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**Improving the Criminal Justice  
Response to Violence against Women in  
Egypt**

EGYZ33

Egypt

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This independent evaluation report was prepared by an evaluation team consisting of Ms. Eva Otero, Lead Evaluator and Ms. Nihad El Ghamry, National Evaluator. The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process of projects. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html>

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# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Full name</i>	<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Full name</i>
CSO	Civil Society Organization	TOT	Training of Trainers
ESP	Essential Services Package	Umoja	United Nation's financial management system
FMA	Forensic Medicine Authority	UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
IEU	Independent Evaluation Unit	UNDP	United Nations Development Program
Mol	Ministry of Interior	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
MoJ	Ministry of Justice	UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
NCW	National Council for Women	UNPDF	United Nations Partnership Development Framework
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
PPO	Public Prosecution Office	USINL	United States Bureau of International Narcotics & Law Enforcement Affairs
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence	VAW&G	Violence Against Women & Girls
ToC	Theory of Change	WHO	World Health Organization

# MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

<i>Recommendation</i>	<i>Management Response (accepted/partially accepted/rejected)</i>
<p>1: Develop an explicit Theory of Change (ToC). Adequate time and resources should be dedicated to a more in-depth process of stakeholders' consultation, risk analysis and assessment of strategic interventions where UNODC can realistically add value and contribute to change.</p>	Partially accepted
<p>2: Improve the quality of reporting, both from a substantive and financial perspective, aligning donor communications to the expectations and information requirements of each respective donor.</p>	Partially accepted
<p>3: Leverage the achievements of EGYZ33 project by taking steps to advocate for and support the institutionalization of trainings and manuals developed for VAW first responders to expand the scope of the benefits of the project as much as possible.</p>	Accepted
<p>4: Establish a middle-management position to mobilise resources, plan new initiatives and support project teams in cross cutting functions such as documentation</p>	Accepted
<p>5: Enhance project governance and potential synergies between national stakeholders, aligning potential interventions with the work of other bilateral and multilateral agencies active in the space of combatting violence against women and girls.</p>	Partially accepted
<p>6: Better integrate gender analysis and gender mainstreaming as core tasks both at conceptual and operational levels.</p>	Accepted

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## *Background*

“Improving the Criminal Justice Response to Violence against Women in Egypt” (EGYZ33) was designed to assist Egypt in exercising its international obligation of due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish acts of violence against women and girls. The project's objective was to develop fair and effective procedures for dealing with cases of violence against women and girls throughout the criminal justice process, ensuring a victim-centred approach, including assistance to and protection of victims, as well as to ensure the fair and just prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators. In this context and based on recommendations emanating from a consultative workshop with key national stakeholders and CSO representatives, the project was designed to deliver the following outcomes:

- **Outcome 1:** VAW issues discussed in national media including the new/amended legislation
- **Outcome 2:** The Egyptian government establishes a functioning integrated coordination mechanism among criminal justice actors established and functioning
- **Outcome 3:** Law enforcement authorities, in particular first responders and investigators, empowered and equipped to respond promptly and effectively to incidents of VAW
- **Outcome 4:** The MOI's VAW unit has a clear and identified purpose and has the capacity to fulfil that role (*Cancelled in project mid-term revision*)
- **Outcome 5:** Medical practitioners' responses to victims of VAW improved
- **Outcome 6:** Enhanced efficiency of the judiciary in dealing with crimes of VAW through targeted trainings
- **Outcome 7:** Comprehensive data is available to ensure tailored and evidence-based interventions

Specifically, the project targeted stakeholders and worked closely with five institutions:

- The Ministry of the Interior (MoI);
- The Forensic Medical Authority (FMA);
- The Ministry of Justice (MoJ);
- The Public Prosecutor's Office (PPO);
- The National Council for Women (NCW).

The project employed a mix of strategies to strengthen organisational capabilities and improve the efficacy as well as quality of response to VAW cases including:

- Training staff and the development of manuals to serve as a benchmark and guidance on response procedures based on international good practices;
- Improving systems and infrastructures, such as the procurement of advanced equipment for forensic practitioners to improve investigation standards and quality of evidence needed to support the prosecution of VAW cases;
- Enhancing information and administration procedures, including the procurement of IT equipment for the PPO to support a comprehensive data management system that covers all crimes including VAW from the first contact with the police until the verdict is pronounced;
- Implementing social awareness activities with the concerned community, including the improvement of NCW's hotline for reporting VAW cases nationwide.

### ***Purpose, scope and methodology of the evaluation***

The main aim of this final evaluation was to review the relevance, efficiency, partnerships and cooperation, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the project; identifying lessons learned and good practices.

The evaluation covered the period from March 2015 until the end of 2018. The evaluation used a gender-responsive evaluation methodology in line with United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) and UNODC Evaluation Norms and Standards.

The independent external evaluation team was composed of two senior consultants, an International Team Leader and a National Evaluator, both with extensive experience and knowledge of conducting evidence-based evaluations.

The evaluation process followed four stages; 1) Conceptualizing UNODC requirements and developing the analytical framework; 2) Designing appropriate data collection tools 3) Gathering evidence through extensive desk review, remote interviews and field data collection from 23<sup>rd</sup>-30<sup>th</sup> October 2018 (52 people were consulted, 19 men and 33 women); and 4) Systematically processing and analysing the information collected.

### ***Main findings***

#### Design

The project had two core strengths; an ambitious design in line with magnitude and complexity of VAW in Egypt and an inclusive consultation of the main counterparts informing its intervention logic and strategies. However, at inception, consultation was an *event* (albeit significant, inclusive and with good repercussions for the design) rather than *'a process'*; hence lacking the length, continuity and depth of reflections on some of the project's critical underlying assumptions, (i.e. *how will improved services and training of Justice actors lead to improved reporting and consequently justice outcomes*). The acceleration of the inception stage, among other factors including the instability of the country and its institutions, also curtailed the ability of project management to draw a more realistic plan on what was implementable.

#### Relevance

The project is fully aligned with Egypt's National Strategy for Combatting Violence against Women 2015-2020 which was coordinated by the National Council for Women (NCW). Yet, evidence suggests that combating VAW did not constitute a top priority with fund allocations for most government counterparts. Hence, donor financing remains a critical driver for continued work on VAW. The project was fully aligned with the UNDAF 2013-2017, where VAW was identified as a theme for possible joint programming.

#### Effectiveness

The project went through a major mid-term revision and many of its outcomes and outputs had significant changes, alterations or cancellations. In general, the project management team has been very agile in responding to the implementation challenges that were arising and has succeeded in seizing new opportunities to keep the implementation progress despite many difficulties. However, it is also true that reactive dynamics have permeated decision-making throughout the project. Instead of being based on rigorous planning, decisions often responded to the need to constantly solve emerging problems in a complex environment.

#### Efficiency

The project was undertaken by a management team working under enormous challenges both internal and external to UNODC. Most notable challenges included the administrative and financial


systems; the constant pressure for mobilizing resources due to the full cost recovery policy, the contextual complexities of dealing with security and justice institutions, the intricacies of handling multiple donors and balancing the pressure for accelerated delivery giving sufficient space, level of engagement and compliance to lengthy approval processes from national counterparts.

Despite these challenges, the project's products/activities were unanimously perceived by stakeholders, including beneficiaries, to be of very good quality. Significant efforts were exerted to deliver quality outputs, with less effort channelled to how these will contribute to broader transformations within institutions and across the touchpoints with VAW survivors.

Most of the resources were invested in equipment or system improvements for the different counterparts<sup>1</sup>. The efficiency of these investments is conditioned by the completion and sustainability of these systems. With a relatively low level of investment, it could be ascertained that the training programme (approximately 26% of total budget) was the most cost-efficient strategy that was most closely linked to the impacts identified in this evaluation.

### Impact

Using the Gender@Work analytical framework, the evaluation team collected evidence on the project's contribution to transformations in the four dimensions of change. **In the collective/visible dimension**, the project contributed to improving policies and systems within the FMA, the PPO and to a lesser extent the NCW by improving their equipment, systems, procedures and guidelines and generally their organisational ability to deal with cases of VAW. Only in the case FMA -where the project reached a tipping point reaching the entire population of forensic medical practitioners-



have these systems and equipment also translated into a tangible and generalised improvement in the justice services related to VAW delivered by the organisation (i.e. personal and visible dimension). Among the notable service improvements were the introduction of new services such as preventive medicine, emergency contraception, and psychological support; the extension of service hours that reduced the time lapse between crime and examination and hence lowering the risk of losing valuable evidence; increased ability to provide more conclusive evidence in cases of assault and rape using the new technologies.

In the PPO, the project financed hardware and software but, most importantly, it has been instrumental in gender mainstreaming of key data within the Information Centre Database improving its relevance and efficacy in addressing VAW cases.

**In the invisible dimensions**, the project has contributed to ideological transformations about what VAW is and how to treat its victims. For example, prosecutors in the PPO reported *“we have shifted our approach from focusing only on getting evidence to bring perpetrators to justice to focusing also on protecting victims”*.

<sup>1</sup> (i.e. for the PPO database; for the hotline in NCW; and for the four clinics in FMA). At the time of this evaluation, only three of the four specialised clinics in FMA were fully functional and the NCW's hotline and PPO's database were still either at a pilot stage (the case PPO database was functional in only 39 offices in the country) or not working at full capacity (24/7 in the case of the hotline).



The evaluation found that the trainings contributed to empowering the participants in different ways. In the MoI, junior female officers valued the fact that they gained enough confidence to comfortably present issues related to VAW to higher ranking male officers.

#### Partnerships and Cooperation

UNODC's unique position and standing in the country constituted to serve as an effective entry point for building strategic collaborations on VAW with governmental partners. Despite challenges outlined in this evaluation, national partners positively valued their partnership with UNODC.

At a strategic level, the UN Joint Programme on VAW currently under development constitutes the most relevant existing collaboration involving the UN family. The project also established significant tactical synergies with other UN agencies, most notable with UN Women.

Mainly due to restrictions coming from national partners, the project has only worked "anecdotally" with the Egyptian women's movement. Promoting more involvement while sensitive could be useful for future projects.

#### Sustainability

Despite the existence of a National Strategy to combat VAW, evidence suggests that combating VAW is not a top priority for most government counterparts. Nonetheless, there are different degrees of will and capacity to continue working on combatting VAW in the future among national partners through donor financing and collaboration. UNODC, for its part, has a firm commitment to combating VAW not only in Egypt, but also globally and has existing plans to continue working on this issue. The sustainability of the project's impact will ultimately depend on its capability to institutionalise the procedures, systems and trainings (outputs) developed within the governmental counterpart institutions. The evaluation has documented some progress in this regard.

#### Gender Equality, Human Rights and Leaving no one behind

While the project was gender specific and intrinsically promoted the empowerment of women, its design and implementation did not fully integrate gender and human rights considerations. The institutional and socio-political context in which the project was immersed was not fully analysed from a gender and human rights perspective (including institutions where women are denied employment). Despite valuable efforts like the inclusion of women trainees, trainers and experts in some workshops, there is room for improvement in future projects to incorporate sex-disaggregated data for reporting and to employ consistent strategies to involve women and other vulnerable groups in project activities.

### *Main recommendations*

#### **Overall Management, Governance and Partnerships**

Country Office Management is recommended to establish a middle-management position to mobilise resources, plan new initiatives and support project teams in cross cutting functions. Both the project management and the Country Office Management should prioritize the creation of a governance body (such as a steering committee or an information-sharing committee) for new VAW projects; enhancing synergies and coordination between UNODC national partners and between UNODC and other bilateral or multilateral agencies active in the space of combatting VAW&G.

### **Sustainability (expanding reach of project products/services)**

Country Office Management is recommended to capitalize on the good quality products produced by EGYZ33 project by taking steps to advocate for and support the institutionalization of trainings and manuals developed for VAW first responders. This will not only expand the reach necessary to contribute to organizational transformations, but it is vital to ensure that these knowledge products remain updated, in use, and that they contribute to sustained improvements in the Justice System's response to VAW.

### ***Main lessons learned and best practices***

The Cooperation with MoI constituted an important good practice. Despite the difficulties of working with the VAW Units as originally envisioned, the manual developed for Law Enforcement Officers, the basic training for Police Officers and the TOT all represent ground-breaking initiatives. They constitute 'firsts' for a counterpart like MOI in their work on the EVAW portfolio with international organizations.

An important lesson that has been learned has been the need to allocate sufficient resources for an adequate inception phase before the formulation of the initiative. In the absence of dedicated personnel for resource mobilization and networking to secure the necessary funds for the full cost recovery, the time – and reflection space- available to project management teams to undertake core conceptual, planning and risk analysis tasks are significantly curtailed.

## SUMMARY MATRIX OF FINDINGS, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings	Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)	Recommendations
<p>1. Design relied on important strengths like the active participation of the main counterparts at the concept stage. Insufficient time and depth of inception phase curtailed ability to devise realistic plan about what was implementable.</p> <p>The project design was ambitious and aligned with magnitude and complexity of the problem. However, the implicit ToC built on a number of underlying assumptions that were not sufficiently challenged.</p>	<p>Desk review (Project Document, progress reports and secondary reviews)</p> <p>Interviews (Project Management, and partners)</p>	<p>Develop an explicit Theory of Change (ToC). Adequate time and resources should be dedicated to a more in-depth process of stakeholders' consultation, risk analysis and assessment of strategic interventions where UNODC can realistically add value and contribute to change.</p>
<p>2. The issues tackled by the project are highly relevant, nonetheless, there no clear consensus among stakeholders on exactly what "violence against women" means. This affected the project's relevance, since the services and products that are appropriate for fighting one kind of VAW (like sexual harassment) are different to those addressing other forms (like domestic violence).</p> <p>The project is fully aligned with Egypt's National Strategy for Combatting VAW as well as with the UNDAF 2013-2017 and with UNODC's Regional Programme for the Arab States</p>	<p>Desk review (Project Document, progress reports and secondary reviews including Combatting VAW National Strategy.</p> <p>Interviews (Project Management, UN Agencies, Donors and partners)</p>	

<b>Findings</b>	<b>Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>
<p>3. The project went through a major revision half-way through its implementation and many of its outcomes and outputs had significant changed or realigned.</p> <p>Despite an extremely complex and challenging environment the project made progress and contributed to positive and important transformations affecting an issue that remained highly sensitive and complex in Egypt. The management team, donors and national partners involved deserve credit for making this progress.</p> <p>However, it is also true that reactive dynamics have permeated decision-making throughout the project. Instead of being based on rigorous planning, decisions have tended to respond to the need to constantly solve emerging problems in a complex environment.</p>	<p>Interviews (Project Management, UN Agencies, Donors, Partners and Bellwethers)</p> <p>Site Visits to FMA Specialised Clinic in Cairo</p> <p>Site Visit to Information Data Centre at PPO</p> <p>Champions Workshops at FMA/NCW</p>	<p>Establish a middle-management position with access to Umoja to mobilise resources, plan new initiatives and support project teams in cross cutting functions such as documentation</p>
<p>4. Undertaking a meaningful assessment of V4M was not fully possible. First, the administrative and financial systems used during the implementation of the project did not ensure adequate monitoring of project expenditure. Second, there was no consistent view across key stakeholders about what is understood as value/success apart from delivering activities. Hence, “value” was placed exclusively in the delivery of good quality outputs. The quality of the products generated by the project was perceived as very good.</p> <p>The bulk of the daily running activities of the project was undertaken by a management team working under enormous multi-layered challenges both internal and external to UNODC. Despite these complexities, the</p>	<p>Interviews (UNODC Egypt Management, Project Management, National Counterparts, UN Agencies)</p> <p>Site Visits to FMA Specialised Clinic in Cairo and the Information Data Centre at PPO</p> <p>Champions Workshops at FMA/NCW</p> <p>Site observation of Police Officers Training at the Police Academy</p>	<p>Enhance project governance and potential synergies between national stakeholders, aligning potential interventions with the work of other bilateral and multilateral agencies active in the space of combatting violence against women and girls.</p>

<p>project management demonstrated significant agility to seize new opportunities and re-align interventions in the face of implementation bottlenecks.</p>		
<p>5. The project has contributed to significant invisible and personal changes in all national partners that have benefitted from training programmes.</p> <p>The project has contributed to several transformations in the collective/visible dimension in the different counterparts (the FMA, the PPO and to a lesser extent in the NCW) by improving their equipment, systems and generally their organisational ability to deal with cases of VAW. It is impressive to note how these institutional improvements have translated into concrete FMA services for victims of VAW.</p> <p>The project is contributing to the achievement of SDG 5 and 16 that exclusively deals with achieving gender equality and empowering women and girls.</p>	<p>Interviews (Project Management, UN Agencies, Donors, Partners and Bellwhethers)</p> <p>Site Visits to FMA Specialised Clinic in Cairo</p> <p>Site Visit to Information Data Centre at PPO</p> <p>Champions Workshops at FMA/NCW</p>	<p>Improve the quality of reporting, both from a substantive and financial perspective, aligning donor communications to the expectations and information requirements of each respective donor</p>
<p>6. At a strategic level, the UN Joint Programme on VAW currently under development constitutes the most relevant existing collaboration involving the UN family. The project also established significant tactical synergies with other UN agencies, most notable with UN Women and UNFPA.</p> <p>UNODC's unique position and standing in the country constituted to serve as an effective entry point for building strategic collaborations on VAW with governmental partners. Despite multiple difficulties, national partners positively valued their partnership with UNODC.</p>	<p>Interviews (Project Management, UN Agencies, Donors, Partners and Bellwethers)</p> <p>Site Visits to FMA Specialised Clinic in Cairo</p> <p>Site Visit to Information Data Centre at PPO</p> <p>Champions Workshops at FMA/NCW</p>	

<p>Mainly due to restrictions coming from national partners, the project has only worked “anecdotally” with the Egyptian women’s movement. Promoting more involvement while sensitive could be useful for future projects.</p>		
<p>7. Despite the existence of a National Strategy to combat VAW, evidence suggests that combating VAW is not a top priority for most government counterparts. Nonetheless, there are different degrees of will and capacity to continue working on combatting VAW in the future. UNODC, for its part, has an unwavering commitment to combating VAW and has firm plans to continue working on this issue.</p> <p>The scope of the project’s impact will ultimately depend on its capability to institutionalise the procedures, systems and trainings (outputs) developed within the governmental counterpart institutions.</p> <p>The interest of donors in continuing to fund the fight against VAW in Egypt is essential, considering that it is not yet a clear priority for the state. There are contradictory indications regarding the willingness and interest of donors in this area, since future engagement appeared to be conditioned by various factors.</p>	<p>Desk Review (Egypt National Strategy for Combatting VAW 2015-2020, UN Joint Programme on Essential Services for Women and Girls Subject to Violence, UNODC Regional Programme for Improving Prevention and Criminal Justice Response to Violence against Women and Girls in the MENA Region )</p> <p>Interviews (Project Management, National Counterparts, UN Agencies, Bellwethers)</p>	<p>Leverage the achievements of EGYZ33 project by taking steps to advocate for and support the institutionalization of trainings and manuals developed for VAW&amp;G first responders to expand the scope of the benefits of the project as much as possible.</p>
<p>8. While the project was gender specific and intrinsically promoted the empowerment of women, its design and implementation did not fully integrate gender and human rights considerations, despite important efforts to do so.</p>	<p>Desk review (project documents and progress reports)</p> <p>Interviews (Project Management, National Counterparts)</p>	<p>Better integrate gender analysis and gender mainstreaming as core tasks both at conceptual and operational levels.</p>

# I. INTRODUCTION

## Background and context

As stated in a recent UNFPA report on violence against women (VAW), an estimated “1 in 3 women worldwide report they have experienced physical and /or sexual abuse, making this form of violence against women and girls one of the most prevalent forms of human rights violations worldwide. Its impact ranges from immediate to long-term multiple physical, sexual and mental consequences for women and girls, including death”<sup>2</sup>.

Egypt is not exempt from this type of violence. According to the database on *Different Forms of Violence against Women* compiled by UN Women, 26% of ever-partnered women in Egypt aged 15-49 years have experienced intimate partner physical and/or sexual violence at least once in their lifetime<sup>3</sup>.

However, as the project document for EGYZ33 rightly identified, women who experience violence often do not report the crime for fear of shame, exclusion or isolation, reprisal or an expectation that their complaint will not be taken seriously by the criminal justice authorities. This analysis is backed by the *Progress on Women report 2011-2012*, which indicates that Egypt is one of the countries with the highest proportion of under-reporting in crimes such as sexual assault<sup>4</sup>.

Egypt is taking this issue seriously and has taken some strides to address the problem. For example, in May 2013, a special unit was set up within the Human Rights Department in the Ministry of Interior (MoI) to address the issue of violence against women. This special unit consisted of both female and male officers and was assigned to deal with cases of sexual harassment as well as all other forms of violence against women (VAW).

In December 2013, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) also set up a special VAW unit, since the Human Rights Department within the MoJ had been requested to handle the VAW portfolio in May 2013. The unit, headed by a Chief Judge and assisted by three additional female Judges, coordinated its work with the MoI and the National Council for Women (NCW).

However, at the beginning of 2014, as the project document points out, it became apparent that these units had serious limitations in terms of their capacities.

## The project

To address this situation, UNODC designed the present project “Improving the Criminal Justice Response to Violence against Women in Egypt” (EGYZ33). The overarching aim of the project is **to assist Egypt in preventing, investigating and punishing acts of violence against women and girls**. More specifically, the original project aims to:

- 1) INFLUENCE POLICY by supporting the efforts of Egyptian authorities to develop a good legislative framework to better deal with VAW cases;
- 2) ENSURE COORDINATION among criminal justice actors.

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<sup>2</sup> UNFPA (2015) The Egypt economic cost of gender-based violence survey (ECGBVS) 2015.

<sup>3</sup> <http://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/fr/countries/africa/egypt#4>

<sup>4</sup> UN Women (2012), Progress on Women Report. In pursuit of Justice, 2011-2012 (pg. 50).

3) **IMPROVE SERVICES** in government institutions that have a key role in fighting VAW. Specifically, the project involves five institutions: i) the Ministry of the Interior (MoI); ii) the Forensic Medical Authority (FMA); iii) the Ministry of Justice (MoJ); iv) the Public Prosecutor's Office (PPO) v) the National Council for Women (NCW). The project contributes to strengthening organisational capacities through the following strategies: i) training staff (including specialised trainings, study tours, training of trainers (ToT), on-job trainings and the development of manuals); ii) improving systems and infrastructures; iii) enhancing information and administration procedures; and iv) implementing social awareness activities with the concerned community.

## Purpose and scope of the evaluation

The object of analysis of this final evaluation was the UNODC project "*Improving the Criminal Justice Response to Violence against Women in Egypt*" (EGYZ33). The main aim of this final evaluation was to review the relevance, efficiency, partnerships and cooperation, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the project. The evaluation also placed important emphasis on identifying lessons learned and good practices that derived from its implementation and that could be applied to similar projects in similar contexts. They were also the base to produce clear and practical recommendations for future interventions in Egypt.

In addition, this is also a gender and human rights responsive evaluation. This means that it has examined equality issues and power relations that are central to the project, as well as the extent to which the project has integrated a gender and human rights (HR) perspective into the full project cycle.

## The composition of the evaluation team

The evaluation team was composed of two senior consultants, Eva Otero, as Lead Evaluator and Nihad El Ghamry, National Evaluator. Eva Otero has 20 years of experience in international development. Since 2008, she has been an independent consultant specialised in conducting evaluations and other learning processes. Nihad ElGhamry is a development practitioner with 19 years of experience and knowledge of conducting evidence-based research.

## Evaluation methodology

There were four stages in this evaluation:

(1) **Conceptualizing** what UNODC needed to know in a well-defined and transparent analytical framework that involved: a) formulating clear questions that the evaluation had to answer; and b) identifying the best sources that could inform each evaluation question. This was developed as part of an inception report that was validated by the project team in Egypt and by the IEU of UNODC.

(2) **Designing appropriate data collection tools** to gather information from identified sources. The evaluation team applied a mixed methods approach, including data sources detailed below.

(3) **Collecting data** to gather evidence through an extensive desk review, remote interviews and a field mission to Egypt carried out from the 22<sup>nd</sup> to the 31<sup>st</sup> of October 2018. The following data collection tools were used:

Desk review analysis: Documentation provided by the project team was supplemented by the relevant literature from a variety of primary and secondary sources (Annex II).

Champion workshops: The evaluation team organised champion workshops (of around 22 people; of which 16 were women) in the NCW and the FMA. Partners' organisations invited people who had put into use the learning coming from the project. During these workshops, a range of participatory tools were used to discuss what progress the project had made and how it had contributed to different transformations.



Interviews/small focus group discussions: The evaluation team also conducted semi-structured interviews and small focus group discussions with 30 key informants, (13 men and 17 women) that were selected on the basis of the Stakeholder Inventory (Annex III).

Direct observation: The evaluation team visited two selected project locations (FMA clinic in Cairo and server's room in the PPO) to validate the delivery and good use of infrastructure, equipment, systems and material provided or developed during the project.

(4) **Analysing the information and writing the report.** The information collected throughout the evaluation process was systematically processed and analysed by the evaluators. The information was compiled and codified in tables of evidence and analysed using triangulation techniques to validate findings. The evaluation team used Quality Data Analysis (QDA) software ([Dedoose](#)) to support this process. Furthermore, the evaluation team analysed available information and insights during a formal preliminary findings session held with the UNODC project team in Cairo.

The Independent Evaluation Unit of UNODC in Vienna (IEU) also played a key role in this last level of analysis by giving their feedback and insights on the initial draft of the evaluation report and acting as a clearing entity for all evaluation deliverables.

## Limitations to the evaluation

1. It is a characteristic of this type of project, which feeds into complex, organic social and political change with diverse actors and trends, that its impact can only be understood as a contribution to change. The timeframes needed to demonstrate and evidence noticeable and sustainable impact on women's lives, partner organisations, or political/economical processes are long, generally much longer than three years of project life. The evaluation team met this challenge by identifying preliminary contributions to change and by assessing the systems that the project had introduced to measure change at a later stage.

2. Even though the project team was very diligent making available all the progress reports produced by the project, a key challenge for the evaluation has been the quality of project monitoring. The evaluation team had to undertake quasi-archaeological efforts to understand what had happened under each output (old and new – before and after the revision) and compile data from different sources through a painstaking process. To meet this challenge, the evaluation team had to reconstruct a comprehensive progress table per output (Annex V); an implicit Theory of Change (ToC) and an analysis of the money budgeted vs. money spent per output (Annex VI). These tasks were conducted together with the project team, in order to adequately capture project progress and efficiency in this evaluation report.

3. During the inception phase, it became clear that accessing some of the stakeholders would not be an easy task. For example, Champions Workshops could only be organised in NCW and FMA. The limited number of champions identified within MoI and PPO negated the ability for the evaluation team to conduct a Champions Workshop and instead a small focus group discussion was held. The evaluation team were only able to meet with MoJ management and could not conduct interviews with trainees. Furthermore, the survey that was initially suggested could not be conducted since the evaluation team did not receive permission to contact trainees for confidentiality issues. The evaluation team worked within these limitations to develop findings as robust as possible by combining multiple sources of information.

## II. EVALUATION FINDINGS

### *Design*

#### Evaluation questions<sup>5</sup>:

- To what extent has the project used an appropriate planning methodology that has clearly defined results and aims, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and were they achievable with the planned approach and resources, following UNODC standards?
- To what extent did the seed funding provided under XAMV12 support the initiation of the implementation of project EGYZ33?

The evaluation showed that the design phase of this intervention faced **certain limitations** but also relied on **important strengths**.

On the positive side, the conceptualization of the intervention was forged during a workshop that was financed by a previous UNODC project (XAMV12), with the **active participation of the main counterparts**. The recommendations and work plans that emerged during this workshop were the pillars of the intervention. This was considered a good practice by all stakeholders consulted.

However, this initial involvement did not guarantee full ownership on the part of national partners during its implementation. Evidence suggests that the design phase would have benefited from more time and resources, which would have allowed stakeholders to **weigh the risks** and draw up a more **realistic plan** about what was implementable and what was not implementable in the current Egyptian socio-political context. Additionally, the project did not base its design on any validated good practices and/or accepted research in to the topic of VAW, specifically in the Egypt or similar contexts.

This deeper and longer reflection process was not possible mainly as a result of three factors: firstly, the fact that UNODC does not specifically allocate core funding to plan for interventions; secondly, discussions with counterparts were very challenging as it was a highly innovative theme for many of them; thirdly, the fact that the initial planning stage was accelerated in order to respond to a concrete funding opportunity that it would have been missed otherwise. In this scenario, the strategic choice was, in the words of the UNODC project team, *“to start and accomplish something rather than getting stuck in planning to be more realistic and losing the chance to start this project all together”* (project management).

An important strength of the project design was that it **was inclusive in terms of coverage**, since **most of the relevant criminal justice actors** with a role to combat VAW in Egypt were included. However, there was a **significant absence** during the design phase, since the National Council for Women (NCW) (the government body charged with coordinating the country strategy to combat VAW), was not involved from the start. The NCW was only brought on board in 2016 after an important project revision<sup>6</sup> Hence, the linkages between NCW interventions and the broader project were weak.

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<sup>5</sup> Evaluation questions were fine-tuned during the inception phase to ensure relevance considering data availability issues.

<sup>6</sup> USINL 1<sup>st</sup> Quarterly Progress Report 2016 (p.5)

The project had an **ambitious design** in accordance with the magnitude and complexity of the problem it sought to address. However, the implicit ToC<sup>7</sup> (see figure 1) built on a number of underlying assumptions that were not sufficiently challenged.

**Critical assessment of the implicit Theory of Change**

As figure 1 illustrates, the overarching horizon of the project was to **reduce the prevalence of VAW** in Egypt. The project had the more immediate aim of **improving the access to justice of women victims of violence**. As mentioned in the introduction, the project rightly identified that women who experience violence in Egypt often do not report the crime. Therefore, a good indicator of success for this aim would be that the number of women reporting violence increases.

There is, however an important untackled assumption that links the immediate aim of the project and the overarching objective, namely the premise that if women access justice, violence towards them will decrease. In fact, the opposite could happen as backlashes are possible from aggressors after a report has been filed (if an adequate protocol to protect victims is not in place).

Both of these objectives were not explicitly mentioned in the original design. The original outcomes formulated in the project document were mostly related to **improving the justice services available to victims**, and not to explicitly encouraging women to access these services.

This internal logic was also **based on another assumption: if better services are available, women will report more**. International research suggested that although the quality of the official services available to victims was an important factor, it might not be the most determining one<sup>8</sup> (this is also discussed under adequacy).

There is, however, an important aspect that must be underlined at this stage. There is solid evidence coming from all consulted sources in the evaluation to argue that

**UNODC combating VAW Reconstructed ToC**



Figure 1: Implicit ToC

<sup>7</sup> The implicit ToC was reconstructed by the evaluation team during the field mission based on the analysis of the interviews and focus groups and on the analysis of the desk review. The ToC was validated by the project team during the preliminary finding session and further reviewed by the project team during the revision of this report.

<sup>8</sup> Women who experience violence often do not report the crime for fear of shame, exclusion or isolation, fear of social reprisal. This analysis is backed by the *Progress on women report 2011-2012* that indicates that Egypt is one of the countries with the highest proportion of under reporting in crimes such as sexual assault - UN Women (2012), Progress on Women Report. In pursuit of

UNODC is uniquely placed to work with these criminal justice actors. **Thus, the entry point of the ToC was correctly identified.** What this evaluation has noted is that the wider contextual picture of the project required more thought and reflection.

The project employed four different strategies to contribute to improving the justice services available to victims of VAW.

The first strategy (in terms of resources invested) sought to **enhance the institutional capacity** of key criminal justice actors to deal with cases of VAW through the improvement of their **equipment and systems** (for example, medical equipment to detect cases of rape and assault or data management systems to document VAW related crimes). The underlying assumption here was that this improvement would translate into better services that, in turn, would be more widely used. However, this might not always be the case. For example, the victims may not want to use spaces that are widely recognised as specialized in VAW (such as those supported by the project with the FMA), for fear of being stigmatized by their community<sup>9</sup>. If such assumption would have been challenged, the project could have addressed more explicitly how best to ensure the privacy and/or anonymity of such services that women can access without being ‘seen or recognized’.

The second strategy received less financing but required the highest level of effort on the part of project actors. It involved **training the staff of national partners** to better deal with VAW in different ways, for example, by positively changing the attitude of the police, the prosecutors and the judges towards the victims of VAW. In terms of impact, it was this strategy that made the clearest contribution to change in the project (see the impact chapter). However, this strategy was also based on a number of unchallenged assumptions, the main ones being: a) that the national partners would have the will and the capacity to institutionalise these trainings in order to reach a critical mass of staff who, in turn, would change the organisational culture and/or systems; i.e. the ways of dealing with VAW; b) that the trainings would prompt changes in behaviours among trainees. This evaluation report explores both assumptions in the impact and sustainability chapters.

The project also envisaged the third strategy of establishing a **coordination mechanism** among criminal justice actors to improve the response to victims of VAW seeking justice. The stakeholders consulted unanimously agreed that this constituted a key step for improving justice services for victims. However, the project had to dismiss this third strategy, as originally envisaged in the project document<sup>10</sup>, for reasons described under the effectiveness and efficiency chapters.

The fourth and last strategy included in the implicit ToC sought to contribute to a more conducive policy environment through the **enactment of positive changes in laws relating to VAW**. This strategy was also dismissed for similar reasons.

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Justice, 2011-2012 (pg. 50).

<sup>9</sup> This is an aspect that was picked up by similar projects in similar context as a recent study indicates: *UNODC, Reflections on the extent of compliance and progress in the implementation of gender – related recommendations in evaluations since 2016* (2018); pg. 18.

<sup>10</sup> The project encouraged coordination among partners through its different activities, such as workshops and trainings. However, the original and formal coordination mechanism could not be implemented.

### Critical assessment of the logical framework

The formulation of the project did not formally follow the above-mentioned ToC but was organised using a **logframe approach based on six outcomes**. Around June 2017, the project went through a major revision that included stopping most activities implemented with the MoI. This revision process implied halting Outcome 4 entirely, as well as most of the components under Outcome 3. It also involved adding a new outputs under Outcome 7 which entailed (among other things) including the National Council for Women (NCW) as a new project partner (Figure 2).




Figure 2: Planned vs. revised outcomes

The evaluation found the **project logframe to be confusing for several reasons**. By way of example, it is worth noting that some of the project outcomes were broadly designed around enhancing partners' capacity, while others were designed around "themes". For example, Outcome 7 was loosely organised around the themes of improving data management systems a) through the criminal database in the PPO; and b) through a hotline for VAW victims in NCW. This configuration of outcomes meant that the internal logic of project was not sufficiently clear. It also meant that the possibility of meaningfully reaching the final implicit objective was limited.

#### Summary of conclusions - Design

Design relied on **important strengths** like the active participation of the main counterparts at the concept stage. It also had **certain limitations**, most notably, this phase was not deep or long enough to draw up a more realistic plan about what was implementable.

The project had an **ambitious design** in accordance with the magnitude and complexity of the problem it sought to address. However, the implicit ToC built on a number of **underlying assumptions** that were not sufficiently challenged.

The **logical framework** used to plan the initiative was **not sufficiently clear**, especially after the major revision of the project.

### Relevance

#### Evaluation questions:

- To what extent are UNODC services and products provided through this project relevant to the needs of various groups of stakeholders, in particular women who were victims of violence and the criminal justice actors involved?
- Were project interventions clearly within stakeholders' mandates and congruent with their strategic framework, including the SDGs?
- To what extent are the project objectives still relevant to the Egyptian Government, end beneficiaries and the international community?

### Adequacy

Information on the prevalence of VAW in Egypt is scarce. However, recent studies <sup>11</sup> and the unanimous testimonies of the people consulted recognised that **VAW remains a widespread and serious problem in the country**. There is also a broad consensus suggesting that **crimes related to violence against women are not reported** in a large percentage. Therefore, **the issues tackled by the project remain highly relevant to the real problems of women facing violence in Egypt**.

However, this evaluation exercise has identified a flaw in the conceptualization of the project that has affected its overall relevance and effectiveness. All stakeholders agreed that VAW was a real problem that UNODC could help fight. Additionally, UNODC has clear tools and handbooks that were consulted during the design of the project, that explains clearly what is VAW. However, the evaluation found that **there was no clear consensus among stakeholders, particularly national partners, on exactly what "violence against women" means**.

Many of the stakeholders consulted **emphasised sexual harassment** and assaults in public places. This is due to the fact that this issue gained ground in the public agenda following several very mediatic incidents<sup>12</sup> in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. Other types of violence against women that are also prevalent in Egypt, such as **domestic violence**, were **not explicitly included in the initial conceptualization of the project**. In fact, the consulted stakeholders had **different ideological standpoints** and understandings regarding this type of violence against women. Additionally, **femicides did not emerge** at all despite the magnitude of the problem worldwide and UNODC's specific experience and expertise on this issue<sup>13</sup>.

The **lack of a clear understanding** on which concrete forms of VAW were being combated through the project somehow **affected its relevance**. The project addressed generically all forms of violence that will put the victim in contact with the judiciary system, However, the services and products that are appropriate for, for example, fighting sexual harassment are different to those addressing other forms of VAW, such as intimate partner violence.

### **Alignment**

The project is **fully aligned with Egypt's National Strategy** for Combatting Violence against Women 2015-2020 which was coordinated by the National Council for Women (NCW). The Strategy specifically mentions strategies that have been carried out through this project<sup>14</sup>.

Despite the existence of this National Strategy, evidence suggests that combating **VAW did not constitute a top priority for most government counterparts**. However, even if, in practice, VAW was not a key focus area among the many competing priorities of the national partners, it remains an issue on which the Egyptian government is willing to work alongside foreign donors and agencies that tackle issues linked to citizen security.

The project was **fully aligned with the UNDAF 2013-2017**, where the issue of VAW was mentioned under different outcomes and was identified as a theme for possible joint programming<sup>15</sup> It was also in line with the UNPDF which

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<sup>11</sup> The Egypt Economic Cost Of Gender-Based Violence Survey, United Nations Population Fund, 2015.

<sup>12</sup> These incidents (most notably a woman who was raped in Tahrir Square) triggered the publication of several studies, including a number of very controversial ones such as that published by UN Women and the Cairo Demographic Centre in 2013, as well as an increase in donor interest and government attention that was reinforced by the President's hospital visit to one of Tahrir Square victims of mass sexual assault.

<sup>13</sup><https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2017/May/femicide-watch-platform-prototype-launched-at-2017-un-crime-commission.html> and UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2018 [https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/GSH2018/GSH18\\_Gender-related\\_killing\\_of\\_women\\_and\\_girls.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/GSH2018/GSH18_Gender-related_killing_of_women_and_girls.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> For example, "capacity building program for judges, members of the public prosecution, forensic doctors and police staff in the fields related to combating violence against women" (p. 54).

<sup>15</sup> United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Egypt (2013 – 2017): Achieving MDGs with Inclusive Growth, Freedom, Social Justice and Dignity, page 50.

included women's empowerment as one of its four outcome areas<sup>16</sup>. The project was also fully **in line with UNODC's Regional Programme** for the Arab States 2016-2021<sup>17</sup> and with the SDGs, particularly SDG 5 and 16.

#### Summary of conclusions - Relevance

The issues tackled by the **project remain highly relevant to the real problems of women** facing violence in Egypt. However, there was **no clear consensus among stakeholders on exactly what "violence against women" means**. This affected the project's relevance, since the services and products that are appropriate for fighting one kind of VAW (like sexual harassment) are different to those addressing other forms (like domestic violence).

The project is **fully aligned with Egypt's National Strategy** for Combatting VAW as well as with the **UNDAF 2013-2017** and with **UNODC's Regional Programme** for the Arab States.

### Effectiveness

#### Evaluation questions:

- To what extent has the project achieved its planned objective and outcomes?

It is important to recall that, as mentioned under design, the project went through a **major revision** half-way through its implementation. This revision was reflected in the progress reports prepared for the main donor (USINL); but **not in UNODC's internal reporting system** (PROFI). The reason for not reflecting this change internally was that formalising the revision would have required a lengthy negotiation process with the national partners<sup>18</sup>. This would have meant delaying further a project that was already significantly delayed.

As a result of these factors, the **information available on project progress was patchy**. The most complete reports made available to the evaluation team were progress reports designed to meet the main donor's requirements and entirely focused on indicators. This meant that the **monitoring system in place left little room for measuring** or reflecting on contributions to **transformations, project quality, challenges, non-achievements or backlashes**<sup>19</sup>.

What follows is a summary of what was done under each outcome versus what was planned. The evaluation team has also developed a detailed annex of progress for each output in (Annex V).

#### **Outcome 1: VAW&G issues discussed in national media including the new/amended legislation (NOT ACHIEVED)**

The new **legislation on VAW is still to be discussed in parliament**. At present, there is a proposed law under consideration (led by the NCW) but the stakeholders consulted were not optimistic about its approval. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) prepared an alternative draft law with the assistance of UNODC under the auspices of this project

<sup>16</sup> UNDPF 2018 – 2022, page 15.

<sup>17</sup> The Programme devotes an entire outcome to VAW: Outcome 3: Gender-sensitive criminal justice systems are in place and a strengthened criminal justice response is provided to combat violence against women.

<sup>18</sup> The activities implied by the revision were already agreed upon with the direct national counterparts and the donors. Amending the document on Profi would have been a lengthy process to do internally and requiring a new signature of the project by the government.

<sup>19</sup> These issues were only partially addressed under "unanticipated results" & significant issues" in the Profi reports which in any case became uncomplete after the major project revision that was not reflected in the system.

but it remains with the Legislative Sector of the Ministry. The representatives of the Ministry were not optimistic about the potential progress of this draft, either.

**After legal approval processes stalled, the project (in total agreement with the main donor) resorted to revising the content of the campaign and reallocating the funds towards advertising the NCW hotline for VAW victims, instead of the *new concepts conveyed in the draft law*.**

According to progress reports and stakeholder testimonies, the campaign produced a radio jingle; radio scripts; video infographics; shopping bags and a TV ad. However, as the NCW hotline is still not ready to go 24/7<sup>20</sup>, some of the products could not be used yet. Others, like the radio jingle and the TV ad intended to raise general awareness around VAW will be aired in due course<sup>21</sup>.

The **adaptation of the campaign illustrates** how the **project management team has been agile in responding to the challenges** that were arising; for example, the stalling of the law on VAW.

On the other hand, it also illustrates the **reactive dynamics** that have permeated decision-making throughout the project. Instead of being based on rigorous planning, **decisions have tended to respond to the need to constantly solve emerging problems** in a complex environment.

**Outcome 2: The Egyptian government establishes a functioning integrated coordination mechanism among criminal justice actors. (NOT ACHIEVED)**

The project chose to **dismiss the activities planned under this outcome** in light of the immense difficulties encountered in coordinating the different government agencies with a role in combating VAW. In fact, governmental and non-governmental sources admitted to the evaluation team that the work between government entities was extremely challenging. Under these circumstances, the project management team **decided to join forces with several UN agencies and support the coordination mechanism foreseen under the UN joint programme on VAW (Outcome1)**<sup>22</sup>.

This is another fine example of how the **project adapted to difficult circumstances without neglecting one of its ultimate goals**; namely, having a governmental coordination mechanism on VAW. Instead of investing resources in a new coordination process marred with difficulties and with few guarantees of success, the project team decided to take a strategic turn by resorting to UN agencies that were already working on a joint programme on VAW. Nevertheless, it is important to note, that even if the project did not undertake any specific actions to formally set up the coordination mechanism, **various activities implemented under other outcomes contributed to increasing the coordination among governmental partners** (if only anecdotally). The report discusses this aspect further in the impact chapter.

**Outcome 3: Law enforcement authorities, in particular first responders and investigators, empowered and equipped to respond promptly and effectively to incidents of VAW&G (PARTIALLY ACHIEVED)**

**Outcome 4: The MOI's VAW unit has a clear and identified purpose and has the capacity to fulfil that role. (NOT ACHIEVED)**

Outcomes 3 and 4 were designed to work with different areas of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI)<sup>23</sup>. **Three of the four outputs planned under the two outcomes had to be cancelled** as a result of implementation challenges. For

<sup>20</sup> In January 2019 the Hotline extended service hours from six to 12 a day.

<sup>21</sup> In January 2019, the evaluation team could not collect evidence backing when exactly this campaign will run.

<sup>22</sup> This outcome aims to 'create an enabling legislative and policy environment in line with international standards on eliminating Gender based violence, with focus on violence against women and girls and all forms of discrimination'

<sup>23</sup> Law enforcement officers and three pilot police stations (under Outcome 3) newly established VAW Unit (under Outcome 4).



example, the refurbishment of police stations to create women-friendly spaces was not implemented as some of the necessary approvals from the Ministry came late.

Most notably, the main reason why most activities did not take place was **the unwillingness of MoI to comply fully with the requirements of the Leahy vetting process** requested by the donor, since USINL had to complete a security clearance process for MoI Police Officers before they could engage in the project<sup>24</sup>.

Finally, only the **first output of outcome 3** “*Increased knowledge and enhanced skills of law enforcement officers*” could be **implemented (using mainly funds from the UK Embassy<sup>25</sup>)**. Under this output, the project developed a manual on combating VAW for police officers (using USINL funds) and conducted basic training sessions for 125 police officers. This was **more than three times what was originally planned**, since 25 police officers was the original target. The main reason why this happened was because the MoI decided to hold all trainings at their premises, which considerably reduced the envisaged cost of holding the activities in outside venues. Furthermore, 15 officers were selected for further ToT trainings. In the original project, only 10 ToT participants were foreseen.

#### **Outcome 5: Medical practitioners’ responses to victims of VAW&G improved (EXCEEDED EXPECTATIONS)**

The activities under this outcome were aimed at increasing the capacity of the Forensic Medical Authority (FMA) to combat VAW. Due to the project revision **the budgetary allocation for this outcome increased more than threefold**. Consequently, the **activities that were implemented also increased** considerably. The project gave basic training in VAW to all forensic doctors of the FMA, around 80 in total<sup>26</sup>. In the conceptualization of the project, a target number of 25 was foreseen. In addition, a ToT course for 15 doctors was designed and delivered.

The **trainings** were accompanied by manuals developed specifically for the FMA. These courses were conducted after a study tour for six female doctors to St Mary’s Sexual Assault and Referral Centre in Manchester (UK) in March 2016. In addition to the activities related to the capacity building of the staff, the project dedicated 83% of the budget line for this outcome to **equipping four specialized clinics** for assisting VAW victims in Cairo, Alexandria, Mansoura and Tanta. The last one had not been totally equipped at the time of this evaluation.

#### **Outcome 6: Enhanced efficiency of the judiciary in dealing with crimes of VAW (PARTIALLY ACHIEVED)**

This outcome aimed to enhance the capacity of the prosecutors in the Public Prosecutor Office<sup>27</sup> (PPO) and judges to combat VAW. The project elaborated a **manual on combating VAW** purposely developed for the PPO that was rolled out to every prosecutor’s Office in Egypt according to PPO representatives.

The **goal of training 110 prosecutors under this outcome was exceeded**. According to progress reports, backed by an analysis of the log of training participants, the project gave basic **training to 180 prosecutors**. Additionally, a ToT programme was developed where 10 prosecutors were selected to offer training to junior prosecutors. These **in-house trainers offered further training to about 100 junior prosecutors** which was a great success according to sources from PPO and outside. Of the 10 people selected for the ToT program, only four remained active, as some left the organization to become judges. Moreover, a Procedural **Manual for Judges** was completed and due to be published <sup>28</sup> under this outcome. In addition to the training programme, the project planned to undertake a **research study** together with the PPO on the casuistry of VAW cases. At the time of the evaluation the research

<sup>24</sup> The project tried to address this limitation by vetting only the head of the units involved in the activities. However, it took much time to get confirmation from the MoI and finally funds were re-allocated to other components.

<sup>25</sup> Only one workshop was done with USINL funds in May 2017.

<sup>26</sup> 40 of those were conducted under project XAMW59 but using the foundation that’s done under EGYZ33.

<sup>27</sup> In Egypt, the Public Prosecutor Office (PPO) is an independent arm of the judicial branch of government, not subject to executive branch control; i.e. independent from the MoJ.

<sup>28</sup> Printing underway in January 2019

had not been published. However, according to the management of the project, this research was useful to plan training at the PPO as all practical examples used in the training were based on this research.

Finally, **the third output under this outcome** aiming at **refurnishing three court rooms** to enhance the protection of victims and strengthen the psychological support provided to victims from the judiciary was **not implemented**. Evaluation sources told the evaluation team that this was due to difficulties in obtaining the necessary permits. This component has now been included under the UNODC Regional Joint Action for the Elimination of Violence against Women and Girls in the Arab States Region (EVAW)<sup>29</sup>

#### **Outcome 7: Comprehensive data is available to ensure tailored and evidence-based interventions (EXCEEDED EXPECTATIONS)**

The outputs under this last outcome **were added to the project after the revision** of June 2017. The outcome was divided in two outputs with little relation between them although coherent with the consecution of the outcome.

The first output sought to **contribute to the development of a database hosted in the PPO** which aimed to provide a comprehensive and complete log of all crimes committed in Egypt. The database was still in its pilot stage at the time of this evaluation and was being mainly financed by the State of Egypt. The project's contribution covered IT equipment to establish the case management database in several offices in Cairo and a training on analytical reporting conducted for 12 staff at the PPO Information Centre.

The second output aimed at **improving the service provided by the NCW hotline** to victims of VAW. The target was to expand the hotline so that it could function 24/7. This output had many implementation challenges according to all parties involved and **the 24/7 target could not be met** as a result. Nevertheless, the project conducted a needs-assessment of the hotline, which served to determine the provision of extra IT equipment and most relevantly, to deliver training to the hotline agents.

#### **Summary of conclusions - Effectiveness**

The project went through a **major revision** half-way through its implementation and many of its outcomes and outputs had significant changes between what was planned and what was done. Most notably, outcome 1 was totally re-designed, activities under outcome 2, 4 and most of outcome 3 were cancelled and new outputs were added under outcome 7.

In general, the **project management team has been very agile in responding to the implementation challenges** that were arising and has succeeded in seizing new opportunities to keep the implementation progress despite many difficulties. However, it is also true that **reactive dynamics** have permeated decision-making throughout the project. Instead of being based on rigorous planning, **decisions have tended to respond to the need to constantly solve emerging problems** in a complex environment.

#### **Efficiency**

##### **Evaluation questions:**

- To what extent were the resources and inputs used appropriately and efficiently, and converted into outputs in a timely and cost-effective manner, considering also their adaptation to unexpected situations or needs?

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
<sup>29</sup> This component is reflected in the log frame as output 2.2 'Protective/safe environments are piloted in major police stations and/or courts

- To what extent were the management, coordination and administrative arrangements sufficient to ensure efficient implementation of the project?
- What factors (external or internal) helped or hindered the progress of the implementation? What was done to address them /use them?<sup>30</sup>

### Value for money

The evaluation team has approached the question of efficiency (i.e. how inputs translate into outputs) from a broad perspective in order to analyse this aspect of project implementation through the all-encompassing and more meaningful concept of Value for Money (V4M) (see figure 3). The standard definition for this concept describes value for money as the achievement of impact in relation to cost/inputs, while bearing in mind the quality of outputs<sup>31</sup>.

Figure 3: Value for Money<sup>32</sup>



Unfortunately, **undertaking a meaningful assessment of V4M within the framework of this project evaluation was not fully possible for two main reasons.** These reasons are in themselves relevant findings of the evaluation and will be discussed in this section.

#### REASON ONE: Tracking the “money” per output

The **administrative and financial systems** used during the implementation of the project **did not ensure adequate monitoring of project expenditure.**

In order to analyse the project’s V4M, the evaluation team requested the project team in Cairo to provide a **basic non-certified excel sheet comparing the money budgeted and spent per output.** Since this information was **not readily available**<sup>33</sup>, it had to be jointly compiled by the project team and the evaluation team. This was a painstaking process that involved extracting information from different sources (project proposals for different donors, Profi, Umoja and original invoices). Furthermore, each of these sources of information followed a different budgeting structure that made the necessary comparative analysis a challenging task. Despite these efforts, the budgetary information could only be partially reconstructed during the course of the evaluation exercise.

What follows is a **simplified table reconstructing what was budgeted, what was spent** and what was reallocated (figure 4). A detailed table is included in Annex VI.

<sup>30</sup> This question was originally included under “effectiveness” in the evaluation matrix but was transferred to “efficiency” since it was more fitting for the purposes of this evaluation exercise to analyse it under this evaluation criterion.

<sup>31</sup> Approach to Value for Money (VfM), UK Department for International Development, July 2011.

<sup>32</sup> LSE (2011) Value for Money: Current Approaches and Evolving Debates

<sup>33</sup> According to previous evaluations of UNODC projects, the new finance system (Umoja) potentially allowed for financial reporting to be organised following a four-level project structure including: objective, outcome, output and activities. However, the evaluation did not find evidence of the use of this type of reporting for this project. Actually, the project team explained in detail how even though the project was organised by output in Umoja, detailed expenditures per output/activity were very difficult to retrieve.

Figure 4: Budgeted vs. spent

Outcome	Budgeted	Spent	Discrepancy	Comment
1. VAW Legislation	Campaigns \$431,232	Campaigns \$157,833	Campaigns \$273,399	Campaign material of the NCW hotline and not for Legislation
2. Governmental coordination	Coordination mechanism \$98,008	Coordination mechanism \$0.00	Coordination mechanism \$98,008	Reallocated to NCW campaign and the FMA equipment
3. General capacity development for Mol	Training Police \$176,413 Equipment \$196,014	Training Police \$148,446 Equipment \$0.00	Training Police \$27,967 Equipment \$196,014	Details for reallocation not traceable
4. Capacity for the VAW office at Mol	Training staff \$156,800 Strategy \$176,400	Training staff \$0.00 Strategy \$0.00	Training staff \$156,800 Strategy \$176,400	Details for reallocation not traceable
5. General capacity development for FMA	Overall \$156,820	Training staff \$95,246 Clinics \$454,957	Overall -\$393,383	Extra funds came to FMA from cancelled activities
6. General capacity development for PPO	Trainings \$156,811 VAW Courts \$78,406	Trainings \$204,821 VAW Courts \$0.00	Trainings -\$48,010 VAW Courts \$78,406	
7. Data management for PPO and NCW	PPO db \$176,427 NCW hotline \$156,816	PPO database \$412,535 NCW training \$21,122 NCW hotline \$65,370	PPO database -\$236,108 NCW \$60,325	Most reallocated money invested in this outcome
	<b>\$1,960,147</b>	<b>\$1,570,329</b>	<b>\$389,818</b>	

As a result of these limitations **in accessing reliable financial information**, the project management team could not access meaningful financial data during the implementation of the activities. This data could (and should) have been **available to inform strategic decisions**, most notably those taken during the revision of the project. Finally, it can also be argued that the lack of readily available financial information was also **detrimental to the project's general accountability** vis-à-vis its donors.

### REASON TWO: Understanding the “value”

The most challenging dimension of this V4M analysis was the **definition of “value”** for the purposes of this evaluation. This involved ensuring that the notion of value is not only associated and/or limited to the completion of a concrete activity (such as conducting a training session), or the development of a specific product (such as a manual); but understood in terms of how each element contributed to changes. From this perspective, **activities are not seen as ends in themselves but considered in relation to how they support progress towards outcomes** and how they contribute to the project's ultimate overarching goal as expressed in its implicit theory of change.




Figure 5: Financial Resources Spent

In this sense, the evaluation found that **a lot of energy and effort had gone into delivering quality products/activities**, which entailed focusing on concrete actions (i.e. “what” was being done), while **little thought was given to** other key dimensions of project implementation such as the **magnitude, critical mass or quality of the transformations that these products/activities were contributing to**. Beyond the question of “what” was being implemented and achieved, the next dimension (i.e. the “so what”) was neglected. Consequently, there was

**no consistent view** across key stakeholders to answer crucial questions such as “*What is understood as value/success in this project?*” (apart from delivering activities) or “*How do we collect the evidence we need to demonstrate the project’s value/success?*”.

In light of these difficulties, the evaluation team analysed the approximate budget that was jointly compiled with the project team. Most of the resources that the project dedicated to the different outcomes were invested in **equipment or system** improvement for the different counterparts<sup>34</sup>. The **efficiency of these investments was heavily conditioned by the completion and sustainability** of these systems (see sustainability chapter).

Despite certain reservations about its outreach (analysed under "quality of outputs"), evidence suggests that **the training programme** constituted the strategy that was most closely linked to the impacts identified in this evaluation (see impact chapter). Furthermore, once the relatively low level of investment in this project component was considered (approximately 26% of the total budget), it could be ascertained that it constituted **the most cost-efficient strategy of the project**.

### *Quality of outputs*

Stakeholders, including beneficiaries unanimously perceived the **quality of the products** generated by the project as **very good**.

In the case of the trainings, three positive aspects were highlighted; a) the **excellent technical expertise** of the trainers; b) the **participatory approach** of the learning methods; and c) the **joint use of foreign experts** who brought a well-received international perspective with the expertise of a local expert who had already gained the trust of the national partners.

A positive element that **deserves special mention** was the modality of **Trainers of Trainers (ToT)** used in the PPO for prosecutor trainings and in the MoI for police officer trainings. Consulted trainees and other key stakeholders highlighted the high technical and human quality of the support and backing offered by UNODC to the selected trainees who were training others. This is important to highlight as often ToT options are difficult to implement. However, in this case, despite certain difficulties, the ToT participants have already trained a significant number of additional individuals.

The Study Tour to Manchester organised for a group of selected female forensic doctors in the FMA also emerged as an example of a **good quality output**. Participants highlighted the meticulous planning and the high relevance of the work to their context and their respective learning processes.

The expert in charge of delivering the trainings to FMA was also the one who decided the place of destination of the study tour. This meant that the place of destination had a direct connection with the contents of the trainings. In this sense, stakeholders underlined that **UNODC was uniquely positioned to organise this type of learning tour to the most relevant places in the world**, given its global vision and unique access to relevant institutions in member states. Stakeholders identified this as a key added value of UNODC in comparison to other bilateral organisations such as the British Council or USAID, which only had the capacity to organise trips to countries within their scope. Finally, all the purchased equipment was of **good standard** according to stakeholders.

In fact, only **one aspect related to the quality of the products required attention** as an area with room for improvement. The evaluation found that in general terms, the products delivered by the project had **limited**

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<sup>34</sup> (i.e. for the PPO database; for the hotline in NCW; and for the four clinics in FMA). At the time of this evaluation, only three of the four specialised clinics in FMA were fully functional and the NCW’s hotline and PPO’s database were still either at a pilot stage (the case PPO database was functional in only 39 offices in the country) or not working at full capacity (24/7 in the case of the hotline).

**outreach** despite having relevant strategies in place (such as the ToT) that were conceived to expand the scope of the benefits of the project as much as possible.

**The reasons why this limitation in the outreach happened related to three dimensions:**

Firstly, the fact that trainings were “**one-off**” limited their efficiency. As, for example, trained staff might move on to other institutions. Also, in such complex issue, there was the need to have refreshment or specialised courses to build on the basic modules. Stakeholders agreed that in order to be efficient, training sessions had to become regular programmes in the institutions.

Secondly, there was the issue of the **limited depth** of the contents delivered. Several stakeholders raised the issue of the limited duration of the trainings, which were considered to be too short to efficiently convey the complexity of the issue at hand. It is important to point out though that while UNODC tends to suggest longer duration of trainings, it’s the governmental counterparts that limit the number of days for a workshop. Often because participants find difficult staying longer time outside their duties.

Finally, the training programmes held in the PPO and in the Mol (in contradiction to the FMA) reached **only a small proportion of the potentially relevant people** who should have been trained and did not constitute a critical mass<sup>35</sup>.

Nonetheless, the evaluation team **identified an exception** worth highlighting during the field work. This concerned the **training programme organised for the Forensic Medical Authority (FMA)**. This programme successfully reached all the forensic doctors in the country who had the specific role of attending victims of VAW. Even if the numbers may seem small (80 doctors in total), the fact that a coverage of 100% was attained nationally constituted **an important achievement** for the project (further details under the impact chapter).

Finally, as mentioned under the value for money section, the **degree of efficiency** of the procured **equipment** was related, among other factors, to **the degree of obsolescence**<sup>36</sup>. The evaluation did not find evidence on whether this aspect had been taken into account; i.e. how the equipment would be maintained to ensure adequate functioning beyond the life of the project.

*Factors hindering and facilitating implementation: Internal and external*

The bulk of the **daily running activities of the project was undertaken by a management team composed of a Programme Associate** (fully paid by the project) **and a Senior Programme Officer** whose salary was partially paid by the project.

Throughout the project, the **work dynamics** of the management team have been of a **constructive and supportive** nature, which has greatly benefited the implementation of the project. Many stakeholders, including all national partners and other UN agencies, have commended the **passion and dedication of the team** as well as its **practical approach, resourcefulness and creativity** when dealing with complex challenges. It is important to understand these challenges clearly in order to put into perspective the scope of the work that could realistically be done and its possible impact. As figure 6 illustrates, these challenging factors can be **typified in different layers**.

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<sup>35</sup> Stakeholders shared the view that extending the scope of these training programmes was a task that should be carried out by the project’s national counterparts. However, the evaluation team did not find evidence to ascertain whether the counterparts had enough will and/or capacity (both technical and financial) to embrace ownership of this role and take on this task in the future. The evaluation report tackles this matter in the sustainability chapter.

<sup>36</sup> The evaluation did not find reports or evidence that some equipment was or may have been obsolete. It was just an aspect not considered.

## INTERNAL FACTORS

**UNODC administration systems:** The first circle of challenging factors that hindered the implementation of the project included aspects that were closely related to **UNODC’s administration systems**. During the implementation of the project, two administrative systems were in place at UNODC, Profi and the newly introduced Umoja. While designed to ensure transparency and accountability, the available evidence suggests that their strict and intricate requirements **constituted important hurdles for the smooth implementation of the project**<sup>37</sup>.




Figure 6: Challenging factors affecting implementation

The **project team had to devote a lot of time and energy to navigate this bureaucracy**, which they did with dedication and creativity. For example, in June 2017, when it became apparent that the **project needed a major revision** because of challenges implementing activities with several of the partners, the management team decided to undertake a revision of the project **with the participation and approval of the main donor but avoided undertaking a formal revision in Profi** (for reasons stated already).

As a consequence of this, the revised project continued its implementation while the project reflected in UNODC’s official system had little to do with what was happening in reality. Consequently, the **official project reports in the system provided very little relevant information** about what the project was really doing and achieving in practice, according to its revised plan. In fact, probably **the most serious hindering factor of the different project administration systems in place was that they failed to produce quality reports, both from a financial perspective and a substantive perspective, as progress reports are solely indicator based**.

**UNODC management culture:** UNODC has a **full cost recovery policy** in place. The full cost recovery modality implies that **UNODC does not provide core funds for key programme positions** (like fundraisers) **or** for key programming **functions** like project design or monitoring and evaluation. This policy had two consequences for this particular project:

1. The ToRs of the project management team required them to undertake many tasks apart from managing this project, while the **expectation of the main donor was to have one and a half persons fully dedicated to it**. This unmet expectation or lack of clarity caused a tense situation where, despite the efforts of a dedicated and hard-working team, the main donor remained under the impression that not enough “womanpower” was put into project implementation.
2. At present, the salaries of UNODC staff in the Egypt Country Office are financed through projects. Hence, **resource mobilisation for their jobs constitutes a key part of their work**, in detriment of other core tasks such as implementation and follow up of on-going projects. This situation also has **profound effects on staff morale** and well-being despite their passion and commitment.

<sup>37</sup> For example, all expenditures had to be signed by UNODC management personnel who were often not immediately available and this caused delays in the overall implementation process. In addition to this, procurement of goods over a certain amount had to follow UNDP protocols, adding another layer of bureaucracy that further delayed activities and required additional efforts on the part of the project team.

## EXTERNAL FACTORS

**The relationship with the main donor:** While commending UNODC as a legitimate and trusted partner in Egypt, the main donor noted instances of unmet expectations on the pace of delivery, frequency and quality of communications and reporting. The UNODC project did not share the same view as they reported to have maintained a fluid information flow with the donor<sup>38</sup>.

Additionally, **USINL often communicated directly with the national partners<sup>39</sup>**, without involving UNODC in these communications. In practice, this meant that the donor **occasionally adopted almost the role of the implementing partner which was confusing for partners and affected UNODC's legitimacy**. This dynamic was **exacerbated by the fact that the project did not have a higher governance body** (such as a steering committee) where these disagreements could be resolved; or where the role of different stakeholders could be clarified. Another important factor that hindered project implementation was the **Leahy vetting protocol** requirement<sup>40</sup> which ultimately limited the participation of the MoI in this initiative.

**National partners:** Many of the national partners involved in this project were unanimously considered by consulted stakeholders to be **very difficult to work with**. Furthermore, it is important to note that many of the representatives of these organisations agreed with this, acknowledging that **internal bureaucratic requirements** were very difficult or lengthy including approvals for every step related to participation in the project; from the approval of the project document to even the approval of meetings within the framework of this evaluation. Additionally, many partners had **very strong patriarchal cultures**, which made it difficult to convey messages about a theme as sensitive as VAW (see gender chapter).

Furthermore, the fact that **intergovernmental coordination** was so challenging meant that the **project had to work in silos** with each and every counterpart on its own<sup>41</sup>. This slowed the implementation of some of the activities and prevented synergies.

Besides these general limitations (common to the organisational cultures of other governmental institutions in Egypt), some of the main counterparts also had their own particular difficulties.

In the case of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), one of the difficulties that affected implementation was linked to their **strict security procedures**. In order to comply with their security policy, all the activities of the project had to go through Homeland Security which implied addressing a myriad of issues that ultimately delayed implementation<sup>42</sup>.

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<sup>38</sup> In addition to the quarterly progress reports submitted to USINL, UNODC reported to have met with the donor on at least a monthly basis. Additionally, during a considerable period of time: weekly reports were being sent to USINL with updates.

<sup>39</sup> USINL sometimes contacted partners to request regular monitoring information for the above-mentioned reports (data on how many women used the waiting room in the FMA or on how many times certain equipment was used, etc.). However, it was brought to the evaluation team's attention that there were times when USINL also discussed important decisions with national partners (such as money allocations).

<sup>40</sup> The Leahy Amendment, or Leahy law, is the United States legislation that bans US assistance to units of foreign security forces where there is credible information that a member has committed gross violations of human rights

<sup>41</sup> An initial MoU was signed with the MOJ that contained a plan for a Steering Committee. Nevertheless, after the implementation of the project started, national counterparts insisted on the need to work separately.

<sup>42</sup> Such as checking and approving detailed contents of manuals and trainings, going through complex authority layers to select training



Regarding the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), several stakeholders noted that this institution had been **reluctant to work with international organizations** in recent years and praised their involvement in this initiative as a positive step. It was also noted that **UNODC was uniquely placed to partner with MoJ** and that the fact that the project manager had several years of experience working for UNODC from the MoJ facilitated communication and had positive effects on project implementation. Nonetheless, the **relationship encountered a number of difficulties**<sup>43</sup>.

According to bellwethers and other UN agencies consulted, the National Council for Women (NCW) also emerged as a **difficult partner** to work with, mainly as a result of organisational challenges, **low capacity and what has been described as lateral positioning** and/or limited influence in the current government.

On the positive side, the evaluation found that the PPO and the FMA were **very receptive partners**. In both cases (but particularly in the case of the FMA), this was closely linked to the **personal commitment of their top-management**. This had very positive implications for the implementation of project activities and helped overcome the bureaucratic difficulties encountered across state institutions in the country.

**Political environment:** The project was designed during a period marked by **political turmoil**, in the aftermath of former president Mohammed Morsi's fall and the election in May 2014 of his successor, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. These factors have permeated both national and international institutions operating in the country, particularly those working on areas or themes perceived as particularly sensitive or controversial. Although the current president won a second four-year-term in March 2018, the **political environment** and inter-governmental coordination remain quite complex. Besides, leadership changes at key institutions such as MoJ and MoI were also hindering factors for the pace of implementation.

**The overall complexity of VAW:** Evidence indicates that changing attitudes and behaviours towards **VAW necessarily requires generational changes**, since VAW is an issue that ultimately touches upon profoundly embedded values and behaviours. This is **also true when seeking to change institutions**, such as ministries or the police, which are ultimately reflections of the societies they operate in. In countries like Egypt, this is exacerbated by the fact that some of these values are also deeply embedded in alternative justice systems rooted in religion (Sharia Law).

#### Summary of conclusions - Efficiency

Undertaking a **meaningful assessment of V4M was not fully possible** for two main reasons; a) the **administrative and financial systems** used during the implementation of the project did **not ensure adequate monitoring of project expenditure**; b) there was no consistent view across key stakeholders about what is understood as value/success in this project apart from delivering activities. In this sense, the emphasis

participants; checking and re-checking the convenience of the activities themselves, etc.

<sup>43</sup> First and foremost, the project document was supposed to be signed by the MoJ as main project partner, but the document was never implemented. During this period the PPO declared its independence and did not act through the MOJ anymore. Additionally, after the signature of the MOU, the MOJ halted the implementation of all activities. At the same time, MoJ was not always satisfied with its level of participation and would have liked more space to provide input on technical issues related to the manual or to the trainings that UNODC was organising for the judges. Although, according to the project team they were kept closely involved with the development of the manual and other activities.

of the project’s “value” was placed exclusively in the delivery of good quality outputs. The quality of the products generated by the project was perceived as very good.

The bulk of the daily running activities of the project was undertaken by a **management team working under enormous challenges both internal and external to UNODC**. These challenges can be typified in layers; a) the UNODC administrative systems; b) the UNODC management culture, especially the full recovery policy; c) the conflicting relationship with the main donor; d) national partners difficult to work with; e) the challenging political environment; and f) the overall complexity of tackling VAW.


## Impact

### Evaluation questions:

- To what extent did the project/programme contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals?
- What, if any, has been the overall impact of the project (intended or unintended) to date, in particular in relation to key stakeholders and beneficiaries at the local level?

The effectiveness chapter of this report has analysed what was done. This impact chapter addresses what was achieved. In other words, it presents concrete evidence (as well as a line of reasoning) from which we can conclude, with some level of confidence, that the project made an important **contribution to documented changes**<sup>44</sup>.

Figure 7: Four dimensions of change



In order to present the changes that the project has contributed to, the evaluation team has adapted the well-known analytical framework *Gender@work*<sup>45</sup>. The main pillar of this framework establishes that **any change affecting gender relations** (including those related to combating VAW) **must touch upon the four different dimensions** suggested by the framework in order to be sustainable (see figure 8).

Individual & invisible: Refers to individual changes related to often subtle but powerful aspects such as improved skills, capacity, knowledge or ideological shifts on VAW.

Collective & invisible: This refers to changing attitudes, or social norms in communities or in organisations (i.e. organisational culture)

Collective & visible: These encompass changes in, for example, laws or written regulations that govern a given community/region/country. They could also mean transformations in organisations, such as new budgets, departments, systems or structures.

Individual & visible: This refers to changes in how women and men access institutionalized services. For example, how women victims of VAW access justice services.

<sup>44</sup> [https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/plan/approach/contribution\\_analysis](https://www.betterevaluation.org/en/plan/approach/contribution_analysis)

<sup>45</sup> From Gender at Work, (<http://www.genderatwork.org>) and inspired by Ken Wilber’s “Integral Theory”

**The tipping point:** To change the collective mind-set of any human group, be it an institution, a region or a country, it is necessary to change the consciousness of a critical mass of people. This is what the evaluation team has called the *tipping point* inspired by the famous essay of the same name<sup>46</sup>. Likewise, a *tipping point* is necessary for a law, a system (like a database) or a piece of equipment to translate into services that systematically benefit the victims of VAW. The concept of *tipping point* is important for understanding the type of transformations to which the project has contributed. In the graphic these tipping points are represented by arrows.

### **Main transformations the project has contributed to**

As illustrated in figure 6, **the project has contributed to transformations in the four dimensions of change**. Contributions under two of these dimensions were particularly intense.

In **the invisible dimensions**, the project has **contributed to significant invisible and personal** changes in all national partners that have benefitted from training programmes. These changes can be divided into three categories;

a) **Ideological transformations** about **what VAW is and how to treat its victims**. For example, prosecutors in the PPO reported “*we have shifted our approach from focusing only on getting evidence to bring perpetrators to justice to focusing also on protecting victims*”. Police officers trained by the project also reported these types of transformations “*VAW seemed trivial at first compared to other crimes, but through the trainings and through working in this field, we discovered that it is a very serious issue to tackle*”.

b) **Gaining new knowledge and skills** about VAW and about how to serve victims better. This was reported in all of the national partners that received training. Among this new knowledge acquired, one of the elements that stands out was the **new awareness of what other actors were doing to combat VAW**. This is particularly relevant given the coordination challenges faced by different governmental institutions, which frequently implied that they were not aware of the services provided by others.

For example, representatives of the PPO declared that “*the trained prosecutors became aware of the NCW legal advisory services and they became aware of the shelters available for women under the management of Ministry of Social Solidarity*”. Likewise, the NCW trainees told the evaluation team that “*the trainings gave us new information on different agencies dealing with violence. For example, we became more aware of the forensic medicine aspects of combatting violence*”.

c) In two instances, the evaluation found that the trainings contributed to **empowering** the participants in different ways. In the MoI, junior female officers valued the fact that they **gained enough confidence** to comfortably present issues related to VAW to higher ranking officers who were mostly male. The NCW hotline agents valued how the trainings encouraged them to **look after themselves psychologically**.

The evaluation could not consult all the participants of the trainings (see limitations of the evaluation). Consequently, it is possible that other personal impacts were not captured and remain undocumented.

In any case, given the number of people trained in the project in relation to the general population (for example 170 trained prosecutors vs 4000 prosecutors in total), it can be concluded that **only in the case of the FMA trainings, the tipping point was reached**. In other words, this was the only case in which the project managed to *touch* enough people to affirm that it contributed to changing the culture of this particular organisation<sup>47</sup>.

<sup>46</sup> Gladwell M, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference*, 2002

<sup>47</sup> This occurred in a twofold manner. On the one hand, both the management and the doctors of the FMA admitted that a general ideological shift had taken place since the project began in the sense that “*more attention is given to VAW. There is more depth in tackling it including the provision of psychological care*”. On the other hand, all the doctors interviewed felt better equipped to tackle these cases.

## MAIN TRANSFORMATIONS - Based on Gender@work




Figure 8: Main transformations the project has contributed to

The evaluation has observed a similar scenario when analysing the changes that the project has contributed to under the two **visible dimensions**.

The project has **contributed to several transformations in the collective/visible dimension in the different counterparts** (the FMA, the PPO and to a lesser extent in the NCW) **by improving** their equipment, systems and generally **their organisational ability to deal with cases of VAW**, each from their own perspective. However, **only in the case of the FMA have these systems and equipment translated into a tangible and generalised improvement in the justice services** related to VAW delivered by the organisation (i.e. personal and visible dimension).

However, improving the organisational capacity to combat VAW is an essential precondition to improve justice services and to facilitate victims' access to justice. This is how the project has contributed to these preconditions in the visible and collective dimension:

- a) **Creation of a dedicated department:** The project has contributed to the creation of a dedicated department on VAW **in FMA**. According to the management of the organisation, the project was a key factor for this to be possible. It is important to highlight the fact that the VAW department is resourced by the FMA itself (see sustainability).

The **PPO** also reported internal conversations on the possibility of having a dedicated coordination unit for VAW. This unit will coordinate all the work of criminal justice actors so that victims can access services from one place<sup>48</sup>.

**b) Enhanced equipment and facilities:** Through the project, **the FMA** purchased key equipment for the clinics of Cairo, Alexandria and Mansoura that significantly increased their organisational ability to detect and document evidence in cases of rape and sexual assault. The project also contributed to renovating the furniture of specific waiting areas for victims of VAW in the clinics that the evaluation team visited.

In the case of **the PPO**, as mentioned under effectiveness, the project devoted a very significant amount of resources to **supporting efforts to systematise the digital recording of all the crimes** (not only those related to VAW) under its jurisdiction. The system was piloted in the Prosecutor's Office and then scaled-up to cover other offices by deploying infrastructure in several Offices in Cairo, Alexandria, Giza, Suez, Ismailia, Port Said and North Sinai.

The project has contributed to financing hardware and software but, most importantly, it has been instrumental, according to the PPO Information Centre management, **for refining its overall design**. For example, some **gender mainstreaming** was done as a result of the project. This entailed key elements such as the inclusion of new fields in the database (notably the relationship between perpetrator and victim). This is essential information when recording femicides.

Even if these elements constitute positive illustrations of the project's achievements, an important issue must be borne in mind: From a gender point of view, the database **will only be useful if other organisations such as the NCW or feminist organisations have access to the information**, so they are able to interpret it through gender lenses and use it as evidence for policy making, advocacy and public campaigning. The evaluation did not find evidence of concrete plans on the use of the information from the database outside the PPO.

Finally, **the NCW** reported that the project contributed to **enhancing certain technical aspects of the hotline** (through new hardware and software), and on December 6<sup>th</sup>, NCW announced -through its social media platforms- the extension of hotline service hours from 6 to 12 hours every day<sup>49</sup>. No further evidence could be collected on this particular matter.

c) In the case of **the FMA**, the project has also contributed to **enhancing the position of the organisation within the government in the field of combating VAW**. According to the management of the organisation, the project trainings and other interactions with the FMA played a key role in improving their knowledge on VAW and allowed them to make meaningful contributions to the National Strategy for combating VAW.

These are important achievements especially in the face of all the challenges the project encountered. It is therefore even more impressive to note how **these institutional improvements have translated into concrete FMA services for victims of VAW**.

- a) New services that did not exist before are now provided to victims (e.g. preventive medicine, emergency contraception, and psychological support).
- b) Service hours have been extended greatly and the time lapse between crime and examination has decreased hence reducing the risk of losing valuable evidence. The average time between assault and

<sup>48</sup> Project staff informed the evaluation team that a draft law proposing its establishment already existed. The evaluation team did not have access to this draft law on the grounds that it was a confidential document.

<sup>49</sup> The NCW hired agents in December 2018 to cover the 3PM-9PM shift using UNODC funds.

examination in 2017 was 24 hours, down from 72 hours in 2016. FMA VAW clinics are now open until midnight and are able to deploy a doctor for emergencies. Before their collaboration with UNODC, the clinics only worked from 9:00 am to 3:00 pm and were closed during weekends.

- c) More conclusive evidence and technical opinions in cases of assault and rape are now being provided to the PG by the FMA (60 percent of cases had conclusive evidence in 2017 compared to 45 percent in 2016)
- d) New technologies such as a colposcopes, a UV lamp and Toluidine Blue Stain, have been introduced in 2017 to improve examinations and detect evidence of violence on clothes or the body.
- e) New standard procedures are being followed since April 2017 as FMA doctors utilize the evidence gathering standard reports developed as part of UNODC manual. This was evidenced through the site visit to Cairo Clinic as forms were readily available in the examination room.

### *Contribution to SDGs*

There is no instrument or official document that links the evaluated project to the achievement of the SDGs in Egypt. However, given the subject matter and the results obtained, it can be inferred that the project **is contributing to the achievement of SDG 5** that exclusively deals with achieving gender equality and empowering women and girls<sup>50</sup>.

Furthermore, Goal 16 also targets reducing violence and related deaths among women (including deaths associated with domestic violence). This issue is also implicit in the project through measures such as the official recording of femicides in the PPO database, for example.

#### Summary - Impact

The project has **contributed to significant invisible and personal changes in all national partners** that have benefitted from training programmes: i.e. Ideological transformations about what VAW is and how to treat its victims; new knowledge and skills about VAW; and in some cases renewed empowerment. Given the number of people trained in the project in relation to the general population, **only in the FMA reached a critical mass to contribute to changing the culture of the organisation.**

The project has **contributed to several transformations in the collective/visible dimension** in the different counterparts (the FMA, the PPO and to a lesser extent in the NCW) by improving their equipment, systems and generally their organisational ability to deal with cases of VAW. It is impressive to note how these institutional **improvements have translated into concrete FMA services for victims of VAW.**

The project **is contributing** to the achievement of SDG 5 and 16 that exclusively deals with achieving gender equality and empowering women and girls.

### *Partnerships and cooperation*

#### Evaluation questions:

- To what extent have partnerships been sought and established and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance provided by this project?
- To what extent has working in partnership with other actors, stakeholders etc. achieved long term results?
- To which extent did UNODC take advantage and maximize its impact in an efficient manner while working with partners and other stakeholders?

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<sup>50</sup> This SDG targets eliminating all forms of harmful practices and violence against women and girls and sets appropriate targets (i.e. Target 5.2: Eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls including trafficking and sexual and other forms of exploitation; and Target 5.3; Eliminating all harmful practices such as child, early and forced marriages and female genital mutilation)

### *UN Family*

At a strategic level, the Egypt **UN Joint Programme on VAW** currently under development constitutes the **most relevant existing collaboration involving the UN family** (see box in the sustainability chapter). This collaboration is key for ensuring an integrated approach to delivery and has the potential to maximise the impact of the project by aligning the efforts of UN agencies combating VAW with the funding opportunities available for this theme.

Although a formal space for information exchanges exists (the UN interagency gender group), in reality, most of this collaboration occurs organically. **Relations between UN agencies working on VAW in Egypt are excellent**, partly because of the collaborative approach of the manager of this UNODC project. The **UN family has a lot of respect for the UNODC management unit** of the project and this has helped to build trust and collaboration throughout its implementation:

*“Given that it is a Regional Office, I must commend the amount of work that was done by UNODC on VAW. Compared to other UN Country Offices, they are achieving a lot”, UN official.*

The evaluation found that the project also established **significant tactical synergies with other UN agencies**. Through these collaborations, the project successfully maximised its resources, thereby improving overall results.

In this sense, the **most relevant partnership was developed with UN Women**. The project actively collaborated with this organisation on the delivery of several outputs. Firstly, the project worked on the development of a Victim’s Advocacy Manual to be rolled out by the NCW with resources partially provided by UN Women. Secondly, UN Women also financed (through the NCW) additional trainings for PPO prosecutors, which strengthened the sustainability of these outputs (also mentioned under sustainability). Thirdly, UNODC invited UN Women’s partners to the trainings (including the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) in charge of administering the public shelters available for victims of VAW). The attendance of MOSS staff proved essential for informing PPO participants about the existence of these services.

The project also established a **significant collaboration with UNFPA** within the framework of the outcomes dedicated to the FMA. UNFPA provided consumable materials needed in FMA’s VAW specialised clinics and funded NCW activities related to training of prosecutors on VAW.

Finally, according to the PPO management, UNODC can also be credited with facilitating contacts between the **PPO and UNICEF** which resulted in the addition of new fields in the PPO database concerning crimes affecting children.

### *National partners*

The stakeholders consulted during the evaluation widely recognised that UNODC’s unique position and standing in the country constituted a key asset for establishing interesting partnerships with several national partners. Its privileged position as a bridge between key institutions allowed **UNODC to serve as an effective entry point for building strategic collaborations on VAW, since it was the first time that some partners** (e.g. FMA) worked on this sensitive issue and one of the few times for partners such as the MoI.

These partnerships **have not only been strategic, they have also been tactic** since national partners have actively contributed to project activities. For example, the training sessions for police officers financed by the UK Embassy was significantly expanded because the MoI provided the venues for the trainings free of charge, thereby saving the cost of using hotel facilities as envisaged in the original proposal.

Despite multiple difficulties (presented in the efficiency chapter), **national partners positively valued their partnership with UNODC**, particularly the three following aspects: a) their specialised support; b) the fact that

they could bring international expertise to the table; and c) the responsiveness and professionalism of the project management team.

*“We find the quality of the partnership to be a good one and the team to be very responsive”, national partner.*

### **Civil society**

The project has **only worked “anecdotally” with the Egyptian women’s movement** requesting informal feedback on some of the project’s products.

It is true that the natural partners of UN agencies are government organisations. Moreover, key stakeholders (including bellwethers) explained how the **political context did not enable dialogue with civil society**, particularly on sensitive issues such as VAW. In this sensitive scenario, it is possible to argue that UNODC could have found itself in a difficult position had it engaged with civil society actors more actively on this particular issue.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that many stakeholders pointed out that **any meaningful transformation, particularly in the invisible and collective dimension** (i.e. transforming collective values) cannot take place **unless civil society is actively involved**.

Civil society actors (especially the women’s movement) have a key role to play in bringing to the table insights based on their experience working with VAW survivors for decades but government actors remain uneasy about engaging with them. In this regard, the **role of UNODC has the potential to be key for facilitating contacts with trusted civil society partners** working on collective values and/or for gaining the trust and support of society for legislative changes that would have never materialised without this dialogue.

#### Summary of conclusions - Partnerships and cooperation

At a strategic level, the **UN Joint Programme on VAW** currently under development constitutes the most relevant existing collaboration involving the UN family. The project also established significant tactical synergies with other UN agencies, most notable with UN Women.

**UNODC’s unique position and standing in the country constituted to serve as an effective entry point** for building strategic collaborations on VAW with governmental partners. Despite multiple difficulties (presented in the efficiency chapter), national partners positively valued their partnership with UNODC.

Mainly due to restrictions coming from national partners, the project has only **worked “anecdotally” with the Egyptian women’s movement**. Promoting more involvement while sensitive could be useful for future projects.

### **Sustainability**

#### Evaluation questions:

- To what extent has UNODC taken into consideration “sustainability” criteria while developing and revising the project document?
- To what extent are the project activities likely to continue after the project completion? And to what extent can they become self-sustaining financially and technically?

The **sustainability of this project can be analysed at two levels**: The first one refers to **how likely it is for the identified change processes to be sustained** beyond the life of the project. For example, the likelihood that key stakeholders (UNODC and national partners) remain involved in combating VAW in Egypt once the project has ended, or the probability of new funds financing this theme in the future. The second level concerns **sustainability**



**in the use of outputs**, changes and results developed throughout the project (such as trainings, manuals and equipment).

The first level (i.e. the likelihood of key stakeholders remaining involved) is particularly important for a complex issue such as **VAW**, which necessarily **requires sustained efforts from multiple actors over generations** in order to be adequately addressed. It is also particularly important for this project, since during the course of the evaluation, the work with most national partners (namely key criminal justice actors) was described as “ground-breaking”, representing “a foot in the door” or a foray into “uncharted territory”. This suggests that the **project constitutes the beginning of a long journey**.

*“A lot needs to be done. It is about changing mentalities, which is very difficult. This needs time and work and it is not a linear process of change”, bellwether.*

### *The sustainability of the process*

The fight against violence against women is **well positioned on the international agenda**. It is explicitly mentioned in the SDGs, as noted in the impact chapter, and constitutes an issue that has been gaining increasing visibility. According to all consulted stakeholders, **this international climate has contributed to keeping the issue on the Egyptian public and political agenda**. The **Egyptian women's movement** (as well as several national and international organizations working on related themes across the country) are also **helping to ensure the inclusion of VAW** in the country’s public agenda.

The evaluation found that **UNODC has an unwavering commitment to combating VAW** not only in Egypt, but also globally. Although this has been its first initiative on this issue in the country, **the organisation has firm plans to continue working on this issue in the future**.

- UNODC Egypt is part of the global Program on VAW called **Essential Service Package (ESP)** led by UNFPA, which includes UN Women, WHO and UNDP as partners. Egypt is eligible for seed funding from this ESP programme.
- UNODC Egypt is also one of the partners of a **Regional Programme led by UN Women** on combating VAW, where UNODC will lead the Justice and Policing component.
- Most relevantly, UNODC is also **partner of a National UN Joint Programme on VAW** led by UNFPA with UN Women, WHO, UNICEF, UNDP and ILO. The design of the Joint Programme was being finalised at the time of the evaluation.

With the exception of the NCW, **national partners lack official strategies or working plans that clearly incorporate VAW** into their mandates, strategic priorities and budgets. Many stakeholders (including international agencies but also government representatives) agreed that the **budget allocations of relevant government bodies to combat VAW were scarce**. In fact, most of the funding was provided by international donors and not by the Egyptian state.

*“Funds are very limited from within (the organisation). We rely on international partners that are: responsive and committed to work on VAW”, National Partner.*

This is in clear contradiction with what the National Strategy states, namely that “*Financing the National Strategy shall depend on three sources: First, the state as a major source*” (p. 11).

The **expectation is that any work on VAW will be mainly financed by international organisations**. Nonetheless, there is a general will to continue working on this issue, even if the level of commitment varies among partners.

The **NCW has shown the highest level of motivation and commitment**, as the institution that is officially mandated to coordinate the National Strategy.

The **FMA** has been exceptionally engaged during the conceptualization and implementation of the project. It is in this institution's strong commitment that the evaluation has found the clearest signs of sustainability. For example, as mentioned under impact, the organisation now sustains the new unit on VAW with its own resources. The organisation also has explicit plans to expand its work on VAW in the future. These plans were shared with the evaluation team in a comprehensive presentation and they included inaugurating more specialised clinics across the country. However, evidence suggests that the **institutional interest was more influenced by the personal commitment** of the previous leadership than by an explicit institutional commitment to combatting VAW overtime and it could therefore be reverted.

The **commitment from the PPO to continue working on VAW was explicit and noticeable** during the evaluation. Representatives of the PPO clearly signalled that they had plans to expand their work on VAW. For example, they were planning to have their own Forensic Laboratory which constitutes a positive development in terms of the overall sustainability of the project results. However, it is important to bear in mind that since this element clearly lies within FMA's field of activity, it requires adequate coordination if its potential is to be maximised in the future. The project is credited with playing a key role in raising the profile of the fight against VAW inside the PPO as an issue of public concern. However, if external pressure on this issue disappears and these efforts are not adequately institutionalised, stakeholders fear a return to a pre-project scenario in which this issue tended to be neglected.

Finally, **the MoI and the MoJ both have VAW units within their formal structures which suggest a level of institutionalisation of the theme**. However, in both cases the project could not work with these units as planned. Furthermore, as pointed out in the original project document, these units had limitations in terms of their capacities that continue to affect their current activities. However, both organisations welcomed the work of the project and were willing to give continuity to some of the outputs developed under its auspices. This will be analysed in the section below.

### *The sustainability of outputs*

As already pointed out under the effectiveness, efficiency and impact chapters, the **scope of the project's impact will ultimately depend on its capability to institutionalise the procedures, systems and trainings** (outputs) developed within the governmental counterpart institutions.

The scope of the impact will also depend on the degree to which the practices introduced by this initiative will be **expanded beyond the project's target group in future years**. As has been pointed out, the latter depends -in many ways- on the sustained political will to combat VAW at the national level and on the degree of commitment of the future leadership of partner Ministries/Authorities.

The evaluation documented evidence suggesting that **some of the outputs will continue to be used and expanded**. In the case of other outputs, their future sustainability and use are more uncertain. The sustainability prospects of these different outputs will be described in detail in the sections below.

**Trainings and manuals:** In general, there was **no evidence of institutionalization of the VAW trainings** conducted across the different entities at the time of this evaluation. It has to be noted in this regard that even if this institutionalization was not explicit in the aims of the project, several stakeholders pointed at it as an important element of the implicit ToC as this quote illustrates:

*"The training needs to be redesigned and redelivered and more institutionalised to cover new staff that come in",* national partner.

However, there were **signs of some continuity**. Most remarkably, the **NCW** (in collaboration with UN Women and UNFPA) **was financing additional training for the PPO** using the training materials (and trainers) used during the project. Also, in the case of the manual developed for law enforcement officers for the MoI, there were

testimonies suggesting that the Ministry of Interior used UNODC's VAW manual inside the Police Academy Trainings for law enforcement personnel. This had the potential to increase significantly the outreach of this particular output. The fact that all **manuals were developed in partnership with the concerned counterparts** and officially adopted by them has been a conducive factor for their use and sustainability.

The **use of ToT as a training modality in both the PPO and the MoI** also emerged as a positive practice supporting efforts to expand the use of the trainings beyond the life of the project. In this sense, both organisations have expressed their willingness to continue rolling out the trainings although not necessarily on their own (i.e. without financial or technical support from other organisations like UNODC).

In terms of the manuals produced, the **VAW manual for prosecutors was reportedly rolled out to all 4000 prosecutor offices** in the country. It is safe to assume that some use will come from it although this aspect is not being monitored by the project<sup>51</sup>. However, in the words of one of the bellwethers consulted *“the development of the manual in itself is no guarantee of its use. Sharing the information and capacity building around its content is critical for creating the desired change”*. The evaluation could not get evidence that adherence to the distributed manual is going to be monitored, and no documented evidence of a training rollout plan beyond the 180 prosecutors trained by the project.

The **manuals developed within the framework of the project will also be adapted for the ESP Programme** led by UNFPA. This will give key actors the opportunity to update their contents and give a second life to the products.

**Equipment and systems:** The **equipment that was acquired for the specialized clinics** of FMA was **in use** in three of the four clinics (Cairo, Mansura and Alexandria) at the time of the evaluation, while the Tanta clinic was still to be fully equipped. The expectation of the organization was its continued use beyond the limits of the project although **no maintenance plan for the equipment** was shared with the evaluation team<sup>52</sup>.

The **PPO database will be developed further beyond the contribution of the project**. According to sources from the organization itself, the Egyptian government has pledged 80 million Egyptian Pounds to continue with its development.

However, **the impact of the database** information on the fight against VAW will ultimately **depend on** the adoption of one of the following strategies: a) strengthening of the **gender capacity** within the organization so that relevant data can be extracted; or b) **establishing relevant synergies** with organizations with gender expertise. The evaluation did not find indications of actions related to either of these.

### *Donor interest in continuing to finance the fight against VAW*

It seems clear that the interest of donors in continuing to fund the fight against VAW in **Egypt is essential, especially considering that it is not yet a clear priority for the state**. The evaluation found **contradictory indications regarding the willingness and interest of donors** in this area, since future engagement appeared to be conditioned by various factors.

While some of the international organisation representatives consulted believed that funding was available from multiple sources and it should not be difficult to leverage the work on VAW; others thought that other themes like women economic empowerment were more appealing to donors, since they represented clear priorities for government and were more in line with its economic reform efforts.

<sup>51</sup> The PPO informed UNODC that this is monitored by them directly and that it is not UNODC role to monitor it.

<sup>52</sup> During the CLPs Presentation, USINL commented that there are maintenance contracts for FMA equipment. At the time of finalizing this report, no copies of contracts were presented to the Evaluation team.

However, the stakeholders consulted unanimously agreed that the **international funds available (whether small or significant) should be channelled mainly through the agencies of the United Nations**, since at present, the Egyptian government has restrictions to work with many international organisations outside the UN family.

Finally, the **two project donors** have expressed their **desire to continue collaborating with UNODC** (although not necessarily in VAW) provided that the communication channels and the monitoring systems in place are significantly improved.

#### Summary - Sustainability

Despite the existence of a National Strategy to combat VAW, evidence suggests that combating **VAW is not a top priority for most government counterparts**. Nonetheless, there are different degrees of will and capacity to continue working on combatting VAW in the future. UNODC, for its part, has an unwavering commitment to combating VAW not only in Egypt, but also globally and has firm plans to continue working on this issue in the future in the country.

The scope of the project's impact will ultimately **depend on its capability to institutionalise the procedures, systems and trainings** (outputs) developed within the governmental counterpart institutions.

The interest of **donors in continuing to fund the fight against VAW in Egypt is essential**, considering that it is not yet a clear priority for the state. There are **contradictory indications regarding the willingness and interest of donors** in this area, since future engagement appeared to be conditioned by various factors.

### *Human Rights and Gender Equality*

#### Evaluation questions:

- To what extent did UNODC take human rights into account while planning and implementing this project?
- To what extent did UNODC take gender aspects into account while planning and implementing this project, including the participation of different stakeholder groups?

While the project was gender specific and intrinsically promoted the empowerment of women, its design and implementation did **not fully integrate gender and human rights considerations**. Although, considerable efforts were done.

The institutional and socio-political context in which the project was immersed was **not fully analysed from a gender and human rights perspective**. For example, the gender capacity (or lack of capacity) of national counterparts was not analysed or even acknowledged, beyond explaining that some had VAW units. This element constituted a **key contextual challenge** that the project should have made explicit from the start, in order to realistically measure the project's contribution in a patriarchal and discriminatory context.

Participation of stakeholders in design: As mentioned under the design chapter, the project followed an inclusive approach and invited many of the key partners to participate. However, the project would have benefited from **including human rights and gender experts, particularly from trusted civil society organisations**. For example, from a gender perspective, civil society organisations and other gender experts would **have helped to ensure that the voices and experiences of women victims of violence were adequately considered**.

It can be argued that in a sense, the project was designed from the perspective of improving the services that the national partners could provide; but not directly taking into account the perspective of the women victims, their challenges and needs. Even though the project made efforts to incorporate women victims voices through case studies and role playing in some of the trainings contents.

On a related note, it is important to underline here **the absence of the NCW during the design** phase. NCW has the thematic legitimacy, the expertise and the political commitment within the government to work on this issue and even if working with them can be challenging, they should have been there to provide a gender analysis. Equally, there was an **absence of any organisation with an explicit human rights focus** during the design stage.

The intervention theory of the project, including progress and results reports, does **not fully address human rights and gender issues**. In concrete terms, this means that: a) no **sex-disaggregated data** for participants in the trainings was available; b) even though some of the trainees; trainers; or experts were women, there was no consistent **and documented strategies to involve women** and other vulnerable groups in project activities. Even though, the project management team in occasions, exercised positive discrimination measures, for example they insisted to have only women going to the Study Tour to Manchester; c) no **systematic gender or human rights analysis** about the use of products was conducted.

Summary of conclusions - Human Rights, Gender Equality and leaving no one behind

While the project was gender specific and intrinsically promoted the empowerment of women, its design and implementation did **not fully integrate gender and human rights** considerations.

### III. CONCLUSIONS

#### **Conclusion 1: Relevance, and Strategic Fit**

The UNODC EGYZ33 was found to be highly relevant to the national context and is fully aligned with Egypt's National Strategy for Combatting Violence against Women 2015-2020 which was coordinated by the National Council for Women (NCW). The design of the project is also aligned with the magnitude and prevalence of violence in Egypt.

The project is fully aligned with Egypt's National Strategy for Combatting VAW as well as with the UNDAF 2013-2017 and with UNODC's Regional Programme for the Arab States. It was designed with consideration emerging from an inclusive stakeholders' consultation workshop which brought together representatives from MoJ, MoI, FMA, CSOs, NCW and international organizations involved in the field of VAW in Egypt.

The acceleration of the inception phase and the lack of a more elaborate consultation process prevented the formulation of a clear definition among stakeholders (particularly national partners) on what "violence against women" means and what forms of VAW are being combatted through the project. This, to some extent, affected the project's relevance.

#### **Conclusion 2: Design**

The design was inclusive in terms of coverage, since most of the relevant criminal justice actors with a role to combat VAW in Egypt were included. However, there was an absence of an important actor namely NCW, making subsequent linkages between its interventions and the broader project design to be weak.

The project had an ambitious design in accordance with the magnitude and complexity of the problem it sought to address. However, the implicit ToC built on a number of underlying assumptions that were not sufficiently challenged.

Critical Data and analysis were lacking during the design phase leaving uncertainties over which interventions were feasible and implementable within Egypt's socio-political context. This included the absence of an explicit ToC, an adequate gender analysis of partner institutions, and most notably the absence of a coordination mechanism or governance body. For example, the implicit assumption that better services for victims will translate to more women accessing the services.

#### **Conclusion 3: Progress**

The project went through a major revision half-way through its implementation and many of its outcomes and outputs were revisited. The absence of security permits curtained the interventions in Courts and Police Stations; while competing institutional mandates and contextual complexities prevented the establishment of a VAW coordination mechanism.

Overall, the project management demonstrated a considerable level of adaptability and agility in the face of persistent challenges as well as emerging opportunities within partner organizations. However, in the absence of rigorous planning and sufficient contextual analysis prior to implementation, reactive dynamics were driving decision-making throughout the project

#### **Conclusion 4: Human Resources**

UNODC human and technical resources were of high quality. The joint use of internationally acclaimed foreign experts with a capable local expert who had access to and trust of the national partners was considered a good

practice. However, the full cost recovery modality which necessitated that staff members undertake tasks such as mobilising resources, networking or planning new initiative has over-strained staff and had implications for project implementation in general, but more importantly profound effects on morale, wellbeing and inability to meet main donors' expectation, despite the high dedication of the project team.

### **Conclusion 5: Monitoring and reporting**

The monitoring system can be clearly improved. The logical framework used to plan the initiative was not sufficiently clear, especially after the major revision of the project.

Progress reports are designed to meet the donor's requirements and are focused on delivery of outputs. This means that there was little documentation of contributions to transformations, quality of project outputs and products, challenges, non-achievements or backlashes indicators.

The **administrative and financial systems** used during the implementation of the project **did not ensure adequate monitoring of project expenditure**. The use of Umoja to generate adequate financial reports that can inform decision making throughout implementation was not evidenced by this evaluation. This posed a limitation on the project's capacity to undertake V4M assessments and determining whether project resources were utilised in a way that produced the maximum value for stakeholders, including donors.

### **Conclusion 6: Value for money**

The most efficient strategy of the project was the training component. Despite certain reservations about its outreach, training programme constituted the strategy that was most closely linked to the transformations that the project contributed to. The products delivered by EGYZ33 were considered "ground-breaking" by stakeholders, representing a foray into "uncharted territory". The training programmes delivered in the FMA, the PPO and with police officers (MoI) were credited with being the *first of their kind*, having opened the door in these organisations to a new issue that was not only highly relevant to the context, but also very sensitive in nature.

The project has contributed to significant invisible and personal changes in all national partners that have benefitted from training programmes. Given the number of people trained in the project in relation to the general population, only in the FMA reached a critical mass to contribute to changing the culture of the organisation. Similarly, the project has contributed to several transformations in the collective/visible dimension in the different counterparts (the FMA, the PPO and to a lesser extent in the NCW) by improving their equipment, systems and generally their organisational ability to deal with cases of VAW.

Overall, significant effort was exerted into delivering quality products/activities. Less focus was given to other key dimensions of project implementation such as the magnitude, critical mass or quality of the transformations that these products/activities were contributing to.

### **Conclusion 7: Partnerships**

UNODC's unique position and standing in the country serves as an effective entry point for building strategic collaborations on VAW with governmental partners. Despite challenges, national partners positively valued their partnership with UNODC.

Although this has been UNODC's first initiative on VAW in Egypt, the organisation has firm plans to continue working on this issue in the future. The UN Joint Programme on VAW, the UNODC Regional Programme and the Global ESP programme are all relevant and existing opportunities for collaboration with the UN family. The project also established significant tactical synergies with other UN agencies, most notable with UN Women and UNFPA and has facilitated important linkages between national counterparts such as PPO with UN Agencies such as UNICEF.

### **Conclusion 8: Sustainability**

VAW is not a top priority for most government counterparts with scarce budgetary allocations for this issue, making donor financing essential for continued efforts. Nonetheless, there are different degrees of will and capacity among national counterparts to continue working on combatting VAW in the future. The scope of the project's impact will ultimately depend on its capability to institutionalise the procedures, systems and trainings developed within the governmental counterpart institutions.

There are contradictory indications regarding the willingness and interest of donors in this area, since future engagement appeared to be conditioned by various factors including responsiveness of the key justice system actors.

### **Conclusion 9: Cross cutting themes**

While the project was gender specific and intrinsically promoted the empowerment of women, its design and implementation did not fully integrate gender and human rights considerations. The project strategies and progress reports do not provide a) sex-disaggregated data for participants in the trainings was available; b) no consistent tactics to involve women and other vulnerable groups in project activities as trainees; trainers; or experts, despite some good efforts in this regard c) no systematic gender or human rights analysis about the use of products was conducted.



## IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

### **Recommendation 1 – Design and planning (improve planning and risk analysis)**

For Country Office Management: During inception phase of future VAW projects, the Country Office Management and national counterparts should develop an explicit Theory of Change (ToC). Adequate time and resources should be dedicated to a more in-depth process of stakeholders’ consultation, risk analysis and assessment of strategic interventions where UNODC can realistically add value and contribute to change.

An explicit Theory of Change (ToC) should be developed to serve as the overarching conceptual framework on the desired outcomes – as opposed to outputs- of the project and the transformations sought across institutions.

The design phase should factor in more time and adequate resources to allow Country Office Management and stakeholders to develop a common understanding on the forms of VAW that will be tackled through the project. This will enable them to develop more relevant services and products. Similarly, a more in-depth consultation process should be pursued during inception to allow stakeholders to weigh the risks and draw up more realistic plans about what was implementable and what is not implementable in the Egyptian socio-political context.

Based on the processes of change specified in the ToC, outcome level indicators should be identified to reflect the nature of the transformations sought. This is considered critical to identify ‘what success looks like’ and hence be able to identify relevant tools to measure and/or document ‘transformations’ that UNODC would not capture through an output-oriented log frame.

In this process, it is advisable to revisit indicators associated to activities and outputs and those associated with outcomes and changes anticipated by UNODC’s contribution. Donors should be core actors in this reflection and in helping to identify the types of metrics, information and narrative that best fit their reporting and accountability requirements.

The inception phase should institute a concrete coordination mechanism to allow stakeholders to revise the assumptions implicit in the project’s theory of change during the implementation of the project. Spaces for strategic reflection before and during the implementation of the project should be formalized.

### **Recommendation 2 –Reporting and donor relations (improve quality)**

For EGYZ33; Country Office Management and UNODC HQ: The Country Office Management should improve the quality of reporting, both from a substantive and financial perspective, aligning donor communications to the expectations and information requirements of each respective donor.

This means that the frequency and quality of donor communications and reporting should be fully aligned with each donor’s expectations, information requirements and hence is contributing meaningfully to their accountability to tax payers. Both the substantive and financial reporting on future projects should better demonstrate the value of donor investments even if Member States agreed to only receive certified budgets<sup>53</sup>, at the country level. This is considered an important step for UNODC Egypt in order not to compromise future funding prospects.

In terms of technical reporting, the content of the current reports should be substantively enhanced through documenting and demonstrating contributions to transformations, quality of project outputs and products, challenges, non-achievements or backlashes. Beyond the question of “what” was being implemented and achieved,

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<sup>53</sup> Certified budgets offer very basic financial information organised by five to seven general budget lines.

the “so what” question should be adequately answered and documented in progress reports. However, donors are also advised to consider the complexities of combatting VAW which is a non-linear process where the transformative implications are neither immediate, nor easily measured.

As for financial reporting, it is recommended that Country Office Management ensures that the administrative and financial systems generate adequate financial reports that inform decision making throughout implementation. This includes – but is not limited to- monitoring of project expenditure per output and per outcome and reports on project burn rate to inform management on the rate at which the budget is being spent quarter-on-quarter and year-over-year.

To accomplish this improvement, Country Office Management is advised to conduct an assessment of the challenges that prevent the project management team(s) from accessing readily available financial information from the new finance system (Umoja). Should issues of capacity or training needs emerge, UNODC Vienna is advised to complement the training delivered with additional coaching to optimize the use of the financial system and ensure that it is being utilized to its full potential.

Apart from making the assessment of value for money more robust, the above recommendations combined will contribute to improving the overall quality of the project.

### **Recommendation 3 – Sustainability (expanding reach of project products)**

For EGYZ33 and Joint Regional Programme on VAW&G: The Project Management should leverage the achievements of EGYZ33 project by taking steps to advocate for and support the institutionalization of trainings and manuals developed for VAW&G first responders to expand the scope of the benefits of the project as much as possible.

Through UNODC regional project on VAW&G (XAMW59) and the UN Joint Regional Programme on VAW&G, UNODC Project Management is well positioned to capitalize on the good quality manuals and trainings delivered through EGYZ33. A planned course of action should be pursued to advocate for – and provide support where relevant and feasible- to institutionalize the training programmes developed by UNODC for VAW&G first responders such as Police personnel, Prosecutors and Forensic practitioners as part of ‘standard trainings’ for all new incumbents, and refreshment trainings for trained personnel at regular intervals.

This entails the provision of technical advice -and coaching where needed- to national counterparts on the feasible modalities for embedding the training content within the regular induction programmes in the institutions. Although this may be a complex undertaking for some national counterparts who did not demonstrate evidence of will and capacity to extend the scope of those trainings, others such as FMA are more likely to respond to and to benefit from additional UNODC technical advice in the area of sustainability.

In areas where the project procured equipment to FMA and PPO it is recommended to address ‘asset management’ issues with the organisations’ management. The national counterparts should be able to identify planned actions to maximise performance of procured equipment, identify and address potential failures and future plans for renewal and/or upgrades. These considerations should in the future constitute part of the planning process prior to procurement of new equipment or infrastructure, to ensure that these ‘new and improved services for VAW&G victims’ are not transitory improvements during the project lifetime.

### **Recommendation 4 – Overall management (human resources)**

For Country Office Management: Establish a middle-management position to mobilise resources, plan new initiatives and support project teams in cross cutting functions such as documentation

UNODC HQ in Vienna should consider assigning core funds to the position of the UNODC Partnership Development Manager. This will enable Programme Manager(s) to optimize the time and efforts dedicated to ‘core tasks’ of implementation and stakeholders’ engagement, thus enhancing the quality of the country Programme at large. It would also free up the Programme Manager position from performing tasks better suited to a resource mobilization and partnership development practitioner.

Maintaining the present staffing level is recommended to be well-prepared for the next phase of VAW&G programming both through the UNODC Regional Programme (XAMW59) and the UN Joint Programme. The continuation of EGYZ33 project management team to the next phase is critical to maintain the organizational learning in the area of VAW&G achieved through the project under evaluation.

### **Recommendation 5 – Partnerships & Governance (improve synergies)**

For EGYZ33 and Country Office Management: Enhance project governance and potential synergies between national stakeholders. In addition, it is strongly advised to better align potential interventions with the work of other bilateral and multilateral agencies active in the space of combatting violence against women and girls.

Both the project management and the Country Office Management should prioritize the creation of a governance body (such as a steering committee or an information-sharing committee) for new VAW projects that involve multiple stakeholders and donors. This governance body will serve as a forum to clarify/discuss the role of different stakeholders, agree on mutual expectations, resolve disagreements where relevant and above all provide the ‘space’ for revisiting project assumptions during implementation and undertake corrective actions ‘collaboratively’<sup>54</sup>.

Other possible synergies could also be explored with programmes/projects of Bilateral Agencies active in the VAW space such as the USAID. With national counterparts who receive funding from multiple sources for improving response to VAW&G such as NCW, it is strongly advised to develop a thorough understanding of these other donor contributions to best devise the most appropriate and relevant entry points that are aligned with UNODC’s particular areas of expertise.

### **Recommendation 6 – Gender (Improve analysis & mainstreaming)**

For EGYZ33 and Country Office Management : During the project lifecycle, the Project Management should better integrate gender analysis and gender mainstreaming as core tasks both at conceptual and operational levels.

An adequate gender analysis of the partner institutions is strongly recommended during the design stage of future VAW&G projects. Through such analysis, UNODC project management will be able to identify socio-cultural factors that may affect the development of the project and the extent to which it can deliver certain transformations.

Although some gender mainstreaming was done as a result of the project such as the inclusion of new fields in the PPO database (notably the relationship between perpetrator and victim), it is recommended to solicit local gender expertise to provide more adequate and systematic gender mainstreaming. Similarly, it is strongly advised to improve the collection and reporting of gender-differentiated data and information.

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<sup>54</sup> National counterparts reiterated during the CLPs Presentation the difficulties of establishing a joint steering committee due to the specificity of each agency and the importance of compliance to each entity's regulations and independence of decision making. They agreed to the importance of joint meetings for the sole purpose of 'knowledge sharing' in relation to project activities.

## V. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

### A good practice: The successful selection of relevant international expertise

The project management succeeded to complement local expertise who had already gained the trust of the national partners with high quality foreign experts who brought a well-received international perspective. The Study Tour to Manchester organised for a group of selected female forensic doctors in the FMA is a vivid example of a good quality output aided by an internationally acclaimed foreign expert. Participants highlighted the meticulous planning and the high relevance of the training to their context and their respective learning processes. The expert in charge also decided the destination of the study tour increasing the linkage to the contents of the trainings and maximizing participants' exposure to a Centre widely known for employing state-of-the-art technologies and procedures for the service of VAW victims. Stakeholders underlined that UNODC was uniquely positioned to organise this type of learning tour to the most relevant places in the world, given its global vision and unique access to relevant institutions in member states

### A good practice: Augmenting UNODC's value added through relevant in-house and global expertise.

The existence of relevant in-house expertise was critical to facilitate UNODC's collaboration with certain institutions that were deemed by many stakeholders as 'impermeable' such as MoI. On one hand, UNODC solicited the support of relevant local expertise with ample experience and tacit knowledge of the 'institutional cultures' of Justice System actors. Similarly, UNODC country office managed to leverage the organization's global vision and unique access to relevant institutions in member states by organizing a high quality learning tour to the most relevant places in the world. Stakeholders identified this as a key added value of UNODC in comparison to other bilateral organisations which only had the capacity to organise trips to countries within their scope. Also the joint use of foreign experts who brought a well-received international perspective with the expertise of a local expert who had already gained the trust of the national partners was highly commended as a good practice.

### A good practice: Employing UNODC's Strategic positioning within the justice ecosystem

The training programmes delivered in the FMA, the PPO and in police officer (MoI) were credited with being the *first of their kind*, having opened the door in these organisations to a new issue that was not only highly relevant to the context, but also very sensitive in nature. All the stakeholders consulted agreed that this constituted one of the project's greatest achievements, even if given its limited scope and resources, the project did not reach the critical mass required to alter the organisational cultures and systems in these organisations. UNODC Country Office persistence to contribute to the improvement of VAW response within a challenging and complex institution such as MoI is considered a good example of using their strategic positioning to 'plant seeds of change'.

### A good practice: The use of ToT as a training modality

A positive element that deserves special mention was the modality of Trainers of Trainers (ToT) used in the PPO for prosecutor trainings and in the MoI for police officer trainings. Consulted trainees and other key stakeholders highlighted the high technical and human quality of the support and backing offered by UNODC to the selected trainees who were training others. This is important to highlight as often ToT options are difficult to implement. However, in this case, the continuity of trainings delivered to the PPO was evidenced and is considered a good practice. The UNODC trained trainers were equipped with necessary skills to independently conduct further trainings within their institution on VAW or in partnership with other UN Organisations and NCW. Plans are in place for the year 2019 and beyond as PPO Trainers have already trained a significant number of additional individuals. On another front, in terms of quality, the evaluation team attested to the highly contextualized and interactive environment by observing a training day at the Police Academy in which Trained Police Officers - supported by UNODC consultant- delivered basic trainings. In the group interview, the junior female officers valued the fact that they gained enough confidence to comfortably present issues related to VAW and train higher ranking officers who were mostly male, an experience that is considered new for them after becoming trainers through

UNODC. Evidence of MoI will and capacity to institutionalize and scale these trainings through the standard training programmes of the Police Academy could not be ascertained during the evaluation.

A good practice: The Cooperation with FMA

The collaboration with the Forensic Medical Authority (FMA) constituted a good practice due to different reasons.

**First**, FMA training programme successfully reached all the forensic doctors in the country who had the specific role of attending victims of VAW. Even if the numbers may seem small (80 doctors in total), the fact that a coverage of 100% was attained nationally constituted an important achievement for the project, an instance where UNODC reached a critical mass to affect change.

**Second**, the intervention was multi-faceted and inclusive, covering knowledge and skills (through training), on-job coaching and observation of international best practices (through the Study Tour St Mary's Sexual Assault and Referral Centre in Manchester, UK) and **third**, UNODC reinforced these capacity development interventions with an infrastructure upgrade in FMA Clinics through the procurement of state-of-the-art equipment. Such technologies enabled doctors to give a higher percentage of conclusive evidence to Prosecutors on rape cases (from 45 percent of cases in 2016 to 60 percent of cases in 2017)<sup>55</sup>. The inclusive entry points together with the receptiveness of FMA management and their personal commitment to sustain service improvements provide a very good practice.

A good practice: The Cooperation with MoI

In May 2013, a special unit was set up within the Human Rights Department in the Ministry of Interior (MoI) to address the issue of violence against women. This special unit consisted of both female and male officers and was assigned to deal with cases of sexual harassment as well as all other forms of violence against women. Despite the existence of VAW Units, the manual developed for Law Enforcement Officers, the basic training for Police Officers and the TOT all represent ground-breaking initiatives. They constitute 'firsts' for a counterpart like MOI in their work on the EVAW portfolio with international organizations. The ability of UNODC to enter a previously 'unchartered territory' was commended by consulted stakeholders. Besides, in terms of quality, the evaluation team attested to the highly contextualized and interactive environment in which the basic trainings took place by observing a training day in Police Academy delivered by UNODC consultant and trained Police Officers. In the group interview, the junior female officers valued the fact that they gained enough confidence to comfortably present issues related to VAW and train higher ranking officers who were mostly male, an experience that is considered new for them after becoming trainers through UNODC.

A lesson learned: Understanding what VAW is

The lack of a clear understanding on which concrete forms of VAW were being combated through the project affected its relevance, since the services and products that are appropriate for fighting sexual harassment are different to those addressing other forms of VAW, such as intimate partner violence, or FGM. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the manuals developed – and consequently the trainings- for law enforcement officers, Prosecutors and Forensic Practitioners have all made explicit references to FGM as a VAW crime.

While it is acknowledged by project management that issues such as FGM are not within the mandate of UNODC, it is important for future EVAW projects to undertake a 'scoping' exercise during inception to define which forms of violence will be proactively tackled through the project, hence informing the project's effort to establish the

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<sup>55</sup> During CLPs presentation held on 4 March 2018, FMA representative confirmed that they are systematizing data collection and have established a Scientific Research Unit.

needed partnerships, devise the right messaging and outreach, and tailor the most relevant and appropriate services for potential victims to different types of violence.

A lesson learned: The importance of allocating resources for planning and project inception phase.

An important lesson that has been learned during the implementation of the EGYZ33 has been the need to allocate sufficient resources for an adequate inception phase before the formulation of the initiative.

Many of the aspects identified as inadequate during this evaluation (including a gender analysis of institutional counterparts, an in-depth consultation process, risk analysis and identification of feasible interventions, the development of a ToC and the establishment of a governance body) were compromised due to an accelerated inception phase.

However, in the absence of dedicated personnel for resource mobilization and networking to secure the necessary funds for the full cost recovery, the time – and reflection space- available to project management teams to undertake these core conceptual and planning tasks are significantly curtailed.

# Terms of Reference of the

## Final Independent Project Evaluation of “Improving the Criminal Justice Response to Violence against Women in Egypt”

**EGYZ33**

Egypt

May 2018



UNITED NATIONS

New York, 2018

## BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Project number:	EGYZ33
Project title:	Improving the Criminal Justice Response to Violence against Women in Egypt
Duration:	September 30, 2014 - January 30, 2018 (3 years, 4 months)
Location:	Egypt
Linkages to Country, Regional and Thematic Programmes:	Regional Programme for the Arab States to Prevent and Combat Crime, Terrorism and Health Threats and Strengthen Criminal Justice Systems in Line with International Human Rights Standards (2016-2021) Sub programme IV: Criminal justice and crime prevention Outcome 1: Member States develop and implement crime prevention strategies Thematic Programme on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform (2012-2015) Outcome 1: Requesting States have developed and implemented crime prevention and criminal justice reform initiatives, including strategies, action plans and measures in accordance with UN standards and norms in crime
Executing Agency:	UNODC
Partner Organizations:	Ministry of justice, Ministry of Interior, Prosecutor General Office, National Council for Women
Total Approved Budget:	\$2,824,441 <sup>56</sup>
Total Overall Budget	\$2,824,441
Donors:	US/INL and UK
Project Manager/ Coordinator:	Mirna Bouhabib
Type and time frame of evaluation: (Independent Project Evaluation/In-depth Evaluation/mid-term/final)	Final Independent Project Evaluation
Timeframe of the project covered by the evaluation:	September 30, 2014 – December 30, 2018 (4 years, 3 months)
Geographical coverage of the evaluation:	Egypt
Budget for this evaluation:	USD 45,0000
Type and year of past evaluations (if any):	NA
Core Learning Partners <sup>57</sup> (entities):	Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Prosecutor General Office, the National Council of Women. US/INL and the UK

<sup>56</sup> Noting that the actual received contributions from donors amount to USD 2,466,166

<sup>57</sup> The CLPs are the main stakeholders, i.e. a limited number of those deemed as particularly relevant to be involved throughout the evaluation process, i.e. in reviewing and commenting on the TOR and the evaluation questions, reviewing and commenting on the draft evaluation report, as well as facilitating the dissemination and application of the results and other follow-up action. Stakeholders include all those to be invited to participate in the interviews and surveys, including the CLPs.



## Project overview and historical context

### a) Project overview

The current project aims to assist Egypt in exercising its international obligation of due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish acts of violence against women and girls, whether those actions are perpetuated by the State or private persons. More specifically, the project's objective is to develop fair and effective procedures for dealing with cases of violence against women and girls throughout the criminal justice process, ensuring a victim-centred approach, including assistance to and protection of victims, as well as to ensure a fair and just prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators. More specifically, the project aims at: a) supporting the efforts of Egyptian authorities in having a good legislative framework to better deal with VAW cases; b) ensuring a better coordination among criminal justice actors; c) enhancing the capacities of all criminal justice practitioners (police officers, prosecutors, forensic doctors and judges) to respond promptly and effectively to incidents of VAW&G; and d) supporting concerned actors, including the prosecution office and the National Council for women in putting in place a comprehensive data system to ensure tailored and evidence-based interventions.

It's important to mention that this project was initially based on seed funding under a previous project (titled XAMV12) under which UNODC conducted a workshop in 2013 with relevant ministries entitled "Towards the Development of a National Strategy to Combat Violence against Women" in order to adopt recommendations and workplan with regard to addressing VAW in Egypt. Later in 2014, UNODC conducted another workshop with relevant ministries on the legislative review of Egyptian legislation. One of this workshop's outcomes was the elaboration and adoption of a specific article on sexual harassment in the Egyptian Penal Code.

The project and its related activities followed a human rights-based approach to programming, integrating the promotion of equality and non-discrimination, ensuring participation and inclusion of disadvantaged groups. Cooperation and coordination with other UN agencies, donors and civil society was essential to ensure efficient and effective implementation and was thus a focus during project implementation.

### • b) Context

In many countries, despite progress in legislation and policies, gaps remain when it comes to effectively protecting female victims of violence and bringing perpetrators to justice. According to a study published by UN Women in 2013<sup>58</sup>, 99.3% of Egyptian women surveyed had been subjected to some degree of sexual harassment. Moreover, 40% of the victims stated that individuals at the scene of the harassment did nothing, and 33.6% stated those around them during the harassment incident did not notice anything. Only 6.6% of surveyed victims stated that they requested help from security forces.

Based on various unofficial reports, the majority of cases of violence against women in Egypt go unreported and unprosecuted. There is a profound lack of confidence and trust in criminal justice institutions among women, and a disturbingly high percentage of victims whose needs for assistance, protection and redress are neither recognized nor met. In Egypt, women who experience

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<sup>58</sup> Study on Ways and Methods to Eliminate Sexual Harassment in Egypt Results / Outcomes and Recommendations Summary.

violence often do not report the crime for fear of shame, exclusion or isolation, fear of reprisal or an expectation that their complaint will not be taken seriously by criminal justice authorities.

In Egypt, victims expect an ineffective response, or worse, re-victimization through shaming or further mistreatment. According to a recent report, "women in focus groups reported being harassed, mocked, and ignored by policemen when they attempted to report an incident at a police station."<sup>59</sup> The police typically cannot be relied upon to seriously investigate and actively respond to incidents of violence against women or situations where individuals and groups are inciting such violence.

Nevertheless, during the past years, the Egyptian government has demonstrated great commitment to fight VAW&G. Within this context, and additionally to the establishment of VAW units at the Ministries of Justice and Interior, and with the technical support of UNODC and UN Women, a specific article criminalizing sexual harassment was elaborated in March 2014. The article was adopted by the president in June 2014. It states that those found guilty of verbal sexual harassment in a private or public place will be sentenced to a minimum of six months in prison and fined no less than EGP 3,000 (\$US 420).<sup>60</sup> Meanwhile, unwanted sexual contact will be punished with a minimum of one year in prison and a fine of at least EGP 10,000.

## Main challenges during implementation

The main challenge was the delay in the implementation of pre-planned activities, due to:

a) Delay to get counterparts' approval on the project

Despite the fact that the project was designed based on the outcomes of a national workshop that gathered all concerned actors working on violence against women in Egypt during 2013, the actual implementation of the project was delayed given the multiple changes occurring on the highest level in the Egyptian Government.

b) Involvement of additional counterparts

During the implementation of the project, the necessity of involving new actors to have a more comprehensive approach was raised in consultation with the donor. In Egypt, even though the work with the prosecution was always done through the MoJ, the parliament approved the independence of the Public Prosecutor's Office from the Minister of Justice in 2015. Accordingly, there was a need to sign a memorandum of understanding with the Prosecutor General Office in order to pursue the implementation of many activities under the project. In addition, and based on the fact that the existing Complaint Offices within the National Council for Women (NCW) could be the entry point to the criminal justice system to women survivors, there was a clear need to support their institutional capacity through a new partnership with NCW.

c) UMOJA

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<sup>59</sup> UN Women, Progress of the World's Women 2011-2012: In Pursuit of Justice (2011).

<sup>60</sup> Article 306 bis of the Egyptian Penal Code

The deployment of the new financial and administrative system across UNODC, Umoja, is still causing difficulties in implementing the project and delays regarding the administrative aspects related to each activity (procurement and payments).

d) Security issues

Furthermore, at times the security situation in Egypt had an impact on the implementation of activities with the Ministry of Interior, notably the organization of training workshops and receiving feedback/approvals on training material.

Project documents and revisions of the original project document

Project document	Year	Please provide general information regarding the original project document.
EGYZ33: “Improving the Criminal Justice Response to Violence against Women in Egypt”.	Sept 2014- Jan 2017	The project document was signed by the MoI in February 2015, In May 2015, an MOU was signed with the MoJ. Finally, the Prosecutor General Office approved a letter of cooperation in April 2015 in relation to activities related to the PG Office.

Project revision (please add further rows as needed)	Year	Reason & purpose	Change in (please check)
November 2016	Sept 2014- Jan 2018	Project revision to a) review some of the project activities; b) extend the lifetime of the projects; and c) increase the project budget.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Budget <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Timeframe <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Logframe

## Main objectives and outcomes

Objective, Outcomes, Outputs	Indicators
Project Objective: Improve the response of the criminal justice system for victims of violence against women and girls in Egypt with a special focus in the governorates of Cairo and Giza.	Criminal justice practitioners are able to deal with cases of VAW&G in a more professional manner. Baseline: 0 Target: 150 practitioners targeted and 80% of them to be skilled enough to deal with VAW cases
Outcome 1: VAW&G issues discussed in national media including the new/amended legislation.	Draft law/ articles in penal code approved by concerned actors available. Baseline: A draft law was submitted by the National Council for Women but it’s not approved. Target: 1 law approved by the Ministry of Justice % of women aware of their rights and of the existing services increased among those targeted in the media campaign. Baseline: Pre-tests will define the level existing of awareness Target: 40%
Output 1.1:	Draft legislative review available

Legislation is drafted and available for approval by all government stakeholders and for discussion in the parliament.	Baseline: 0 Target: 1 by May 2017
Output 1.2: Public awareness campaigns conducted in coordination with different agencies such as NCW, the forensic authority etc., on the new concepts conveyed in draft laws on VAW&G and on existing and developed services for women subject to violence.	Number of advocacy tools developed and disseminated. Baseline: 0 Target: 4 brochures, handouts/flyers, printed material etc.  Number of sensitisation meetings organised in coordination with NCW Baseline: 0 Target: 15 (quarterly meetings)
Outcome 2: The Egyptian government establishes a functioning integrated coordination mechanism among criminal justice actors established and functioning.	Strengthened interaction among competent authorities, common efforts consolidated and duplicated efforts avoided Baseline: 3 competent institutions are engaged Target: 5 competent institutions engaged  Sustained participation (at appropriate levels of leadership) from the following key actors: Prosecutor General Office, MoJ, MoI, NCW and NGOs representatives. Baseline: 0 Target: 24 meetings per year
Output 2.1: Capacities of MoJ, Prosecutor General Office and MoI to coordinate criminal justice actors' responses to VAW&G supported.	Number of coordination meetings held Baseline: 0 Target: 2 per year (5 in total)  Recommendations on design, structure and purpose of the coordination unit produced Baseline: 0 Target: 1 list of recommendations produced
Outcome 3: Law enforcement authorities, in particular first responders and investigators, empowered and equipped to respond promptly and effectively to incidents of VAW&G.	Increased knowledge and enhanced skills of law enforcement officers Baseline: unknown Target: 50% of knowledge increased  Relevant cases submitted to Courts in a timely manner
Output 3.1: Law enforcement officers under the technical supervision of the Human Rights Department/ VAW unit capable of providing professional gender sensitive response to women victims of violence in Egypt in accordance with the produced training manual.	Number of law enforcement officers (m/f) affiliated to the Human Rights/ VAW department trained on gender sensitive response to female victims of violence Baseline: 0 Target: 25  Number of trained trainers delivering training session based on the produced manual and using produced training tools Baseline: 0

	Target: 10
<p>Output 3.2: Establishment of professional reporting and recording mechanisms supported at three police stations in the pilot areas and in two directorates in the governorate of Cairo and Giza ensuring the safety and confidentiality of the victims and increased awareness and confidence of women and girls to report incidents of VAW&amp;G.</p>	<p>Number of police officers (m/f) trained on reporting VAW&amp;G cases. Baseline: 0 Target: 200</p> <p>Police stations refurbished Baseline: 0 Target: 3 stations in total (Cairo, Giza and Alexandria)</p>
<p>Outcome 4: The MOI's VAW unit has a clear and identified purpose and has the capacity to fulfill that role.</p>	<p>VAW unit effectively monitors how incidents of VAW&amp;G are handled. Baseline: unknown Target: Competent authorities are guided by the VAW unit in 6 governorates</p> <p>VAW unit able to mentor or provide guidance to governorates struggling to implement SGBV prevention policies. Baseline: unknown Target: 70% of VAW incidents are monitored by the VAW unit</p>
<p>Output 4.1: The MOI VAW Unit has the necessary tools and training to improve case documentation and management.</p>	<p>Software developed and provided to the VAW unit Baseline: 0 Target: 1 database software by June 2017</p> <p>Number of staff trained (m/f) on software functions and how to use in accordance with policies. Baseline: 0 Target: 20</p>
<p>Output 4.2: The MOI VAW unit supported in developing a VAW&amp;G Prevention Strategy and implementation is piloted in the three areas where this project is operating</p>	<p>Number of educational visits undertaken. Baseline: 0 Target: 15 in total in the three areas</p> <p>Prevention strategy elaborated. Baseline: 0 Target: 1</p> <p>Number of working group meetings held Baseline: 0 Target: 8</p>

<p>Outcome 5: Practitioners assigned to the Forensic Medicine Authority (FMA) have the skills and knowledge to collect evidence from victims of VAW&amp;G in a victim-sensitive manner.</p>	<p>Satisfaction rate of women with the provided services Baseline: unknown Target: 40% of 200 women and girls (80 total) respond that they are satisfied with services received</p>
<p>Output 5.1: Capacities of forensic practitioners enhanced to deliver high-quality evidence examination</p>	<p>Medical practitioners (m/f) trained. Baseline: 0 Target: 25</p> <p>Number and types of tools developed. Baseline: 0 Target: 3 (CDs and documentation)</p>
<p>Outcome 6: The judiciary deals more efficiently with crimes of VAW&amp;G through targeted trainings and specialized courts.</p>	<p>Prosecutors willing to take on VAW cases Baseline: unknown Target: 70% of trained prosecutors handle cases of VAW in a gender-sensitive and non-judgmental way</p>
<p>Output 6.1: Gaps and challenges faced by prosecutors and judges identified and addressed to enhance judicial capacities to effectively manage cases of VAW&amp;G.</p>	<p>Recommendations for addressing identified gaps and challenges produced. Baseline: 0 Target: 1 set of recommendations.</p>
<p>Output 6.2: Prosecutors and judges capable of providing professional gender sensitive responses to women victims of violence in Egypt in gender in accordance with the produced training manual.</p>	<p>Number of prosecutors (m/f) trained on gender sensitive response to female victims of violence in Egypt. Baseline: 0 Target: 110</p>
<p>Output 6.3: Victim friendly court environments are in place in three existing criminal courts to avoid secondary victimization and provide victim and witness protection during investigations and trials of VAW&amp;G cases.</p>	<p>Court rooms refurbished to enhance protection of victims. Baseline: 0 Target: 3 in Cairo, Giza and Alexandria</p> <p>Number of psychologists (m/f) trained on follow-up on VAW cases. Baseline: 0 Target: 80</p>
<p>Outcome 7: Comprehensive data is available to the MOJ to ensure tailored and evidence-based interventions.</p>	<p>Installation/operationalization of the prosecution case management system Baseline: 0 Target: System will be 50% complete by November 2016 and 100% by the beginning of 2017.</p> <p>Number of calls NCW will be able to receive and process in an efficient manner</p>

	<p>Baseline: 3 to 6 cases per day Target: 20 to 30 cases per day</p>
<p><b>Output 7.1:</b></p> <p>Cases management system for VAW&amp;G cases established at the Prosecution Office to monitor how cases of VAW&amp;G are being dealt with at each level of the judicial procedure</p>	<p>Case management system piloted in several prosecution offices.</p> <p>Baseline: 19 in Alexandria Target: additional 15 in East and Central Cairo</p>
<p><b>Output 7.2:</b></p> <p>The National Council for Women Ombudsman Offices capacity is enhanced to better receive, analyse and monitor cases on VAW across Egypt</p>	<p>Call Centre functionality</p> <p>Baseline: Available call centre until 15:00PM Number of trained agents: 0 Target: Time extended to reach 24/7 Number of trained agents: 13</p> <p>Percentage of women approaching NCW who benefit from social or psychological support through webcams in NCW ombudsman offices</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 10% of women approaching NCW</p>

## Contribution to UNODC’s country, regional or thematic programme

This project falls under the Thematic Programme Strengthening Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (2016-2021).

It also contributes to the Regional Programme for the Arab States To Prevent and Combat Crime, Terrorism and Health Threats and Strengthen Criminal Justice Systems in Line with International Human Rights Standards (2016-2021), Sub-programme IV: Criminal Justice and Crime Prevention.

The project focuses on the following main components: legislation, coordination of criminal justice actors, police, forensics, judicial processes, data collection and analysis, monitoring, and evaluation. Linkage to UNODC strategy context and to Sustainable Development Goals.

The project falls under the UN Sustainable Development Goal 16 “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”.

The different activities of the project contribute to target 16.a of the Sustainable Development Goal 16 that aims to: “Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international

cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime”.

The project falls as well under the UN Sustainable Development Goal 5 on Gender Equality. The different activities of the project, contributes as well to goal 5.2 that aims to: “Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation”.

Strategic framework 2016-2017 for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Sub-programme 5: Justice

(b) Crime prevention and criminal justice system reform initiatives within UNODC’s mandate are developed and implemented in accordance with international standards and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice.

## DISBURSEMENT HISTORY

*Please indicate in the tables below the budget and expenditures for the respective time periods throughout the life time of the project, as well as the time period of the project that will be covered by the evaluation.*

<b>Time periods throughout the <u>life time of the project</u></b>	<b>Total Approved Budget</b>	<b>Overall Expenditure</b>	<b>Expenditure in %</b>
<b>2015</b>	USD 2,344,316	USD 93574	4%
<b>2016</b>	USD 2,344,316	USD 1,079,481	46%
<b>2017</b>	USD 2,466,166 (2344316 + 121,850)	USD 1,014,444 (USD 921163 + USD 93,281)	41%
<b>Project overall</b>	2,466,166	2,276,520.54 (114,934.53+ 129,147.51+ 2,032,438.5)	92.3%

## PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION



According to UNODC Evaluation Policy, each project/programme must undergo an independent, external final independent project evaluation or a mid-term evaluation every four years in case of long duration of a project/ programme.

The project evaluation seeks to assess the implementation of the project activities and derive recommendations and ensure accountability to the donor (US/INL and UK), stakeholder and counterparts (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, the Prosecution Office and the National Council for Women), to support project improvement and decision making. The evaluation will assess the extent to which the objective, outputs and outcomes were met and whether the resources have been wisely utilized. This allows UNODC to identify areas of improvement, best practices and lessons learnt for potential future interventions in Egypt in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice in General and Violence Against Women in particular. Taking into consideration that UNODC is currently part of the UN joint global programme on essential services for women and girls subject to violence that will be implemented during the coming 2 years and Egypt is one of the countries targeted under this programme. More specifically, the final evaluation will assess the sustainability of the materials as provided by the project to the beneficiaries and whether results of the project can be replicated in other UNODC initiatives elsewhere.

The evaluation will be conducted based on the following criteria: relevance, design, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, partnerships and cooperation and will further specifically assess how gender and human rights aspects have been mainstreamed into the project.

## SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

<b>Unit of analysis</b> (full project/programme/ parts of the project/programme; etc.)	EGYZ33
<b>Time period of the project/programme covered by the evaluation</b>	September 30, 2014- 31 October 2018 (3 years, 3 months)
<b>Geographical coverage of the evaluation</b>	Egypt

## KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

### Evaluation Criteria

The evaluation will be conducted based on the following DAC criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, as well as partnerships and cooperation, gender and human rights and lesson learned. The questions will be further refined by the Evaluation Team.

<b>Relevance</b>
<i>Relevance is the extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.</i>
1. To what extent are the outputs, outcomes and objectives of this project/programme relevant to implementing the Sustainable Development Goals?
2. To what extent are UNODC services and products provided through this project relevant to the needs of various groups of stakeholders, in particular women who were victims of violence and the criminal justice actors involved?

3. To what extent are the project objectives still relevant to the Egyptian Government, end beneficiaries and the international community?
<b>Efficiency</b>
<i>Efficiency measures the outputs - qualitative and quantitative - in relation to the inputs.</i>
1. To what extent were the resources and inputs used appropriately and efficiently, and converted into outputs in a timely and cost-effective manner, considering also an adaptation to unexpected situations or needs?
2. To what extent did the seed funding provided under XAMV12 support the initiation of the implementation of project EGYZ33?
<b>Effectiveness</b>
<i>Effectiveness is a measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.</i>
1. To what extent has the project achieved its planned objective and outcomes?
2. To what extent is the progress or lack thereof made so far, result of external factors rather than of project activities? How did external factors impact on the effectiveness of the project?
<b>Impact</b>
<i>Impact is the positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.</i>
1. To what extent did the project/programme contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals?
2. What, if any, has been the overall impact of the project to date, in particular in relation to key stakeholders and beneficiaries at the local level?
3. Was there any unintended positive or negative impact of the project?
<b>Sustainability</b>
<i>Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.</i>
1. To what extent has UNODC taken into consideration “sustainability” criteria while developing and revising the project document?
2. To what extent are the project activities likely to continue after the project completion? And to what extent can they become self-sustaining financially?
<b>Partnerships and cooperation</b>
<i>The evaluation assesses the partnerships and cooperation established during the project/ programme as well as their functioning and value.</i>
1. To what extent have partnerships been sought and established and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance provided by this project?
2. To which extent did UNODC take advantage and maximize its impact in an efficient manner while working with partners and other stakeholders?
3. To what extent has working in partnership with other actors, stakeholders etc. achieved long term results?
<b>Human rights and Gender Equality</b>
<i>The evaluation needs to assess the mainstreaming of human rights as well as gender equality aspects throughout the project/ programme.</i>
<b>Human rights</b>
1. To what extent did UNODC take human rights into account while planning and implementing this project?
<b>Gender</b>
1. To what extent did UNODC take gender aspects into account while planning and implementing this project, including the participation of different stakeholder groups?
<b>Lessons learned and best practices</b>
<i>Lessons learned concern the learning experiences and insights that were gained throughout the project/ programme.</i>

1. What lessons can be learned from the project implementation in order to improve performance, results and effectiveness in the future?
2. What lessons can be drawn from unintended results?
3. What best practices emerged from the project implementation?
4. What best practices emerged from having an initiation phase project?

## EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation should include a mixed methods approach of qualitative and quantitative methods, providing for a triangulation of findings. The evaluation should further be guided by the principles of human rights and gender equality. Gender-sensitive evaluation methods and gender-sensitive data collection techniques are therefore essential in order to identify key gender issues and define strategies for developing appropriate data bases for better gender analysis in future project planning.

The methodology includes a thorough desk review and analysis of all existing documentation (secondary data sources) (Annex II). The evaluators may further request additional desk review materials if deemed necessary. The evaluators are also expected to use primary sources, such as structured and semi-structured interviews, observations or any other relevant tools as a means to collect relevant data for this evaluation. An on-line questionnaire may further be developed to help collect the views of stakeholders who might not be available for interviews, as well as to gather quantitative data.

The present ToR provides basic information as regards to the methodology of the evaluation, however this should not be regarded as exhaustive but only meant to guide the evaluators.

The evaluation will be based on a participatory approach. While remaining independent, the evaluation will engage all stakeholders and partners, in particular the CLPs, in the evaluation process. The stakeholders will be responsible for the evaluation planning, implementation and reporting. This means that core-learning partners will be briefed by Project Management on the ToR; take note of the evaluators proposed, provide support and insights throughout the evaluation process, as applicable, are briefed by Project Management on the draft report, take note of the final report and take note of the implementation of recommendations. Project Management will share the minutes of the various briefing with IEU for information and its records.

The evaluation will be conducted by one international and one national independent evaluators who are external to the project.

The evaluation will be processed through the ProFi application of Programme/Project Evaluations and all steps and all deliverables will be cleared by IEU. These different steps of the evaluation process include:

- Desk review of relevant background documents (original project document and project revisions, UNODC progress reports (semi-annual and annual), reports on project activities, official communications with key stakeholders, tools developed under the project and other supplementary documents, Substantive reports; Formal letters to counterparts; Publications; etc.) listed in Annex 2;
- Preliminary findings of the desk review to be summarized in an Inception Report, which is not to exceed six pages. The Inception Report should specify the evaluation methodology determining thereby the exact focus and scope of the evaluation exercise, including the evaluation questions, the sampling strategy and the data collection instruments. The Inception Report is one of the key deliverables, which is shared with the Project Manager and the Independent Project Evaluation Unit (IEU) for comments and be cleared by IEU one week before the field mission starts;
- A field mission to Egypt where the UNODC Office is located and the activities have been carried out. Additionally, field visits to forensic clinics, the National Council for Women (NCW), the Prosecutor General Information centre etc. will be organised in order to gain a full overview of the project. (Field mission to be discussed and decided upon together with the evaluators);
- Structured and semi-structured individual and/or group interviews with project management team, key stakeholders and donor (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, NCW, the Prosecution Office, US/INL), project beneficiaries, etc., as well as relevant staff at Vienna HQ and in the field (UNODC staff in Egypt office, UNODC's Regional Office for the Middle East and North Africa (ROMENA) (UNODC staff at Vienna HQ to be interviewed through phone/Skype), Partner government officials who are benefitting from and are directly involved in UNODC's work in Egypt, Representatives of development partner/donor agencies who are contributing to UNODC's work; other UN agencies and partners as appropriate etc. (face-to-face and per phone/Skype); (stakeholders to be interviewed in the evaluation process are to be discussed and decided upon together with the evaluators);
- On-line questionnaire to help collect the views of stakeholders who might not be available for interviews, as well as to gather quantitative data;
- Analysis of findings and follow-up phone interviews with additional stakeholders, as necessary;
- Draft evaluation report (based on UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates to be found on the IEU website) <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/index.html>), to be submitted to the Project Manager, for review of factual errors or omissions, as well to IEU for review and comments. The evaluators will incorporate the necessary changes and submit the revised draft evaluation report to IEU for review and comments (may entail several rounds of comments) and subsequent clearance, followed by a briefing to CLPs;
- Final evaluation report. The evaluators incorporate all the necessary changes, following feedback from CLPs and IEU, and submit the finalized report to IEU for clearance;
- 2-page Evaluation Brief of the key evaluation results to be reviewed and cleared by IEU;
- Presentation of final evaluation findings and recommendations.

## TIMEFRAME AND DELIVERABLES

Duties	Time frame	Location	Deliverables
Desk review and preparation of draft Inception Report	25 August – 2 Sept. 2018  (8 w/d)	Home base	Draft inception report containing: preliminary findings of the desk review, refined evaluation questions, data collection instruments (including questionnaire and interview questions), sampling strategy, evaluation matrix and limitations to the evaluation
Review of draft Inception Report by IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)	1 week for IEU review  6 Sept. 2018		Comments on the Inception Report to the evaluation team
Incorporation of comments from IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)	16 September 2018  (2 w/d)		Revised draft inception report
<b>Deliverable A: Final inception report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates</b>	<b>16 September 2018</b> <b>(Overall: 10 w/d for each evaluator)</b>		<b>Final inception report to be cleared by IEU</b>
Interviews with staff at UNODC HQ/FO; evaluation mission: briefing, interviews; presentation of preliminary findings	7-16 October 2018  (8 w/d)	UNODC/HQ;  ROMENA; Egypt	Presentation of preliminary findings
Drafting of the evaluation report; submission to project management for review of factual errors and to IEU for review and comments;	11 November 2018  (10 w/d)	Home base	Draft evaluation report
Review of IEU for quality assurance and Project	2 weeks for review		Comments on the draft evaluation report

Management for factual errors	25 November 2018		
Consideration of comments from the project manager and incorporation of comments from IEU (can entail various rounds of comments)	20 December 2018 (4 w/d)	Home base	Revised draft evaluation report
<b>Deliverable B: Draft evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates</b>	<b>20 December 2018</b> <b>(overall: 22 w/d per evaluator)</b>		<b>Draft evaluation report, to be cleared by IEU</b>
Briefing of Project Management to CLPs on draft evaluation report	2 weeks for review 3 January 2019		Minutes of the meeting, including potential comments of CLPs, provided by Project Management to IEU
Consideration of comments, if any, from Core Learning Partners	5 January 2019 (2 w/d)	Home base	Revised draft evaluation report
Final review by IEU; incorporation of comments and finalization of report (including proofreading, etc. by evaluation team)	7 January 2019 (1 w/d)	Home base	Revised draft evaluation report
2-page Evaluation Brief and presentation of evaluation results (to be reviewed and cleared by IEU; can entail various rounds of comments)	10 January 2019 (2 w/d)		Draft Evaluation Brief; Draft Power Point Presentation
<b>Deliverable C: Final evaluation report incl. management response (if needed); presentation of evaluation results; Evaluation Brief</b>	<b>15 January 2019</b> <b>(overall: 5 w/d per evaluator)</b>		<b>Final evaluation report; Presentation of evaluation results, Evaluation Brief - to be cleared by IEU</b>
Project Management: Finalise evaluation follow-up plan in ProFi	20 January 2019		Final evaluation follow-up plan to be cleared by IEU

Project Management: Disseminate final evaluation report	25 January 2019		Final evaluation report disseminated
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## EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation will be carried out by two independent evaluators, one International and one National (one team leader and one team member) with extensive expertise in evaluation as well as the necessary knowledge of judicial and social aspects relating to criminal justice reform.

The role of the lead evaluator

- Carry out the desk review;
- Develop the inception report, including sample size and sampling technique;
- Draft and finalize the inception report and evaluation methodology, incorporating relevant comments, in line with the guidelines and template on the IEU website <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>; to be cleared by IEU before the Field Mission;
- Carry out the field mission;
- Lead and coordinate the evaluation process and the oversee the tasks of the evaluators;
- Implement quantitative tools and analyse data;
- Triangulate data and test rival explanations;
- Ensure that all aspects of the terms of reference are fulfilled;
- Draft an evaluation report in line with UNODC evaluation policy and the guidelines and template on the IEU website <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation-step-by-step.html>; incorporate comments received by IEU; clearance IEU;
- Finalize the evaluation report on the basis of comments received; clearance IEU;
- Draft and finalise a 2-page Evaluation Brief; review and clearance by IEU
- Include a management response in the final report, if needed;
- Present the final evaluation findings and recommendations to stakeholders.

The role of the team member:

- Assist the Lead Evaluator in all stages of the evaluation process, as per the respective TOR;
- Provide substantive inputs and knowledge on criminal justice throughout all stages of the evaluation-process, including translation of relevant documents to English;
- Participate in selected missions and provide interpretation for the team leader when required;
- Provide methodological evaluation quality assurance throughout the evaluation process;
- Comment on all deliverables of the evaluation team;
- Translate the executive summary of the evaluation report (after IEU approval) in Arabic.

The evaluators will not act as representative of any party, but should use his/her independent judgment and should not have been directly involved in the design, appraisal or implementation of the project.

The evaluation team leader must have:

- Advance university degree in the area of law, criminal justice or related field as well as 10 years relevant professional experience is required, Knowledge in the fields of gender issues and violence against women is an asset;
- Extensive knowledge of, and expertise in applying, qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods;
- A strong record in designing and leading evaluations;
- Researches methodology including desk review skills;
- Necessary knowledge of judicial and social aspects relating to criminal justice reform;
- Up to date knowledge and practical experience of UN programmes, policies, guidelines and procedures is desirable.
- Excellent communication and proven drafting skills in English. knowledge of French or Arabic is an asset;

The evaluation team member must have:

- Advance university degree in the area of law, criminal justice or related field as well as 10 years relevant professional experience is required, Knowledge in the fields of gender issues and violence against women is an asset;
- Extensive knowledge of, and expertise in applying, qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods;
- A strong record in designing and leading evaluations;
- Researches methodology including desk review skills;
- Necessary knowledge of judicial and social aspects relating to criminal justice reform;
- Up to date knowledge and practical experience of UN programmes, policies, guidelines and procedures is desirable.
- Excellent communication and proven drafting skills & translation in English and Arabic

The evaluators must not have been involved in the design, implementation, supervision or coordination of and/or have benefited from the project under evaluation. The evaluators must be independent and not have any past or expected future associations with the project. The evaluators will not act as a representative of any party and must remain independent and impartial.

## Management of the Evaluation Roles and responsibilities of the Project Manager

The Project Manager is responsible for:

- managing the evaluation;
- drafting and finalizing the ToR;
- selecting Core Learning Partners (representing a balance of men, women and other marginalised groups) and informing them of their role;
- recruiting evaluators following clearance by IEU;
- providing desk review materials (including data and information on men, women and other marginalised groups) to the evaluation team including the full TOR;
- reviewing the inception report as well as the evaluation methodology;



- liaising with the Core Learning Partners;
- reviewing the draft report for factual errors;
- developing an implementation plan for the evaluation recommendations as well as follow-up action (to be updated once per year);
- disseminate the final evaluation report and facilitate the presentation of evaluation results.

The Project Manager will be in charge of **providing logistical support** to the evaluation team including arranging the field missions of the evaluation team, including but not limited to:

- All logistical arrangements for the travel of the consultants (including travel details; DSA-payments; transportation; etc.);
- All logistical arrangement for the meetings/interviews/focus groups/etc., ensuring interview partners adequately represent men, women and other marginalised groups (including translator/interpreter if needed; set-up of meetings; arrangement of ad-hoc meetings as requested by the evaluation team; transportation from/to the interview venues; scheduling sufficient time for the interviews (around 45 minutes); ensuring that members of the evaluation team and the respective interviewees are present during the interviews; etc.);
- All logistical arrangements for the presentation of the evaluation results;
- Ensure timely payment of all fees/DSA/etc. (payments for the evaluators need to be released within 5 working days after the respective deliverable is cleared by IEU).

For the field missions, the evaluation team liaises with the UNODC Regional/Field Offices and mentors as appropriate

## Roles and responsibilities of the evaluation stakeholders

Members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) are identified by the project managers. The CLPs are the main stakeholders, i.e. a limited number of those deemed as particularly relevant to be involved throughout the evaluation process, i.e. by receiving briefings by Project Management on the TOR and the evaluation questions, and the draft evaluation report, as well as facilitating the dissemination and application of the results and other follow-up action. Stakeholders include all those to be invited to participate in the interviews and surveys, including the CLPs.

## Roles and responsibilities of the Independent Evaluation Unit

The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) provides mandatory normative tools, guidelines and templates to be used in the evaluation process. Please find the respective tools on the IEU web site <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/evaluation/evaluation.html>. Furthermore, IEU provides guidance and evaluation expertise throughout the evaluation process.

IEU reviews and clears all steps and deliverables during the evaluation process: Terms of Reference; Selection of evaluator(s); Inception Report; Draft Evaluation Report; Final Evaluation Report; Evaluation Follow-up Plan.

## PAYMENT MODALITIES

The independent national evaluator(s) will be issued consultancy contracts and paid in accordance with UNODC rules and regulations. The contract is a legally binding document in which the evaluator agrees to complete the deliverables by the set deadlines. Payment is correlated to deliverables and two instalments are typically foreseen:

- The first payment (12 working days) upon clearance of the Inception Report (in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates) by IEU;
- The second payment (22 working days) upon clearance of the Draft Evaluation Report (in line with UNODC norms, standards, evaluation guidelines and templates) by IEU;
- The third and final payment (i.e. the remainder of the fee – 5 working days) only after completion of the respective tasks, receipt of the final report (in line with UNODC evaluation norms, standards, guidelines and templates) and clearance by IEU, as well as presentation of final evaluation findings and recommendations.

75 percent of the daily subsistence allowance and terminals is paid in advance before travelling. The balance is paid after the travel has taken place, upon presentation of boarding passes and the completed travel claim forms.

## ANNEX II. DESK REVIEW LIST

### *UNODC documents*

1. Q1 2016 USINL Quarterly Progress Report
2. Q2 2016 USINL Quarterly Progress Report
3. Q3 2016 USINL Quarterly Progress Report
4. Q4 2016 USINL Quarterly Progress Report
5. Q1 2017 USINL Quarterly Progress Report
6. Q2 2017 USINL Quarterly Progress Report
7. Q3 2017 USINL Quarterly Progress Report
8. Q4 2017 USINL Quarterly Progress Report
9. EGYZ33 Project Revision Document
10. EGYZ33 Old project Document Profi Before Revisions
11. EGYZ33 2015 Annual Profi Report
12. EGYZ33 2016 Annual Profi Report
13. EGYZ33 2017 Annual Profi Report
14. EGYZ33 2015 Semi Annual Profi Report
15. EGYZ33 2016 Semi Annual Profi Report
16. EGYZ33 2017 Semi Annual Profi Report
17. Updated Semi-Annual Review 2018
18. UK Annual Progress Report, August 2018
19. XAMV12 Final Workplan 2013
20. XAMV12 Workshop Recommendations
21. XAMV12 VAW Workplan 2014
22. UK Annual Progress Report (January 2017 – November 2018)
23. UNODC, Manual for Forensic Practitioners on Dealing with Survivors of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (Ar)
24. UNODC, Manual for Public Prosecutors on Combatting Violence against Women Crimes (Ar)
25. UNODC, Manual for Effective Police Response to Violence against Women Crimes (Ar)
26. Abdel Meguid, Shaimaa, UNODC Training Curriculum for Hotline Agents, National Council for Women (Ar)
27. Standard Forms, Forensic Evidence Report (Ar)
28. Standard Forms, Investigation Consent Form (Ar)
29. Force International, 2018, 'Effective Police Response to Crimes of Violence against Women, Training Of Trainers Evaluation Report'
30. Force International, 2017, 'Effective Police Response to Crimes of Violence against Women, Training Of Trainers Evaluation Report'
31. VAW Cases Study, List of Cases disaggregated by Governorate
32. VAW Cases Study Report
33. List of equipment procured (EGYZ33)
34. Forensic Medical Practitioners training (video documentation)
35. List of Training Workshops
36. UNODC Regional Programme for the Arab States (2016-2021)
37. UNODC Regional Programme for the Arab States (2016-2021) Fund Allocation by Agency.
38. UNODC, 2018. Regional Programme Project Document (XAMW59)
39. UNODC-Ministry of Justice, 2015. Memorandum of Understanding

40. UNODC-Egyptian Public Prosecution. Memorandum of Understanding for Information Database Support (EGYZ33)
41. UNODC-Egyptian Public Prosecution, 2018, Memorandum of Understanding (*new*)
42. United Nations Joint Programme: Essential Services for Women and Girls Subject to Violence, 2017 (*Draft*)

### *External documents*

1. Abul Komsan, Nehad, 2005. "Clouds in Egypt's Sky" Sexual Harassment: from Verbal Harassment to Rape: A Sociological Study.
2. Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2016. Report on Violence against Women in Egypt
3. Forensic Medical Authority, 2018. Presentation on Specialized Clinics for Violence against Women & Children.
4. National Council for Women, Key Performance Indicators for Complaints Office
5. National Council for Women, Progress Report, Complaints Office. 2016 (PPT Doc)
6. Nassif, Carol, 2016. Complaints Office Organizational Assessment Final Report, National Council for Women
7. Public Prosecution Office, 2018, 'Pre & Post-Training Evaluation Form' (Ar)
8. The National Strategy for Combating Violence against Women, First Edition, 2015.
9. UNEG, 2018. Guidance on Evaluating Institutional Gender Mainstreaming
10. UNFPA, 2015. The Egypt Economic Cost of Gender-Based Violence Survey
11. UN Women, 2011. In Pursuit of Justice: Progress of the World's Women
12. UN Women, 2013. Study on Ways and Methods to Eliminate Sexual Harassment in Egypt. Results/Outcomes and Recommendations Summary
13. United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Egypt (UNDAF 2013 – 2017)
14. United Nations Partnership Development Framework Egypt 2018 to 2022: United for a Sustainable Future
15. USAID, 2009. Egypt Violence Against Women Study: Summary of Findings Report
16. Undated Proposal for Restructuring Women's Complaints Office of the National Council for Women (Ar)

Number of external documents reviewed: 16

Overall number of documents reviewed: 41

### ANNEX III. LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED DURING THE EVALUATION

<i>Number of interviewees</i>	<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Type of stakeholder</i>	<i>Sex disaggregated data</i>	<i>Country</i>
4	Embassies	Donors	Male: 1 Female: 3	Egypt
2	Bellwether	Civil Society/Judge	Male: 1 Female: 1	Egypt
2	Ministry of Justice	National Government Counterparts	Male: 1 Female: 1	Egypt
1	Ministry of Interior		Male: 1	Egypt
4	Public Prosecutors Office		Male: 4	Egypt
3	Forensic Medical Authority		Male: 1 Female: 1	Egypt
2	National Council for Women		Female: 2	Egypt
1	CARE International		International NGOs	Female: 1
2	UNFPA	UN Agency	Female: 1	Egypt
	UN Women		Female: 1	
3	Trained Police Officers	Beneficiaries	Male: 1 Female: 2	Egypt
2	Trained Public Prosecutors		Male: 2	Egypt
7	Trained Forensic Doctors		Male: 4 Female: 4	Egypt
14	Trained Staff at Women's Complaints Office (NCW)		Male: 2 Female: 12	Egypt
1	UNODC	Management at the Country Office	Female: 1	Egypt
3	UNODC	Staff/Consultant	Male: 1 Female: 2	Egypt
	UNODC	HQ IEU	Female: 1	Vienna

Total: 52

Male: 19  
Female: 33

## ANNEX IV. EVALUATION TOOLS: QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEW GUIDES

### a) Interview guidelines

Criteria	Evaluation Questions	Interview Questions	UNODC Egypt	Senior Partners	Partners	Donors	Civil Soc.	UN Ag.	Bellwether
Design	To what extent the project has used an appropriate planning methodology that has clearly defined results and aims, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is they achievable with the planned approach and resources, following UNODC standards.	Tell us about the design of the project. What went well? In insight, would do should think it should have been done differently?	x	x	x	x		x	
Relevance	Were project's interventions clearly within stakeholders' mandate and congruent with their strategic framework, including the SDGs?	What are the strategic lines of your organisation? How does VAW fit into them?	x	x	x	x		x	
Efficiency	To what extent were the resources and inputs used appropriately and efficiently, and converted into outputs in a timely and cost-effective manner, considering also an adaptation to unexpected situations or needs?	Do you think resources have been used wisely? Anything that it could have been achieved with a little more? Any place where the project could have save resources with better planning?  Give us an assessment on the quality of the products ( about technical quality and outreach)	x		x				

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Evaluation Questions</b>	<b>Interview Questions</b>	<b>UNODC Egypt</b>	<b>Senior Partners</b>	<b>Partners</b>	<b>Donors</b>	<b>Civil Soc.</b>	<b>UN Ag.</b>	<b>Bellwether</b>
<b>Efficiency</b>	To what extent the coordination, management and administrative arrangements sufficient to ensure efficient implementation of the Project.	Tell us how decisions were taken. What worked? Anything that could have been done better?  Were there any admin bottlenecks you can identify? How were they overcome?	x	x	x	x			
<b>Impact</b>	What, if any, has been the overall impact of the Project (intended or unintended) to date, in particular in relation to key stakeholders and beneficiaries at the local level?	Help us identify changes that the project has contributed to. They can be personal (knowledge, ideological shifts, etc.); institutional (what is done differently in your organisations); political (changes in legislation, regulations, etc.)	x	x	x	x		x	x
<b>Sustainability</b>	To what extent are the project activities likely to continue after the project completion? And to what extent can they become self-sustaining technically and financially?	Any plans to remain involved in the fight against VAW after the project finishes? Tell us about it.  What support would you need to keep up the work?	x	x	x	x		x	
<b>Lessons Learnt</b>	What lessons can be learned from the project implementation in order to improve performance, results and effectiveness in the future?	Any best practices or lessons for the future? Any recommendations?	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

## B) GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE: WORLD CAFÉ FOR CHAMPIONS WORKSHOP (FMA; NCW; MOI)

### **Setting**

Create an environment, most often modeled after a café (or living rooms in houses), i.e. small round tables, block paper, colored pens, and optional “talking stick” item. There should be three/five chairs at each table (optimally). We will do two tables (log number of men/women)

### **Welcome and Introduction (10 minutes)**

The facilitator begins with a warm welcome and an introduction to the World Café process, setting the context, and putting participants at ease. Identifying two hosts.

### **Small Group Rounds (30 minutes)**

The process begins with the first of two 15 minutes rounds of conversation for the small group seated around a table. At the end of the 15 minutes, each member of the group moves to the other table. They will leave one person as the “table host” for the next round, who welcomes the next group and briefly fills them in on what happened in the previous round.

### **Questions**

Both tables will talk about a **question** specially crafted for the specific context and desired purpose of the evaluation. We want to focus on effectiveness/impact and sustainability.

### **Effectiveness /impact**

This information is about their relationship with the project. We want to know what activities they participated in and what benefits/challenges they have had and who has been involved (included gender analysis). Changes these activities have contributed to.

### **With this info we can feed into:**

What, if any, has been the overall impact of the Project (intended or unintended) to date, in particular in relation to key stakeholders and beneficiaries at the local level?

What has been the impact of the Project, in particular in relation to key stakeholders and beneficiaries at the local level?**Question:**

We will talk about what has happened: Talk about the activities you have been involved in, how they went and how they have contributed to changes. Changes could be personal (give examples) or institutional (what is done differently in your organisation?)



## **Sustainability**

We need info about the future expectations of the champions and the factors that need to be in place to ensure sustainability. With this info we will feed into the evaluation question:

To what extent has UNODC taken into consideration “sustainability” criteria while developing and revising the project document?

To what extent are the project activities likely to continue after the project completion? And to what extent can they become self-sustaining financially and technically?

### **Question:**

We will talk about the future – what needs to happen: What kind of support would you need to maintain these changes/results? Factors (internal or external to your organisation) that can help or hinder the sustainability.

### **Harvest (20)**

Hosts are invited to share insights or other results from their conversations with the rest of the large group (10 minutes each).

### **Final plenary (30 minutes)**

## ANNEX V. DETAILED PROGRESS BY OUTPUT

Outcome		Output	Planned Results	Achieved Output-level results	Comments
Outcome 1	VAW&G issues discussed in national media including the new/amended legislation.	<b>Output 1.1</b> Legislation is drafted and available for approval by all government stakeholders and for discussion in the parliament	1 law approved by the Ministry of Justice	Will not be finalized under this project (Annual report 2017)	In terms of overall capacity building efforts, UNODC trained around <b>437 criminal justice practitioners</b> , including prosecutors, police officers, forensic practitioners, NCW lawyers/social workers, and data-entry analysts at the Public Prosecutor's Office. (2017 Annual report)
		<b>Output 1.2</b> Public awareness campaigns conducted in coordination with different agencies such as NCW, the forensic authority etc, on the new concepts conveyed in draft laws on VAW&G and on existing and developed services for women subject to violence.	Public awareness campaigns on the revised VAW&G legislation implemented.	-Radio jingle (30 seconds); 5 radio scripts and 1 video infograph produced (Q42017). -16,800 shopping bags produced -Campaign was not launched due to management issues at NCW (Semi-Annual review 2018)	
Outcome 2	The Egyptian government establishes a functioning integrated coordination mechanism among criminal justice actors established and functioning	<b>Output 2.1</b> Capacities of MoJ, Prosecutor General Office and Mol to coordinate criminal justice actors' responses to VAW&G supported.	Recommendations on design, structure and purpose of the coordination unit produced through conducting 2 workshops with the relevant agencies Support to 5 coordination meetings	Will not be implemented under this project	UNODC is still in discussions regarding the establishment of an integrated coordination mechanism

	Outcome	Output	Planned Results	Achieved Output-level results	Comments
Outcome 3	Law enforcement authorities, in particular first responders and investigators, empowered and equipped to respond promptly and effectively to incidents of VAW&G.	<b>Output 3.1</b> Law enforcement officers VAW unit supervision are capable of providing professional gender sensitive response to VAW victims in line with produced training manual.	Train 25 Officers from Human rights Department/VAW unit on gender-sensitive VAW response	125 law enforcement officers received basic training , during 8 workshops. (Annual Profi Report 2017)	USINL donor decision was taken to cancel ToT for Moi due to consistent delays and cancellations of planned training events.  The UK Embassy Consular Fund financed the additional basic trainings for Police Officers
			10 officers receive ToT and are capable of delivering training using manual and tools developed	15 law enforcement officers received the ToT (May 2018)	
		<b>Output 3.2:</b> Establishment of professional reporting and recording mechanisms supported at 3 police stations ensuring the safety and confidentiality of the victims	200 Police officers trained on reporting VAW&G cases	Will not be implemented under this project	The database system of the PPO will be implemented as well in the different police stations. This is being negotiated between the PPO & MOI. (2018 Semi Annual review)
			3 Police stations refurbished	Will not be implemented under this project	
Outcome 4	The MOI's VAW unit has a clear and identified purpose and has the capacity to fulfil that role.	<b>Output 4.1</b> The MOI VAW Unit has the necessary tools and training to improve case documentation and management.	1 Software developed and provided to the VAW unit	Will not be implemented under this project	Outcome removed in the project revision dated 07.04.2016 in agreement with US/INL.
			20 unit staff trained on software functions and how to use in accordance with policies.	Will not be implemented under this project	
		<b>Output 4.2</b> The MOI VAW unit supported in developing a VAW&G Prevention	15 educational visits undertaken.	Will not be implemented under this project	
			Prevention strategy elaborated	Will not be implemented under this project	

		Strategy and implementation is piloted in the 3 SC areas	8 working group meetings held	Will not be implemented under this project	
<b>Outcome 5</b>	<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Output</b>	<b>Planned Results</b>		<b>Comments</b>
	Medical practitioners' responses to victims of VAW&G improved.	<b>Output 5.1</b> Capacities of forensic practitioners enhanced to deliver high-quality evidence examination	25 Medical practitioners (m/f) trained.	50 forensic practitioners trained (May, Nov 2016) 6 female doctors went on Study Tour to St Mary's Sexual Assault and Referral Centre in Manchester (UK) in March 2016 15 doctors received ToT by end of 2017	Specialized clinics within FMA were established and equipped in Cairo, Alexandria, and Mansoura.  UNODC assessment of the received services will be implemented under the UNPDF joint programme" (Semi Annual review 2018)
<b>Outcome 6</b>	Enhanced efficiency of the judiciary in dealing with crimes of VAW&G through targeted trainings	<b>Output 6.1</b> Gaps and challenges faced by prosecutors and judges identified and addressed to enhance judicial capacities to effectively manage cases of VAW&G.	1 set of recommendations for addressing identified gaps and challenges produced.	Research study on VAW cases was finalized (Q2 Report 2017)	
		<b>Output 6.2</b> Prosecutors and judges capable of providing professional gender sensitive responses to women victims of violence in Egypt in gender in accordance with the produced training manual.	110 prosecutors (m/f) trained on gender sensitive response to female victims of violence		Exceeds planned, yet qualitative data is needed to ascertain and document quality and efficacy of those efforts.
		<b>Output 6.3</b> Victim friendly court environments are in place in three existing criminal courts	3 Court rooms refurbished to enhance protection of victims. 80 psychologists (m/f) trained on follow-up on VAW cases.	Will not be implemented under his project	Both activities removed in the project revision dated 07.04.2016 in agreement with US/INL. Yet reported on in 2018 Semi-Annual review stating "This activity will be implemented with sister UN agencies involved under the UNDPF joint programme."

	Outcome	Output	Planned Results	Achieved Output-level results	Comments
Outcome 7	Comprehensive data is available to ensure tailored and evidence-based interventions	<b>Output 7.1</b> Cases management system for VAW&G cases established at the Prosecution Office to monitor how cases of VAW&G are being dealt with at each level of the judicial procedure	Case management system piloted in 15 additional prosecution offices (east and central Cairo).	- IT equipment to establish the case management database in 15 offices in Cairo delivered to PG Office (Q4 2017) -10 data entry specialists trained over the course of 1 month on analytical reporting (3 days/week)	
		<b>Output 7.2</b> The National Council for Women Ombudsman Offices capacity is enhanced to better receive, analyse and monitor cases on VAW across Egypt	Call centre availability extended to 24/7	- Equipment delivered to NCW (3 laptops, 3 smartphones, a call manager, 2 servers with necessary ACs in their allocated server room) (Q3 2017 Report) - UNODC IT updated Call centre software (Q4 Report 2017)	
			13 Call Centre agents trained	-60 lawyers and social workers at the Ombudsman Offices in different governorates trained. (Sep.2016) -A Victim's Advocate Training Manual for Complaints' Office completed (Q3 2017 Report) -Training delivered for agents on how to answer calls and deal with complainants	

## ANNEX VI. DETAILED BUDGET (PLANNED VERSUS SPENT)

Outcome 1: VAW&G issues discussed in national media including the new/amended legislation	Planned (USD)	Expenditure (USD)	Discrepancy (USD)	Source (Donor)	Comments/ Explanations for Discrepancy
<b>Output 1.1</b> Legislation is drafted and available for approval by all government stakeholders and for discussion in the parliament.	14,700			USINL (XAMV12)	No expenditures under this output as legislation was stalled. NCW is handling directly with other entities.
<b>Output 1.2</b> Public awareness campaigns conducted in coordination with different agencies such as NCW, the forensic authority etc., on the new concepts conveyed in draft laws on 2018VAW&G and on existing and developed services for women subject to violence.	431,232	157,833.00	273,399.00	USINL	Expenditures covered the NCW campaign production elements including radio jingle, video production Shopping bags. Campaign messaging was planned for the legislative amendments, redirected later to promote the hotline. UNODC could not consider covering launch as hotline was not yet ready. Additionally, the donor pressure to re-allocate unspent amounts was another factor here.
<b>Subtotal Outcome 1</b>	<b>431,232</b>	<b>157,833</b>	<b>273,399</b>		Discrepancy covered part of the Staffing costs which exceeded the planned in the original project document due to the no-cost extension from Dec 2016 to Dec. 2017 ( <i>This explanation contradicts Staffing cost actuals stated below as expenditures are lower than forecasted</i> )
Outcome 2: The Egyptian government establishes an integrated coordination mechanism among criminal justice actors established & functioning.	Planned (USD)	Expenditure (USD)	Discrepancy (USD)	Source (Donor)	Comments/ Explanations for Discrepancy
<b>Output 2.1</b> Capacities of MoJ, Prosecutor General Office and Mol to coordinate criminal justice actors' responses to VAW&G supported.	98,008	0	98,008	USINL	Challenges encountered in implementing the coordination mechanism stalled the activities here. Total was reallocated to NCW campaign to cover outstanding costs of production. An amount was also re-allocated to FMA equipment
<b>Subtotal Outcome 2</b>	<b>98,008</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>98,008</b>		
Outcome 3: Law enforcement authorities, in particular first responders and investigators, empowered and equipped to respond promptly and effectively to incidents of VAW&G.	Planned (USD)	Expenditure (USD)	Discrepancy (USD)	Source (Donor)	Comments/ Explanations for Discrepancy
<b>Output 3.1</b> Law enforcement officers capable of providing professional gender sensitive response to women victims of violence in Egypt in accordance with produced manuals.	176,413	148,446	27,967	UK Embassy + USINL	Of the re-allocated budget, USD 13K financed the NCW server equipment. The rest of the re-allocated budget not traceable.

<b>Output 3.2</b> Establishment of professional reporting and recording mechanisms supported at three police stations in the pilot areas and in two directorates in the governorate of Cairo and Giza ensuring the safety and confidentiality of the victims and increased awareness and confidence of women and girls to report incidents of VAW &G.	196,014	0	196,014	USINL	All planned amount re-allocated across the different activities.
<b>Subtotal Outcome 3</b>	<b>372,427</b>	<b>148,446</b>	<b>223,981</b>		
<b>Outcome 4: The MOI's VAW unit has a clear and identified purpose and fulfills that role.</b>	<b>Planned (USD)</b>	<b>Expenditure (USD)</b>	<b>Discrepancy (USD)</b>	<b>Source (Donor)</b>	<b>Comments/ Explanations for Discrepancy</b>
<b>Output 4.1</b> The MOI VAW Unit has the necessary tools and training to improve case documentation and management.	156,800	0	156,800	USINL	Outcome 4 budget was re-allocated in total during the project revision that took place around June 2017. Profi reports remained the same as any changes would have necessitated new approvals from national counterparts and a lengthy complex process.
<b>Output 4.2</b> The MOI VAW unit supported in developing a VAW&G Prevention Strategy and implementation is piloted in the three areas where this project is operating	176,400	0	176,400		
<b>Subtotal Outcome 4</b>	<b>333,200</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>333,200</b>		Reallocated in total to cover other activities. No specific decisions are taken at the time of re-allocation on which activities in particular

Outcome 5: Practitioners assigned to the Forensic Medicine Authority (FMA) have the skills and enhanced to deliver high quality evidence	Planned	Expenditure	Discrepancy	Source	Comments/ Explanations for Discrepancy
Outcome 6: The judiciary deals more efficiently with crimes of VAW&G through targeted trainings and specialized courts.	Planned (USD)	Expenditure (USD)	Discrepancy (USD)	Source (Donor)	Comments/ Explanations for Discrepancy
enhanced to deliver high quality evidence and judges identified and addressed to enhance judicial capacities to effectively manage cases of VAW &G.	156,820	550,203	-393,383	USINL	channeled to FMA as a result of cancellation of many activities
<b>Sub-Total Outcome 5</b>	<b>14,400</b>	<b>1,500</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>(XAMV12)</b>	Budget allocated for this output was USD14,400 from XAMV12 project not EGYZ33.
<b>Output 6.2</b> Prosecutors and judges capable of providing professional gender sensitive responses to women victims of violence in Egypt in gender in accordance with the produced training manual	156,820	550,203	-393,383		The re-allocation from cancelled activities financed the additional equipment procured to FMA to cover Cairo, Alexandria and Mansoura Clinics.
	156,811	204,821	-48,010	USINL	Discrepancy reflects the additional allocations that were channeled to PPO Trainings

Output 6.3: Victim friendly court environments are in place in three existing criminal courts to avoid secondary victimization and provide victim and witness protection during investigations and trials of VAW&G	78,406	0	78,406	USINL	Amount unspent as no approvals received to work in courts. Amount re-allocated to other activities
<b>Subtotal Outcome 6</b>	<b>235,217</b>	<b>204,821</b>	<b>30,396</b>		The unspent amount re-allocated across other activities

Outcome 7: Comprehensive data is available to the MOJ to ensure tailored and evidence-based interventions	Planned (USD)	Expenditure (USD)	Discrepancy (USD)	Source (Donor)	Comments/ Explanations for Discrepancy
<b>Output 7.1</b> Cases management system for VAW &G cases established at the Prosecution Office to monitor how cases of VAW&G are being dealt with at each level of the judicial procedure	176,427	412,535	-236,108	USINL	
<b>Output 7.2</b> The National Council for Women Ombudsman Offices capacity is enhanced to better receive, analyse and monitor cases on VAW across Egypt	156,816	96,491	60,325		
<b>Subtotal outcome 7</b>	<b>333,243</b>	<b>509,026</b>	<b>-175,783</b>		Discrepancy reflects the additional allocations made to PPO Database financed by cancellation of Mol and coordination unit activities.

<b>Total Activities</b>	<b>1,960,147</b>	<b>1,570,329</b>	<b>389,818</b>	USINL + UK Embassy	Apart from total expenditures per outcome, the below numbers could not be estimated with accuracy from the system or from project documents. Hence, the total planned (USD 2.6M) is far from the grant amount on which plans were based (USD 2.3M)
<b>Personnel Costs</b>	<b>241,200</b>	<b>224,185</b>	<b>17,015</b>		
<b>Evaluation</b>	<b>30,000</b>	<b>33,000</b>	<b>-3,000</b>		
<b>NET PROJECT TOTAL</b>	<b>2,231,347</b>	<b>1,827,514</b>	<b>403,833</b>		
<b>Cost Centre (FCR)</b>	<b>132,916</b>	<b>137,068</b>	<b>-4,152</b>		
<b>Programme Support Cost (PSC)</b>	<b>279,082</b>	<b>244,950</b>	<b>34,132</b>		
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>2,643,345</b>	<b>2,209,532</b>	<b>433,813</b>		The numbers stated here reflect estimates as 2018 FCR expenditures were not traceable on the system. Current expenditures were manually extracted from UMOJA for summation for years 2016 and 2017 and 2015 numbers were obtained from the old Profi system



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USINL FUND 2,204,082 UK Fund 121,850					*PSC are costs charged by HQ from each project. It is calculated as 13% of Net Project Total expenditures + FCR.
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