Final independent project evaluation of

“Strengthening Anti-Corruption Institutions in Indonesia”

(Forming part of the Sub-Programme 2 on Anti-Corruption of Indonesia Country Programme 2012-2016)

INDA03

Indonesia

April 2018
This independent evaluation report was prepared by an evaluation team consisting of two external independent evaluators, Ms Pauline Arifin (team member) and Mr Pierre Robert (team leader). The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process of projects. Please find the respective tools on the IEU website: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html

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<tr>
<td>ACBI</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Behaviour Index</td>
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<td>ACBS</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Behaviour Survey</td>
</tr>
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<td>ACCH</td>
<td>Anti-Corruption Clearing House</td>
</tr>
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<td>AGO</td>
<td>Attorney General’s Office</td>
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<td>AIPJ</td>
<td>Australia-Indonesia Partners for Justice</td>
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<td>Bappenas</td>
<td>Ministry of National Development Planning</td>
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<td>BPK</td>
<td>Supreme Audit Board</td>
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<td>BPS</td>
<td>National Statistics Agency</td>
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<td>CPI</td>
<td>Corruption Perception Index</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>FIU</td>
<td>Financial Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>IACF</td>
<td>Indonesia Anti-Corruption Forum</td>
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<td>IALDF</td>
<td>Indonesia-Australia Legal Development Facility</td>
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<td>ICW</td>
<td>Indonesia Corruption Watch</td>
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<td>IEU</td>
<td>Independent Evaluation Unit</td>
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<td>INP</td>
<td>Indonesian National Police</td>
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<td>KPK</td>
<td>Corruption Eradication Commission</td>
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<td>LPSK</td>
<td>Witness and Victim Protection Agency</td>
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<td>MLA</td>
<td>Mutual Legal Assistance</td>
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<td>MoFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MoL &amp; HR</td>
<td>Ministry of Law and Human Rights</td>
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<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>The Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights</td>
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<td>PGC</td>
<td>Programme Governance Committee</td>
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<td>POIDN</td>
<td>Programme Office in Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPATK</td>
<td>Financial Transactions Analysis and Report Centre</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stranas</td>
<td>National Strategies for Corruption Prevention and Eradication</td>
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<td>TI-I</td>
<td>Transparency International Indonesia</td>
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<td>ToT</td>
<td>Training of Trainers</td>
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### MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Management Response (accepted/partially accepted/rejected)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: <strong>Continued support to fight against corruption.</strong> POIDN should continue providing input and technical advice to KPK and its other institutional partners in Indonesia, prioritising areas where UNODC has unique expertise and skills, or where long-term UNODC input is appropriate.</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
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<td>2: <strong>Enhanced focus on the provincial level.</strong> POIDN should, while maintaining engagement with KPK and other central institutions, enhance its engagement with provincial-level institutions addressing corruption, including local police forces, prosecutors and courts.</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
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<td>3: <strong>Enhanced focus on the private sector.</strong> POIDN should, while maintaining its engagement with KPK and other institutions, put a strong emphasis on anti-corruption engagement with the private sector.</td>
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<td>4: <strong>Enhanced focus on whistleblower protection.</strong> POIDN should consider the relevance of including in future programming an element of research and capacity-building support to the development of further safeguards for whistleblowers.</td>
<td>Partial Accepted</td>
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<td>5: <strong>Further support to women as agents of change.</strong> POIDN should work with KPK and CSOs to further broaden the scope of SPAK, with a view in particular to encourage women in the business sector to join.</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
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<td>6: <strong>Improved project design.</strong> POIDN should ensure that some of the design weaknesses identified in the present project are addressed when designing future projects.</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
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<td>7: <strong>Enhanced focus on Training of Trainers.</strong> POIDN should ensure that the training component of future projects emphasizes a Training of Trainers approach. In this regard, POIDN should support the strengthening of Indonesia’s training institutions for staff involved in the fight against corruption.</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
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<td>8: <strong>Enhanced cooperation between anti-corruption and other anti-crime agencies.</strong> POIDN should encourage a strengthening of the cooperation and coordination between anti-corruption institutions and other relevant anti-crime agencies, including those fighting drug trafficking.</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

This is the report of the final Independent Project Evaluation of the project “Strengthening Anti-Corruption Institutions in Indonesia” (INDA03), covering the time period from October 2013 to September 2017 (end of the field mission). The project was implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Programme Office in Indonesia (POIDN), working with a range of Indonesian partner organisations: government institutions, justice sector institutions, Ministries, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), media and universities. The total approved budget for the project was US$2,505,051, with Norway as the sole donor (through the Norwegian Embassy in Indonesia).

According to the Project Document, the project was part of UNODC’s Sub-Programme 2 (Anti-Corruption) of the overall Indonesia Country Programme. The overall objective of the Country Programme was defined as providing “improved capacity to respond to and counter drugs and crime threats in Indonesia”. In addition to the sub-programme on Anti-Corruption, there were four other sub-programmes: on Transnational Organised Crime and Illicit Trafficking; Terrorism Prevention; Justice; and Drugs and HIV.

Purpose, scope and methodology of the evaluation

In order to assess the project and draw relevant lessons from its implementation, a team of two independent external evaluators, (a team leader and a team member) with combined experience in anti-corruption and evaluation methodology conducted the evaluation. According to the evaluation terms of reference (TOR) the aim of the evaluation was to seek “to provide accountability to the donor by determining whether the project objectives were met or not, assess the utilisation of resources, identify areas for improvement, and to learn lessons for executing the next phase of the project, as well as formulate a strategy after the life of the project.” The evaluation followed the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD – DAC) criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, as well as assessed partnership and cooperation, human rights and gender. It also followed a mixed-methods as well as gender-responsive evaluation methodology in line with United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) and UNODC Norms and Standards. The scope of the evaluation encompassed the entire project design and implementation period. The evaluators carried out an inception phase in September 2017, mainly based on a desk analysis of the project documentation provided by POIDN. A field visit to Jakarta took place from 25 to 29 September 2017 inclusive. During the field phase, the evaluators interviewed face-to-face or by phone stakeholders including representatives of the key participating Indonesian institutions, civil society organisations, beneficiaries, the donor, as well as staff at UNODC Headquarters in Vienna and at the Regional Office in Bangkok. They conducted an on-line and paper survey of participants in training activities and met a small focus group of training participants.
Main findings

Design

The project design was sound. The project was based on the following analysis and hypotheses:

- Indonesia was politically and legally – including via the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) – committed to fighting corruption, but lacked a comprehensive policy framework to do so effectively.
- Indonesia had a range of anti-corruption agencies, but these lacked institutional capacity, technical know-how and organisational development to effectively deal with complex “corruption scenarios”.
- The third component of the analysis was that civil society and the media had a role to play in the fight against corruption.

The logical framework was appropriate, in the sense that the flow from programme objective to outcomes and activities was rational and reflective of the intervention logic. The proposed risk mitigation approaches were realistic and reflected POIDN’s in-depth knowledge and understanding of the work of the Indonesian partner organisations. The key concerns related to project design came in part from the somewhat over-broad wording of intended outcomes, and also from the fact that the baseline was not always very clear. For example it is obvious that the capacity for "identification of corrupt practices" was there in the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) prior to the project - but the project document did not specifically say what improvements were intended during the specific project period.

Relevance

The project was very relevant in that it addressed clear needs, consistent with priorities set at national level (National Strategy for Corruption Prevention and Eradication (Stranas), and also meeting UNODC's broader strategic approach). The Indonesian stakeholders had been appropriately involved in discussing the project. It clearly also was calibrated properly to accompany Indonesia's growing skills and its evolving role as a regional hub of knowledge and good practices in the field of anti-corruption. The project was also very relevant in relation to fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially SDG16 on justice.

The analysis of the fight against corruption in the project document was sound and in line with the approach taken by the Government of Indonesia, as demonstrated by Stranas. The project built on previous projects’ engagement with KPK and other partners at national level, and therefore benefited from years of interaction. The evaluation however shows that there were needs and constraints faced by institutions at provincial level. The implementation of project activities in several provincial capitals around Indonesia was an opportunity for POIDN to help build capacity (among the police, prosecutors, court officials and judges).

Efficiency

The project represented good value for money, and made good use of UNODC's added value as UNCAC custodian, as a repository of expertise and as a hub for international and regional coordination and consultations. The project clearly benefited in that respect from UNODC's institutional expertise, its access to outside experts/trainers, and its experience of other similar projects.
In terms of project management/institutional arrangements for delivery of activities, the project also performed well. Much of the credit for this aspect can be traced to the commitment and dedication of the project team in Jakarta. It was clear that the team had strong organisational skills, as well as a good understanding of the substantial issues related to the fight against corruption and the implementation of UNCAC, and that these skills commanded respect on the part of the Indonesian stakeholders.

The project demonstrated that, in addition to formal fora for consultations, more informal dialogue should be encouraged between POIDN and stakeholders, so as to anticipate problems, address issues such as changing priorities or adapt to the demands of political decision makers. The emphasis on informal dialogue certainly helped this project achieved its outcomes.

**Partnerships and cooperation**

Interviews and document analysis showed that POIDN was effective in fostering strong partnerships: at central level with its long-standing partners, including KPK and the Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas), and at provincial level in a more tentative way. POIDN made good use of its unique position as custodian of UNCAC and hub of expertise to develop its partnerships. However, this was also dependent on POIDN maintaining an intense dialogue with Bappenas as well as with the specialised anti-corruption agencies.

**Effectiveness**

Generally the project was very effective in that the planned activities were implemented, results achieved and outcomes largely met. There was also unanimous feedback that the quality standard of activities - especially training - was good. Interviews with training participants, project progress reports and feedback from representatives of stakeholder institutions demonstrated that the project helped strengthen anti-corruption policy making in line with UNCAC. It certainly also helped enhance institutional capacity, through training and Training of Trainers (ToT). The Civil Society Organisation (CSO) side of the project was also effective. Effectiveness would have benefited further if there had been more interconnection between the outputs of the UNODC project and beneficiary agencies’ own multi-year strategies.

**Impact**

It is premature to identify specific changes as impacts of this project, bearing in mind that it was part of a continuous engagement by POIDN over many years and that other donors/institutions are also active in supporting the fight against corruption in Indonesia. The evaluators were able on the basis of interviews and document analysis to identify elements of impact, patterns or attitude changes that are likely to influence future anti-corruption activities. The survey of training participants, as well as interviews and project documentation, show that the project is likely to achieve some positive impact in terms of institutional and CSO capacity to fight corruption, and in terms of staff skills and competences. The evaluation showed that the beneficiary project partners intended to continue to deliver training using modules developed and disseminated by POIDN, adapted and further updated to meet specific agency needs. The evaluators did not identify negative or unintended impacts, except to some extent in relation to unfulfilled expectations on the part of anti-corruption institutions.

**Sustainability**

As in the case of impact, there are elements of sustainability that can be identified. They include the adoption of policies and practice consistent with UNCAC, the acquisition of new skills by government officials, and the reinforcement of the key civil society platform on the fight against
corruption. One element that could reinforce the sustainability of future projects – one that requires the cooperation of Indonesian stakeholders – would be to include an exit strategy in the initial project design, to help ensure for example that knowledge transfer from international experts is appropriately followed-up.

**Human rights and gender equality**

The project did not explicitly use a rights-based approach, but it did integrate – for example in training curricula – relevant references to non-discrimination, accountability, transparency and the rule of law. The project appears to have contributed to the promotion and protection of human rights by highlighting in training the need to reinforce due process in all aspects of the prevention and prosecution of corruption. The project, by building the capacity of CSOs to address corruption, contributed to enhancing citizens’ involvement in the fight against corruption and in the process of keeping the government accountable.

The project document noted that outcome 2, focusing on the contribution of civil society to the fight against corruption, would include a focus on “gender networks” (referring in particular to CSOs and platforms addressing women’s rights and political participation). Of particular relevance was the project’s collaboration with *Saya Perempuan Antikorupsi* (“I am a Woman against Corruption” (SPAK)), a KPK-led movement and network of women in a range of positions, committed to fight corruption. In 2017, SPAK contributed to a ToT session targeted at women in the Attorney General’s Office and in the National Police, highlighting women as agents of change in the fight against corruption. SPAK members also contributed to training and awareness-raising sessions targeting journalists.

**Main conclusions**

The project was highly relevant in that it was based on a sound analysis of the situation of the fight against corruption in Indonesia, and addressed needs that were clearly in line with the country’s commitments under UNCAC. The approach was appropriate to addressing identified needs. The approach based on three outcomes was sound, with focus on policy development and coordination; capacity building and coordination; and strengthening CSOs. However, some outcomes and outputs were over-broad.

Staff expertise in Indonesia and in UNODC Headquarters and Regional Office benefited the project. The project team identified skilled and experienced experts to provide input into the project’s activities. As a result, the project is likely to achieve some impact by contributing to changing attitudes, reinforcing political will and enhancing the skills of those fighting corruption. The work done to reinforce the legislative and regulatory framework of the fight against corruption, as well as the critical mass of participants in training sessions, are likely to enhance readiness among institutions to fight corruption.

Partnerships and cooperation were effective. The cooperation between the project team and its partners helped deliver project activities to a high quality standard. The project’s sustainability lies in legal and regulatory changes, acquired skills and capacity, enhanced networking and dialogue between government institutions and civil society. These elements should be reinforced in the future. An explicit exit strategy is lacking at this point, but the capacity exists to develop one in the final weeks of the project.

A number of elements indirectly contributed to the protection of human rights, and to a sound gender approach. Aspects of the project supported a greater degree of civil society involvement in the fight against corruption. Support to women as agents of change in the fight against corruption helped strengthen the project’s gender dimension.
Main recommendations

1. **Continued support to fight against corruption.** POIDN should continue providing input and technical advice to KPK and its other institutional partners in Indonesia, prioritising areas where UNODC has unique expertise and skills, or where long-term UNODC input is appropriate.

2. **Enhanced focus on the provincial level.** POIDN should, while maintaining engagement with KPK and other central institutions, enhance its engagement with provincial-level institutions addressing corruption, including local police forces, prosecutors and courts.

3. **Enhanced focus on the private sector.** POIDN should, while maintaining its engagement with KPK and other institutions, put a strong emphasis on anti-corruption engagement with the private sector.

4. **Enhanced focus on whistleblower protection.** POIDN should consider the relevance of including in future programming an element of research and capacity-building support to the development of further safeguards for whistleblowers.

5. **Further support to women as agents of change.** POIDN should work with KPK and CSOs to further broaden the scope of SPAK, with a view in particular to encourage women in the business sector to join.

6. **Improved project design.** POIDN should ensure that some of the design weaknesses identified in the present project are addressed when designing future projects.

7. **Enhanced focus on Training of Trainers.** POIDN should ensure that the training component of future projects emphasizes a Training of Trainers approach. In this regard, POIDN should support the strengthening of Indonesia’s training institutions for staff involved in the fight against corruption.

8. **Enhanced cooperation between anti-corruption and other anti-crime agencies.** POIDN should encourage a strengthening of the cooperation and coordination between anti-corruption institutions and other relevant anti-crime agencies, including those fighting drug trafficking.

Lessons learned and best practices

**Relationship between POIDN and its partners: need for sustained, informal exchange of information as well as formal processes.** The relationship between the project team and the project partners in Indonesia was generally good, particularly in the second half of the project period. One important factor underpinning this good relationship was the high level of the international expertise POIDN could bring to bear. It was clear that the quality of the experts identified by POIDN contributed to partners’ trust. In addition, it was important for POIDN to maintain a sustained dialogue and information exchange on project activities with the Government of Indonesia – through Bappenas – as well as with individual institutions.

**Work with CSOs**
Civil society in Indonesia is relatively strong. The media and CSOs have built a track record of investigating and denouncing corruption, and have become skilled at monitoring the work of anti-corruption agencies such as KPK. POIDN support for civil society – including the media – in the fight against corruption has been reinforced as a result of the project. POIDN should build on this record of support to further cooperate with CSOs, with a view in particular to helping strengthen civil society capacity at provincial level. The innovative work done in relation to media training
proved to be an integral part of the civil society support work that could be done by POIDN. The Women against Corruption (SPAK) movement has proved able to act as a bridge between institutions and civil society in relation to enhancing the role of women as agents of change in the fight against corruption.
## SUMMARY MATRIX OF FINDINGS, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The project was relevant in that it was based on a sound analysis of the situation in Indonesia. The project’s approach was appropriate to addressing identified needs, based on three outcomes. The project was in line with Indonesian and UNODC strategies.</td>
<td>Project proposal, grant agreement Project documentation (annual reports, etc.) UNODC country and regional programmes</td>
<td>1. <strong>Continued support to fight against corruption.</strong> POIDN should continue providing input and technical advice to KPK and its other institutional partners in Indonesia, prioritising areas where UNODC has unique expertise and skills, or where long-term UNODC input is appropriate.</td>
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<td>2. The project activities highlighted the need for further capacity building, particularly in province-based anti-corruption institutions. KPK and other central institutions are planning to conduct basic training for their staff, with less or no need for UNODC support.</td>
<td>Project progress reports, reports from training activities Interviews with POIDN project team Interviews with participants in training sessions</td>
<td>2. <strong>Enhanced focus on the provincial level.</strong> POIDN should, while maintaining engagement with KPK and other central institutions, enhance its engagement with provincial-level institutions addressing corruption, including local police forces, prosecutors and courts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. POIDN is moving, in accordance with UNODC strategy and in agreement with counterparts in</td>
<td>Project progress reports, reports from training activities</td>
<td>3. <strong>Enhanced focus on the private sector.</strong> POIDN should, while maintaining its engagement with KPK and other institutions, put a strong</td>
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1 A finding uses evidence from data collection to allow for a factual statement. In certain cases, also conclusions may be included in this column instead of findings.

2 Recommendations are proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a project/programme; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. For accuracy and credibility, recommendations should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions.
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<td>Indonesia, towards support for anti-corruption in a range of key economic sectors. Past engagement with business groups and related stakeholders has laid the groundwork for more sustained work with the private sector.</td>
<td>Interviews with POIDN project team Interviews with trainers, consultants Publications by partner organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. The project has included substantial engagement with civil society. However it included only limited support for policy advocacy, which should be considered in future projects. Indonesia has some safeguards for whistleblowers, but there is scope for additional research and policy advice to be supported by UNODC, with a view to reinforcing the mainstreaming of human rights in UNODC’s programming.</td>
<td>Interviews with POIDN project team Publications by partner organisations, other stakeholders Interviews with representatives of partner organisations, CSO representatives, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. The project was mindful of gender mainstreaming in that it kept disaggregated data on the participation of women and men in training sessions and other project activities. The project cooperated with CSOs and KPK in supporting the SPAK “Women against Corruption” initiative, including by holding a training workshop for women.</td>
<td>Interviews with POIDN project team Interviews with representatives of partner organisations, CSO representatives, etc. Project progress reports, reports from training activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. The project design was not based on an explicit theory of change approach, but it clearly set out an analysis underpinning the key outcomes and outputs built into the project. The logical framework was generally sound, but had some weaknesses, including over-broad outcome formulations and outputs that were not always</td>
<td>Project proposal, grant agreement Project progress reports, reports from training activities Interviews with representatives of partner organisations, Interview with POIDN project team</td>
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</table>
realistic in view of the project’s timeframe and resources. The logframe also lacked an explicit exit strategy.

7. The training component of the project was of a high standard. The ToT approach may help ensure that institutions mainstream training and develop the capacity to replicate training provided by UNODC, thus helping disseminate relevant skills and expertise.

The project’s sustainability depended in part on the commitment of partner institutions to support follow-up training sessions. Sustainability was in some cases hampered by uncertainty as to the extent to which partner institutions will used ToT alumni to conduct further training sessions.

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<th>7. Enhanced focus on Training of Trainers. POIDN should ensure that the training component of future projects emphasizes a Training of Trainers approach. In this regard, POIDN should support the strengthening of Indonesia’s training institutions for staff involved in the fight against corruption.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Interviews with representatives of partner organisations, CSO representatives, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interviews with participants in training sessions, POIDN project team, trainers, consultants</td>
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8. The beneficiary institutions developed effective cooperation relationships with each other, in some cases with the support of Bappenas.

INDA03’s engagement with Indonesia in all the areas under its mandate should be more integrated, so as to ensure that partners working on anti-corruption and on drug trafficking learn more from each other.

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<tr>
<th>8. Enhanced cooperation between anti-corruption and other anti-crime agencies. POIDN should encourage a strengthening of the cooperation and coordination between anti-corruption institutions and other relevant anti-crime agencies, including those fighting drug trafficking.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desk review of project documentation</td>
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<td>Interviews with representatives of partner organisations</td>
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<td>Interviews with POIDN project team</td>
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<td>UNODC country and regional programmes</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

Background and context

This is the report of the final Independent Project Evaluation of the project “Strengthening Anti-Corruption Institutions in Indonesia” (INDA03), covering the time period from October 2013 to September 2017 (end of field mission) by UNODC’s Programme Office in Indonesia (POIDN), working with a range of Indonesian partner organisations: government institutions, justice sector institutions, Ministries, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and universities. The total approved budget for the project was US$2,505,051, with Norway as the sole donor (through the Norwegian Embassy in Indonesia).

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The planned outcomes of Sub-Programme 2 on Anti-Corruption were:

(a) 2.1: Improved law enforcement response (corrupt practices identified and investigated by state agencies);

(b) 2.2: Civil society and the media (enhanced engagement of civil society and the media in implementing anti-corruption strategies);

(c) 2.3: Anti-money laundering and asset recovery (money laundering activities identified and effectively acted on, and criminal assets recovered).

The project was designed to address all three outcomes of Sub-Programme 2. The Project Document was approved by UNODC and the donor in October 2013 and effectively started in December 2013. It was revised in 2015 (one-year extension, till 31 December 2016, with adjustments to the logical framework) and in 2017 (six-months extension, till 30 June 2017, and another four-months extension till 31 October 2017). According to financial data provided by the project team, total actual spending on the project amounted to about US$2.041 million, or 85.3% of the budget (taking into account exchange rate fluctuation).

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3 The actual project budget eventually amounted to US$2.394 million, as a result of exchange rate fluctuation.

4 See: INDA03 Project Document, and Indonesia County Programme 2012-2016, Section 3.

5 The relative under-spending on the planned budget can largely be explained by the fact that the Indonesia Rupiah experienced a degree of devaluation against the US$ over the project period. The US$ gained about 15-20%
The project’s objective was formulated as follows in the logical framework (logframe): to “strengthen law enforcement capacities and enhance civil society oversight to reduce corrupt practices in Indonesia”. The formulation of the three planned outcomes of the project was identical to that of the outcomes of Sub-Programme 2 mentioned above. The key outputs under each outcome were the following (summarised from the logframe):

(a) Outcome 1: Improved law enforcement response
   a. 1.1: national law reflects UNCAC commitments
   b. 1.2: Research on the nature and extent of corruption
   c. 1.3: Law enforcement skills and knowledge developed
   d. 1.4: Case management and capabilities enhanced
   e. 1.5: Enhanced inter-agency coordination and international cooperation

(b) Outcome 2: Civil society and media
   a. 2.1: Anti-corruption fora established/strengthened
   b. 2.2: Complaint mechanisms and court monitoring systems
   c. 2.3: Support to civil society, media and academia on anti-corruption strategies

(c) Outcome 3: Anti-money laundering and asset recovery
   a. 3.1: Strengthening Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK)
   b. 3.2: Relevant legislation, policies and procedures developed and implemented
   c. 3.3: Judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials trained
   d. 3.4: Improved international cooperation

The project involved work with all the key Indonesian institutions involved in the fight against corruption, including the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Indonesian National Police (INP), Attorney General’s Office (AGO), Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK), and the Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas). The judiciary, NGOs and universities were also involved.

A wide range of activities was implemented as part of the project, according to annual progress reports. They included reviews of legislation and policies in view of UNCAC recommendations; thematic publications, workshops and seminars; training for officials in partner organisations; support to inter-agency cooperation; as well as activities involving civil society and independent experts.

Taking action after ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003, Indonesia enacted the Law number 7 of 2006, which mandated the establishment of implementing agencies and institutions in support of corruption eradication, including the KPK, against the Indonesian currency over the period, reducing project operating costs calculated in US$.

6 According to the project document, the following institutions were additional partners in the project: Supreme Court (SC); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA); Ministry of Law and Human Rights (MoL & HR); and National Statistics Agency (BPS).
INTRODUCTION

the PPATK and the Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK). During the last decade, Indonesia has shown consistent improvements in eradicating corruption. According to the World Bank, Indonesia’s rank under the “Control of corruption” indicator progressed by 27% (to 42.8 out of 100) between 2014 and 2016.\(^7\) Other observers broadly confirmed these findings, using different methodologies. For example, according to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI\(^8\)) developed by specialist non-governmental organisation Transparency International, Indonesia’s standing improved by one point to 37/100 in 2016 (last available year), ranking the country 90\(^{th}\) of 176 under consideration. From 2012, the Indonesian CPI score has improved by 5 points, which is substantial. However, corruption still remains serious impediment to Indonesia’s development.

Since 2004 the government has formulated two National Strategies for Corruption Prevention and Eradication (Stranas), which provided policy directives to all government agencies on the conduct of corruption prevention and eradication activities. The first edition of Stranas focused on prevention through the redesign and improvement of public service performance management and measurement. The strategy also prioritised enforcement action in five development sectors that have been prone to irregularities: (1) business licensing; (2) taxes and customs; (3) land registration; (4) law enforcement; and (5) labour and employment.

The second edition of Stranas, issued under a Decree signed by President H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in March 2012\(^9\), detailed a long-term vision (2012-2025) to support anti-corruption with “a system of cultural values with integrity” and detailing specific strategies on corruption prevention; law enforcement; legal and regulatory harmonisation; anti-corruption education; and monitoring of corruption eradication measures.\(^10\)

In addition, the administration of President Joko Widodo (widely known as Jokowi), elected in 2014, has reinforced Indonesia’s commitment in corruption eradication by issuing Presidential Instruction Number 10 of 2016 on the Prevention and Eradication of Corruption 2016-2017.\(^11\) The regulation consists in 31 action plans within seven high-priority areas: (1) public procurement, (2) extractive industries, (3) infrastructure, (4) private sector, (5) state revenue, (6) commerce and (7) state-owned companies.

According to figures compiled by the Anti-Corruption Clearing House (ACCH), an Internet portal coordinated by KPK, people from the business sector form the largest group of individuals accused of corruption (170 cases in 2017), while civil servants at all levels represent 150 cases, with 134 people convicted on corruption charges. The number of business sector people involved in

\(^7\) Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. Methodological details are at: [www.govindicators.org](http://www.govindicators.org)

\(^8\) This unofficial but widely used index, developed by the international NGO Transparency International, ranks countries according to their level of corruption, as perceived by a range of stakeholders and on the basis of criteria such as legislation, institutional arrangements to fight corruption, public perceptions, etc.

\(^9\) National UNODC published an English translation of this document


corruption cases has led anti-corruption agencies in Indonesia to focus on strengthening integrity in the business sector, including private and state-owned enterprises, over the last three years. The period covered by Presidential Instruction 10/2016 ended in 2017, but interviewees noted that Indonesia had not yet developed a specific process to monitor progress on implementation of anti-corruption policies. In this context the Indonesia Anti-Corruption Forum (see below), supported by UNODC, is one of the few potential sources of progress monitoring information, at least in terms of understanding the public’s experience of corruption and bribery.  

Map 1. Areas of INDA03 activities - Sources: project progress and training sessions reports

Several entities are linked and work together in corruption eradication in Indonesia:

- **The Corruption Eradication Commission.** According to the Law No. 3/2002 on the Commission for the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption (article 7), the KPK is authorized to coordinate investigations, indictments, and prosecutions against criminal acts of corruption. The KPK may also supervise other institutions whose tasks and authority are to fight corruption, as well as institutions that perform public service. In handling corruption cases, KPK departments conduct preliminary investigations, investigations, and prosecutions.

- **The Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre.** Law No. 8/2010 on “Countermeasures and Eradication of Money Laundering” established the PPATK as the independent institution tasked with preventing and eradicating money laundering. According to the law, PPATK has the following functions: prevention and eradication of money laundering; management of data and information gathering; monitoring the __________

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12 For example, at the 4\textsuperscript{th} meeting of the IACF (in 2014) a pilot project to survey local perceptions of corruption in East Kalimantan was discussed, along with the possibility of developing a provincial-level corruption perception index. To the evaluators’ knowledge, there is no current plan for a similar survey to take place at the national level.
fulfilment of financial transactions reporting; and analysis of reports of financial transactions to identify possible cases of money laundering and other criminal acts. When PPATK identifies suspicious financial transactions, it provides recommendations or inputs to relevant authorities such as the Presidency, or law enforcement agencies and judicial actors such as the KPK, the Indonesian National Police, and the Attorney General’s Office.

- The Indonesia Anti-Corruption Form (IACF). Supported by UNODC since its inception in 2010, along with Bappenas and KPK, IACF is the key civil society coordination venue in relation to the fight against corruption. The key civil society actors in the fight against corruption at national level are Transparency International Indonesia (TII), Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), and Kemitraan. Universities and individual academics also contribute to their work.

**Purpose and scope of the evaluation**

According to the evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR, appended), the evaluation seeks to provide “accountability to the donor” and to “learn lessons” relevant to subsequent project phases. The scope of the evaluation covered the entire duration of the INDA03 project. Geographically, the scope covered Indonesia as a whole, with a focus on Jakarta – where most stakeholders were based and most activities took place – while also using evidence from activities implemented outside the capital, for example through a questionnaire sent to training participants. In essence, the evaluation addressed three aspects:

- Project: the activities, outcomes and impact of the project, assessed in accordance with the standard evaluation criteria set out in the ToR.
- Lessons learned and good practices: assessment at that level attempted to identify patterns the most effective and innovative project approaches.
- Future action: the first two elements of the evaluation provided information to propose future approaches that may be integrated in future UNODC support to anti-corruption efforts in Indonesia, and globally where relevant.

**The composition of the evaluation team**

A team of two independent external evaluators conducted the evaluation under the guidance of the UNODC Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU). The team consisted of Ms Pauline Arifin, an anti-corruption expert, and of Mr Pierre Robert (team leader), a consultant with expertise in evaluation methodology and project management. They carried out an inception phase in September 2017, based on a desk analysis of the project documentation provided by UNODC and on a range of other publicly available documentation, such as research reports by non-governmental organisations and governance data compiled by international institutions such as the World Bank. A field phase consisting in a visit to Jakarta took place from 25 to 29 September 2017 inclusive. During the field
phase, the evaluators interviewed face-to-face or by phone all stakeholders, including representatives of the key participating Indonesian institutions, civil society organisations and the donor – that is, all members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) – and conducted an on-line survey of participants in training activities. They also held phone interviews with people previously involved in the project, who are no longer in Indonesia, and of relevant staff and managers at UNODC Headquarters in Vienna and at the Regional Office in Bangkok.

Evaluation methodology

The evaluation followed the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD – DAC) criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, as well as assessed partnership and cooperation, human rights and gender. It also followed a mixed-methods and gender-responsive approach in line with UNEG and UNODC evaluation norms and standards as well as requirements. The data analysis included secondary data assessed as part of the desk review as well as primary data collected during the field missions in the form of semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. Triangulation of sources, methods and theories ensured an objective and thorough analysis of all collected data, which formed the basis for formulating findings and drawing conclusions. Recommendations and lessons learned as well as best practices were derived from these analyses.

The evaluation questions were listed in the ToR; the evaluation team complemented them at inception stage by detailing judgement criteria tailored to each project outcome, and by listing the expected sources of evidence.

The evaluation team used the following information gathering tools:

**Desk analysis** – this involved studying all documentation received from the project team; compiling other relevant documentation from public sources such as government, NGOs, IGOs, academic institutions, etc.; and using those to formulate preliminary findings that were tested in the course of interviews and triangulate against other sources of information such as interviews.

**Semi-structured interviews** with a range of stakeholders, including beneficiaries of programme activities – this involved discussing the project, on the basis of the evaluation matrix, and taking into account each stakeholder’s particular area of work, level of knowledge or experience of the project, and other specificities. These interviews followed an interview guide developed at inception stage. The evaluators also made sure that interviewees were given opportunities to raise issues of their choice. Interviewees were also given time to address future needs, identify good practice that they would like to see reproduced, and raise any concern. The evaluators interviewed 18 stakeholders (eight women and ten men) representing 15 institutions (Bappenas, KPK, PPATK, etc.) in addition to the members of the POIDN project team in Jakarta and members of the UNODC Regional Office in Bangkok. The breakdown of people interviewed by gender and institution is given in Annex IV.

**A focus group meeting** was held with four participants in training sessions (three men and one woman), coming from the Financial Intelligence Unit, the National Police and the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Some participants had attended more than one training session – including one who had attended a Training of Trainers session, and one who had been used as a resource person after attending training himself.
Survey. The UNODC project team assisted the evaluators in circulating a short online and paper survey of participants in training activities, which the evaluators used as a tool for triangulation. The added value of the survey was to obtain the views of a key set of project beneficiaries, who might not otherwise be heard through interviews or focus group meetings. The survey was administered in Bahasa Indonesia. The English version and the analysis of the results are appended to this report. The evaluators received 57 responses in total from staff at four institutions: FIU (3 respondents); MoL & HR (6); INP (34); AGO (11) – three further respondents did not specify the name of their institution. The vast majority of respondents were female (52 out of 57 respondents), which is probably indicative of gender differences in attitudes toward training.

The evaluators have received extensive information from UNODC. This covered the design of each component, activities, outputs and outcomes achieved, as well as information on the management and reporting systems. In addition, the evaluators researched additional publicly available information about each of the partner organisations and civil society organisations (CSOs) involved, and reviewed relevant anti-corruption legislation and regulations.

In addition to meeting stakeholders in Jakarta, the team also conducted phone/Skype interviews with a number of informants who were not based there: workshop facilitators, mentors and other technical advisors who conducted short-term missions to Indonesia as part of the project. This included interviews with staff members of UNODC Headquarters who provided inputs in various activities.

Limitations and constraints to the evaluation

As anticipated in the inception report, one constraint affecting the evaluation was that, since the project was initially designed and started in 2013, some of the staff and managers involved at the time had moved on to different posts. The evaluators mitigated this constraint by conducting two interviews by phone with former project team members, and analysing reports and documentation used at the time of the project’s design.

Other constraints and limitations were addressed as follows:

- Limited participation in focus group meeting: despite invitations and reminders, there was low attendance at the planned focus group meeting (see above). This was compensated by the fact that the participants who did join the meeting engaged in detailed discussion, and had a broad knowledge of the project, gained inter alia through taking part in follow-up training sessions and through familiarity with feedback given to them by colleagues.
- Lack of visits to training locations outside Jakarta: all institutional and NGO partners were based in Jakarta, and the evaluators could gain a well-rounded view of the project through the interviews they conducted there. However, they could not meet staff in locations outside the capital, where training needs are widely said to be acute. They could mitigate this limitation, in part, by discussing the training process with trainers themselves (and with UNODC project team members who attended many of the sessions), and by reviewing the reports prepared by UNODC staff after each session.
II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

Design

Intervention logic

The Project Document described corruption as a “serious impediment to Indonesia’s development” and the fight against corruption a “major priority of the reform era”\(^{14}\). To set the project into the context of Indonesia’s policy to fight corruption, the Project Document includes an introduction that provides an overall timeline of key steps taken by Indonesia in the fight against corruption prior to the project. These steps included the ratification of UNCAC\(^{15}\) in 2006 (the first review of Indonesia’s UNCAC implementation took place in 2010, the second took place in the fourth quarter of 2017), and the promulgation in 2012 of the Stranas, referred to in the introduction to this report. The Stranas includes visions for the long-term (2012-2025) and the medium term (2012-2014), and addresses them through five missions, consistent with the provisions of UNCAC. An analysis of the project document and interviews with stakeholders demonstrate that the project’s planned outcomes and outputs were consistent with Indonesia’s national strategies, as set out in the 2012 Stranas. The table on the next page visualises the linkages between the Stranas missions and the project’s outcomes and outputs.

As the table makes clear, the Stranas clearly forms the bedrock of the project design in the sense that the three outcomes of the INDA03 project are consistent with the missions set out in this national strategy. Moreover, the design of the project also took account of a training needs assessment conducted during the design phase by POIDN and other agencies, including the Indonesia-Australia Legal Development Facility (IALDF) for KPK, AGO, INP, Supreme Audit Board (BPK), PPATK and the Anti-Corruption Court. Several interviewees highlighted the appropriateness of the project design to Indonesia’s needs, noting for example the crucial importance of ensuring that police investigators and prosecutors should share a common understanding of technical issues such as asset recovery and the management of financial intelligence, failing which cases risk collapsing when brought to court. A number of interviewees also noted – consistent with the needs assessment and the project document – that staff capacities across the beneficiary institutions had progressed, but that training had to remain a priority, particularly in relation to investigators and prosecutors (as well as judges) in jurisdictions outside Jakarta.

\(^{14}\) The term “reform era” refers to Indonesia’s democratization following the 1998 resignation of former President Suharto.

\(^{15}\) https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf
Table 1: linkages between 2012 Stranas missions and INDA03 project outcomes and outputs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stranas-PPK missions</th>
<th>Linkages</th>
<th>Project Outcomes and outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To build and establish an integrated national system, mechanism, capacity for preventing and taking action against corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td>1: Improved law enforcement response</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1 National legislation, policies and strategies on corruption reflect commitments under UNCAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>To reform the national laws and regulations that support corruption prevention and eradication (CPE) in a consistent, consolidated, and systematic manner</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Information generated and available on the nature and extent of corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>To build and consolidate a system and mechanism for confiscating assets gained from corruption through effective national and international cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3 Knowledge and skills of law enforcement enhanced to prevent and detect corruption, in line with Indonesia’s bureaucratic reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To build and internalize an anti-corruption culture among the government structure and the society</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.4 Case management systems and capabilities enhanced</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5 Enhanced inter-agency coordination and international cooperation on countering corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To develop and publicize a system for reporting the performances in implementing CPE</td>
<td></td>
<td>2: Civil society and media</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.1 Anti-corruption forums and networks established and strengthened</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 Court monitoring and complaint-post mechanisms established and sustained in agreed high priority areas</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 Civil society groups, media and academia are supported to implement anti-corruption strategies</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3: Anti-money laundering and asset recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1 PPATK is strengthened in line with its own capacity building plans</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 Legislation, policies and procedures on money laundering and asset recovery developed and implemented effectively</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.3 Judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials qualified to implement money laundering and asset recovery regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.4 Mechanisms for more effective international cooperation developed and implemented on MLA and AR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: INDA03 project document, Stranas.\(^{16}\)

\(^{16}\) The table does not attempt to show all the possible linkages, it seeks to preserve clarity by focusing on key links.
In addition, the Project Document also took account of previous project experience to set out “observations\(^\text{17}\)”\(^\text{17}\), including the following:

- A number of “promising legal developments” had taken place in Indonesia since 2004;
- There was a strong stated commitment by the government to fight corruption;
- Nevertheless there were “weaknesses in the system” including in particular (according to the Project Document):
  - Indonesian law enforcement agencies “often inadequately equipped to deal with complex corruption scenarios”;
  - Need to “raise investigative and managerial abilities” in the key anti-corruption agencies;
  - Training curricula need updating and to take a more practical approach. There was a need “to institutionalise anti-corruption training”; and
  - The KPK needs support to fulfil all of its mandate (coordination with other agencies as well as repressive, preventive and monitoring functions).

In this context, the logic of the intervention was based at first on UNODC’s status as the custodian of UNCAC and the Convention on Transnational Organised Crime. According to the Project Document and the project team, the INDA03 project followed on from two earlier projects in Indonesia, which ran broadly concurrently and ended in late 2013\(^\text{18}\). The projects had begun addressing the capacity building and training needs identified above, and also supported a stakeholder forum for policy and strategy dialogue about the fight against corruption. These projects, together with a separate project\(^\text{19}\) on strengthening judicial integrity and capacity, laid the groundwork for the present project, whose strategy was to build on the momentum achieved by the earlier activities, taking into account the action of other actors such as the World Bank (which worked with UNODC on a Stolen Asset Recovery initiative).

The project was therefore based on the following analysis and hypotheses:

- Indonesia was politically and legally (including via UNCAC) committed to fighting corruption, but needed further support to develop a comprehensive policy framework to do so effectively.

\(^\text{17}\) See INDA03 Project Document, p. 7.

\(^\text{18}\) See INDA03 Project Document, p. 12. The first project, entitled “Strengthening the capacity of anti-corruption institutions in Indonesia” (IDNT71) was funded by Norway and provided “specialised training programmes” and aimed “to build the technical capabilities of key agencies to execute the Government of Indonesia’s initiatives to check corruption and recover lost assets”, as well as supporting an anti-corruption campaign to increase public awareness through small grants. This project ended in May 2013. The other project (IDNT81, “Support to the fight against corruption in Indonesia”) was funded by the EU to “strengthen the KPK”; provide training to staff at KPK and other relevant agencies, and support the implementation of the Stranas-PPK through the creation of a stakeholder forum and other mechanisms. This project ended in December 2013.

\(^\text{19}\) See INDA03 Project Document, p. 13. The project, entitled “Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Capacity in Indonesia”, supported the development and implementation of action plans for strengthening judicial integrity and capacity in the provinces of South East Sulawesi and South Sumatra.
The key hypothesis in this respect was that there would be continuing support for the fight against corruption, from the top level of the government and from the legislature.

- Indonesia had a range of anti-corruption agencies, which needed further support to enhance institutional capacity, technical know-how and organisational development to effectively deal with complex “corruption scenarios”. Meanwhile the coordination and mutual support among the agencies was not as complete as desirable.
  - The key hypothesis in this respect was that the capacity of the agencies could be developed through training and technical assistance, and that there was scope to establish national, sustainable training mechanisms that could in future function with minimal external support.

- The third component of the analysis was that civil society and the media (and other independent stakeholders such as academics) had a role to play in the fight against corruption, by providing avenues for complaint and supporting complainants and whistle-blowers, and by monitoring and keeping institutions accountable on their work against corruption.
  - The key hypothesis in this respect was that the fight against corruption required the involvement of all actors of society, and that members of the public could be encouraged to take action against corruption, thus reducing its incidence and fighting a culture of silence and fear that may exist among vulnerable social groups in this respect.

Although the Project Document itself did not include an explicit theory of change, it did include the above analysis and implicit hypotheses. These in effect outlined a theory of change, which held that activities such as research and legislative work, capacity building and training, as well as outreach to civil society, were able to enhance momentum in Indonesia towards sustainable, independent national mechanisms to fight corruption, in keeping with Indonesia’s international commitments under UNCAC and other international instruments, including human rights standards.

On the basis of interviews with the project team and all stakeholders as well as informants, and feedback with participants in training sessions, the evaluators have concluded that the theory of change on the basis of which the project was designed was sound, and captured key challenges and opportunities facing the fight against corruption in Indonesia. In the view of many stakeholders, the project could comprehensively address the “weakness” identified above concerning the updating of training curricula. Other issues, such as agencies’ dealing with complex cases and the need to raise administrative or management capacities, were seen to be of a longer-term nature. While the design of the project was appropriate to address them to an extent, further support remains necessary.

**Stakeholder consultations**

Stakeholder consultations took place in the planning process for this project, and needs expressed by stakeholders at the time were taken into account, according to project documents and interviews. Nevertheless, needs expressed ahead of time by stakeholders may have differed somewhat from actual needs experienced when the project activities started, over a year later. To some extent this situation is unavoidable and the project's relevance can be maintained provided there is enough flexibility built into the design, which appears to have been the case.
However, future projects would benefit from consultations with stakeholders that take a longer-term view of needs, based on strategic reviews conducted by stakeholders themselves, to develop a multi-year understanding of the evolution of their work, needs and operational constraints. Such reviews should take into account both the current Indonesian legal framework and the broader set of UNCAC obligations and commitments that Indonesia should fulfil in the future.

**Design of the logical framework**

The logframe was generally sound in the sense that the flow from programme objective to outcomes and activities was rational and reflective of the intervention logic. The logframe also included appropriate risk assessment and mitigation approaches – which were unusually detailed since they went down to the level of each output. The proposed risk mitigation approaches were appropriate and realistic, and reflected POIDN’s in-depth knowledge and understanding of the work of the Indonesian partner organisations, as well as lessons learned from the consultations conducted during the design phase.

The outcomes and outputs of the logframe (summarised above in the introduction chapter of this report) were in line with UNCAC and logically connected with one another. However, the formulation of the outcomes was excessively broad and did not specifically indicate what progress the project was expected to deliver. Outcome 1, for example read: “Improve law enforcement response – corrupt practices identified and investigated by state agencies”. This is a very general statement that fails to capture what particular advances the project should deliver. Outcome 2, by contrast, was clearer, in that it called for “enhanced engagement of civil society and the media in implementing anti-corruption strategies”. Outcome 3 (“money laundering activities identified and effectively acted on and criminal assets recovered”) also read more like a general statement of purpose than a specific description of what the project should achieve with regard to money laundering and asset recovery.

In addition, the logframe had two weaknesses:

- Although the indicators were generally appropriate, some lacked specificity. For example, the reference to “capacity (…) enhanced” under Outcome 1 does not say clearly what level of achievement is expected. Indicators under Outcome 2 also lack clarity: they seem to focus on process aspects (existence of feedback from CSOs and media) rather than substance. Indicators under Output 2.2 on the court system are also somewhat unclear, as they fail to specify the level of improvement that is expected in this field.

- The structure of the logframe, which includes bullet points on “Activities” under each Output, is also somewhat confusing because it suggest that each activity should serve to deliver one output only. However in practice, a given activity (such as a training session for example) is likely to be able to contribute to the delivery of more than one output, and indeed more than one outcome.

It might be helpful for future UNODC logframes to list activities in a separate section, to avoid suggesting a one-to-one link between activities and outputs. In addition, it would be useful for the logframe to include more information about each envisioned activity.

In concluding this section, it is worth asking whether – and how – the project design could have been improved. The findings above, concerning the need for ongoing stakeholder consultations to update training needs assessments, and concerning the formulation of aspects of the logframe, point to possible improvements but do not suggest any fundamental weakness in the design of the project.
Indeed, it is clear on the contrary that the overall design of the project was excellent and in line with both Indonesia’s strategic demands and needs, and UNODC’s own policies and programming approaches. It is therefore suggested that a future project design should refine the theory of change of the present project, but not necessarily re-create an entirely new one, since the theory of change has been of demonstrable appropriateness to the particular set of needs addressed here.

**Summary - Design**

The project design was sound. The logical framework was appropriate, in the sense that the flow from programme objective to outcomes and activities was rational and reflective of the intervention logic. The proposed risk mitigation approaches were realistic and reflected POIDN’s in-depth knowledge and understanding of the work of the Indonesian partner organisations. The key concerns related to project design were mainly related to the somewhat over-broad wording of intended outcomes.

**Relevance**

**Evaluation questions:**

- To what extent was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of national partner organisations, i.e. Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Bappenas, law enforcement agencies (INP, AGO), judiciary, and civil society organisations?
- To what extent was the project relevant to the implementation of UNODC’s Country Programme in Indonesia as well as UNODC’s overall strategic framework and other UN strategies in the region?
- To what extent are the outputs, outcomes and objectives of this project relevant to implementing the Sustainable Development Goals?

The project was very relevant in that it addressed clear needs and was consistent with priorities set at national level (Stranas, and also meeting UNODC’s broader strategic approach). Interviews with stakeholders’ representatives and the POIDN project team made clear that the Indonesian partner institutions had been appropriately involved in discussing the project. It clearly also was calibrated properly to accompany Indonesia’s growing skills and its evolving role as a regional hub of knowledge and good practices in the field of anti-corruption. The project was also very relevant in relation to fulfilling SDG16 on justice, especially targets 16.5 (reduction of corruption and bribery) and 16.6 (institutional accountability and transparency). More indirectly, the project is relevant to

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20 Under Output 1.2, the project aimed at supporting the generation of information on the nature and extent of corruption. Some of this information could be used to assess the fulfilment of the indicators under the two SDG targets. However, the project focused on improving the collection of data on corruption cases and on other data-related issues of direct interest to investigators and prosecutors. This is in contrast to the SDG approach, which emphasises the measurement of the targets’ achievement very much based on social research (for example on the proportion of citizens who had to bribe an official to obtain a service, or on citizens’ degree of satisfaction with the justice system). In that sense the project is more closely aligned with UNCAC than with the SDG targets and indicators.
SDGs on climate, health and education in that it may ultimately contribute to improving integrity in such sectors as forestry, the extractive industries and the delivery of government services.

Analysis of project documentation and interviews with stakeholders demonstrated that the project identified substantial needs in relation to the fight against corruption and addressed those in ways that were fully in line with UNCAC. As mentioned above, the project design was based on a sound overview of the respective mandates and needs of KPK, the police, the AGO, and other key institutions working on anti-corruption issues.

Beyond the state actors’ beneficiaries, the project strategy took into account the institutional development, legal environment and capacity of CSOs. As a result, it is evident that the CSO component of the project was also relevant, in that it identified a clear need for support and provided it in a targeted and strategic manner.

**Relevance at project outcome and output levels**

Each of the project’s three outcomes was relevant to the needs of Indonesia in terms of capacity building and fulfilment of UNCAC commitments (as well as in terms of implementation of UNODC’s Country and Regional Programme and strategies). This finding emerges clearly from the above overview of the project design and from interviews with stakeholders and respondents to the online survey, who unanimously viewed the project as responding to key needs and as consistent with the country’s national strategy.

Against this overall positive background, however, some outputs were of less direct relevance to the aim of the project, at least in the way they were formulated. These were:

- **Output 1.2 (information generated and available on the nature and extent of corruption).** As was made clear in interviews with KPK, project team members and NGOs, this output was formulated in an over-ambitious manner, making full delivery difficult in the context of the project. This was because substantial additional research capacity – on the part of Indonesian stakeholder as well as UNODC – would have been necessary to meet the required indicators. For example, a full database of corruption cases would require a degree of coordination among anti-corruption agencies, prosecutors and police, which could not be achieved during the project period, as was made clear by several stakeholders. A public perception survey, as suggested in the project document, was also an over-ambitious endeavour in the time and with the budget available. It is suggested that a narrower formulation of this output, with less ambitious indicators, would have been more achievable. For example, the output could have been limited to gathering and analysing existing information about corruption cases.

- **Output 2.2 (court monitoring and complaint-post mechanisms established and sustained in agreed high-priority areas).** The output was probably over-ambitious in raising the expectation that it could be extended to provincial courts, under the authority of the Supreme Court. While the principles of court monitoring and complaint-post mechanisms are sound, stakeholders with knowledge of institutional capacity in provincial courts were doubtful that conditions existed during the project period to deliver this output. This concern was reinforced by the fact that most of the project’s activities (except for training) were concentrated at the national capital level. Indeed, the main action taken during the project to deliver this output has been to support the development of policies and institutional processes to enhance monitoring. It is suggested that a more modest formulation of the output, focusing on what was in fact done (provision of technical assistance to develop guidelines and advice on processes), would have been more relevant.
Relevance to individual institutions

All stakeholders agreed that the training sessions, workshops and seminars were highly relevant to the needs of the Indonesian institutions. Some felt, however, that training sessions were not always sufficiently tailored to specific issues within institutions’ mandates – such as asset recovery, financial intelligence, etc. Personnel who had attended several training sessions, in particular, expressed the hope that future sessions could be more focused on narrow thematic topics, to be addressed in more depth. Nevertheless these interlocutors also recognised that the sessions remained relevant to police investigators, prosecutors and judges. They noted that personnel based in Jakarta had a greater level of skills than their counterparts at provincial level, for whom a large number of “standard” training sessions running through the basics of the fight against corruption would remain necessary for years to come. On the other hand, specialists in KPK and other Jakarta institutions expressed hope that sessions could be developed to address topics such as the detection of money laundering, financial crime investigation, asset recovery, drafting of Mutual Legal Assistance requests, etc.

Improving relevance?

Could the project have been made more relevant, beyond the minor remarks on outputs made above? This question can be answered, on the basis of interviews, the focus group discussion and written reports, by considering the following aspects:

(a) In terms of overall analysis of the fight against corruption, there is no ground to believe that a different problem analysis would have made the project more relevant. The analysis was sound and shared by the Government of Indonesia, as demonstrated by the project’s alignment with Stranas (see Table 1 above).

(b) The project built on previous projects’ engagement with KPK and other partners at national level, and therefore benefited from years of interaction. Although this did not necessarily translate into unconditional mutual understanding, the record of collaboration ensured that UNODC had a sound understanding of the strengths of KPK and the other institutions, and of the constraints on their operations.

(c) The same could perhaps not be said about the needs and constraints faced by institutions at provincial level. The implementation of project activities in several provincial capitals around Indonesia was an opportunity for UNODC to help build capacity (among the police, prosecutors, court officials and judges). These activities also highlighted the continuing need to develop institutional capacity at provincial level. Jakarta-based KPK and government officials interviewed by the evaluators stated that they too became more aware of this need, partly as a result of their participation in UNODC-supported training sessions. The capacity gap between the national and provincial levels is one cause of the weaker relevance of output 2.2, as described above.

(d) One issue that the project did not directly address under the outcome on civil society and the media concerned policy advocacy. Capacity development was provided through training for the media (involving also civil society organisations) and IACF meetings were supported, thus helping civil society develop strategies to improve transparency and accountability in a range of sectors including education and health, natural resources management, public sector service delivery, etc. However support to IACF to conduct
policy advocacy as a form of follow-up to Forum meetings could have helped further advance the transparency and integrity agendas.

Within the limited financial and human resources of the project, it was clear therefore that it was impossible to meet more than a fraction of the capacity-building needs at provincial level, while at the same time building capacity in Jakarta.

In 2017, as the project ends, the situation is now different. Capacity at Jakarta level is appropriate, and the project helped support processes for training and skills development that will require less international input in the future, thanks to the momentum achieved. It is therefore going to be both relevant and logistically realistic to prioritise capacity building at provincial level in future UNODC work in Indonesia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary - Relevance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The project was very relevant, in that it addressed clear needs, consistent with priorities set at national level and also meeting UNODC's broader strategic approach. The Indonesian stakeholders had been appropriately involved in discussing the project. It clearly also was calibrated properly to accompany Indonesia's growing skills and its evolving role as a regional hub of knowledge and good practices in the field of anti-corruption. The project was also very relevant in relation to fulfilling the SDGs, especially SDG16 on justice. The project built on previous projects’ engagement with KPK and other partners at national level, and therefore benefited from years of interaction. The evaluation however shows that there were needs and constraints faced by institutions at provincial level. The implementation of project activities in several provincial capitals around Indonesia was an opportunity for POIDN to help build capacity (among the police, prosecutors, court officials and judges).</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Efficiency</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation questions:</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ To what extent were inputs converted into outputs in a cost-efficient and timely manner, and how have unexpected causes of delay been managed?</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ To what extent have all planned outputs been delivered in a logical sequence and with high quality?</td>
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The project generally represented good value for money, and made good use of UNODC's added value as UNCAC custodian, as a repository of expertise, and as a hub for international and regional coordination and consultations. This is made clear by the analysis of project progress reports and by a review of the project budget. Feedback from interviews showed that the project benefited in that respect from UNODC's institutional expertise, its access to outside experts/trainers, and its experience of other similar projects. The evaluators found that the project was also efficient in that the project team and POIDN management were generally proactive and took timely measures to address project implementation issues. Nevertheless, efficiency was somewhat hampered by project management difficulties in the early period of implementation, and by some administrative delays that affected participants in training sessions. These issues are reviewed in detail below.
Value for money

On the basis of the project documentation, the efficiency of the project in terms of value for money seems appropriate in view of the expenses incurred, the quality of the expertise of the staff and consultants involved, and in terms of adaptation to operational constraints. The project budget was US$2.394 million over 48 months (including the no-cost extension). The main areas of spending are summarised in the table below.

Table 2: INDA03 main spending areas, 2014-2017. Sources: funding agreement, project progress reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main area of spending</th>
<th>Share of budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International experts (trainers, technical advisors)</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International consultants (research, etc.)</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other personal costs (project team, etc.)</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training sessions (logistics, accommodation, allowances, etc.)</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other meetings, workshops and seminars</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (equipment, operating expenses, evaluation, etc.)</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment to POIDN</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All other areas of spending (equipment, operating expenses, evaluation, etc.) other than the payment to POIDN (11.5%) represented, together, less than 10% of the budget. The distribution of costs was therefore clearly in line with the project objectives and its logical framework: the largest single area of spending was on training and workshops (which together represented almost 40% of the budget), while the other main expenses concerned personnel costs – experts, consultants, POIDN staff – also about 40% of the total. This distribution of costs is to be expected for a project of this nature, which relies heavily on human resources. It is to be noted that equipment expenses were minor in this case, since the project did not include the procurement of such items as computer systems, case management software, etc.

The expertise and skills of the project team, trainers and consultants supported by the project were of a high standard, as exemplified by training sessions, for civil servants as well as the media (among other stakeholders), which were widely praised by participants. Similarly, training materials have also been of a high standard, according to reports and project documentation. As a result, the evaluators take the view that the project’s inputs in terms of financial and human resources were commensurate with its outputs.
Despite this, the project suffered from administrative problems. A three-months long gap in activities occurred in late 2015 when UNODC, as part of the UN Secretariat, switched to a new financial reporting system known as Umoja. Because the issuance of payments to third parties was interrupted during the changeover (due in part to the need to train staff) project activities had to be suspended. This gap in implementation was later more than compensated by a no-cost extension.

Of more consequence for the day-to-day running of the project was that the new Umoja system made it somewhat more complex than before to organise training events because it requires detailed information about each participant, weeks in advance of training events. This makes it difficult to replace planned participants who cancel at short notice (who may be police officers deployed on a case). Participants have also complained of long delays in receiving their travel allowance. These problems with Umoja are well known to UNODC and are difficult to circumvent. While not fundamental, dealing with these issues has by all accounts increased the workload of the project team.

**Project management**

In terms of project management/institutional arrangements for delivery of activities, the project also performed well. Much of the credit for this aspect can be traced to the commitment and dedication of the project team in Jakarta. It was clear that the team had strong organisational skills, as well as a good understanding of the substantial issues related to the fight against corruption and the implementation of UNCAC, and that these skills commanded respect on the part of the Indonesian stakeholders. Interviews with Indonesian stakeholders made clear that the project team’s skill at cooperating and sharing information with their national partners played a key role in ensuring an atmosphere of trust conducive to the effective implementation of the project.

The project was implemented by the POIDN project team. The Programme Governance Committee (PGC), consisting of the Bappenas, MoFA and POIDN, monitored the project and approved work plans. The involvement of Bappenas in project governance was important because the official in charge was a senior official who could report directly to the Minister.

Nevertheless, some reports and interviews suggested that an issue of trust arose during the first year of the project, between KPK and POIDN. POIDN overcame the problem by pro-actively nurturing relationships and providing constant, formal and informal, feedback to Indonesian stakeholders, starting with Bappenas. While the evaluators were not in a position to ascertain the entire series of events that led to the temporary breakdown of trust (which was then restored), the episode was a reminder of key facts, which can be summarised as follows:

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An example of administrative difficulty is that the Umoja system requires every payee (including individual participants at training sessions who receive a travel or subsistence allowance) to provide bank account details. KPK personnel face the particular problem that KPK rules (designed precisely to prevent corruption) forbid them from communicating their bank account details to outside entities. As a result, some KPK officers simply avoid taking part in some UNODC training sessions.

It should be noted that, at the time of the evaluators’ visit to Indonesia, the project “team” was effectively reduced to one Project Officer (with management oversight by the Country Manager). The team had access to an additional staff member during earlier phases of the project. However, the task of coordinating with the various stakeholders, as well as organizing training sessions and other events, essentially fell on one individual.
The fight against corruption is a very sensitive matter, inter alia because it involves matters of national sovereignty and because accusations of corruption may be used for political gain. In this context, the actions of international actors such as POIDN may easily be misconstrued as biased or partial.

Effective consultation channels are necessary. Senior representatives of all stakeholders concerned must be able to meet reasonably frequently, and to receive regular progress reports if they do not meet.

It is prudent to hold a mix of formal and informal exchanges between POIDN and its institutional interlocutors. In addition to formal fora for consultations, a more informal dialogue should be encouraged between POIDN and stakeholders, so as to anticipate problems, address issues such as changing priorities or adapting to the demands of political decision makers (interviews made clear that the existence of informal dialogue certainly helped this project achieve its outcomes).

Summary - Efficiency

The project represented good value for money, and made good use of UNODC’s added value as UNCAC custodian, as a repository of expertise and as a hub for international and regional coordination and consultations. The project clearly benefited in that respect from UNODC’s institutional expertise, its access to outside experts/trainers, and its experience of other similar projects.

In terms of project management/institutional arrangements for delivery of activities, the project also performed well. Much of the credit for this aspect can be traced to the commitment and dedication of the project team in Jakarta. It was clear that the team had strong organisational skills, as well as a good understanding of the substantial issues related to the fight against corruption and the implementation of UNCAC, and that these skills commanded respect on the part of the Indonesian stakeholders.

The project demonstrated that, in addition to formal fora for consultations, more informal dialogue should be encouraged between POIDN and stakeholders, so as to anticipate problems, address issues such as changing priorities or adapt to the demands of political decision-makers. The emphasis on informal dialogue certainly helped this project achieve its outcomes.

Partnerships and cooperation

Evaluation questions:

- To what extent have partnerships been sought and established (including UN agencies) and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance?
- To what extent were efficient cooperation arrangements established (e.g. between UNODC and Government at national and local levels, donors, other UN agencies, and other relevant partners)?

Interviews and document analysis showed that POIDN was effective in fostering strong partnerships with two types of stakeholders: the key agencies mandated to fight corruption (KPK, PPATK, INP and AGO, etc.); and on the other hand with Bappenas.
The partnership between POIDN and the anti-corruption institutions was key to the sound design of the project, including the identification of training needs and other outputs. This partnership clearly benefited from the long-standing engagement of UNODC in Indonesia. Nevertheless the temporary breakdown in trust between KPK and POIDN, which occurred early in the project implementation period, demonstrated that partnership needed to be nurtured on an ongoing basis through extensive consultations at senior levels between POIDN and KPK. Similar consultations took place with the other partner institutions. At a more technical level of interaction, interviewees reported that trust was restored in part through the quality of the international expertise mobilised by the project team, and in part through the explicit commitment of the project team to consulting and liaising intensively with their counterparts in the beneficiary institutions. The involvement of the donor (Norwegian Embassy) also reportedly contributed to reinforcing the partnership between POIDN and the beneficiary institutions.

The partnership with Bappenas was also essential to the effective implementation of the project, for slightly different reasons. Whereas POIDN’s engagement with the individual anti-corruption institutions was based on their respective legal mandates and on meeting their training and capacity building needs, the engagement with Bappenas was of a different nature: Bappenas’ role in this case was to ensure that POIDN’s contribution was consistent with Indonesia’s overall development strategy, taking into account other aspects of engagement. Bappenas also reportedly contributed to the dialogue between the anti-corruption institutions and POIDN. According to interviews, the change in programme monitoring process from the initial Steering Committee approach to a Programme Governance Committee approach, in 2015, also contributed to improving the partnership with Bappenas.

The partnership with Bappenas was important, partly because Bappenas was not merely acting as a facilitator for the project implementation – it was a fully fledged actor in the definition of the project’s approach, and also in ensuring buy-in for that approach on the part of the senior levels of Indonesia’s government, including the Office of the President. This is because Bappenas has a mandate to coordinate the various line ministries and overseeing the beneficiary institutions in terms of their use of development assistance funding – and additionally claims a role monitoring international assistance to civil society organisations. Officials interviewed by the evaluators noted that Bappenas monitored the performance of individual ministries in the delivery of the project, thus playing a central role in overseeing the contribution of the Indonesian institutions to the delivery of the project’s outputs.

The third element of partnership involved civil society and the media. Civil society was grouped into the IACF, where the main actors are Transparency International Indonesia, Indonesia Corruption Watch, and Kemitraan. Universities are also represented in this forum. The project involved support for IACF meetings, but the relationship between the project and civil society was much wider ranging. Civil society organisations were frequently invited by the project team or the partner institutions to attend workshops and public events, and interviews showed that there were frequent informal consultations with civil society representatives. The relationship with the media was by nature more arms-length, since it was important for POIDN not to appear to be conducting a public relation exercise. However the training session aimed at journalists on investigating and raising awareness about corruption was highly praised by those involved, and clearly contributed both to enhancing the image of UNODC and to building the capacity of the Indonesian media to address corruption.23

23 The partnership with civil society and the media laid the groundwork for further collaboration. As mentioned
As mentioned in the Efficiency section of this report, the project’s achievements owed a lot to the dedication and commitment of the project team, and to timely action taken to address implementation concerns as they arose. This included reacting to the breakdown of trust period, alluded to above. The commitment and skills of the project team and of POIDN as a whole in developing and nurturing the above partnerships were important drivers of the project’s success.

At the risk of stretching the concept of partnership, it might be argued that the project lacked a sufficiently elaborated “partnership” with one set of stakeholders: the business sector. This was justified in the context of this project, where the focus was firmly on support to institutional capacity building and civil society collaboration. This is also not to say that the business sector was ignored: the project collaborated with the Alliance for Integrity (an international business integrity NGO) and Germany’s Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in holding a two-day anti-corruption conference in Medan in March 2017. The conference, while addressing transparency in public services, also focussed on “strengthening public integrity”, using private sector (as well as UNODC and KPK) resource people, for an audience of government officials and business people, as well as civil society representatives. This initiative was not unique and the IACF regularly invites business people to its meetings.

As POIDN moves towards more capacity building in specific economic sectors such as forestry/natural resources and trade, it is likely that it will enhance its partnership with the business sector by addressing chambers of commerce, commercial courts, trade associations, etc., and by supporting the development of integrity guidelines directed at the business sector.

It is worth asking in this context whether UNODC was able to take advantage of its unique position as an international institution and of its comparative advantage to achieve results that could not necessarily be achieved, had support come from other donors. Three elements of response stand out:

- UNODC’s involvement in the fight against corruption is long-standing and legitimate, as it is the custodian of UNCAC. This is important in view of the political sensitivity of the fight against corruption.
- In addition to its legitimacy, UNODC also gained respect by demonstrating its own expertise – for example by bringing some of its own experts to Indonesia when needed, which helped it gain (or re-gain) the trust of the institutions.
- While other entities (such as bilateral agencies) could have implemented some of this project, they could not have played the role UNODC did in relation to helping Indonesia meet its commitments under UNCAC.

Summary - Partnerships and cooperation

Interviews and document analysis showed that POIDN was effective in fostering strong partnerships: at central level with its long-standing partners, including KPK and the Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas), and at provincial level in a more tentative way. Elsewhere in this report, it would be appropriate for future UNODC support to IACF to include the development and support to the implementation of a policy advocacy strategy.
POIDN made good use of its unique position as custodian of UNCAC and hub of expertise to develop its partnerships. However, this was also dependent on POIDN maintaining an intense dialogue with Bappenas as well as with the specialised anti-corruption agencies.

Effectiveness

Evaluation questions:

- To what extent did the project achieve its planned objective and outcomes?
- To what extent did the quality of the outcomes meet national partner organisations’ needs?
- To what extent were appropriate measures taken to mitigate unplanned negative and positive effects on target groups contributing to results produced and services provided?

Overview

On the basis of project progress reports analysis and of feedback received from interviewees and participants in training sessions, the evaluators found that the project was generally effective in that substantial progress was made towards achieving the three planned outcomes, which together contributed to progress towards the project’s overall objective. Within each outcome area, the majority of outputs were achieved to a satisfactory degree. Stakeholders widely took the view that the quality standard of activities – especially training – was good.

The project helped strengthen anti-corruption policy-making in line with UNCAC, as demonstrated by the progress reports. It certainly also helped enhance institutional capacity through training and ToT. The CSO side of the project was also effective. The project contributed to the enhancement of institutional and operational capacity of anti-corruption agencies, and to improving inter-agency cooperation through improved training, seminars and joint monitoring and evaluation of UNCAC.

The key concerns related to effectiveness were related to the over-broad wording of the intended outcomes and of some outputs – as noted above in the Design section – and to the fact that the baseline was not always very clear. For example it is obvious that the capacity for "identification of corrupt practices" was there in KPK prior to the project, but the project document did not specifically say what improvements were intended during the project period. This is a common problem with projects that provide training because it is difficult to directly link training activities to the use of acquired skills by staff in specific situation. Nevertheless, the survey and focus group meeting showed that, at least in their subjective perception, those who participated in training sessions found them useful in their subsequent work. The project was also effective in continuing support for CSO coordination through the anti-corruption fora. This was important also because the CSO component was the main entry point to support a gender equity approach, harnessing the role of women as agents of change, as advocated by CSOs.

Effectiveness at outcome/output level

Outcome 1
Good progress was made towards achieving this outcome (bearing in mind its over-broad formulation, as noted in the Design section above) in the sense that the five outputs making up this outcome were largely, if sometimes partially, delivered in accordance with the logframe indicators. There were a number of consultation workshops and meetings, which often brought together institutions and CSOs. For example a meeting of legal experts on the compliance of legislation with UNCAC was held in March 2017 together with Kemitraan and other civil society participants. This is also the outcome under which the numerous training sessions, and trainings of trainers, were held. Training curricula were of a high standard, and institutions such as the police clearly intend to continue using the curricula beyond the project period.

The box on the next page outlines the training process – in this example, training and ToT sessions for police officers. The trainer and participants interviewed noted that, with over 400,000 police officers in Indonesia it is impossible to build anti-corruption capacity across the board in the short term. Three forms of follow-up to the UNODC support received to date are necessary, according to stakeholders:

- A basic form of familiarisation on the fight against corruption should be mainstreamed into the basic training undergone by every police recruit (and in on-going training for the roughly 400,000 existing police officers). Some training is already in place, and the curricula developed by UNODC for this project could easily be used to complement what already exists.
- Further in-depth training should be given to a narrower range of police officers. According to interviewees, there are about 2000 police investigators: the training should target at last all the Team Leaders, probably with modules that are longer on average than those described in the box below.
- The ToT “alumni”, like trainees themselves, need access to a concise compendium of guidelines and standard operating procedures (SOP). UNODC’s trainers compiled such documents, but these are not yet officially endorsed by the Indonesian National Police, and may not be complete (some SOP reportedly needing to be written or

**Box 1: brief overview of anti-corruption training for police**

The training had three levels: basic, advanced, and ToT. A typical basic session lasts 3 days, with about 40 participants. Advanced involved under 20 officers for 2 days. ToT is for 7 to 9 participants, over 3 days.

The trainer develops the curriculum on the basis of TORs set by UNODC in consultation with the beneficiary institution (police in this case, but a similar model is followed with the AGO in the case of prosecutors’ training). Resource people are identified (usually retired officials or people outside the civil service). The training itself alternates “lecture”-style sessions and case studies, role play, and group discussions. The police hierarchy identifies the participants. At advanced level, the mix of activities is similar but the issues are more complex, also often include more current problems.

Those selected for ToT are all experienced investigators (or prosecutors in the case of AGO training). ToT participants must deliver training modules in front of their peers before doing so with “real” trainees. There is a risk that trained trainers are subsequently redeployed away from anti-corruption investigation, and therefore cannot train colleagues. The police hierarchy does not necessarily demand that ToT “alumni” conduct training sessions.
revised). It would be important, according to interviewees, to ensure that such guidance is issued, possibly with the support of the Police Academy.

As mentioned above, the main area of weakness in effectiveness regarding this outcome has concerned output 1.2 on research about the nature and extent of corruption. This is not to say that no action was taken. For example, UNODC was involved in planning the research for the 2015 annual Anti-Corruption Behaviour Survey (ACBS), compiled each year by the National Statistics Agency. (POIDN had supported the previous surveys too). This survey is designed, according to a summary published on the UNODC website, to “become the baseline for programme planning” in relation to the Stranas strategy on anti-corruption culture. The ACBS includes the development of an Anti-Corruption Behaviour Index (ACBI) seeking to measure the degree of public tolerance of corruption, together with the degree to which the public experienced actual corruption in the past 12 months. The 2015 ACBI demonstrated, in comparison with 2012, an increasing intolerance of corruption (i.e. a greater proportion of the people surveyed expressing opposition to corruption), while also noting a decrease in the experience index (meaning that fewer people surveyed had personally experienced instances of corruption in the previous year).

**Outcome 2**

This outcome was also implemented to a satisfactory extent. It called for enhanced engagement of civil society and the media in the fight against corruption. In essence, it consisted in supporting the IACF meetings and related civil society coordination activities, and in providing capacity building to civil society organisations and the media. A third output, concerning court monitoring and complaint-post mechanisms, was included under that outcome (presumably because of the assumption that civil society and the media would play a substantial role in these issues). This output was not achieved to the same extent, since the focus was placed – out of necessity – on work with the Supreme Court to set the policy groundwork for a monitoring and post-complaint process that can be deployed across the country.

As part of output 2.1 under this outcome, UNODC supported IACF meetings. There have been five IACF forums since 2010, the last two of which have been supported by the project:

- **IACF IV (2014)** discussed the strengthening of integrity in the electoral process and the role of civic society. It also developed recommendations on tackling political corruption and corruption in extractive industries.

- **IACF (2016)** reflected on 10 years of implementation of UNCAC, and discussed the role of women in combating corruption. This was particularly relevant to UNODC, because of its contribution to the *Saya Perempuan Anti-Korupsi* (SPAK) “I am a Woman against Corruption” implemented by KPK with civil society support. In this framework, UNODC undertook in June 2017 a ToT for about 70 women law enforcement officials.

In relation to outcome 2, one of the most innovative activities undertaken by the project has been a training session on corruption investigation, aimed at Indonesian journalists. This was held over two days in November 2016 for an audience of 79 participants (61 male and 18 female) from 44 print and electronic media. The training session was led by an international consultant and featured

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24 See: Anti-Corruption Behavior Survey, by Hendry Syauptura, BPS, 2015, slide 13 of a 17-slide presentation. The document is accessible on the UNODC Indonesia website.
leading Indonesia journalists as resource people (including journalists from the current affairs magazine *Tempo*, which is well known for its independent reporting and had been, shortly before the session took place, involved in the publication of the corruption revelations known as the Panama Papers). The local knowledge of the journalists leading the training was, according to the trainer and a participant, key to the credibility and effectiveness of the session. The session was appropriately designed, taking into account the needs of both investigative journalists writing lengthy reports, and those of TV mass-market journalists who reach a wide audience but must get messages across in a brief and entertaining manner. Both sets of journalists were trained, including (in the words of an interviewee) “celebrity journalists who had never touched the topic of corruption”. It was also appropriate, according to interviews, to bring together journalists from large media houses and others working basically on their own, with limited investigative capacity. According to interviews, there was clear empirical evidence of impact after this training, as participating journalists subsequently sent UNODC links to stories they had produced on corruption issues. In addition to engaging a broad range of journalists and media personalities, the training was also innovative in that it encouraged collaboration and highlighted the role of women – including women journalists – as agents of change in the fight against corruption. One SPAK representative speaking at a seminar in July 2017 highlighted the importance of journalists also covering corruption prevention efforts in education and in the family (see below section on gender). Combining investigation, coverage of corruption cases and coverage of prevention, the training highlighted the way in which the media can help achieve Sustainable Development Goals – particularly SDG16 on justice (see Relevance section above).

With the caveat mentioned above, outcome 2 was largely achieved. With regard to support for civil society and the media’s involvement in anti-corruption strategies, the support to the successive IACF was an appropriate channel. The evaluators found, however, that the outputs concerned (2.1 and 2.3) could have been more thoroughly achieved if the project had included more explicit support for civil society to engage in *policy advocacy*. This could have involved the development of policy recommendations addressed to relevant targets in the executive and legislative branches, together with the development of advocacy messages tailored to specific target groups (elected officials, national- or local-level government decision makers, business leaders, the media, etc.). This is all the more important since, as interviewees noted, institutions such as KPK have become more adept at conveying their own messages to the public through their own press departments – a similar capacity on the part of civil society is key to maintaining the balance. One interviewee noted that UNODC is in practice well placed to help civil society develop policy advocacy strategies, because UNODC itself conducts such strategic work regularly, addressing parliamentarians and other elected officials as well as senior policy makers across the government.

**Outcome 3**

Like outcome 1, outcome 3 (which focused on money laundering and asset recovery) was also achieved, largely on the basis of an effective set of training activities. The project involved capacity building for PPATK in the form of training (output 3.1); reviews of legislation and procedures, including mutual legal assistance (MLA) requests, as well as specialist training for law enforcement officials, prosecutors and judges. The main feedback received by the evaluators on this outcome – which differed little from outcome 1 in terms of training, the main difference being the specialist audience and the more technical topic – was that the activities again highlighted the capacity and skills differences between personnel in Jakarta-based institutions and their counterparts at provincial level.
This concern is unrelated to the effectiveness of the project but it poses a challenge to POIDN in terms of future engagement with Indonesia, as follows:

- Jakarta-based institutions can handle their own overall training needs, though they may still benefit from international expertise on narrow technical issues such as cybercrime, crypto-currencies, etc.
- There is a greater need for both basic and advanced training at institutions outside Jakarta.
- This need is made more pressing by the fact that these provincial institutions handle issues that are sensitive and where malpractice is a major risk (such as trade in natural resources).
- As POIDN moves towards more anti-corruption support addressing specific sectors and business areas and specific pilot regions of Indonesia, this capacity gap will clearly need to be addressed.

**How to improve effectiveness further**

Against the satisfactory effectiveness picture overall, how could a future project be implemented to be (even) more effective? Based on interviews and documentation, the evaluators suggest the following approaches: that future programme should make even more extensive use of UNODC expertise in such fields as survey methodology. This expertise could help better address issues such as research on the extent and perception of corruption, through further cooperation between POIDN and Indonesia’s Bureau of Statistics.

Effectiveness would also benefit if there was more interconnection between the outputs of UNODC projects and beneficiary agencies' own multi-year strategies. This may concern "macro" issues, such as the areas in which training is most needed, as well as "micro" issues, such as making sure that anti-corruption institutions can track which staff have been trained on what, and make sure that they keep working on these issues. It would also be important to ensure that UNODC support is predicated on enhanced inter-agency cooperation, involving joint action plans among agencies and joint inter-agency management of these action plans, to ensure that capacity acquired through engagement with UNODC is used as fully as possible.

It is also important to make a clear distinction between basic training – for which in the evaluators’ view KPK does not need substantial international input any more – and more specialised training that may be targeted to the work of specific agencies, or specific staff within agencies. In addition, interviews showed that training topic on money laundering for instance, should be targeted to agencies other than KPK, including judicial officials, staff in AGO and officers of the Indonesian National Police. Finally, by fostering the development in Indonesia of expertise on "emerging" anti-corruption issues, such as cyber-crime, POIDN could help Indonesia enhance its international role as a centre of anti-corruption expertise.

**Summary - Effectiveness**

Generally the project was very effective in that the planned activities were implemented, results achieved and outcomes largely met. There was also unanimous feedback that the quality standard of activities - especially training - was good. The project helped strengthen anti-corruption policy-making in line with UNCAC. It certainly also helped enhance institutional capacity, through training and Training of Trainers (ToT). The Civil Society Organisation (CSO) side of the project was also effective. Effectiveness would benefit if there was more
Impact

Evaluation questions:

- What, if any, difference has the project made to beneficiaries?
- To what extent have law enforcement investigation techniques promoted by the project contributed to successful prosecutions and convictions of corruption in project target areas?
- What are the project’s intended or unintended, positive and negative long-term social, economic, technical, environmental and other effects on individuals, communities and institutions?

When seeking to identify specific changes as impacts of this project, it is important to bear in mind that it was part of a continuous engagement by POIDN over many years and that other donors/institutions are also active in supporting the fight against corruption in Indonesia. Also, the full impact of the most recent activities may only materialise in the future.

Nevertheless, the evaluators were able on the basis of interviews and document analysis to identify elements of impact, patterns or attitude changes that are likely to influence future anti-corruption activities. These include impact on UNCAC implementation and review processes.

One key positive impact, according to interviewees, has been that the relevant government institutions have become more exposed to – and more understanding of – the international mechanisms on the fight against corruption, including the UNCAC review process. Indonesian officials have been able to exchange with counterparts around the world, including in meetings supported by the project. This has been positive. Indonesia is also becoming more relevant as an actor on the world anti-corruption scene. KPK officials who have worked with counterparts in other countries (for example Timor-Leste) have returned with an enhanced understanding of the issues at stake in building anti-corruption institutions. It is largely UNODC’s engagement with Indonesian institutions that has laid the groundwork for such international linkages.

The survey of training participants, as well as interviews and project documentation, show that the project is likely to have a positive impact in terms of institutional and CSO capacity to fight corruption, and in terms of staff skills and competences. This includes enhanced capacity to focus on the private sector; understanding of the role of CSOs in advocacy against corruption; improved understanding by prosecutors and judges of the impact of corruption and on addressing money laundering and asset recovery. The project is also likely to contribute to a continued change in attitudes, away from a sense of fatalism about corruption being unavoidable and towards specific actions being taken at all levels to prevent and fight corruption. This finding is borne out by the annual Anti-Corruption Behavior Survey referred to above.
The project is likely to impact the project beneficiaries through knowledge acquired by staff. Although the elements of impact identified below cannot be solely attributed to the project, the immediate effects of the project as observed during the evaluation indicate that:

- The project activities and outputs have enhanced the participation of CSOs in policy and political debates at local level on the fight against corruption.
- The project activities have also reinforced mutual knowledge between civil servants at national and provincial levels.
- The training of journalists was particularly impactful in that it fostered dialogue between investigative journalists and mass market TV personalities, as well as CSO members working on corruption issues. This helped enhance journalists’ understanding of the issues related to corruption, and of the benefits of presenting them to the public using citizens’ own concerns (see Innovation section below).
- Through assistance on the UNCAC review process, the project has contributed to KPK improving implementation of UNCAC commitments. In a clear change in strategic focus, KPK has been increasing its focus on strengthening integrity in the private sector, in addition to its work on public institutions.

The evaluators did not find specific data on the impact of the project on the fight against impunity for those who engage in corruption. However, the sustained (and increasing) flow of corruption cases brought before the courts and leading to convictions should, over time, counteract any sense of impunity.

To achieve more impact, the project would have needed to reach a greater "critical mass" of beneficiaries. While this has arguably been done at the level of the capital, it could not be done at the provincial level, where the scale of needs is out of proportion with the resources available under this project.

Nevertheless, the project arguably laid the groundwork for further impact, especially in the form of high-quality training curricula that can be replicated by Indonesian institutions, and by supporting the IACF to spread a public message raising awareness against corruption.

### Summary - Impact

It is premature to identify specific changes as impacts of this project, bearing in mind that it was part of a continuous engagement by POIDN over many years and that other donors/institutions are also active in supporting the fight against corruption in Indonesia. The evaluators were able on the basis of interviews and document analysis to identify elements of impact, patterns or attitude changes that are likely to influence future anti-corruption activities. The survey of training participants, as well as interviews and project documentation, show that the project is likely to achieve some positive impact in terms of institutional and CSO capacity to fight corruption, and in terms of staff skills and competences. The evaluation showed that the beneficiary project partners intended to continue to deliver training using modules developed and disseminated by POIDN, adapted and further updated to meet specific agency needs. The evaluators did not identify negative or unintended impacts, except to some extent in relation to unfulfilled expectations, on the part of anti-corruption institutions.

### Sustainability
Evaluation questions:

- To what extent are the project results (impact, if any, and outcomes) likely to continue after the project ends?
- Is stakeholders’ engagement, especially ownership of the project’s target groups, likely to continue, be scaled up, replicated or institutionalised after external funding ceases?

Like all projects that put a strong emphasis on training, the first and most essential element of sustainability is that acquired skills and expertise remain with those who participated in training, and as a result enhance the capacity of the institutions to which the participants belong. The effectiveness of the training sessions and their high standard of quality – in terms of curriculum content, trainers’ expertise and relevance of the resource people – have been widely recognised, as set out earlier in this report. Representatives of beneficiary institutions have also acknowledged to the evaluators (and to POIDN itself) the benefits of the training to their staff and institutions. Two other factors contribute to the sustainability (and impact) of the project’s training aspect:

- The achievement of a certain critical mass of training participants, in the sense that, in total, a sizeable proportion of KPK, PPATK and AGO professionals have undergone some form of training. This critical mass effect is less clear in relation to the police, due to the sheer size of Indonesia’s police force, but it is noticeable in the more centralised Jakarta institutions.
- The other factor, more limited in scope, is the ToT component of the project: if a sufficient proportion of the ToT alumni hold training sessions themselves, there is scope for the project’s sustainability to be enhanced, especially if the ToT alumni are supported in their training efforts by their institutions’ senior officials.

Despite this, sustainability was somewhat hampered by a lack of clarity as to institutions’ approach to follow-up training. KPK has ambitious plans to strengthen its own training capacity, but some stakeholders expressed concern that it would focus on basic training modules rather than on the more specialised ones that may be needed only by a smaller proportion of staff. Regarding police and prosecutors, there is a more structural concern: because there is no specialist anti-corruption police or prosecutors corps, officers and prosecutors working on corruption issues may be reassigned to different duties at short notice. This makes it difficult to ensure that the training delivered is used beyond the three- or four-year rotation cycle of police and prosecutors (the problem does not arise in that form in the specialist anti-corruption institutions such as KPK, or among judges).

Further substantial elements of sustainably can be identified in other aspects of the project. These include the government’s adoption of policies and practices consistent with UNCAC. Although policy decisions cannot be unequivocally attributed to the project (or to any one factor), they do reinforce the resilience of the country in the face of corruption, thus contributing to sustainability. Moreover, as the project contributed to Indonesia’s fulfilment of its commitments under UNCAC, it also is likely to help raise Indonesia’s regional profile in the fight against corruption.

The strengthening of IACF should also help ensure that the message about anti-corruption, and civil society’s monitoring ability, continue to be leveraged beyond the project period. According to interviews, the civil society partners and KPK are committed to continuing support for the IACF, using national resources.
One element that could reinforce the sustainability of the training component of future projects would be to include an exit strategy in the initial project design, which would explicitly set out the process whereby the beneficiary institutions would mainstream the training into their future organisational development plans. This could help ensure for example that knowledge transfer from international experts is appropriately followed-up, and that the training approach is “owned” by or “championed” within the beneficiary institutions by a clearly defined entity. The exit strategy would then be designed to help that entity implement the follow up to the project. In some cases it could be appropriate to bring two or more institutions together, as part of an exit strategy, to follow up the project.

To some extent, the intrinsic quality of the input provided by UNODC (e.g. the provision of highly skilled trainers, widely recognised by our interviewees) is in itself an element of sustainability, but this needs to be further supported. In this regard, a continued involvement of donors is probably a requirement in the short term, taking into account also that the exit strategy recommended above for future projects would require a multi-year commitment on the part of the beneficiary institutions.

**Summary - Sustainability**

As in the case of impact, there are elements of sustainability that can be identified. They include the adoption of policies and practice consistent with UNCAC, the acquisition of new skills by government officials, and the reinforcement the key civil society platform on the fight against corruption. One element that could reinforce the sustainability of future projects - one that requires the cooperation of Indonesian stakeholders - would be to include an exit strategy in the initial project design, to help ensure for example that knowledge transfer from international experts is appropriately followed-up.

**Human rights and gender equality**

**Evaluation questions:**

- To what extent were human rights considerations mainstreamed in the design and implementation of the project?
- To what extent were gender considerations mainstreamed in the design and implementation of the project?

**Human rights**

The link between the fight against corruption and human rights is complex. It is widely accepted that “corruption can (…) affect the enjoyment of civil and political rights (…) by weakening public institutions and eroding the rule of law”.²⁵ Corruption also has a deleterious impact on economic, social and cultural rights, and may worsen the situation of members of vulnerable groups: according

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to the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) “the economically and politically disadvantaged suffer disproportionately from the consequences of corruption, because they are particularly dependent on public goods”\textsuperscript{26}.

The project was designed to support the implementation of UNCAC, which as a UN convention is consistent with international human rights standards but is not “rights-based” in the way its provisions are framed. Logically therefore, the project did not explicitly use a rights-based approach in framing its outcomes and outputs. Nevertheless, it did integrate\textsuperscript{27} – for example in training curricula – relevant references to non-discrimination, accountability, transparency and the rule of law. The inclusion of the judiciary among project partner institutions is also part of this logic, as is the inclusion of support to civil society.

The single project output that was of most direct relevance to the exercise of human rights in the fight against corruption was probably 2.2 (court monitoring and complaint-post mechanisms established). As noted above, this output was somewhat over-ambitious in its formulation because the legal and regulatory framework for post-complaint mechanisms was not fully in place at the time the project began. It was therefore logical to start implementation by supporting the Supreme Court in designing the relevant processes, for subsequent deployment in tribunals across the country.

Despite this relative weakness, interviews and reports made clear that the training and ToT sessions implemented throughout the project systematically highlighted the fact that anti-corruption work contributes to the exercise of human rights by citizens, and therefore to the fulfilment of Indonesia’s international commitments, not only under UNCAC but also under international human rights standards. The project further contributed to the promotion and protection of human rights in that it highlighted, in the training and legal research done under Outcome 1, the need to reinforce due process in all aspects of the prevention and prosecution of corruption. By building the capacity of CSOs to address corruption, the project contributed to enhancing citizens’ involvement in the fight against corruption and in the process of keeping government accountable.

Could the project have done more to mainstream human rights? Interviews and documentation do not suggest any substantial weakness in this regard. If anything, the evaluators suggest that future phases of support could perhaps consider involving a degree of collaboration between the KPK and the Human Rights Commission, which is the statutorily independent national human rights institution in Indonesia. Such collaboration could result, for example, in joint missions to strengthen the accessibility of public services, including in the justice sector. Another area that a future project could consider would be the protection of whistleblowers: there is an evolving body of good practices in this field and a future project could include this issue in a programme of research and policy advice.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{26}See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/AntiCorruption.aspx

\textsuperscript{27}See Project Document, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{28}Strengthening safeguards for whistleblowers may become increasingly relevant if UNODC strengthens its focus on the fight against corruption in the business sector, particularly in fields such as the exploitation of natural resources. In this field, information on malpractice might often come from employees of private sector companies, who might be unwilling to relay information in the absence of legal safeguards (for example protections against dismissal motivated solely by an employee’s denunciation of corrupt practices).
Gender equality

The project document stated that the “gender dimension” was to be “taken into consideration” and listed gender disaggregated data as an approach to doing so. Nevertheless, it stated that “there [would] be no differing needs of men and women, which the programme [would] address during implementation”. Gender issues were mentioned also in general terms in the 2012-2016 Indonesia Country Programme.

The project did not address gender differences in relation to legislation, UNCAC commitments and institutional capacity building— that is, the mainstay of outcomes 1 and 3 of the project. The project document did note, however, that outcome 2, focusing on the contribution of civil society to the fight against corruption, would include a focus on “gender networks” (referring in particular to CSOs and platforms addressing women’s rights and political participation). Interviews showed that work with CSOs was important to ensure that the project had a gender dimension.

In practice, the project took into account the fact that women, if they may not have different needs, do have different social roles than men, and this was reflected in joint activities with other donors in relation to the Saya Perempuan Antikorupsi (“I am a Woman against Corruption”, SPAK) project, a KPK-led movement and network of women in a range of positions, committed to fight corruption. In June 2017, SPAK contributed to a ToT session targeted at about 70 women in the Attorney General’s Office and in the National Police, highlighting women as agents of change in the fight against corruption. SPAK members also contributed to training and awareness-raising sessions targeting journalists.

The SPAK approach now encompasses civil society, encouraging women in various walks of life to become “SPAK agents”. According to the KPK and the Australia-Indonesia Partners for Justice organisation (AIPJ), which supports this process, there are now over 1,500 SPAK agents in at least 34 provinces of Indonesia, over 60% of whom are in CSOs while others are policewomen, prosecutors, judges, teachers, etc.

There is scope for the SPAK approach to be replicated and developed across all anti-corruption institutions and in the private sector. This would be particularly relevant if UNODC was to focus more on the private sector in the future.

Summary - Human rights and gender equality

The project did not explicitly use a rights-based approach, but it did integrate – for example in training curricula – relevant references to non-discrimination, accountability, transparency and the rule of law. The project appears to have contributed to the promotion and protection of

29 The view that women and men do not have “different needs” in relation to corruption (which the writers of the project document probably did not mean as a universal truth anyway) is debatable. Many in the development assistance world would argue that corruption has a disproportionate impact on women. A briefing document issued by the Swedish Agency for International Development puts this as follows: “many forms of corruption affect both women and men, but given the unequal gender relations in society women are in many settings more exposed to corruption and its consequences”. See Sida Gender Tool Box Brief “Gender and Corruption”, March 2015, available on the Sida website (www.sida.se). See also Transparency International, “Gender, Equality and Corruption: What are the Linkages?”, Policy Brief 1/2014 (www.transparency.org).
human rights by highlighting in training the need to reinforce due process in all aspects of the prevention and prosecution of corruption. The project, by building the capacity of CSOs to address corruption, contributed to enhancing citizens’ involvement in the fight against corruption and in the process of keeping government accountable.

The project document noted that outcome 2, focusing on the contribution of civil society to the fight against corruption, would include a focus on “gender networks” (referring in particular to CSOs and platforms addressing women’s rights and political participation). Of particular relevance was the project’s collaboration with Saya Perempuan Antikorupsi (“I am a Woman against Corruption” (SPAK)), a KPK-led movement and network of women in a range of positions, committed to fight corruption. In 2017, SPAK contributed to a ToT session targeted at women in the Attorney General’s Office and in the National Police, highlighting women as agents of change in the fight against corruption. SPAK members also contributed to training and awareness-raising sessions targeting journalists.
III. CONCLUSIONS

The project was highly relevant in that it was based on a sound analysis of the situation of the fight against corruption in Indonesia, and addressed needs that were clearly in line with the country’s commitments under UNCAC. The project approach was appropriate to addressing identified needs. The approach based on three outcomes was sound, with focus on policy development and coordination; capacity building and coordination; and strengthening CSOs. However, some outcomes and outputs were over-broad. The project sought to achieve a broad range of outputs in each of its three outcome components, leading to an original project design that was overly complex and calling for a range of activities that was not realistic in view of the then-prevailing political context.

The project benefited from staff expertise in Indonesia and in UNODC Headquarters and Regional Office. The project team identified skilled and experienced experts to provide input into the project’s activities. UNODC staff in Vienna and Bangkok also provided useful advice, contributing to the project’s overall effectiveness and impact. The project is likely to achieve some impact by contributing to changing attitudes, reinforcing political will and enhancing the skills of those fighting corruption. The work done to reinforce the legislative and regulatory framework of the fight against corruption, as well as the critical mass of participants in training sessions, are likely to enhance readiness among institutions to fight corruption.

The project benefitted from effective partnerships and cooperation. The cooperation between the project team and its partners helped deliver project activities to a high quality standard. The public awareness activities contributed to raising the profile of the fight against corruption in Indonesia. The support to IACF helped civil society devise and implement a public awareness strategy, while media training raised the profile of investigative journalism and highlighted its importance in the fight against corruption.

The project’s sustainability lies in legal and regulatory changes, acquired skills and capacity, enhanced networking and dialogue between government institutions and civil society. These elements should be reinforced in the future. An explicit exit strategy is lacking at this point, but the capacity exists to develop one in the final weeks of the project. The project included a number of elements that indirectly contributed to the protection of human rights, and incorporated a sound gender approach. The project helped foster the rule of law and the effective functioning of the judiciary. It addressed legal loopholes that weakened the fight against corruption. It supported a greater degree of civil society involvement in the fight against corruption. Support to women as agents of change in the fight against corruption – in the context of institutions, education and the family – helped strengthen the gender dimension of the project.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the findings and conclusions of this report, the evaluation team has formulated the following recommendations to UNODC. They are generally addressed to POIDN, though some would require the support of geographic or thematic experts at UNODC Headquarters to be implemented.

1. **Follow up to the project.** POIDN should continue providing input and technical advice to KPK and its other institutional partners in Indonesia, prioritising areas where UNODC has unique expertise and skills, or where long-term UNODC input is appropriate. These areas include in particular the UNCAC review process; research and statistics; legislation and regulation; and the provision of intelligence software, coupled with training on its use and maintenance. POIDN should also continue to support the media’s and CSOs’ work against corruption, through training and advice, and through continued support for the IACF. POIDN should also work with KPK and its other partners, as well as with Bappenas, to enhance its support to the fight against corruption at provincial level. (POIDN)

2. **Focus on provincial institutions.** POIDN should enhance its engagement with provincial-level institutions addressing corruption, including local police forces, prosecutors and courts. This should be done with a view to strengthening anti-corruption capacity outside Jakarta, particularly in relation to key business and trade flows (exploitation of, and trade in, natural resources; construction, etc.). POIDN should consider identifying a limited number of pilot provinces for such engagement.

3. **Address the private sector.** POIDN should, while maintaining its engagement with KPK and other institutions, put a strong emphasis on anti-corruption engagement with the private sector. Years of engagement with civil society and some business groups have set an appropriate groundwork for more formal work with the private sector, including large companies that could set valuable examples of integrity. Training and support to the development and monitoring of codes of conduct may be appropriate techniques. Work with companies that seek public contracts (including concessions for the exploitation of natural resources) may be an appropriate entry point. POIDN should work with the anti-corruption institutions to help persuade the private sector to engage in this field.

4. **Consider addressing the issue of protections for whistleblowers.** POIDN should consider the relevance of including in future programming an element of research and capacity-building support to the development of further safeguards for whistleblowers. This should be done in support of KPK and the Witness and Victim Protection Agency. The research should consider whether existing legal safeguards afford sufficient protection to potential whistleblowers in both the public and the private sectors.

5. **Support the extension of the SPAK approach to ensure more women become agents of change.** POIDN should work with KPK and CSOs to further broaden the scope of SPAK, with a view in particular to encourage women in the business sector to join. The SPAK model has clearly gained momentum in recent years, partly thanks to collaboration with UNODC, and could constitute a good way for POIDN to further train women as agents of change and raise awareness about the gender impact of corruption.
6. **Improve project design.** POIDN should ensure that some of the design weaknesses identified in the present project are addressed when designing future projects. The key issues to take into consideration are to narrow down the formulation of outcomes and outputs so as to specify to the extent possible the changes expected during the project period, and to separate the description of activities from the delivery of individual outputs, since most outputs are delivered through a plurality of activities. Also, working at design stage with beneficiary institutions to develop a project exit strategy could help ensure that the national partners are better prepared to follow up on project activities on their own.

7. **Prioritisation of Training of Trainers.** POIDN should ensure that the training component of future projects emphasizes a Training of Trainers approach. It is important for UNODC teams and managers involved in the design of future projects to reflect on the best ways to achieve critical mass for the acquisition of new skills by Indonesian stakeholders. They should consider the option of using a ToT approach more systematically, or to work directly with judicial training institutions, with a view to entrenching the acquisition of new skills by civil servants across institutions (including the Judiciary) involved in the prevention and fight against corruption. The Corruption and Economic Crime Branch of UNODC Headquarters should also be consulted with regard to this approach. In this regard, **POIDN should support the strengthening of Indonesia’s training institutions for staff involved in the fight against corruption.** In terms of capacity development, future projects should prioritise giving support to training institutions and to the staff training departments of targeted anti-corruption institutions. It is also important to set the provision of training within a broader learning strategy aimed at reinforcing the core competencies of officials in each ACA, instead of providing generic training based on one-off needs analyses. To that end, POIDN should work with KPK’s training experts and with training institutions for police as well as the judiciary to ensure that up-to-date training curricula are maintained, focusing on implementation of UNCAC. Training should continue to include a gender equality approach, leveraging the work of SPAK. POIDN should also work with its Indonesian partners to facilitate the dissemination of Indonesia’s anti-corruption experience to other countries, particularly within the ASEAN region.

8. **Enhance cooperation among institutions.** POIDN should encourage a strengthening of the cooperation and coordination between anti-corruption institutions and other relevant anti-crime agencies, including those fighting drug trafficking. POIDN should encourage innovative strategies to reinforce coordination between ACAs and anti-drugs agencies in Indonesia. This approach could start with identifying topics for joint research and studies on strategic issues, addressing linkages between the two areas of criminality.
V. LESSONS LEARNED

Relationship between POIDN and its partners: need for sustained, informal exchange of information as well as formal processes.

The relationship between the project team and the project partners in Indonesia was generally good, particularly in the second half of the project period. One important factor underpinning this good relationship was the high level of the international expertise POIDN could bring to bear. It was clear that the quality of the experts identified contributed to partners’ trust.

In addition, it was important for POIDN to maintain a sustained dialogue and information exchange on project activities with the Government of Indonesia – through Bappenas – as well as with individual institutions. This dialogue proved effective at overcoming difficulties in communications that had occurred in the early period of project implementation. In this regard, informal meetings and debates effectively complemented official exchanges and meetings on project management.

Work with CSOs

Civil society in Indonesia is relatively strong. The media and CSOs have built a track record of investigating and denouncing corruption, and have become skilled at monitoring the work of anti-corruption agencies such as KPK. POIDN support for civil society – including the media – in the fight against corruption has been reinforced as a result of the project. POIDN should build on this record of support to further cooperate with CSOs, with a view in particular to helping strengthen civil society capacity at provincial level.

The innovative work done in relation to media training – based on standard UNODC approaches, revised to fit the situation in Indonesia – proved to be an integral part of the civil society support work that can be done by POIDN.

The Women against Corruption (SPAK) movement has shown it was able to act as a bridge between institutions and civil society in relation to enhancing the role of women as agents of change in the fight against corruption. SPAK has become a useful channel for women in civil society to cooperate with women in the civil service.
### ANNEX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE EVALUATION

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project number:</th>
<th>INDA03</th>
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<tr>
<td>Project title:</td>
<td>Strengthening Anti-Corruption Institutions in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration:</td>
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| **Core Learning Partners**<sup>30</sup> (entities): | Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK),  
Indonesian National Police (INP),  
Attorney General’s Office (AGO),  
Supreme Court (SC),  
National Planning Agency (BAPPENAS),  
Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK). |
|---|---|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Total Approved Budget:</strong></th>
<th>$2,505,051</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Donors:</strong></th>
<th>Norwegian Embassy in Indonesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Project Manager/Coordinator:</strong></th>
<th>Ms. Yunety Tarigan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Type of evaluation (mid-term or final):</strong></th>
<th>Final Independent Project Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Time period covered by the evaluation:</strong></th>
<th>January 2015 to end of the field mission (tentatively end of November 2017)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Geographical coverage of the evaluation:</strong></th>
<th>Indonesia with a special focus on the project target area: Jakarta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Planned budget for this evaluation:</strong></th>
<th>USD $30,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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*Project overview and context in which the project is implemented*

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<sup>30</sup>The Core Learning Partnership (CLP are the key stakeholders of the subject evaluated (project, programme, policy etc.) who have an interest in the evaluation. The CLP works closely with the Evaluation Manager to guide the evaluation process.
Corruption is a serious impediment to Indonesia’s development, and combating corruption has been a major priority of the reform era. In 2006, Indonesia has ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), reinforcing the conviction that States are best served through a prevention and corruption eradication strategy.

In relation to this matter, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) has taken some initiatives to fight graft and corruption in Indonesia such as reforming the regulatory frameworks, setting the Government’s anti-corruption agenda through the National Strategy on Prevention and Corruption Eradication, and strengthening the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the national anti-corruption courts. However, a major challenge to combating corruption is that Indonesia’s oversight mechanisms are largely under-resourced. Many agencies lack the capacity and advanced skills required to deal with complex cases of corruption and abuses of public expenditure, particularly in investigation, surveillance and interview techniques. There is also a dearth of trainers capable of providing the necessary guidance and instruction on a continuous and consistent basis. Further compounding reform efforts is weak communication and coordination amongst key institutions such as the Attorney General’s Office (AGO), Indonesian National Police (INP) and KPK. This inhibits information sharing, the ability to pool resources and ultimately, effective prosecution of corruption cases. The coordination and supervision function of KPK on prevention needs to be strengthened by establishing systems through which KPK can exercise oversight.

Against this background, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has developed a project to support the Country on strengthening law enforcement capacities and enhancing civil society oversight in Indonesia. The project is part of UNODC Country Programme for Indonesia 2012-2016, Sub-Programme 2: Anti-Corruption, Outcomes 1, 2 and 3. It is also aligned with the Regional Programme for Southeast Asia 2014-2018 under Sub-Programme 2 on Anti-Corruption.

The project’s main objective is to strengthen law enforcement capacities and enhance civil society oversight to reduce corrupt practices in Indonesia. More specifically, the project aims to achieve the following three outcomes:

Improved Law Enforcement Response; Corrupt practices identified and investigated by state agencies;

Enhanced engagement of civil society and the media in implementing anti-corruption strategies;

Money laundering activities identified and effectively acted on and criminal assets recovered.

Since 2012, UNODC and the Government of Indonesia, represented by BAPPENAS, the National Planning Board, have been collaborating to implement the project framework, with its Sub-Programme 2 on Anti-corruption focusing on supporting the Government’s anti-corruption efforts by (1) identifying and investigating corrupt practices by public officials, (2) increasing the engagement of civil society and the media in combating corruption and (3) identifying and acting on money laundering activity and recovering stolen assets. The implementing partners of UNODC in Indonesia for Sub-Programme 2 are: BAPPENAS, KPK, Ministry of Law and Human Rights, AGO, INP, BPK, the Judicial Commission, PPATK, the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Indonesia, the Supreme Court, The National Statistics Agency, Indonesia Corruption Watch, Transparency International Indonesia, and Kemitraan.

UNODC works closely with the GOI in implementing the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (STRANAS-PK) including its socialisation, monitoring and evaluation, in partnership with the BAPPENAS and civil society. UNODC supports increased inter-agency cooperation and
coordination amongst anti-corruption agencies such as the KPK, the INP and AGO, and also focuses on expanding capacity building activities at the sub-national level. UNODC has also worked with the KPK and the judiciary with the Supreme Court in disseminating policies on anti-corruption through several forums touching on corruption in the private sector. In its capacity as the secretariat for the UNCAC, UNODC has also held close cooperation with all relevant ministries relating to UNCAC peer reviews and the Conference of States Parties to the UNCAC.

UNODC has also entered into strategic partnerships with Indonesian NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs) to supplement the quality of its service delivery. These organisations have been critically important by employing their networks with local communities to involve citizens in decision-making processes. Close partners of UNODC in Indonesia include Transparency International Indonesia, LeiP and the Partnership for Governance Reform (Kemitraan).

At the end of the project, public awareness on corruption issues is expected to be enhanced and anti-corruption agencies strengthened with better investigative skills; improved cooperation should exist to fight corruption concertedly; the KPK shall be strengthened to implement its road map; national anti-corruption strategy shall be monitored and evaluated with involvement of civil society, and corrupt practices should be limited with public engagement.

**Justification of the project and main experiences / challenges during implementation**

UNODC is the custodian of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) as well as the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC). Both of these Conventions have great relevance to the global fight against corruption.

Since 2009, UNODC has implemented the following two anti-corruption projects in Indonesia - the Norwegian-funded project on Strengthening the Capacity of Anti-Corruption Institutions in Indonesia (IDNT71), which ended in May 2013, and the EU-funded project on Support to the Fight against Corruption in Indonesia (IDNT81), which ended in June 2014. The former provided specialised training programmes and aimed to build the technical capabilities of key agencies to execute the Government of Indonesia’s initiatives to check corruption and recover lost assets, provided support to the activities of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to fight corruption, and supported through small grants an anti-corruption campaign to increase public awareness. The latter supported Indonesia’s anti-corruption efforts by strengthening the KPK, especially its coordination and supervision function in relation to other institutions authorised to eradicate corruption; conducting specialised anti-corruption training to improve the operational, technical and coordination capabilities of key institutions such as KPK, National Police, AGO, Audit Board and the Anti-Corruption Court mandated to investigate and prosecute corruption cases; and supporting the Government of Indonesia to progress implementation of its National Anti-Corruption Strategy through the creation of a stakeholder forum, strengthening corruption monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and reviewing progress made in implementation of UNCAC.

In addition, a project on “Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Capacity in Indonesia” funded by Germany has been conducted in Indonesia. As part of this project, UNODC carried out an assessment of justice sector integrity and capacity. Based on the findings of this assessment, UNODC supported the development of action plans for strengthening of judicial integrity and capacity in the provinces of South East Sulawesi and South Sumatra and carried out numerous activities to implement these plans of action. The partners to this project also included the Attorney
General’s Office, Judicial Commission, KPK and the BAPPENAS. The phase III of this project has ended in August 2013.

These completed projects have synergised the specialised training programmes conducted for INP, KPK, BPK, AGO, PPATK and the Supreme Court, and had trained 387 officers (further details are available in the evaluation report of the project IDNT8131). However, a persistent demand for conducting more training programmes has been noticed, which explains the necessity to continue and ensure sustainability in capacity building. The institutionalisation of the training programmes for the KPK has also been explored through the development of a comprehensive training needs assessment (TNA). Such TNA set the grounds for the development of the training curriculum, agenda and its sustainability through the development of core trainers from training of trainer activities and mentoring of the trainers with international experts.

The momentum gained at grass root level to raise awareness on anti-corruption issues through campaigns also had to be built upon and institutionalised. For instance, the Anti-corruption Forum established under the EU-funded project has become an important platform for the civil society and government to come together to address anti-corruption issues. Therefore, in order to sustain the activities conducted so far under both projects and not to lose the momentum gained in the fight against corruption, a follow-up programme was required combining the activities under the phased out projects.

During the implementation, the Sub-programme was halted by a letter of 7 October 2014 from the Government focal point, BAPPENAS, citing problems with the execution modalities of UNODC. The issues have since been resolved and the Sub-programme is back on track since mid-April 2015. However, this has resulted in slower implementation rate in the last six months.

Also, in the 4th quarter of 2015, UNODC has made a transition to a new Enterprise Resource Planning system (SAP), Umoja, aimed to harmonise the Secretariat-wide process management. While efforts were undertaken to minimise disruptions, UNODC has experienced significant impact on implementation during the transition period. Despite remaining challenges, a normalisation of implementation has been achieved in the course of 2016.

Project documents and revisions of the original project document

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project document</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>General information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original document</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Original project document approved in October 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project revision</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reason &amp; purpose</th>
<th>Change in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

# Project Revisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project revision</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Project revision</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Project revision processed in June 2015 to extend the duration of the project by one year until 31 December 2016, adjusting the logframe at output level and modifying the indicators and means of verification accordingly</td>
<td>Logframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Project revision</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Project revision to extend the duration of the project by six months until 30 June 2017 to conduct a final evaluation</td>
<td>Timeframe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The project document was designed and approved in October 2013 as part of the UNODC Country Programme for Indonesia 2012-2016. Revisions have been made to the outcomes during project implementation, and a no-cost extension has been sought and agreed to by the donor due to unexpected delays in implementation. The project was scheduled to end on 31 December 2016, but has been extended at no cost for ten months until 31 October 2017. The no-cost extension has been agreed as a means to manage risks of implementation delay in relation to the transition to a new harmonised UN financial and administrative system – Umoja – which was adopted globally by UNODC in October 2015.

**UNODC strategy context, including the project’s main objectives and outcomes and project’s contribution to UNODC country, regional or thematic programme**

The project’s main objective is to strengthen law enforcement capacities and enhance civil society oversight to reduce corrupt practices in Indonesia.

More specifically, the project aims to achieve the following three outcomes:

- Improved Law Enforcement Response; Corrupt practices identified and investigated by state agencies;
- Enhanced engagement of civil society and the media in implementing anti-corruption strategies;
- Money laundering activities identified and effectively acted on and criminal assets recovered.

The project contributes directly to the objectives set out by the UNODC Country Programme for Indonesia 2012–2016. The project is part of Sub-Programme 2: Anti-Corruption and contributes to Outcome 1, 2 and 3. This project also links to Sub-Programme 2: Anti-Corruption, Outcome 2.1 on strengthening anti-corruption policies, legislation and strategies of the Regional Programme for Southeast Asia 2014-2018.

The project also links to the UNODC Strategic Framework Sub-programme 2 on Countering Corruption, in particular, accomplishment (c) on Improved capacity of Member States, supported by UNODC at their request, to prevent and fight corruption in line with the United Nations Convention against Corruption and to address economic fraud and identity-related crime.

In addition, the project contributes to the Sustainable Development Goal 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, in particular, its Target 16.5: Sustainably reduce corruption and bribery in all
their forms, and Target 16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels. The project supported the review of national legislations, policies, and strategies on anti-corruption, as well as the UNCAC review mechanism, and provided specialised comprehensive criminal justice training for law enforcement, to support private and financial sectors to implement anti-money laundering strategies and to enhance awareness on corruption issues involving the media, civil society and academia.

DISBURSEMENT HISTORY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time periods throughout the life of the project</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Expenditure in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 2013 – June 2017</td>
<td>USD 2,505,051</td>
<td>USD 2,040,726</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

Reasons behind the evaluation taking place

The final independent project evaluation is conducted close to the end of the project as envisaged in the project document. This external, independent evaluation initiated by the UNODC is also in line with the UNODC Evaluation Policy, norms and standards. The project ends on 31 October 2017, and therefore it is proposed to conduct the evaluation in August-September 2017. The evaluation seeks to provide accountability to the donor by determining the extent to whether the project objectives were met or not, assess the utilisation of resources, identify areas for improvement, and to learn lessons for executing the next phase of the project, as well as formulate a strategy after the life of the project. The outcome of the evaluation will be shared with Donor, the Core Learning Partners of the project as well as with UNODC management and will be published on the IEU website. It is previewed that the main users of the evaluation results will be the donor, the implementing partners and beneficiaries, UNODC, as well as other UN programmes who can use the lessons learned for other initiatives in this region and in this thematic area.

The evaluation will assess the following DAC criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, established partnerships and cooperation, human rights and gender. Furthermore, the evaluation will identify lessons learned and best practices and derive recommendations.

SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit of analysis (full project/programme/ parts of the project/programme; etc.)</th>
<th>INDA03 project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time period of the project/programme covered by the evaluation</td>
<td>October 2013 – October 2017 (end of field mission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical coverage of the evaluation</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EVALUATION CRITERIA AND KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation will be conducted based on the following DAC criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, gender and human rights, and lessons learned, and will respond to the following questions (provided as indicative only, and required to be further refined by the evaluation team).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance of a project or programme is the extent to which its objectives are continuously consistent with recipient needs, UNODC mandate and overarching strategies and policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. To what extent was the project relevant for to the needs and priorities of national partner organisations, i.e. Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Bappenas, law enforcement agencies (INP, AGO), judiciary, civil society organisations?

2. To what extent was the project relevant to the implementation of UNODC’s Country Programme in Indonesia as well as UNODC’s overall strategic framework and other UN strategies in the region?

3. To what extent are the outputs, outcomes and objectives of this project relevant to implementing the Sustainable Development Goals?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Efficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency is a measure of how resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into outputs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. To what extent were inputs converted into outputs in a cost efficient and timely manner, and how have unexpected causes of delay been managed?

2. To what extent have all planned outputs been delivered in a logical sequence and with high quality?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness is the extent to which a project or programme achieves its objectives and outcomes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. To what extent did the project achieve its planned objective and outcomes?

2. To what extent did the quality of the outcomes meet national partner organisations’ needs?

3. To what extent were appropriate measures taken to mitigate unplanned negative and positive effects on target groups contributing to results produced/services provided?
### Impact

Impact is the positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term economic, environmental, social change(s) produced or likely to be produced by a project, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended, after the project was implemented.

1. What, if any, difference has the project made to beneficiaries?

2. To what extent have law enforcement investigation techniques promoted by the project contributed to successful prosecutions and convictions of corruption in project target areas?

3. What are the project’s intended or unintended positive and negative long-term social, economic, technical, environmental, and other effects on individuals, communities, and institutions?

### Sustainability

Sustainability is the extent to which the benefits of the project or programme will last after its termination and the probability of continued long-term benefits. Projects and programmes need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.

1. To what extent are the project results (impact if any, and outcomes) likely to continue after the project ends?

2. Is stakeholders’ engagement, especially ownership of the project’s target groups, likely to continue, be scaled up, replicated or institutionalised after external funding ceases?

### Partnerships and cooperation

Partnerships and cooperation is a measure of the level and quality of UNODC’s cooperation with partners and implementing partners (e.g. donors, NGOs, Governments, other UN agencies etc.).

1. To what extent have partnerships been sought and established (including UN agencies) and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance?

2. To what extent were efficient cooperation arrangements established (e.g. between UNODC and Government at national and local levels, donors, other UN agencies, and other relevant partners)?

### Human rights and gender

Evaluate whether mainstreaming of human rights and gender was considered in project design and implementation.

### Human rights

1. To what extent were human rights considerations mainstreamed in the design and implementation of the project?
**Gender**

2. To what extent were gender considerations mainstreamed in the design and implementation of the project?

**Lessons learned and best practices**

Finally, the evaluation will look at lessons learned and best practices of the project

1. What lessons can be learned from the project implementation in order to improve performance, results and effectiveness in the future?

2. What best practices emerged from the project implementation?

3. What lessons can be drawn from unintended results?

### EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

*The methods used to collect and analyse data*

This evaluation will use methodologies and techniques as determined by the specific needs for information, the questions set out in the ToR and the availability of stakeholders. In all cases, the evaluation team is expected to analyse all relevant information sources, such as reports, programme documents, thematic programmes, internal review reports, programme files, evaluation reports (if available), financial reports, and any other documents that may provide further evidence for triangulation, on which their conclusions will be based. The evaluators are also expected to use interviews, surveys or any other relevant quantitative and/or qualitative tools as a means to collect relevant data for the evaluation. While maintaining independence, the evaluation will be carried out based on a participatory approach, which seeks the views and assessments of all parties identified as the key stakeholders of the project/programme – the Core Learning Partners (CLP).

The present ToR provide basic information as regards the methodology, which should not be understood as exhaustive. It is rather meant to guide the evaluators in elaborating an effective, efficient, and appropriate evaluation methodology that should be proposed, explained and justified in the Inception Report.

In addition, the evaluation team will be asked to present a summarised methodology (including evaluation matrix) in the Inception Report outlining the evaluation criteria, indicators, sources of information, and methods of data collection. The evaluation methodology must conform to the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards, as well as the UNODC Evaluation Policy, Norms and Standards.

While the evaluation team shall fine-tune the methodology for the evaluation in an Inception Report, a mixed-methods approach of qualitative and quantitative methods is mandatory due to its appropriateness to ensure a gender-sensitive, inclusive methodology. Special attention shall be paid to an unbiased and objective approach and the triangulation of sources, methods, data, and theories. Indeed, information stemming from secondary sources will be cross-checked and triangulated.
through data retrieved from primary research methods. Primary data collection methods need to be gender-sensitive as well as inclusive.

The credibility of the data collection and analysis are key to the evaluation. Rival theories and competing explanations must be tested once plausible patterns emerge from triangulating data.

The limitations to the evaluation need to be identified and discussed by the evaluation team in the Inception Report, e.g. data constraints (such as missing baseline and monitoring data). Potential limitations as well as the chosen mitigating measures should be discussed.

The sources of data

The evaluation will have to utilise a mixture of primary and secondary sources of data. The primary sources include, among others, interviews with key stakeholders (face-to-face or by telephone), use of surveys and questionnaires, field missions for case studies, focus group interviews, observation, and other participatory techniques. Secondary data sources will include the project documents and their revisions, progress and monitoring reports, and all other relevant documents, including visual information (e.g. eLearning, pictures, videos, etc.)

Desk Review

The evaluation team will perform a desk review of existing documentation (please see the preliminary list of documents to be consulted in Annex II of the evaluation ToR). This list is however not to be regarded as exhaustive as additional documentation may be requested by the evaluators.

Phone interviews / face to face consultations

The evaluators will conduct phone interviews/ face-to-face consultations with identified individuals from the following groups of stakeholders:

Member States (including recipients and donors);

Relevant international and regional organisations;

Non-governmental organisations working with UNODC;

UNODC management and staff; etc.

Questionnaire

A questionnaire (on-line) should be developed and used in order to help collect the views of additional stakeholders (e.g. trainees, counterparts, partners, etc.), if deemed appropriate.

TIME FRAME AND DELIVERABLES

Time frame for the evaluation

The evaluation process shall commence by 1 August 2017. Documents required for desk review shall be furnished to the evaluators prior. This will facilitate them to conduct the desk review and prepare the inception report.
Time frame for the field mission

The evaluators shall be on mission to Jakarta for meetings and interviews with the Project Manager, the core learning partners and other relevant project stakeholders.

Expected deliverables and time frame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duties</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Deliverables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desk review and preparation of Draft Inception Report</td>
<td>21-31 August 2017 (10 working days)</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
<td>Draft Inception Report containing: preliminary findings of the desk review, refined evaluation questions, data collection instruments (including questionnaire and interview questions), sampling strategy, evaluation matrix and limitations to the evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Draft Inception Report by IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)</td>
<td>1-5 September 2017 (IEU review)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Comments on the Draft Inception Report to the evaluation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporation of comments provided by IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)</td>
<td>6-9 September 2017 (3 working days) Home-based</td>
<td></td>
<td>Revised Draft Inception Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deliverable A – Final Inception Report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates</strong></td>
<td>By September 2017 (overall 13 working days)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Final Inception Report to be cleared by IEU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with staff in UNODC Jakarta and project target area. Evaluation mission: briefing, interviews; presentation of preliminary findings</td>
<td>10-18 September 2017 (8 working days, including travel time)</td>
<td>UNODC, Jakarta</td>
<td>Presentation of preliminary findings (if requested)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drafting of the Evaluation Report</td>
<td>19 September - 4 October 2017 (15 working days)</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
<td>Draft Evaluation Report (to be reviewed and cleared by IEU; can entail various rounds of comments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission to Project Management for review and revision of any factual errors and to IEU for review and comments</td>
<td>5 - 24 October 2017</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
<td>Comments on the Draft Evaluation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of comments from the Project Manager and incorporation of comments from IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)</td>
<td>25-29 October 2017 (4 working days)</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
<td>Revised Draft Evaluation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deliverable B – Draft Evaluation Report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates</strong></td>
<td>By 29 October 2017 (overall 27 working days)</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
<td>Draft Evaluation Report to be cleared by IEU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of comments from Core Learning Partners</td>
<td>15-16 November 2017 (1 working day)</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
<td>Revised Draft Evaluation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final review by IEU; incorporation of comments and finalisation of report (can entail various rounds of comments)</td>
<td>17-21 November 2017 (4 working days)</td>
<td>Home-based</td>
<td>Revised Draft Evaluation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deliverable C - Finalisation of Evaluation Report incl. Management response (if needed) and presentation of evaluation results</strong></td>
<td>By 21 November 2017 (overall 5 working days)</td>
<td>Home-based; UNODC</td>
<td>Final Evaluation Report; Presentation of evaluation results to counterparts. All to be cleared by IEU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finalisation by the Project Management of the Evaluation Follow-up Plan in ProFi  
By 22 November 2017  
Final Evaluation Follow-up Plan to be cleared by IEU  

Dissemination by Project Management of the Final Evaluation Report  
November 2017  
Disseminate Final Evaluation Report  

EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION  

Number of evaluators needed  
Two evaluation consultants will be sought for conducting the final Independent Project Evaluation and will be contracted through UNDP. The qualifications and responsibilities of the evaluators are specified in the respective Terms of Reference (Annex I).  

The roles and tasks of the evaluation team  
The evaluators, one team leader with strong evaluation experience and one team member with expertise on anti-corruption issues, will be expected to carry out the following specific tasks.  

Team leader:  
Carry out a desk review;  
Develop the Inception Report, including sample size and sampling technique;  
Lead and coordinate the evaluation process;  
Implement quantitative tools and analyse data;  
Triangulate data and test rival explanations;  
Ensure that all aspects of the Terms of Reference are fulfilled;  
Draft an Evaluation Report (in English) in line with UNODC norms, standards, guidelines and templates that can be found on the IEU website http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html;  
Ensure that the language and grammar of the evaluation report is high quality and meets standards for international documents;
Finalise the Evaluation Report on the basis of comments received, including management response in the final report;

Present the final evaluation findings and recommendations to stakeholders.

Team member:

Contribute to the desk review and drafting of the Inception Report with a specific focus on anti-corruption programme;

Assist the Evaluation Consultant/Team Leader in the evaluation process, as per the evaluation Terms of References;

Support the Evaluation Consultant/Team Leader in presenting the findings and recommendations of the evaluation;

Contribute to the drafting of the Evaluation Report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates.

Absence of conflict of interest

According to UNODC rules, the evaluators must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation.

Furthermore, the evaluators shall respect and follow the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for conducting evaluations in a sensitive and ethical manner.

Reference to the evaluators’ ToR detailing qualifications and responsibilities

Please refer to Annex I for the details of the evaluators’ ToR.

MANAGEMENT OF EVALUATION PROCESS

Roles and responsibilities of the Project Manager

The Project Manager is responsible for:

Managing the evaluation;

Drafting and finalising the ToR;

Selecting Core Learning Partners (representing a balance of men, women and other marginalised groups) and informing them of their role;

Recruiting evaluators following clearance by IEU;

Providing desk review materials (including data and information on men, women and other marginalised groups) to the evaluation team including the full ToR;

Reviewing the inception report as well as the evaluation methodology;
Liaising with the Core Learning Partners;

Reviewing the draft report for factual errors;

Developing an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations as well as follow-up action (to be updated once per year); and

Disseminating the final evaluation report and facilitating the presentation of evaluation results.

The Project Manager will be in charge of providing logistical support to the evaluation team, including arranging the field missions of the evaluation team, including but not limited to:

All logistical arrangements for the travel of the consultants (including travel details; DSA payments; transportation; etc.)

All logistical arrangements for the meetings/ interviews/ focus groups/ etc., ensuring interview partners adequately represent men, women and other marginalised groups (including independent translator/ interpreter if needed; set-up of meetings; arrangement of ad-hoc meetings as requested by the evaluation team; transportation from/to the interview venues; scheduling sufficient time for the interviews (around 45 minutes); ensuring that members of the evaluation team and the respective interviewees are present during the interviews; etc.)

All logistical arrangements for the presentation of the evaluation results;

Ensuring timely payment of all fees/ DSA /etc. (payments for the evaluators need to be released within 5 working days after the respective deliverable is cleared by IEU).

For the field missions, the evaluation team liaises with the UNODC Regional/ Field Offices and mentors as appropriate.

Roles and responsibilities of the evaluation stakeholders

Members of the Core Learning Partners (CLP) are to be selected by the Project Managers. The CLPs are the main stakeholders, specifically, a limited number of those deemed as particularly relevant to be involved throughout the evaluation process, i.e. in reviewing and commenting on the TOR and the evaluation questions, reviewing and commenting on the draft evaluation report, as well as facilitating the dissemination and application of the results and other follow-up action. Stakeholders include all those to be invited to participate in the interviews and surveys, including the CLPs.

Roles and responsibilities of the Independent Evaluation Unit

The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) provides mandatory normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html. Furthermore, IEU provides guidance and evaluation expertise throughout the evaluation process.
IEU reviews and clears all steps and deliverables during the evaluation process: Terms of Reference; Selection of evaluator(s); Inception Report; Draft Evaluation Report; Final Evaluation Report; Evaluation Follow-up Plan.

PAYMENT MODALITIES

The Consultants will be issued a consultancy contract and paid in accordance with UNODC rules and regulations. The contract is a legally binding document in which the consultants agree to complete the deliverables by the set deadlines.

Payment is correlated to deliverables and three instalments are typically foreseen:

The first payment upon clearance by IEU of the Inception Report (in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates);

The second payment upon clearance by IEU of the Draft Evaluation Report (in line with UNODC norms, standards, evaluation guidelines and templates);

The third and final payment (i.e. the remainder of the fee) only after completion of the respective tasks, receipt of the Final Evaluation Report (in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates) and clearance by IEU, as well as presentation of evaluation results.
ANNEX II. EVALUATION TOOLS: QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEW GUIDES

Interview guide

The table below summarises the questions that will be raised by the evaluators in the context of semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. The questions will be formulated so as to help address each of the judgement criteria listed in the Evaluation Matrix.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Were you (was your organisation) involved in discussion of the project prior to design being finalised?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the project design take into account Indonesia’s policies at the time of its design, as well as its commitments under UNCAC?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Did the project design take into account a consideration of the situation and needs of CSOs dealing with anti-corruption?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Was the project strategy based on a sound analysis of the political and socio-economic strengths and weaknesses of the national governments, and of the partner organisations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the project strategy take into account the institutional development, mandate and capacities of the partner organisations, as well as their needs in terms of capacity building, organisational development and mandate?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the project strategy take into account the institutional development, legal environment and capacity of the CSOs involved in the project, as well as their needs in terms of capacity building and advocacy?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was the project designed to help upgrade the competence of the anti-corruption bodies and to support prosecutions?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Was the project also designed to support advocacy?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were the project strategy and design consistent with UNODC priorities at national and regional levels?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the project help strengthen anti-corruption policy-making, coordination, research, monitoring and legislation, in line with UNCAC?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Did the project help enhance institutional and operational capacity of anti-corruption agencies, and improve inter-agency cooperation?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Did the project help ensure that CSOs were empowered to increase the provision of services and their participation in anti-corruption activities?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Were the organisation and implementation of project activities such that they amounted to tangible support to the Government of Indonesia in preventing and fighting corruption?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Is there evidence of enhanced inter-agency coordination, improved research capacity, and strengthened legal drafting among partner organisations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there evidence of improved institutional development strategies, enhanced corruption prevention capabilities, law enforcement and intelligence/investigation capabilities, and public awareness raising capacity, among partner organisations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there evidence of effective project planning in relation to the CSO stakeholders in the project, of strengthened CSO capabilities, and of enhanced CSO networking and advocacy in relation to the fight against corruption?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the project, as implemented, help beneficiaries and target groups to address their needs in relation to the fight against corruption, and help ensure that end-users (institutions, CSOs and ultimately private citizens) were better able to exercise their rights in relation to transparency and accountability?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Answer</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Was the project’s effectiveness enhanced by sound intervention logic,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>underpinned by appropriate performance indicators?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Was the project’s effectiveness underpinned in part by a sound</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>political economy analysis and by an appropriate analysis of risks</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>and mitigation strategies?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Taking into account its activities, outcomes and impact, did the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>project represent good value for money, in keeping with similar</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-implemented projects?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Did the project made good use of the expertise available to UNODC,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>particularly with regard to research, and took into account lessons</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>learned and good practices developed by other UNODC projects in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>similar domains?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Was the project team able to manage the project in such a way as to</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ensure the timely delivery of planned outputs and activities,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>particularly since 2015?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Did institutional arrangements help ensure that project management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mechanisms put in place by UNODC were appropriate to deliver</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>management that was timely, flexible and accountable?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Was the budget designed and implemented in a way that enabled it to</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>meet its objectives?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Was there was a reasonable relationship between project inputs and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outputs?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Did institutional arrangements promote effective project management</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>and accountability, including through appropriate monitoring and</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>evaluation processes?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Did the project activities and outputs improve policy-making and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monitoring in relation to anti-corruption efforts?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the project activities and outputs enhance coordination at</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>working/expert level?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Did the project activities and outputs enhance the participation of</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CSOs in policy and political debates on the fight against corruption,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as well as the visibility of their advocacy?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Has the project contributed to changes in the approach that the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and other stakeholders take to the fight against</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>corruption?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Did the project contribute in a tangible manner to a greater</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>understanding of corruption among the target institutions and CSOs,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including relevant staff members and managers?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Did the project contribute to changed attitudes on the fight against</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>corruption on the part of civil servants, staff and managers of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partner organisations and CSOs, including with regards to the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>important of conducting impartial research and developing effective</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>advocacy approaches?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Did the project contribute to changing public attitudes about</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>corruption among the wider public, especially among people targeted</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>by media campaigns, ACA and CSO public activities?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the project design include an exit strategy that identifies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>processes and approaches to foster a continued impetus towards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>broadening the fight against corruption?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are the stakeholders in the project willing and able to follow up on</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>project activities, where applicable?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are the policies, methodologies and political approaches developed during the project period likely to be continued beyond the end of the project?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the training, mentoring and other capacity building activities help ensure that the partner organisations maintain and develop their activities and continue to enhance coordination and cooperation with each other?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the CSO-related activities help CSO to establish organisational processes, acquire anti-corruption skills (research, campaigning, advocacy) and coordination mechanisms that are likely to be used beyond the project’s funding period?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were principles such as transparency, accountability, and equality before the law, non-discrimination and participation taken into account in activities such as training, public awareness raising and advocacy?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could the project contribute to enhancing public trust in the anti-corruption institutions and the judiciary?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Did the project address the protection of whistleblowers, and more generally of those who seek legal recourse against instances of corruption?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the project support work with women’s rights NGOs to create awareness of, and engage in, the fight against corruption?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the project encourage the Indonesian partners to adopt gender-responsive approaches in their respective field of work?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent was UNODC able to take advantage of its unique position and comparative advantage to achieve results that could not have been achieved had support come from other donors?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was UNODC able to achieve results that alternative implementers would have found more difficult to achieve?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the project design made good use of UNODC’s status as an international, impartial actor?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Survey of participants in training sessions and seminars**

**Introduction**

- The survey will be circulated in Bahasa Indonesia.
- Brief explanation of the purpose of the evaluation.
- Reminder that all personal data will be confidential and all data will be anonymised.
- A word of thanks to the survey participants for taking the time to respond to the survey.

**Questions**

1. Please indicate your area of work
   
   Answer: drop-down menu

2. Please indicate your gender
   
   A: Male – Female – I’d rather not say

3. Topic of training session you attended
   
   A: drop-down menu

4. To what extent did the session meet your expectations?
   
   A: scale of 1 to 10

5. How would you rate the quality and quantity of information given?
   
   A: scale of 1 to 10

6. Was the content of the training technically up to date?
   
   A: scale of 1 to 10

7. How would you rate the trainer?
   
   A: 5 options

8. How applicable has the training been to your work?
   
   A: scale of 1 to 10

9. How would you rate the effectiveness of the training in addressing the human rights aspects of corruption?
   
   A: scale of 1 to 10
10. How would you rate the effectiveness of the training in addressing the gender aspects of corruption?
   A: scale of 1 to 10

11. Can you give an example of the way you used the skills acquired through the training?
   A: free text

12. What topic/topics do you think UNODC should cover in future training sessions?
   A: free text

13. Any other comments?
   A: free text
ANNEX III. DESK REVIEW LIST

UNODC documents

- 1st Draft Report of the Training Need Assessment (TNA) for the Reporting Parties of PPATK
- Final Report of the Training Needs Assessment (TNA) for the Law Enforcement Agencies associated with PPATK
- Completed Activities August 2014 – December 2015
- Performance Progress Report for the period from 01 January 2014-31 May 2015 for Sub Programme 2 on Anti-Corruption (INDA03) for the segment funded by Government of Norway
- Performance Progress Report for the Period from 1st January 2016 – 31 December 2016 for Sub Programme 2 on Anti-Corruption (INDA03) for the segment funded by Government of Norway
- Semi Annual 1 Jan-30 June 2017 Project Progress Report for INDA03
- Mission Report: Training on Anti-Money Laundering, Mutual Legal Assistant and Asset Recovery for National Investigation Officer
- Mission Report: Meeting on e-learning with Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC)
- Mission Report: Regional Workshop on Liability of Legal Persons for Corruption Offences at the National and International Level
- Mission Report: Collective Action to Promote Transparency in Public services and Strengthening Corporate Integrity
- Mission Report: Training on Money Laundering to enhance the Capacity of PPATK personnel
Mission Report: The Training of Trainers for Female Law Enforcement Personnel to Enhance their Capacity to be An Agent of Change on Anti-Corruption (SPAK)

Training Activities Report: Basic – Advance – Training of Trainer Prevention and Detecting Corruption to Enhance the Capacity of Law Enforcement Personnel

Short Guidance to Detect and Investigate Corruption: Strengthen Responses to Anti-Corruption Program for Law enforcement personnel in Indonesia

Minutes of Meeting: UNCAC Review

Gap Analysis Matrix of UNCAC

Number of internal documents reviewed: 18

External documents

- Achievements and Benefits: Implementation of the National Strategic Plan in Combating and Preventing Corruption
- 4th Indonesian Anti-Corruption Forum (IACF)
- 5th Indonesia Anti-Corruption Forum (IACF) – Terms of Reference
- The 5th Indonesia Anti-Corruption Forum (IACF)
- The National Strategic Plan (PPK) Presidential Instruction 55/2012 Review Matrix
- Twitter monitoring during the International Day Against Corruption 2016
- Identifying and Compensating Victims of Corruption: The Indonesia Experience
- Measuring the benefits and outcome from the PPK program (by Fahmi Badoh)

Number of external documents reviewed: 9

Overall number of documents reviewed: 27
ANNEX IV. LIST OF PERSONS CONTACED DURING THE EVALUATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of interviewees</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Sex disaggregated data</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>Female: 2 Male: 3</td>
<td>Indonesia/Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AIPJ</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>Female: 1 Male: 1</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>PPATK</td>
<td>Female: 1 Male: 1</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Trainers</td>
<td>Female: 1 Male: 1</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>TII</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jakarta University</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bappenas</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Norwegian Embassy</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kemitraan</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>MoL &amp; HR</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>INP</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Alliance for Integrity</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tempo Magazine</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Total: 23*
Male: 13
Female: 10

This number does not include the 57 survey respondents from four institutions (52 women, 5 men):

- FIU (3 respondents);
- MoL & HR (6);
- INP (34);
- AGO (11)
- Three further respondents did not specify the name of their institution.