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EVALUATION OF THE UNODC SAHEL  
PROGRAMME (2013-2019)

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Sahel Region

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This evaluation report was prepared by an evaluation team consisting of (Emmanuelle Diehl- Team Leader, Stella A. Attakpah - Evaluation Team Member, Victorien Ncho- Evaluation Team Member). The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process of projects. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html>

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
# LIST OF ACRONYMS

AIRCOP	Airport Communication Programme
AU	African Union
CENOZO	Norbert Zongo Cell for Investigative Journalism in West Africa
CLPs	Core Learning Partners
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
CT	Coordination Team of the Sahel Programme
CTED	United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
CVE	Counter Violent Extremism
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
ECOWAS	Economic Cooperation for West African States
EU	European Union
EUCAP	EU Capacity Building Missions in Mali and Niger
GE	Gender Equality
HALCIA	Haute Autorité de Lutte contre la Corruption et les Infractions Assimilées
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Rights
IEU	Independent Evaluation Unit
INTERPOL	International Police
IO	International Organisation
JAITF	Joint Airport Interdiction Task Force
LeTrain.Net	Network of the Law Enforcement Training Institutions)
MLA	Mutual Legal Assistance
MS	Member State
NACIWA	Network of National Anti-Corruption Institutions in West Africa
ROMENA	Regional Office of Middle East and Africa
ROSEN	Regional Office of Senegal
SADC	Southern African Development Community Countries
SC	Steering Committee
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SP	Sahel Programme
ToC	Theory of Change
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime
TOCTA	Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNCAC	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNISS	United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNTOC	The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000)
USA	United States of America
WACAP	West Africa Central Authorities of Prosecutors Against Organized Crime
WAPIS	West African Police Information System

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is of the mid-term evaluation of UNODC Programme XAMZ17 commonly referred to as the Sahel Programme (SP). This programme was designed in parallel to the United Nations Integrated Sahel Strategy to address the varied crises affecting the Sahel sub-region and its neighbors. The SP focuses on building Member States' (MS) capabilities and reinforcing their criminal justice system to adequately fight Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). The SP is based on a series of Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessments (2009-2012) conducted by UNODC and the thorough understanding of UNODC Regional office in Senegal (ROSEN) of threats affecting the region. UNODC ROSEN has been operating in the region and in each country for years. Moreover, the Malian Crisis in 2012 and the end of the Qaddafi regime opened up the gates of already porous borders to further trafficking and infiltration of terrorist factions across the Sahel countries. Transnational organized crime generated \$1.6 trillion in profits in 2015.<sup>1</sup> Profits surged due to fragile state institutions, large unchecked borders, low levels of convictions and the blurred lines between legitimate business and illicit activity because of the significant size of informal markets across the region<sup>2</sup>.



Source: Norwegian Center for Global Analysis, 2015

These illicit activities include counterfeiting, illegal logging, mining, and fishing, crude oil theft, trafficking of organs, weapons, humans, cultural property, and natural resources. In many Sahel countries, organized crime has taken advantage of exacerbated government corruption, ranging from petty crimes by police officers to large-scale complicity by high-level officials. Economic hardships and underdevelopment also make these countries' economies highly vulnerable to illicit

<sup>1</sup> <http://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-illicit-superhighway-transnational-organized-crime-in-africa/>  
<sup>2</sup> <http://www.groundswellinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/Pathways-to-Resilience-in-the-Sahel.pdf>  
<http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/PB%20Fix%20the%20unfixable.pdf>  
[http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs\\_opinion/2014/DIEEEO125-2014\\_UOE\\_y\\_Sahel\\_ENGLISH\\_CPintado.pdf](http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2014/DIEEEO125-2014_UOE_y_Sahel_ENGLISH_CPintado.pdf)

trade, which may be the only source of income for individuals and communities.<sup>3</sup> The United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel UNISS's focus is threefold; first, to address corruption and economic development; second, to tackle the security sector; and third, to respond to the humanitarian crisis crippling the sub-region. As the map above underscores, traffickers and terrorist factions (AQIM amongst others) are using conflict areas in the Sahel region to thrive and conduct their operations. Mauritania appears to be less affected; in 2015 Mauritania had already integrated a strong border control policy and security sector reform to curb the terrorist factions that had infiltrated the north and western part of the country, which had consequently led to many terrorists' attacks in the early 2000s. As a result, one of the key outputs of the SP is the support to the security platform of the G5 Sahel whose administrative offices are headquartered in Nouakchott in Mauritania. This platform's role is to encourage data, information exchange amongst police forces of each Sahel country for real time communications and increase chances of arrest.<sup>4</sup>

The mid-term evaluation was timely and responded to, as stated in the Project Cycle Manual of the SP, the evaluation requirements of UNODC. The SP contracted a team of independent evaluators to conduct this mid-term evaluation under the guidance of the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU). The evaluation objectives were to determine the extent to which planned objectives and outcomes have been reached up-to-date, inform potential strategic realignments, provide inputs regarding the design of the programme, as well as be forward-looking and guide the improved implementation of future objectives and activities. The evaluation team assessed these objectives through the DAC criteria Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, (Preliminary) Impact, Sustainability as well as the UNODC criteria Design, Partnership and Communication, Human Rights and Gender. The evaluation team drew out a series of lessons learned, best practices and issued a set of recommendations to help adjust programming of the next phase of activities 2017-2019.

The IEU supervised the evaluation process, and the evaluation team coordinated closely with the programme coordination team, who guided and facilitated the review and engagement process in key geographic areas<sup>5</sup> for interviews and field missions for effective data collection and triangulation. Any document, map or chart that has been relevant to support or illustrate the findings of this evaluation has been included within the core of the report and in annexes. The draft evaluation report was reviewed by the SP coordination team for factual errors, and the IEU for methodology compliance. The final draft report was sent to Core Learning Partners for comments on factual errors. The final report will be distributed to the SP coordination team, the donors and the CLPs and will be published by the IEU on the UNODC website<sup>6</sup>.

## **Main findings, conclusions and recommendations**

### **Relevance**

The SP programme was designed within the context outlined above to address these challenges and support MS of the Sahel region and its neighbors to address these threats. The programme is based on context and threat analyses and a thorough understanding of the regional and country needs. The

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<sup>3</sup> TOCTA 2013, 2016; UNISS strategy document and the SP and UNISS integration document.

<sup>4</sup> The G5 Sahel security platform strategy document.

<sup>5</sup> The evaluation team carried out field missions in Senegal, Austria, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal again to attend the Steering Committee April 2017. The field missions were complemented by phone interviews with relevant Core Learning Partners (CLPs), beneficiaries and project management team in different Field offices (ROSEN, ROPAN, and HQ).

<sup>6</sup> The final report will be available here: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations.html>

programme was approved in 2013 by MS at the Ouagadougou summit and started implementing activities in 2014. It is planned for 2014-2019 as an initial phase and is funded by varied donors: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and the United States. Over the last three years, the SP managed to raise \$24 million dollars and is amongst the best funded programmes of UNODC. It is highly relevant to MS' needs, but also to donors' own priorities in the region. Furthermore, the SP's thematic areas are relevant to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 16 especially that focuses on peace, justice and strong institutions). It was however a bit too early in the evaluation process to review the impact of the SP's activities on the SDG but the evaluation concluded that the SP is relevant to SDG 16 because of the Sahel context. Indeed, the situation in the region remains fragile and requires further engagement from the international community. With the Bamako peace agreement<sup>7</sup> faltering on its implementation, the situation in the whole region remains very fragile and the SP's objectives remain highly relevant.

## **Design**

The Programme was designed by a task force based in HQ but who coordinated closely with thematic experts in the field at ROSEN. The SP is fully managed by ROSEN from staff recruitment to financial disbursement and funds allocation, which allows for flexibility and greater responsiveness to local realities. Financial mechanisms were agreed upon at the onset between HQ and ROSEN to ensure full cooperation and coordination amongst field experts and HQ specialized sections (justice, firearms, prison reforms, law enforcement, TIP/SOM, terrorism, and corruption). The SP has its own coordination team based in Dakar. This coordination team is one of the success factors of the SP and one of its best practices.

## **Effectiveness**

As of March 2017, the SP reported 304 activities implemented across the 5 countries and 9 thematic areas (corruption, law enforcement, terrorism, forensic, firearms, border control, trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants (TIP-SOM), justice and money laundering). 8,018 beneficiaries received either technical support or capacity building trainings from the SP. Out of the 304 activities, 100 were regional, 78 took place in Mali, 38 in Niger, 30 in Senegal, 30 in Burkina Faso, 17 in Chad and 10 in Mauritania. The distribution amongst countries was to respond to MS' needs. Mali being at the core of the crisis and where many international organizations have their base operations, since coordinating activities with other UN agencies is easier than in Burkina Faso or in Mauritania for instance. It is critical though to highlight that the number of activities per country does not reflect their effectiveness on achieving the SP's objectives. The sheer volume of activities and beneficiaries does not always correlate to effectiveness. The evaluation team could not always draw the connection from outputs to the outcomes as a means to achieve the SP's goals. For the next few years of the programme, some key words such as what is understood by 'activity', 'synergies' and 'impact' have to be defined. Finally, the intervention logic of outputs to outcomes have to be formulated. The logical framework, at the moment, does not translate this logic clearly to really assess the SP' effectiveness and longer-term impact.

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<sup>7</sup> <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/sahel-malis-crumbling-peace-process-and-spreading-jihadist-threat>

## **Efficiency**

The efficiency of the SP was greatly praised by all interviewees due to its success in raising large funds, but also to have established internal mechanisms for increasing the coordination and exchange between the thematic experts and the SP Coordination Team (CT). The SP's efficiency depends on a strong coordination team, thematic experts and UNODC and UNODC ROSEN upper management (Regional representative and Head of the SP Coordination Team) who help raise its visibility amongst MS and official aid agencies. National Project Officers (NPOs) have been recruited in Mali, Chad and Niger to help facilitate and build relations amongst the SP CT and relevant stakeholders. NPOs were found to play a great part in managing local stakeholders and logistics at lower cost than having a full-fledged office in each country with international programme managers. Another NPO was under recruitment for Mauritania but it has been stalled for now and there no plans are yet defined for Burkina Faso.

With regards to funds disbursements, the new financial and administrative management system Umoja affected the implementation of some activities due to delays in DSAs, payments to service providers and other procedures. Umoja's delays were the result of a drastic cultural shift within the whole organization that required long trainings, trials and errors on financial reports, and fund integration into the new system. The SP coordination team confided that all funds allocated to the SP were integrated into the Umoja system so when the transfer to this new operating system was to start in 2015, the transition would be easier. In 2014, when the SP started, reports were, however, issued based on the previous financial system (ProFi). One observation that arose from the evaluation is the inability to draw links between outputs and budget disbursement from ProFi reports while with Umoja, the coordination team can now draw these conclusions more easily. The evaluation team however, only received the official financial statements, still based on the prior system (the coordination team sent screen shots of budget disbursement for 2016, which were not available in the new system yet, in order to ensure a clear comparison between 2014-2015 and 2016).

## **Partnership and communication**

The SP draws from UNODC ROSEN and HQ's large panel of partners amongst international organizations (United Nations Police (UNPOL), International Police (INTERPOL), UNICEF The United Nations Children's Emergency Fund etc.), non-governmental organizations (the Danish Demining Group - DDG- for instance) and local governmental officials. Partnerships are meant to maximize on their respective added value and their complementarity/synergies. Some partnerships as for instance with DDG are based on mutual benefits and synergies as DDG has operations across remote areas that UNODC cannot access, while the SP has the means to deliver and equip law enforcement and border control offices for instance. Partnerships were deemed generally good but synergies are yet to be fully identified across different actors; civil society organizations are generally missing from the SP's engagement process. This omission is rationalized by UNODC's mandate that serves MS. However, CSOs could help the SP thematic experts implement activities and vulgarize implications of legal reforms preferred by the SP.

There are several levels of communications – internal, with beneficiaries and with external stakeholders. Communications were generally found to be excellent and the tools (designed and concise brochures, reports, assessment reports etc.) used by the SP were appreciated for their design, conciseness and messaging. Internal communications between the SP CT, thematic experts and HQ were again reported as positive but coordination to ensure integrated and identified synergies are yet to be strengthened. Finally, the SP does not have a media outreach strategy. No press releases on the SP were found during a manual media monitoring web-search conducted by

the evaluation team. More visibility in the local press and amongst international outlets could help raise UNODC's and the SP's profile amongst donors, but also the local population that needs to be informed of progress made and activities undertaken in their region. Civil society organizations can also play a role in vulgarizing the reforms, and the objectives of the SP outside of the capital cities.

### **Human rights and gender**

Human rights are approached as being at the core of UNODC's mandate and of all activities and as a result, they are not always mentioned or sufficiently stressed upon during workshops or technical assistance because they are seen as implicit. Some joint activities were conducted with United Nations Police (UNPOL) Mali who had staff specialized on human rights, which helped bring the issue to the center of the agenda for activities. Further analysis showed that human rights are not systematically integrated across all thematic areas of the SP and civil society organizations can help play a role of dissemination, and ensuring respect of human rights by law enforcement bodies and the judiciary. On gender, the SP collects disaggregated data on female vs male attendance amongst beneficiaries. Gender and human rights are sensitive topics in these countries where gender divide is large, especially in the security sector where very few women are recruits, as acknowledged by the coordination team. Gender and HR have to be fully integrated into the programming of the SP's activities so they help achieve the SP's objectives.

### **Preliminary impact**

The SP is responding to the situation in the sub-region in the Sahel and activities are monitored by the monitoring manager from the SP's coordination team. The activities reported upon have yielded results that are highlighted in the SP annual reports<sup>8</sup>. Some key achievements that often came through during the evaluation process were the following: the support towards the elaboration of the security platform of the G5 Sahel, the creation of the investigative journalist center (CENOZO), seizures at airports through the Joint Airport Interdiction Taskforce (JAITFs), increased convictions and the dismantling of a baby trafficking network in Niger due to mutual legal assistance (MLA) facilitated through the West African Central Authorities of Prosecutors (WACAP) against transnational organized crime, as well as the marking of 1,100 arms in Burkina Faso and in Mali. Some of these results are the contribution of other UNODC projects that are funded by the SP as activities are implemented in the Sahel countries (JAITFs for instance). Attributing results to the SPs only, was however not possible, as there are over 17 initiatives funded in the Sahel region by other actors and synergies and coordination amongst all agencies is not always effective. Finally, the evaluation team underlined the need to better define what the SP understands by 'preliminary impact', 'activities' and 'synergies' in order to better understand the contribution of the SP and of UNODC towards achieving future preliminary results for the remaining years of the SP.

### **Sustainability**

The SP was designed to respond to the Sahel countries' crises, where states institutions are fragile, and require a lot of international support. Based on interviews and the desk research, it is understood that strengthening these MS' capabilities and combating transnational organized crime (TOC) in the region will require time and large amounts of funding. According to recent reports, about 4 billion of US dollars per year have been invested by multilateral and bilateral actors to address these

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<sup>8</sup> The Sahel Programme annual reports 2014-2015-2016

crises.<sup>9</sup> As a result, sustainability of the SP's results has to be measured against that highly volatile environment that can overturn reforms or repeal international legal provisions. The SP tries to mitigate lack of sustainability by offering training of trainers (ToTs), by integrating modules in police and judiciary's schools' curricula and by creating regional bodies that are accountable to several states. There is no exit strategy in the SP as this current programming phase 2014-2019 is regarded as phase 1 and funding could potentially extend activities beyond this date to continue responding to the Sahel region's needs. TOC is highly complex and requires endurance and long-term commitment from international players to support the fragile states of the Sahel region both technically and financially.

However, the sustainability of the programme can be further improved through strengthening the coordination amongst international actors involved in the region; fostering real synergies to maximize outputs and resources; continuing engaging with MS but being more proactive at the design phase of activities; reporting and engaging with donors on strategic planning phases so all of them can understand the scope of their contributions and plan accordingly with the others.

The SP has not yet defined key terms that could help the monitoring team within the SP collected data more efficiently and help the evaluation team draw clear analysis from the findings. Visibility amongst local populations and closer engagement with civil society organizations remains to be strengthened in the next stage of the SP to ensure the vulgarization of reforms, dissemination of human rights and keep local and central authorities accountable.

Finally, the financial system operation before the implementation of Umoja did not allow the SP to draw clear analysis between outputs and disbursement and therefore it was unclear how efficient and adopt corrective measures when needed.

## **Conclusions**

Overall, the Sahel Programme is considered as one of UNODC's flagship programmes due to its innovative management model and integrating almost all UNODC's mandates. The SP responds to local realities and is aligned with UNISS. Its funding levels and the ongoing commitment of MS and donors is a testament to its success.

## **Lessons learned and best practices**

The evaluation team underlined a series of best practices in this report such as: a) the design of the SP was jointly conducted by UNODC HQ and UNODC ROSEN; b) the SP has its own coordination team; c) monitoring and evaluation are managed by the SP's coordination team; d) the SP has a communication and branding strategy through web stories and annual reports; e) all funds were codified within Umoja system; f) designed based on threat assessments and ongoing multi-stakeholders' engagement through the Steering Committee. Four lessons learned were also identified during the evaluation: a) coordination is tedious and requires a dedicated team to that effort; b) coordination and a cohesive approach is key to achieving the SP's goals; c) political will is critical for sustainability and progress of the SP's goals; d) activities only<sup>10</sup> based in the capital cities limit the outreach and the desired impact of the SP.

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<sup>9</sup> <http://www.unocha.org/sahel>

<sup>10</sup> Most activities take place in the capital cities; only few capacity building activities have taken place outside of these cities so far as for instance in Diffa and Sikasso).

## **Recommendations**

These lessons learned and best practices helped formulate recommendations (see Summary Matrix on next page and the dedicated 'Recommendations' section) divided amongst highly important and important recommendations. The highly important ones are the following:

- A clear intervention logic could benefit the SP's monitoring and evaluation process in order to measure preliminary and longer-term impact;
- Clearly define terms such as 'impact, activities and synergies'. It will help draw connections amongst activities and results, and identify potential synergies amongst the SP's thematic pillars and with external partners;
- Strengthen coordination efforts within the SP's thematic pillars and with other international players;
- Connect budget disbursement to outputs for clearer monitoring and reporting processes;
- Map and design an engagement strategy with civil society organizations to vulgarize the SP's results across remote areas, and involve them as implementing partners of the SP's activities in remote areas;
- Ensure ongoing and a more strategic engagement with donors
- Recruit an NPO for each Sahel country.
- Human rights and gender mainstreaming should be integrated further across all activities undertaken by the SP.

# SUMMARY MATRIX OF FINDINGS, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings <sup>11</sup>	Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)	Recommendations <sup>12</sup>
<b>Key recommendations</b>		
<p><b>Improving the intervention logic</b></p> <p>The intervention logic could be improved in order to assess how activities are connected in order to achieve the prime objectives of the SP.</p> <p>Currently activities can be taking place in parallel or simultaneously without a clear sequence of action or a clear presentation as to how the SP will achieve its objectives.</p> <p>Furthermore, key words such as impact, activities and synergies are not defined. As a result, it is more difficult for the coordination team to report the different types of activities (visit, trainings, resolution, etc..) and draw connections to the desired results.</p>	<p>Programme documents The SP's project management cycle document UNISS UNISS and the SP's alignment report Logframes Programme reports 2015-2016 Interviews External research papers on the status of Sahel region and organized crime</p>	<p><b>The Sahel Coordination Team should define a clearer intervention logic.</b></p> <p>A clear intervention logic with clear definitions could help draw clear pathways from activities to the desired outputs more easily, especially for monitoring and impact measuring purposes.</p>
<p><b>Coordination amongst UN agencies of UNISS</b></p> <p>Coordination is tedious, despite efforts undertaken by UNODC to strengthen the process. It affects preliminary and long-term impact through siloed operations and duplications of activities.</p>	<p>UNISS SP Reports 2015-2106 SP programme documents UNISS and the SP's alignment report Interviews External research papers on the status of Sahel region and organized crime</p>	<p><b>UNODC ROSEN and the SP Coordination should encourage synergies.</b></p> <p>UNODC ROSEN is chair of the security pillar of the UNISS so it could encourage closer synergies amongst UN agencies contributing to the UNISS. The SP coordination team could identify strengthen existing partnerships and identify new ones to enhance efficiency of the Programme.</p>

<sup>11</sup> A finding uses evidence from data collection to allow for a factual statement.

<sup>12</sup> Recommendations are proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a project/programme; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. For accuracy and credibility, recommendations should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions.

		Greater coordination efforts can solidify the UNISS strategy, avoid duplication, foster greater synergies and achieve the needed coordinated efforts to implement the strategy and the SP's objectives.
<p><b>General financial reports, as used by the previous financial management system, were not sufficient for effective monitoring.</b></p> <p>The financial efficiency of the programme remains difficult to assess as financial reports are general and do not link financial disbursement to outputs and outcomes. Umoja now connects disbursements to outputs, which should help.</p>	<p>Budgets vs financial reports Programme logframes SP reports 2015-2016 Interviews</p>	<p><b>The SP coordination team can now link disbursements to outputs through Umoja for detailed reporting and monitoring.</b></p> <p>It will enable the coordination team and future evaluation teams to clearly assess the efficiency of the activities, understand where the gaps are and how to maximize resources (financial and human) to achieve the SP's objectives.</p>
<p><b>Insufficient CSOs' engagement.</b></p> <p>CSOs are key stakeholders that can help vulgarise legal reforms within remote communities and create the link between the government and the population. CSOs are sometimes invited to be part of events but are not key implementing partners. This is a gap that impacts on the long-term objectives of the SP, especially in areas where the SP does not have a reach – remote provinces and borders where organized criminal networks are most active.</p>	<p>SP Programme documents UNISS SP reports 2015-2016 Web stories Interviews</p>	<p><b>A clear CSO engagement strategy through a clear mapping and vetting process.</b></p> <p>The SP coordination team along with the thematic teams need to define a clear CSO engagement strategy that is best fitted to each thematic pillar of the SP. Integrating mapped and vetted CSOs can help adjust activities to local realities, advance the vulgarisation of legal reforms, integrate human rights and gender sensitive approaches and promote the SP's objectives within the larger population rather.</p>
<p><b>NPOs play a critical role.</b></p> <p>The SP does not have an NPO in each country yet. It is clear from the evaluation that NPOs presence helps advance the SP's objectives and enhances UNODC' visibility. At the moment, the SP has NPOs in Mali, Chad and Niger. One is under recruitment in Mauritania</p>	<p>Staff planning table Programme documents Interviews Donor reports</p>	<p><b>Recruit an NPO for each Sahel country.</b></p> <p>The SP coordination team needs to recruit at least a NPO for each Sahel country targeted by the SP. The NPO ensures closer coordination with local authorities, ensures a point of contact in country, helps organize activities. That NPO offers insights on changes,</p>

and there are none in Burkina Faso yet.		risks and key players active in the country.
<p><b>Relation with Donor were found satisfactory</b></p> <p>Conclusions on donors' relations with the SP staff and UNODC ROSEN were satisfactory. It was observed that closer engagement from the planning phase and during implementation could be strengthened to ensure donors have all information at hand to report to their own governmental counterparts and ensure alignment of their own strategies with the SP's objectives.</p>	<p>Donor reports Programme documents Interviews Financial reports Steering committee reports and planning</p>	<p><b>Ensure closer communication and engagement with strategic donors</b></p> <p>The SP coordination team and UNODC ROSEN should organize an annual donor meeting in Dakar and one in Vienna where they showcase in detail how much each of these donors' pledges contributed to achieving what activities and how they all fulfil a part of the puzzle to achieve the SP's objectives; and within a larger context their own strategies and UNISS</p>
<p><b>Gender and Human Rights are not automatically promoted during the SP.</b></p> <p>Due to cultural context and UNODC's mandate to respond to MS' needs, HR and Gender remain sensitive topics to approach and openly push forward during activities and more formal engagement with governmental stakeholders. Hence, the SP covers lightly HR during activities and gender is mainly accounted through a female vs male ratio participation of the SP's activities.</p>	<p>Donor reports Programme Documents SP reports 2014-2015-2016 UNEG 2016 UNGD 2003 Interviews</p>	<p><b>The SP coordination team should ensure integration of gender sensitivity and human rights approach into the SP programming.</b></p> <p>Further HR and Gender programming through closer engagement with CSOs for instance can help advance the SP's objectives and better promote amongst stakeholders the importance of promoting HR and gender within their legal framework for society advancement and achieving SP's objectives.</p>
<b>Important recommendations</b>		
<p><b>The SP covers UNODC' thematic areas.</b></p> <p>Conclusions highlight both the benefits and the drawbacks of having these different thematic pillars as it opens up to developing further activities based on MS' requests and to respond to donors' interests. Other</p>	<p>Steering Committee recommendations 2015-2016 Programme documents SP reports 2015-2016 Communication presentations (brochures, ppts, prezi) interviews</p>	<p><b>Consolidate existing tools and projects under the SP.</b></p> <p>The SP coordination team with the thematic teams should ensure operationalization and strengthen existing mechanisms developed through the SP and projects funded by the SP. For instance, the security platform of the G5</p>

<p>thematic areas were added to the SP's programme for the coming year. They add another layer of funding requirements and management. That adds more pressure to the small coordination team and on the thematic experts, while they could be focusing on ensuring full consolidation of existing projects and tools in the Sahel region developed by the SP.</p>		<p>Sahel should be finalized and made operational; furthermore, regional bodies and tools such as WAPIS, or WACAP, CENOZO, NACIWA, or the JAITFs through Aircop or the task forces created through the Container Control Programme should be strengthened to be fully operational and more effective.</p>
<p><b>High impunity, high volatility and criminality in the Sahel countries built distrust and fear in security forces and governmental institutions.</b> The evaluation underlined that law enforcement and judiciary officers are the ones receiving the most technical support and capacity building from the SP. Although the Leihy vetting requirements for US funded activities force trainees to be vetted, most trainees are not required by other donors to be vetted and are often assigned by their respective ministries without prior vetting.</p>	<p>Programme documents UNISS SP Reports 2015-2106 SP programme documents Interviews External research papers on the status of Sahel region and organized crime</p>	<p><b>Conduct a gap assessment and regular vetting on law enforcement and judiciary bodies to understand progress, challenges and assess how human rights and international standards are respected.</b> The SP coordination team with the Thematic experts at ROSEN and HQ should conduct regular training gap assessments and vet their trainees at least once a year. These gaps assessment would help build stronger relations with relevant authorities, ensure ownership, and avoid duplication. Furthermore, the vetting would help assess how human rights and international standards are upheld.</p>
<p><b>Procurement is very lengthy and delayed</b> UNODC Procurement procedures are lengthy and complicated pending the level of amounts required. Although procurement plans are developed by the SP team, they have so far only kept under the 40K in order to avoid further procedural delays. It is understood as a mechanism to avoid further delays but it limits the type</p>	<p>Donor reports Programme documents Financial statements Budgets vs financial reports Procurement plan Interviews</p>	<p><b>Ensure planned procurement requests for each year so it is cleared by the financial team in due time.</b> The SP coordination team, the thematic experts and the financial team should agree at the end of each financial year of a procurement, which is both realistic and applicable to the local needs. The procurement plan should be shared with key partners such</p>

<p>or number of equipment requested. Furthermore, it was not always clear to the thematic experts what were the procurement requirements.</p>		<p>as the Danish Demining Group (DDG) and other UN agencies to ensure equipment requested fits local needs and foster closer coordination amongst implementing partners.</p>
<p><b>Hardly any media coverage</b> The media monitoring and the evaluation missions underline the absence of media outlets around key events such as the steering committee presentation or the launch of mechanisms such the security platform, networks such as CENOZO or WACAP for instance. All web-stories are only posted on the UNODC website and are not picked up by any local or international outlet.</p>	<p>Media monitoring Steering Committee reports Press releases Communication strategy Web stories</p>	<p><b>Better Media Coordination</b> The SP coordination team should engage with local and international media outlets around key events to raise further visibility about the SP's achievements</p>
<p><b>The SP developed several tools and methodologies to ensure a certain level of sustainability of its outputs for longer-term impact.</b> For instance, training curriculum on human trafficking and smuggling of migrants as well as investigative procedures on transnational organized crimes are integrated into law enforcement and judiciary schools' curriculum to ensure recruits are also trained on these principles and tools.</p>	<p>Programme document, Progress reports, Donor reports Interviews,</p>	<p><b>The SP coordination team and thematic experts should continue ensuring sustainability of their outputs.</b> They need to explore different routes to ensure sustainability of their outputs within the Sahel countries. For instance, through curriculum, training of trainers, developing stronger partnerships with other agencies that can take over outputs implementation if the SP comes to end and look for catalytic/ripple effects in the programming.</p>




# I. INTRODUCTION

## The Sahel Programme Background

The Sahel Programme (SP) XAMZ17 started on January 10th of 2013 for an original period of 4 years until 2017 and was extended for another two years until 2019. This programme supports the development of accessible, efficient and accountable criminal justice systems in the countries of the Sahel<sup>13</sup>, to combat illicit drug trafficking, organized crime, terrorism and corruption in the region. The programme was drafted at critical times for the region, while multiple crises had erupted across North Africa and into the Sahel Region.

For over a decade, the international community has expressed serious concerns over the instability of the Sahel region, the increasing transnational threats, the fragility status of most states in the region, the thriving organized criminal networks (cocaine trafficking from Latin America for instance) and the multiplication of extremist factions in parts of the region. The region is one of the poorest in Africa with high levels of food insecurity across most targeted countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger ) with very long and porous borders that enabled thriving illegal trafficking markets (wildlife, drugs, human, arms and weapons, and other illegal goods) across the whole region.<sup>14</sup> In addition, most of the countries suffer from fragile public institutions and ill-equipped law enforcement and criminal justice systems. As seen on this map, the Sahel region borders countries with past civil wars and revolutions, which weakened their own governments, pushed populations to flee to neighbouring countries and enabled terrorist and organized criminal networks to thrive amongst turmoil, distrust and weakened rule of law.



<sup>13</sup> Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Mauritania.

<sup>14</sup> The SP programme document background information and the TOCTA 2013.

The SP was designed to address multiple threats (terrorism, human/drug/weapons trafficking, corruption and increased state infrastructural fragility) in the region as a contribution to the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, following the Security Council Resolution in 2012 (S/RES/2056)<sup>15</sup>. The SP was a direct response to the Libyan and Malian crises in 2012 that had rippled effects across the region.

The programme document was amended three times in order to adapt to human resources needs and extend the programme to 2019. A total budget of USD \$62,509,000 was agreed upon as the ideal amount required to fulfil the programme's objectives across the 5 selected countries within that period (2013-2017). So far, the SP has raised USD \$24,600,000 of which USD\$16,173,835 were disbursed for the implementation of 304 activities as of March 2017. There are multiple donors: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United States, with Japan and Denmark being the largest contributors so far.

The programme is managed by a Coordination Team (CT) based in the UNODC Regional Office for West and Central Africa (ROSEN), Dakar, Senegal. Thematic issues are implemented by thematic experts based both in the ROSEN Office and at HQ in Vienna. UNODC became the UN organization in charge of the security pillar in June 2016 within the UNISS strategy. Before this, the coordination role was managed by United Nations Office of West Africa (UNOWA)<sup>16</sup>. According to interviews, UNODC was viewed as the most appropriate entity to manage the security pillar due to its mandate of UNODC as guardian of the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its long-standing experience in the region addressing these threats.

The main objective of this programme is to increase beneficiary countries' (Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger and Chad) capabilities to fight transnational organized crime and terrorism through accessible, efficient and accountable criminal justice systems. This entails strengthening the legal frameworks of the countries, securing their borders, equipping and capacitating their law enforcement agencies and judiciary and ensure adequate and standardized judicial systems and prison management. The Sahel Programme had the advantage of having been designed while the UNISS was being drafted. This parallel process enabled UNODC to "hit the ground running". Considering the priorities of the SP, the programme is well aligned especially within the UNISS security pillar. The evaluation team goes into further details on the complementarity with UNISS and other regional programmes under the Design and Relevance sections.

## **The Evaluation methodology and scope**

As planned by the programme and in line with UNODC Evaluation Policy, Norms and Standards, UNODC contracted an independent evaluation team to carry out the mid-term independent evaluation of the programme under the guidance of UNODC's Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) and in consultation with the Sahel Programme Coordination Team in ROSEN.

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<sup>15</sup> <http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10698.doc.htm>

<sup>16</sup> the United Nations Office of West Africa UNOWA became UNOWAS by adding the Sahel Region the United Nations Office of West Africa and of the Sahel in 2016.

The evaluation took place between February 2017 and May 2017. In line with the ToR, the evaluation covered the period from October 2013 until the end of the field missions that took place in 5 countries (Senegal, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and a visit to UNODC's HQ in Vienna, Austria). The evaluation objectives were to determine the extent to which planned objectives and outcomes had been reached up-to-date, inform potential strategic realignments, provide inputs regarding the design of the programme, as well as be forward-looking and guide the improved implementation of future objectives and activities. The specific objectives of the evaluation were the following:


- Contribute to organizational learning by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of UNODC in the region under each thematic area, as well as integrate lessons learned from other projects/programmes or evaluations;
- Inform on the appropriateness of the programme's initial design and its capacity to adapt to the region's evolving issues to orient future implementation;
- Contribute to accountability by assessing the achievements of UNODC in the region and the appropriateness of the utilisation of resources;
- Contribute to decision-making in relation to UNODC strategic orientation in the region and in thematic areas for the remainder of the Sahel Programme;
- Contribute to improved performance for the remainder of the implementation of the programme to ensure achievement of its objectives and outcomes before completion and further increase its impact.

The evaluation consisted of a combination of desk research, interviews (65 stakeholders) (phone and in-person), field observation as well as a survey. The evaluation team also closely reviewed the data that have been regularly harvested by the SP Coordination team. As seen in graphic 1 below, the interviewed stakeholders consisted of UNODC staff (HQ, ROSEN, ROMENA, and National Programme Officers in Chad, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria<sup>17</sup>), as well as beneficiaries (magistrates, law enforcement officers, governmental representatives) from different recipient governments from the Sahel region, Civil Society Organizations, other UN agencies (UNOWAS, UNPOL and MINUSMA) and donors.

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<sup>17</sup> The NPO in Nigeria works on the ECOWAS UNODC Programme in Nigeria but was relevant for his collaboration with the SP as a neighboring country and as the location of UNOWAS headquarters.

**Graphic 1: Stakeholders Division for the interviews of the evaluation**



Source: the evaluation team based on interview schedules.

The evaluation used a set of tools to conduct this mid-term evaluation:

- Extensive desk review that included a close review of the collected data by the monitoring manager within the SP coordination team.
- Semi-structured interviews
- A survey was developed for capacity building recipients
- Observation of capacity building activities, facilities and work sessions

These tools enabled the team to cross-reference and triangulate the data to draw conclusions, lessons learned, best practices and issue a set of recommendations. The survey did not yield sufficient amount of responses (4 out of 100) to consider the information as reliable. It confirmed the SP’s difficulty to gauge capacity building activities’ relevance and effectiveness as it is very cumbersome and time consuming to reach former trainees after 3 or 6 months after the end of the activities. The evaluation compensated this low response rate by organizing informal group meetings in the field with law enforcement officers and took aside trainees during capacity building activities during the field visits.

Finally, this evaluation was overseen by the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) to ensure appropriate and sound methodology. The final report is reviewed by the IEU and the CT simultaneously and cleared after an initial round of comments by the IEU. The IEU ensures that methodology, TOR and formats are respected. The report is then distributed to relevant stakeholders, including the core learning partners (refer to annex TOR), and published on the IEU website.

## Sampling Ratio of Interviewees

The selection of the interviewees was based on a purposive sampling methodology- that was complemented when deemed relevant, necessary and acknowledged by the CT by a snowball sampling process. A list of stakeholders was proposed by the CT team in the TOR; however, in order to ensure a balanced and diverse source of information, additional stakeholders were requested. The sampling of interviewees, as shown in the chart above, was chosen to represent a mix of programme delivery and administrative managers<sup>18</sup>, beneficiaries of programme activities<sup>19</sup>, as well as programme partners<sup>20</sup>. The evaluation team was pleased with the mixed sampling ratio amongst UNODC staff, beneficiaries and donors. However, the evaluation team would have liked to reach more beneficiaries and tried to send a survey to have a larger outreach. The survey was sent to 100 recipients<sup>21</sup> but received only 5 responses. Hence, the results of the survey were not considered in the analysis for this report.

## Limitations

### Time constraints

Due to time constraints and funds allocated to this mid-term evaluation, the field study was conducted in 5 countries (Austria, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania and Niger) but not in Burkina Faso and Chad which are also beneficiary countries as explained above in the methodology. 2-3 days were envisaged per country visit. To counterbalance the inability to travel to all beneficiary and participating countries, phone and Skype interviews with selected stakeholders were set up during the field missions. The CT assisted in organizing phone and Skype interviews.

The initial meetings in Senegal, and right after in Vienna at UNODC HQ to meet with the IEU and interview a first list of stakeholders, enabled the evaluation team to consolidate their preliminary findings, agree on final reporting processes from the field and on ‘dos and don’ts’ during the field missions. It was critical that all team members adhere to a ‘do no harm’ approach in engaging with stakeholders. The National Programme Officers located in Mali, Chad, and Niger informed the evaluation team of potential cultural taboos to consider in order to avoid any ‘faux pas’ during the field missions.

### Constraint for effectiveness and impact measurement

This evaluation is taking place three years after the programme’s inception and is half way through its initial planned phase (2013-2019). As a result, not all activities have been implemented and not every targeted country has achieved the expected outcomes or intermediary outcomes. However,

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<sup>18</sup> **Programme delivery and administrative partners** are directly involved in designing and implementing the project including UNODC HQ, ROMENA, HQ, UNPOL, MINUSMA, and UNOWAS. Interview topics included sustainability, partnership and cooperation, human rights and gender as well as management issues (efficiency, effectiveness, challenges and lessons learned) and future strategic directions.

<sup>19</sup> **Programme Beneficiaries** – Beneficiary and Associated countries and stakeholders in each targeted country Chad, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso. Specific institutions such ministry of interior, justice and law enforcement agencies in the recipient countries. Questions on partnerships, sustainability, cooperation, human rights and gender, and expectations were raised.

<sup>20</sup> **Programme partners** are donors- Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain.

<sup>21</sup> These 100-surveyed-people had received trainings through the programme and were randomly selected amongst list of beneficiaries.

the evaluation team managed to harvest some intermediary results according to work plans and the revised logframe (2016).

### **Gender Equality and Human Rights (GE&HR)**

There is limited information and baseline data on GE&HR in the programme logframe and revisions. However, the TOR reflected the interest to consider GE&HR and obtain recommendations for future programming. According to the desk research, some disaggregated data was collected during capacity building activities and GE&HR are mentioned during trainings and included into curricula of law enforcement and judicial academia. However, the programme reports acknowledge the lack of gender data due to the cultural context (low level of women in law enforcement agencies and the judiciary) and because of differing legal frameworks based on urban vs rural (urban settings more prone to respect western based systems whereas rural areas customarily apply Islamic law). In order to mitigate these caveats, the evaluation team tried to obtain information as to how capacity building activities have been conducted so far (from letters of invitation to inclusion of case studies) as well as to how legal assistance take into consideration GE & HR considerations when developing a national strategy or integrating international conventions into a country's legal framework. This report highlights under the GE&HR section: a) potential best practices in GE&HR within the Sahel context and the themes of the programme; b) the underlying causes for the limited integration of GE&HR considerations in the programme (political, cultural, operational, financial, lack of expertise, and budget); c) collected GE&HR related information and sex-disaggregated data when available. The evaluation team conducted external research on the level of female ratio within law enforcement and the judiciary for each country of the Sahel region in order to understand and triangulate the findings.

## II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

### Design

#### **To what extent does the Sahel Programme contribute to the UNODC Integrated Programming Approach?**

As a programme, the SP happens to be the first of its kind within UNODC that truly demonstrates interlinkages between Thematic (TP) and Regional Programmes (RP) at both operational and policy levels<sup>22</sup> within the Programme (based in the field with contributions from HQ).

Expertise from both HQ and the field (vertical) as well as inter-divisional (horizontal) teams contribute to the SP in an integrated manner. This has birthed a new way of doing things at both HQ and in the field where thematic activities are carried out jointly by both HQ and Field staff, which may lead to what is referred to as an opportunity for “joint strategic thinking”. The Programme generated by default a lot of interaction and team-work without which the team could possibly not function. This has in a way positively impacted effectiveness, efficiency, streamlining of internal processes even though there is still room for improvement.

By having experts in the field, and by leveraging HQ expertise to fill in the gaps where needed the SP is an example of how UNODC is able to bring its technical assistance services directly to the beneficiary countries in a region. The programmes are planned in a way that one thematic area fits into another – an example of integrating activities to address an issue in a holistic manner.

In particular, activities are planned in a way that takes a holistic approach to fighting organized crime, terrorism and corruption through the provision of targeted training activities and other technical assistance activities to the relevant sectors as well as assisting member States to draft their laws. The Coordination Team unit of the SP has impacted the modalities by which activities are funded, measured and reported on as it is further explained in other sections of this report.

#### **To what extent was the development of the Sahel Programme based on an adequate analysis of the needs of the target group and of the context? To what extent were beneficiaries involved in the design of the programme?**

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<sup>22</sup> IPU/SPU Concept Note: Thematic and Regional Programmes: an integrated approach. 27 October 2009

## **To what extent were implementing institutions involved in the design of the programme?**

### **Adequate Needs Analysis**

Based on desk review and interviews during the field visits, UNODC's response to the Sahel crises i.e. the design of the Sahel Programme was based on adequate needs analysis. Analysis of the security situation had been done in the region prior to the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel. The desk review also showed that the overall framework of the UNODC Regional Programmes for West Africa (2010-2014) and for the Arab States (2011-2015), constituted the main vehicles for UNODC support and assistance to the countries in West and North Africa. In addition, on 25 February 2013, ECOWAS and UNODC jointly released a Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (TOCTA<sup>23</sup>) for West Africa, which underscored the need to address methamphetamine production and trafficking in cocaine, heroin, cannabis, firearms and counterfeit medication. UNODC ROSEN, ROMENA and HQ identified the challenges that affected the region in 2012 around the Malian crisis and the ongoing threats that have been destabilizing the region for a decade. As visible in the summary of UNODC's contribution to UNISS<sup>24</sup>, the context is well analysed and appropriately framed.

### **Beneficiary Involvement**

The target groups (key ministries – Justice, Interior and Defense, foreign affairs- Law Enforcement agencies, Judiciary bodies and specialized institutions for these target groups) fit within UNODC's mandate to serve Member States and build their capabilities to strengthen their criminal justice response mechanisms as well as their governance structures. According to interviews, many local beneficiary institutions were consulted and contributed with inputs on the design of the different activities implemented by the SP. According to the desk research, and observation at the last Steering Committee, the SP is evolving as it responds to contexts, MS' requests and donors' priorities.

The desk review as well as field visits underlined that the SP proves to adequately respond to national security priorities such as the needs for training and for the elaboration of national legislation relating to organised crime, trafficking and smuggling, terrorism, fire-arms, anti-money laundering and corruption in the beneficiary countries.

From the donor community, their representatives confirmed their awareness of UNODC activities through regular briefings and correspondences. However, it was not clear whether they participated in the design of the programme from the onset or not.

## **To what extent did the design of the logframe allow results and activities to connect well to the indicators defined for the Sahel Programme? How could the design of the Programme be further strengthened?**

The desk review showed that the project document was first revised in May 2014 to raise the budget and accommodate changes in the staffing table. In December 2014, a second project revision was

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<sup>23</sup> UNODC, "Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment", July 2009.

Available at: [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/West\\_Africa\\_Report\\_2009.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/West_Africa_Report_2009.pdf) 3

UNODC, "Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment," February 2013. Available at: [http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West\\_Africa\\_TOCTA\\_2013\\_EN.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf) 4Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, Togo, Guinea, and Niger (using 2008 figures

<sup>24</sup>[https://www.unodc.org/documents/westandcentralafrika/UNODC\\_contribution\\_to\\_the\\_UN\\_Sahel\\_strategy\\_English.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/westandcentralafrika/UNODC_contribution_to_the_UN_Sahel_strategy_English.pdf)

done to update the logical framework and accommodate changes in the staffing table. A third project revision was done in June 2015 to extend the duration of the Programme until 2017<sup>25</sup>, include a mid-term evaluation and accommodate changes in the staffing table as well as include smart indicators. These revisions highlight flexibility to accommodate changes following lessons learned and MS' needs.

The review of the project documents and interviews with the programme managers also revealed that expected results (outcomes) are connected to set indicators. However, indicators are limited to the “number of actions” taken by or carried out for beneficiary countries. It is clear that each SP team member is aware of their different tasks that lead to the achievement of the overall expected results (outcomes).

The logframe has 166 activities (outputs) listed under all 5 expected outcomes as seen in the graphic below. All expected outcomes have between 3 and 7 outputs and each output has a set of activities up to a maximum of 19 activities e.g. outcome 3, Output 3.4, has 19 planned activities, that should lead to the desired outcome when all actions/activities are completed. Some other Outputs- such as 3.7- have as little as 3 activities. It is critical to highlight that it remains unclear to the evaluation team in what order activities are meant to take place in order to achieve the desired outcomes. Furthermore, milestones and targets are unclear as to when these activities are meant to be completed. The main objective of the programme is as indicated earlier and captured in the logframe as follows: *Strengthen capacities in the region and support the development of accessible, efficient and accountable criminal justice systems in the Sahel, in order to effectively combat drug trafficking, organized illicit trafficking, organized crime, terrorism and corruption in the region.* General indicators for the programme are:

1. Number of Sahel countries developing and/or implementing strategies, action plans or programmes with UNODC assistance in the areas of crime prevention and criminal justice, including judicial cooperation, accountability, access to justice and prison reform
2. Number of Sahel countries developing and/or implementing strategies, action plans or programmes with UNODC assistance in the areas of law enforcement including border management, control of fire arms and forensics
3. Number of Sahel countries that have taken steps to ratifying relevant UN legal instruments (the three drug control conventions, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its supplementing Protocols, the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and the international legal instruments against terrorism, and/or have taken steps to incorporate their legal provisions in domestic legislation

All 5 outcomes also have their own indicators. However, the intervention logic could be strengthened in order to better identify critical pathways that will help identify what activities need to take place first in order for others to follow to achieved the SP objectives.

As it was observed, the logframe did not indicate any time frame or pre-determined budget per indicator. The budget is explained further in another section of this report.

### **Graphic 3: Outcomes and output table as per the SP logframe**

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<sup>25</sup> Evaluation ToR

<p><b>Outcome 1:</b> Updated national legislation and increased use of regional and international cooperation mechanisms enable factors for combating drug trafficking, illicit trafficking, organized crime, terrorism and corruption efficiently</p> <p><b>Specific Indicators:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of national legislatures considering draft legislation in line with UNCAC, UNTOC and international legal instruments against terrorism, for eventual adoption</li> <li>• Number of UNCAC Self-Assessment reports available</li> <li>• Number of MLA requests issued, received and/or executed by participating authorities</li> </ul>	<p>Output 1.1 has 9 sub-activities Output 1.2 has 7 sub-activities Output 1.3 has 4 sub-activities</p>
<p><b>Outcome 2:</b> Increased capacity of, and information exchange between, law enforcement entities leads to higher detection and interdiction rates</p> <p><b>Specific Indicators:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of potential cases of illicitly trafficked goods at entry and exit points identified</li> </ul>	<p>Output 2.1 has 8 sub-activities Output 2.2 has 5 sub-activities Output 2.3 has 9 sub-activities Output 2.4 has 7 sub-activities</p>
<p><b>Outcome 3:</b> Accountable criminal justice officials investigate, prosecute and adjudicate crimes in a more effective and efficient manner</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Specific Indicators:</b></li> <li>• Number of countries planning or implementing new or improved oversight policies</li> <li>• Number of countries improving their training curricula for criminal justice officials</li> <li>• Number of judicial cases that demonstrate improved effectiveness and efficiency</li> </ul>	<p>Output 3.1 has 10 sub-activities Output 3.2 has 5 sub-activities Output 3.3 has 7 sub-activities Output 3.4 has 19 sub-activities Output 3.5 has 5 sub-activities Output 3.6 has 4 sub-activities Output 3.7 has 3 sub-activities</p>
<p><b>Outcome 4:</b> Scientific evidence in support of judicial investigations and proceedings is generated</p> <p><b>Specific indicators</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of beneficiaries noting that improved capacity is being used for generating scientific evidence in judicial investigations, including marked firearms</li> </ul>	<p>Output 4.1 has 6 sub-activities Output 4.2 has 8 sub-activities Output 4.3 has 7 sub-activities Output 4.4 has 7 sub-activities</p>
<p><b>Outcome 5:</b> Improvement in the access and treatment of people in contact with the judicial system and improvement of prison management, in line with human rights standards and norms</p> <p><b>Specific indicators:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of countries where reforms and pilot schemes have been operationalized in prisons and in the judicial system</li> <li>• Number of victim/witness referrals</li> </ul>	<p>Output 5.1 has 7 sub-activities Output 5.2 has 4 sub-activities Output 5.3 has 6 sub-activities Output 5.4 has 11 sub-activities Output 5.5 has 8 sub-activities</p>

As aforementioned, the sequencing of activities could be clearer; currently, a particular activity number is used for several activities under the different thematic areas of the programme. For the purpose of evaluation/audit, it might be recommended that a different number is assigned to each activity per thematic area (e.g. Justice, Anti-Corruption, etc...). It was challenging for the evaluation team to link outcomes (results) and outputs (activities) to the indicators and assess preliminary impacts.

### Sequencing of activities (critical pathways)

The following table shows the current numbering of the different activities. The evaluation could not obtain clarification nor make sense of why different type of activities have the same sequencing numbers.

#### Graphic 4: Sample table of actions numbering and sequencing

Activity 1.1.4 Atelier National pour la ratification et la mise en œuvre des instruments universels contre le terrorisme et le crime organisé Feb-14
Activity 1.1.4 Atelier National pour la ratification et la mise en œuvre des instruments universels contre le terrorisme et le crime organisé May-14
Activity 1.1.4 Nigeria Conduct technical assistance activity: “National retreat for the review of Nigerian civil aviation related laws” Jul-14
Activity 1.1.4 Nigeria Conduct technical assistance activity: “Legislative Workshop for the Review of Nigerian Civil Aviation and its Agencies Laws” Sep-14
Activity 1.1.4 One régional workshop on legislative harmonization - renforcement des reponses legislatives et operationnelles contre les trafics illicites d’armes à feu dans la zone sahelo-saharienne
Activity 1.1.4 Regional conference to raise awareness about asset disclosure principles for Sahel country participants May-14
Activity 1.1.4 Workshop for the Justice Sector on Anti-Corruption in Burkina Faso Oct-14
Activity 1.1.4 Regional workshop on investigative journalism Nov-14
Activity 1.1.4 Regional conference on anti-corruption Feb-15
Activity 1.1.4 Follow-up legislative workshop for the amendment of the Nigeria civil aviation and other agencies related bills Jun-15
Activity 1.1.4 Follow-up legislative workshop for the amendment of the Nigeria civil aviation and other agencies related bills Aug-15
Activity 1.1.4 Technical and financial support to NACIWA's amended constitution Jun-15

In order to improve the logframe and the design of the SP, a clearer intervention logic with a classification codes/sequencing per action, thematic area and country and regional level actions could help draw clear pathways from the outcomes to the indicators more easily, especially for monitoring and impact measuring purposes.

According to the desk research and the interviews a number of activities were conceptualized by other projects (e.g. AIRCOP, the Firearms Programme, etc.) but some of their results were reported in the SP progress reports if activities were taking place in any of the Sahel countries.

It is clear that there is internal integration of activities taking place in the SP, but it is not clear besides the geographic criteria – Sahel country- under what premises would the SP report and implement activities from another project.

### Relevance

**How relevant is the Programme to target groups’, including Governments’, needs and priorities? How relevant is the SP to the donor countries?**

In response to the evolving threats jeopardizing the stability of the Sahel region, with potential negative ripple effects across the whole West African region, the SP was designed simultaneously with the UNISS. Based on the desk research and the interviews and as highlighted in the background and design sections, the SP is and remains relevant- both in terms of normative support as well as in capacity building and equipment needs- to beneficiary institutions in the 5 Sahel countries but also to neighbouring countries.

Numerous conventions, security briefs, declarations<sup>26</sup> to support the creation of the G5 Sahel and asserting the needs to further engage in the Sahel region, as well as numerous international renown think tanks highlight that over 17 strategies are implemented in the region by international and foreign aid agencies.

According to the desk research<sup>27</sup> and interviews, security and judicial institutions in the Sahel countries were fragile<sup>28</sup>, insufficiently staffed<sup>29</sup> and ill-equipped to respond adequately to the endemic threats affecting their countries and the region. These on-going threats were exacerbated with the numerous crises in Mali and especially following the fall of the Qaddafi Regime, leaving a security vacuum. As a result, the Security Council showed high interests which led to the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel<sup>30</sup>. According to the desk review, an estimated 20,000 firearms<sup>31</sup> from Libya had crossed into the Sahel, and cocaine worth \$1.25 billion had been dumped in West Africa. The profits from that illicit trafficking exceeded the security budgets of most countries in the region. In addition, human trafficking<sup>32</sup> and thousands of migrants<sup>33</sup> were crossing through the Sahel and the Sahara going to Europe and the Middle East. Porous borders, growing terrorist threats, food insecurity, corruption and other grievances (youth unemployment, growing demographic, etc...) weakened the stability of the region and each country of the Sahel need to strengthen their governance and their criminal justice system.

As a result, the SP was designed to respond to the Sahel countries' most urgent needs and in alignment with the UNISS and other international strategies in the region implemented by the EU, the USA, bilateral aid, other UN agencies and other players such as ECOWAS and the African Union<sup>34</sup>. According to interviews, these numerous strategies were found to be overlapping at times but the countries' needs were so great that duplicated efforts were found to be relevant and necessary.

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26 Declaration of Niamey Deuxième conférence des ministres de l'intérieur des pays du G5 Sahel, Niamey May 14th 2015 <https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/g5-conference-niamey.html>

27 UNODC, assessment Report, 2014

28 <http://www.un.org/undpa/en/africa/sahel>

29 Niger, with an area of 1,267,000 Km<sup>2</sup> and a population of 17, 83 million inhabitants registered 400 magistrates, with 42 women." Chancellerie" January 2nd, 2017

30 <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11692.doc.htm>

31 ibid

32 [https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/GLOTIP\\_2014\\_full\\_report.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/GLOTIP_2014_full_report.pdf)

33 <https://www.iom.int/news/eu-iom-seek-strengthen-border-and-migration-management-niger>, <https://www.iom.int/news/eu-iom-launch-migrant-protection-reintegration-initiative-central-mediterranean-migration>, <https://www.iom.int/countries/mali>,

34 [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report\\_19\\_Sahel.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_19_Sahel.pdf)

<https://www.csis.org/programmes/transnational-threats-project/militancy-and-arc-instability/militancy-and-arc-instability-2>

As of March 2017, The SP had delivered 304<sup>35</sup> activities in order to support beneficiary countries: (i) to align most of their domestic legislation to international standards<sup>36</sup>; (ii) to secure efficiently their borders<sup>37</sup>; (iii) to promote international cooperation and exchange of information between states, international organizations and donors<sup>38</sup>; (iv) to establish an accountable criminal justice system by capacitating staff in investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating criminal cases<sup>39</sup>; (v) to strengthen the capacity of using scientific evidence<sup>40</sup>; (vi) to improve the access and treatment of people in contact with the judicial system and align prisons management to human rights standards and norms (vi)<sup>41</sup>.

### Relevancy of SP to donors

The evaluation team reviewed the SP's fundraising strategy, pledges awarded by different donors and key donors' strategies in the region in order to understand whether the SP was aligned or not. According to interviews and desk research, the SP is well aligned with Denmark's Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) for the Sahel<sup>42</sup> that was designed in 2013 to address the crises in the region through an integrated approach. The Danish PSF focuses on several pillars and one is on security and has the Danish Demining Group and UNODC as key partners.

The SP is also aligned with Japan's counter-terrorism and law enforcement priorities as per the Tokyo International Conference on the Development of Africa (TICAD) of 2013 and of 2016<sup>43</sup>. The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria and Germany have a similar agenda to the EU strategies<sup>44</sup> for the Sahel, which focus on youth and radicalization, security and counter-terrorism and rule of law as well as on governance and fragility. These countries are also donors to the SP. According to interviews, they see the SP as a good instrument and relevant to address key issues on law enforcement, the rule of law and terrorism in the Sahel countries. The funding pledges, as seen in the graphic below, reflect these priorities.

<sup>35</sup> As reported in Smart Sheet up until the end of the evaluation mission in April 2017.

<sup>36</sup> In May 2015, Niger passed a legislation on smuggling of migrants; Burkina Faso adopted two anti-corruption laws, one on the prevention and repression of corruption (March 2015) and one organic law creating the High Authority for State Control and Anti-corruption (November 2015); Mauritania adopted a new law on legal aid allowing better access to justice (September 2015)

<sup>37</sup> Creation in Mali and Niger the Joint Airport Interdiction Task Force respectively in late 2014 and 2015

<sup>38</sup> Creation of the West African Network Central Authorities and Prosecutors against organized crimes (i); Support of UNODC to the Creation and operationalization of the Security Cooperation Platform of the G5 Sahel(ii); Establishment of the Asset Recovery Inter Agency Network for West Africa (ARIN-WA) facilitated by UNODC

<sup>39</sup> In Mali, in coordination with the UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA, UNODC delivered a training programme to build capacity of frontline which led to the seizure of 400 kg of cannabis, 436 kg of crack cocaine, 274 doses of "OFF" (mixture of heroin and other substances) and 41 court cases; First Conviction for Money Laundering in Niger, May 2015, with a judicial confiscation of USD 670,000; Airport Task Force in Mali seized 14 kg of cocaine and 16 kg of methamphetamines (the SP report 2016)

<sup>40</sup> Building capacities on scientific evidence allowed law enforcement agents in charge of drug trafficking repression in Mali to better know the different sorts of drug and to know how to differentiate them.

<sup>41</sup> Sahel Programme manual, Report of Activities January 2016, Assessment Report 2014


<sup>42</sup> In 2013 programming for a third regional programme for the Sahel began. It had a development objective of contributing to peace and stability in the Sahel region. This was to be achieved through three stands of work: 1) mediation and conflict resolution; 2) improved security, especially through democratic control of the security sector; and 3) countering violent extremism and organised crime. Implementing partners include multilateral organisations and international non-governmental organisations. DKK 125 million was allocated to this programme.

<sup>43</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/partnerships/ticad.shtml>

<sup>44</sup> [file:///Users/EM/Downloads/mapping\\_eu\\_activities\\_in\\_sahel-presentation\\_0.pdf](file:///Users/EM/Downloads/mapping_eu_activities_in_sahel-presentation_0.pdf)

From its inception, the SP raised USD 24, 6 million, which represents 39,67% of the projected budget of USD 62,000,000. Donors are Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, The Netherland, Luxembourg and The United States. See the charts below.

**Graphic 5: Donor division for the Sahel Programme**



Source: the evaluation team based on revised donor pledges obtained during field mission

Japan is the donor that provided the most funding so far, with a contribution estimated of USD 7,535,681, as of March 2017, followed by Denmark USD 5,844,491.

This amount as compared to other UNODC programmes and in taking into account the lapse of time, is significant and demonstrates overall the relevancy of the SP to donors.<sup>45</sup> However, relevancy differs from one thematic area to another. Justice (USD 2,020,680.28), law enforcement (USD 1,635,802.92), firearms (USD 1,488,895.74) and terrorism (USD 1,389,153.09) prevention have received more funds from donors. Justice area was more relevant for Austria than Japan, which concentrated its funds on terrorism prevention and law enforcement. Trafficking in persons, anti-corruption (USD 809,155.08) and money laundering (USD 795,754.04, and USD 195,740.96) were subjected to lower donor attention. Unevenness in the distribution of funds between thematic areas revealed the majority of earmarked funding as compared to soft-earmarked funding. The SP reports do not highlight these thematic earmarked-un-earmarked differences, which could help understand the SP focus on some activities rather than others due to funding allocation.

<sup>45</sup> Denmark- aligned with their own Peace and Stabilization Fund for the Sahel as UNODC is one of their 4 partners along with National Democratic Institute, the Danish Demining Group, Center of Humanitarian Dialogue; Strategic Cooperation between Japan and UNODC -The joint plan of action, 2 June 2013 and modified on 09 June 2015

**How relevant was the Sahel Programme for beneficiary countries in relation to the implementation of UNODC projects and programmes in the region?**

SP is aligned with several regional programmes and thematic areas<sup>46</sup>; by its substance and territory scope, it falls within the traditional attributions of UNODC and as such contributes to the implementations of its activities in the targeted countries.

**SP and regional programmes**

The SP is aligned with the Regional Programmes for the Arab States 2011-2015 (i); 2016-2021 (ii); the Regional Programme for West Africa 2010-2014 (iii); and 2016-2020(iv). The SP is also aligned with ECOWAS regional programme, the Airport Communication Programme (AIRCOP), the global programmes on Anti-Corruption and Money Laundering as well as the global programmes on Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants. The chart below underlines what the SP aligns with in each programme elements.

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<sup>46</sup> Regional Programme for the Arab States 2011-2015, Regional Programme for the Arab States 2016-2021, Regional Programme for West Africa 2010-2014, Regional Programme for West Africa 2016-2020; Thematic Programme on Action against Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking 2011-2013, Thematic Programme on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform 2012-2015, Thematic Programme on Terrorism Prevention 2012-2015

UNODC Projects in West Africa	AIRCOP	Global Programmes on TIP & SOM, GLO.ACT, GLOT59 GLOT92	Global Programmes on UNCAC and on Money Laundering	Regional Programme for West Africa 2010-2014	Regional Programme for West Africa 2016-2020	Regional Programme for the Arab States 2011-2015	Regional Programme for the Arab States 2016-2020	ECOWAS regional programme
Elements of alignment with the SP	The SP supports AIRCOP JAITF's creation in the Sahel countries as it is aligned with the SP's objectives to combat illicit trafficking. JAITFs in Niger, Mali	GLO.ACT takes place in Mali and Niger; and the other global programmes respond to MS needs and TA requests to build LE and Judiciary capabilities on TIP and SOM and support legislative reforms. These programmes are aligned with the SP pillar on TIP and SOM	the SP is aligned with the UNCAC global programme through support the implementation of capacity building activities and cost-sharing the salary of West Africa Anti-Corruption regional advisor. The SP also supported the creation of CENOZO	The SP is aligned with 2 sub-programmes out of the 4 Sub-Programmes of the regional programmes: 1- Organized Crime, Illicit Trafficking and Terrorism; 2- Justice and Integrity; Mauritania and Chad are not part of the regional programmes targeted countries.	The SP is aligned with Pillar 1:strengthening criminal justice systems, Pillar 2: Preventing and countering Transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking; pillar 3 preventing and countering terrorism; pillar 4 preventing and countering corruption But Chad and Mauritania are not part of the countries covered by the programme	sub-programme 1 on countering organized crime and sub-programme 2 on promoting and building justice. The programme was designed before the Arab Spring revolutions but its focus remained relevant to the 18 member states of the Arab League- the North African member States such as Algeria, Morocco, Libya especially are most relevant as they are neighboring countries of the Sahel region and the Libyan revolution played a destabilising role in Mali and the rest of the region. Libya, Morocco and Algeria are partner countries in the SP to deliver trainings and cooperate on some activities such as border control and TIP	the SP is aligned with this programme sub-programme 1 and 2 on Combating Organized Crime, Countering Terrorism, Combating Corruption and Financial Crimes and Strengthening Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice	The SP supports this project through supporting capacity building activities to LE agents to identify drugs, curb and stop illegal trafficking in the ECOWAS region. Mauritania and Chad are not part of ECOWAS

The latest two Regional Programmes for West Africa (2010-14 and 2016-20) gather a pool of experts that cover most of the SP's thematic areas. Furthermore, the SP is integrated within the RP as some Sahel countries are also covered by the RP at the exception of Chad and Mauritania. The growing problem of drug trafficking and other transnational organized crimes led to the adoption of ECOWAS Action Plan (2008-2015)<sup>47</sup>, for which a request was submitted for technical assistance of UNODC. As a response, UNODC designed the West Africa Regional Programme (RP) with the aim of bringing technical assistance to ECOWAS states to fight transnational crimes and related infringements. Furthermore, an ECOWAS programme initiated by UNODC focused on curbing drug demand reduction, drug traffic and organized crime was designed to respond to ECOWAS countries' needs to confront this growing threat in the region.

However, in 2012, terrorism became a serious threat in West Africa, with the collapse of the Libyan Regime and the irruption of terrorist groups in Mali. Although, these threats could have been managed by the RP, its logframe did not include terrorism, as it had not been identified as a major threat at the time of its design<sup>48</sup>. As a result, UNODC decided to develop the SP that is flexible, complementary of the RP and focusing on the Sahel countries, adding Mauritania and Chad. From its inception, the SP has conducted several activities that favoured the implementation of the RP in those Sahel countries, especially through National Integrated Programmes (NIP)<sup>49</sup>, which are part of RP's building blocks; these NIPs did not, however, work as expected due to delays, funds and fragility, excluding that of Cabo Verde<sup>50</sup>.

### **SP and thematic areas**

The SP is aligned to: (i) Thematic Programme on Action against Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and Illicit Trafficking 2011-2013<sup>51</sup>; (ii) Thematic Programme on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform 2012-2015 by building Sahel countries' law enforcement and judiciary's capabilities; (iii) Thematic Programme on Terrorism Prevention 2012-2015 inspired by the Strategy for the period 2008-2011 for UNODC; (iv) the Strategic Framework for the period 2010-2011 and (v) the Strategic Framework for the period 2012-2013<sup>52</sup>. Thematic areas as well as Strategic frameworks serve as guidelines with which all projects/programmes implemented by UNODC have to comply to and so does the SP.

The Thematic Programme on Action Against Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking offers the larger vision and anchors UNODC's position as guardian of the UNTOC and has the agency to have developed experience and field analysis on these crimes over the last decade as stated: *One objective of this Thematic Programme is to review and revitalize the UNODC approach to transnational organized crime to place less emphasis on servicing multilateral processes, and to ensure that UNODC can deliver cutting edge upstream technical assistance. We aim to develop innovative responses to existing and emerging challenges, provide real and tangible services to Member States, to shape the nature of international policy making in a proactive manner, and to*

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<sup>47</sup> ECOWAS Regional Action Plan against illicit drug trafficking, abuses and organized crime was initiated in 2008. It was endorsed in the same year through a Political declaration by ECOWAS heads of States and Government. This Action plan was followed by an Operational Action Plan elaborated on 12-13 May 2009 in Abuja, which was adopted later by ECOWAS heads of States and Governments in June 2009

<sup>48</sup> Regional Plan, West Africa, In-depth Evaluation Report, December 2015. P.39

<sup>49</sup> National Integrated Programme is a part of building block of the Regional Plan. Its objective is to bring a national response in line with the regional programme to the threats of drug and organized crimes.

<sup>50</sup> Most of National Integrated Programmes failed to work because of their mechanism of funding based partially on the contribution of beneficiary countries. Apart from Cabo Verde which funds its own NIP with USD 5,870,000, other countries did not react positively. (Regional Plan, West Africa, In-depth Evaluation Report, December 2015. P.41)

<sup>51</sup> [https://www.unodc.org/res/human-trafficking/2012/strategy-on-human-trafficking-and-migrant-smuggling\\_html/Thematic\\_Programme\\_on\\_Transitional\\_Threats.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/res/human-trafficking/2012/strategy-on-human-trafficking-and-migrant-smuggling_html/Thematic_Programme_on_Transitional_Threats.pdf)

<sup>52</sup> [https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/FINGOV/Background\\_Documentation\\_2011-2013/A-65-6-Rev1\\_E.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/FINGOV/Background_Documentation_2011-2013/A-65-6-Rev1_E.pdf)

*impact the lives of individuals, enhancing their security, productivity and quality of life.* Thematic Programme on Action Against Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit and the Trafficking the SP are aligned on the Sub-Programme 2 and 3 focusing on Regional and National Capacity Building and Trafficking in Persons and Migrant Smuggling.

### **Did the SP consider and adapt to changed circumstances?**

The SP was designed in reaction to the Malian crises in 2012 and at the same time of the UNISS. The situation since then has not dramatically changed that would make the SP adapt to new circumstances. However, drawing lessons from what happened to the RP in 2012, with the extension and exacerbation of terrorism in the region, the SP is based on threat assessments, ongoing research (from the different thematic sections in ROSEN and at HQ) and a Steering Committee<sup>53</sup>, which is composed of ministries of security, justice and foreign affairs of each beneficiary country as well as donors and other relevant implementing partners (MINUSMA, UNOWAS, UNPOL, etc.). As underscored by its terms of reference, its role is, inter alia: to supervise the implementation of UNODC's contribution through the setting up of an effective monitoring system (i); to promote ownership of the SP by beneficiary countries (ii); to review the implementation of UNODC's contribution and evaluate obtained results (iii); to conduct policy discussion and strategies to guide the support provided by UNODC, in particular with regard to identification of priorities within the different fields and activities (iv); to identify new challenges and opportunities that SP will have to address (v)<sup>54</sup>. The Steering Committee enables beneficiary countries to get involved and voice their concerns and demands as well as make adjustments when needed. Through this Committee, several readjustments have been done in accordance to changed circumstances.

Four programme revisions were applied to the logframe since the SP's inception. These changes were related to staffing rather than external changes in the Sahel countries. The only major change that occurred was the need to address children associated to terrorism activities. As a result, the SP CT at the Steering Committee of 2016 proposed to include this thematic in the SP and it was adopted by MS.

### **What was the added value/niche of the Sahel Programme?**


Observations during field missions fortified by several interviews of stakeholders and other desk reviews have pointed out the success of the SP activities, with some palpable and encouraging results, mostly attributed not only to the relevance of proposed solutions but also to the high level of expertise of UNODC in operating in challenging complex criminal matters. One of the key added values that repeatedly came forward during interviews is the fact that the SP has its own coordination team to monitor, report, supervise, help raise funds and communicate amongst relevant parties and stakeholders. The graphic below highlights the added values that were mentioned most and puts an emphasis on the 'own coordination team' as a special asset that other programmes do not have.

### **Graphic 6: added value of the SP**

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<sup>53</sup> Steering Committee is a structure in charge of the monitoring of Sahel Programme. It comprises of representatives of Ministries in charge of Justice, foreign affairs and Security of each signatory country of SP: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco and Niger. The Technical Secretary is held by ROSEN. Meetings are taken place once a year in Dakar.

<sup>54</sup> Terms of Reference of the Steering Committee



source: evaluation team based on data collected during field missions and desk research

However, this positive perception cannot overshadow some weaknesses noted during the field mission that are also critical to understand so the SP can improve its activities and yield greater results over the next phase of the programme.

Firstly, the SP activities, while widely appreciated, are not always as inclusive as beneficiary countries would like with regards their design, implementation and follow-up<sup>55</sup>.

Secondly, deep assessment of activities undertaken during the last three years under the SP and generally UNODC reveals the low consideration granted to civil society in a context where it is expected greater cooperation to favour: awareness within the population about these delicate threats (i), local ownership (ii); vulgarization of information (iii); and existence of a kind of “counter power” to state institutions<sup>56</sup>. Recipients of UNODC activities are exclusively, if not, mostly Member States due to its mandate, but it does not preclude activities to invite CSOs to participate and become implementing partners in some activities (legal reforms for instance).

UNODC’s mandate is displayed as rationale behind this posture, but when it comes to tackle such complex and evolving threats, the need of readjusting actions by diversifying partners is of a great importance to enhance capacities and visibility<sup>57</sup> among populations; and to this point of view, local civil society is a key partner “which can provide for insights on final beneficiaries needs and ensure a more sustainable basis from bottom-up initiative and identification of local leadership to raise awareness and increase social involvement”<sup>58</sup>.

Thirdly, it was highlighted that emerging threats prosper where state’s authorities are absent or fragile; most activities undertaken by the SP such as building capacities either staffs or institutions,

<sup>55</sup> Interviews of stakeholders during field mission

<sup>56</sup> Regional Programme, West Africa In-depth Evaluation Report, Dec. 2015, P.16

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

are centralized in the capitals, even if, some participants came from different areas. As a consequence, most of countryside security and judicial institutions remain unequipped and not trained to challenge these threats that thrive on these weaknesses<sup>59</sup>. In Mali, for instance, while more attention is paid in the capital and to some extent in the north through the peacekeeping mission, the centre is where the Malian government and international agencies have less control than in the capital<sup>60</sup>; this situation that can be propitious for the entrenchment of all kinds of organized crimes.

Finally, and most importantly, when examining implemented activities under the SP and from recommendations issued at the latest Steering Committee's session<sup>61</sup>, one can raise the question as to the strategic advantage of extending the SP's mandate<sup>62</sup>. As a result, the SP resembles a 'regional programme that aims to foster closer and more effective cooperation amongst the Sahel countries through regional activities to strengthen MS' capabilities to combat organized crime in the region. The SP should be characterized by activities of cooperation and coordination between states, especially when facing transnational threats, after a mandatory preparatory step of institutional and normative harmonization through technical support and capacity building sessions at the domestic level.

For the last three years, the SP has performed 304 activities, with 204 at the domestic level through mainly normative, capacity building and procurement supports, in different thematic areas. Less activities at the regional level have taken place so far. The programme has supported the development of several regional mechanisms such as the security platform located with the G5 Sahel, or others such as WACAP, NACIWA and CENOZO for instance. These mechanisms still need to mature and become fully operational; that requires further support from the SP in the coming years of the programme.

## **Effectiveness**

**To what extent were the mandate, timeframe, objectives and targets of the Sahel Programme conceived realistically and feasibly taking into account the challenges of the region?**

### **Mandate, objectives and targets**

UNODC<sup>63</sup> is a global leader in the fight against illicit drugs and international crime. Established in 1997 through a merger between the United Nations Drug Control Programme and the Centre for International Crime Prevention, UNODC operates in all regions of the world through an extensive network of field offices. UNODC is mandated to assist Member States in their effort against illicit drugs, crime and terrorism.

In the Millennium Declaration, MS also resolved to intensify efforts to fight transnational crime in all its dimensions, to redouble the efforts to implement the commitment to counter the world drug problem and to take concerted action against international terrorism through field-based technical cooperation actions, research and normative work.

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<sup>59</sup> *Central Mali: An uprising in the Making!* International Crisis Group, Page 6

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Steering Committee, from April 5<sup>th</sup> to 7<sup>th</sup>, 2017, Dakar-Senegal

<sup>62</sup> During the last steering committee, from 5<sup>th</sup> to 7<sup>th</sup> April 2017, the scope of intervention of SP was extended inopportunistically by including, among others, cyber criminality, where it was expected more stress and dissemination of implemented activities at domestic and sub-regional levels.

<sup>63</sup> <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop>

The overall objective of the SP is to increase national capacities to counter transnational organized crime and terrorism while facilitating access to a capable justice system. The main tasks developed to achieve this goal have been mainly to provide training for law enforcement and support in the development or the strengthening of national laws and facilitate access to justice. This objective is realistic taking into consideration the weaknesses identified in the five beneficiary countries. The actions fall well within the mandate of the programmes of UNODC.

The final programme document and logical framework includes activities with their objectives, baselines, targets and indicators that are measurable. However, indicators seem to be limited only to the number of trainings offered, the number of participants, and number of laws enacted. There was no specific predetermined timeframe for actions to be taken which probably explains why the SP had to be extended twice. The SmartSheet (monitoring tool) system used by the coordination team to report, monitor, catalogue and collect data on actions being undertaken, has been very useful to share information and measure progress made thus far. Missions, other progress and assessment reports, as well as analysis of stakeholders meeting reports also serve as tools to monitor progress of activities. The programme seems to be within scope as clearly indicated i.e. all activities are being undertaken in the context of the Sahel countries – Security and Governance sectors in line with the mandated thematic areas of UNODC.

### **Timing and targets**

The logframe does not indicate any timeframe for activity implementation. However, since the establishment of Umoja in 2015 activities are currently budgeted for, which helps ensure that the actions remain within budget. However, in order to determine whether the programme is within schedule there is need for planned lead times and end timelines for each indicator.


From the aforementioned, timing/scheduling is not very clear in order to fit actions within a “triple constraint” of standard project management principles i.e. Scope – Time (schedule) – Budget, in order to determine if planned activities were effectively carried out within the scope, time and budget allocated for them. Numerous activities are listed in the Smartsheet as listed as having taken place but according to the field missions and desk research, these actions can be understood as preparations towards an “activity”. However, the evaluation team understood during the field missions that an activity is ‘any action undertaken which necessitates a mission report’ i.e. visits to countries to consult with or prompt or inform the relevant authorities of (for ‘buy-in’ or for them to take action) for a training course/workshop or legislative drafting to take place.

Political willingness and the security situation impacted the timing and the implementation of projected activities in the different countries. However, credit is to be given to the SP CT for finding ways to upscale activities in post or very unstable countries as for instance in Mali in the face of its post conflict situation. However, it was observed by the evaluation team that many activities remain concentrated in the capital cities of the countries. The desk research revealed some activities taking place in more remote areas but they are not the norm. In countries where instability is weakening security and the governmental control of their borders and governorates, it is critical to train law enforcement officers and judiciary across all constituencies, especially in the most critical bordering locations where transnational organized criminal networks flourish.


Some countries have benefited from more activities than others. These depend on political willingness and country’s requests but also on donors’ priorities. Mali has benefitted from 79 activities as opposed to Chad with 17 activities between 2014 to the time of this report. This may also be attributed to external factors such as the presence of MINUSMA in Mali, which allows for

an atmosphere of readiness of the country to receive UNODC activities. The table below shows activities as they have occurred in the Programme.

**Graphic 7 Activities Per Geographic Areas**



Source for both graphics: evaluation team based on SP report 2016 and SmartSheet as of March 2017



In terms of the timeframe, the current programme is set from 2013-2019, which is very short to start observing critical impact on structural and complex challenges affecting the Sahel region. It is expected that this current timeframe will be extended through donor funding to continue

supporting beneficiary countries until the overall objectives are achieved and MS can stand on their own to combat organized crimes and curb security threats.


In this first phase of the SP implementation (2014-2017), some delays were experienced but are explained by multiple factors such as the complex nature of the programme coupled with external factors beyond the control of the coordination team of the programme as well as countries' capabilities to adequately absorb the SP's technical assistance. For example, training is provided to law enforcement officers who go back to their office and have no functional space to work. Office furniture is then provided by the programme as well as IT equipment. For instance, the Security Platform of the G5 Sahel, the SP does not only provide capacity building for the relevant staff, but has to procure office supplies; one factor that is out of the SP's control is the need, for instance, to ensure internet connectivity and the right softwares (1-24/7 the Interpol software for instance) so trained staff can immediately use and implement the skills acquired.

Furthermore, the field missions revealed that most beneficiaries were satisfied to receive the assistance whether delayed or not. In some specific cases, such as the G5 Security Platform, the beneficiaries were dissatisfied with the delays in obtaining the SP's technical assistance. Additionally, the evaluation team confirmed that some activities undertaken by the SP faced some challenges, as for instance procurement delays that represent a major set-back in an implementation plan. As aforementioned, strategic choices to delay or postpone activities due to multiple factors explain the fact that some activities have not yet been implemented (refer to outcome 2 output 2.1<sup>64</sup> that has 8 activities and only 2 – 2.1.3 and 2.1.7- see annex 6- were implemented).

### **To what extent is progress or lack thereof, the result of external factors rather than of the Sahel Programme activities?**

#### **Graphic 8: External Factors vs UNODC Activities to Maximize Progress**

<sup>64</sup> Activities under this output have been delayed because of the absorption capacity at this point in time. Not only is upgrading of skills essential, but the technical facilities needed for information exchange and intelligence collection, are not yet available to facilitate the provision of this technical assistance. It is obvious that in some cases, training needs to happen before the procurement of IT equipment. However, in some case this needs to be done in parallel so that new skills acquired will not be lost before the provision of procurement items.



Source: evaluation team – based on desk review and field mission

There are quite a number of key external factors that have had positive impact on the SP at the start of the programme: a) donor funding; b) a stable environment; c) MS political will, as highlight in the graphic above. The MS' willingness to go with UNODC actions in order to overcome the treats of organized crime, terrorism and corruption in the region was a positive commitment. The political will was very strong and security forces were also eager to obtain training to confront terrorist factions and organized crime groups. Interviews with Malian trainees concurred that the trainings offered by UNODC strengthen their understanding of key problems related to drugs identification, border control, traffic in persons, smuggling of migrants and arms control.

Delays and other obstacles that have affected the progress of programme delivery are attributable to factors such as weak governance and fragility, amongst others. In Chad<sup>65</sup>, for instance the time span needed for a bill to pass in Parliament e.g. draft laws not only take time to pass, and this may sometimes be beyond the life-cycle of the project. Other times draft laws, as discussed between UNODC and the country may not pass as initially agreed e.g. Burkina Faso (assistance was provided by the SP to draft the anti-corruption law but the final bill that was passed had some deliberate or otherwise omissions).

### To what extent do partners' interests impact the programme?

For this report, partners refer to implementing partners – donors, other UN agencies and others (CSOs, regional bodies...)

<sup>65</sup> Desk review revealed many correspondences to Chad for specific actions to be taken but no corresponding response from the country.

### **Donors**

According to the field missions and the review of the budget and reports, donors fund according to their own governments' interests and geographic focus. While some donors give the SP some flexibility in the use of soft-earmarked funds in carrying programme activities, other donors have specific interests where funds are "hard earmarked" for specific actions. Prison sector reform received the least interests from donors and as a result obtained little funding. Soft earmarked funding compensated and helped implement these activities as planned under the SP.

As aforementioned, one donor, for example, has specific interest in funding more counter-terrorism related activities, but generally provides strict earmarked funding and the focus of the programme has to fit within its own national agenda. Similarly, another donor responds to its own Peace and Stability Fund for the Sahel region. This fund operates with key partners, and UNODC is one of them<sup>66</sup> with their respective mandate and added value. Donors fund activities with strict earmarked funding while others fund UNODC with soft-earmarked funding. Soft-earmarked funding offers greater flexibility to the SP to develop activities rooted in local needs. A few respondents mentioned that soft-earmarking enables activities to be implemented at a cheaper price than through strict earmarked. This assumption could not be properly verified as the budgets do not differentiate soft-earmarked from strict earmarked funding.

### **Other UN agencies**

As the SP fits the UNISS, the SP should be influenced by other UN agencies' interests. As mentioned under relevance, the SP does respond to other UN agencies' interests as they are aligned with the SP's objectives. The field missions underlined duplication of activities undertaken by different UN and international agencies especially on the topics of 'trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants' where other agencies share a similar mandate. As a result, law enforcement officers were found to attend several trainings on similar topics which led to coordination fatigue amongst MS' counterparts and questioned the effectiveness of these activities led by the SP and other agencies.

Hence, coordination amongst these agencies is required as part of the UNISS Steering Committees and the working groups for UNISS. It was highlighted and observed that communication and coordination amongst UN agencies are not as effective as they could be and while it is not UNODC's sole responsibility to enforce or find solutions to better coordination, UNODC has been trying to strengthen coordination within the security pillar of UNISS. Further information on the different partners will be provided under the "partnership" section.

### **Others**

The Danish Demining Group (DDG) for instance is an international organization that has signed an MOU with UNODC within the SP framework as DDG is one of the key CSOs that contributes with local assessments (situational, equipment requirements, limitations and gaps) as they have field offices and staff located across the region, in remote areas. Their interests however do not negatively impact on the SP activities because their activities come as a support for the SP's activities.

To summarize, donors' interests, amongst all partners involved, are the primary 'influencers' as they finance according to their own strategies and constituents. Furthermore, strict earmarked

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<sup>66</sup> The National Democratic Institute, the Danish Demining Group, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue are the other three main partners, and Norway is another silent partner.

funding has more impact on the type of activities and where they are implemented than soft-earmarked pledges. However, the level of impact or effectiveness of these activities is not necessarily enhanced by earmarked funding. As to the other partners, they play a contributing and supporting role to the SP activities.

**In your view, how can the effectiveness of the programme be further improved in the remaining years of implementation?**

In order to capacitate MS to fight organized crime in the region, it is essential that anti-corruption institutions are strengthened. Corruption lessens any efforts to counter organized crime, money-laundering and trafficking of all sorts. The future focus should therefore be more on “strengthening” anti-corruption institutions. Furthermore, the SP supports MS agencies with information sharing and database softwares as well as some equipment but further support is required to effectively equip these units that combat organized crime and terrorism in the Sahel countries. One recent high-level money laundering case in Niger showed that capacity building is useful but that tools are also essential for the judiciary to finalize and conduct its work until cases are prosecuted and finalized.

In addition, the effectiveness of the SP could be further improved by:

- a) **Improving the coordination amongst UN agencies** working on UNISS is critical. This enhanced coordination could help yield greater impact and especially work ‘as one’ and on several fronts simultaneously such as building MS capabilities (UNODC) to fight criminal networks and strengthen the criminal justice system and working with youth at risks of radicalization (UNICEF) in remote areas and targeted communities for instance. It is understood that UNODC alone is not responsible to spearhead communications and coordination amongst agencies but UNODC could potentially do it within the security pillar as its Chair.
- b) **Increase the use of local and regional experts** – for trainings, assessments, and partners’ engagement. The use of local NPOs (Chad, Mali and Niger) proved to be very useful to engage regularly with the local authorities. They also understand their countries’ challenges, limitations and opportunities, which help identify opportune windows to engage and implement activities.
- c) **Resort to civil society organizations for greater outreach and vulgarization of legal norms, texts and implement across the country.** As seen with DDG that helps with equipment and conflict assessments from remote areas of the country. Further outreach and activities (trainings of law enforcement officers and magistrates for instance) in hot spots and in sensitive areas should be prioritized to yield greater impact.
- d) **Engage with the local and international media:** closer engagement and the invitation of the press to attend some events as well as sending press releases with key web stories for instance could help change the misrepresentation of the ‘simple law enforcement vs “the bad guys” dynamic’, which often criminalizes groups of people and countries through generalization rather than facts. Further efforts are needed on understanding the official and unofficial social, political and economic structures that sustain these high levels of organized crimes, violent extremism and terrorism. Furthermore, a clear message in the media can help solidify MS’ engagement and ensure their political commitment to the SP’s objectives.

## **Efficiency**

**To what extent is the programme progressing on implementing each output and sub-activities? Are there adequate organizational and management structures in place to reach the programme's objectives including internal implementation procedures, and sufficient human resources (skills and numbers), reporting relations, tools, and procedures?**

### **Human Resources and Recruitment**

The SP is a field based programme and makes sense to be managed and coordinated by the field. However, as a programme under UNODC, the SP does not have its own staff dedicated exclusively to the implementation of its activities, apart from the Coordination Team. For its functioning, the SP relies on the expertise of staff located at ROSEN and HQ who are involved in several global and regional projects. This design helps its efficiency as it leverages thematic sections' experts - both in the field and at HQ although further cross-thematic programming could be strengthened to respond to donor priorities and to local realities of TOC.

Its thematic managers (8 in total), are located at HQ or in the ROSEN office in Dakar. They are involved in several global and regional programmes, they have close insights of the challenges and parameters of implementations of different global programmes and can create potential linkages between them in order to avoid internal duplication. The SP is one example of good practices on the thematic integration between regional and global programmes (e.g. Container Control Program, AIRCOP project, Prison Reform, Firearms and human trafficking).

The only difficulty that remains is the nature of relationships maintained by the coordination team and thematic experts located respectively in ROSEN and HQ. Information collected during the field mission revealed that the coordination team is not involved in the operationalization of activities as its role is focused on providing necessary resources for these activities achievements<sup>67</sup> leaving thus the design, planning, substance and implementation of activities to the pool of thematic experts in relation with beneficiary countries; which means horizontal relationships, absence of any hierarchical relationship, presenting certainly some advantages, in terms of flexibility but can be a source of difficulty when conflicts or misunderstandings occur. The head of the coordination team plays a coordination and an oversight role; the head of the regional office is only requested to intervene as a last resort to diffuse any misunderstanding or a dispute, especially with regards to MS representatives or donors. Overall, these observations do not negatively affect the efficiency of the SP, as the coordination amongst field managers, the coordination team and thematic experts is rather fluid and constructive. This coordination is strengthened by three tools: 1) monthly meeting in Dakar, 2) yearly coordination meeting and 3) the web-based planning and monitoring tool Smartsheet.

Furthermore, the SP's coordination team is paid by the SP but the others (thematic experts and field managers) are cost-shared through different global and regional programmes; common practice at UNODC in order to compensate for the lack of Regular Budget. The fact that the SP budget distribution was agreed from the onset of the programme caused initial controversies but enabled clear distribution of funding segmentation per pillars between HQ and the field.

Experts that contribute to the SP activities are cost-shared since they are allocated by several projects avoiding thereby of being financially borne by a single project; situation that has the advantage of reducing costs related to human resources and of fortifying most donors' satisfaction, whose key concern is to be sure that their funds will be assigned to outputs' delivery.

<sup>67</sup> Manual on the Organization of the Project Cycle of the UNODC Sahel Programme, 2016.


However, the SP' staffing is insufficient compared to the needs and the scope of themes addressed by the programme. The lack of human resources has several effects on the efficiency of the programme: (i) it puts substantial pressure on the current experts to deliver activities in due time; (ii) UNODC is at a disadvantage compared to other UN agencies that have offices and staff across the targeted countries; (iii) it impacts the visibility of UNODC and of the SP activities and results as there is less immediate communication and interaction with beneficiary countries; (iv) the SP is not as anchored in outside of the capital cities' realities as it could be; when an NPO – at least- is present in each of the targeted country, that person helps outweigh these challenges. Finally, there is a lack of human rights and gender experts amongst the thematic experts and field managers. The monitoring requirements are large and are increasing with the raising number of activities; at the current moment, only one person – supported by an intern- fulfils that function. That person receives full support from the other members of the coordination team but another full-time monitoring person could help really assess and measure progress and preliminary and longer-term impacts.

### Budget disbursement

From a projected budget of USD \$62,509,000, the SP raised USD \$24,600,000 of which USD \$16,173,835.2 were used for the implementation of 304 activities as of March 2017. This amount includes Full Cost Recovery<sup>68</sup> and Program Support Recovery<sup>69</sup> (PSC).

The level of expenditure has increased across the years. Thus, from January 2014 to December 2016, expenditures in two years increased by USD \$13, 354,385.

**Graphic 9 Expenditures per year of the Sahel Programme**



Source: evaluation team based on financial information made available during the field missions

As shown in Graphic 9, the level of expenditure has increased over the years. This growth reflects the level of activities that reached a peak of 119 activities in 2015 to decrease slightly to 100 activities in 2016. During 2014 and 2015, outcomes 1 and 3 have attracted more attention, with about 82 activities, with some duplications in the targeted countries. They are followed by outcomes 2, 4 and 5.<sup>70</sup> With regard to the outputs, output 1.1 comes at the top, with 26 activities followed by outputs 4.4 and 3.4. As financial information of those years was not reported outcomes-based and outputs-based, it is difficult to link them to expenditures so as to know the exact amount spent for each. According to interviews and desk research, the former financial management system (Profi) did not provide that level of detailed information; only activities implemented in 2016 offer

<sup>68</sup> Full cost recovery is the total cost for activities implementation, incurred in the field. Its rates vary according to the size of the project. Full cost recovery of the SP is about 6.5%.

<sup>69</sup> PSC is the indirect cost that has to be recovered for the support of activities funded from voluntary contributions. It is about 13% of the contribution for UNODC at large.

<sup>70</sup> Progress Report, 2015

this possibility. Indeed, during 2016, USD 7,182,170.55 were spent to implement 100 activities under 23 outputs. According to data procured by the SP coordination team during the field mission, activities completed under output 3.4 related to training on investigation and prosecution techniques, represented a total of USD1,969,507.27. These activities captured the most funds for 2016. More than 500 security and judicial staffs of different countries were capacitated on these techniques.

However, since activities performed by the SP are of three sorts (training sessions, procurement and normative assistance), it would have been useful, in addition of what is being done, to report financial information accordingly in order to know which of them has absorbed more funds. Such reporting could help understand the reasoning and make relevant adjustments if needed. This observation also applies to outcomes and outputs of the SP; until Umoja, no financial reports connected disbursements to the different outputs and outcomes. This evaluation could therefore not compare disbursement for different activities nor for different outcomes between each year from the SP's inception. The final summative evaluation that is planned to take place at the end of the programme in 2019, should be able to compare and better understand funds' prioritization according to activities and outcomes.

However, budget disbursement was available with regards staffing. The SP coordination team shared their staffing table that highlights a total of 32 staff members whose total wages amounts to USD 3,703,574 for the 3-year period (2014-2016), as seen in the table 10 below. Human resources costs for the SP represents a ratio of 22.89% of the total expenditures for the period of reference. Overall, taking into account the number of activities performed in comparison with the initial forecasts, the means used (both human and financial), the evaluation team concluded positively on the level of efficiency of the programme, despite some certain challenges as highlighted above. Finally, according to interviews, this efficiency could have been even greater if coordination with external partners involved in the UNISS had been more operational.

Table 10: Budget disbursement for the SP staff members

	Number	Year		
		2014	2015	2016
International Professional staff	13	879,792	1,030,166	472,575
International general service staff	4	127,850	99,608	55,400
Local service contracts	14	287,100	345,067	250,857
Local fixed term contracts	1	52,000	52,000	52,000
Total	32	1,346,742	1,526,000	830,832

Source: the evaluation team put together this table based on the SP's staffing table and budget.

**To what extent has the coordination between field-led projects, global programmes, other UN agencies involved in the various pillars of UNISS, and the Sahel Program led to the efficient use of resources?**

Coordination is a cornerstone in a complex management structure. Technically, it consists in insuring within a group or an organization a conjunction of efforts towards the achievement of a common goal. It requires therefore federation, combination and cooperation of talents. Defined as such, there is no doubt coordination maximizes efficiency. This assertion is truer with regard to programmes and strategies as the one on stake where several actors act in different but complementary fields toward the achievement of a common goal.

Indeed, the SP as part of an integrated response calling therefore for multiple interventions from several actors, its management requires great coordination, both internally and externally, to

achieve success, and maximize resources for economy of scale purposes. The following sections highlights the types of mechanisms put in place by the SP to coordinate and enhance its efficiency.

### **Internal Coordination**

The SP is a cross-thematic program that leverages on the expertise of pools of experts located, both at ROSEN and HQ, dealing with several thematic areas in different fields; which is an advantage of being aware of ongoing and upcoming activities taking place under the different projects and take measures accordingly to avoid duplication, competition and promote complementarity. These types of tasks suppose for each team leader great coordination skills to stimulate synergy of actions amongst the different teams. To that end, three mechanisms have been put in place to translate this reality: monthly and yearly meetings and Smartsheet.

- **Monthly meetings** gather all the staff of the SP based in Dakar, as well as the NPOs in Chad, Niger and Mali. Thematic managers are not required to attend. This meeting is to assess and discuss finalized and upcoming activities.

- **Yearly meetings** take place in Dakar with all the SP' staff, including representative from HQ and ROMENA and serve as an opportunity to exchange about strategic, technical and topical aspects of the SP and harmonize practices.

- **Smartsheet** is a web-planning tool used by all the SP's contributing experts and coordination team to gather and share information about activities on a real time regardless of the geographical location or time zone. It allows all substantive teams to be on the same level of information. However, as experienced during this evaluation field missions, Smartsheet requires a high-speed internet connection, which is not entirely effective in Sahel countries.

Overall, aforementioned these tools and processes are seen as positive and a means to strengthen coordination within the SP, which is starting to foster closer cross-thematic planning.

### **External Coordination**

If coordination with governments, including international organizations like ECOWAS and the G5 Sahel seems to be appreciated, it appears differently with regard to other UN agencies (such as UNDPKO, UNDP, UNICEF) and international organizations working on the same thematic areas.

- **External coordination with governments' counterparts**

Field mission revealed that much efforts are accomplished by the SP experts to coordinate activities with beneficiary countries. However, this positive assessment has to be relativized as it varies from country to country due to multiple factors from security, political instability, and donor priorities. In addition, this coordination, when occurring, takes place most often at the implementation stage rather than throughout the project and activities' cycle (planning, design, implementation and follow-up).

Findings during field missions also unveiled that coordination is punctual mostly at the time of intervention of activities instead of having check in points (onset- during and after) in order to adjust future activities according to lessons learned (especially with regards to technical assistance on legislative reforms and capacity building). Of course, this kind of coordination imposes much more visibility in terms of staff that the SP cannot afford at the moment as the thematic experts are overstretched across different programmes and projects in the region and in the Sahel countries. The SP coordination team is also not sufficiently staffed to add that level of coordination requirements.

Furthermore, some countries do not have focal points in place, or like in the case of Mauritania and Burkina Faso, the SP does not have any NPO at the moment so coordination is less frequent and more difficult. It is currently done by the SP experts when they are deployed to these countries for specific activities and take the opportunity to meet with relevant focal points. In such cases, the involvement of relevant stakeholders at the planning stage is lesser than when an NPO can consult with the mandated authorities and plan activities accordingly.

- **Coordination with other UN agencies**

An integrated strategy calls for multiples sectorial responses of several actors within the limits of their respective mandates; this integrated approach presents an advantage as it allows for tasks division between actors and thereby in theory favours efficient use of resources towards achieving the goals. However, this is possible provided that an effective coordination exists.

To that end, UNISS has set an institutional mechanism consisting of: (i) the contact group of international partners for the Sahel; (ii) the ministerial coordination platforms established in November 2013 with the overall mission to “*ensure coherence between the various initiatives and strategies<sup>71</sup> for the Sahel and enhance coordination and synergy of actions in their implementation for better efficiency and efficacy<sup>72</sup>”;*

and (iii) the Steering Committee of UNISS chaired by UNOWAS. However, field missions underlined the difficulties in fostering a close coordination amongst UNISS UN agencies; coordination remains a good practice in theory but is yet to become a reality in the field. As a result, rarity of joint activities and some overlap of mandates<sup>73</sup> between agencies leading to duplication of activities and a little competition amongst agencies were observed.

- Coordination with key stakeholders of the SP through an annual Steering Committee

Two official Steering Committees have so far taken place. The evaluation team had the opportunity to attend the second one in Dakar in early April (5-6-7 April) and witnessed the Sahel countries’ key ministries (Justice, and Interior, Foreign Affairs) as well as other stakeholders (MINUSMA, UNOWAS, G5 Sahel and others) participate. The Steering Committee is an opportunity for the SP coordination team to share results, achievements of the past year as well as agree on a path forward with the present members. A set of recommendations is issued in full agreement with the participants. These recommendations are then shared with a larger group that includes the donor community based on the Sahel region and more broadly in West Africa. The Steering Committee is an opportunity for participants to raise questions, and inform the SP coordination team about their country’s latest reforms, security situation and most pressing concerns. For the SP coordination team, it is an opportunity to engage with most stakeholders, keep them interested and maintain the donors’ interests.

Nonetheless, some joint activities<sup>74</sup> were observed during the field mission but all of them are the result of the pragmatism of the SP’s experts. More explicit, the Smartsheet put in place by UNODC as coordinator of the security task force, with the aim of sharing information on activities between UN agencies, did not yield the level of input from other agencies as expected because of several factors: lack of habit, bad internet connection, overburdened, lack of dedicated coordination staff, lack of all required information, amongst others. The evaluation team concluded that coordination is a difficult task and requires resources and time that most UN agencies lack. UNOWAS, as the chair of the UNISS, has to rethink the coordination functions amongst agencies otherwise the integrated strategy will defy its core function of ‘integrated’ programming- and have UN agencies operate in siloes until the strategy gets dissolved.

### **To what extent did the transition to Umoja (November 2015) impact the efficiency of the Sahel Programme?**

<sup>71</sup> Strategies for the Region of Sahel reach the amount of 17.

<sup>72</sup> *Supporting the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel*, United Nations of West Africa and the Sahel, Department of Politic affairs: <https://unowas.unmissions.org/supporting-implementation-united-nations-integrated-strategy-sahel>

<sup>73</sup> OIM and UNODC on the question trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants; UNODP on the legal aspects of terrorism

<sup>74</sup> Joint activities with UNPOL in Mali is an example of best practice to duplicate.

Umoja, a Swahili word meaning “unity” is a reform initiated by UN Secretariat to simplify its operational processes by implementing the software SAP<sup>75</sup>. It aims at providing a real-time approach to the management of UN finance, resources and assets. Dedicated to replacing the old system that was criticized for being fragmented and inefficient by the end of 2016, Umoja is yet to become fully operational and efficient. Many stakeholders complained about Umoja during the field missions as being the reason for delayed payments, slow procurement processes and DSAs disbursement. Indeed, the transition of UN Secretariat to a new enterprise resource planning (ERP) requires a culture change that is yet to happen across UNODC at large. In the context of the SP, it was reported to have impacted activities delivery negatively. For instance, from November 2015 to March 2016, it was not possible to make any financial transactions; this applied to UNODC at large and not only to the SP. The SP team, as every programme manager at UNODC, had to follow intensive training on Umoja procedures. These trainings took time and resources but the evaluation team concluded that Umoja mainly affected capacity building activities and equipment due to payment delays on procurement requests and DSAs’ disbursements. For example, Umoja affected the operationalization of the security platform of the G5 Sahel as its procurement took longer than expected and therefore not every country security platform is yet fully equipped.

It was however highlighted that the SP’s coordination team director in Dakar managed to curtail further delays by converting all funds onto the Umoja system from the onset. Delays and issues remain nonetheless as many program managers have not yet fully mastered Umoja.

### **How can the efficiency of the program be further improved in the remaining years of implementation?**

For the remaining time of SP, as it is suggested in the set of recommendations, a procurement plan has to be prepared for each year and shared with thematic teams and HQ, while stressing on the partnership with civil society organizations such as the Danish Demining Group, as they have the eyes on the ground in remote areas where UNODC does not. This latter recommendation will enable the decentralization of activities and overcome the lack of staff in the field.

It is also recommended, in terms of financial reporting, in addition of what is done, to link budgets disbursement to outputs and outcomes so it is easier to report on. The SP CT is currently using Umoja to do that but official financial report have not yet been cleared to be used for official reporting.

## **Human Rights and gender**

### **Human rights**

Security-Peace, Development and Human rights are the driving themes that constitute the three pillars on which rest the whole policy of the United Nations. Human rights issues are a cross-cutting subject that have to be taken into account in all activities implemented under the United Nation’s flag. Each UN agency has to comply with this obligation within its mandate according to the Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation and Programming adopted in

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<sup>75</sup> Systems, Applications and Products for Data Processing

2003<sup>76</sup>. The Charter of the United Nations also enjoins each state to promote universal respect and observance of human rights<sup>77</sup>.

As a UN agency, UNODC has to comply with the following tools: relevant human rights conventions and treaties, Resolution 51/12 of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs<sup>78</sup>, Resolutions 1904 (2009) and 1624 (2005), Human Rights Position Paper (2011/2012)<sup>79</sup>, Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) on UN support to non-UN Security<sup>80</sup>, UNODC and the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights<sup>81</sup>.

Three kinds of obligations have to be borne by UNODC when implementing activities: the promotion, the protection and the respect of human rights.

- **The SP and promotion of human rights**

In performing its activities, UNODC must have a human-rights-based approach, which means that all activities have to be guided by human rights standards. This posture is not always easy to handle as human rights issues are politically sensitive in West African countries and may lead to misunderstandings that could undermine the achievement of UNODC mandate or jeopardize UNODC's relations with some MS.

The SP performs three kinds of activities: normative assistance, capacity building, and activities related to equipment procurement. If normative support, cooperation and other activities have been overall performed in accordance with human rights standards by abiding to normative regulations and standards, the evaluation team concluded slightly different with regard to building capacities sessions. The triangulation of information collected during the field mission, both from recipients and documents reviewed, pointed out that the promotion of human rights was not addressed sufficiently throughout capacity building sessions. Human rights are often addressed briefly, partially and very often swiftly; some joint activities conducted with UNPOL Mali<sup>82</sup> had staff specialized on human rights, which helped bring the issue at the centre of the activities' agenda. Law enforcement agencies and judiciary bodies across the Sahel region are often associated with incidents of human rights violations<sup>83</sup>, it is therefore paramount to integrate HR at the core of all capacity building activities through closer collaboration with other agencies focused on HR or through recruiting gender experts to support curriculum and training program development. The objective is to build these agencies' representatives' understanding on: (i) the interplays of human rights issues within the SP objectives; (ii) to explain the reasons why they have to comply; (iii) to which extent this compliance can be helpful in the achievement of their missions.

<sup>76</sup> The UN Statement of Common Understanding on Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development Cooperation and Programming was adopted by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) in 2003. The purpose is to ensure that UN agencies, funds and programmes apply a consistent Human Rights-Based Approach to common programming processes at global and regional levels.

<sup>77</sup> Articles 55, 56 and 57 of United Nations Charter

<sup>78</sup> [https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Drug\\_Resolutions/2000-2009/2008/CND\\_Res-2008-12e.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Drug_Resolutions/2000-2009/2008/CND_Res-2008-12e.pdf)

<sup>79</sup> [https://www.unodc.org/documents/justiceandprisonreform/UNODC\\_Human\\_rights\\_position\\_paper\\_2012.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/justiceandprisonreform/UNODC_Human_rights_position_paper_2012.pdf)

<sup>80</sup> [https://www.pksoi.org/document\\_repository/Lessons/Human-Rights-Due-Diligence-Policy-on-UN-Support-to-Non-UN-Security-Forces-LMS-2417.pdf](https://www.pksoi.org/document_repository/Lessons/Human-Rights-Due-Diligence-Policy-on-UN-Support-to-Non-UN-Security-Forces-LMS-2417.pdf)

<sup>81</sup> [https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison\\_reform/UNODC\\_Human\\_rights\\_position\\_paper\\_2012.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison_reform/UNODC_Human_rights_position_paper_2012.pdf)

<sup>82</sup> Staff of UNPOL Mali disposes specialists in human rights and gender issues who are involved in any trainee undertook under its flagship or in collaboration with other UN agencies as UNODC

<sup>83</sup> Report on human rights situation in Mali between November 1<sup>st</sup>, 2013 to May 31<sup>st</sup> 2014; Report issued to the Security Council on the activities conducted UNOWAS;

[http://www.un.org/fr/documents/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/1137&TYPE=&referer=http://www.un.org/fr/sc/documents/sgreports/2016.shtml&Lang=E](http://www.un.org/fr/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/1137&TYPE=&referer=http://www.un.org/fr/sc/documents/sgreports/2016.shtml&Lang=E)

The promotion of human rights also supposes the involvement of reliable local civil society organizations. So far, CSOs are not key implementing partners within the SP. In Niger<sup>84</sup>, CSOs were invited to attend a roundtable discussion to adapt the work plan according to the participants' inputs. According to the desk review and interviews, the involvement of CSOs is not common practice within the SP; however, the evaluation observed that CSOs were invited to attend certain working sessions and workshops when related to topics like corruption, human trafficking, victims' protection, child soldiers and terrorism. Involved CSOs could help the SP achieve its objective by disseminating information about reforms, legal obligations, and different activities of the SP within remote provinces of these 5 Sahel countries. Furthermore, CSOs integration helps promotes local ownership and is helps keep governmental authorities in check on progress or delays on reforms.

Moreover, a human-rights-based approach also entails conducting an assessment, either formal or informal, of human rights in each beneficiary country when planning and setting up any regional and national programmes<sup>85</sup>. Desk research and other interviews during the field missions show the non-fulfilment of this recommendation. This formal assessment is very often replaced by continuous informal monitoring which, even if not sufficient, has to be encouraged and strengthened. According to information collected during field mission and additional desk research, three reasons can justify the lack of human rights based approach in the SP: (i) political sensitivity towards human rights in the region; (ii) formal human rights assessment is out of the mandate of UNODC; (iii) it is time consuming and costly to conduct thorough human rights assessment

Even if these evoked reasons are justified, resorting to informal assessment not only during the performance but also at the stage of the planning any project/programme/output has to become an automatic practice; which entails a review of reports such as the United Nations Human rights treaty bodies, as well as country and thematic reports of the United Nations Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council, recommendation of the Human Rights universal Periodic Review Process<sup>86</sup> and reports of relevant local civil societies in each country of the Sahel.

- **The respect of human rights and the Leahy vetting process**

UNODC has the obligation to align its activities to Human Right Due Diligence Policies<sup>87</sup> that stipulates that activities should not be pursued if there are sufficient grounds to believe that beneficiaries have committed serious violations of international humanitarian, human rights and refugees' rights. This obligation applies to non-UN security forces such as the national military, police, intelligence services, security forces in charge of border control as well as administration in charge of their control and command. In practice, this duty has been rarely applied as it requires a scrutiny of the names of participants of any UNODC activity; which is very difficult to perform

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<sup>84</sup> In Niger, during the field mission, we attend a preparatory meeting for the design and implementation of a set of activities of which local civil society organizations were associated.

<sup>85</sup> UNODC Guidance Note – Human Rights, P.10

<sup>86</sup> The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a unique process which involves a review of the human rights records of all UN

Member States. It was created by Resolution 60/251 of UN General Assembly, on 15 March 2016

<sup>87</sup> At the national level, this is in the context of the UNCT. The UNCT has responsibility to oversee the HRDDP, UNODC does not have the institutional lead.

because of the numerous trainings and trainees, reluctance of countries to disclose information, the delays in sending out attendees' names and the lack of transparent and reliable database.

Leahy vetting is mandatory only when capacity building activities are funded by the United States government. Within the SP, Leahy vetting<sup>88</sup> has not been an obstacle to the delivery of the SP's activities.

## Gender

According to UN gender mainstreaming guidelines, gender has to be considered in any United Nations activity. *“Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetrated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality<sup>89</sup>”*

West African countries have been culturally patriarchal and until recently few women were involved in the labour market.<sup>90</sup> Conclusions on documents reviews and interviews highlight that gender is mostly considered through a count of female attendance to capacity building activities especially and through the recruitment of SP's thematic managers and experts.

### Female recipients of the SP activities

According to the field mission and additional desk research, efforts have been undertaken to increase female attendance to the SP activities, especially those related to capacity building. These efforts consisted of inserting into correspondences to relevant ministries a note to encourage female participation to capacity building activities organized by the SP. This diligence was, however, not systematized across all thematic experts of the SP. The SP does not have a formal template that all thematic experts use to send out invitations for capacity building activities. Despite some efforts, female participation remained low on paper. However, the evaluation team considered the fact that culturally speaking the law enforcement and the judiciary fields do not generally rank high amongst female professionals. Taking into considerations these factors, the SP managed to attract female participants as highlighted above by the numbers but needs to continue its efforts to capacitate more women and raise awareness amongst relevant country counterparts of the importance of gender mainstreaming.

Activities undertaken per country amounts to a total of 5001 beneficiaries, with 550 women; which gives a rate of 10.99%, in terms of female's attendance. Mali is the country with the highest rate, 14.13% followed by Mauritania, 10.79%; Niger, 10.13%; Chad 9.60% and Burkina Faso at the bottom, with 8.97%.

Regional activities reveal a total of 3017 beneficiaries, of which we note 513 women, with a rate of 17%. Total of activities, regional and national, reach a number of 8018, with 1063 women; which

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
<sup>88</sup> Leahy vetting or Leahy amendment is a United States Human rights law which refrain Departments of State and Defense from providing any military support to foreign military forces that have violated human rights with impunity. The Leahy vetting process requires grantees of US government funding to vet every trainee before they receive trainings. <http://test.hrgov.getusinfo.com/issues/leahy-vetting/>

<sup>89</sup> ECOSOC Resolution1997/2.

<sup>90</sup> <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/gender/chapter4/chapter4.html>

gives a rate of 13.52%. As seen in the graphic below, the ratio female/male is minimal and was explained due to the low percentage of women enrolled in law enforcement or justice professions in the countries of the Sahel. However, the following graphic 10 shows that law enforcement had the highest turnout of female participants.


**Graphic 11: Ratio Female/Male Per Country for SP Activities**



Source: evaluation team based on Smartsheet information as to March 2017

With regards to activities undertaken per thematic area, law enforcement area leads with 17.31% female officers, followed by border control with 16.66%, anti-corruption with 14.57%, terrorism with 14.29%, Justice with 14.17%, Money laundering with 11.09%, Firearms with 10.46%, Forensic with 8.88% and TIP/SOM with 6.49%. These percentages reflect the low levels of female recruits within these different professional sectors, which is taken into consideration when assessing the level of trainees participating within the SP activities.

**Graphic 12: Ratio Female/Male per Thematic Area Covered by the SP**



source: the evaluation team based on Smartsheet and the SP report 2016

Analysis of the above charts demonstrates a low level of attendance of women in the SP' activities, which amounts to a total of less than 15% of participants. The assessment is not surprising as it mirrors the ongoing gender gap in most of West African countries where inequalities between women and men remain highly entrenched in cultural customs and professionally biased, especially in the security and judicial sectors. A research performed by the Geneva Centre for the Monitoring of Army Forces in 2013 and named "Gender and the Security Sector in West African Countries"<sup>91</sup> confirms this reality. According to this research, the number of female recruits in the sectors of justice, defence and security represents about 12%. For the three of SP' countries concerned by this research, Mali has the highest rate of women in the security sector as a whole with 43%. In the sector of Police, we have Mali (12%), Burkina Faso (2 %) and Niger (3%).<sup>92</sup> The evaluation team concurred that female participation was rather low during capacity building activities due to the cultural taboos with regards female recruits in security sector and the justice sector.

### **SP and the gender-sensitive approach<sup>93</sup>**

<sup>91</sup> Le Secteur de la Sécurité et le Genre en Afrique de l'Ouest" Miranda Gaanderse et Kristin Valasek. P.9 file:///Users/EM/Downloads/00\_Complet\_Etude\_sur\_le\_genre\_afrique\_de\_l\_ouest.pdf

<sup>92</sup> idem

<sup>93</sup> The application of the gender-sensitive approach in the framework of the Sahel Programme, in line with established UNODC criteria for the provision of technical assistance and with ECOSOC resolutions 2011/5 and 2011/67

Inserting gender sensitive programming in the fight against the evolving threats of transnational organized crimes and related infringements is suggested to act efficiently as women and men are affected differently<sup>94</sup>. Currently, most training programmes developed by the SP do not highlight the gender dimension in their curricula; trainings on human trafficking and especially those focused on victims' protection and investigation procedures do highlight how to protect women and the girl's child differently and what provisions are to be taken. Otherwise, the evaluation team did not observe a clear gender component in other training programmes.

This insertion has to be done at the levels of design, and continued during the implementation and monitoring phases of the activities.

During the design, gender-sensitive approach has to be reflected in the structure and outcomes. Structure comprises, among others, staff and financial resources. While the SP's outcomes seem to be driven by gender-sensitive approach, it appears differently with regards to the architecture of the SP that does not have any gender expert amongst its staff members. The evaluation concluded that no gender analysis was conducted by the SP prior its inception due to time, cost and lack of baseline information available in the Sahel countries on gender indicators (female ratio in law enforcement agencies, number of trafficked female etc...). Accordingly, a cost-benefit analysis was considered by the SP team and deemed unnecessary as it would yield little results.

Although some efforts were observed to ensure female participation during the SP's capacity building activities, more have to be done on technical assistance and legislative support proffered by the SP as no gender based approach seem to have led their implementation. With respect to the Sahel countries 'normative frameworks, the evaluation team could not verify whether they respected and integrated gender provisions and whether the SP supported that process or not. This question remains to be assessed at the end of the SP and during the final evaluation.

## **Preliminary Impact**

### **To what extent is the Sahel Programme contributing – realistically and appropriately- to political changes and security threats in the region and in each targeted country?**


There have been small strides in results achieved e.g. the prosecution of a high-level money laundering case in Niger and the interception of drugs (cocaine) in Mali. However, it is too early to determine what realistic impact the programme will have by the end of its cycle. Institutions are yet to become fully equipped and trained in order to apply what the SP supports. So far, external support remains essential as the Sahel countries' institutions remain fragile and do not have the means (human nor financial) to work towards achieving the overarching goal of the SP which is to combat transnational organized crime in the region. Further support is paramount in order to observe preliminary and longer-term impact.

The evaluation team concluded that the SP is nonetheless working towards preliminary and longer-term impact by responding to the threats of the region. According to the United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, TOC is one of 'six clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned now and in the decades ahead' (United Nations 2004). This assessment still stands today, more than a decade later, and also explains the United Nations Security Council decision to design the UNISS. As shown in the graphic 13 below, TOC reacts to the drivers of conflicts and instability that criminal networks thrive on.

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<sup>94</sup> UNODC Guidance Note, Mainstream Gender, P.12


**Graphic 13: drivers of instability in the Sahel countries and the SP’s response**



source: evaluation team based on desk research and interviews

This graph highlights the key drivers of instability of the Sahel region that were well identified by UNODC HQ and Rosen at the design phase of the SP. The activities developed by the SP respond to the security sector reform and the strengthening of state institutions. These activities also fit the UNISS Strategic goals I and II as seen in graphic 2 of SP' and UNISS. The graphic 14 SSR strategic pillars and pillars of the SP reflect the priorities of the SP for the first phase of the programme. Although, prison reform is one of the output (5.4) of the SP, prison reform has not yet been a priority as it is a costly process and requires commitment from national state institutions, stable political establishment and the support of international donor agency. Nonetheless, prison reform was mentioned as a preoccupation for the region at the last Steering Committee in Dakar (April 2017). The SP pillars are well fitted to the SSR needs in the region.

**Graphic 14: SSR strategic pillars and Pillars of the SP**



source: evaluation team based on desk research and field missions

Another critical element of addressing fragility drivers and fighting TOC, is the need to strengthen international cooperation at the broader regional (Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Nigeria) and sub-regional levels (amongst the 5 countries of the Sahel). In that respect, the SP is developing tools, and mechanisms to reinforce sub-regional cooperation and exchange of information through the G5 Sahel security platform, the JAITFs at Airport and Container Control Programme Task forces at wet and dry ports across the region, but also through capacity building of law enforcement on investigation procedures on trafficking of illicit goods and of people; reforming national legal frameworks to facilitate extradition and strengthen cooperation on money laundering and corruption cases. All of these activities are under way but some high-profile activities such as the G5 Sahel security platform is yet to become fully operational to yield potential ripple effects on other aspects of TOC and SSR. These upcoming years of the SP will be determining to understand how the SP' activities are adapting and responding to the Sahel countries' realities and context.

At the moment, ongoing updates on the political and security changes in the Sahel countries are undertaken by the SP and UNODC thematic experts on their respective activities but not in a coordinated and formal process. More thorough research is required to keep abreast of changing tides and to tailor the SP's responses to this volatile environment remains critical for impact. Finally, as mentioned under different sections, strengthening the intervention logic against external

factors, well defined indicators and ongoing research will help convey to donors and stakeholders what realistic milestones and timeframe look like to achieve the SP goals.

**Are intermediate outcomes likely to contribute to long-term social, economic, technical and environmental changes for individuals, communities and institutions related to the programmes?**

According to recent reports, by renowned think tanks<sup>95</sup> and the latest UN news center<sup>96</sup>, and non-governmental organizations<sup>97</sup>, the fragile peace process in Mali and the threats perpetuating in the Sahel region require an effective coordination amongst the numerous Sahel strategies. Many programmes, including UNODC and the SP teams, recognize the need to act at different levels and address different drivers of conflicts and of fragility – from social and economic development, humanitarian needs and security.<sup>98</sup> USD 4 billion per year have been disbursed for multi-sectorial assistance (excluding the cost of the UN stabilization mission) since the Malian crisis (2012). Based on interviews, observation and desk research, the evaluation team concluded on a difficult engagement amongst international actors who continue to operate in silo which is not as effective and impactful as coordinated and integrated programming could yield. UNISS tried to resolve the isolation of programmes and the SP has identified opportunities to foster a real coordination through member states themselves for longer-term impact. The G5 Sahel security platform has a chance of fostering regional coordination amongst MS and amongst international actors. This is an example that was often referred during the evaluation process as a potential successful outcome with lasting impact on communities and institutions. It is nonetheless not the only intermediary outcome achieved by the SP. However, as there is little baseline (for instance: the ratification dates of relevant protocols and conventions that most countries have acceded to prior the SP's inception – at the exception of Chad that is lagging behind) for the SP indicators, combined to unclear the intervention logic as well as the absence of a distinct definition of what impact would look like for different thematic pillars of the programme. Furthermore, although security sector reforms and the criminal justice mechanisms affect individuals, communities and institutions, UNODC's mandate and the SP's objectives focus on strengthening institutions and legal frameworks to then protect the populations. As a result, intermediate outcomes are yet to be properly refined. Such clarification will help draw clearer connections between outputs to outcomes and assess real long-term results of the SP.

**Has there been any unintended impact derived from the implementation of the programme (e.g., an unbalanced emphasis on one or certain substantive issues)?**

Security, threats, instability and fragile states are at the core of the Malian crises which have affected the sub-regional countries and spread North and South<sup>99</sup>. Nonetheless, as highlighted in numerous reports, the crises are multidimensional. Governmental Institutions are fragile and organized criminal networks and terrorist groups feed on these weaknesses. They also spread in areas where most international actors are absent due to security threats to their staff and operations. As a result, terrorist factions and other criminal networks (smugglers, traffickers) have set up stronghold in the middle part of Mali, and on borders that are porous and where impunity,

<sup>95</sup> The International Crisis Group, the Clingendael Foundation, the Fletcher School, the Africa Institute for Security amongst others. Refer to media monitoring report in annex.

<sup>96</sup> <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=57130&&Cr=peacekeeping&&Cr1=#.WWacvtOGOqA>

<sup>97</sup> Human Rights Watch


<sup>98</sup> <http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/PB%20Fix%20the%20unfixable.pdf>

<sup>99</sup> [https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West\\_Africa\\_TOCTA\\_2013\\_EN.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf)

infiltration and corruption persist within state institutions and security forces.<sup>100</sup> The Malian crisis attracted a lot of attention from the international community, donors and non-governmental actors, due to the implication this crisis has on that region and all over the world, especially on Europe. Consequently, most immediate actions and funding focused on counter-terrorism, counter-violent extremism (CVE), trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants and building security forces capabilities. Amongst the numerous actors, as mentioned above, most of them understood the need to approach the crisis from different angles. UNODC and the SP focus on building MS' capabilities to strengthen their security sector as well as ensure a strong criminal justice system. The SP received funds that were both earmarked and soft earmarked to implement activities. According to funding and budget disbursement, most donors focused on the SSR aspects of TOC and funded less corruption and money laundering activities and hardly any funding went to prison reform.

Despite funding gaps, the anti-corruption unit at ROSEN, in coordination with the CT, managed to implement 38 activities on anti-corruption and 12 on money laundering. In total, these activities targeted 1118 beneficiaries on anti-corruption and 342 on money laundering. Compared to terrorism (1784 beneficiaries) and law enforcement (1658), it is a positive picture of the complementarity of actions taken by the SP. Graphic 15 shows a rather positive outlook on the division of activities amongst the pillars of the SP. Further funding to anti-corruption and money laundering in the Sahel region is required, as corruption could impact the outcomes of the SP and all other initiatives (17) in the region, if not tackled as a priority by the international community and local stakeholders.

**Graphic 15: Activities per thematic area of the SP.**



Source: the SP evaluation matrix from Smartsheet

Overall, the SP is perceived as a flexible programme that allows thematic teams to implement activities through the SP's funding as long as they fit within the scope of the programme and covers the Sahel countries. No other unintended preliminary impacts were identified during this mid-term evaluation.

<sup>100</sup> see annex 6 for report references and links

### **How can the programme further increase its impact in the remaining years of implementation?**

It is important to understand that corruption is a double-edged sword. Corruption blunts efforts to address security issues, breeds conflict and at the same time organized crime groups and terrorists feed on corruption to carry out their criminal activities. It is therefore important to strengthen anti-corruption institutions in the countries so that they serve as a mechanism to address issues of crime, security, money laundering etc.... The SP implements anti-corruption and anti-money laundering activities but further funding needs to be oriented towards corruption, which has ramifications across all of the other pillars of the SP.

This question is better answered by the recommendation section, which enumerates some very important and strategic recommendations. However, as mentioned just above, defining what is meant by ‘impact’ by the SP will help the monitoring team develop the right tools to harvest the needed data; a clear definition will also help the overall intervention logic and draw connecting paths (through activities) between outputs and outcomes. At the moment, impact is not defined anywhere and everyone has a very distinctive interpretation of what impact should look like or what it is. Finally, a clearer definition will help build further coordination and correlation amongst all these initiatives that are ongoing in the Sahel region.

### **Partnership and communication**

#### **To what extent are synergies and partnerships being created, used and maintained to the best extent possible? How could they be improved?**

For this report, synergies are defined as outputs/activities where commonalities or benefits from thematic expertise and added value can be drawn. The evaluation team looked at: i) internal synergies amongst the thematic areas and how they currently cooperate ii) external synergies with other international agencies and relevant stakeholder.

##### **i) Internal synergies**

Internal synergies are those that exist within the SP implementation team, who is composed of the coordination team and the thematic experts both at HQ and in ROSEN. Internal synergies are supposed to take place naturally as this is a cross-thematic programme that represents almost all mandates of UNODC. Synergies with the AIRCOP project in the region has been successful as they are aligned with the objectives of the SP through the creation of the Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces (JAITFs) in Niger and Mali and through the capacitation of these officers to identify and seize drugs or other illicit trafficked goods. However, the evaluation team concluded based on interviews, desk research and observation that while there is a general understanding about everyone’s activities, synergies for cross-thematic operations are not so easily fostered. Strict earmarked funding, short staffed and coordination problems arose as reasons for the few internal synergies mentioned during the evaluation process. The coordination meetings that take place at ROSEN and with HQ are opportune fora to discuss potential synergies. Examples of synergies within the SP is the recent project undertaken by the justice section on children connected to terrorist groups, where a work-plan was shared in Niger with members of civil society organizations and government representatives. Discussions on prisons and counter-terrorism/CVE, understanding the link between terrorism groups getting funds from trafficking in persons are underway but there are not yet any concrete projects that have been yet developed within the SP on these synergies.

Another level of cooperation/partnership was underlined during the desk research is the funding mechanism that allows staff time to be divided across different UNODC programmes and projects. Such funding mechanism mitigates for the lack of regular budget funding and enables programmes/project staff to ensure a certain level of job security and ensure project/programme activities are implemented without too many staffing gaps. The SP coordination team is fully paid by the SP and the SP contributes to thematic experts' salaries that also work across different UNODC programmes and projects<sup>101</sup>. These thematic experts are critical for the SP's cross-thematic objectives and for the added value of UNODC overall.

ii) External synergies

External synergies and coordination problems were the recurring theme amongst all interviewed stakeholders during this evaluation. UNISS core objective is to foster greater synergies amongst UN agencies based on their respective mandate. It remains a challenge and everyone is talking about 'coordination fatigue' and yet the need to better coordinate. Several mapping exercises of all the initiatives to identify gaps and opportunities to cooperate were conducted by think tanks or governments (Mali).<sup>102</sup>

Despite challenges and according to the SP's Project cycle Manual, Partners encompass a wide range of potential counterparts: 'Partners other than the concerned partner governments in the Sahel and Maghreb regions include international organizations (including UN agencies), civil society organizations, regional organizations and other governments. Partnerships can either lead to actual or potential joint activity implementation, the provision of resources or other forms of facilitation in order to execute the Sahel Programme'<sup>103</sup>.

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<sup>101</sup> AIRCOP, Container Control Programme, West African programme, TPB branch at HQ, Human trafficking and GLOZ35 programme

<sup>102</sup> See annex 6 for references

<sup>103</sup> the SP Project Cycle Manual' p.16

Graphic 16: types of stakeholders/partners of the SP

Thematics of the SP	Corruption	Firearms	Terrorism	Forensic	TIP/SOM	Law Enforcement	Border Control	Money Laundering	Justice
<b>Professions</b>									
Prosecutors	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Judges	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Police officers	X	X		X	X	X		X	X
Customs & Boarder control officers		X		X	X	X	X	X	
Forensic police officers				X	X	X			
Social workers					X				X
Official governmental officials	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Journalists	X								
<b>Types of entities</b>									
Regional bodies	X				X	X	X	X	X
Think tanks									
Academia	X				X	X	X		X
Civil society organizations	X				X				X
Private sector	X								
Government	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<b>Key Ministries</b>									
Justice	X		X						
Interior		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Foreign Affairs			X			X	X	X	
<b>UN and international agencies</b>									
UNDP	X								
UNPOL						X	X		
MINUSMA			X			X	X		
UNOWAS	X		X			X	X		
IOM					X				
UNICEF					X				
UNPKO			X			X	X		
CTED			X						
European Commission	X					X			
WCO						X	X		
INTERPOL			X			X	X		
G5 Sahel			X			X	X		

source: the evaluation team based on desk research and field mission

The graphic above reflects the different types of professions targeted by the SP as well as the types of stakeholders from governmental ministries, regional bodies, civil society to UN and international agencies. Amongst the most recipient of activities are prosecutors, judges and policies officers that receive capacity building trainings on the thematic across the SP. This graphic provides a glimpse of the different types of professionals, entities as well as sphere (local vs international) the SP coordination team and thematic experts have to foster relationships and engage with.

Amongst the most important partners for the SP are: International Organization for Migration (IOM), World Customs Organization (WCO), INTERPOL, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), United Nations Police (UNPOL), United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), UN Women, United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Danish Demining Group (DDG), European Union (EU) and the EU Capacity Building Missions in Mali and Niger (EUCAP), the G5 Sahel, as well as the donors of this programme (see efficiency section). The partnerships amongst UN agencies are agreed upon as described by UNISS. The

partnership with service providers<sup>104</sup> and international non-governmental organizations<sup>105</sup>, is negotiated and defined according to each entity and responsibilities. These relations are either sealed through an MoU or more informally as activities are being planned and implemented.

As highlighted, external synergies are not as effective as expected and they do not leverage the partners' respective mandates and expertise to their full potential. Coordination is not as frequent as it should be and that affects the synergies and the effectiveness of their action, leading to overlaps, duplication and missing some critical gaps.

**Which areas of the programme has received more donor attention (substantive topics, countries, regions) and how can the programme ensure to further strengthen the donor base?**

This question was covered under relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and preliminary impact through different angles but to avoid redundancy, this sub-section summarizes the findings and complements it with recommendation on how to further strengthen the donor base.

Donor attention focused on addressing TOC through a security sector reform and strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law. Billions of dollars went each year in addressing the crises in the Sahel region. Donors to the SP are diverse but there are primarily two large donors – Japan and Denmark – that both finance the programme, as it is aligned with their own Sahel strategies (see relevance), focused on addressing security threats that could have ripple effects in the greater region, Europe and other countries. As highlighted under efficiency, donor funding is not reported to specific activities in the financial reports, which makes the assessment of attributing donors to outputs very difficult. Donor and progress reports highlight, into brackets, beside an activity who was the donor but without further details. A clear connection of donors to thematic topics of the SP was therefore not possible during this mid-term evaluation. However, it was noted during the field missions that the financial needs to implement the objectives of the SP are considerable and requires constant fund raising and donor relations. The current situation of the Sahel region continues to attract the international community's attention and therefore funds are available. The SP should ensure closer engagement with existing donors through linking outputs to outcomes and twice a year having a closer debrief with key donors highlighting how their contribution fit within the larger scope of the Sahel crises. The steering committee invites donors to attend a final session where a summary of the prior meetings and an overview of the SP achievements so far are presented. This session is very formal and does not give the opportunity for the SP and the donors to really engage at a strategic level. It is highly recommended to ensure full disclosure and engagement with existing donors, which helps create a strong base to continue raising funds from others.

**To what extent was the communication with partners and beneficiaries of good quality?**

The SP has several layers of communication: i) with partners; ii) beneficiaries; iii) with donors and iv) external stakeholders

- i) With partners

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<sup>104</sup> Center for International Peace, Universities across the Sahel region, Anti-Corruption bodies such as la Haute Autorité de Lutte contre la Corruption et les Infractions Assimilées (HALCIA), NACIWA Anti-Corruption Academy in Nigeria, LETrain.Net (Network of the Law Enforcement Training Institutions), the Danish Institute for Human Rights, the Liberian Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC), or Italian Central Directorate of Anti-Drugs Service, etc... Based on APPR report 2017, assessment report 2016, and programme documents, donors reports 2015, 2016.

<sup>105</sup> such as Danish Demining Group (DDG) or The Open Society Institute for West Africa (OSIWA),

As mentioned earlier in the section above, partnerships require ongoing engagement and complementarity of objectives, expertise, logistics etc. Coordination amongst partners was nonetheless perceived as rather positive when it occurred. The SP does not have a set newsletter or monthly email that goes out to its partners but engages with them when considered necessary when activities are relevant to these partners for instance. A common Smartsheet was created and shared amongst UN partners but it never got used according to the field mission findings. The partners never got used to filling up the Smarsheet information required to have an overall picture of each UN partner's activity to avoid duplication and seek for greater synergies amongst them. Finally, the regional representative of the ROSEN office, regularly visits his counterparts in West Africa, including the Sahel countries. His visits were welcomed by his counterparts as a means to keep high level diplomatic engagements and keep informed of the SP' high strategic orientations. However, coordination could be strengthened should communications be more frequent and more formatted through a one common platform known and used by all key partners and specifically UN agencies part of the UNISS.

ii) With beneficiaries

Communication was generally deemed satisfactory by beneficiary bodies and recipients. However, a closer engagement at the design phase of the activities was viewed as a process that would yield more results and a closer relationship with relevant governmental ministries. Communication with beneficiaries take place – most of the time- at the implementation phase so the right trainees or the right national legal entities are convened to work with UNODC's experts within the SP. Follow up questionnaires for capacity building activities are also a means to engage and obtain feedback with beneficiaries. The evaluation team observed and experienced by sending the survey, that online communications are extremely difficult in the Sahel countries and beneficiaries may take months to respond if they do at all to the SP CT or thematic experts.

iii) With donors

According to the desk research and interviews, the evaluation team concluded that communications and reporting with donors was viewed as satisfactory and timely based on each donor reporting requirements. The donor reports include all activities that were implemented during that quarter, or half year as required. In person briefings happen with donors that are either based in Dakar where the ROSEN office is or when the regional representative and the SP coordination team director is on mission and visiting local counterparts and donors when based in country. For instance, the Danish donor representative is based in Bamako but is often in Senegal and was regularly briefed on progress made in the SP. However, all donors want a closer collaboration and would like to have more insight on the programming of activities. They would like to have a session dedicated to donors' engagement only where they could understand where and how their funds contributed to the overall goals to combat transnational organized crime and equip MS to do as per the SP's objectives. A session is currently organized during the last day of the annual steering committee. This session remains formal and involves other parties. As a result, donors all expressed their wish to have an only donor meeting with the SP coordination team to agree on the key strategic goals so their interests are the SP continue to be aligned.

iv) With external stakeholders

The SP progress and assessments reports as well as its communication strategy, as outlined in the SP Sahel programme cycle document that focuses on web-stories, printed reports, rolls up, social media and press releases. They key messaging is also targeted to MS, Donors, Key implementing partners and to the larger public. Web stories have to follow certain guidelines that are to be succinct, believable, interesting, global interest, and up to date. Furthermore, according to the communication guidelines, the messaging has to be tailored to specific audience and focus on the

follow: governance and security needs of the Sahel countries; Sahel programme activities being implemented; tangible changes on the ground; coordination between UN agencies; statistical information and trends. Furthermore, based on interviews and observation, donor and progress reports as well as all presentations were mentioned as amongst the best laid out and concise documents across all UNODC offices. However, the evaluation team could not verify what outreach and impact web-stories and printed documents had on other stakeholders. The only observations were that UNODC was perceived as an expert in its field (security sector and criminal justice) but as a UN agency was a rich entity with large funds and therefore needed to be more present and duplicate its activities across each country of the Sahel. As previously mentioned, NPOs' presence in country is critical to raise the SP and UNODC' profile amongst partners, donors, and all other stakeholders. The messaging to MS should also focus on UNODC's niche and on its added value.

In addition, the evaluation team conducted a manual media monitoring search (see annex 6) to understand the media outreach and visibility that the SP had within local and international media outlets. Only UNODC web site related links came up in the search; no news outlets seem to have picked up on any of the press releases and few international reports from think tanks mentioned UNODC and the SP. Social media presence is managed by the communication department at HQ, which has to clear any posting prior being posted on UNODC's website and therefore limits the SP's social media potential outreach. It is understood that this HQ social media control is to ensure a balance amongst UNODC's projects and programmes and not have one occupy too much space over another. Consequently, the SP's media strategy should be focused on strengthening their outreach to news outlet – local and international – around key events such as the Steering Committee, donor reports and use other UN related events to the Sahel region to raise awareness around the SP.

## **Sustainability**

### **What results are most likely to persist after the end of the Sahel programme and other related projects?**

The Sahel Programme is based on the assumption that combating terrorism and organized crime is a joint effort that requires countries' engagement, capabilities and local efforts to address the legal and institutional mechanisms required to intercept and disrupt these organized criminal networks from all angles (production, financing, human resources and distribution networks). As aforementioned, the Sahel programme was designed within a context of great interest from multiple actors in the region and other national and regional programmes. Moreover, the programme was agreed upon by ministerial decrees by each targeted country which should ensure the programme's objectives long-term support. MoUs were signed with each country to clarify each party's responsibilities to achieve the programme's objectives. It is clear that the participating countries are also members of regional FATF-Style bodies (MENAFATF/GAFIMOAN- Mauritania; GIABA – Mali, Niger Burkina Faso; and GABAC – Chad) that conduct regular peer reviews of the legal and institutional frameworks of the countries involved to ensure compliance with anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism mechanisms. It is also understood that these peer review mechanisms assess the compliance with UNTOC and UNCAC mechanisms.

Additionally, the Sahel Programme planned activities geared towards ensuring a certain level of sustainability such as curriculum integration within academic programmes for LE and judiciary institutions, and the cooperation with multiple donors to avoid financial constraints. According to the additional desk research and the field mission, most stakeholders perceive their activities (technical assistance on drafting laws, amending a MS' legal framework or assisting with the

creation of national committees on trafficking in persons or on anti-corruption for instance) as sustainable. Although legislation can be revoked or not properly applied, these activities are perceived as having long-term sustainability. That assumption does however not apply to capacity building activities that are often one or two sessions in each country on different topics. Such an approach does not ensure that learnings are integrated into the trainees' professional life. The SP monitoring team tries to follow up through direct calls and interviews of trainees to understand how they use and apply the trainings they received. Such practice is a positive step towards gathering information about the relevancy and effectiveness of the trainings but not necessarily on their sustainability. The SP and the thematic experts are now working with the specialized training institutes for law enforcement and the judiciary to integrate within curricula the modules on TIP/SOM, money laundering, corruption, investigation procedures and international cooperation. It is a constructive sustainable step that needs to be materialized across each country in the Sahel region. The SP coordination team can integrate as part of the monitoring indicators how many schools have integrated SP trainings into their curriculum. It will provide another level of MS commitment to building their LE and judiciary bodies and ensure sustainability in the trainings.

One element that was repeatedly stressed upon during the evaluation process was the financial strains and lack of financial resources that these countries faced to embark on all of these reforms. Every international aid programme has only so much amount of funds to allocate over x number of years. According to renowned think tank reports<sup>106</sup>, the countries of the Sahel do not have the financial capability to carry out the needed reforms without international support. It is therefore critical for the Sahel Programme's sustainability to continue engaging with multiple donors, have a clear fundraising plan, emphasise on fostering synergies with other programmes in the region to maximize resources and yield results.

Finally, an aid or technical assistance programmes such as the SP should have a clear exit strategy so local ownership and a proper hand over is timely and planned. The SP does not have an exit strategy as its objectives need long-term commitments from both donors and MS to remain engaged. Accordingly, although the current implementation period extends until 2019, the coordination team and UNODC may extend the SP. The time frame enables however to set targets and assess progress and challenges against work plans. The final evaluation in 2019 will help draw lessons learned and best practices to hopefully inform the continuation of the SP with specific recommendations beyond 2019.

### **To what extent has local ownership by beneficiaries and national and regional stakeholders been achieved?**

Local ownership of beneficiaries and national and regional stakeholders is encouraged through a series of mechanisms: a) the signing of the Ouagadougou accords that launched the SP; b) signing of MoUs with each country and entity at the onset of the programme; c) the SP' annual steering committee that gathers all relevant MS' stakeholders; d) the regular engagement conducted by thematic experts, NPOs, the Head of UNODC ROSEN and the SP coordination team.

The SP thematic experts also encourage MS to create a budget line dedicated to equipment, training facilities, communication and software costs and other related expenses to building their capabilities to combat transnational organized crime and adopt international standards into their normative framework. When a budget line is adopted into a country's annual financial law or annual

<sup>106</sup> See annex 6

budget, it is another sign of MS commitment. National committees, centers for investigative journalists, anti-corruption bodies or special joint task forces that resort to intelligence and police sharing information software (I-24/7 or CenCOMM) require minimum budgets for IT and internet connectivity and ongoing running costs. Each country in the region has its own strategic plan on how to address security threats and the humanitarian crises; however, they are also torn by economic hardships, elections, famine, high demographics and increasing terrorist attacks. All these factors have a destabilizing effect on the government and their commitment as priorities shift constantly to respond to the most immediate crisis rather than focusing on longer-term engagements. The SP CT and UNODC ROSEN are, however, trying to keep them informed and engage; and the role of the NPOs is crucial for UNODC's anchorage and presence when needed.

**How can the sustainability of the programme be further improved in the remaining years of implementation?**

The sustainability of the programme can be further improved through strengthening the coordination amongst international actors involved in the region. It is understood that coordination with international players is not dependent on the SP coordination team efforts and could therefore affect the Programme's efficiency if too much time was dedicated to that objective. However, the SP's efficiency could benefit greatly should it focus on fostering real synergies to maximize outputs and resources; continue engaging with MS but be more proactive at the design phase of activities; report and engage with donors on strategic planning phases so all of them can understand the scope of their contributions and plan accordingly with the others. The SP should also define what impact means and continue monitoring closely progress and identify bottlenecks in the implementation phase of the different activities. Visibility amongst local populations and closer engagement with civil society organizations should be proffered in the next stage of the SP to ensure the vulgarization of reforms, dissemination of human rights and keep local and central authorities accountable. Finally, a closer output to disbursement analysis should also be drawn so the efficiency can be assessed correctly. Umoja will allow the SP coordination team to draw this type of correlation and conduct further analysis between outputs and disbursements. Sustainability is based on ongoing efforts, corrective measures and commitment from all stakeholders.

### III. CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation reported on all key criteria: design, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, preliminary impact, sustainability, human rights and gender as well as partnerships and cooperation. The evaluation team was able to collect and triangulate the data to verify and confirm preliminary assumptions and refute others as well as concluded on a series of findings reflected in the matrix that led to key recommendations, lessons learned and best practices.

The SP was found to be relevant to MS and in line with international players' positioning on the crises in the region. The SP was designed in parallel to the UNISS and UNODC chairs the UNISS security pillar since 2016. UNISS and the SP are both focused on strengthening MS' security sector and criminal justice institutions to combat transnational organized crime afflicting the region and beyond. UNODC is the guardian of the UNTOC, as well as other international conventions such as the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and viewed as an expert in its field. Furthermore, the SP is a unique programme at UNODC as it was designed with inputs from both HQ and the field offices through a special dedicated Task force. The SP also manages the funds from UNODC ROSEN and supports experts based at to HQ which is usually the opposite. As a result, the SP was perceived as a successful programme with lots of best practices to replicate if possible.

Replication is possible only if several factors coincide: large amounts of funding available at the onset of the programme and context that raises a lot of attention from the international community. These factors were there for the SP which helped start as soon as it got approved by MS. Moreover, the available funding allowed for the creation of the SP's own coordination team that is cornerstone to the effectiveness of the programme. While the SP coordination team is praised upon internally, further efforts are yet required to encourage closer collaboration and find synergies with other international players in the Sahel region. It is a crowded space with all major donors and aid agencies implementing their own strategies. They all speak about coordination as the bottleneck for greater effectiveness, efficiency and impact. It remains a challenge for all of them, UNODC's SP included.

Another challenge is to maximize resources – both human and financial- to yield the desired outputs and outcomes. The SP was to some extent efficient as it managed to raise large funds and implement over 304 activities between 2014 and March 2017 (time of the evaluation field mission). Activities were rather well divided amongst the different pillars with more focus on the topics of law enforcement, terrorism, corruption – in alignment with UNISS and with the SP logframe. Human resources were deemed satisfactory but the recruitment of a NPO in each Sahel country is highly suggested to increase liaison, ownership and visibility of the SP's objectives amongst local stakeholders and other international players. There are no gender and human rights experts dedicated to the SP nor to any of the thematic pillars, which affects the level of indicators, integration of human rights based and gender sensitive approaches across all activities. Finally, the SP's efficiency could be better assessed if financial reports showed disbursement per outputs that will now be possible through the new system Umoja. It would help the SP CT make a cost-benefit analysis and distribute budgets where needed to achieve greater impact.

One example of the added values of the programme is its flexibility that allows the SP to fund activities across the different thematic pillars. Moreover, the SP is a response to the UNISS, whose

core objective is to address the Sahel countries crises through collaboration, synergies and integrated approach. Although the SP benefits from UNODC's large array of partners, synergies amongst them need to be identified and implemented. Internal synergies amongst thematic areas are starting to emerge but they are not yet a common practice within the SP.

Finally, the SP's coordination team has one monitoring manager whose role is to only monitor and report on progress, delays and achieved indicators into the matrix designed for that purpose. Monitoring and evaluation processes are a priority for the SP CT and UNODC ROSEN. Monitoring reports show a high implementation rate with 304 activities implemented with 8000 beneficiaries across the 5 countries. Preliminary results are highlighted in the annual SP reports and well communicated to partners, donors and MS. Nonetheless, some terms need to be defined clearly and jointly by the SP CT, UNODC ROSEN thematic experts and UNODC HQ; terms like impact, activities, synergies will help clarify the intervention logic and better assess longer-term impact for the final summative evaluation in 2019. Such process will also support the SP coordination team prioritize their activities in their work-plan more strategically in order to achieve the SP's objectives.

Overall the SP has been so far, a rather successful programme and certainly an example to follow in terms of design, relevancy and management. The SP was designed based on a sound understanding of the region and the threats affecting the population and the stability of the governments. The SP recruited local NPOs to ensure local presence but also as a means to mitigate risks by ongoing status report on the level of security, and stability enabling activities of the SP to unfold with minimal risks. Some lessons learned were drawn such as: 1) coordination of a large programme requires a dedicated team; 2) coordination is critical for the SP's success; 3) political will amongst Sahel countries is required for long-term impact and sustainability; 4) activities only in the capital cities are not always best fitted to context and to reaching beneficiaries working in sensitive areas.

In conclusion, the SP started building MS' capabilities and strengthening their criminal justice system but further cohesions, synergies and integrated planning need to really be enforced. Without such efforts, the volatility and the seriousness of the threats in the region could overshadow all programmes and have detrimental consequences for the region and the neighbours in the South and in the North. The SP is yet to really unpack its tools and the next three years will be determining to solidify preliminary impacts and foster new partnership through identified synergies.

Furthermore, the SP' staffing is insufficient compared to the needs and the scope undertaken by the program. The lack of human resources has several negative effects on the efficiency of the programme: (i) it puts substantial pressure on the current experts to deliver activities in due time; (ii) UNODC is at a disadvantage compared to other UN agencies that have offices and staff across the targeted countries; (iii) it impacts the visibility of UNODC and of the SP activities and results as there is less immediate communication and interaction with beneficiary countries; (iv) the SP is not as anchored in outside of the capital cities' realities as it could be; when an NPO – at least- is present in each of the targeted country, that person helps outweigh these issues. Finally, there are no human rights and gender experts amongst the thematic experts and field managers. The monitoring requirements are large and are increasing with the raising number of activities; at the current moment, only one person – supported by an intern- fulfils that function. That person received full support from the other members of the coordination team but another full-time monitoring person could help really assess and measure progress and preliminary and longer-term impacts.

## IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are to support the implementation of the second phase of the Sahel Programme. Recommendations are structured according to **key** recommendations and **important** recommendations as reflected in the matrix.

### Key recommendations

1. **Improving the intervention logic** could benefit the SP's monitoring and evaluation process to measure preliminary and longer-term impact.<sup>107</sup>

Currently, activities can be taking place in parallel simultaneously without a clear sequence of action or a clear presentation as to how the SP will achieve its objectives. Furthermore, there are a few activities that were conceptualized by other projects logframes (e.g. AIRCOP, & the Firearms Programmes) and that are funded by the SP when activities occur in the Sahel countries. Furthermore, the SP coordination team needs to define key words such as activities, 'impactful synergies' and 'impact'. As a result, clarified definition and numbering sub-activities per country or determining a classification protocol per country as well as at the regional level could help draw clear pathways from activities to desired outputs more easily

2. **Encourage coordination amongst UN agencies of UNISS and with other partners.**

Coordination is difficult, despite efforts undertaken by UNODC to strengthen the process. It affects preliminary and long-term impact through siloed operations and duplications of activities. UNODC ROSEN as chair of the security pillar of the UNISS should encourage synergies amongst UN contributing agencies. The SP Coordination team strengthen existing partnerships and identify new ones to enhance the SP's efficiency. Although it is understood that it is not UNODC nor the SP's sole responsibility, greater coordination can solidify the UNISS strategy and enhance the SP's efficiency, avoid duplication, foster greater synergies and achieve the needed coordinated efforts to implement the strategy.

3. **The SP coordination team started leveraging Umoja to link budget disbursements to outputs and outcomes for easier reporting and monitoring and analysis.**

The financial efficiency of the programme remains difficult to assess as financial reports were until now general and did not link financial disbursement to outputs and outcomes.

Umoja now connects outputs to disbursement and therefore helps the SP coordination team draw proper conclusions and adjust budget disbursement according to the SP's objectives if needed. The official financial reports for 2017 using Umoja were not yet available for the evaluation team to review but it can be expected that the reporting to donors will also be clearer from now on. Donors are more attracted by this kind of reports. Furthermore, it will enable the coordination team and future evaluation teams to clearly assess the efficiency of the activities,

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<sup>107</sup> There are numerous online tools that can help build a theory of change and design the intervention logic. The evaluation team also recommends to the SP coordination team to organize a theory of change and intervention logic workshop with your thematic experts and identify the different spheres of control, influence, stakeholders and design a rigorous activity-output connected logframe where one outcome leads to the other through a chain of activities. They can resort to an external consultant to help facilitate the workshop and take the team through the different steps.

understand where the gaps are and how to maximize resources (financial and human) to achieve the SP's objectives.

**4. A clear CSO engagement strategy through a clear mapping and vetting process.**

CSOs are part of the key stakeholders that ensure vulgarisation of legal reforms within remote communities and create the link between the government and the population. Furthermore, CSOs are key actors to ensure human rights are respected, as well as try to warrant governmental accountability, transparency and the rule of law. CSOs are sometimes invited to be part of events but are not key implementing partners. This is a gap that affects the long-term impact of the SP's activities, especially in areas where the SP does not have a reach – remote provinces and borders where organized criminal networks are most active. As a result, the SP coordination team along with the thematic teams need to define a clear CSO engagement strategy that is best fitted to each thematic pillar of the SP. Integrating mapped and vetted CSOs can help adjust activities to local realities, advance the vulgarisation of legal reforms, integrate human rights and gender sensitive approaches and promote the SP's objectives within the larger population rather. This strategy has to consider civil society organizations' limitations (financial management, governance structure, minimal human resources, etc...) to ensure UNODC' strategic and beneficial engagement process.

**5. Recruit an NPO for each Sahel country.**

NPOs play a critical role. The SP does not have an NPO in each country yet. It is clear from the evaluation that NPOs presence helps advance the SP's objectives and enhances UNODC' visibility. At the moment, the SP has NPOs in Mali, Chad and Niger. The SP coordination team needs to recruit at least a NPO for each Sahel country targeted by the SP. The NPO ensures closer coordination with local authorities, ensures a point of contact in country, helps organize activities. That NPO offers insights on changes, risks and key players active in the country.

**6. Relations with donors were found to be satisfactory.**

Conclusions on donors' relations from the SP staff, UNODC ROSEN and donor interviews were viewed as satisfactory. It was observed that closer engagement from the planning phase and during implementation could be strengthened to ensure donors have all information at hand to report to their own governmental counterparts and ensure alignment of their own strategies with the SP's objectives. The SP coordination team and UNODC ROSEN coordination should organize an annual donor meeting in Dakar – separate from the Steering Committee sessions- and one in Vienna where they showcase in detail how much each of these donors' pledges contributed to achieve what activities and how they all fulfil a part of the puzzle to achieve the SP's objectives and within a larger context their own strategies and the UNISS.

**7. The SP coordination team should ensure integration of gender sensitivity and human rights approach into the SP programming.**

Due to cultural context and UNODC's mandate to respond to MS' needs, HR and Gender remain sensitive topics to approach and openly push forward during activities and more formal engagement with governmental stakeholders. Hence, the SP powders HR during activities and gender is mainly accounted through a female vs male ratio participation of the SP's activities as underline under the HR & Gender section.

Further HR and Gender programming through closer engagement with CSOs for instance could help advance the SP's objectives. Integrating strong gender analysis as well as gender indicators in the logframe could help the CT and the monitoring process to assess progress and challenges to respond to different impacts of the SP on beneficiaries and on combating TOC. Furthermore, stakeholders understand the importance of promoting HR and gender within their legal framework for society advancement and achieving SP's objectives.

## Important recommendations

### 1. **Consolidate existing tools and projects under the SP rather than expand to other topics**

The evaluation conclusion highlights both the benefits and the drawbacks of having these different thematic pillars covered under the SP as it opens up to developing further activities based on MS' requests, who do not have necessarily have at hand all the information available (progress, availability of funding, donor priorities, ongoing activities etc.). It was observed that other thematic areas and projects focus were added to the SP's programme for the coming year, such as children affected by terrorism, prison reforms and cyber criminality. These, although critical, add other layers of planning and coordination as well as additional funding requirements. Although such additions are to keep MS' priorities in check and donors interested, these additional efforts that can put further strain on the small coordination team and on the thematic experts that are already stretched to cover the Sahel region and other West African countries through other programmes/projects; all in all, when they could be focusing on ensuring full consolidation/operationalization of existing projects, tools, mechanisms, networks in the Sahel region. As a result, the SP coordination team with the thematic experts should ensure operationalization and strengthened existing mechanisms developed through the SP and projects funded by the SP. For instance, the security platform of the G5 Sahel should be finalized and made operational; furthermore, regional bodies and tools such as WACAP, CENOZO, NACIWA, or the JAIFs through AIRCOP or the task forces created through the Container Control Programme should be strengthened to be fully operational and more effective.

### 2. **Conduct a gap assessment and regular assessments on Law enforcement and judiciary bodies to understand progress, and challenges and assess how human rights and international standards are respected.**

The evaluation underlined that law enforcement and judiciary officers are the ones receiving the most technical support and capacity building from the SP. Considering the high levels of impunity and highly volatile environment of the Sahel countries, the SP coordination team should conduct once a year at least a gap assessment on the training programmes received by these trainees (from UNODC and other agencies) as well as vet them to assess how human rights and international standards are upheld. The process is costly and therefore has to be financially doable with funds allocated by donors to conduct such assessments. But the populations fear and distrust security forces in these countries and such vetting and monitoring would help rebuild trust in the authorities and in international agencies.

### 3. **Ensure planned procurement requests for each year so it is cleared by the financial team in due time.**

The evaluation team concluded that procurement procedures are lengthy and complicated pending the level of amounts required. Although procurement plans are developed by the SP team, they have so far only kept under the USD 40,000 in order to avoid further procedural delays. It is understood as a mitigation process to avoid further delays but it limits the type of equipment or the numbers requested. Furthermore, it was not always clear to the thematic experts what were the procurement requirements. The SP coordination team and the thematic experts should agree at the end of each financial year of a procurement, which is both realistic and applicable to the local needs. The procurement plan should be shared with key partners such as the Danish Demining Group (DDG) and other UN agencies to ensure equipment requested fits local needs and foster closer coordination amongst implementing partners.

- 4. The SP coordination team should try to better coordinate and engage with media**  
The media monitoring and the evaluation missions underline the absence of media outlets around key events such as the steering committee presentation or the launch of mechanisms such the security platform, networks such as CENOZO or WACAP for instance. All web-stories are only posted on UNODC and are not picked up by any local or international outlet. The SP coordination team should engage with local and international media outlets around key events to raise further visibility about the SP's achievements.
  
- 5. The SP coordination team should continue ensuring sustainability of their outputs.** The SP developed several tools and methodologies to ensure a certain level of sustainability of its outputs for longer-term impact. For instance, training curriculum on human trafficking and smuggling of migrants as well as investigative procedures on transnational organized crimes are integrated into law enforcement and judiciary schools' curriculum to ensure recruits are also on trained on these principles and tools. Hence, the SP needs to continue ensuring sustainability through these processes but also explore different options to achieve greater sustainability. For instance, one option can be through developing stronger partnerships with other agencies that can take over the SP outputs' implementation by integrating them into their own programmes if the SP comes to an end. The SP coordination team needs to also look for catalytic/ripple effects in the programming so the outputs go beyond the preliminary impact.

# V. LESSONS LEARNED & BEST PRACTICES

## Lessons Learned

**What lessons can be learned from the implementation in order to improve performance, results and effectiveness in the next programme cycle?**

Several lessons learned could be drawn from this mid-term evaluation of the Sahel Programme.

- **Coordination is tedious and requires a team dedicated to these efforts**

Coordination is at the core of the UNISS and within the SP as it requires coordinating with all the thematic experts for programming purposes. Although it is understood that it is not of the sole responsibility of the SP nor of UNODC ROSEN, coordination is not as effective as it could be amongst core partners within UNISS especially and key implementing partners (governmental agencies and international organizations such as DDG). As Chair of the security pillar of UNISS, UNODC ROSEN and the SP CT could potentially encourage greater coordination.

On the other hand, coordination amongst the SP thematic experts and the coordination team was found to be positive but ongoing engagement is required to ensure success, cohesion and integrated programming.

- **Political will is critical to progress towards achieving the SP's objectives**

In theory, the SP should benefit from the 5 countries' political support as each country agreed on the objectives and the programme at the Ouagadougou conference. However, as the SP focuses on different pillars, some might obtain less political support than others for instance- corruption is viewed as less of a priority than other pillars focusing on building law enforcement bodies for instance. As a result, activities on anti-corruption can be implemented and reforms are underway and be revoked by an administration. Furthermore, the SP's activities and funding are exhaustive and need to be supplanted by governmental funding and long-term engagement in order to yield the desired impact of curbing organized crime in the region.

- **Activities based only in the capital limits the outreach and therefore the desired impacts of the SP**

Although law enforcement officers and members of the judiciary from outside of the capital cities are invited to attend capacity building activities, the outreach to remote and border areas remain minimal. Due to security protocols, it is difficult to better engage in these remote areas, as a result, the SP started discussions to include within the law enforcement schools' curricula, so all recruits receive the same training and they can be then dispatched across the country having gone through the same core learnings. However, integration of all the SP pillars workshops have not all been integrated yet. It is in process.

## Best practices

## **What best practices emerged from the implementation of the Sahel Programme and to what extent can they be replicated by other programmes?**

- **The design was jointly coordinated between HQ and ROSEN**

A task force established at HQ had the responsibility to coordinate the design and ensure full integration of the thematic experts based in the field. The SP is field based and the finances are managed through the SP coordination unit. As a result, the SP has greater visibility of the field needs and thanks to some soft-earmarked funding, the coordination unit has the flexibility to fund activities where needed the most and to respond to MS' requirements more efficiently. The joined efforts managed to also galvanize sufficient funding before the programme started. As a result, as soon as the SP was approved by MS, activities could 'hit the ground running'<sup>108</sup> with no delays.

- **Monitoring is ongoing and managed by the coordination team**

The SP has invested in ongoing monitoring of all activities and has a staff position that is fully dedicated to that purpose. As a result, reports on activities benefits, successes and failures are related to the SP evaluator. Such process enables to understand distribution of resources, understand priorities (what pillar gets more attention) and country implementation. The monitoring staff with the support of the coordination team also follows up with trainees through phone calls and emails. They pre-select trainees, what they call 'their potential golden nuggets', based on the level of information they provided into the feedback forms after the end of the training programmes. Accordingly, the monitoring expert follows up to obtain qualitative feedback and more granularity on the usage of the trainings and how it helped that person during his/her professional life. Disaggregated data on female vs male participation in trainings and other activities as defined earlier (section on effectiveness) has been collected regularly. The information is then collected on Smartsheet in order to be available to the SP coordination team but also to the thematic experts. Everyone can use the information for communication materials but the main person in charge of data entry is the monitoring staff in order to avoid errors and confusion. The SP monitoring staff mentioned that they were in the process of improving the capacity building evaluation matrix to also connect it more efficiently to the financial disbursements so correlation can be better drawn between activities, outputs, outcomes and disbursed funds.

- **The SP has its own coordination unit**

The coordination unit's role is to ensure thematic experts, and other relevant experts and partners are informed of the SP's objectives in order to implement activities in due time according to donors' funding priorities. Furthermore, the coordination unit support the thematic experts with proposal development, donor outreach and liaison, financial reporting and monitoring of activities. This coordination unit was at many occasion praised and viewed as the cornerstone of the SP. The coordination unit is paid through the SP, which is rare at UNODC. It is a privilege that other programmes cannot afford due to insufficient funds. SP benefits from multiple donors and managed to collect about USD 24 million since 2013. The Coordination Team is viewed as one of the added value and best practices of the SP. It should be replicated whenever possible (funds available to that purpose) in other programmes.

- **A clear communication and branding strategy**

Another best practice and often referred as amongst the best communication products produced within UNODC programmes, is its branding and communication strategy. Annual reports<sup>109</sup> are

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<sup>108</sup> Informant during field mission

<sup>109</sup> As for instance, the annual report 2016

well designed, well structured, short and highlights preliminary results in each pillar of the SP. Furthermore, the SP started using tools such as Prezi to showcase results to donors and prepare presentations to other stakeholders. The branding remains within UNODC's branding requirements but the annual reports incorporated the sandy colors of the region. According to interviews, the reports are very useful tools to disseminate information and promote the SP's activities amongst key stakeholders.

- **Integration of all funds into Umoja from the onset was perceived as a best practice**

Umoja has affected beneficiaries and foremost programme managers that have to transition from ProFi to Umoja. Feelings towards that culture change are very mixed. Nonetheless, one best practice that transcribed during interviews has been the fact that the coordination team leader spent a few weeks at the onset of the programme in Vienna to follow the training and transfer all SP's received funds into Umoja. Such process helped speed the up the already slow process. However, delays and issues still remain as mentioned under Efficiency.

- **Based on threat assessments, ongoing research and a multi-party Steering Committee**

Drawing lessons from what happened to the RP in 2012, with the extension and exacerbation of terrorism in the Sahel region, the SP is based on threat assessments, ongoing research (from the different thematic sections in ROSEN and at HQ) and a Steering Committee<sup>110</sup>, which is composed of ministries of security, justice and foreign affairs of each beneficiary country as well as donors and other relevant implementing partners (MINUSMA, UNOWAS, UNPOL, etc.). This is perceived as a best practice considering the context. It was, however, highlighted that duplicating the structure of the SP is not as easy as it could seem as there are numerous external factors that played a great part in the SP design (high donors' interest, security council's interests, UNODC long-term presence in the region etc.).

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<https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/newrosenwebsite/sahel-programme/sahel-programme.html>

<sup>110</sup> Steering Committee is a structure in charge of the monitoring of Sahel Programme. It comprises of representatives of Ministries in charge of Justice, foreign affairs and Security of each signatory country of SP: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco and Niger. The Technical Secretary is held by ROSEN. Meetings are taken place once a year in Dakar.

# ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE EVALUATION

## I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Project number:	XAMZ17
Project title:	Strengthening criminal justice systems in the Sahel in order to effectively combat drug trafficking, illicit trafficking, organised crime, terrorism and corruption in the region
Duration:	6 years, 3 months: Oct 2013 – Dec 2019
Location:	The Sahel (5 core countries: <b>Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania</b> and <b>Niger</b> ; participating countries: <b>Algeria, Libya</b> and <b>Morocco</b> , with possible linkages with <b>Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal</b> and <b>Togo</b> , as relevant and necessary)
Linkages to Programme:	Country N/A
Linkages to Programme:	Regional <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Regional Programme for the Arab States 2011-2015</li> <li>- Regional Programme for the Arab States 2016-2021</li> <li>- Regional Programme for West Africa 2010-2014</li> <li>- Regional Programme for West Africa 2016-2020</li> </ul>
Linkages to Programme:	Thematic <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Thematic Programme on Action against Transnational Organised Crime and Illicit Trafficking 2011-2013</li> <li>- Thematic Programme on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform 2012-2015</li> <li>- Thematic Programme on Terrorism Prevention 2012-2015</li> </ul>
Executing Agency:	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
Partner Organizations:	<u>Regional Organizations:</u> G5 Sahel <u>International Organizations:</u> INTERPOL, World Customs Organization (WCO) <u>UN System:</u> United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), Department of Political Affairs (DPA),

	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED)
Total Approved Budget:	USD 11,189,222
Total Overall Budget:	USD 62,509,000
Donors:	Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway
Project Manager/Coordinator:	Mr. Erik van der Veen
Type and time-frame of the evaluation (mid-term or final):	Mid-term Independent Project Evaluation, 6 February 2017 - 8 July 2017
Time frame of the project covered by the evaluation:	October 2013 – end of the evaluation field mission (tentatively April 2017)
Geographical coverage of the evaluation:	Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger
Planned budget for this evaluation:	USD 75,000
Core Learning Partners <sup>111</sup> (entities):	Governments G5 Sahel Donors MINUSMA/UNPOL

### Project overview and historical context in which the project is implemented

Through its Sahel Programme, UNODC supports the development of accessible, efficient and accountable criminal justice systems in the countries of the Sahel, to combat illicit trafficking drug trafficking, organized crime, terrorism and corruption in the region.

The Sahel region refers to Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. To ensure a comprehensive and sustainable approach to the challenges affecting the region, the neighbouring countries of the Maghreb region (Algeria, Libya and Morocco) have also been included as participating countries in the Sahel Programme. Depending on the nature of the activity, linkages are made with other countries in West Africa, such as Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo, as relevant and necessary.

The Programme has been developed within the framework of the UN Regional Integrated Strategy for the Sahel 2013-2017 (UNISS), developed pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2056 (2012) and contributes mainly to the Strategy's security pillar, as well as to the governance pillar.

<sup>1</sup> The Core Learning Partnership (CLP) are the key stakeholders of the subject evaluated (project, programme, policy etc.) who have an interest in the evaluation. The CLP works closely with the Evaluation Manager to guide the evaluation process.

UNODC undertook a series of assessment missions to all beneficiary countries to inform the development of the Programme and determine priorities for implementation.

Approval at technical level was obtained from concerned countries (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco and Niger) at a validation workshop in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in June 2013. Subsequently, approvals at the ministerial level have been obtained from all participating countries.

Activity implementation is coordinated with the other UN agencies participating in the implementation of the UN Integrated Strategy, most notably with the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This includes the offices of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Head of UNOWA, and the SRSG and Head of the Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA).

## Gender

Understanding the interrelationship between gender and security threats and crime is vital to the overall effectiveness of any response. Women and men can have different priorities, responsibilities and needs relating to the reduction of crime and the achievement of security and justice. In fact, women and men are impacted differently by drugs, crime and terrorism; they also often have different levels of access to justice systems and face different constraints in their efforts to improve their security or social conditions, a reality that is particularly true in the Sahel region, especially with regard to law enforcement and judicial sectors.

In order to build secure societies and develop fair, accountable, and effective criminal justice systems, UNODC recognizes the importance of applying a gender perspective to its work. This involves being aware of the gendered dimensions of any activity, which in turn requires analysis, information and consultations with both men and women. This gender approach is integrated into the monitoring framework of the UNODC Sahel Programme, which tracks for example the number of men and women that benefit from implemented activities in order to get a detailed and comprehensive understanding of gender dynamics. At the time of writing, roughly 15% of Sahel Programme direct beneficiaries are women (979 in absolute terms).

UNODC experts also recommend the designation of female participants to training activities and workshops, in a bid to reach a diverse and balanced audience, while stimulating changes in both perceptions and procedures pertaining to gender equality in the work place. This, in turn, allows for a better-informed design of future activities in order to increase efficiency, fairness and effectiveness. For instance, one of the programmes that contribute to the implementation of the Sahel Programme deals with increasing interdiction capacities at air borders; given the surge in female mules to smuggle drugs, the programme has been actively requesting participating authorities to designate female participants and team members. Women are better positioned to carry out searches on female passengers, and consequently instill a change in attitudes regarding the perception of women in the law enforcement sector, which remains largely male-dominated as

far as the Sahel region is concerned. Training sessions also regularly address gender issues by integrating modules to raise awareness of such issues and incentivize fairer treatment and recruitment procedures.

### Human rights

Human rights are interrelated and indivisible, which means that all international human rights are relevant to the work of UNODC. The responsibility to protect human rights is engaged where UNODC encounters denials of rights within the sphere of UNODC technical assistance and its relations with partners. With its expertise in the areas of the rule of law, criminal justice and prevention, as well as drug prevention, treatment and care, UNODC regularly deals with challenging human rights situations. Where appropriate, a UNODC country presence may be able to use contacts with relevant counterparts to draw attention to international standards. Protection of human rights however may not involve public denunciation of abuses; rather, through constructive and open dialogue with government counterparts, human rights protection may be achieved alongside the delivery of technical assistance.

To support this work, several initiatives have been and are being undertaken to mainstream human rights into all aspects of the Office's work. The Guidance Note for UNODC staff on the promotion and protection of human rights for instance serves as a useful reference point for including human rights standards in various types of training and support activities. UNODC also provides legal and technical assistance to governments in the aim of establishing institutional frameworks aligned with human rights and international conventions (in particular the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime). Significant progress has been achieved on several topics such as migrant smuggling as well as victim and witness protection.

### Justification of the project and main experiences / challenges during implementation

#### Justification

The Sahel region is confronted with complex security and political challenges to the stability and development of the region, which are interrelated with humanitarian and developmental issues as well as the adverse effects of climate and ecological changes.

Armed conflict, the proliferation of arms and transnational organized crime and other illicit activities such as drug trafficking in the Sahel region, and the increasing links, in some cases, with terrorism continue to pose a tremendous threat to peace and security in the region.

The activities of terrorist organizations are an important cause of insecurity and violent conflict. These include groups such as the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (Boko Haram, renamed Islamic State of West Africa

following a pledge of allegiance towards the Islamic State, also known as Daesh in 2015), Ansar Eddine and Al Mourabitoun.

This situation further exacerbates the extremely fragile humanitarian situation in the Sahel where at least 20 million people remain at risk of food insecurity and over 5 million children are at risk of acute malnutrition<sup>112</sup>.

In this context, the Sahel Programme continues to be highly relevant, which is demonstrated by high levels of engagement and ownership on behalf of beneficiary Governments. Other partners in the international community, including the recently established G5 Sahel, show a continued interest in working with UNODC to support the Programme or coordinate the implementation of respective technical assistance programmes to ensure complementarity and ownership.

#### Challenges / Unrealized potential

The Sahel Programme has delivered on activities and results and other than daily activity-level and operational challenges, implementation has been smooth.

The main area of unrealized potential is political. The UNODC Sahel Programme was developed as a contribution to the UNISS to give UNODC’s interventions in the Sahel more visibility, and better access to Governments and potential donors. Due to a myriad of reasons, ranging from difficulties in inter-agency cooperation to the length of programme development cycles among certain implementing partners the UNISS is widely considered to have been ineffective in providing a contribution to the region. As a result, and for the time being, the association with the UNISS has not produced the dividends that were initially envisaged. It is not thought that the UNODC Sahel Programme has suffered visibility or credibility losses due to its association with the UNISS, rather it is considered effective as a stand-alone programme.

Finally, the security situation in Libya has prevented the implementation of any activities in the country. Libyan officials did however take part to regional events.

#### Project documents and revisions of the original project document

The Sahel Programme’s project document is formally entitled “UNODC Contribution to the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel” and is available [here](#).

<b>Project document</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Please provide general information regarding the original project document.</b>
The UNODC Contribution to the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel	2013	The purpose of the Sahel Programme is to outline UNODC’s response to the Sahel crisis in light of the challenges facing the region. Through the activities proposed in the document, UNODC will contribute to the UN Integrated Regional Strategy for the Sahel, which was developed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2056 (2012). This

<sup>112</sup> <http://www.unocha.org/sahel2015/>

		strategy focuses on five thematic pillars, namely: governance, security, human rights, humanitarian assistance and resilience.
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Project revision (please add further rows as needed)	Year	Reason & purpose	Change in (please check)
1	2014	A first project revision was done in May 2014 to raise the budget and accommodate changes in the staffing table.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Budget <input type="checkbox"/> Timeframe <input type="checkbox"/> Logframe
2	2014	A second project revision was done in December 2014 to update the logical framework and accommodate changes in the staffing table.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Budget <input type="checkbox"/> Timeframe <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Logframe
3	2015	A third project revision was done in June 2015 to extend the duration of the Programme until 2017, include a mid-term evaluation and accommodate changes in the staffing table. This revision followed a strategy meeting with the participating governments. At this occasion, ToRs for a Steering Committee were approved	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Budget <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Timeframe <input type="checkbox"/> Logframe

The first Sahel Steering Committee meeting was in Dakar in April 2016 to assess the progress and discuss the future orientation of the Programme. The Committee decided to extend the Programme until 2019 and review the formulation of the logical framework (which mirrors the original project document mentioned above) to reinforce action on issues related to Trafficking in Persons / Smuggling of Migrants (TIP/SOM), foreign terrorist fighters (FTF), anti-corruption and cooperation with the G5 Sahel.

[UNODC strategy context, including the project's main objectives and outcomes and project's contribution to UNODC country, regional or thematic programme](#)

The “UNODC Contribution to the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel” (available [here](#)) drafted in response to the report submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2056 (2012), provides the framework guiding the programmatic activities of the UNODC Sahel Programme.

Its primary objective is that countries of the Sahel region demonstrably increase their capacity to address transnational organized crime and terrorism through accessible, efficient and accountable criminal justice systems.

As such, it aims to achieve the following Outcomes:

- 1) National legislation is up to date and regional and international cooperation mechanisms are used as enabling factors for combating drug trafficking, illicit trafficking, organized crime, terrorism and corruption
- 2) Sahel borders are better secured with increased interdiction rates
- 3) Accountable criminal justice officials investigate, prosecute and adjudicate crimes in a more effective and efficient manner
- 4) Capacity to use scientific evidence in support of judicial investigations and proceedings is strengthened
- 5) Targeted support to improve the access and treatment of people in contact with the judicial system and strengthened prison management in line with human rights standards and norms

The Sahel Programme has operated within the policy framework of the below Regional and Thematic Programmes:

- Regional Programme for the Arab States 2011-2015
- Regional Programme for the Arab States 2016-2021
- Regional Programme for West Africa 2010-2014
- Regional Programme for West Africa 2016-2020
- Thematic Programme on Action against Transnational Organised Crime and Illicit Trafficking 2011-2013
- Thematic Programme on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform 2012-2015
- Thematic Programme on Terrorism Prevention 2012-2015

## Linkage to UNODC strategy context and to Sustainable Development Goals

The UNODC Sahel Programme is aligned with the 2016-2017 UNODC Strategic Framework established in January 2014 by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (E/CN.7/2014/CRP.4). It contributes to the following sub-programmes identified therein:

- Sub-programme 1. Countering transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking and illicit drug trafficking;
- Sub-programme 3. Countering corruption;
- Sub-programme 4. Terrorism prevention;
- Sub-programme 5. Justice;
- Sub-programme 7. Policy Support;
- Sub-programme 8: Technical cooperation and field support

The United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have replaced the Millennium Development Goals as the key targets for international development since September 2015 (when the Sahel Programme had already been created), defining the 2030 development agenda of the UN.

Within this framework, the Secretary-General has emphasized the need to build peaceful societies, with both effective justice systems and strong, inclusive institutions. The 16th SDG<sup>113</sup> points to the need to reduce corruption and bribery, promote rule of law at national and international levels and ultimately strengthen the capacities of developing countries in matters of global governance.

UNODC has acquired extensive knowledge and experience in assisting countries in West and Central Africa in addressing these challenges. UNODC promotes regional cooperation and develops strong collaborative ties with national authorities as the guardian of the UN Convention against Transnational Crime (UNTOC) and the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). UNODC's overall approach is to support the strengthening of regional capacities, while enhancing the accessibility of criminal justice systems to combat trafficking, organized crime, terrorism and corruption, contributing to the SDG of building inclusive institutions that ultimately foster more peaceful societies.

Through its various sub-programmes, the UNODC Sahel Programme directly contributes to the achievement of the following targets of SDG 16:

- Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere
- End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children
- Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all
- By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime
- Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
- Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime

Moreover, forming part of the UNODC Contribution to UNISS – a strategy developed by the UN Security Council in consultation with the international community and recipient governments – the Sahel Programme ensured an alignment with the national priorities of its target countries from the onset.

The addition a Steering Committee mechanism that convenes regular yearly meetings since January 2015 ensures that beneficiary countries' evolving priorities, strategies and indicators are taken into account when reviewing the strategic orientation of the Sahel Programme. This dynamic relationship between beneficiary states institutions and UNODC Sahel Programme management and experts was exemplified during the last Steering Committee that took place in April 2016 in Dakar, following which the logframe of the

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<sup>113</sup> *Sustainable Development Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels*

Programme was reviewed to include a stronger focus on new priorities that include, among others, the issue of children associated with violent extremist groups, foreign terrorist fighters, and the possible links between forms of transnational organized crime and terrorism. Finally, close consultation with and active support to the G5 Sahel – a regional organization tasked with strengthening and coordinating security and development efforts in the Sahel – also ensure a close fit between the programmatic priorities of UNODC in the region and the needs and ensuing strategies of beneficiary countries.

## DISBURSEMENT HISTORY

	<i>Total Approved Budget</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Expenditure in %</i>
Time period	2013-2016	2013-2016	2013-2016
Budget	USD 15 million	USD 10 million	67%

## PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

### Reasons behind the evaluation taking place

The purpose of the formative mid-term Independent Project Evaluation is to determine the extent to which planned objectives and outcomes have been reached up-to-date, inform potential strategic realignments, provide inputs regarding the design of the programme, as well as be forward-looking and guide the improved implementation of future objectives and activities.

Moreover, the duration of the UNODC Sahel Programme exceeds four years, and a mid-term evaluation is therefore required to comply with the UNODC Evaluation Policy, Norms and Standards.

### Assumed accomplishment of the evaluation

The evaluation will serve to establish results achieved under the Sahel Programme up-to-date as well as to identify lessons learned and best practices to inform and direct the future priorities, objectives, initiatives and activities that will be targeted and implemented as well as improve performance under its framework until its end date.

The evaluation will further assess design, relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, partnerships and cooperation, gender and human rights mainstreaming of the implementation of the project activities, as well as be forward-looking and assess, to the

extent possible, sustainability and preliminary impact, and whether the objectives and outcomes are likely to be achieved before completion of the project. The final summative evaluation to be undertaken 6 months before completion of the project, will further have a stronger focus on sustainability and impact.

The specific objectives of this evaluation are to:

- Contribute to organizational learning by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of UNODC in the region and under each thematic area, as well as integrate lessons learned from other projects/programmes or evaluations;
- Inform on the appropriateness of the programme's initial design and its capacity to adapt to the region's evolving issues to orient future implementation;
- Contribute to accountability by assessing the achievements of UNODC in the region and the appropriateness of the utilisation of resources;
- Contribute to decision-making in relation to UNODC strategic orientation in the region and in thematic areas for the remainder of the Sahel Programme;
- Contribute to improved performance for the remainder of the implementation of the project to ensure achievement of its objectives and outcomes before completion and further increase its impact.

#### The main evaluation users

The intended main users of the evaluation are UNODC management, recipient Governments and their respective beneficiaries, the Programme Coordinator and other project managers, as well as donors and partners.

## SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

#### The unit of analysis to be covered by the evaluation

This evaluation will cover the UNODC Contribution to the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS), commonly referred to as the Sahel Programme. The Programme is implemented by teams covering a vast array of countries and topics ranging from law enforcement (border management, the fight against illicit trafficking, drug trafficking, etc.) to legislative assistance and terrorism prevention.

#### The time period to be covered by the evaluation

The period to be evaluated goes from the start of the Programme in October 2013 until the end of the field mission (tentatively April 2017). The evaluation is expected to begin in February 2017 and be finalized by July 2017.

### The geographical coverage of the evaluation

The Sahel Programme covers 5 core countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger), and 3 other participating countries (Algeria, Libya and Morocco).

The countries that will be covered by this evaluation are the five core ones, although not each country will be visited by the evaluation team for considerations related to their strategic importance and relative level of implementation at the time of the mid-term evaluation. For the scope of this exercise, only Mali, Mauritania and Niger will be visited directly, while Burkina Faso, Chad and Maghreb countries will be contacted via phone, skype and in written form given the relatively lower number of stakeholders and CLPs to be interviewed. Mali and Niger feature the highest levels of implementation and ensuing operational results, while Mauritania holds high levels of political importance due to its pivotal role in the G5 Sahel (its Headquarters are stationed in Nouakchott). UNODC has been providing operational support and equipment to the G5 Sahel in Nouakchott; a field visit for the evaluation is thus recommended.

The work of the programme is managed by the UNODC Regional Office for West and Central Africa in Senegal, whereby a mission to Dakar, Senegal, will further be included to meet with the project coordinator and team.

The security situation in Libya has prevented the implementation of any activity (Libyan officials did however take part to regional events). Algeria and Morocco participate in selected activities of the Programme, mostly in an expert capacity.

A mission to Vienna, HQ will further be included to include interviews and meetings with programme managers, coordinators and experts responsible for the sub-programmes that contribute to the implementation of the Sahel Programme.

## EVALUATION CRITERIA AND KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation will be conducted based on the following DAC criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, gender and human rights and lesson learned, and, will respond to the following below questions, however, provided as indicative only, and required to be further refined by the Evaluation Team.

<i>Design</i>
1. To what extent does the Sahel Programme contribute to the UNODC Integrated Programming Approach?

2. To what extent was the development of the Sahel Programme based on an adequate analysis of the needs of the target group and of the context?
3. To what extent did the design of the Logical framework allow for results and activities to be subordinated to the indicators defined for the Sahel Programme?
4. How could the design of the Programme be further strengthened?
<i>Relevance</i>
1. How relevant is the Programme to target groups', including Governments', needs and priorities?
2. How relevant is the Sahel Programme to the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel?
3. How relevant was the Sahel Programme for the implementation of UNODC projects and programmes in the region? What was the added value of the Sahel Programme?
<i>Efficiency</i>
1. To what extent has the coordination between field-led projects, global projects, other UN agencies involved in the various pillars of UNISS, and the Sahel Programme led to the efficient use of resources?
2. To what extent were the financial resources properly mobilized and distributed, and did the financial setup of the Sahel Programme enable an efficient implementation of the goals?
3. To what extent did the transition to Umoja (November 2015) impact the efficiency of the Sahel Programme?
4. How can the efficiency of the programme be further improved in the remaining years of implementation?
<i>Effectiveness</i>
1. To what extent were the mandate, timeframe, objectives and targets of the Sahel Programme conceived realistically and feasibly taking into account the challenges of the region?
2. To what extent are the Sahel Programme's objectives and outcomes being/likely to being achieved?
3. To what extent is progress or lack thereof, the result of external factors rather than of Sahel Programme activities? How did external factors impact on the effectiveness of activities?
4. How can the effectiveness of the programme be further improved in the remaining years of implementation?
<i>(Preliminary) Impact</i>
1. To what extent is the Sahel Programme contributing in an appropriate and realistic way to the changes in the political and security situation in the region and individual countries?
2. Is the Programme likely to contribute to long-term social, economic, technical, environmental changes for individuals, communities and institutions related to the Programme?
3. Has there been any unintended impact derived from the implementation of the programme (e.g., an unbalanced emphasis on one or certain substantive issues)?

4. How can the programme further increase its impact in the remaining years of implementation?
<i>Sustainability</i>
1. Can it be expected that the changes achieved for partner institutions and beneficiaries (until now) are long-term, and will persist after the end of the Sahel Programme and of the related individual projects?
2. To what extent has local ownership by beneficiaries and national and regional stakeholders been achieved?
3. How can the sustainability of the programme be further improved in the remaining years of implementation?
<i>Partnerships and cooperation</i>
1. To what extent are synergies and partnerships being created, used and maintained to the best extent possible? How could they be improved?
2. Which areas of the programme has received more donor attention (substantive topics, countries, regions) and how can the programme ensure to further strengthen the donor base?
3. To what extent was the communication with partners and beneficiaries of good quality and how could it be improved in the future?
<i>Human rights and gender</i>
<i>Human Rights</i>
1. Has the human rights vetting (Leahy vetting principles) affected implementation? Is there any indication that technical assistance activities might have led to human rights violations?
2. To what extent did UNODC contribute to the UN implementing the UN human rights due diligence policy and its related Guidance Note in an appropriate way?
3. How can human rights aspects be further integrated into programme implementation?
<i>Gender</i>
1. To what extent was a gender-sensitive approach been applied in the framework of the Sahel Programme, in line with established UNODC criteria for the provision of technical assistance and with ECOSOC resolutions 2011/5 and 2011/6?
2. To what extent were women actively included as direct beneficiaries by the programme?
3. How can gender aspects be further integrated into programme implementation?
<i>Lessons learned and Best practices</i>
1. What lessons can be learned from the implementation in order to improve performance, results and effectiveness in the next programme cycle?
2. What best practices emerged from the implementation of the Sahel Programme and to what extent can they be replicated by other programmes?
3. What lessons can be drawn from unintended results?
4. What lessons can be drawn from the working arrangements with partners (global, regional, and national)?

# EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

## The methods used to collect and analyse data

While maintaining independence, the evaluation will be carried out based on a participatory approach, which seeks the views and assessments of all parties. The evaluation uses a participatory approach through the active participation of the evaluation stakeholders, in particular the Core Learning Partners (CLP), in the evaluation process. These should share responsibilities for the evaluation planning, implementation and reporting. In particular, this means involving CLPs in selecting the evaluation team, defining the ToR and the evaluation questions, collecting the data and reviewing the draft evaluation report.

The present ToR provide basic information with regards to the methodology, however this should not be regarded as exhaustive. It is rather meant to guide the evaluation team in elaborating an effective, efficient, and appropriate evaluation methodology that should be proposed, explained and justified in an Inception Report.

The team leader will present a fine-tuned summarized methodology (evaluation matrix) in an Inception Report which will specify the evaluation criteria, indicators, sources of information and methods of data collection. The evaluation methodology must conform to the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards and use a mixed approach of qualitative and quantitative methods.

The credibility and analysis of data are key to the evaluation. Special attention shall be paid to an unbiased and objective approach and the triangulation of sources, methods, data, and theories. Indeed, information stemming from secondary sources will be cross-checked and triangulated through data retrieved from primary research methods.

The limitations to the evaluation will be identified by the evaluation team in the Inception Report. As it will not be possible to visit all countries party to the Sahel Programme, efforts will be made to solicit their inputs through surveys/questionnaires (to be elaborated in the inception report).

The first step in defining the evaluation methodology is a grouping of the units of analysis (the Sahel Programme and its related projects) with regard to the methodology used. Some guidelines are provided hereafter.

Gender-sensitive evaluation methods and gender-sensitive data collection techniques are further essential in order to identify key gender issues, address marginalized, hard-to-reach and vulnerable population, as well as to define strategies for developing appropriate data bases for better gender analysis in future project planning.

## The sources of data

Specific evaluation questions are to be formulated, based on i) the results framework of the Sahel Programme, and ii) the information needs of internal and external key stakeholders.

Secondary data, such as baseline data, audit reports and information from internal reviews such as annual reviews will also feed into the evaluation and will be crosschecked and triangulated with primary data stemming from first-hand sampling and collection methods (see in Annex 2 the list of desk review material).

Findings and recommendations of the Sahel Programme evaluation will be discussed and disseminated with UNODC staff, partners and beneficiaries in the region as well as in UNODC headquarters.

### **Secondary Research Methods / Desk Review**

The evaluation team will perform a desk review of existing documentation, including, among others: the project document and revisions; Monitoring data; Baselines; Annual and progress reports; Tools developed under the project and other supplementary documents; Official communications with Member States and key stakeholders; Thematic Programmes and Strategic Documentation; and Evaluations and audits. See Annex 2 for a more detailed structure of the documents to be provided for the desk review.

### **Primary Research Methods**

Primary sources of data include, among others:

- Qualitative methods: structured and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, key representatives of different entities (face-to-face, by telephone or through internet).
- Quantitative methods: survey questionnaires.

Primary data collection methods should be gender sensitive.

#### *1. Sampling Strategy*

The evaluation team is responsible for further refining the proposed sampling strategy, based on objective criteria, when drafting the Inception Report. This includes identifying, with the support of the ROSEN, site visits within each country selected. The evaluation team also develops the sampling techniques that will be applied for the different data collection instruments.

#### *2. Phone interviews / face to face consultations*

The evaluation team will conduct phone interviews / face-to-face consultations with identified individuals from the following groups of stakeholders: UNODC staff at HQ and at ROSEN; Partner government officials who are benefitting from and are directly involved in UNODC's work in those countries where UNODC has implemented the Sahel Programme; relevant Permanent Missions in Vienna; representatives of development partner/donor agencies who are contributing to UNODC's work; other UN agencies, etc.

#### *3. On-line questionnaire*

If feasible, an on-line questionnaire will be developed and used in order to help collect the views of some stakeholders (e.g. from within UNODC, donor agencies and government partner agencies) who it might not be possible to directly interview/consult through face-to-face meetings. The on-line questionnaire will be clear and concise, and appropriately targeted. It will be administered by

the evaluation team. ROSEN will directly assist the evaluation team by providing a list of email contact details. It is expected that a readily available online software package (e.g. Survey Monkey) be used to develop and administer the survey.

#### *4. Field visits*

The evaluators will conduct field visits to the countries with most political and programmatic relevance: Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The other countries (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad and Morocco) will be evaluated remotely through VTC or other appropriate means, when pertinent, given the relatively lower number of stakeholders and CLPs to be interviewed. Mali and Niger feature the highest levels of implementation and ensuing operational results, while Mauritania holds high levels of political importance due to its pivotal role in the G5 Sahel (its Headquarters are stationed in Nouakchott). UNODC has been providing operational support and equipment to the G5 Sahel in Nouakchott; a field visit for the evaluation is thus recommended.

The evaluation team will review the proposed countries during the Inception Phase and finalise the selection together with Project Management. A mission to Dakar, Senegal, will further be included to meet with the project coordinator and team.

A mission to Vienna, HQ will further be included for interviews and meetings with programme managers, coordinators and experts responsible for the sub-programmes that contribute to the implementation of the Sahel Programme.

#### **Feedback on preliminary findings and recommendations**

Prior to the end of the field mission, the team will provide a short debriefing on its preliminary observations.

Following the preparation of a first full draft of the evaluation report cleared by IEU, the cleared draft report will be provided by IEU for feedback to the CLPs.

The team will make a final presentation of the evaluation results at UNODC Headquarters, where e.g. Member States, donor representatives and other relevant stakeholders will participate, as required.

#### **Projects Methodology**

The evaluation should cover an activity portfolio that is representative of what is done in the region and allows the evaluation to answer the questions identified in the ToR. However, the evaluation will not consider all the activities that fall under the Sahel Programme with the same methodological lens. This will be done through a review of the available documentation; a validation of the foreseen intervention logic/design with a special focus on the relevance to national priorities and to UNODC's strategic priorities. The evaluation team will also identify the information gaps to be filled through other data collection methods in order to be able to answer the ToR questions.

# TIMEFRAME AND DELIVERABLES

## Time frame for the evaluation

The evaluation is expected to begin in February 2017 and be finalized by July 2017.

## Time frame for the field mission

The field missions of the evaluation team will take place between March and April 2017.

## Expected deliverables and time frame

<i>Duties</i>	<i>Time frame</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Deliverables</i>
Desk review and preparation of Draft Inception Report	06/02/2017 – 24/02/2017 (12 working days for team leader) (8 for team members)	Home based	Draft Inception report containing: preliminary findings of the desk review, refined evaluation questions, data collection instruments (including questionnaire and interview questions), sampling strategy, evaluation matrix and limitations to the evaluation
Submission of inception report to IEU and Project Manager for review and comments and for subsequent clearance of draft Inception Report by IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)	27/02/2017 – 03/03/2017 (2 working days for team leader) (1 for team members)		Revised draft Inception Report
<b>Deliverable A – Final Draft Inception Report in line with UNODC Evaluation guidelines, handbook, templates, norms and standards</b>	<b>By 06/03/2017</b>		<b>Final Inception report to be cleared by IEU</b>
Interviews with staff at UNODC HQ/RO; Evaluation mission: briefing, interviews; presentation of preliminary findings	08/03/2017 – 31/03/2017 (20 working days:  Travel to Vienna: 08/03/2017, mission 09-10/03/2017	<u>UNODC/HQ/RO</u> : Vienna, Austria Dakar, Senegal  <u>Field</u> Bamako, Mali Nouakchott, Mauritania, Niamey, Niger	Presentation of preliminary findings

	<p>Travel to Dakar: 12/03/2017, mission: 13-14/03/2017</p> <p>Travel to Bamako: 15/03/2017, mission: 16-17/03/2017</p> <p>Travel to Nouakchott: 19/03/2017, mission: 20-21/03/2017</p> <p>Travel to Niamey:22/03/2017, mission: 23- 24/03/2017</p> <p>3 days to consolidate preliminary findings, 1 day to present them, and 1 day to travel back to home country</p>		
Drafting of the evaluation report and further telephone/skype interviews;	03/04/2017 – 21/04/2017 (13 working days for team leader) (8 for team members)	Home based	Draft evaluation report (to be reviewed and cleared by IEU; can entail various rounds of comments)
Submission to Project Management for review of factual errors and to IEU for review and comments	24/04/2017-05/05/2017		
Consideration of comments from the project manager and incorporation of comments from IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)	08/05/2017–12/05/2017 (3 working days for team leader) (1 for team members)	Home based	Revised draft evaluation report
<b>Deliverable B – Draft Evaluation Report in line with UNODC Evaluation guidelines, handbook, templates, norms and standards</b>	<b>By 19/05/2017</b>		<b>Draft evaluation report, to be cleared by IEU</b>
IEU to share the draft evaluation report with Core Learning Partners for comments	22/05/2017 – 02/06/2017		
Consideration of comments from Core Learning Partners	05/06/2017 – 09/06/2017 (2 working days for team leader) (1 for team members)	Home based	Revised draft evaluation report
Final review by IEU;	12/06/2017 – 16/06/2017		Revised draft evaluation report

Incorporation of comments by IEU and finalization of report,	19/06/2017-23/06/2017 (2 working days for team leader) (1 for team members)		
<b>Deliverable C - Finalization of report</b>	<b>By 26/06/2017 + 1 day in July 2017 (TBD) for presentation of evaluation results for team leader</b>	<b>Home based; UNODC</b>	<b>Final evaluation report; Presentation of final evaluation findings and recommendations All to be cleared by IEU</b>
<b>Project Management: Provide Management Response, if needed, for inclusion into final evaluation report and finalise the Evaluation Follow-up Plan in ProFi (to be cleared by IEU)</b>	<b>By 07/07/2017</b>		<b>Final Evaluation Follow-up Plan and Management Response, if needed, for inclusion into final evaluation report</b>
<b>Project Management: Disseminate final evaluation report</b>			Final evaluation report disseminated

## EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

### Number of evaluators needed

The evaluation will be composed of a team of experts without any prior involvement with the programmes under evaluation. The team (gender based and multicultural) will be composed of experts in the following areas:

- An international lead evaluator (Team Leader) with a solid background and professional experience in the field of evaluation of international programmes and experience in applying, qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods, as well as RBM; Work experience with the United Nations is desirable. The Lead Evaluator will supervise the evaluation team and coordinate the evaluation process including its various deliverables;
- Two national/regional evaluators (Team Members) who should have expertise in law enforcement and/or judicial affairs in the region as well as expertise in evaluating projects and programmes at an international level.).

The international lead evaluator (Team Leader) must be familiar with the context of Sub-Saharan Africa and speak fluent French.

The qualifications and responsibilities for the Team Leader and each Team Member are more specified in the respective job descriptions attached to these Terms of Reference (Annex I).

### The role of the lead evaluator (Team Leader)

Carry out the desk review; develop the inception report, including sample size and sampling technique; draft and finalize the inception report and evaluation methodology, incorporating relevant comments, in line with the guidelines and template on the IEU website <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>; lead and coordinate the evaluation process and the oversee the tasks of the Team Members; implement quantitative tools and analyse data; triangulate data and test rival explanations; ensure that all aspects of the terms of reference are fulfilled; draft an evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation policy and the guidelines and template on the IEU website <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>; finalize the evaluation report on the basis of comments received; present the final evaluation findings and recommendations to stakeholders.

More details will be provided in the respective job descriptions in Annex I.

### The role of the other evaluators (Team Members)

The Team Members will contribute with specific knowledge in their respective area of expertise to all deliverables of the evaluation (including the Inception Report; Draft and Final Draft Evaluation Report); in consultation with the Evaluation Team Leader.

Assist the Team Leader in all stages of the evaluation process, as per the respective TOR; participate in selected missions; provide methodological evaluation quality assurance throughout the evaluation process; comment on all deliverables of the evaluation team; and apply methodological tools.

More details will be provided in the respective job descriptions in Annex I.

### Absence of Conflict of Interest

According to UNODC rules, the consultants must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.

Furthermore, the evaluators shall respect and follow the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for conducting evaluations in a sensitive and ethical manner.

## MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION PROCESS

## Management Arrangements

The independent evaluation will be carried out following UNODC's evaluation policy, norms and standards as well as UNEG Norms and Standards. The evaluation team will work closely with UNODC's Independent Evaluation Unit.

## Roles and responsibilities of the Project Manager

The Project Manager is responsible for:

- Managing the evaluation;
- Drafting and finalizing the ToR
- Selecting core learning partners (representing a balance of men, women and other marginalised groups) and informing them of their role;
- Recruiting evaluators following proposal and clearance by IEU;
- Providing desk review materials (including data and information on men, women and other marginalised groups) to the evaluation team including the full tor;
- Reviewing the inception report as well as the evaluation methodology;
- Liaising with the core learning partners;
- Reviewing the draft report for factual errors;
- Providing a management response, if needed, for inclusion in the final evaluation report;
- Developing an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations as well as follow-up action (to be updated once per year);
- Disseminating the final evaluation report and facilitating the presentation of evaluation results.

The Project Manager will be in charge of **providing logistical support** to the evaluation team including arranging the field missions of the evaluation team, including but not limited to:

- All logistical arrangements for the travel of the consultants (including travel details; DSA-payments; transportation; etc.)
- All logistical arrangement for the meetings/interviews/focus groups/etc. (including independent translator/interpreter if needed; set-up of meetings; arrangement of ad-hoc meetings as requested by the evaluation team; transportation from/to the interview venues; scheduling sufficient time for the interviews (around 45 minutes); ensuring that members of the evaluation team and the respective interviewees are present during the interviews; etc.)
- All logistical arrangements for the presentation of the evaluation results;
- Ensure timely payment of all fees/DSA/etc. (payments for the evaluators need to be released within 5 working days after the respective deliverable is cleared by IEU).

For the field missions, the evaluation team liaises with the UNODC Regional/Field Offices and mentors as appropriate

### Roles and responsibilities of the evaluation stakeholders

Key stakeholders of the programme – called “Core Learning Partners” - will participate in the evaluation process during key stages. Members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) will be selected by the Programme Coordinator in consultation with IEU and include beneficiaries, partner organizations and donors, Member States etc. (please see Annex III)

The CLPs are a limited number, representing, to the extent possible, a balance of men, women and marginalized groups, of those deemed as particularly relevant to be involved throughout the evaluation process, i.e. in reviewing and commenting on the TOR and the evaluation questions, reviewing and commenting on the draft evaluation report, as well as facilitating the dissemination and application of the results and other follow-up action. Stakeholders include all those to be invited to participate in the interviews and surveys, including the CLPs.

### Roles and responsibilities of the Independent Evaluation Unit

The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) provides mandatory normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html>.

IEU reviews and clears all steps in the evaluation process: Terms of Reference; Selection of evaluator(s); the methodology in the form of an Inception Report; Draft Evaluation Report; Final Evaluation Report; Evaluation Follow-up Plan.

### Logistical support responsibilities

The Project Manager will be in charge of providing logistical support to the evaluation team including arranging the field missions of the evaluation team. For the field missions, the evaluation team liaises with the UNODC Regional/Field Offices and mentors as appropriate.

## ANNEX II. EVALUATION TOOLS: QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEW GUIDES

In order to collect the needed information amongst all stakeholders and ensure due process, it was best to design a series of interview guidelines. All interview guidelines will start with the following key points:

*In header- put the name of the evaluators present for our own reference*

**Name of stakeholder:**

**Position:**

**Date and location of the interview**

- The evaluator thanks the interviewee for awarding time to answer our questions
- Restate objectives of the evaluation.
- Explain the confidentiality of this interview and how that person's name will not be mentioned in the evaluation or any discussion related to the findings of the evaluation. Inform of the time needed for the interview -30 to 45 minutes and that their participation will be taken as the informed consent.
- Ask first question about that interviewee's responsibility or affiliation with the programmes to get context and level of engagement.

Interview guidelines will be divided according to the types of stakeholders as identified above (sampling) and according to GE&HR guidelines and considerations for 1) UNODC HQ; 2) UNODC field Offices; 3) UN Bodies; 4) implementing partners; 5) Beneficiaries; 6) implementing partners; and 7) Donors; 8) other relevant stakeholders (CSOs, experts for instance).

Interview question sheets will be prepared the day or a few days beforehand following the matrix from the IR and the instructions below. Each questionnaire should be adjusted to the interviewee. The interview should not exceed 45 minutes. Leave the right part of the page for note taking and comments – additional questions

A question excel sheet has been prepared with sub-questions to each question found in the matrix above. The excel sheet is changeable according to the type of stakeholder being interviewed

**Interview notes guideline** – at the end of each day, the team members will review their notes and summarize them to send to the team leader following the template below.

**Minutes template for interviews**

**Stakeholder:**

**Location:**

**Date:**

**Stakeholders attending:**

#### Interview Overview

Write the answers on the questionnaire sheets so it is easier for reference. But in a summary form with key critical points that answers the questions (electronically).

Here highlight any questions that could not be answered either through lack of time, refusal of the stakeholder.

Highlight any sensitivity during the interview.

Relevance:

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#### Key Takeaways and additional information to collect

Examples:

- Had no information on GE&HR
- Outcomes indicators are difficult to integrate on policy and legislative technical support because of lack of resources for data collection and for country level assessment before programming

A questionnaire has been developed for recipients of training activities of the programme. It will be sent via email, using the programme's database of trainees found in the Smartsheet shared by the programme team. The evaluation team concluded that the best way to send the questionnaire was in a word document and via email. This process should hopefully yield a sufficient high level of responses so the information can complement the other collected data. The following introduction letter will be sent along with the table below via email.

United Nations Office against Drug and Crime has recruited a team of independent evaluators to assess UNODC's contributions to the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel region, commonly known as "the Sahel Programme". This evaluation as required by UNODC policy intervenes at the mid-term of the performance of this programme.

Dear participant,

This is a survey on the Sahel Programme whose main objective is to support the strengthening of capacities of countries in the region and to enhance the accessibility, the efficiency and accountability of criminal justice systems to combat drug trafficking, corruption, transnational organized crime and terrorism. This survey is one element of the

data collection process conducted during this mid-term evaluation.

As one of the stakeholders, your opinion is essential for this mid-term evaluation. Therefore, the team will be very grateful if you could fill out the following questionnaire. In doing so, you will help the evaluation team gather additional information on capacity building and other related activities undertaken under the Programme.

This survey focuses on your impression and experience with UNODC. Your name and position will not be mentioned in the final report. It will be anonymous.

Your participation is very much appreciated. Do not hesitate to contact the team leader, Emmanuelle Diehl (emdiehl@gmail.com), for any questions and comments you may have. The deadline for completion is April 10<sup>th</sup> 2017, There are 24 questions on this questionnaire.

Thank you in advance for your participation.

Sincerely,

The Evaluation team

**I- Personal information (except for your name- not required for anonymity)**

Question	Response
1. What is your profession? <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Law Enforcement officer</li><li>• Prosecutor</li><li>• Judge</li><li>• Magistrate</li><li>• Academic/research</li><li>• Civil Society Organization</li><li>• International Organization</li><li>• Other – please specify</li></ul>	
2. What is your gender? <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Female</li><li>• Male</li></ul>	
3. What is your nationality?	
<b>Information on the Sahel Programme</b>	
4. What did you know about the the Sahel Programme before attending any of its workshops?	

6. What training(s) of the Sahel Programme did you attend? Please add title of the training, location and date	
7. In what capacity did you attend this training? Please select one of the responses: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Law enforcement official</li> <li>• Legal practitioner</li> <li>• CSO</li> <li>• Trainer</li> </ul>	
8. Have you attended similar trainings on the same topics before? If yes, please precise on what, when and offered by whom?	
<b>level of satisfaction</b>	
9. Are the training topics and level responding to your needs and expectations? Please elaborate further	
10. Was the methodology and materials adequate to your needs?	
11. What tools and materials were most useful to you?	
12. How are UNODC's trainings different from other international organizations' ones in the Sahel region? What is UNODC's added value/niche in your opinion?	
13. Have you gone through any mentoring after initial trainings? If yes, please mention who was your mentor and from what nationality?	
14. How often do you use the acquired skills in your daily work?	
15. What major learnings did you take away from the trainings? Please provide examples	
16. Was the training live or online? Which type of training would better suite your circumstances – live or online training?	

<p>17. Are UNODC's training techniques and materials applicable to my local context? Please explain how is yes and why not if no.</p>	
<b>Trainings and workshops - Organization of the workshop</b>	
<p>18. Are you satisfied with the training workshops you attended?</p>	
<p>19. How would you rate the quality of training documents supplied? Select from 1 to 5 (5 being very good, 1 very bad)</p>	
<p>20. What type of training course/workshop did you attend?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training?</li> <li>• Train the trainer?</li> <li>• Mentoring</li> <li>• Joint investigations</li> <li>• Joint operations</li> <li>• Other – please specify</li> </ul>	
<b>Content and relevance of the training</b>	
<p>21. Was the training useful to you? Please explain how? And give examples of concrete applications of the learnings.</p>	
<p>22. Did the training enable you to: select the relevant statements (as many as you want)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Understand the concerns addressed by UNODC</li> <li>• Improve your ability to prevent and combat corruption, transnational organized crime, terrorism, human and smuggling trafficking</li> <li>• Learn more about available resources, tools and techniques</li> <li>• Widen your network locally and internationally</li> <li>• Understand gender issues in relation to these crimes</li> <li>• Understanding human rights issues in relation to these crimes</li> </ul>	

<p><b>23. How have the experience and knowledge acquired during the training been transferred to your professional institution? Please select all matching boxes below:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National curriculum in place</li> <li>• Training of trainers</li> <li>• Training/employment guide</li> <li>• Informal mentoring within your team/institutions</li> <li>• It has not been yet, but there is a plan to do so</li> <li>• It has not been transferred yet and there is no plan to do so</li> </ul> <p>Other – please indicate</p>	
<p><b>24. Has there been a follow-up policy in your institution after these trainings?</b></p>	
<p><b>25. Have you already been contacted by UNODC staff for follow-up after the different trainings?</b></p>	
<p>26. How could UNODC's capacity building activities be improved? Please elaborate in the box</p>	
<p>27. any additional comment you would like to add?</p>	

Interview question sheets were prepared the day or a few days beforehand following the matrix from the IR. Each questionnaire was adjusted to the type of stakeholders. The interview did not exceed 40 minutes.

## ANNEX III. DESK REVIEW LIST

### Documents reviewed

United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel
UNODC Contribution to the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel
UNODC Sahel Programme LogFrame (original and revised)
UNODC Sahel Programme Progress Reports
The Sahel Programme Assessment Report 2014
Financial management reports
UNODC strategic framework and other strategic documents
UNODC mandates
UNODC guidelines in relevant areas, including note on Full Cost Recovery
Key Conventions UNTOC, UNCAC, UNTC, Drugs....
Relevant Thematic Programmes
Communication plan(s);

UNODC Position Paper on Human Rights (2011)114
Guidance Note on Gender Mainstreaming in UNODC (2013)115
UNODC evaluation guidelines, templates, handbook, policy 116
UNODC Inception Report Guidelines and Template 117
UNODC Evaluation Report Guidelines and Template 118
EU Action Plant against illicit trafficking in and use of firearms and explosives
The Regional Programme on Drug Control, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform in the Arab States (2011-2015)
UNODC Regional Programme for West Africa (2010-2014):
UNODC Regional Programme for West Africa 2016-2020
UNEG: Integrating human rights and gender equality in evaluation119;

114 [http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/UNODC\\_Human\\_rights\\_position\\_paper\\_2012.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/UNODC_Human_rights_position_paper_2012.pdf)

115 <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/directory/docs/UNODC-GuidanceNote-GenderMainstreaming.pdf>

116 <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/normative-tools.html>

117 <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations-step-by-step.html#Undertaking>

118 <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/independent-project-evaluations-step-by-step.html#Undertaking>

119 <http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/980>

ToR for the mid-term Independent Programme Evaluation;
UNODC In-Depth Evaluation Report of the Regional Programme for the Arab States 2011-2015;
UNODC In-Depth Evaluation Report of the Regional Programme for West and Central Africa;
Missions reports for each country
MoUs
Training reports
Manual on the organization of the programme cycle of the Sahel Programme
External reports on the situation in the Sahel region
Work plans for each year
The Sahel Programme's Organisational Chart
Programme and invitees for the upcoming Steering Committee April 2017
Additional financial information on donor disbursements and financial reports for 2016
Relevant other programme reports such as AIRCOP, SEACOP, TPB report activities for the Sahel region, anti-corruption programme report for the Sahel region

Invitation letters for capacity building from the different thematic sections
Work plans for each year
The Sahel Programme's Organisational Chart
The SP staffing table
The G5 Sahel strategy document
<i>Number of documents review: over 60</i>

## ANNEX IV. LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED DURING THE EVALUATION

<i>Number of interviewees</i>	<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Sex disaggregated data</i>	<i>Country<sup>120</sup></i>
16	UNODC HQ	Male: 7 Female: 9	Austria
16	UNODC Dakar	Male: 5 Female: 11	Senegal
1	UNODC ROMENA	Male: 1 Female: 0	Egypt
2	UNOWAS	Male: 1 Female: 1	Mauritania, Senegal
2	MINUSMA	Male: 1 Female: 1	Senegal, Mali
3	UNPOL	Male: 3 Female: 0	Mali
2	G5 Sahel	Male: 2 Female: 0	Mauritania, Senegal
4	Government of Mali	Male: 4 Female: 0	Mali
6	Government of Niger	Male: 6 Female: 0	Niger
0	Government of Chad	Male: 0 Female: 0	Niger
2	Government of Burkina Faso	Male: 1 Female: 1	Senegal
2	Government of Mauritania	Male: 2 Female: 0	Mauritania

<sup>120</sup> Country refers to where stakeholders were interviewed and not their nationalities

2	Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Male: 1 Female:1	Mali
1	Japan Foreign Affairs	Male: 0 Female:1	Mali
1	Embassy of Austria	Male: 0 Female:1	Senegal
1	The European Commission in Senegal	Male: 1 Female: 0	Senegal
1	Embassy of Canada	Male: 0 Female:1	Senegal
1	Embassy of the Netherlands	Male: 0 Female:1	Senegal
2	Danish Demining Group	Male: 2 Female: 0	Mali
Total: 66		Male: 37 Female: 29	

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## ANNEX V. List of activities implemented under each outcome

### Outcome 1:

*Updated national legislation and increased use of regional and international cooperation mechanisms enable factors for combating drug trafficking, illicit trafficking, organized crime, terrorism and corruption efficiently.*

Output 1.1: has 9 sub-activities (1.1.1 – 1.1.9)

Legislation in line with international conventions and protocols is supported

Activity 1.1.1	Comprehensive assessment report covering the Sahel region	Dec-14
Activity 1.1.4	Atelier National pour la ratification et la mise en œuvre des instruments universels contre le terrorisme et le crime organisé	Feb-14
Activity 1.1.4	Atelier National pour la ratification et la mise en œuvre des instruments universels contre le terrorisme et le crime organisé	May-14
Activity 1.1.4	Nigeria Conduct technical assistance activity: “National retreat for the review of Nigerian civil aviation related laws”	Jul-14
Activity 1.1.4	Nigeria Conduct technical assistance activity: “Legislative Workshop for the Review of Nigerian Civil Aviation and its Agencies Laws”	Sep-14
Activity 1.1.4	One regional workshop on legislative harmonization - Renforcement Des Reponses Legislatives Et Operationnelles Contre Les Trafics Illicites D’armes A Feu Dans La Zone Sahelo-Saharienne	
Activity 1.1.4	Regional conference to raise awareness about asset disclosure principles for Sahel country participants	May-14
Activity 1.1.4	Workshop for the Justice Sector on Anti-Corruption in Burkina Faso	Oct-14
Activity 1.1.4	Regional workshop on investigative journalism	Nov-14
Activity 1.1.4	Regional conference on anti-corruption	Feb-15
Activity 1.1.4	Follow-up legislative workshop for the amendment of the Nigeria civil aviation and other agencies related bills	Jun-15
Activity 1.1.4	Follow-up legislative workshop for the amendment of the Nigeria civil aviation and other agencies related bills	Aug-15
Activity 1.1.4	Technical and financial support to NACIWA's amended constitution	Jun-15

Activity 1.1.5	National workshop to support UNCAC self-Assessment Process	Mar-15
Activity 1.1.5	National workshop to support UNCAC self-Assessment Process	Jul-15
Activity 1.1.6	Legislative drafting to strengthen the anti-corruption authority in Burkina Faso (ASCE)	Jul-15
Activity 1.1.6	Legislative drafting to strengthen the anti-corruption authority in Burkina Faso (ASCE)	Aug-15
Activity 1.1.7	Engagement with the political leadership in Mali to reorganize the country's law enforcement apparatus (Draft Legislation)	Oct-14
Activity 1.1.7	National workshop to discuss possible revisions to the anti-corruption legislation	Dec-14
Activity 1.1.7	Provide legislative and technical assistance to the Ministry of Justice on a comprehensive law on TIP	Oct-14
Activity 1.1.7	Collaborative exercise with the Government of Mauritania on the review of draft legislation on Legal Aid	Jan-15
Activity 1.1.7	Collaborative exercise with the Government of Mauritania on the review of draft legislation	Dec-14
Activity 1.1.7	Provide Support to Nigerien anti-corruption authorities	Mar-15
Activity 1.1.7	Legal training workshop to Nigerien anti-corruption authorities (HALCIA)	May-15
Activity 1.1.7	Stakeholders national meeting to facilitate review and drafting of legislation on international cooperation in line with relevant international conventions	Aug-15
Activity 1.1.7	Stakeholders national meeting to facilitate review and drafting of legislation on international cooperation in line with relevant international conventions	Aug-15
Activity 1.1.7	Provide Support to Burkinabe anti-corruption authorities	Mar-15
Activity 1.1.8	Assessment Norbert Zongo Press Center	Mar-15
Activity 1.1.8	Attend a sub-regional CSO meeting on anti-corruption in West Africa	May-15
Activity 1.1.8	Opening Centre for Investigative Journalism at the Norbert Zongo Press Center	Jul-15
Activity 1.1.9	Awareness on anti-corruption was raised among students, professors, members of civil society and government representatives in Dakar, Senegal, on Anti-Corruption Day on 9 December 2014	Dec-14
Activity 1.1.9	Awareness-raising activity on illicit trafficking and drug consumption patterns in the gold mining and road transportation industries	Jun-15

Output 1.2: has 7 sub-activities (1.2.1-1.2.7)

Cooperation on criminal matters among Sahel countries (Sahel Judicial Platform) is promoted and strengthened

Activity 1.2.2	5th annual meeting of the Judicial Cooperation Platform for the Sahel countries	Nov-14
Activity 1.2.2	Sahel Platform Coordination Meeting	Oct-15
Activity 1.2.2	Provide technical support to national authorities on preparation of the fifth annual meeting of the Sahel Judicial Cooperation Platform, and coordination meetings with other technical assistance providers in the country	Sep-14
Activity 1.2.4	sub-regional workshop on international cooperation in criminal matters: Mauritania, Mali and Senegal	Dec-14
Activity 1.2.4	sub-regional workshop on international cooperation in criminal matters for terrorism and human rights	Feb-15
Activity 1.2.4	Sub-Regional Workshop for Sahel Countries, Algeria and Morocco on cross-border criminal justice cooperation in countering terrorism	Mar-15
Activity 1.2.4	Workshop on Networking between Sahel Platform Focal Points and Counterparts of other Regional Platforms	Mar-15
Activity 1.2.6	Training workshop to promote the Sahel Platform	Mar-14
Activity 1.2.6	Training workshop to promote the Sahel Platform	Mar-14
Activity 1.2.6	Training workshop to promote the Sahel Platform	Oct-14
Activity 1.2.6	Training workshop to promote the Sahel Platform	Apr-14
Activity 1.2.6	Training workshop to promote the Sahel Platform	Jun-14
Activity 1.2.6	Training workshop to promote the Sahel Platform	Oct-14
Activity 1.2.7	Meeting of Interior Ministers of the G5 Sahel (in Niger) to coordinate development and security policies of the region	May-15
Activity 1.2.7	Assessment mission for the establishment of a security cooperation platform with the G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso and Mali)	Aug-15
Activity 1.2.7	Assessment mission for the establishment of a security cooperation platform with the G5 Sahel (Chad and Niger)	Sep-15
Activity 1.2.7	Assessment mission for the establishment of a security cooperation platform with the G5 Sahel (Mauritania)	Dec-14
Activity 1.2.7	Workshop on the formulation of the legal and institutional framework for cooperation on security and defence between the G5 Sahel States	Oct-15
Activity 1.2.7	Participation in Heads of States Summit of the G5 Sahel on issues related to defence and security	Nov-15
Activity 1.2.7	Participation in G5 Sahel consultations with development partners and UNODC	Jun-15

Output 1.3: has 4 sub-activities (1.3.1 – 1.3.4)

The participation of Sahel countries in the Network of West African Central Authorities and Prosecutors (WACAP) is promoted

Activity 1.3.1	3rd WACAP Meeting in Burkina Faso	May-14
Activity 1.3.1	4th WACAP Meeting	Mar-15
Activity 1.3.1	5th WACAP Meeting in conjuncture with ARIN-WA and Sahel Platform meeting	Oct-15
Activity 1.3.2	Advisory services on legal drafting (including missions)	Dec-14
Activity 1.3.4	National training for Burkina Faso on international cooperation	Jun-14
Activity 1.3.4	Informal exchange network of law enforcement and criminal justice practitioners with a mandate in firearms trafficking	Jul-14

#### Outcome 2:

*Increased capacity of, and information exchange between, law enforcement entities leads to higher detection and interdiction rates*

Output 2.1 Out of 8 sub activities the following were carried out.

Activity 2.1.3	Provide training on techniques for profiling, intelligence gathering, analysis and exchange, as well as on techniques for investigation and reporting drug trafficking, TIP/SOM and firearms trafficking	Dec-16
Activity 2.1.7	Provide tactical equipment (drug test kits) to law enforcement in border areas in collaboration with DDG	Feb-17

Activities under this output have been delayed because of the absorption capacity at this point in time. Not only is upgrading of skills essential, but the technical facilities needed for information exchange and intelligence collection, are not yet available to facilitate the provision of this technical assistance. It is obvious that in some cases, training needs to happen before the procurement of IT equipment. However, in some case this needs to be done in parallel so that new skills acquired will not be lost before the provision of procurement items.

Output 2.2 has 5 sub activities

Activity 2.2.3	Train JAITF staff for Joint Operations "Ailes Africaines" (Niger) and Westerlies (Mali and Niger)	May-16
Activity 2.2.3	Train JAITF staff for Joint Operations "Ailes Africaines" (Niger) and Westerlies (Mali and Niger)	Apr-16

Activity 2.2.4	Conduct on-site mentoring sessions for JAITF staff (2nd mentoring)	Feb-16
Activity 2.2.4	Conduct on site mentoring sessions for CAAT (3rd mentoring)	Oct-16
Activity 2.2.4	Conduct on-site mentoring sessions for JAITF staff (specialized mentoring on air cargo and postal mail control)	Apr-16
Activity 2.2.3	Exchange programme for Head of JAITF of Mali to Togo	May-16
Activity 2.2.4	Conduct on-site mentoring sessions for JAITF staff	Oct-16
Activity 2.2.1	Conduct assessment for JAITF establishment	Sep-16
Activity 2.2.3	Deliver specialized training on fraudulent travel documents for JAITF staff	Nov-16
Activity 2.2.3	Deliver specialized training on the analysis of X-ray imagery for AIRCOP JAITF staff	Nov-16
Activity 2.2.3	Specialized training for Heads of anti-drug units organized in partnership with the Italian Central Directorate of Anti-Drugs Service (September 2016)	Sep-16
Activity 2.2.3	Training on INTERFLOW Initiative for the Head of the Mali JAITF	Sep-16
Activity 2.2.5	AIRCOP specialized regional operational training on I-24/7 and preliminary investigation for West African countries	Oct-16
Activity 2.2.5	Training on the fight against illegal waste trafficking in Dakar	Dec-16

Output 2.3 has 9 sub activities

Activity 2.3.5	Mentoring 5: 2 weeks mentorship for container targeting team in Dakar port	Feb-16
Activity 2.3.5	Mentoring 5: 2 weeks mentorship for container targeting team in Dakar port	Jul-16
Activity 2.3.5	Training 6: 3 officers from Senegal unit to follow theoretical training in Lomé, Togo	May-16
Activity 2.3.3	Provision of IT equipment (scanner and printer) to Dakar's JPCU	Jun-16

Output 2.4 Out of 7 sub activities, the following were undertaken and completed at the time of the field visit.

Activity 2.4.4	Awareness raising workshop of the G5 Sahel SCP for internal and external stakeholders	Nov-16
Activity 2.4.2	Refurbishment	
Activity 2.4.2	Refurbishment	
Activity 2.4.2	Refurbishment	

Activity 2.4.2	Refurbishment	
Activity 2.4.2	Refurbishment	
Activity 2.4.3	Provision of equipment	
Activity 2.4.3	Provision of equipment	
Activity 2.4.3	Provision of equipment	
Activity 2.4.3	Provision of equipment	
Activity 2.4.3	Provision of equipment	
Activity 2.4.4	Drug trafficking training for PCMS Staff	Feb-17
Activity 2.4.5	Intelligence gathering and exchange training for PCMS staff	Mar-17

### Outcome 3:

Accountable criminal justice officials investigate, prosecute and adjudicate crimes in a more effective and efficient manner.

#### Output 3.1 has 10 sub activities

Activity 3.1.2	Training of investigators, prosecutors and magistrates on anti-corruption at the maiden NACIWA Anti-Corruption Academy in Abuja, Nigeria	Oct-15
Activity 3.1.4	DPKO Judicial Officers Training	Mar-15
Activity 3.1.4	Training for national anti-corruption authorities, including codes of conduct, internal investigation procedures	May-15
Activity 3.1.4	Training for national anti-corruption authorities, including codes of conduct, internal investigation procedures	Jul-15
Activity 3.1.4	Training for national anti-corruption authorities, including codes of conduct, internal investigation procedures	Oct-15
Activity 3.1.8	Regional Seminar on Integrity in the Police for the Sahel	Mar-15
Activity 3.1.8	Regional Seminar on Integrity in the Police in the Sahel Region	Oct-15

#### Output 3.2 has 5 sub activities

Activity 3.2.3	Meeting of UNODC criminal justice officials and consultations with HQ-based experts	
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#### Output 3.3 has 7 sub activities

Activity 3.3.1	Training course on integrity and anti-corruption for UNODC trainer	
Activity 3.3.1	Develop and validate a syllabus on organized crime and international cooperation to be integrated in Chad magistrates school curriculum	Apr-15
Activity 3.3.1	Develop and validate a syllabus on organized crime and international cooperation to be integrated in Mali's magistrates school curriculum	May-15

Activity 3.3.1	Mission d'évaluation et de contact avec les autorités judiciaires et de l'Institut national de formation judiciaire du Mali	Dec-14
Activity 3.3.3	Regional workshop on the development of thematic modules on TIP and SOM for training schools' curricula (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger)	May-15
Activity 3.3.3	Meeting with CAMES in Doha to introduce anti-corruption modules in African universities	Jun-15
Activity 3.3.5	National training workshop (ToT) based on TIP and SOM modules developed	Sep-15
Activity 3.3.5	National training workshop (ToT) based on TIP and SOM modules developed	Oct-15
Activity 3.3.5	Training trainers of Chad magistrates school on the new syllabus	Jun-15
Activity 3.3.5	Training trainers of Mali magistrates school on the new syllabus	Jul-15
Activity 3.3.5	Training for students' magistrates on the new syllabus by the trainers one of which is under the expert 's supervision	Jul-15
Activity 3.3.6	Disseminate UNODC technical tools and publications by participating in Meeting on Networking of the Law Enforcement Training Institutions "LE TrainNet"	Apr-15

Output 3.4 has 19 sub activities

Activity 3.4.1	Pre-validation Workshop on the situation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) in the Sahel Region	Jun-15
Activity 3.4.1	Produce an analysis of the situation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) and the related needs with the aim of establishing further understanding for targeted intervention and baselines against which indicators and means of verification can be measured	Oct-15
Activity 3.4.1	Assessment mission to evaluate the needs of counter-terrorism technical assistance and contact relevant authorities	Feb-14
Activity 3.4.1	Assessment mission to evaluate the needs of counter-terrorism technical assistance and contact relevant authorities	Apr-14
Activity 3.4.2	National training workshops for criminal justice officials on legal framework against terrorism, investigation and prosecution of terrorist cases	Feb-14
Activity 3.4.2	National Training Workshop on Investigation and Detention in Terrorism Cases and Human Rights	Jun-15
Activity 3.4.2	National Training Workshop on investigation and prosecution of terrorism related-cases.	Jun-15
Activity 3.4.4	Dissemination of counter-terrorism legal training tools & publications	Nov-14

Activity 3.4.7	Arms trafficking and terrorism training for Anti-crime Squad	Feb-15
Activity 3.4.7	Arms trafficking and terrorism training for Anti-crime Squad	Apr-15
Activity 3.4.7	Basic computer skills training for Police, Gendarmerie	Apr-15
Activity 3.4.7	Basic computer skills training for Police, Gendarmerie	Mar-15
Activity 3.4.7	Basic police skills training for Gendarmerie	Feb-15
Activity 3.4.7	Basic police skills training for Gendarmerie, National Guard	Apr-15
Activity 3.4.7	Drug trafficking training for Anti-Drug Squad	Apr-15
Activity 3.4.7	Forensics training for Police	Apr-15
Activity 3.4.7	Gender-based violence training for Police, Gendarmerie	Mar-15
Activity 3.4.7	Management skills training for Gendarmerie	Apr-15
Activity 3.4.7	Management skills training for Gendarmerie	Mar-15
Activity 3.4.7	Terrorism and TOC training for Police, Gendarmerie	Mar-15
Activity 3.4.7	Forensics training for Gendarmerie (30 participants)	May-15
Activity 3.4.7	Drug trafficking training for Anti-Drug Squad	May-15
Activity 3.4.7	Basic computer skills training for Police, Gendarmerie	May-15
Activity 3.4.7	Terrorism and TOC training for Judicial Police	Jun-15
Activity 3.4.7	Arms trafficking and terrorism training for Anti-crime Squad (33 participants)	Jun-15
Activity 3.4.7	Judicial and Scientific Police training for the Police and the Gendarmerie (33 participants all m)	Aug-15
Activity 3.4.7	Computer skills training for Police, Gendarmerie (34 participants, including 10 women)	Aug-15
Activity 3.4.7	Management skills training for Gendarmerie (24 participants all m)	Sep-15
Activity 3.4.7	Judicial and Scientific Police training for the Police and the Gendarmerie (44 participants including 8 woman)	Sep-15
Activity 3.4.10	Provide training to support the identification of human trafficking victims and migrant smuggling and their referral to support and care structures	Feb-15
Activity 3.4.12	Training workshop on terrorism financing for FIUs of Sahel countries and Neighbouring FIUs	Oct-14
Activity 3.4.12	Training workshop on financial investigations - FIU/Law enforcement	Jul-15

Output 3.5 has 5 sub activities

Activity 3.5.3	Foster the development of appropriate ways and means to improve cooperation between investigators and magistrates, for example, through regular meetings	May-15
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Activity 3.5.3	Foster the development of appropriate ways and means to improve cooperation between investigators and magistrates, for example, through regular meetings	May-15
Activity 3.5.3	National training for magistrates and judicial police officers of Niger on criminal matters	May-15
Activity 3.5.3	National training workshop on international cooperation between investigators and magistrates, for example, through regular meetings	May-15

Output 3.6 has 4 sub activities

Output 3.6 There was one conviction - Niger

Output 3.7 has 3 sub activities

Activity 3.7.1	2nd Regional meeting on Seizure, Confiscation and Management of proceeds of Crime	Nov-14
Activity 3.7.1	Endorsement of the ARIN-WA network initiative by GIABA Ad Hoc Ministerial Committee Meeting	May-15
Activity 3.7.2	5th WACAP Meeting in conjuncture with ARIN-WA and Sahel Platform meeting	Oct-15
Activity 3.7.3	National training workshop on Asset recovery in Burkina Faso	Jun-15

Outcome 4:

Scientific evidence in support of judicial investigations and proceedings is generated.

Output 4.1 out of 6 sub- activities the following were undertaken

Activity 4.1.1	Assessment of the national infrastructure, equipment and human capacities in drug analysis	Jan-15
Activity 4.1.1	Assessment of the national infrastructure, equipment and human capacities in drug analysis	Jan-15
Activity 4.1.1	Assessment of the national infrastructure, equipment and human capacities in drug analysis	Jan-15
Activity 4.1.6	Promote regional cooperation among laboratories in the Sahel, West Africa and the Maghreb, as well as with competent international structures and mechanisms	Oct-15

Output 4.2 has 8 sub activities

No activity carried out

Output 4.3 has 7 sub activities

Activity 4.3.1 G5 Sahel Security Platform Meeting

Output 4.4 has 7 sub activities

Activity 4.4.1	Lancement de la campagne sensibilisation et collecte Senegal	Oct-14
Activity 4.4.1	Workshop on legislative review of firearms control in Saly, Senegal	Sep-14
Activity 4.4.2	Legislative assessments, national stakeholder dialogues	Jun-15
Activity 4.4.2	Legislative assessments, national stakeholder dialogues	Jun-15
Activity 4.4.2	Legislative assessments, national stakeholder dialogues	Mar-14
Activity 4.4.2	Legislative assessments, national stakeholder dialogues	Jul-14
Activity 4.4.2	L'atelier De Formation Et Soumission Du Texte Sur Le Marquage Des Armes Legeres Et L'enregistrement Des Armes A Feu	Oct-14
Activity 4.4.2	legislative review, gap analysis and establishment of country profile in view of the legislative harmonization	Oct-14
Activity 4.4.2	legislative review, gap analysis and establishment of country profile in view of the legislative harmonization	Nov-14
Activity 4.4.2	legislative review: Working session with the Mauritanian national drafting committee on firearms law	Jul-15
Activity 4.4.4	Improve storage security and stockpile management of firearms and ammunition	Jan-15
Activity 4.4.5	provision of marking machines (2) and spare parts; training on marking and record-keeping, transportation and labour costs during the marking process	Sep-14
Activity 4.4.5	provision of marking machines (1) and spare parts; training on marking and record-keeping, transportation and labour costs during the marking process	Sep-14
Activity 4.4.5	provision of marking machines (2) and spare parts; training on marking and record-keeping, transportation and labor costs during the marking process	Sep-14
Activity 4.4.5	provision of marking machines (3) and spare parts; training on marking and record-keeping, transportation and labor costs during the marking process	Oct-14
Activity 4.4.5	Training on the use of marking machines	Sep-14
Activity 4.4.5	Training on the use of marking machines	Sep-14
Activity 4.4.5	Training on the use of marking machines	Sep-14
Activity 4.4.5	Training on the use of marking machines	Oct-14
Activity 4.4.6	organise a training workshop on the role of the Civil society in the control of illicit trafficking and exchanging of information between west African and Latin America CSO expert	Feb-15

Activity 4.4.6	Regional Workshop on legislative harmonization following legislative assessments and national stakeholder dialogues	Feb-14
Activity 4.4.7	Cross Regional Meeting	Mar-15
Activity 4.4.7	Regional meeting on synergies between Arms Trade Treaty, the Firearms Protocol and others relevant legal instruments	Sep-15
Activity 4.4.7	Establishment of regional network on firearms information exchange	Jul-14
Activity 4.4.7	Attend a regional expert meeting on enhanced firearm control and stockpile management in Sahel region	Sep-15
Activity 4.4.7	Participate to the regional seminar on synergies firearms protocol and other relevant legal instruments	Jul-15
Activity 4.4.7	Meeting to enhance south-south cooperation on training and exchange of best practices in firearm marking	Nov-14

#### Outcome 5:

Improvement in the access and treatment of people in contact with the judicial system and improvement of prison management, in line with human rights standards and norms

Output 5.1 has 7 sub activities

Activity 5.1.4	Regional seminar on access to legal aid in criminal Justice Systems in Sahel countries	Sep-14
Activity 5.1.4	National follow-up workshop on legal aid	Oct-15
Activity 5.1.4	National follow-up workshop on legal aid	Aug-15

Output 5.2 with 4 sub activities

No activity undertaken yet.

Output 5.3 has a total of 6 sub activities 5.3.1-5.3.6

Activity 5.3.2	Regional seminar on protection of victims and witnesses in Mauritania	Dec-14
Activity 5.3.2	Regional seminar on the drafting of a regional model law protection of victims and witnesses in Niger	Jun-15
Activity 5.3.2	Sub-Regional Workshop on the Treatment of Children Allegedly Involved with Boko Haram as Alleged Offenders, Victims and/or Witnesses of Crime	Oct-15
Activity 5.3.3	National Training for criminal justice officials in contact with victims and witnesses	Aug-15
Activity 5.3.4	National Training for criminal justice officials in contact with victims and witnesses	Aug-15

Output 5.4 has 11 sub activities

Output 5.5 has 8 sub activities

Activity 5.4.2	National follow-up workshop on prison reform This is a workshop. There was a one, day meeting with the prison managers. National Chad	Jun-15
Activity 5.4.2	Regional workshop on prison reform Niamey Niamey	Nov-2014
Activity 5.4.8	Workshop to define a pilot programme on prison reform to set up the platform on social integration programmes	Apr-15
	Training on dynamic security and PAJED II/UNODC workshop. Good training from the feedback information.	April last year
	workshop UNODCII/PAJED/Prison. Prison leadership and social leadership. National Security Audit in seven prisons	June 2016
	La Restitution. Mission to talk about issues and discussing with the prisons administration separating. Sharing of the finding of the Audit. Mission was also done in Mali as well as Burkina Faso. Restitution was done.	October 2016
	Training on prison leadership for 15 prisons Followed by meeting on the risk evaluation of the prisons with a few other countries. to develop risk evaluation tools for the 3 countries.	2017 Feb 21-24
	Mission to Mali. Follow up on the security audit to talk to the prison admin director. Two-day meeting.	March 2017

# Annex VI: Media monitoring

Two sorts of media monitoring were conducted:

One to understand how UNODC's Sahel Programme was featured in local and international press.

The second to understand what is the situation in the Sahel region and whether the SP's activities sustainability, relevance, partnerships, synergies made sense and what the SP should focus on within the remaining years.

The evaluation team conducted research on the internet in English, and French with the following tags:

For a quick media monitoring of the Sahel Programme

- UNODC + Sahel Programme
- Sahel Programme + Mali
- Sahel Programme + Niger
- Sahel Programme + Mauritania
- Sahel Programme + Burkina Faso
- Sahel Programme + Chad
- Sahel programme + SSR
- Sahel Programme+ Criminal Justice system

For the Sahel countries context

- Sahel Countries + TOC
- Sahel Countries + crises
- Mali + crises
- TOC + reforms
- TOC+ international community
- Police reforms + impunity + Sahel Programmes

Documents and websites visited

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/sahel-malis-crumbling-peace-process-and-spreading-jihadist-threat>

[https://sites.tufts.edu/gis/files/2016/01/Bernard\\_Aneliese\\_DHPP207\\_2016.pdf](https://sites.tufts.edu/gis/files/2016/01/Bernard_Aneliese_DHPP207_2016.pdf)

<http://www.groundswellinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/Pathways-to-Resilience-in-the-Sahel.pdf>

<http://oasisinitiative.berkeley.edu/>

<http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/PB%20Fix%20the%20unfixable.pdf>

[http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs\\_opinion/2014/DIEEEO125-](http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2014/DIEEEO125-)

[2014\\_UOE\\_y\\_Sahel\\_ENGLISH\\_CPintado.pdf](http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2014/DIEEEO125-2014_UOE_y_Sahel_ENGLISH_CPintado.pdf)

<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190285/PolBrief76Eng.pdf>

<https://www.arcjournals.org/pdfs/ijps/v1-i2/2.pdf>

<http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/TerrNASahel2015.pdf>

[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/433778/EXPO-DEVE\\_ET\(2012\)433778\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/433778/EXPO-DEVE_ET(2012)433778_EN.pdf)

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/chad-between-ambition-and-fragility>

<https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12689.doc.htm>

<http://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/resources/>