart sound analysis, which relies on good statistics.

Operation TARCET is widely regarded as having been a success. It established a good means of bringing together the countries of the region and combining training, planning and operational execution. This increased capacity, improved cooperation and delivered operational results. Many interviewees found it unfortunate that it was stopped after Op TARCET III in 2011.

Project ‘visibility’ is often important to donors who want their assistance to be visually acknowledged. The visibility of Project E29 has not been particularly high; many interviewees knew that the precursor training had been provided by UNODC, but were not

²⁴ This hypothesis, which is beyond the strict scope of the evaluation, could be worthy of further development in a separate paper.

particularly aware of which project it actually came through. This is not necessarily a problem, but is perhaps explained by the fact that Project E29 focuses on a particular theme, rather than on an agency or activity, meaning that activities delivered by the project can be mistakenly assumed to be a part of other more specific or more familiar projects.

Agencies tend to put their own needs first and foremost rather than considering national ones and can therefore be tempted to maximise their own involvement in a project even at the expense of other agencies and the national good. If project plans do not explicitly specify exactly which agencies they hope to reach, then the choice of recipients is left in the hands of others, meaning that 'agency greed' can lead to an over representation in some agencies at the expense of others.

The frequent rotation of staff into new positions continues to be a problem in most agencies and countries. The specific effects of this are that operational staff that have undergone expensive training in order to be able to fulfil a specific role are soon moved out of that role meaning that the return on the training investment is not realised, and a new training requirement is raised for the incoming officer. In addition, the same rotation amongst managerial staff creates problems for project management and the project evaluation because newly rotated managers do not have a longer-term view of the project.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

Having succeeded in establishing awareness of the importance of precursor control UNODC ROCA should continue to promote awareness and should seek opportunities to include new precursor related activities in the new Regional Project that is currently being planned, as well as in other UNODC heroin related projects in the Central Asian region.

An adequate regulatory and legislative framework is now present in each Central Asian country such that the obligations imposed under Articles 12 of the 1988 Convention can be met. The authorities with competence for policing diversion of precursor chemicals are also properly established and trained such that they can meet this responsibility. However, the rate of large seizures of precursor chemicals in the region remains low, whilst export levels for Afghan opiates remain high.

This indicates two possible conclusions; that the day-to-day work to interdict precursor diversion in Central Asia is not being done effectively, or that the precursors are entering Afghanistan by other routes. The latter is an opinion widely held by operational officers in the beneficiary countries, and as such is an issue worthy of closer scrutiny. If confirmed, it would provide the motivation for a similar anti-precursor effort to be implemented in Iran and Pakistan.

In particular, the Intelligence Led Policing paradigm is not being consistently and comprehensively applied by law enforcement agencies in the region. Not individually, and certainly not collectively. ILP was not explicitly mentioned as an important element in Project E29, but taken together, its activities do imply and support an ILP approach.

Cross-border cooperation between the countries in the region is not fully developed, but the joint activities run by Project E29, like training courses and seminars, have indirectly helped to improve this. Indeed, such activities do show that international cooperation is possible, but unfortunately it still does not seem to occur organically, but rather tends to depend upon an external catalyst. Accordingly, encouragement should be given for more joint-activities like Op TARCET to be conducted.

In particular ROCA and the management of Project RER/H22 should encourage CARICC to take the initiative and propose activities like this on the basis that they give CARICC the opportunity to demonstrate its capacity to perform a regional coordination role, whilst at the same time availing itself of the kind of data needed to perform its intelligence role. The RIWG is another vehicle through which opportunities for operational cooperation can be identified and acted upon.

The foundation of a successful intelligence-led policing approach is good data, and although mechanisms to facilitate this have been implemented, they are not fully utilised. There should be a continued effort to increase the quality, quantity and availability of statistics. This applies to both attempted diversions and seizures. This would provide the basis for evidence-based planning at the strategic level, and intelligence-led action at the operational level. International best practice shows that this is the effective way to counter organised crime groups active in precursor trafficking.

All Central Asian countries should be encouraged to make a much greater use of the resources provided by INCB, particularly the PICS database. This is probably best achieved through leadership by the Afghan Opiate Trade Project, within the broader framework of the Paris Pact Initiative.

The training that has been provided by Project E29 is held in high regard. That said, there are still some structural improvements that can be made. Project Managers should consider including a ‘train-the-trainer’ element in all training activities to ensure that the skills and knowledge imparted during the training can be cascaded down to a wider audience on return to the home agency. This also provides something of an antidote to the common problem of trained staff being rotated out from the role for which training was provided. This is seen as one of the main challenges to the sustainability of project achievements. This, and other measures to enhance sustainability should be considered in advance, and included within the original project planning documentation.

UNODC should also try to ensure that trainers with ‘local familiarity’ are the first choice for delivering training, particularly in the case of hands-on practical training. ‘Familiarity’ here means both the ability to communicate in a locally understood language, and also sensitivity to local realities such that time is not wasted on covering issues that are the norm where they from but are inappropriate or unrealistic in Central Asia.

Priority should be given to carefully identify, and explicitly mention in project documentation, the national agencies that the project will target for inclusion in training events. This ensures that the project itself remains in control of who attends its courses, and prevents that control from falling into the hands of one national agency that may then favour its own officers at the expense of other agencies. This approach ensures that the increased capability created by the project is appropriately spread across all national agencies thereby standardising and increasing overall national capacity.

Capacity building projects only produce real operational improvements if staff who have been trained are retained in posts where they can exploit the new skills they have been trained in. Unfortunately, frequent and random staff rotation is an all too common phenomena within Central Asian law enforcement agencies. Whilst there is probably little that project managers can do to prevent or even reduce staff rotation, they

The Aides Memoire produced by the project, posters and hand-books for assisting with precursor identification and handling, have been well received. They are an effective way of ensuring that the improvements produced by training efforts are sustainable. They also provide good visibility for UNODC and the donors to the project.

Although gender and human rights may not have been regarded as explicit considerations in their own right when Project E29 was launched, it is the case that such ‘new’ elements may emerge during the lifespan of a long-running project and accordingly Project Managers should use project revisions as the means to incorporate such requirements into their planning and activities.

No explicit ‘exit strategy’ has been elaborated for Project E29. Accordingly, there is the danger that when the project ends all the momentum and awareness that has built up around precursor control could be lost. Hence, deliberate thought does need to be given to how this should be maintained. Those ROCA staff engaged in the design and scoping of the new Regional Programme need to be mindful of this.

V. LESSONS LEARNED

The evaluation shows that the absence of a proper scoping or threat assessment prior to the start of a project can be problematic. If an objective effort is not made to confirm that the premise upon which the project is based is indeed valid, the project may struggle as the activities it implements do not have a 'hard target' to aim at. A needs assessment is also vital to ensure that the activities the project intends to implement are both needed and wanted by the intended beneficiaries. If either of these activities reveals discrepancy between the supply side and the demand side, alterations should be made to maximise relevance from the outset of the project.

If project documents do not explicitly list the agencies that the project wants to work with within the beneficiary countries, the danger of 'agency greed' arises. This describes a situation where one agency is in a position to administer the participation of other agencies in project activities. In a worst-case scenario, this can create an uneven spread of activity amongst agencies, and uneven levels of capacity between them. This could undermine the capacity of the country as a whole. To avoid such a situation arising, the Project Manager must ensure that all the target agencies are explicitly mentioned in the project documentation.

The evaluation has shown that activities like Op TARCET are a useful tool in any project that attempts to build capacity. In particular, the combination of training, operational action and cross-border cooperation within an intelligence-driven target area is a good way of both developing and testing new capacity. The existence of CARICC as a regional coordination body provides the mechanism through which activities of this nature can and should be held in future.

Successful training relies on good communication, and some degree of empathy between trainers and students. Trainers who have to rely on interpreters and who lack an experience based familiarity with the local environment are therefore unlikely to be as effective as those that do possess these traits.

ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE
EVALUATION

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
Vienna

Terms of Reference of the

**FINAL INDEPENDENT PROJECT
EVALUATION
OF
Precursor Control in Central Asia
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and
Azerbaijan**

TD/RER/E29

Tashkent, Uzbekistan

June, 2014



UNITED NATIONS
New York, 2014

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I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Project number:	RER/E29
Project title:	Precursor Control in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and Azerbaijan
Duration:	01 June 2000 – 31 December 2014
Location:	Central Asia and Azerbaijan
Linkages to Country Programme:	Strategic Outline for Central Asia And Southern Caucasus 2012-2015
Linkages to Regional Programme:	Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries 2011 – 2014
Linkages to Thematic Programme:	Action against Transnational organized crime And illicit trafficking, including drug trafficking Sub-programme 2: Regional and national capacity building and technical assistance
Executing Agency:	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Regional Office for Central Asia (UNODC ROCA)
Partner Organizations:	Law enforcement agencies in Central Asia and Azerbaijan
Total Approved Budget:	USD 6,733,582
Donors:	Austria Canada France

	<p>Germany</p> <p>Italy</p> <p>Turkey</p> <p>United Kingdom</p> <p>USA</p>
Project Manager/Coordinator:	Mr. Ottabek Murodov
Type of evaluation (mid-term or final):	Final Independent Project Evaluation
Time period covered by the evaluation:	01 June 2005 – 31 December 2014
Geographical coverage of the evaluation:	Central Asia and Azerbaijan
Core Learning Partners ²⁵ (entities):	<p>Azerbaijan:</p> <p>Customs Committee</p> <p>Kazakhstan:</p> <p>Border Service of the National Security Committee</p> <p>Customs Control Committee of the Ministry of Finance</p> <p>Drug Control Committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs</p> <p>National Security Committee</p> <p>Ministry of Justice</p> <p>Kyrgyzstan:</p> <p>Border Service of Kyrgyz Republic</p> <p>Ministry of Internal Affairs</p>

²⁵ The Core Learning Partnership (CLP are the key stakeholders of the subject evaluated (project, programme, policy etc.) who have an interest in the evaluation. The CLP works closely with the Evaluation Manager to guide the evaluation process.

	<p>State Committee of National Security</p> <p>State Customs Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic</p> <p>State Service on Drug Control</p> <p>Tajikistan:</p> <p>Customs Service</p> <p>Drug Control Agency under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan</p> <p>Main Directorate of border guards of State Committee of National Security</p> <p>Ministry of Internal Affairs</p> <p>State Committee of National Security</p> <p>Turkmenistan:</p> <p>Ministry of Internal Affairs</p> <p>Ministry of National Security</p> <p>State Coordination Commission on Drug Control under the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan</p> <p>State Customs Service</p> <p>State Border Service</p> <p>State Drug Control Service of Turkmenistan</p> <p>Uzbekistan:</p> <p>National Information-analytical Centre of Drug Control under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan</p> <p>National Security Service</p> <p>Ministry of Internal Affairs</p> <p>State Customs Committee</p>
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	<p>State Border Guards Committee of the National Security Service</p> <p>Drug Control Committee of the Ministry of Health</p>
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Project overview and historical context in which the project is implemented

The RER/E29 – “Precursor Control in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and Azerbaijan” was started in 2000 and the precursor trafficking routes to Afghanistan appear to roughly operate along major Afghan opiate routes in the reverse direction. The Balkan, Northern and Southern routes out of Afghanistan move hundreds of tons of heroin to Western and Asian markets. Likewise, these routes are used in the reverse direction to smuggle hundreds of tons of precursors to Afghanistan just for heroin production.

Although much is known about drug trafficking suppliers, consumers, routes and even traffickers, disruption remains difficult. The current level of communication and cooperation among the countries in the region is unfortunately not at sufficient level. Besides, the current capacity of the law enforcement agencies in the region as well as traditional methods of land border control are not sufficient to stem the flow of opiates into destination markets. The need to strengthen and scale up counter narcotics policies and interventions is more pressing today than ever before especially in view of the political transition facing Afghanistan in the near future

The RER/E29 Precursor Control in Central Asia began in May 2000 with an initial budget of US\$ 5,000,000. The original objective of the project was to respond to the potential threat of diversion of precursors in Central Asia and the impact of such diversion on existing problems related to the illicit manufacture of drugs. Thus, the project originally focused on introducing controls for licit chemicals used in industry that could also be used as heroin precursors (identified according to a list provided by the International Narcotics Control Board). It raised awareness of the role played by precursor chemicals in transforming opium into heroin and encouraged the countries in the region to participate in the Pre-Export Notification scheme for monitoring chemical shipments and international movements.

As the licit controls became more robust, more attention was paid to increasing enforcement capacity of, and providing technical assistance to, those competent authorities engaged in the detection and interdiction of illicit precursor chemicals. Part of this approach included the creation of a regional action focusing on the interdiction of precursor chemicals called Operation TARCET (the successor to a similar initiative called Operation Transshipment). TARCET stands for Targeted Anti-trafficking operation in the Region that will enhance Communication, Expertise and Training. It involved all five countries in Central Asia and invited the parallel participation of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan. There have been three TARCET operations in total - 2008, 2009 and (last phase) 2010.

Justification of the project and main experiences / challenges during implementation

The project objectives are currently pursued through and contribute to the Regional Intelligence Working Group on Precursors (RIWGP), an initiative launched within the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries (Sub-Programme 1: Regional Law Enforcement Cooperation).

During the project implementation the situation with precursors trafficking has changed and the project became the initiator of the many successful operations and activities in Central Asia. For example operation TARCET, organized in cooperation with CARICC, became a regular meeting on countering precursor trafficking in Central Asia. During these - meetings, the cooperation between law enforcement agencies of the region were strengthened and large parties of illegal precursors seized. However, after the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries (RP) began its implementation the main activities related to precursors in the region were organized in cooperation with RP.

Project documents and revisions of the original project document

The initial project document was produced in February 2000. Due to extension the project duration and increasing project coverage and budget, the project has subsequently gone through six project revisions, in 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2011.

The current project end date is 31/12/2014. During the past 11 years, eight donors (Austria, Canada, France, Italy, UNDP, Turkey, UK and USA) have pledged \$6, \$6,733,582. The current budget total \$6,733,582.

The latest project revision contains the following objectives: “To reduce the volume and extent of the illicit manufacture of heroin in Afghanistan through the strengthening of the precursor control mechanism in the Central Asian countries”

According to the changes during the project revision, the project revision gives the following immediate objective (Outcome):

Objective: Enhanced capacity, skills and knowledge base by which law enforcement in Central Asia and Azerbaijan can better control and interdict precursor chemicals

Indicators:

At least 80% of officers trained by the project report that their skills have been improved in training feedback questionnaires.

Quantities of precursor chemicals interdicted increase by at least 10% between 2011 and 2014.

Relevant competent authorities control, detect and interdict the smuggling of precursors more effectively

Indicators:

Where appropriate, relevant competent authorities have completed international Pre-Export Notification procedures 100% of the time

Quantities of precursor chemicals interdicted increase by at least 10% between 2011 and 2014.

UNODC strategy context, including the project’s main objectives and outcomes and project’s contribution to UNODC country, regional or thematic programme

The Project was launched in June 2000 and was aligned with the UNODC regional plans outlined in the Strategic Outline for Central Asia And Southern Caucasus 2012-2015, Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries 2011 – 2014 and Action against Transnational organized crime, And illicit trafficking, including drug trafficking: Sub-programme 2: Regional and national capacity building and technical assistance.

II. DISBURSEMENT HISTORY

	<i>Total Approved Budget ((01/06/2000 – 31/12/2014))</i>	<i>Expenditure (01/06/2000 – 31/03/2014)</i>	<i>Expenditure in % (01/06/2000 – 31/03/2014)</i>
	6,733,582	6,411,593	94.55%

III. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

Reasons behind the evaluation taking place

This is a final independent project evaluation and is initiated by the project manager. No independent project specific evaluation has been conducted in the past 6 years. The extended duration, significant resources and financial commitment involved now merit a clear and thorough assessment of the project's relevance, design and progress towards achieving its stated objectives.

Assumed accomplishment of the evaluation

Through this evaluation, UNODC should obtain a frank assessment on the effectiveness of the activities conducted in this specific area and draw on recommendation and lessons learned to inform future programming. This evaluation will also offer an opportunity to increase accountability for all stakeholders involved and identify problems that may have to be addressed differently in the future.

Specific questions, among others, that are expected to be answered include; To what extent have the resources available converted to output in a timely and cost-effective manner for the knowledge products?; To what extent has the Project improved Member States capacity to develop and share information on migrants smuggling?; And To what extent are the project results (outcomes and impact, if any) likely to continue / be sustained after the project has finished?

UNODC ROCA is committed to continue support CA states in strengthening their capacity to address the precursor control even after the completion of the Project, as planned by the Regional programme for Afghanistan and neighbouring countries the project activities will be continued under the RP activities. The identified best practices and/or inaccuracies during this evaluation process will help improving further activities of the RP and ROCA and fortify CA countries capacity to effectively control precursor trafficking.

The main evaluation users

The main users and benefactors of this evaluation will be the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia and Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, Core Learning Partners (see Annex 3) and the project donors and law enforcement agencies of the Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

IV. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The unit of analysis to be covered by the evaluation

The scope of the independent evaluation will be limited to the implementation, impact, use and sustainability of the precursors control objective achieved through the improvement of the legislation and regulations concerning import and export of chemicals; provision of assistance in the strengthening of chemicals import/export control, supply of equipment, consultancy, expertise

and training; the quality, impact and use of core knowledge products; the impact of the project in support of the regional cooperation on precursor control; as well as evaluating the training on precursors in CA countries. In particular the evaluation will assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of these activities (training, data collection, knowledge products and equipment) conducted over the period 2005-2014 at national and regional levels

The time period to be covered by the evaluation

Activities conducted over the period October 2005 until the end of the evaluation field mission (tentatively October 2014) at national and regional levels.

The geographical coverage of the evaluation

The scope for the geographical score of the training component of the project will be Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Six field missions are planned, Namely, Baku (Azerbaijan), Astana (Kazakhstan), Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), Dushanbe (Tajikistan), Ashkhabad (Turkmenistan) and Tashkent (Uzbekistan).

V. EVALUATION CRITERIA AND KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

<p><i>Relevance</i></p> <p><i>Relevance is the extent to which the objectives of a project are continuously consistent with recipients' needs, UNODC mandate and overarching strategies and policies.</i></p>
1. How strong was the original business case for this project? How well did the project design meet this business case?
2. How have the project revisions developed the original project objectives? Have they addressed any shortcomings in the project design or the impact of external influences?
3. To what extent is the project relevant and appropriate in light of the Strategic Programme Framework, the Strategic Outline and the Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries?
4. To what extent are the objectives of the project aligned with, and responsive to, the current policy priorities and action plans of governments of the regions?
5. To what extent is the project relevant to the respective Law enforcement's agencies needs and priorities?
<p><i>Efficiency</i></p> <p><i>Efficiency is a measure of how resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into outputs.</i></p>
1. To what extent has the project been implemented in a cost-effective and efficient manner?
2. To what extent is the structure and profile of the project management team appropriate to the needs of the projects?
3. To what extent was the project managed effectively and with timely responses to changing circumstances?

<i>Effectiveness</i>
<i>Effectiveness is the extent to which a project or programme achieves its objectives and outcomes.</i>
1. To what extent have project objectives, outcomes and outputs from the original project document been achieved? How could project planning be improved to be more effective?
2. To what extent do the objectives, outcomes and outputs from the new project revision respond to present circumstances and stakeholder expectations?
3. How has the concept of Operation TARCET (and previously Operation Transshipment) contributed to achieving the original objective? To what extent has RIWGP improved upon Operation TARCET?
<i>Impact</i>
<i>Impact is the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term economic, environmental, social change(s) produced or likely to be produced by a project, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended, after the project was implemented.</i>
1. What is the anticipated long term impact of this project? Is the project likely to achieve that impact?
2. Have there been any positive or negative unintended results?
3. To what extent can any identified changes in the precursor's situation in the region be attributed to the project?
<i>Sustainability</i>
<i>Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of a project or programme are likely to continue after its termination. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.</i>
1. To what extent are project interventions sustainable in the long term? If they are not, what is needed to ensure their continued resilience and viability in the future?
2. To what extent are the project's results likely to continue after the project?
3. What measures are in place to ensure skills are retained within the target group?
4. What measures are in place to ensure future maintenance and repair of any equipment provided
<i>Partnerships and cooperation</i>
<i>Partnerships and cooperation is a measure of the level of UNODC cooperation with partners and implementing partners (e.g. donors, NGOs, Governments, other UN agencies etc.)</i>
1. How were the stakeholders identified, properly engaged and informed. What is the extent of their participation?
2. To what extent did UNODC coordinate its interventions and alignment with other partners active in the field of precursors control?
3. What are the opportunities, achievements and/or challenges of the established partnerships?
4. How were the stakeholders identified, properly engaged and informed. What is the extent of their participation?
<i>Human rights and gender</i>
1. To what extent has the project taken into consideration human rights concerns during the implementation of its activities and the design of the project?
2. To what extent has the project addressed the gender dimension of working with law

enforcement officers at the border location and the design of the project?	
<i>Lessons learned and best practices</i>	
1.	What lessons have been learned so far during the implementation of this project?
2.	Which, if any, best practices can be identified from the implementation of this project?
3.	Have any lessons learned or best practice been incorporated into the project from previous evaluation conducted in 2005? If so, how?
4.	What lessons can be learned and best practices identified to inform future programming in the area of precursor control?

VI. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The methods used to collect and analyse data

Include desk reviews of relevant project document, six field missions, observations and interviews with key stakeholders, the donor and CLPs as well as surveys and questionnaires.

The sources of data

Interviews with CLP's and donors and relevant stakeholders outlined in Annex 3, as well as further interviews with stakeholders as proposed by the evaluator. Interviews with other UNODC ROCA staff involved into the precursor controlling. Briefing and individual interviews with Regional Representative, Senior Law Enforcement Advisor, Financial Analyst, Procurement Officer, Human Resources Associate, Operations Manager and Programme Associate

Field missions to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and UNODC field offices and related national projects and project coordinators and consultants.

The evaluation will be undertaken through a triangulation exercise of data stemming from desk review, structured interviews, field missions, questionnaires, surveys, observations and other sources to be established by the evaluator.

The independent project evaluation is to be conducted following UNODC/IEU's evaluation policy, handbook, guidelines and templates, (to be found on the IEU website, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/index.html>), as well as UNEG Norms and Standards.

VII. TIMEFRAME AND DELIVERABLES

Time frame for the evaluation

18 August 2014 to 10 October 2014

Time frame for the field mission

It is anticipated that the evaluation will involve visits to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and UNODC field offices.

Tentative time-frame for mission to 9-22 September 2014.

Expected deliverables and time frame

The Evaluator will have the overall responsibility for the quality and timely submission of all deliverables, as specified below:

All deliverables will be the responsibility of the Evaluator:

- Inception report containing a refined work plan, methodology and evaluation tools in line with the UNODC evaluation policy, guidelines and handbook to be submitted to IEU through the application on Independent Project Evaluation in ProFi. Following incorporation of comments by Project Management and the UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU), the finalized inception report should be ready before the start of the field mission and be cleared by IEU before any field mission is undertaken.
- The field mission should end with an oral debrief to allow the clarification of any misunderstandings or misconceptions and to answer any points of confusion or ambiguity.
- Draft evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation policy, handbook, guidelines and templates; to be cleared by IEU.
- This report should be a complete draft document reflecting the evaluation and initial findings. It should be submitted electronically to Evaluation Manager and IEU for comments and suggested amendments. All CLPs should also have the opportunity to comment – the Project Manager will share the Draft Evaluation Report with CLPs.
- Final evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation policy, handbook, guidelines and template, including incorporating all comments and annex with management response (if necessary) to be submitted and be cleared by IEU.
- This should include a review of the original project design, the way in which it has been implemented, the impact it has had on precursor control in Central Asia and whether there are recommendations or lessons to be learned for the future. All questions from the ToR need to be responded to or clearly stated why it was not possible to answer some question.
- Power point Presentation of evaluation findings and recommendations to CLPs and other key stakeholders

<i>Duties</i>	<i>Estimated Timeframe incl deadlines</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Deliverables</i>
<i>Desk review, completion of UNODC security training (on-line), preparation of interview plan and evaluation methodology in form of an Inception Report (to be cleared by IEU before any field mission starts).</i>	<i>18-28 August</i>	<i>Home</i>	<i>Draft inception report including questionnaires; in line with UNODC Evaluation Guidelines, Handbook and Templates (Both shall be submitted to UNODC ROCA and IEU for review)</i>
<i>Incorporation of all comments received and submission of final Inception report to ROCA and IEU for review and clearance</i>	<i>5 September</i>		<i>Final inception report</i>
<i>Briefings and interviews with ROCA management, operations and logistical support Field mission</i>	<i>8-9 September</i>	<i>Tashkent.</i>	<i>Notes</i>
<i>Meetings with stakeholders in Almaty, Astana, Ashgabat, Baku, Bishkek and Dushanbe (with travel) Field mission</i>	<i>9-22 September</i>	<i>Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan Uzbekistan</i>	<i>Interview notes</i>
<i>Debrief with Evaluation Manager & ROCA (via Skype)</i>	<i>27 September</i>	<i>Home ,</i>	<i>Comments and clarifications of any misunderstandings or misconceptions are provided</i>
<i>Preparation of draft evaluation report in line with UNODC Evaluation Handbook, Guidelines and Templates</i>	<i>28 September – 13 October</i>	<i>Home</i>	<i>Draft report shall be submitted to ROCA and IEU for review and comments</i>
<i>Review of draft report by the project manager, selected stakeholders and IEU</i>	<i>14 – 24 October</i>	<i>Home</i>	<i>Comments and clarifications are provided by ROCA and IEU</i>

<i>Incorporation of all comments received and finalization of the report. Preparation of a final Power point presentation on draft evaluation findings to key stakeholders</i>	<i>3 November</i>	<i>Home</i>	<i>The draft report shall be submitted to ROCA and IEU for further review Power point presentation shall be made available for UNODC ROCA and CLPs.</i>
<i>Submission to IEU and clearance of final report. Dissemination by the project manager and publication on the IEU website</i>	<i>10 November</i>		

VIII. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

Number of evaluators needed

The final evaluation of the project will be carried out by one International Independent Evaluation Expert identified by UNODC through a competitive selection process and supported by the national Project Manager. The Evaluation Expert Evaluator will be an expert in reviewing criminal justice and/or law enforcement structures, and have experience of evaluating technical assistance projects. Costs associated with the evaluator will be borne by the project. The expert Evaluator shall act independently, in line with UNODC evaluation policy, handbook and guidelines and UNEG Ethical Guidelines and in his individual capacity and not as a representative of any government or organisation that may present a conflict of interest. In his individual capacity and not as representative of the government or organization which appointed them. She/he will have no previous experience of working with project RER/E29 or of working in any capacity linked with it.

The role of the lead evaluator

Carry out the desk review; develop the inception report, including sample size and sampling technique; draft and finalize the inception report and evaluation methodology, incorporating relevant comments, in line with the guidelines and template on the IEU website <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>; lead and coordinate the evaluation process and the oversee the tasks of the evaluators; implement quantitative tools and analyse data; triangulate data and test rival explanations; ensure that all aspects of the terms of reference are fulfilled; draft an evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation policy and the guidelines and template on the IEU website

<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>; finalize the evaluation report on the basis of comments received; include a management response in the final report; present the final evaluation findings and recommendations to stakeholders.

More details will be provided in the respective job descriptions in Annex I.

Conflict of interest

According to UNODC rules, the consultant must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.

Reference to job description detailing qualifications and responsibilities

The Evaluation Expert/Evaluator should have the following qualifications and experience:

- An academic degree in project management, business administration or international development and/or graduation from a recognised national law enforcement academy both with at least 5 years professional experience;
- Substantial experience in evaluating & monitoring technical assistance projects;
- Experience in evaluating the design and implementation of organisational structures at a senior level, preferably in a law enforcement context;
- Previous experience of law enforcement in an operational capacity is highly desirable.
- Experience in conducting outcome and impact evaluations of projects and programmes in international development and preferably regarding counter-narcotics enforcement;
- Experience of having applied recognised quality management and assessment methodologies (such as the Balanced Scorecard or the Business Excellence Model of the EFQM) is desirable;
- Recognised project management training and/or accreditation skills. Membership of a professional body related to project management will be an advantage;
- Familiarity with the precursor chemical situation in the region will be an asset;
- Technical knowledge of human rights and gender issues;
- Fluency in spoken and written English required, with proven drafting skills, working knowledge of Russian is an asset.

The evaluator will be responsible for drafting the evaluation report, ensuring the report meets the necessary standards and for submitting the drafts as described in a timely manner.

IX. MANAGEMENT OF EVALUATION PROCESS

Roles and responsibilities of the Project Manager

The Project Manager is responsible for managing the evaluation, drafting and finalizing the ToR, selecting Core Learning Partners and informing them of their role, recruiting evaluators, providing desk review materials to the evaluation team, reviewing the inception report as well as the evaluation methodology, liaising with the Core Learning Partners, reviewing the draft report, assessing the quality of the final report by using the Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports, as well as developing an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations as well as follow-up action.

The evaluation should be planned and conducted in close consultation with UNODC ROCA. The evaluation tools and methodology must be agreed with ROCA and cleared by IEU.

Project Management

Management is responsible for drafting and finalizing the ToR, selecting Core Learning Partners and informing them of their role, recruiting evaluators, providing desk review materials to the evaluation team, reviewing the inception report as well as the evaluation methodology, liaising with the Core Learning Partners, reviewing the draft report, assessing the quality of the final report by using the Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports, disseminating the final evaluation report, as well as developing an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations.

ROCA will be responsible for the meeting schedule, arranging the interviews, providing translation and coordinating all administrative matters.

Interpretation will be arranged as needed.

Roles and responsibilities of the evaluation stakeholders (Core Learning Partners)

Members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) are selected by the project managers. Members of the CLP are selected from the key stakeholder groups, including UNODC management, mentors, beneficiaries, partner organizations and donor Member States. The CLPs are asked to comment on key steps of the evaluation and act as facilitators with respect to the dissemination and application of the results and other follow-up action.

Roles and responsibilities of the Independent Evaluation Unit

The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) provides mandatory normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html>.

IEU provides norms, tools and templates for the different stages of the evaluation process. IEU also advises on evaluation matters and is involved in the process described in the Roles and Responsibilities table for Independent Project Evaluations (to be found on the IEU website, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/index.html>). All deliverables of this evaluation (Terms of Reference; Inception Report; Draft Evaluation Report; Final Evaluation Report) are to be commented on and cleared by IEU.

The independent evaluation will be conducted by the evaluator following UNODC/IEU's evaluation policy, handbook, guidelines and templates, as well as UNEG Norms and Standards Norms and Standards of the UNEG and UNODC guidelines by providing comments on evaluation tools and methods, the draft report and clearance of the final report.

The evaluator will submit a draft report to the Evaluation Manager, the UNODC IEU, and to ROCA, as well as to all "Core Learning Partners". The report will contain the draft findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation team. The report should be no longer than 20 pages, excluding annexes and the executive summary. The report will be distributed by UNODC as required to the governmental authorities and respective donors, and will be discussed at a Tripartite Meeting by the parties to the project.

Logistical support responsibilities

The Project Manager will be in charge of providing logistical support to the evaluation team including arranging the field missions of the evaluation team. For the field missions, the evaluation team liaises with the UNODC Regional/Field Offices and mentors as appropriate

ROCA will provide office space, an internet connection and use of a desktop computer where appropriate as well as assistance with interpretation. The evaluator will need to provide his/her own laptop, cameras or other equipment. ROCA will assist with transport within the region and support international travel arrangements and the issuance of visa (where necessary)...

X. PAYMENT MODALITIES

Consultants will be issued consultancy contracts and paid in accordance with UNODC rules and regulations. Payment correlates to deliverables – three instalments are foreseen (25%, 25% and 50% of total fees):

- The first payment (25 per cent of the consultancy fee) upon receipt of the Inception

Report and clearance by IEU;

- The second payment (25 per cent of the consultancy fee) upon clearance of the Draft

Evaluation Report by IEU;

- The third and final payment (50 percent of the consultancy fee, i.e. the remainder of

the fee) only after completion of the respective tasks, receipt of the final report and presentation and its clearance by UNODC/IEU.

Payment will only be releases after the respective clearance of IEU. All deliverables are to be in line with the UNODC Evaluation policy, handbook, guidelines and templates.

ANNEX 1. JOB DESCRIPTIONS OF EVALUATOR

Independent Project Evaluation of the UNODC project TD/RER/E29 Precursor Control in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and Azerbaijan

Job description for the International Evaluation Consultant

Post title	International Evaluation Consultant
Estimated time period	18 August 2014 to 10 October 2014
Starting date required	18 August 2014
Duty station	Home base; missions to Baku (Azerbaijan), Astana (Kazakhstan), Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), Dushanbe (Tajikistan), Ashkhabad (Turkmenistan) and Tashkent (Uzbekistan).

1. Background of the assignment:

The RER/E29 “Precursor Control in Central Asia” began in May 2000 with an initial budget of US\$ 5,000,000. The objective of the original project document was to respond to the potential threat of diversion of precursor chemicals in Central Asia and the impact of such diversion on the illicit manufacture of opium. The project originally focused on introducing controls for licit chemicals in industry. It raised awareness of precursor chemicals and encouraged participation in the INCB Pre-Export Notification scheme for monitoring chemical shipments.

As licit controls became more robust, more attention was paid to increasing enforcement capacity of and providing technical assistance to those competent authorities engaged in the detection and interdiction of illicit precursor chemicals. Part of this approach included the creation of a regional action focusing on the interdiction of precursor chemicals called Operation TARCET (the successor to a similar initiative called Operation Transshipment). TARCET stands for Targeted Anti-trafficking operation in the Region that will enhance Communication, Expertise and Training. It involved all five countries in Central Asia and invited parallel participation by Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan. There have been three TARCET operations (in 2008, 2009 and 2010) and a fourth is planned for 2012.

2. Purpose of the assignment:

This is a final evaluation and is initiated by the project manager. No project specific evaluation has been conducted in the past 6 years. The extended duration, significant resources and financial

commitment involved now merit a clear and thorough assessment of the project's relevance, design and progress towards achieving its stated objectives.

The results of the evaluation are intended for use by those managing the project and for the regional office in Tashkent to enable them to learn from and make desirable adjustments to ongoing implementation. It will also inform stakeholders and help them learn more about project accomplishments.

The main stakeholders will be interviewed and briefed as part of the evaluation process and shall receive the key findings. Their comments, opinions and ideas shall be reflected in the report where appropriate. The exhaustive list of stakeholders (the Core Learning Partners) attached. (Annex 3)

The Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries was launched in December 2011. Precursor chemical control is one of the objectives of Sub-Programme 1 of the programme. Conducting an evaluation at the present time will also look into the activities conducted jointly with the Regional Programme and guide the development of wider regional initiatives on precursor chemicals under that programme.

3. Specific tasks to be performed by the consultant:

The International Evaluation Expert will within the framework of the TD/RER/E29 Project be responsible for the following tasks:

- Ensure quality and timely delivery of all activities and report
- Carry out the desk review
- Provide methodological evaluation quality assurance throughout the evaluation process and inputs
- Develop and submit the evaluation Inception Report in line with UNODC evaluation handbook, guidelines and templates to the Project Manager (clearance by IEU), and take into account any comments received; clearance necessary before field mission takes place.
- Conduct planned missions, undertake interviews and facilitate the participation of CLPs
- Implement appropriate quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis tools and methods
- Triangulate data and test rival explanations
- Ensure that all aspects of the evaluation terms of reference are fulfilled
- Prepare and submit an Aide Memoire which includes preliminary findings

- Present findings to the project implementation team and CLPs (as possible/appropriate)
- Draft an evaluation report in line with UNODC and IEU evaluation policy, handbook, guidelines and templates and requirements to be reviewed by the project manager and cleared by IEU.
- Finalise the evaluation report on the basis of feedback received, incorporating all requested changes in accordance. To be cleared by IEU.
- Apply ethical evaluation standards in line with international best practice (UNEG Ethical Guidelines)

4. Expected tangible and measurable output(s):

Inception report, Aide Memoire, Draft Evaluation Report and Final Evaluation Report. All outputs are to be in line with UNODC Evaluation Policy, handbook, guidelines and templates.

5. Dates and details as to how the work must be delivered:

On the basis of the Terms of Reference, s/he will carry out the following duties:

<i>Duties</i>	<i>Estimated Timeframe incl deadlines</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Deliverables</i>
<i>Desk review, completion of UNODC security training (on-line), preparation of interview plan and evaluation methodology in form of an Inception Report (to be cleared by IEU before any field mission starts).</i>	<i>18-28 August</i>	<i>Home</i>	<i>Draft inception report including questionnaires; in line with UNODC Evaluation Guidelines, Handbook and Templates (Both shall be submitted to UNODC ROCA and IEU for review)</i>
<i>Incorporation of all comments received and submission of final Inception report to ROCA and IEU for review and clearance</i>	<i>5 September</i>		<i>Final inception report</i>
<i>Briefings and interviews with ROCA management,</i>	<i>8-9 September</i>	<i>Tashkent.</i>	<i>Notes</i>

<i>operations and logistical support Field mission</i>			
<i>Meetings with stakeholders in Almaty, Astana, Ashgabat, Baku, Bishkek and Dushanbe (with travel) Field mission</i>	9-22 September	<i>Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan Uzbekistan</i>	<i>Interview notes</i>
<i>Debrief with Evaluation Manager & ROCA (via Skype)</i>	27 September	<i>Home ,</i>	<i>Comments and clarifications of any misunderstandings or misconceptions are provided</i>
<i>Preparation of draft evaluation report in line with UNODC Evaluation Handbook, Guidelines and Templates</i>	28 September – 13 October	<i>Home</i>	<i>Draft report shall be submitted to ROCA and IEU for review and comments</i>
<i>Review of draft report by the project manager, selected stakeholders and IEU</i>	14 – 24 October	<i>Home</i>	<i>Comments and clarifications are provided by ROCA and IEU</i>
<i>Incorporation of all comments received and finalization of the report. Preparation of a final Power point presentation on draft evaluation findings to key stakeholders</i>	3 November	<i>Home</i>	<i>The draft report shall be submitted to ROCA and IEU for further review Power point presentation shall be made available for UNODC ROCA and CLPs.</i>
<i>Submission to IEU and clearance of final report. Dissemination by the project manager and publication on the IEU website</i>	10 November		

6. Indicators to evaluate the consultant's performance:

The consultant's performance will be based on quality of the final report and timeliness of delivery.

7. Qualifications/expertise sought (required educational background, years of relevant work experience, other special skills or knowledge required):

Required experience, knowledge, skills and qualifications:

The consultant should demonstrate:

A strong professional record in designing and leading independent reviews and evaluations (at least 5 years)

Extensive knowledge of, and experience in applying, qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods

Previous work experience with undertaking project design, management and/or evaluation exercises with criminal justice projects / agencies, particularly those involving the police

Experience of working on / with donor funded development projects in the Central Asian region

Experience of working with UN agencies, and ideally with UNODC

Excellent communication, facilitation and report writing / production skills

Post graduate educational qualifications

Languages:

The consultant must have excellent English spoken, reading and proven drafting skills. Knowledge of another language relevant to the evaluation might be an advantage.

Absence of Conflict of Interest:

According to UNODC rules, the consultant must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.

Ethics:

The evaluator shall respect and apply the UNEG Ethical Guidelines.

ANNEX II. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 2005 MID-TERM EVALUATION

- Give more training with practical exercises to operative law enforcement staff that work with control of goods at border checkpoints. Focus on working routines that limit the possibility for corruptive behaviour and control/search of goods for precursors by the use of technical equipment.
- Improve the capability and capacity for gathering, compiling and analysing information from the legal trade using the National Database System and information from law enforcement.
- Co-operate with other relevant UNODC projects in the region that work with objectives to comprise and strengthen border controls, national and regional information exchange, intelligence and analyst work.
- In co-operation with Project H22 (CARICC), initiate a regional operation for information exchange and profiling of goods transited in the Central Asian countries with Afghanistan as the recipient country. Objective for the operation; identify suspicious goods to support a target oriented work at border checkpoints to Afghanistan.

ANNEX III. EVALUATION TOOLS: QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEW GUIDES

The following questions formed the basis for the interview with each of the persons named in Annex III. Not all questions were necessarily asked to all interviewees.

General

- What is your overall opinion of the project?
- What project activities have you (or your agency) been personally involved in?
- Do you feel that your country has an effective approach to controlling precursor trafficking?

Relevance

- To what extent have the projects objectives matched the real needs in your country?
- Have there been any major elements missing from the project that you think should have been included?
- How well has the project adapted to changing needs over time?

Efficiency

- Do you feel that your agency / country has received its fair share of project resources?
- Have you become aware of any wasteful, excessive or unnecessary activities in the project?
- Have any of the activities carried out by the project
- Could you suggest any ways in which things could have been done better in the project?

Effectiveness

- How well do you understand the roles of the other actors in the overall anti-precursor effort?
- If you have received new equipment through the project, has it been appropriate to your needs and to what extent have you been able to utilise it?
- How effective and user-friendly are the new regulatory instruments, databases etc that have been developed through the project?
- Have you been notified of, or been able to apply, any 'best practice' from other agencies/countries?

Impact

- What changes in operational performance do you notice in your agency as a result of the project?

- How successful has the project been in bringing different agencies together to work collaboratively to similar standards and ends?
- How successful has the project been in bringing neighbouring countries together to work collaboratively to similar standards and ends?
- How effective is regional cooperation in the fight against precursor trafficking and to what extent does CARICC contribute to this?
- During the lifetime of the project, what trends have you noticed in the statistics for seizures, arrests, prosecutions & convictions?

Sustainability

- Are you and colleagues in your agency, aware of what activities have been carried out in other agencies?

Are you aware of any factors that might jeopardise the longer-term viability of the changes that have been brought about by the project?

ANNEX IV. PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Personal interviews during the Central Asia Field Mission 13th 24th October 2014-11-10

ROCA Tashkent 13th October

- UNODC ROCA – 4 people

Uzbekistan 14th October

- National Drug Control Service – 1 person
- Drugs Investigation Department – 1 person
- Counter-Contraband Department, Customs Service – 1 person

Kazakhstan 15th October

- Investigations Department, KNB – 5 people

CARICC 16th October

- Operations Department – 2 people

Tajikistan 17th October

- Contraband Department, Customs Service – 1 person
- Department for Illegal Drug Trade, Customs Service – 1 person
- Anti Drug-Smuggling Directorate, MoI – 1 person
- Drug Police (UBNON) MoI – 2 people
- Drug Control Agency – 3 people

Kyrgyzstan 20th October

- Illicit Drugs Department, Customs Service – 2 people
- Ministry of Interior – 2 people
- Drug Control Agency – 2 people

Azerbaijan 22nd October

- Operations Department, Customs Service – 2 people

Turkmenistan 24th October

- Customs Service – 3 people

Heroin Route II, EU funded project

- HR2 – 2 people

Telephone interviews following the Central Asia Field Mission

- Heroin related Projects, EU Agencies – 2 people
- Donor representatives – 2 people

ANNEX V. DESK REVIEW LIST

1. Project (Revision) Documents

- a. [RER-E29_original 2000.doc](#). The original project plan dated (no date)
- b. [Revision Document RERE29 2004 08.doc](#). Describing the first revision of the project dated August 2004
- c. [Evaluation Report Precursor Control in Central Asia. En. 25.10.-31.11.05.doc](#). Presenting the findings of the mid-term evaluation carried out in November 2005.
- d. [E29 Revision II 21June 2006.doc](#). Describing the second revision of the project dated 21st June 2006.
- e. [E29 Project Revision III-24Sept 2007.doc](#). Describing the third revision of the project dated 24th September 2007.
- f. [E29-Project Revision IV. 21.04.09. doc](#) describing the fourth revision of the project dated 21st April 2009.
- g. [E29 - Project Revision - V 2010.doc](#) describing the fifth revision of the project dated 25th February 2010.
- h. [E29 - Project Revision - VI SB3. En 2011.doc](#) describing the sixth revision of the project dated 5th May 2011.

2. Progress Reports

- a. Semi-Annual Progress Report 2006
- b. Annual Progress Report 2006
- c. Semi-Annual Progress Report 2007
- d. Annual Progress Report 2007
- e. Semi-Annual Progress Report 2008
- f. Annual Progress Report 2008
- g. Semi-Annual Progress Report 2009
- h. Annual Progress Report 2009

- i. Semi-Annual Progress Report 2010
- j. Annual Progress Report 2010
- k. Semi-Annual Progress Report 2011
- l. Annual Progress Report 2011
- m. Semi-Annual Progress Report 2012
- n. Annual Progress Report 2012
- o. Semi-Annual Progress Report 2013
- p. Annual Progress Report 2013

3. Other Documents

- a. Various Op TARCET documents
- b. Various RIWG-P documents
- c. Various MPT documents
- d. TOR of the final Independent Project Evaluation of RERE29

ANNEX VI. PROJECT ACTIVITIES (BY HALF YEAR)

2006 JAN - JUNE

Output 1:

- National Drug Control system training 19-20 June, Uzbek Ministry of Health
- National Drug Control system training 19-20 June, Uzbek Ministry of Health

Output 2:

- 4 SUV provided to TJ
- 2 SUV provided to UZ.
- Precursor DVD translated into Russian.
- New precursor CBT module.
- TADOC training for KY (12-16 June)
- TADOC training for TJ & UZ (19-23 June)
- TADOC training for KZ & TK? (26-30 June)

Output 3:

- 25 Precursor test kits provided to each of 5 CA countries

Output 4:

- National Drug Control system training 19-20 June, Uzbek Ministry of Health

Revision 2 July 2006 (R1 April 2004)

2006 JULY - DEC

Output 1:

- Trg by Proj. Coord. On legislation in India & EU during Bishkek seminar

Output 2:

- 4 days CBT training for TJ, TK & UZ customs
- Joint UNODC / French on-site practical training on UZ-AF border
- Joint UNODC / French on-site practical training on TJ-AF border & Dushanbe customs terminal
- Joint UNODC / French on-site practical training on TK-AF border
- Russian language version of CBT precursor module finalized
- Russian language version of CBT precursor module installed in DCA & MOI of TJ
- Russian language version of CBT precursor module installed in DCA & MOI of KY
- Russian language version of CBT precursor module installed in Nat. Sy. Svc. of UZ
- Russian language version of CBT precursor module installed in customs of TK

Output 3:

- Nil

Output 4:

- National Operation Trans-shipment debriefing 2-4 Oct

2007 JAN - JUNE

Output 1: strengthened regulatory system

- NDS server installed in Ministry of Health of TJ
- Training on NDS for TJ MoH personnel

Output 2: increased LEA capacity

- CBT centre established in UZ customs
- Precursor module installed in UZ customs CBT
- Planning meeting for national precursor interdiction operations in KA
- Planning meeting for national precursor interdiction operations in KY
- Planning meeting for national precursor interdiction operations in TJ
- Planning meeting for national precursor interdiction operations in TK
- Planning meeting for national precursor interdiction operations in UZ
- Training on Spectrophotometer (HazMatId) for customs/scientifics of all 5 CA
- Precursor training in Dushanbe for 30 AF & 10 TJ officers

Output 3: improved regional cooperation

- 11th FANC meeting in Tashkent 30 April
- Operational meeting on precursor interdiction in Tashkent: AF, TJ, TK & UZ
- Strategy paper & draft operational plan presented to Paris Pact meeting in Vienna
- Keynote address to Marshall centre

Revision 3 August 2007**2007 JULY - DEC**Output 1: strengthened regulatory system

- Working meeting with all TJ agencies & Interpol to discuss enhancing LEA capacity for InfoEx
- NDS server installed in Ministry of Health of TK
- Training on NDS for TK MoH personnel

Output 2: increased LEA capacity

- Technical meeting in Vienna 4-5 Oct to agree Op plan for anti-precursor interdiction
- Precursor training in Dushanbe for TJ customs & BG officers

Output 3: improved regional cooperation

- Reg. Coord went to 7th International DLO conference in Tehran 23-25 Oct
- Op TARCET mission to Afghanistan to brief & engage international counterparts
- Op TARCET mission to India to brief & engage international counterparts
- Op TARCET mission to Iran to brief & engage international counterparts

2008 JAN - JUNE

Output 1: strengthened regulatory system

- Nil

Output 2: increased LEA capacity

- Precursor training (3days) and practice (5 days) in KA
- Precursor training (3days) and practice (5 days) in KY
- Precursor training (3days) and practice (5 days) in TJ
- Precursor training (3days) and practice (5 days) in TK
- Precursor training (3days) and practice (5 days) in UZ
- Pocket guide supplied to all Op TARCET personnel
- Equipment for Op TARCET procured
- Op TARCET conducted in AF
- Op TARCET conducted in KA after operational planning session
- Op TARCET conducted in KY after operational planning session
- Op TARCET conducted in PK
- Op TARCET conducted in TJ after operational planning session
- Op TARCET conducted in TK after operational planning session
- Op TARCET conducted in UZ after operational planning session
- Op TARCET operational planning session in Iran
- Monitoring/Assessment mission to KA
- Monitoring/Assessment mission to KY
- Monitoring/Assessment mission to TJ
- Monitoring/Assessment mission to TK
- Monitoring/Assessment mission to UZ
- Op TARCET briefing to 13th FANC meeting

Output 3: improved regional cooperation

- CARICC engaged as Op TARCET op coordinator.
- 2nd Coordination meeting at CARICC

2008 JULY - DEC

Output 1: strengthened regulatory system

- Regional workshop on regulatory mechanisms
- Testing of communication links between MoH & NDSCS

Output 2: increased LEA capacity

- Op TARCET debrief & review in Izmir
- Meeting to discuss establishment of mobile precursor team in KA
- Meeting to discuss establishment of mobile precursor team in KY
- Meeting to discuss establishment of mobile precursor team in TJ
- Meeting to discuss establishment of mobile precursor team in TK
- Meeting to discuss establishment of mobile precursor team in UZ

Output 3: improved regional cooperation

- Nil

2009 JAN - JUNEOutput 1: strengthened regulatory system

- Nil

Output 2: increased LEA capacity

- Op TARCET II planning meeting in AF
- Op TARCET II planning meeting in KA
- Op TARCET II planning meeting in KY
- Op TARCET II planning meeting in PK
- Op TARCET II planning meeting in TJ
- Op TARCET II planning meeting in TK
- Op TARCET II planning meeting in UZ
- Commission on Narcotics drugs meeting March
- High level planning meeting for Op TARCET II in Tashkent in May
- Meeting on intelligence gathering for Op TARCET II in Kabul in June
- Precursor control training in Ashgabat, TK
- Precursor control training in Tashkent, UZ
- Procurement of equipment for MPT

Output 3: improved regional cooperation

- Nil

Revision 4 April 2009**2009 JULY - DEC**Output 1: strengthened regulatory system

- DCC of MoH in UZ equipped with NDS server & software

Output 2: increased LEA capacity

- Precursor training for all 5 CA countries in Germany, Poland & Lithuania
- Op TARCET II conducted in AF
- Op TARCET II conducted in KA
- Op TARCET II conducted KY
- Op TARCET II conducted PK
- Op TARCET II conducted TJ
- Op TARCET II conducted TK
- Op TARCET II conducted UZ
- MBT established and equipped in KA
- MBT established and equipped in KY
- MBT established and equipped in TJ
- MBT established and equipped in TK
- MBT established and equipped in UZ
-

Output 3: improved regional cooperation

- Intelligence consultation meeting at CARICC 2-3 Sept
- Regional precursor MOU meeting

2010 JAN - JUNE

Output 1: strengthened regulatory system

- Nil

Output 2: increased LEA capacity

- Op TARCET II debrief meeting Almaty 30-31 March
- Precursor control training for UZ customs 8 & 15 June
- Precursor control booklet & poster distributed to all CA agencies
- Precursor control booklet translated & issued to Chinese BG officers
- Equipment supplied to TJ MPT

Output 3: improved regional cooperation

- CARICC meeting for heads of operational departments

Revision 5 Feb 2010

2010 JULY - DEC

Output 1: strengthened regulatory system

- Nil

Output 2: increased LEA capacity

- French precursor control training in KA & KY (9-12 Nov)
- French precursor control training in TJ (16-19 Nov)
- French precursor control training in UZ (26-29 Oct)
- Italian advanced precursor control training for all 5 CA countries (15-20 Nov)
- MPT training at 17 UZ BCPs
- Op TARCET III Team Leaders meeting, Tashkent 2-3 August

Output 3: improved regional cooperation

- Azerbaijan joins the project

2011 JAN - JUNEOutput 1: strengthened regulatory system

- Nil

Output 2: increased LEA capacity

- Op TARCET III operational planning training for all 5 CA countries in Tashkent (21-25 Feb)
- Coordinating meeting with UZ MoI Academy about future cooperation
- Procurement of equipment for KY MPT

Output 3: improved regional cooperation

- Discussions with China to become involved in TARCET III
- Translation of precursor booklet into Chinese

Revision 6 May 2011**2011 JULY - DEC**Output 1: strengthened regulatory system

- 2nd Regional Workshop for regulatory mechanisms for precursor control Almaty 26-27 Oct

Output 2: increased LEA capacity

- Nil

Output 3: improved regional cooperation

- Op TARCET III debriefing meeting Beijing (10-11 Nov)
- Paris Pact 2nd Precursors Expert Group meeting New Delhi (14-15 Nov)

2012 JAN - JUNE

Output 1: Officers from relevant LEA provided with necessary capacity to detect smuggling

- Precursor control TOT training for KA, KY & TJ in Texas
- Equipment provided to KY for MPT
- Procurement of radio communications equipment for UZ customs
- Participation of CA countries in International Collaborative Exercise (ICE) promoted.
- INCB Precursor Incident Communication System introduced to CA

Output 2: Neighbouring countries (CH & RUS) participate

- Working meeting at CARICC (6-7 Feb) “coordinate efforts in combating transnational drug crime”
- Regional intelligence working group on precursors meeting, Tashkent (1-2 May.)

Output 3: application of advanced investigative techniques

- Working group on precursors control, Bishkek (8-9 Feb.)

2012 JULY - DEC

Output 1: Officers from relevant LEA provided with necessary capacity to detect smuggling

- 30 Precursor test kits supplied to SSDC of KY
- MPT created in AZ
- Updated NDS installed in UZ MoH & NCDC

Output 2: Neighbouring countries (CH & RUS) participate

- Nil

Output 3: application of advanced investigative techniques

- SCO working group meeting on precursors (Sept.)
- Regional laboratory meeting on forensics Almaty (3-4 Oct)
- Regional intelligence working group on precursors meeting, Bishkek (5-6 Nov.)

2013 JAN - JUNEOutput 1: Officers from relevant LEA provided with necessary capacity to detect smuggling

- Nil

Output 2: Neighbouring countries (CH & RUS) participate

- 1st Case-based Regional Intelligence working group Precursors (C-RIWGP) meeting CARICC (1-2 Jul.)
- CA regional information modelling conference CARICC (22-23 Jan)
- 3rd Regional Intelligence working group Precursors (RIWGP) meeting Dushanbe (7-8 May)
- 2nd C-RIWGP meeting CARICC (21 Jul.)

Output 3: application of advanced investigative techniques

- Training on Synthetic drugs & labs TADOC (1-5 April)

2013 JULY - DECOutput 1: Officers from relevant LEA provided with necessary capacity to detect smuggling

- 30

Output 2: Neighbouring countries (CH & RUS) participate

- 4th Regional Intelligence working group Precursors (RIWGP) meeting Tehran (3-4 Dec)

Output 3: application of advanced investigative techniques

- SCO

2014 JAN - JUNE

Output 1: Officers from relevant LEA provided with necessary capacity to detect smuggling

- Nil

Output 2: Neighbouring countries (CH & RUS) participate

- 5th Regional Intelligence working group Precursors (RIWGP) meeting Ashgabat (14-15 Jan.)
- 6th Regional Intelligence working group Precursors (RIWGP) meeting Astana (8-9 Apr.)
-

Output 3: application of advanced investigative techniques

- Nil