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## **JOINT FINAL INDEPENDENT PROJECT EVALUATION**

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**Project: “Supporting the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalisation to Violence in Prisons”**

**UNOCT Project No: 22824-005 UNOCT Global Programme on PRR**

**UNODC Project No: GLOZ85 UNODC Project “Supporting the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalisation to Violence in Prisons”**

**November 2024**

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## ACRONYMS

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
CTED	United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EMG	Evaluation Management Group
EQ	Evaluation Questions
ESC	Evaluation Steering Committee
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
FTFs	Foreign Terrorist Fighters
GCTS	United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
ICT	Information, Communication, and Technology
ISCAP	Islamic State's Central Africa Province
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
IWG	Interagency Working Group
KII	Key informant Interview
Kostanay Academy	Kostanay Training Academy
LNOB	Leaving no One Behind
LSI-R	Levels of Supervision Inventory – Revised
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning
Mol	Ministry of Interior
MoU	Memorandums of Understanding
MS	Member States
NCOs	Non-Commissioned Officers
NMRs	Nelson Mandela Rules

PATS	Prison Academy and Training School
PCVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
PCVET	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism
Prodoc	Project Document
PVE	Prevention of Violent Extremism
RBM	Results-Based Management
RNA	Risk and Needs Assessment
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
TOR	Terms of Reference
ToT	Training of Training
UNCCT	United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism)
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNOCT	United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UPS	Uganda Prisons Service
US	United States
VEP	Violent Extremist Prisoner
WG	Working Group

## MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

**Evaluation Recommendation #1: All technical assistance inputs (e.g., processes, tools, policies, training materials) must be developed to be context specific and fit for purpose (e.g. accounting for national practice, regulation and resources).**

Accepted? Yes	Rationale (if Partially or Not): N/A		
Priority	Timeframe	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
High	Long-term	January 2025 ongoing	Implementing agencies' project teams
Key Actions			
1.1 Ensure technical assistance inputs are peer reviewed			
1.2 Ensure technical assistance inputs are consulted with relevant national stakeholders			

**Evaluation Recommendation #2: Projects related to violent extremism should ensure that there is a shared conceptual clarity with all levels of the national authorities and partner agencies.**

Accepted? Yes	Rationale (if Partially or No): N/A		
Priority	Timeframe	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
High	Long-term	January 2025 ongoing	Implementing agencies' HQ and project teams
Key Actions			
2.1 Conduct briefings with relevant national stakeholders at the commencement of new projects			
2.2 Establish working groups with representation by relevant national stakeholders to provide updates throughout new projects			

**Evaluation Recommendation #3: Human resource planning, timely recruitment, and efficient procurement should be applied to contribute to positive outcome, and reduce the likelihood of harm to the project progress, as well as implementing agency and donor reputations.**

Accepted? Yes	Rationale (if Partially or Not): N/A		
Priority	Timeframe	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
High	Long-term	January 2025 ongoing	Implementing agencies' project teams
Key Actions			
3.1 Conduct regular reviews of human resource gaps and needs during the implementation of new projects			

**Evaluation Recommendation #4: In projects with predetermined broad thematic areas, prioritisation, approaches and activities in those thematic areas must be influenced to the greatest extent possible by national authorities.**

Accepted? Yes	Rationale (if Partially or Not): N/A		
Priority	Timeframe	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
High	Long-term	January 2025 ongoing	Implementing agencies' HQ and project teams
Key Actions			
4.1 Conduct needs assessments at the beginning of all new projects			
4.2 Engage regularly with national authorities to understand emerging gaps and needs, and, where possible, adjust project focus and activities to meet these gaps and needs			

**Evaluation Recommendation #5: Project design and implementation documentation should include theories of change appropriate to different conceptual levels (e.g., impact level, outcome level, activity - such as training), and where technical assistance is planned the empirical evidence-based literature supporting programme approach and anticipated outcomes should be visible and linked to SMART indicators and a MEL system for data capture.**

Accepted? Yes	Rationale (if Partially or Not): N/A		
Priority	Timeframe	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
High	Long-term	January 2025 ongoing	Implementing agencies' HQ and project teams
Key Actions			
5.1 Ensure future projects include appropriate resourcing for M&E support			
5.2 Establish an M&E Plan for all new projects			

**Evaluation Recommendation #6: With training forming a lynchpin of this and many other projects, it is crucial that it should be designed and measured in accordance with criminal justice training best practice and that program planners should be supported to achieve this.**

Accepted? Yes	Rationale (if Partially or Not): N/A		
Priority	Timeframe	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
High	Long-term	January 2025 ongoing	Implementing agencies' project teams
Key Actions			
6.1 When designing future criminal justice training ensure alignment with best practice			

**Evaluation Recommendation #7: Flexible, adaptive and responsive programme management rests on a high quality MEL system grounded on SMART indicator data.**

Accepted? Yes	Rationale (if Partially or Not): N/A		
Priority	Timeframe	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual

High	Long-term	January 2025 ongoing	Implementing agencies' project teams
Key Actions			
7.1 Establish a results database for all new projects			

<b>Evaluation Recommendation #8: Within the framework of a joint implementation modality, well-coordinated projects can lead to sustained collaboration and joint efforts for scale-up.</b>			
Accepted? Yes	Rationale (if Partially or Not): N/A		
Priority	Timeframe	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
High	Long-term	January 2025 ongoing	Implementing agencies' project teams
Key Actions			
8.1 Develop a joint work plan at the outset of all new joint projects outlining the respective roles and responsibilities of each implementing agency			

<b>Evaluation Recommendation #9: As countries are sometimes prone to political turbulence, changes in cabinets or legislation, projects should be ready to adjust their work plans to the changed context quickly and effectively.</b>			
Accepted? Yes	Rationale (if Partially or Not): N/A		
Priority	Timeframe	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
High	Long-term	January 2025 ongoing	Implementing agencies' HQ and project teams
Key Actions			
9.1 As new risks, gaps and needs emerge, propose updates to the joint work plan, for confirmation by national authorities and donors			

<b>Evaluation Recommendation #10: To effectively promote cross-cutting issues, projects should design and implement targeted strategies for the integration of human rights, gender equality, and LNOB principals into projects.</b>			
Accepted? Yes	Rationale (if Partially or Not): N/A		
Priority	Timeframe	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
Medium	Long-term	January 2025 ongoing	Implementing agencies' HQ and project teams
Key Actions			
10.1 Conduct context specific human rights impact and opportunity assessment and gender analysis at the conception of the project/programme			
10.2 Develop measurable indicators on human rights, gender and LNOB, that would support integration of these considerations in MEL			



10.3 Consult with the Human Rights and Gender Section at early stages, in the design phase

**Evaluation Recommendation #11: Highlighting national benchmarks and guidance on HR, LNOB and gender provides additional traction to advocacy using international standards and good practice.**

Accepted? Yes	Rationale (if Partially or Not): N/A		
Priority	Timeframe	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
Medium	Long-term	January 2025 ongoing	Implementing agencies' HQ and project teams
Key Actions			
11.1 Consider national benchmarks, standards and guidance when conducting context specific human rights impact and opportunity assessment and gender analysis at the conception of the project/programme			
11.2 When engaging with national authorities on human rights, gender and LNOB considerations, refer to national standards as well as introduce relevant international norms and standards			

**Evaluation Recommendation #12: Customs and norms related to gender at a national and even a local level can have a very specific influence on programming and activities involving women. A full analysis on the specific gender legislation and customs must be undertaken.**

Accepted? Yes	Rationale (if Partially or Not): N/A		
Priority	Timeframe	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
Medium	Long-term	January 2025 ongoing	Implementing agencies' HQ (specifically human rights and gender sections/units) and project teams
Key Actions			
12.1. Conduct gendered context analysis or full-fledged gender analysis at the conception of the project/programme			
12.2 Conduct consultations with women-led CSOs and/or women in communities to inform intervention logic and monitoring of the project			

**Evaluation Recommendation #13: To effectively implement strategies aimed at promoting human rights, gender equality, and LNOB considerations, it is crucial that the project teams and beneficiary Member States have the necessary capacity.**

Accepted? Yes	Rationale (if Partially or Not): N/A		
Priority	Timeframe	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
Medium	Long-term	January 2025 ongoing	Implementing agencies' HQ and project teams

Key Actions
13.1 Ensure future projects include appropriate resourcing for human rights and gender expertise
13.2. Ensure that capacity building delivered to MS incorporates human rights, gender equality and LNOB considerations

<b>Evaluation Recommendation #14: Where CSOs are involved in programmes which are at the nexus of security and social welfare, IAs should mitigate any potential negative response to CSOs from government.</b>			
Accepted? Yes	Rationale (if Partially or Not): N/A		
Priority	Timeframe	Target Implementation Date	Responsible Individual
Medium	Long-term	January 2025 ongoing	Implementing agencies' HQ and project teams
Key Actions			
14.1 In engagements with national authorities regarding new projects, raise awareness on the role of CSOs in this field and possible unintended impact of CT/PCVE measures on civic space and CSO activities			
14.2 Based on local context and potential risks for CSOs, take necessary measures to support the safe engagement of CSOs in the project/programme			

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES

In December 2017, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), through its United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT), launched a new project titled, *“Supporting the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalisation to Violence in Prisons”* (the project). It aimed to increase the capacity of selected member states to effectively manage violent extremist prisoners (VEPs) and to prevent radicalisation to violence in their prison systems. Upon approval of the project and its design, the selection of beneficiary member states (MSs) commenced. Kazakhstan and Tunisia were first selected with their work plans endorsed by their national prison authorities in March 2019 and July 2020, respectively. Uganda was selected last, with its work plan formally approved in January 2020. Initially, the project was planned to run for four years, through December 2021. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was extended at no cost until December 2022.

The project intended to support these MS in managing VEPs and preventing radicalization to violence in prisons by enhancing: i) Safety and security mechanisms and capacities in the pilot prisons; ii) Systems and skills in prison administration to assess risks and needs of VEPs; iii) Pre-release prison-based disengagement and rehabilitation programs, and iv) Post-release social reintegration services. For this purpose, pilot prisons housing VEPs were identified: eight pilot prisons (one female and seven male) in Kazakhstan; three in Tunisia (all male), and six (one female and five male) in Uganda. The project was centred on the premise that VEP-related challenges must be addressed in compliance with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules).

The project implemented a range of different activities, including capacity building (creation and delivery of new training courses on VEP management for prison staff, organisation of workshops for the prison training institutions, and knowledge exchange); development and piloting of security audits as well as risk and needs assessment tools; disengagement interventions for VEPs, and procurement of equipment for workshops in pilot prisons as well as audio-visual appliances for training institutions and prison agencies. The scope of these activities in each beneficiary member state is discussed in the Effectiveness Section (the main body of the report). The project was implemented in collaboration with the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). The project's overall budget amounted to USD 7.25 million with the funding provided by the European Union (EU) (USD 4.55 million), the Government of the Netherlands (USD 1.39 million), and UNOCT/UNCCT (as a steward of contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Counter-Terrorism) (USD 1.31 million).

## EVALUATION PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

This independent final evaluation was jointly commissioned by UNOCT/UNCCT and UNODC. The joint evaluation was conducted to assess the project in terms of its relevance, effectiveness, sustainability, and alignment with human rights/gender equality/disability inclusion/Leaving No One Behind (LNOB) principles. In addition, lessons learned were developed from the evaluation findings to inform the design and implementation of future UNODC and UNOCT/UNCCT projects in this field. The evaluation findings will contribute to the evidence base regarding the effective management of VEPs. The evaluation encompassed all phases of the project's lifecycle, including its planning, design, and implementation. It covered the entire five-year project duration from its inception in December 2017 to its end in December 2022. Activities implemented in all three beneficiary member states – Kazakhstan, Tunisia, and Uganda – were assessed.

The evaluation team (ET) used a mixed-methods approach to employ a variety of data collection and analysis methods to address the evaluation questions. A mixed-methods approach allowed the ET to triangulate data in order to gain a holistic understanding of the project and use this information to assess all four evaluation criteria. The data collection methods included: a desk review of internal and external documents; semi-structured interviews with key informants (in-person and remote); focus-group discussions (FGDs), and site visits to the pilot prisons and training institutions. The ET travelled to Kazakhstan and Uganda to collect data. The ET did not visit Tunisia as the clearance to interview government counterparts and visit pilot prisons was not received from the Tunisian authorities in time.

A desk review of a large number of project documents, reports, and products was undertaken, together with additional documentation gathered during the data collection phase. In total, 130 documents were examined. The ET also interviewed 55 people, including 25 women and 30 men, who represented implementing agencies, donors, beneficiaries (national prison services and training academies), partners (CSOs), and international/local consultants. In addition, the ET conducted three FGDs: one in Kazakhstan and two in Uganda, participated by a total of 25 people, including nine women and 16 men. FGDs were organised with the beneficiary training institutions (Kostanay Training Academy in Kazakhstan and the Prison Academy and Training School [PATS] in Uganda) as well as the Ugandan Prison Service (UPS), a beneficiary prison agency in Uganda. To physically observe the use of instruments supported by the project, the ET paid visits to two prisons in Kazakhstan (one female and one male) and one male prison in Uganda. The total number of participants in interviews, FGDs, and prison visits was **93 individuals, including 39 women and 54 men.**

Primarily, the evaluation findings will be important for the implementing agencies (UNODC and UNOCT/UNCCT), and the associated partner (CTED). Secondly, the project donors (EU and the Government of the Netherlands) will also be the key users of evaluation results to inform their future decisions. Thirdly, national counterparts (prison authorities, police, and Ministries of Justice), training academies, and CSOs will also benefit from this evaluation.

## **MAIN FINDINGS PER EVALUATION CRITERIA**

**Relevance:** The project was aligned with the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) and particularly, its Fifth Review, the latest review available during the project design. The project was also closely linked with the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, the UN Security Council Resolution 2396, and the Nelson Mandela Rules (NMRs).

The evaluation found that the project was relevant to the national context and policy priorities of the three beneficiary member states, aligning with their PCVE strategies. The project was also pertinent to the needs of prison services in terms of increasing the capacity of prison staff to manage VEPs. The number of prisoners convicted of terrorism-related crimes was on the rise in the three member states, but there was a gap in the capacity of prison services to effectively manage them. Prison administrations were interested in learning international tools and practices in the good management of VEPs. In response, the project supported new training modules and capacity-building events on VEPs management. The project design also offered an integrated approach to managing VEPs through four areas of interventions – security audit, risk and needs assessment (RNA), prison-based rehabilitation, and post-release services. The evaluation findings show that the prison authorities in Kazakhstan found the project-supported RNA tools, security audits, and in-prison rehabilitation programs pertinent to their needs. In Uganda, the RNA tool developed with the support of the project was relevant to the interests of the prison service.

Despite these positive findings, there were also some limitations to relevance observed. The evaluation found that the project was skewed more toward producing general penal reform effects, rather than targeting management of VEPs. Specifically, RNA tools, security audits, and prison-based rehabilitation activities targeted the general prison population, including VEPs. Project investments in improving the general prison system would potentially have a multiplier effect and contribute to the prevention of the dissemination of terrorist ideologies and radicalisation to violence among prisoners. However, there were convincing reasons to target resources and activities specifically on VEPs to reduce the threats they pose.

Moreover, as the project architecture was designed before the selection of beneficiary member states, some output and outcome indicators were overly ambitious and thus, became unattainable. Further, these indicators tended to reflect the project delivery objectives over substantive outcomes. This directed the project to predominantly focus on activities, frequently losing sight of the larger purpose, and failing to gauge changes. In addition, the monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) system was not managed effectively, which significantly attenuated its capacity to demonstrate effectiveness at the outcome (as opposed to activity) level. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, prison authorities, particularly in Tunisia, were often reluctant to share data related to the implementation of the project-supported tools (e.g., security audits). This also impeded the project's ability to receive updated data on the performance indicators.

In addition, the evaluation found the project could have been more flexible in Tunisia to better adapt to the changed political context there. Moreover, the development of the project architecture before the selection of beneficiary member states limited the options for the national authorities to fully engage in the project design to prioritise and sequence the proposed approaches.

Finally, the joint implementation modality changed over time, when UNODC took a more significant role in project implementation towards the end of the project. Furthermore, the ET received overwhelming feedback during the data collection that the UNODC played a central role in the project implementation, using its, or establishing, field presence in the beneficiary member states and previous experience in prison management and criminal justice reform while UNOCT brought its specialized knowledge and resources to the project.

**Effectiveness:** The extent to which the project achieved its intended outputs, outcomes, and objectives was mixed. Out of the three beneficiary member states, Kazakhstan achieved a good record of progress across all four outputs: security audits (i), RNA tools (ii), pre-release rehabilitation programs (iii), and post-release services (iv). In Uganda, there was some good progress across the first two outputs, and additionally, there was good progress on enabling reform measures, though very limited progress against the final two outputs. Given that this was notionally a five-year program, the effective implementation period in Uganda, accounting for a slow start, disruptive COVID-19 restrictions, and funding issues, was no more than 18 months. This hindered the project's full delivery there. In Tunisia, in the absence of engagement from authorities with the ET, it is hard to verify the level of progress, but information during the desk review and interviews with KIIs shows that considerable effort was evident in implementing good practices recommendations. Overall, there were potentially effective developments that provide a platform for reaching the intended results if funding is secured in the future. Key areas where improvements could be achieved are described in the Recommendations section.

Three overarching factors contributed to the difficulty in demonstrating results. First, the project's limited MEL system did not support the collection of evidence of change. Many indicators, for example, simply recorded programme delivery activities or other types of outputs rather than outcomes. Second, the project-as-funded was intended to address VEPs in prison and ultimately strengthen societal resilience against violent extremism and radicalisation to violence. Yet the three country work plans designed many key objectives of a general criminal justice reform character, which meant direct effects upon VEPs and the wider goal of societal resilience to violent extremism (the intended objectives) were set further back time-wise. Third, the three beneficiary member states were very different, and different effects were achieved in each, making any overall conclusion on effectiveness relative to intentions difficult to draw. Differences between beneficiary countries were associated with programming time or access, counterparts' capacity to engage simultaneously in four thematic areas, and the overall capacity of the prison systems to support and absorb change.

Finally, it should be noted that UNOCT/UNCCT, decided not to approve the request for a second no-cost extension for the project. This was due to the UNOCT's senior management's decision (UNOCT Program Review Board) to realign unspent project funds to other initiatives and projects exclusively focusing on VEPs rehabilitation. This shortened the project timeline and meant a number of activities were not implemented, which, on balance, impacted the achievement of further results.

**Sustainability:** The sustainability of the project benefits varies among the member states due to differences in the launch dates, the level of government ownership, the progress of piloting instruments, and the government absorption capacity for change. There were stronger indications of sustainability in Kazakhstan. The VEP management courses were integrated into the national curriculum. The Center for Training of Prison Officers in the PCVE at Kostanay Training Academy (Kostanay Academy) created with the support of the project continues to function at the time of writing and is now fully funded by the Academy. All eight pilot prisons institutionalised the RNA tool. The Ministry of Internal Affairs decided to implement the psychology-related component of the RNA tool in all prisons of Kazakhstan. The project also built strong local ownership there. The sustainability of the project deliverables is less evident in Uganda, except for the training modules introduced at the PATS. Late selection of the country, COVID-19, and early termination of the project were the key factors that impeded sustainability there. The sustainability of project benefits in Tunisia was not able to be measured due to the ET not having the possibility within the agreed timeframe to verify the implementation of the project-supported instruments and their ongoing use.

**Human rights, gender equality, disability inclusion, and LNOB:** Promotion of human rights and specifically, NMRs in managing VEPs was central to the project design and implementation. The project supported NMRs through training modules introduced in Kostanay Academy and PATS, capacity-building events, and the UNODC online course on NMRs. As a result, a large number of prison staff in the three member states raised their awareness of NMRs. The RNA tools also supported the NMRs and provided the prison

staff in Kazakhstan with a more integrated approach to addressing the needs of prisoners, including their medical and mental health concerns, delivered in a gender-sensitive manner in women prisons, such as including questions on pregnancy. However, specific indicators to measure the project's impact on the enjoyment of human rights by VEPs or improvements in the behaviour of prison staff in treating VEPs were missing in the project design. This shortcoming limited the in-prison MEL system, and MS cautious handling and sharing of data related to VEPs hindered the ET from assessing the extent of changes with respect to NMRs.

The project encouraged the participation of female prison officers in capacity-building events to enhance their knowledge and skills. As a result, a relatively high percentage of female prison officers (slightly over 30% in Kazakhstan and Uganda) took part in the workshops. This is a good accomplishment in a male-dominated prison sector. Gender perspectives were designed to be mainstreamed into other interventions; however, their results varied among the three beneficiary member states. Kazakhstan achieved more institutional changes by establishing gender-responsive training courses, RNA tools, and in-prison rehabilitation programs. In Uganda, the project supported compulsory training modules at the PATS that included gender considerations to sensitise recruits., This was achieved by integrating the Bangkok Rules and gender-responsive approaches to address the healthcare needs of female prisoners, including pregnant women and women with children, into the Human Rights module. In Tunisia, the project did not appear to have made significant progress, except for raising awareness of female prison staff.

With respect to LNOB principles, these were promoted through training modules (e.g., in Uganda, for example, a Human Rights module at PATS extensively covered vulnerable prisoners such as prisoners with disabilities). Besides, the RNA tool in Kazakhstan incorporated LNOB values. It integrated questions to assess the physical and mental health needs of prisoners, allowing prison officers to take appropriate actions.

## LESSONS LEARNED

The ET identified 11 lessons learned as follows:

1. **Progress towards effective management of VEPs and prevention of radicalisation to violence in prisons is viable.** Projects that benefit from comparable MS experience, where human rights compliance and gender responsive sensitive approaches are integral, with an appropriate range of targeted interventions, implemented in a timely fashion, through high-quality relationships with MS, leveraging non-state stakeholders and using a broad cohort of suitably qualified and experienced experts, can lead to significant and positive change in the management and treatment of VEPs.
2. **Alignment of project and policy frameworks:** Operational and procedural changes with adaptations in staff practice in a prison system are much more likely to deliver progress and planned change when there is conceptual clarity and directives issued at a policy level of the national partners. This is particularly so in a project like this with complex, evolving, and sometimes contentious issues within the PCVE continuum and where government strategy and policy documentation are still in draft.
3. **Continuity of human resources:** When dealing with complex and sensitive programming areas that are viewed as national security issues by the authorities, implementing agencies benefit from project team stability, timely appointments and retention of staff, to enable the establishment of trusting professional relationships. Where this was evident in the project, it was seen as a contribution to positive progress and where absent was cited as a contributory factor to limited project progress.
4. **Technical assistance inputs:** Where inputs such as proposed tools or techniques are provided by the project, the greater extent to which national authorities and national experts contribute to their development, adaptation, testing, and application is of positive consequence to their final integration and the quality of their use within a system. This is even more essential in the PCVE sector where the emergence of VE needs PCVE responses that directly address the contextual push and pull factors and do not rely on blue-print PCVE lessons from contexts where relevance and comparability to the MS are limited.
5. **Procurement:** When procurement processes are delayed and there is no clear explanation to national authorities, it undermines trust and harms levels of cooperation. In the project where it

was timely and focused and filled very specific gaps, it was shown to support and catalyse positive reform.

6. **Equally relevant does not correspond to equally important:** Issues that are clearly relevant because they correspond to the government-documented strategies or are identified as areas of need, simply because prison systems have multiple and complex needs, do not always mean equally shared priorities between all project stakeholders. In this project, issues that were legitimately deemed relevant did not always have equal weighting or importance for the authorities. The development of country work plans assisted in prioritization at the commencement of the project to reflect this and was a positive approach.
7. **High-quality results-based management (RBM) design supports effective programming.** A programme logic clearly communicated by theories of change assists, guides, and makes transparent why the things done are being done, including via reference to evidence-based empirical research underpinning programme approaches and choices, in addition to normative instruments.
8. **Delivering training does not correspond to creating change.** Training delivery and effectiveness measurement may fail to reflect evidence-based best practices. Programme planning should include independent measurement of training effects, such as behavioural change among prison officers, to evidence outcome-level change.
9. **Indicator data supports in-programme MEL:** Establishing from inception a database of high-quality indicators allows programme managers to track progress towards programme goals and supports responsive and adaptive programme management.<sup>1</sup> In a project like this where some anticipated indicators are less accessible, IAs, donors and authorities should reach an agreement from early in implementation to find and agree on alternatives and incorporate these into project documentation, monitoring and reporting.
10. **Better planning for the joint implementation modality:** To ensure greater coherence in projects jointly implemented by UN agencies, sufficient time should be allocated during the inception phase for the planning and distribution of implementation functions through MoU's or workplans to support achievement of overall project objectives. The evaluation findings show that such planning should be based on the comparative advantages, field presence, and technical expertise of each agency.
11. **Project adaptability due to changing context:** Implementation of the project in three different MS demonstrates that when projects face changes in political context or confront complex bureaucracies, employing adaptive decision-making allows adjustments to work plans and re-allocation of resources into areas that can bring more effective change for the beneficiaries.

## **GOOD PRACTICES**

The evaluation captured the following good practices:

1. **Prison programmes that are rehabilitative in nature and intent and that respond to a range of risk-associated needs identified in a robust and multidimensional assessment process. This should include rigorous individualized assessment utilizing evidence-based methods, as well as taking into consideration, where appropriate, intersectional factors including, but not limited to, gender, age, religion, ethnicity, socio-economic status. This process should include integrated safeguards, ensuring it addresses the multifaceted and interlinked issues and concerns of prisoners.** Relying on one approach would be insufficient. This comprehensive practice, promoted and in some cases utilized by the project, contributed to encouraging prisoners' pro-social choices and supported their disassociation with violent extremism.
2. **Staff and prisoner relationships are essential for positive PCVE outcomes.** The project's emphasis on staff attitudes and behaviours and the support of a whole institution approach, with the aim that all prison and custodial staff work in a way that supports PCVE outcomes, was a good and essential practice.
3. **The work to support a robust, nuanced, and safe assessment of risk to lead to not only rehabilitative interventions but also appropriate custodial conditions and treatment was an important practice to ameliorate the likelihood of an unnecessarily punitive or stigmatizing experiences for prisoners.**

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<sup>1</sup> For example, see Serpe, L., Ingram, M., & Byom, K. (2022). Nimble adaptation: Tailoring monitoring, evaluation, and learning methods to provide actionable data in complex environments. *New Directions for Evaluation*, 2022, 97–106.

4. **PCVE rehabilitative approaches that focus on VE-related risk and needs but in addition, address prisoners' needs associated with regular welfare concerns, such as legal status and family contact, was a good practice as it contributed to enhancing relationships between prisoners and state officials. It also can be an accessible pathway to addressing more complex prisoner issues and concerns related to association with violent extremism.**
5. **The partnerships with civil society for post-release support mitigated the limitations of the absence of state capacity in some communities and locations. Such an approach reduces some of the stigmatization for former prisoners or returnees if they are deemed to be 'under observation or control'.**
6. **Project activities and approaches that recognized prisons do not operate in a silo but are part of both the justice and security architecture, reflect good practice in that prisons alone cannot deliver positive PCVE outcomes.** Issues such as security and intelligence, case back log and legal representation, and community reintegration require robust and systemic interagency cooperation. This good practice was enhanced when it promoted the establishment of documented processes and tools to guide and deliver interagency cooperation.
7. **Project activities that unpacked complex issues and disabused myths (e.g., 'VE is just about religion', 'women cannot have VE agency', 'all those who are associated with VE have mental health conditions') were very positive practices in addressing understandings that may lead to stigmatization and ill-considered approaches and treatment.**
8. **Societal norms and legislation related to gender are of huge influence on the experiences of women, especially in rehabilitation and reintegration efforts. Activities tailored to account for these influences demonstrated good practices.**
9. **New approaches, processes, and tools developed through the project's support benefitted from the good practice of testing, supported rollout, and monitoring, which refined and improved them and built confidence in their utility and application.**
10. **Exit strategy to invest in the development of training modules:** Prison systems in the three beneficiary member states face high staff turnover and rotation and this is likely to be the case in other countries as well. In this situation, training materials and courses serve as sustainable instruments to sensitise new prison staff to basic and innovative techniques in VEP management. When these new courses are officially integrated into training institutions, they contribute to a viable project exit strategy.
11. **Establishing partnerships with prison authorities** is crucial to launching and implementing projects on a sensitive topic such as VEPs management. This also facilitates building local ownership, one of the preconditions for sustainable project results.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation made a total of 14 recommendations.

1. **Technical assistance input processes should be reviewed:** The implementing agencies' (IA's) project teams should integrate and ensure quality control of technical assistance inputs. Steps should include IAs testing inputs for organisational cultural and practice influences, capacity, and regulations. These steps should also include robust and thorough engagement with national authorities and experts to assist development, test the inputs, design evaluability and measurement systems, and revise as required.
2. **A more comprehensive and inclusive policy framework is required:** The IAs should develop due diligence processes to directly link concepts, terminology, and practices to existing legislation and regulation in beneficiary MS and ensure this is part of engagement with senior officials to foster an enabling environment for change. Parallel or later work with operational staff should reference, and be based upon, agreements from these higher-level meetings and reference to the national legislative and regulatory framework. An apex management technical working group of the lead authority agency or agencies should be operational and regularly serviced by the IAs to contribute to a whole of government approach.
3. **Human resources and procurement constraints can impede implementation progress and should be reviewed:** The IAs should undertake a detailed review of the challenges that occurred during implementation to maintain project team posts as operational and to understand the procurement performance where it fell well below satisfactory standards of timeliness and continuity.
4. **Relevance and prioritization are not static and require a more flexible programme design:** The IAs and donors should more fully and collectively engage with national authorities throughout the project duration to ensure they can hear directly views and justifications for suggested



- adaptations in prioritisation and approach particularly at times of change in the national context. Where there is a viable justification from authorities that fits within the financing agreement parameters, adjusted focus and sequencing of thematic areas should be considered as an important strategy for project commencement, building momentum and ensuring relevance.
5. **High-quality RBM should be implemented to support effective programming:** The IAs should develop or reinforce support systems for the project teams and compliance management at the project approval stage to ensure alignment with the UNODC RBM guidance and the visibility of empirical evidence-based citation supporting technical assistance design, anticipated outcomes, and risk mitigation strategies.
  6. **Training delivery alone is insufficient and should be accompanied by robust systems to measure training effects at the level of behaviour change and to ensure training-effect maintenance:** UNODC should support programme design capacities both centrally (in Vienna) and in field offices by (a) developing and continually updating best practice guidance based on the professional-training research literature, including with respect to training-effect measurement and training effect maintenance; and (b) ensuring appropriate compliance systems for alignment with this guidance are in place in the project approval systems.
  7. **A robust MEL system should be adopted to support programme managers in tracking the effects of their activity and where appropriate making responsive and adaptive shifts to work plans:** From project inception, an in-programme monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) database should be constructed and suitably resourced, including via specialised MEL staff expertise. A modifiable template for such a MEL system should be developed and made available across the organisation. It should be rolled out with suitable technical support, and provision should be made (e.g., via fields for entering hyperlinks) for source verification, such as to MS documents, statistical collections, and scientific evidence. It should include the capacity for appropriate graphic data representation (e.g., figures, pivot tables) to support dissemination of results to both direct and indirect beneficiaries of programming.
  8. **Better planning for the joint implementation modality is necessary to foster stronger coherence in delivering results:** At the project planning stage, the IAs need to devote sufficient time to discussing the role of each agency in the implementation of project interventions (e.g., through an inception workshop). The outcome of such discussion should be the development of a work plan outlining the responsibilities for the delivery of concrete project activities, as well as the sequence of engagement.
  9. **Implementing a flexible programme model to adapt projects to changes in the political context should be considered:** Since projects are often implemented in a complex political environment, the programme models should allow for suitable adaptations to be made. Therefore, it is recommended to assess new risks and make necessary modifications to the work plan throughout the project. A flexible and agile approach allows accommodation of change and develops interventions better tailored to the changed landscape.
  10. **Human rights, gender equality, and LNOB considerations should be more broadly integrated into projects as fundamental components:** To achieve this, the project objectives and outcomes should explicitly address gender and human rights issues, while the project framework should detail how they will be assessed. In this regard, developing measurable indicators to track progress, including impact on gender equality, human rights, and LNOB, should be essential elements of the MEL system. Additionally, involving the Human Rights and Gender Section in the project design process is crucial. Their expertise can help shape the project proposal and ensure that gender, human rights, and LNOB considerations are embedded from the outset. Establishing a formal review process where draft project proposals are examined by the Gender and Human Rights Section prior to approval will be beneficial. This step will provide feedback and ensure alignment with best practices.
  11. Human rights, gender equality, and LNOB considerations and approaches within projects should build explicitly on those elements that exist within the national legal framework and regulation in combination with international human rights standards, guidance and good practice.
  12. Gender equality can be deeply impacted by very specific and localized law and custom. Projects should ensure that gender-based programming and activities fully account for these local and national factors.
  13. **Enhancing capacity of project teams and beneficiary MS on human rights, gender equality, and LNOB considerations is vital for their effective mainstreaming and reaching impactful outcomes:** This can increase awareness and facilitate effective mainstreaming of these considerations into project design and interventions, thereby helping to reach the objectives set in these areas. Capacity building will also enhance commitment of the MS to these principles throughout the project lifecycle and beyond.

14. IA partnerships with CSOs working on sensitive PCVE issues, particularly rehabilitation and reintegration, should have safeguards in place, e.g. transparency, protocols and documented permissions to ensure that their legitimate activities, as protected under international human rights law, are not restricted by the Government and to ensure protection and avert risks for the CSOs working in this space. Early programme development and consultation with MS where such work might be implemented should include mutual awareness raising of unintended impact of CT measures on credible and legitimate CSO initiatives.

## INTRODUCTION

Prisons are often regarded as 'places of vulnerability' in which radicalisation may take place, where prisoners with no previous involvement in violence are vulnerable to being radicalised<sup>2</sup>, though as recognised in Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017), prisons can be a place for reform.<sup>3</sup> There is a growing concern that poorly managed prisons may provide a breeding ground where violent extremists can recruit new members.<sup>4</sup> Specifically, scholars argue that Western prisons were one of the main recruitment grounds for Al Qaeda.<sup>5</sup> In overcrowded prisons, VEPs often take advantage of the concentrated population to develop violent extremist networks.<sup>6</sup> In addition, some prisoners may become more radicalised as a result of prison-related grievances, and frustrations related to being in prison. Prisons are often conducive environments for the growth and spread of extremist religious beliefs.

Given that the majority of VEPs will eventually be released into their communities upon completion of their sentences, the absence of effective disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration programmes for these prisoners may pose potential threats to society.<sup>7</sup> One of the risks is that VEPs may prepare for illegal acts of violent extremism. There is also a risk of re-offending if prison authorities fail to deliver adequate rehabilitation programmes.

In contrast, a well-managed prison that adheres to the principles of good governance and human rights standards and has effective programmes and operating policies (e.g., risk and needs assessment [RNA] tools, in-prison disengagement, and rehabilitation programmes, community-engaged reintegration plans, etc.) offers a unique opportunity to work with VEPs to positively influence their future behaviour and disengage from violence.<sup>8</sup> Effective management of VEPs in prison can lead to positive outcomes in terms of violent extremism prevention: it can reduce levels of recidivism; it can contribute to preventing radicalisation to violence from occurring within the prison setting; it can hinder recruitment, and impede the plotting of violent and criminal activities from prison.<sup>9</sup>

The issue of effective management of VEPs became increasingly significant from 2016-2017, when foreign terrorist fighters (FFT) returned, or attempted to return, to their countries of origin. According to UNODC, approximately 40,000 individuals from over 120 countries travelled to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as Daesh (Arabic acronym for ISIS) as fighters.<sup>10</sup> Although many governments in Europe and the Middle East refused to take their nationals back, other countries such as Albania, Turkey, and Central Asian countries launched repatriation programmes. Many of those returning were convicted of terrorism-related offences and imprisoned. In addition, the terrorist landscape grew more complex with ISIS expanding its membership throughout Africa and Asia, while local extremist

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<sup>2</sup> Prisons and Terrorism Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries, Available at: <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Prisons-and-terrorism-15-countries.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> Acknowledging that prisons can serve as potential incubators for radicalisation to terrorism and terrorist recruitment, and that proper assessment and monitoring of imprisoned foreign terrorist fighters is critical to mitigating opportunities for terrorists to attract new recruits, recognising that prisons can also serve to rehabilitate and reintegrate prisoners, where appropriate, and also recognising that Member States may need to continue to engage with offenders after release from prison to avoid recidivism, in accordance with relevant international law and taking into consideration, where appropriate, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners ("Nelson Mandela Rules").

<sup>4</sup> Council of Europe Handbook for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, Available at: <https://rm.coe.int/16806f9aa9>

<sup>5</sup> Yaacoub, Salim. "British and Lebanese Prisons: Are They Fertile Breeding Ground for Terrorism?" *Journal of Strategic Security* 11, no. 3 (2018): 79-92

<sup>6</sup> Dealing with Radicalisation in a Prison and Probation Context RAN P&P - Practitioners Working Paper, Available at: [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/en?file=2016-12/ran\\_p\\_and\\_p\\_practitioners\\_working\\_paper\\_en.pdf](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/en?file=2016-12/ran_p_and_p_practitioners_working_paper_en.pdf)

<sup>7</sup> Council of Europe Handbook for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, Available at: <https://rm.coe.int/16806f9aa9>

<sup>8</sup> CTED Analytical Brief: Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalisation to Violence in Prison, Available at: [https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/cted\\_analytical\\_brief\\_violent\\_extremist\\_prisoners\\_22032023\\_final.pdf](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/cted_analytical_brief_violent_extremist_prisoners_22032023_final.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/expertise/foreign-terrorist-fighters.html>

groups also proliferated.<sup>11</sup> This led to a higher number of convicted local VEPs (e.g., the number of VEPs in Kyrgyzstan tripled from 193 in 2015 to 614 in 2018).<sup>12</sup>

To assist selected member states in strengthening their prison management of VEPs, as well as in effectively preventing prisoners' radicalisation to violence during their imprisonment, UNODC and UNOCT/UNCCT launched this project in December 2017. Following approval of the project and its design, the process of selecting member states began. Three beneficiary member states – Kazakhstan, Tunisia, and Uganda – eventually were selected, and their country-level work plans were subsequently developed and endorsed.

The project was developed to be implemented under a joint management modality with UNODC and UNOCT/UNCCT acting as implementing partners. UNOCT/UNCCT also contributed funds towards the project, as a steward of contributions to the United Nations Trust fund for Counter-Terrorism. The project was implemented in collaboration with the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), which acted as an associated partner. The overall responsibility for and coordination of the project was assigned to a project coordinator from the UNODC Global Programme on Addressing Prison Challenges (GLOZ85). This project was a part of both the UNODC Global Programme (GLOZ85) and the UNOCT/UNCCT Global Programme on Prosecution, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (22824-005).

**Figure 1. The project beneficiary member states**



Source: The Evaluation Team created this map using Zeemaps

The project's overarching objective was to contribute to strengthening the resilience of societies against violent extremism and radicalisation to violence while respecting international human rights standards (Figure 2). The project aimed to reach this objective by increasing the capacity of prison staff to effectively manage VEPs and to prevent radicalisation to violence in prison systems (*Project Outcome*). The project intended to enhance the capacity of national prison authorities to effectively manage VEPs by improving:

- Safety and security mechanisms and capacities in prisons (corresponds to *Output 1*)
- Systems and skills in prisons to assess risks and needs of VEPs (corresponds to *Output 2*)
- Pre-release prison-based disengagement and rehabilitation programmes (corresponds to *Output 3*)
- Post-release social integration services (corresponds to *Output 4*).

<sup>11</sup> Country Reports on Terrorism 2017, US Department of State, [www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2017](http://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2017)

<sup>12</sup> [https://mptf.undp.org/sites/default/files/documents/30000/study\\_on\\_management\\_in\\_open-type\\_colonies\\_and\\_probation.pdf](https://mptf.undp.org/sites/default/files/documents/30000/study_on_management_in_open-type_colonies_and_probation.pdf)

**Figure 2. The Project Logical Framework**



The project was designed to achieve VEP-related development benefits for the national prison administrations, including their line ministries (e.g., Ministries of Justice and Interior Affairs). Prison agencies, administrations, and staff were the primary target groups (duty bearers). VEPs and the broader prison population, in particular those vulnerable to radicalisation to violence, were the final beneficiaries (rights holders). The project also planned to work with civil society organisations (CSOs) involved in the disengagement and post-release services for VEPs.

The project was initially designed for four years to start in December 2017 and end in December 2021. Due to COVID-19, the project was extended at no cost until December 2022. Since the project design was finalised before any member state was identified for participation, far shorter programming periods were achievable. Kazakhstan, Tunisia, and Uganda were selected with the agreement of the EU, the Government of the Netherlands, UNODC, and UNOCT/UNCCT; however, their work plans were not signed off until March 2019 in Kazakhstan, July 2020 in Tunisia, and January 2020 in Uganda. In addition to COVID-19, the effective length was even further truncated when the second request for a no-cost extension (allowing catch-up in the face of the foregoing delays) was declined by UNOCT/UNCCT. Thus, the actual time available for implementation of project activities was much shorter than the official project duration (2017-2022), and project results should be interpreted in this context.

The project implemented a range of different activities and the types of major activities implemented in each beneficiary member state are summarised in table below.

**Table 1. Summary of Key Project Activities**

Thematic area	Kazakhstan	Tunisia	Uganda
<b>Safety and Security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regular meetings with prison authorities to discuss and revise standard operating procedures (SOPs) on data collection and</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development of a framework for security audits</li> <li>Trainings on security audits</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Development of a draft framework for intelligence sharing between the Uganda Prison Service and the Uganda Police Force</li> </ul>

	<p>information sharing in prison facilities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development and piloting of a framework for security audits</li> <li>• Development of training modules on VEP management and their delivery</li> <li>• Trainings on data collection, information sharing and dynamic security</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training on intelligence sharing and inter-agency cooperation</li> <li>• Development of six PCVE training modules and their delivery</li> </ul>
<b>Risk and Needs Assessments (RNA)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review of existing risk and needs assessment methodologies, development and piloting of a new RNA tool</li> <li>• Trainings on use of the RNA tool</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review of existing RNA methodologies and development of a new tool</li> <li>• Trainings on the Prisoner Classification and RNA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of a prisoner classification framework</li> <li>• Trainings to conduct RNA of prisoners</li> </ul>
<b>Social Reintegration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of training modules and delivery of trainings on prison-based social reintegration programmes</li> <li>• Procurement of equipment for skills development in pilot prisons</li> <li>• Procurement of audio-visual appliances and materials for religious and psychosocial counsellors</li> <li>• Trainings on prison-based rehabilitation programmes for VEPs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expert discussions and trainings on pre-release of VEPs</li> <li>• Workshop on design and implementation of prison-based rehabilitation programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trainings on disengagement of VEPs</li> </ul>
<b>Prison-based Rehabilitation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of training modules on post-release plans for prisoners</li> <li>• Discussions on social reintegration support for prisoners after their release with Karaganda and Pavlodar local municipalities and Regional Prison Departments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dialogue building between CSOs and prison authorities on rehabilitation of VEPs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pro bono legal aid support provided by the Uganda Law Society, a local civil society organization, to fast-track resolution of petty-offence cases of pre-trial detainees to decrease overcrowding in pilot prisons</li> </ul>

The project's total budget was USD7.25 million funded by the European Union (EU) (USD4.55 million), the Government of the Netherlands (USD1.39 million), and UNOCT/UNCCT (as a steward of contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Counter-Terrorism) (USD 1.31 million).

## EVALUATION PURPOSE AND SCOPE

UNOCT/UNCCT and UNODC commissioned this joint independent final evaluation of the project. Its purpose was to support accountability for results and to enable learning. The evaluation assessed the performance of the project in terms of achieving its intended results (one outcome and four outputs) in all three beneficiary member states. It analysed all phases of the project's lifecycle, including its design, and implementation. It covered the entire five-year project period (2017-2022).

In line with the Terms of Reference (TOR), the evaluation analysed the project performance in terms of four evaluation criteria: *Relevance*; *Effectiveness*; *Sustainability*; and *Human Rights, Gender Equality, Disability Inclusion, and Leaving no One Behind (LNOB)*. The analysis of each evaluation criterion was guided by a set of evaluation questions (EQ) agreed to in the Inception Report. Since two Effectiveness EQs were closely intertwined and complemented each other, the ET reported them together in one sub-section. Namely, the EQs, "*To what extent has the project achieved its intended outcomes and objectives?*" and "*To what extent were unintended effects (positive or negative) observed?*" were reported together.

The evaluation was carried out by a team of three independent experts consisting of one Evaluation Expert (team lead) and two Substantive Experts (team members).

The evaluation findings will be important for program managers within the implementing agencies (UNODC and UNOCT/UNCCT) and their associated partner (CTED). Secondly, the project donors (the EU and the Government of the Netherlands) will also be the key users of evaluation results to inform their future decisions. Thirdly, national counterparts (prison authorities and line ministries such as Ministries of Justice and Interior Affairs), local training academies (Kostanay Academy in Kazakhstan and PATS in Uganda), and CSOs will also benefit from this evaluation.

## METHODOLOGY


### DATA COLLECTION

The evaluation used the following four types of data collection:

**I. Desk review** allowed the ET to familiarise themselves with the project context, project design, and implementation, and identify key stakeholders for the evaluation process. It was refined with information from additional documents gathered during the data collection phase such as standard operating procedures (SOPs) (safety and security audit guidelines, RNA tools, and intelligence frameworks), training modules, CTED analytical briefs, and others. The ET also reviewed a large number of external documents, including national PCVE strategies, the UN, EU, and other international legal documents and guides such as the Nelson Mandela Rules (NMRs), Council of Europe's Handbook for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, the United States (US) Department of State's Human Rights Reports, and others. In total, 130 documents were reviewed (the full list of reviewed internal and external documents is listed in Annex VI).

**II.** The ET also conducted **semi-structured interviews with key informants (KIs)** (online and in-person, individual and group). The evaluation gathered the opinions of a larger number of stakeholders, including implementing agencies (UNODC and UNOCT/UNCCT), associated partner (CTED), national government counterparts (prison agencies and prison training institutions), donors (EU, and Dutch Embassies in the three countries), partners (CSOs), and consultants. In total, the ET carried out **55 interviews, including 25 female and 30 male participants** (Annex VII). The number of interviewees by stakeholder group and gender is provided in Figure 3. While interviewing prisoners was not planned as part of this evaluation, the project staff in Kazakhstan organised an interview with one ex-prisoner from Pavlodar Province. He benefited from the rehabilitation programmes supported by the project. The interview aimed to get an in-depth understanding of the effects of this programme.

**Figure 3: Interviews by stakeholder groups and gender**



Source: The Evaluation Team

The ET travelled to Kazakhstan (two evaluation experts) and Uganda (one expert) to conduct in-person interviews with prison authorities, national consultants, and CSOs, as well as carry out focus-group discussions (FGDs) and prison visits. The ET visited three cities in Kazakhstan (Astana, Karaganda, and Kostanay) and one city (Kampala) in Uganda. The ET was unable to travel to Tunisia as the clearance to interview government counterparts and visit pilot prisons was not received on time. To mitigate this, the ET conducted online interviews with ex-project staff, Tunisian CSOs, and the Dutch Embassy in Tunis. In the absence of official clearance, it was not possible to conduct online interviews with Tunisian officials.

Interviews were conducted in three languages (English, Russian, and French). Independent interpreters were provided to translate one online interview with a Tunisian CSO from French into English.


Given the sensitive context of the project, the ET prioritised do-no-harm approaches to ensure that evaluation work was conducted in a manner that upheld confidentiality, anonymity, and respect. This especially concerned interviews with CSOs and the ex-prisoner. The ET conducted interviews with them in the absence of their national government counterparts in a secure location (e.g., online or in their offices). The ET assured the confidentiality of all interviews by not disclosing any information at any time to any party.

To obtain quantitative data, a five-point rating was incorporated into several interview questions (Annex V). These questions were asked of all stakeholders participating in interviews. For each evaluation criterion, there was at least one question requiring a rating. However, only the UNODC project staff, who were directly involved in the project implementation, were able to provide ratings for all the questions. Other stakeholders (e.g., government counterparts, donors, consultants, and CSOs) only rated those questions in which they participated (e.g., relevance).

III. The ET conducted three **FGDs**. The first FGD was organised with nine trainers from the Kostanay Academy. The second FGD was conducted with 8 instructors from the Prison Academy and Training School (PATS) in Uganda. The third FGD was conducted with eight senior officers of the Ugandan Prison Service (UPS). It was held in Upper Prison, Luzira. In total, **25 people participated in these three FGDs, including nine women and 16 men** (Figure 4).



Figure 4. FGD participants by organisations and gender



Source: The Evaluation Team

**IV. Site visits:** To physically observe the use of SOPs and rehabilitation programmes, collect evidence of project implementation, and interview prison staff, the ET paid visits to the following three prisons:

- **Kazakhstan:** one female prison and one male prison in Karaganda Province;
- **Uganda:** one male Upper Prison in Luzira.

During site visits in Kazakhstan, the ET met with a total of 13 prison administrators and officers in both male and female prisons. In Uganda, the ET had one FGD (8 people) in the prison and later, interviewed 2 prison staff. Site visits did not include direct formal interviews with prisoners, which were not integrated into this evaluation.

Moreover, the ET had a site visit to the Prison Staff Training Centre on Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) at the Kostanay Academy in Kazakhstan, and the PATS in Uganda. These two site visits enabled the ET to review their training materials and observe the use of training equipment such as audio-visual appliances procured by the project.

The following table provides a summary of the total number of participants in interviews, FGDs, and prison visits with the gender and location breakdown. It shows that the ET engaged **with a total of 93 project stakeholders, including 39 women and 54 men.**

Table 2. Total Number and Gender of Participants in KIIs, FGDs, and Prison Visits

Data collection tool	Number of stakeholders	Gender	
		Female	Male
KIIs	55	25	30
FGDs	25	9	16
Prison visits	13	5	8
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>54</b>

## DATA ANALYSIS

The robustness of the evaluation methodology was ensured by triangulation of the information from different sources, i.e. data from secondary sources (desk review materials) were triangulated with data from primary sources (KIIs, FGDs, and site visits).

A *summative* analysis was used to help assess the effects of the project's interventions on its target groups, what the project achieved, and how accomplishments were attained. For KIIs and FGDs, a *thematic analysis* was used that helped to identify the patterns and meaning across the data to derive the most prevailing themes, issues, and problems. *Content analysis* was employed to examine the content of SOPs, as well as training materials.

## **ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

This joint evaluation was conducted in line with the norms, and ethical principles of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). In particular, the ET adhered to and respected the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation. To demonstrate this commitment, the evaluators signed the UNEG Pledge of Ethical Conduct and provided by UNOCT/UNCCT at the project inception phase.

Data was obtained, collected, analysed, or otherwise used through lawful, legitimate, and fair means. The data obtained was analysed using the highest standards of moral and ethical conduct. The data was also anonymised. No individual is quoted in this report. All the data collected has only been used for the evaluation purposes.

## **HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER, LNOB, and DISABILITY INCLUSION CONSIDERATIONS**

The evaluation process factored in human rights, gender equality, LNOB, and disability inclusion considerations. These principles were integrated into all the evaluation stages and the ET ensured that these values were respected. First, in the inception phase, the ET ensured that data-collection tools such as guides for interviews, FGDs, and observation incorporated human rights and gender-responsive questions (Annex V). In addition, the evaluation methodology was inclusive by ensuring the participation of various stakeholders, including CSOs acting on behalf of VEPs. Third, no barriers were established to achieve an inclusive LNOB approach in the data collection phase. The ET was open to interviewing all stakeholders, regardless of function in the project (staff, partners, etc.), languages spoken, or disability status. Fourth, recognizing that the prison agencies were dominated by men, the ET made an effort to include women respondents whenever possible. When a choice was made between men and women, especially in FGDs, preference was given to women. Fifth, in the data analysis and report drafting phase, the ET analysed the results achieved, and specifically, to what extent duty bearers (prison staff) increased their capacity to meet their obligations, especially in regard to the NMRs, and whether the project products (e.g., RNA tools, and training materials) were geared toward human rights and gender equality. Overall, the evaluation was conducted in line with the UNODC Guidance Note for Evaluators on Human Rights Mainstreaming in Independent Evaluations, and the UNEG Guidance Document on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations.

## **LIMITATIONS TO THE EVALUATION**

<b>Limitations to the evaluation</b>	<b>Mitigations measures</b>
Neither a field trip to Tunisia nor online interviews with Tunisian officials could take place due to the lack of clearance from the government authorities on time	To address this, the ET conducted KIIs with informants from other stakeholder groups, including ex-project staff, CSOs, international consultants, and the donor (Dutch Embassy in Tunisia). The field trip was compensated for by a comprehensive analysis of desk review materials.
Inability to interview the cooperating partners in Tunisia (Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance and Search for Common Ground) and more CSOs there. Tunisian CSOs were provided with a series of capacity-building events to engage them in the post-release rehabilitation of VEPs.	These two organisations, along with 3 CSOs, did not respond to the ET's invitations for interviews. The ET relied on the desk review and sought input from other CSOs.

Limited time was provided for the two Substantive Experts to contribute to the report writing and field research	The evaluation activities (interviewing, analysis, etc.) were distributed within the ET to maximise existing knowledge and skills (e.g. technical, sector, language, etc.).
No opportunity to hear directly from the prisoners related to changes resulting from the project	The ET used parallel sources such as reliable and respected research studies, media sources, CSO reports, and accounts from regular visitors to prisons (national experts and CSOs) to gain an understanding of possible changes inside prison for prisoners.
Delays in the evaluation implementation limited data collection and meant that one Substantive Expert was no longer able to travel to Uganda	Virtual interviews and FGDs were organised for this expert.
This joint evaluation was conducted extremely late (one year after the project's completion). As a result, numerous stakeholders found it challenging to remember the specifics of the project implementation, and the document archive was harder to access. In addition, it was difficult to locate some project stakeholders such as former project staff and CSOs in Tunisia	The ET cross-checked data from other interviews and desk review materials. The ET used social media to contact the former project employees and CSOs in Tunisia.
Delays in the submission of the additional internal documents by the project team	The ET sent numerous reminders to the project staff to expedite the submission of documents. The ET also sought information (documents) directly from the project stakeholders (e.g., international consultants.)
The project had limited monitoring data on the achievement of the performance indicators (outcome and output indicators)	The ET relied on data from the interviews, FGDs, and prison visits.
Given the sensitive nature of the evaluation topic, public statistics related to VEPs were limited or unavailable, while government responses to the ET's written requests (emails) were delayed or many remained unanswered	The ET sent email numerous reminders to the prison authorities seen during prison visits (Ugandan case). The ET also requested the project staff, who are now employed by other UNODC programmes, to assist in obtaining data.
Appropriate scope of the evaluation objectives relative to the time and resources allotted, including a lack of supporting MEL. This evaluation encompassed 11 EQs for analysis, making it an extensive list (e.g., human rights and gender equality criteria had 4 separate EQs)	The ET focused on responding to the key EQs and integrated some EQs into one analysis (subsection).
Three beneficiary member states with distinct languages	Independent interpreters were hired by UNOPS to translate KIIs from Russian and French into English and vice versa.

## FINDINGS

### RELEVANCE

#### EQ1. How well does the project align with the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy?

*The project was congruent with the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) and particularly, its Fifth Review. The project was also responsive to other global strategic and normative documents such as the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, the UN Security Council Resolution 2396, the NMRs, and the Women, Peace, and Security agenda.*

The evaluation findings demonstrate that the project was relevant to the [GCTS](#) (2006) and [its Fifth Review](#) (A/RES/70/291) (2016), the latest review available during the project design. [The Fifth Review](#) expressed concern about the danger of recruitment and radicalisation to terrorism, including in prisons, and called upon member states and the UN agencies to take action to address all drivers of violent extremism conducive to terrorism. It also urged for greater coordination among the UN entities and with donors in developing and maintaining the effective rule of law-based criminal justice systems. In addition, the Fifth Review encouraged member states to enhance engagement with CSOs and to support their role in the implementation of the Strategy. The project was pertinent to all these aspects of the GCTS. In particular, the project objectives were in line with the GCTS's goals and its pillars<sup>13</sup> by focusing on addressing the risks of radicalisation in prisons. The project also sought to engage CSOs in the delivery of rehabilitation and post-release services for VEPs. In terms of greater coherence, the project represented a joint initiative of UNODC and UNOCT/UNCCT with CTED assisting in the selection of the beneficiary member states, scoping missions, and other project interventions (e.g., RNA).

The GCTS recognises the importance of PVE as and when conducive to terrorism, and in this regard, it encourages member states and UN entities to implement recommendations of [the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism](#) (A/70/674) (2016). The project was congruent with the goals of this Plan, which outlines that inhumane detention conditions, inhumane treatment of prisoners, and overcrowding spur prisoners to join extremist groups. The Plan stresses the need for safeguards to be put in place to prevent the spread of extremist ideology in prisons and encourages member states to consider the need to reform their penitentiary systems to prevent and counter radicalisation in prisons in line with the principles of human rights and the rule of law.

The project was also aligned with other global strategic documents such as [the UN Security Council Resolution 2396](#) (2017) acknowledging that prisons could serve as potential incubators for radicalisation to terrorism and terrorist recruitment. It calls upon member states to take all actions to maintain a safe and humane environment in prisons; develop tools to address radicalisation to violence and terrorist recruitment; develop risk assessments to prevent terrorist recruitment and radicalisation to violence; develop gender-sensitive strategies within the prison system, rehabilitate and reintegrate prisoners and engage with offenders after release from prison to avoid recidivism.<sup>14</sup> The Resolution requested UNODC, UNOCT/UNCCT, and CTED to provide support to the member states in implementing both this Resolution and the GCTS. The project mirrors these points, and it serves as the follow-up action to this Resolution.

According to the evaluation findings, the project was closely linked with [the Nelson Mandela Rules](#) (A/RES/70/175), which provide the universally recognised blueprint for good prison management and the treatment of all prisoners. The NMRs served as the foundational framework for the overall project design and implementation, while the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders (Bangkok Rules, A/RES/65/229) guided the project design and delivery in respect of women prisoners. The programmatic activities such as security audits, RNA, rehabilitation programmes, capacity-building activities, and other interventions were based on these rules. In addition, the project promoted UNODC's certified e-learning course on the NMRs and integrated these rules into the curriculum of Kostanay Academy and PATS. [The UNODC Handbook on the Management of VEPs and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons](#) ([UNODC Handbook on VEPs Management](#)), which guided the project design and implementation, was also aligned with the NMRs. Moreover, the project was aligned with the UN Capacity-Building Implementation Plan for Countering the Flow of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), which was developed in close coordination with CTED. It emphasizes the need to support disengagement efforts in prisons as part of the global efforts to counter the FTF phenomenon.

The project had a relevance to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda (WPS), established through the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and its subsequent resolutions, including the UNSCR 2242.

<sup>13</sup> The GCTS's pillars: i) Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; ii) Measures to prevent and combat terrorism; iii) Measures to build member states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism, and iv). Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.

<sup>14</sup> <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N17/460/25/PDF/N1746025.pdf?OpenElement>

The WPS emphasizes the importance of incorporating gender considerations in counter-terrorism and PCVE programming. Notably, UNSCR 2242 calls for greater integration of gender perspectives throughout activities to counter terrorism and violent extremism. It also underscores the different impact on the human rights of women and girls of terrorism and violent extremism, including in the context of their health, education, and participation in public life. The project aligned with WPS goals by seeking to target female VEPs and aiming to enhance the management and treatment of prisoners, including women, by increasing the capacity of prison staff. The project was designed to embed gender considerations into its interventions, such as RNA tools and disengagement programmes. In addition, it sought to improve prison conditions, including those in female facilities, by supporting the development of safety audits.

## EQ 2: How responsive was the project to the needs and priorities of the three member states?

*The project was relevant to the needs and interests of the three beneficiary member states aligning with their policy priorities such as PCVE strategies. The project was pertinent to the human rights obligations taken on by Member States through international treaties. The project was responsive to the needs of the beneficiary countries to increase the capacity of prison staff. Development of RNA tools, security audits, prison-based rehabilitation programmes, and post-release services were found to be pertinent to the prison authorities' needs.*

Based on the evidence collected for this evaluation, it is clear that the project was responsive to the needs and interests of the three beneficiary member states. First, the project was aligned with their policy priorities and the human rights obligations assumed through international conventions. In **Kazakhstan**, the project was pertinent to the Government's PCVET strategy, *State Programme on Countering Religious Extremism and Terrorism 2018-2022*, which coincided with the project period in Kazakhstan.<sup>15</sup> The strategy outlines some of the needs that the project set out to meet. Specifically, Article 4 calls upon prison agencies to prevent prisoners from being prone to radical ideas, which was one of the expected project results. Article 5 urges prison services to improve their theological rehabilitation programmes, namely by engaging external pastoral services. The project focused on the rehabilitation of prisoners, including VEPs, through pastoral care. In addition, this strategy establishes a new job position within the prison system known as an Officer on Theological and Rehabilitation Work (VEP inspectors). Consequently, the Kazakh government recruited 114 such inspectors for prisons nationwide. The project provided training for them and revised their job description to streamline it with the UNODC Handbook on VEP's Management.

The roadmap for the modernisation of the law-enforcement bodies of Kazakhstan for 2019-2021 includes a chapter on the reform of the penitentiary system. It highlights the need to improve the training and retraining of prison officers, to ensure a gradual transition from the joint accommodation in dormitories to a cell-based system, to enhance prison-based rehabilitation programmes, and improve post-release services.<sup>16</sup> The project had a clear focus on and delivered support very much related to these issues. The roadmap also notes that measures need to be taken to improve the quality of induction and in-service training programmes (practice-oriented training) of prisons officers. This was aligned closely with the project outcome. The project also supported the creation of a new Center for Training of Prison Officers in PCVE at Kostanay Academy to systematically train and retrain prison staff. All of these indicate the project interventions in Kazakhstan were responsive to the government's PCVE-related objectives.

The project had a close relevance to Kazakhstan's 2018–2021 government-led repatriation programmes, which brought back 607 men, women, and children from Syria and Iraq.<sup>17</sup> Later, a number of them (about 30 people) were convicted for fighting on the side of ISIS, including 18 women.<sup>18</sup> As a whole, the number of prisoners convicted for violent extremism and terrorism-related crimes in Kazakhstan increased twofold between 2016 and 2018, reaching 659 in 2018.<sup>19</sup> Many government stakeholders underlined in interviews that the prison agency needed support to effectively manage these prisoners due to their limited capacity in this field. They emphasized the project's significance in addressing this capacity gap.

<sup>15</sup> The State Program on Countering Religious Extremism and Terrorism for 2018-2022 (in Russian language), Available at: <https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1800000124>

<sup>16</sup> Scoping mission report 2018

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/knb/press/news/details/291882?lang=ru>

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> <https://kisi.kz/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/terror.pdf>

In addition, the project was pertinent to the human rights obligations assumed by Kazakhstan, which is a party to several international treaties governing the treatment of prisoners. Kazakhstan is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which mandates that all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. The Covenant also prohibits torture and any cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of anyone, including prisoners. Kazakhstan has also ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which requires each state party to take effective measures to prevent and punish acts of torture. The project intended to support beneficiary MSs in enhancing their compliance with human rights obligations by increasing the capacity of prison services to manage VEPs in alignment with human rights principles. It sought to widely promote NMRs and raise awareness of prison staff about these rules. The project also planned to promote alternatives to the imprisonment in order not to deprive VEPs of their right to liberty. Moreover, RNA tools, prison-based disengagement programs, and post-release services were all designed to advance the human rights of prisoners.

In **Tunisia**, the project was pertinent to the National Strategy for Countering Extremism and Terrorism adopted in 2016, which remains in effect. The Strategy's Pillar 1 on Prevention acknowledges the importance of the prevention of radicalisation in prisons and specifies several PVE interventions linked with the project.<sup>20</sup> In particular, the strategy calls *"to mitigate risks emanating from prisoners, especially those returning from conflict zones, through reinforcing security and safety in prisons and improving rehabilitation services"*.<sup>21</sup> Pillar 1 also prioritises post-release reintegration programmes. Under Pillar 2 on Protection, the strategy articulates the need *"to strengthen the capacities of prisons"*.<sup>22</sup> All these objectives of the national strategy are congruent with those of the project.

The relevance of the project for the Tunisian context was also supported by interviewees from all stakeholder groups, including CSOs. The Saferworld report estimated that between 3,000 and 7,000 Tunisians have joined groups fighting in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, representing one of the largest contingents of FFTs, whereas a proportion of them returned home.<sup>23</sup> The government's anti-terrorism efforts led to a large surge in arrests and the VEP prison population.<sup>24</sup> In September 2018, around 1,000 individuals were held in prisons for terrorism- and violent extremism-related crimes, including 631 in Mornaguia's pilot male prison. In the same period, there were 36 female VEPs in the only female prison in Tunisia in Manouba.<sup>25</sup>

At the same time, Tunisian prisons operated at over 200% of their capacity, with no foreseeable reduction in congestion. The majority of prisoners convicted of terrorism-related offences were accommodated among other prisoners while a limited number were housed in designated units. Damaged and limited infrastructure, overcrowding, violence between prisoners, limited financial and human resources, as well as the limited capacity of rehabilitation programmes were the main security challenges identified by prison authorities during the 2018 project's scoping mission. All of these indicate that the project was relevant both to the national context and the needs of the Tunisian prison system.

The project was consistent with Tunisia's commitments under the human rights treaties it has ratified. Tunisia is a signatory to the ICCPR, the CAT, and the CRPD. In addition, Tunisia ratified to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which has also been endorsed by Kazakhstan. CEDAW urges states parties to adopt appropriate measures to prohibit all forms of discrimination against women, including those who are incarcerated, and to safeguard their rights against any discriminatory actions. The Convention provides that discrimination against women encompasses ill-treatment that affects women disproportionately, such as imprisonment conditions that do not respond adequately to the specific needs of women. By increasing the capacity of prison staff and raising their human rights awareness, the project aimed to contribute to the prevention of prisoner discrimination. It also planned to improve prison conditions through security audits. The RNA tools and disengagement

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<sup>20</sup> The First Report for 2016-2019, the National Counter Terrorism Commission, Available at: <http://www.cnclct.tn/fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/First-Report-2016-2019.pdf>

<sup>21</sup> Ibid

<sup>22</sup> Ibid

<sup>23</sup> Lola Aliaga and [Kloé Tricot O'Farrell](#), Counter-Terror in Tunisia: A Road Paved with Good Intentions?, Saferworld, Available at <https://www.saferworld-global.org/long-reads/counter-terror-in-tunisia-a-road-paved-with-good-intentions>

<sup>24</sup> Scoping Mission Report, Tunisia, November 2018.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid

programmes were designed to provide the prison staff with a more integrated approach in addressing the needs and concerns of prisoners, including women.


All of these conventions—CCPR, CAT, CRPD, and CEDAW—have been ratified by Uganda, highlighting their relevance to this MS.

In **Uganda**, the government lacked any approved PCE/PCVE strategy until 2022. The government began developing the PCVET strategy in 2017, three years before the project, and although in draft form far earlier, it was not put to ministers for approval until 2021, and came into effect in 2022. This strategy recognizes that the prison is a high-risk area in terms of radicalisation. Although the number of VEPs was low at the project inception phase (158 VEPs in 2019 and the UPS expected an additional 350 VEPs, who were the pre-trial detainees<sup>26</sup>), prison and police authorities noted in interviews that the project was relevant to their needs for several reasons. First, they reported that the number of VEPs grew over time, including as a result of the November 2021 bombings in Kampala. Second, extremist groups, such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a militant group that originated in Uganda and pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2019, now act regionally.<sup>27</sup> In this regard, interlocutors pointed out that other countries in the region would also benefit from the project. Third, severe conditions in prisons operating at 312% of their actual capacity in 2019 (there were around 57,000 prisoners in 253 prisons) were deemed to pose potential risks for the spread of radicalisation in prisons. For instance, Upper Prison (Maximum Security) in Luzira housed 3,237 prisoners in June 2019 despite having a capacity of 624 individuals. In response to the changing national context, Uganda was selected with the intention of laying the groundwork for PCVE.

The relevance was also found in other areas where the project intervened. Interviews with government authorities and prison visits in Kazakhstan and Uganda revealed that the development of RNA met their interests. In Kazakhstan, security audits and extended prison-based rehabilitation programmes also responded to their needs. The prison agencies regarded international good practices presented by the project to be especially pertinent.

The following graph (Figure 5) summarises the ratings provided by different stakeholders about the project relevance to the needs and priorities of the three beneficiary member states. During interviews, the ET requested stakeholders to rate the relevance on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being not relevant and 5 highly relevant. In total, 32 participants provided their assessments, and Figure 2 displays the mean scores by various stakeholder groups. All groups, including government agencies, found the project relevant or highly relevant. The overall mean was high, reaching 4.55.

**Figure 5. Project Relevance by Stakeholder Groups, Mean Scores**



Source: The Evaluation Team

<sup>26</sup> Whether or not these additional VEPs ever arrived is unknown. Across the duration of the project neither the UNODC project team nor the national counterpart, UPS, were able to say how many VEPs were actually in prison in any given year. See, Effectiveness - Uganda, below for more information on this data failure.

<sup>27</sup> The Allied Democratic Forces was formed in Uganda, but fled to the Democratic Republic of Congo and pledged allegiance to IS in 2019, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/uganda-democratic-republic-congo/kampala-attacks-and-their-regional-implications>

**EQ 3: To what extent were the activities included in the project design relevant to achieving the project's objectives?**

*The project developed country-specific work plans; however, some output and outcome indicators were overly ambitious and thus became unattainable. In addition, these indicators tended to reflect the project delivery objectives over substantive outcomes. This directed the project to predominantly focus and report on activities rather than assessing changes. The project did not revise the country work plans and its indicators to better adapt to the changed context (Tunisia). The MEL system was not managed effectively to demonstrate effectiveness (changes) at the outcome (as opposed to activity) level. While roles and responsibilities were shared and clearly delineated at the start of the project, UNDOC took a lead role in project implementation towards the end of the project. In addition, the ET found overwhelming feedback during the data collection that the UNODC played a central role in the project implementation due its field presence and past experience in penal reform.*

The project logframe included one overall objective, one specific objective (regarded as an outcome in the country-specific work plans), and five outputs. The overall objective, a long-term change was formulated without fulfilling the specific, measurable, and time-bound criteria. The logframe does not specify which societal stratum the objective is aimed at. In addition, the prodoc does not explicitly explain the linkage between the effective management of VEPs and the resilience of societies against violent extremism.

The agreed project four outputs were interlinked, had a logical sequence, and were the areas of work identified as important and legitimate components of the PCVE response.<sup>28</sup>

Since the logframe was created before the selection of beneficiary member states, the project developed country-based work plans, following the scoping missions. New output indicators, sub-outputs, and activities were added to the work plans, which were tailored to the national context. For instance, in Kazakhstan, a new sub-output 1.4.4 "*Analysis of the legislation and sentencing policies for violent extremism and terrorism-related crimes*" was added. In Uganda, activity (sub-output) 1.1.3 "*Enhance co-operation and coordination between the UPS and Uganda Police Force to facilitate information exchange*" was included. The work plans shared the same outcome, key outcome indicators, and five outputs, with some additional localised outcome and output indicators. Yet, the logframe had a number of flaws.

First, the prodoc notes that a dual approach would be used to implement the project: (i) *to prevent the progression to VE by focusing on those prisoners who may be vulnerable*, and (ii) *to effectively manage VEPs by focusing on those prisoners who have embraced VE*. However, as discussed in greater detail in Effectiveness, the project was skewed more towards producing general penal reform effects, rather than targeting the management of VEPs. Project activities such as security audits or prison-based rehabilitation activities targeted the general prison population, including VEPs. Yet, as one of the donor representatives underlined, "the project was supposed to focus on the de-radicalisation of prisoners, but the project conducted a high number of trainings on general prison management and never reached the point to de-radicalise prisoners". The return of the project investments in improving the general prison system would potentially have a multiplier effect. However, the rationale and need to target activities specifically on VEPs to reduce the threats they pose was not only compelling, but the beneficiary member states had specifically requested the inclusion of the VEP-focused work. The Effectiveness provides more analysis on this aspect.

Second, the actual outcomes were labelled as outputs and incorporated a mix of outcome and output indicators. For instance, under Output 1.1 one of its indicators, "*Increased information-sharing between prison administrations and other relevant criminal justice agencies*", was articulated as an outcome indicator.

Third, since no baseline data was available at the project design level as countries were identified at a later stage, some of the output indicators were potentially ambitious. Thus, they were unattainable. One vivid example is that Output 1.1 established a target of a "*60% implementation rate of security audit recommendations at the project end*". Uganda did not reach this indicator as not a single security audit was undertaken there. In Kazakhstan, security audits were implemented in only 2 out of 8 prisons. The piloting of security audits in Tunisia remains unknown. Further, and as observed in the mid-term evaluation, whether or not security audit recommendations are implemented is a matter for the member states, but not UNODC. In addition, indicators tend to reflect the project delivery objectives over

<sup>28</sup> Compendium of Good Practices in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs), Global Centre on Cooperative Security, 2018.



substantive outcomes. This resulted in the project being predominantly focused on the implementation of activities, frequently losing sight of the larger purpose.

Fourth, the project adaptability was rigid during project implementation, with the exception of the COVID-19 period. It especially concerns interventions in Tunisia. Given the change of cabinet, political turbulence, highly centralised decision-making processes, and other barriers, many activities were delayed or halted in Tunisia. However, the work plan and its performance indicators were not revisited. Several new activities were implemented to support the creation of the Research Centre on PVE in Prisons and a CSO Network on PVE in Prisons in Tunisia. However, they were not reflected in the work plan. Several interlocutors underlined that the project could have been more adaptive to the context in Tunisia, such as through the expansion of prison-based rehabilitation activities, which seemed feasible to carry out there.

Fifth and foremost, monitoring and reporting of the outcome and output indicators' performance was not systematically undertaken, especially for Tunisia and Uganda. Monitoring data was available for Kazakhstan at the output level, but not outcome. As a result, the ET faced numerous constraints in validating the achievement of certain outcome and output indicators as the project simply lacked this data or they were not reported. For instance, at the output level, one of the indicators was *"number of concluded MoUs and 60% implementation rate of MOUs provisions at the end of the project"*. The progress reports lacked this information. This is just one example from a raft of deficiencies. It indicates that the MEL system was not well established. No database was created, whether at the country level or UNODC or UNOCT/UNCCT Headquarters (HQ), to capture, monitor, and link data to validation sources.

The mid-term evaluation, conducted in February 2022, also highlighted the limitations of the project's monitoring system – limitations that remained throughout the remainder of the project. Some interlocutors noted that having a MEL Officer would have enabled running an effective MEL system since the project staff were overly occupied. For instance, the project team in Tunisia was in charge of the implementation of a parallel UNODC Tawassol Project, having objectives similar to the project. On the other hand, prison authorities, particularly in Tunisia, were often hesitant to disclose data regarding the results of new practices introduced with the project's support. However, implementing a systematic approach to monitor progress and establishing a results-based MEL system that prioritizes outcomes would have assisted the project in gauging changes.

Neither implementing agencies (UNODC or UNOCT/UNCCT) took the lead in establishing and running the MEL system. As per the prodoc, the project was to be jointly implemented by UNODC and UNOCT/UNCCT with the functions distributed as follows:

**Table 3. Responsibilities of UNODC and UNOCT/UNCCT as per the Prodoc**

Outputs	Responsible implementing agency
Output 0	UNOCT/UNCCT and UNODC
Output 1	UNOCT/UNCCT and UNODC
Output 2	UNODC
Output 3	UNODC and UNOCT/UNCCT
Output 4	UNOCT/UNCCT and UNODC

Finally, the joint implementation modality changed over time, when UNODC took a stronger role in project implementation towards the end of the project. Furthermore, the ET found overwhelming feedback during the data collection that the UNODC played a central role in the project implementation, using its, or establishing, field presence and previous experience in prison management and criminal justice reform while UNODC brought its specialized knowledge and resources to the project.

All the interlocutors highly appreciated the role of CTED in providing advisory services to the project. In particular, CTED conducted scoping missions to the three beneficiary member states and prepared assessment reports. It also provided support in the selection of beneficiary member states.

**EQ 4: To what extent was the project design and implementation informed by a context analysis including considerations regarding human rights and gender equality, young people, and vulnerable groups?**

*The project design was informed by UNODC's previous experience in prison management and its Handbook on VEPs Management containing good practices. Scoping mission reports provided context analysis on the challenges in managing VEPs in the three beneficiary member states. The body of international norms related to the treatment of prisoners (e.g., NMRs) guided both the project design and implementation to enhance the protection of the human rights of VEPs and other prisoners. Bangkok Rules and other normative statutes informed the gender-specific approaches intended to be used in the project implementation.*

At the time, when the project was being designed, the issue with FTFs was critical. Starting from 2016-2017, many FTFs returned to their home countries. As earlier mentioned, this led to an increase in the number of VEPs. A CTED report indicated that as of November 2017, 5,395 FTFs were imprisoned in 79 countries.<sup>29</sup> This number did not include VEPs, who acted at the local level and were subsequently convicted. The UN Security Council encouraged member states to prevent prisoners convicted of terrorism-related offences from radicalising other prisoners to violence.<sup>30</sup>

On the supply side, the project design was informed by the UNODC's prior expertise in prison management as well as tools and approaches promulgated by [its Handbook on the VEPs Management](#). The handbook identifies a range of challenges affecting the management of VEPs, and shares policies and good practices from different countries. According to UNODC, this publication constitutes the first technical guidance tool to address the manifestation of radicalisation to violence and violent extremism in prison settings at the UN level. The Handbook was a response to address the insufficient evidence base regarding promising practices for managing VEPs. Stemming from this handbook and previous UNODC experience, the project design offered a holistic approach to managing VEPs through four areas of interventions – security audit, RNA, prison-based rehabilitation, and post-release services.

The project design was also informed by the EU's expertise in this area. As a donor, the EU actively contributed to the project development. The Council of Europe's [Handbook for Prison and Probation Services regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism](#) was also a useful resource in designing project interventions. It offers similar to UNODC's Handbook instruments such as RNA, prison-based rehabilitation, safety and security, post-release services, and capacity-building of prison staff.

At the same time, the prodoc acknowledges that “the dynamics leading to the radicalisation of prisoners have not yet been fully understood”.<sup>31</sup> It also notes that empirical studies measuring the extent of prison radicalisation on the one hand, and the effectiveness of disengagement programmes on the other, are still lacking.<sup>32</sup> The EU Handbook also points out there is no one-size-fits-all strategy for managing VEPs as the capacities of countries differ. With this premise in mind, the project design represented in a way a pilot approach to managing VEPs.

The project concept centred on promoting human rights standards in managing VEPs. The body of international norms related to the treatment of prisoners (e.g., NMRs, Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, and others), directed both the project design and implementation to enhance the protection of human rights of VEPs and other prisoners.

The project was developed to promote gender sensitivity in managing VEPs. For this purpose, the project targeted female prisons despite the significantly low number of female VEPs and female prisons in three member states. In Kazakhstan, out of 659 VEPs in 2018, only 4.8% were women.<sup>33</sup> In Tunisia, there were around 1,000 VEPs in 2018, while Manouba, the only women's prison in the country, accommodated 36 VEPs. In Uganda, women constituted just 2% of the prison population.<sup>34</sup> According to KIIs, the project's effective and persuasive communication with prison authorities led to the inclusion of one female prison in Kazakhstan and Uganda. As a result, one female and seven male prisons were the pilot prisons in Kazakhstan, and one female and five male prisons in Uganda. In Tunisia, even though all three pilot prisons were male, the project targeted women officers working in female prisons.

<sup>29</sup><https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/files/documents/2021/Jan/cted-trends-report-march-2018.pdf>

<sup>30</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 2396 dated December 2017, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n17/460/25/pdf/n1746025.pdf?token=HSvNLOG1DFj1YwMRG9&fe=true>

<sup>31</sup> Prodoc, page 5.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Scoping Mission Report, Kazakhstan, September, 2018.

<sup>34</sup> Scoping Mission Report, Uganda, June, 2019.

The UNODC [Handbook on the VEPs Management](#) focuses both on male and female VEPs and offers gender-sensitive instruments for female prisoners, including pregnant women, women with infants, and breastfeeding mothers. These gender-sensitive tools were incorporated into the project design (e.g., gender-based RNA questions and in-prison rehabilitation). International statutes such as the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders (Bangkok Rules) also guided the project implementation and were integrated into the training courses of Kostanay Academy and PATS.

On the demand side, the scoping missions to three beneficiary member states, led by CTED, were constructed around the major four intervention areas. They provided the national context analysis, including the security and safety challenges of VEPs in three beneficiary member states, and weaknesses of their RNA, disengagement activities, and social integration programmes. They also identified what capacities were needed for the prison authorities in three member states to fulfil their obligations. The scoping assessment results were translated into the work plans of three member states.

During the project implementation, CTED assessments, research, and analysis informed the selection of beneficiary member states and broadly the project implementation (e.g., RNA).

## EFFECTIVENESS

### Introduction

The findings for effectiveness relate to the stated intent detailed in the country work plans and monitoring tables. The logical framework in the project document is a meaningful, but broad statement of intent. It was used as an overarching reference point, developed prior to selection of the beneficiary countries. Therefore, it does not provide suitably detailed benchmarks for the evaluation of effectiveness. The effectiveness findings focus on the outcome and the outputs as the evaluation was not established, in terms of resources allocated, to explore sub-outputs. Where specific sub-outputs offer useful illustrations related to outputs or outcome, they are referenced. The first country-specific output (*Project implemented in line with national needs*) is mainly considered in Relevance. Effectiveness findings follow the structure documented by the project, and each member state will be considered under each output heading and outcome.

Throughout documenting findings of effectiveness, the ET are conscious of the principle:

*It is not sufficient for those responsible for prisons to be aware of and to refer to these international standards. If they are to implement the standards in their daily work, they must be able to interpret them and to apply them in real working situations.*<sup>35</sup> However, as a prison system's most valuable and important commodity is its staff, investing in staff and working to support them to adapt their practices and behaviours through greater awareness, knowledge and skills founded in human rights, is a prerequisite for the positive effect of new approaches and reforms. Unfortunately, assessment of how staff applied *them in real working situations* was beyond the scope of resources committed to this evaluation, though undoubtedly it is of critical importance and should be integrated into future evaluation plans.

#### **Q5: To what extent has the project achieved its intended outcomes and objectives?**

*Effectiveness ranges from high to low both within and across beneficiary countries. More success was found in the first two output areas (safety and security, and RNA) than in the third and fourth (pre-release and post-release rehabilitation services) for a variety of reasons, including truncated programming timelines, delivery schedules, and the rejection of the second no-cost extension.*

*Some of what was effective was related to general penal reform work, rather than VEP-targeted reform. In some cases, there was very effective development that, while not reaching planned targets, provides a platform for some of the intended results if further funding is secured in the future.*

<sup>35</sup> A Human Rights Approach to Prison Management, International Centre for Prison Studies, KCL, 2009

*In Kazakhstan there was a good record of progress across all outputs. In Uganda, there was some good progress across the first two outputs, and additionally, there was good progress on enabling reform measures, though very limited progress against the final two outputs. In Tunisia, in the absence of engagement from authorities with the ET, it is hard to verify the level of progress, but certainly data collection shows that considerable effort was evident in implanting good practices recommendations, which would ordinarily yield positive progress towards the outputs.*

*There is a similar pattern with progress towards the outcome (increasing capacity of prison staff): there is strong indication that the outcome is achieved in Kazakhstan, somewhat achieved in Uganda, and the absence of evidence makes it difficult to make a firm statement about Tunisia.*

## **PROJECT DESIGN**

After initial agreement on approach and core priorities, the countries where the project was to be implemented were selected. This approach to design, with predetermined priorities, can have limitations, particularly when there is an extended period of time between the project design and implementation. An extended delay in implementing a project increases the likelihood of political change and changes of the government officials who are the focal points of the project. Even without staff changes, it is quite possible that officials involved with the project might have legitimately altered priorities by the time of implementation.

The initial project proposal was drafted in 2017, the (EU) financing agreement was signed in November 2017, the Tunisia scoping mission was conducted in November 2018, and the Tunisia work plan was signed off in July 2020. The work plan activities were bespoke to Tunisia, but had to align with the priorities agreed in 2017. Where projects are rigidly structured and have to be agreed and implemented with officials who may have alternative priorities and are unable to negotiate adjustments, there is a likelihood that they will be demonstrably less committed to the predetermined activities (regardless of their legitimacy). KIIs reported this to be the case in Tunisia and identified it as one of the reasons for slow and incomplete implementation of the project. Further comments on the design are made in the Uganda section below.

## **EXTERNAL INFLUENCES**

Throughout the course and duration of a project such as this, there are many external factors beyond the control of the implementing agencies that can influence the level and effectiveness of implementation. Some of these are expected and predictable, such as scheduled elections. During such predictable events, implementation has to adapt as government officials have a time bound focus on other matters and heightened security levels place limitations on ordinary business such as accessing places of detention and liaising with police officials.

It is not unusual for there to be unpredictable and unscheduled political changes as well, which can also have a significant impact on project plans. Periods of social unrest and unforeseen political change not only change the priorities of government officials, but also shift the focus of the agencies of justice and security who have to attend to these unforeseen and potentially destabilising events. In these cases, it can also mean that the nature of international cooperation alters in terms of work with police, judiciary and prisons.

Finally, within a project duration there can also be incidents related to violent extremism or terrorism that are of direct consequence to the government agencies involved in the project, and which will influence a project's rate of implementation and effectiveness. All three beneficiary member states within the project experienced external issues such as these which had an impact on the project. These are documented in Annex 1

The project implementation coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic. The impact of COVID is well documented in project reports and need not be the focus of the evaluation. What is worth noting though is that in a project, where a strong element is related to technical assistance, the way states adapted to the requirements of COVID-19 had a huge impact on the ability to implement the project. In locations with good infrastructure, ICT capacity and resources, adaptations to remote working were easier to accommodate. The impact on the project was far greater in locations where ICT adaptability was less robust, where COVID-19 restrictions on group gatherings were stricter and of longer duration, or where school closures (for instance Uganda) that were of consequence to adult parents and guardians were

longer. It is worth noting that prisons are locations that are extremely vulnerable to outbreaks of infectious disease, meaning that rapid and dramatic restrictions needed to be implemented to protect the prison community. In the beneficiary member states, where prison infrastructure is most stressed due to overcrowding and where prison health services are weaker, the urgent humanitarian needs were much more profound and the impact on planned project business much more significant.

## **EFFECTIVENESS FINDINGS FOR KAZAKHSTAN**

*Good progress related to effectiveness in Kazakhstan was evident in outputs 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. Some progress was evident in output 1.4. There is significant evidence for progress towards the Outcome. Below are the main findings and in Annex 1 fuller findings with extended commentary.<sup>36</sup>*

### **Output 1.0.: Project implemented in line with national needs, and project results and lessons learned widely disseminated**

**The project was tailored to national needs.** KIIs confirmed the issues, priorities and approaches identified in the 2018 scoping mission and during implementation addressed national needs. Issues related to more prisoners being identified and categorised as having extremist ideology, the influence of this prisoner cohort on other prisoners, the absence of an evidence based approach to understanding the risks and needs of these prisoners, the lack of nuance in approach to this cohort of prisoners in terms of their conditions and treatment, the absence of meaningful rehabilitative opportunities both in terms of psychosocial counselling, employment and relationships outside of prison, and the gaps in provision of post release services were all noted as significant themes.

**The comprehensive approach of the project was highly appropriate in meeting national needs.** The different sub-components, variety of types of support and activity – new approaches, documented tools, integrating these into policy and regulation, human capacity building, and materials and equipment support were confirmed by KIIs as highly effective in addressing the range of needs.

**The project met needs that were identified in Government PCVE programmes and strategy.** The project was relevant to the State Programme on Countering Religious Extremism and Terrorism identifying clearly some of the needs the project intended to address, and partially indicating an outline of some of the approaches. This is just to reiterate one more aspect from this strategy:

*Convicted persons in prisons to be provided with information and awareness raising counter-propaganda. Institutions of the penal and correctional system are supported with operational measures aimed at the prevention and suppression and spread of radical ideology.<sup>37</sup>*

### **Output 1.1.: Strengthened security and safety mechanisms and capacities in prison facilities through improved coordination with other relevant stakeholders**

**Formal and institutionalised improved coordination towards safety and security was not evident through the data collection of the evaluation. There was however considerable activity that intrinsically required more, or prompted time-bound, coordination.** Work supported by the project that increased coordination included: multi-agency and multi-disciplinary participation in capacity building activities; interagency working groups; interagency training modules; the prison audit process that depends upon different stakeholders; the development and sharing of data and information across agencies and specific training development activities such as with Prosecutor General's Office (GPO) on inter-agency cooperation and information sharing.

**The application of the security audits required and initiated new types and levels of coordination and assisted the authorities to identify security related needs.** The joint work of the Interagency Working Group (IWG) for the security audit demanded the sharing of data and new cooperation through the

<sup>36</sup> Annex 1 provides an extended analysis of evaluation findings on Effectiveness as well as technical issues. These will be highly relevant for programme planners seeking to learn and improve similar projects in the future.

<sup>37</sup> (un-official web translation).

development and piloting of the audit. The majority of IWG members were from the Prisons Committee, and others from the Department on Countering Extremism, GPO, National Security Committee, Committee on Religious Affairs, and Ministry of Information.

**The security audit is valued by prison authorities.** The prison Security Audit Framework, its Checklist and Reporting Guidelines developed with the project support were endorsed on 18 May 2022 by the Order of the Chair of the Prison Committee. The audit was developed and tested in two pilot prisons (one medium-risk security prison and one high-risk security prison) in the designated pilot phase.

**A platform for strengthening security has been introduced through the piloting of security audits.** There was good progress in the development, the beneficiary revision and testing of the audits though the audit has not delivered the fullest potential. Government officials reported that some of the findings of the pilots had enabled them to identify gaps, some of which had been addressed.

**The project has contributed to a flow of data and wider involvement of government departments in the sector.** The improved flow of higher quality data (e.g. more government departments having an increased awareness and understanding of the relevant issues) was noted by KIIs as instrumental in the strengthening of security. The broadened range of government agencies involved with PCVE in prisons is positive: it somewhat diminishes a purely security focus and has added a rights-based approach in relation to this category of prisoners<sup>38</sup>. This is seen as a direct contribution to strengthened safety mechanisms for prisoners.

**Safety and security have been strengthened through a broader awareness of a human rights approach to prison management.** KIIs noted that awareness raising alone will not deliver a human rights compliant system nor alone improve security, but stated that human rights awareness was an essential part in reforms needed and contributed to the progress they observed.

#### **Output 1.2: Improved systems and skills in prison administration to individually assess the risks and needs of VEPs as a basis for allocation and programming**

**The staff in the pilot prison have improved skills to individually assess the risk and needs of VEPs and use that assessment data for good prison management and programming for prisoners. Within the pilot prisons, there is widespread use for all categories of prisoners of the RNA tools.** The RNA tool was developed through the provision of technical assistance using good international practice – reflecting learning and expertise for established comparable practice,<sup>39</sup> builds upon existing relevant practices already officially used within the penitentiary systems (the RNA tool is aligned with Article 95 of the Kazakhstan's Penal Code "Assessing Prisoner's Behaviour for Individualisation of Punishment") and has been adapted to the Kazak context through the input and expertise within the IWG for RNA.

**The RNA tools and processes build on some existing national practice, which is important for its introduction and long-term acceptance.** The users of the RNA tool in Kazakhstan are committed to its ongoing implementation and improvement as evidenced by the efforts to adjust and enhance based on the lessons learned through its use within the pilot phase. The new approach incorporated and built upon existing national relevant practice which was described as a key factor in its utility, acceptability and would contribute to its sustainability.

**The RNA tools have contributed to the individualisation of treatment of prisoners in particular those who are categorised as VEPs.** The risk and needs process and tools piloted have elements that address association with violent extremist organisations. Those specific findings feed into risk reduction measures and sentence planning. The application of the RNA tools reveals a range of needs and guides interventions in support of VEPs. Within at least one of the pilot provinces (Karaganda), the RNA tool will in addition be used in the prisons that were not initially part of the pilot phase.

**The RNA tool and process require enhancement and improvement for its fullest effectiveness.** There are procedural adaptations that need to be further tested, finalised and reflected in regulation. Some of the

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<sup>38</sup> For more on the benefits of a whole of government approach, see Compendium of Good Practices Measuring Results in Counter-Terrorism and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, 2023

<sup>39</sup> Handbook on The Classification of Prisoners, UNODC 2020

issues to be addressed include sequencing of the completion of the assessment process by the different professional groups, who have responsibility for them, and a process by which all the assessments and findings are combined into an overall rating or some such benchmarking. The paper-based method currently used for the RNA was reported by KIIs as an impediment to its effectiveness.

**Output 1.3: Enhanced capacity of prison administrations to deliver inter-disciplinary disengagement interventions on social reintegration of prisoners, including VEPs**

**Prison staff have an enhanced capacity to deliver interdisciplinary disengagement interventions for social reintegration as a result of project support.** In the prisons, where RNAs have been implemented, the prison authorities and their partners have a better understanding of appropriate interventions they should and could deliver for the disengagement of all prisoners, including VEPs. The disengagement interventions as a result of enhanced assessment processes can now be more tailored to the individual needs of prisoners.

**Staff have benefited from training and mentoring in RNA.** KIIs reported that the training they had received, online, in person and through testing and mentoring was of direct positive consequence in their related work. The training modules for this work included:

- for psychologists working with VEPs and other prisoners;
- for PVE inspectors (theologists);
- for prison officers.

They are integrated into the curriculum and training resources of Kostanay Academy and delivered by the Centre for Training of Prison Officers in the PCVE, which was officially established in 2019 with project support. The training materials that had been used and will continue to be used to improve the knowledge and skills of relevant staff responsible for disengagement activities.

**The provision of materials and equipment has improved the quality of the disengagement services available in pilot prisons.** Audio visual equipment enhanced the work of religious counsellors. It has allowed them to deploy a wider range of, and more engaging, material related to alternative narratives. The refurbishment and materials provided to pilot prisons related to psychosocial services, including counselling, extended the range of interventions for disengagement for prisoners including the VEPs. The enhanced environment for these activities, supported by the project, was reported by authorities in the prison to have increased the numbers of prisoners requesting services from these professional groups.

**The provision of materials and equipment for skills development has increased the numbers of prisoners, including VEPs participating in disengagement services.** Before the project, in one of the pilot prisons only five prisoners worked in the furniture workshop. With project support, this has increased to 40, including up to 17 VEPs. Prisoners gained income from their work and increased skills. Work is still required to establish sustainable mechanisms for skills development interventions, which are not self-funding.

**Output 1.4: Improved social reintegration prospects of (former) VEPs through solid post-release services and/or the resort to alternative to imprisonment in suitable cases**

**There was limited obvious change that indicated improved social reintegration prospects of former VEPs.** In terms of sequencing activities, post-release services logically come after RNA and rehabilitation services inside prison and therefore, was more vulnerable to delays from COVID-19 and the shortened duration of the project in the absence of the second no-cost extension. A total of three of the eight activities in this output were cancelled due to the absence of the second no-cost extension:

- *Develop a format for individual post-release plans for prisoners*
- *Piloting individual post-release plans for prisoners*
- *Develop training modules on the preparation of individual post-release plans for prisoners.*

**There were some discreet positive changes that can act as a good starting point for improved reintegration including prisoners improved conditions for family contact.** Prisoners and their families benefited from the project provision of materials to increase viability and enhance conditions of prisoner

and family visits. Prior to release and of direct consequence to reintegration, fostering or reestablishing positive family and community benefits are of the key contributing steps<sup>40</sup>.

**Prisoners used vocational skills gained through project support and were able to secure employment post release.** In Pavlodar, prisoners, including VEPs have found employment in a furniture workshop and were able to gain an income to contribute to their stable reintegration.

**Outcome: Increased capacity of prison staff to effectively manage violent extremist prisoners and to prevent radicalisation to violence in prison system of Kazakhstan**

**There is overwhelming information that identifies increased capacity of prison staff.** Some of this increase in capacity is seen to have a direct positive influence on the effective management of VEPs and the prevention of radicalisation to violence in the prison system of Kazakhstan (processes, approaches, and skills that prompt an enhanced understanding of VEPs), and positive adaptations in their conditions and treatment (individualisation and a broader scope of risk and needs response delivered to a higher standard).

**Staff capacity has been increased to good effect in relation to security audits. The piloting of the process offers increased options for safety, security, and good prison management.** In May 2022, the Prison Security Audit Framework, its Checklist and Reporting Guidelines were endorsed by the Order of the Chair of the Prison Committee. The fullest benefits of this innovation require some further adaptations, enhanced application through linking the audit to existing databases for ease of use and capturing existing relevant data, ensuring discreet intelligence analysis can feed into the audit, training to support its roll out to other provinces, and procedural enhancements such as its digitalisation.

**Staff capacity and delivery has been increased in the application and use of results from RNA and this enhances capacity related to management of VEPs.** The RNA tools are valued and regularly and widely used in the pilot locations. Assessing risks and identifying needs (responses) to address those risks are core elements in the management of VEPs in terms of conditions and treatment. They also offer a key contribution to the prevention of radicalisation in prisons.

**Staff capacity and delivery of rehabilitative services have increased, which contributes to the prevention of radicalisation to violence in prison and contributes to the likelihood of more effective management.** The higher quality of delivery through new staff knowledge and skills, the increased range of rehabilitative activities, and the improved quality have led to more VEPs being involved.

**Staff capacity through training has been enhanced through all aspects of the project and within several key government agencies.** Staff rotation, including retirement, however depletes the pool of trained staff in the key functions. Integrating some of the modules into the curriculum as has happened with the Kostanay Academy is a good start in ameliorating the negative consequences of staff rotation and loss of knowledgeable staff. Other steps will be required to maintain adequate levels of trained staff while new approaches, systems and tools are integrated and institutionalised.

## **TUNISIA**

*Progress related to effectiveness in Tunisia was partially evident in outputs 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, though often the evidence was of some of the right things being done, that should lead to progress, rather than de facto progress. There was very little evidence of progress in output 1.4. There is very limited evidence of progress towards the Outcome. Below are the main findings and in Annex 1 fuller findings with extended commentary.*

The depth and details of findings related to effectiveness in Tunisia reflect the very limited opportunities for data collection. Effectiveness in Tunisia was influenced by multiple factors over and above the consequences of COVID-19. There were extensive and profound political changes in the period of implementation, which are well documented, and go well beyond what was anticipated in the project document in terms of assumptions, risks, and mitigations. While the political changes (absence of

<sup>40</sup> See Chapter Six: Connecting with Friends, Families and Communities, Council of Europe Handbook for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, 2016



decision makers, changing decision makers, changing decision-making processes and authorisations) are a resource (time) expensive for a project to deal with, and are beyond the project's control, there were project-controllable elements that exacerbated the impact of these occurrences. Based on evaluation findings, three issues are identified which made it more difficult to manage these external issues and which, on balance, contributed to the slow and incomplete progress towards the Tunisia outputs.

**1) Incomplete staffing complement.** For the duration of the project in Tunisia, a staff team of 3 was planned: a full-time Project Manager, 75% time; a Project Officer, and a 40% Finance Assistant. There were significant gaps in this planned staffing model. For instance, from Sept 2020 to March 2021, there was no Project Manager, with much of the burden of backstopping this role being taken by the Project Officer with support from Vienna HQ. KIIs stressed that authorities' optimal engagement is when they have regular contact with project officials and there is time to build a trusting relationship, particularly when dealing with such sensitive issues as surrounding violent extremism.

**2) Procurement delays.** KIIs reported that discreet procurement (material, equipment, and costs of works outside existing framework agreements) was subject to extraordinary delays, which frustrated beneficiaries and undermined the work to build essential trusting relationships. The ET understands that this type of procurement is done through the UNODC Regional Office in Cairo but has no means to explore why there were such delays.

**3) Project inflexibility.** The third factor within the control of the project and its donors that KIIs close to the project reported was the authorities' perception of project rigidity, which did not adapt to adjustments in beneficiary needs. In the absence of the opportunity to meet with authorities in the evaluation, the ET does not have clear details on the nature of proposed adjustments nor the means to assess their reasonableness. KIIs close to the project noted the authorities' perception and that this perception further undermined the nature of cooperation and delayed processes of engagement, authorisation, and implementation.

The final element related to effectiveness which was similar for all countries, but seems to have been compounded in Tunisia due to the relatively slow progress of implementation, was the absence of the second no-cost extension, which is reported as resulting in 12 of the 56 activities not being completed. It is also worth noting of the 56 activities, 6 were reported as complete through the participation of authorities in the final conference in Kazakhstan in September 2022. The ET does not have the means to find out if the completion of so much through this one event was always planned. Other activities, while reported as complete, do not have documented supporting evidence that conveys a real sense of completeness.

### **Output 1.0.: Project implemented in line with national needs and project results and lessons learned widely disseminated**

**The project was designed in line with national needs.** The scoping mission report records the prison authorities identified the following priority areas: (i) providing support to the implementation of project Tawassol;<sup>41</sup> (ii) strengthening the capacity of prison staff to prevent and counter violent extremism in prisons and manage violent extremist prisoners, including some safety and security capacities; (iii) supporting development and implementation of disengagement interventions for all prisoners, not only focusing on violent extremist prisoners, to avoid granting of special status to VEPs; (iv) improving contacts of prisoners, including VEPs with the outside world (families, community, civil society, etc.) and (v) strengthening capacity of state bodies to provide support to prisoners during their re-entry into society.

The prison authorities, within the larger approach developed by the Ministry of Justice of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, identified capacity building and the development of a pilot project for the rehabilitation and reintegration of VEPs, which too are consistent with the needs addressed through the project.

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<sup>41</sup> According to the scoping mission, Tawassol project emphasises the importance of an individualised approach supported by the reinforcement of familial and social contributions meant to prepare detainees for release and reintegration in their social environment. The project also ensures prisoners are provided with vocational training and the possibility to develop a personalised professional plan intended to provide economic opportunities essential for the prevention of recidivism and social reintegration.

**There was incomplete data collection to fulfil meaningful dissemination of lessons.** The limited information sharing by authorities and implementation of MEL tending to rely upon activity recording and reporting, limited the usefulness of results or lessons to be disseminated.

**Output 1.2.: Strengthened security and safety mechanisms and capacities in prison facilities through improved coordination with other relevant stakeholders**

**Inputs were provided by the project to strengthen safety and security measures, though it was not possible for the ET to find that the authorities had fully utilised or continue to use the project inputs.** Pilot security audits were conducted by UNODC and the authorities. Subsequently, as reported in the project documents authorities stated that follow-up would be undertaken by them.

**The Centre for Research and Studies of Violent Extremism was established with project support.** In principle, the centre would be the facility to enhance the development of policies and the capacity of governments to respond to VEP in prisons. KILs were either not able to confirm the continuing functionality of the centre or indicated that it was not operational.

**Output 1.2: Improved systems and skills in prison administration to individually assess the risks and needs of VEPs as a basis for allocation and programming**

**The project provided a range of technical inputs to contribute to RNA assessment for VEPs.** The project convened meetings and awareness-raising events with authorities to facilitate enhanced RNA processes and techniques. It was not possible for the ET to establish if the authorities have adopted or been using this assistance in the management of VEPs.

**Output 1.3: Enhanced capacity of prison administrations to deliver inter-disciplinary disengagement interventions on social reintegration of prisoners including VEPs**

**The project undertook activities that could contribute to the enhanced capacity of prison administrations to deliver inter-disciplinary disengagement interventions on social reintegration of prisoners, including VEPs.** Work was done on the establishment of a working group, technical documentation on rehabilitation and roadmaps, and promoting the role of CSOs. In the absence of feedback from the authorities, it is not possible to find that these activities have been utilised to deliver services or if the changes in capacity have been used.

**Output 1.4: Improved social reintegration prospects of (former) violent extremist prisoners through solid post-release services and/or the resort to alternative to imprisonment in suitable cases**

**The project undertook activities that could contribute to the improved social reintegration prospects of (former) VEPs through solid post-release services and/or the resort to alternative to imprisonment in suitable cases.** These activities, which included seeking to increase knowledge and skills, addressing strategic communications, and seeking to foster partnerships between authorities and CSOs, appear to have been insufficient and failed to attract full participation from authorities to have made a meaningful contribution. Logically, these events would have followed an implementation sequence, which means they come after the earlier outputs and later in the project cycle. This also appears to have resulted in this output being most heavily curtailed by the absence of the second no-cost extension.

**Outcome: Increased capacity of prison staff to effectively manage VEPs and to prevent radicalisation to violence in prison system of Tunisia**

**There was activity to suggest that there is enhanced staff capacity to effectively manage VEPs and to prevent radicalisation to violence in the prison system of Tunisia.** However, it is not possible to find that this capacity has been, or is, used for the effective management of VEPs or the prevention of radicalisation. The scope and intensity of activity that was finally implemented seems insufficient to become embedded in policy and practice.

**A note on data and evidence.** It should be noted at the outset that the limited MEL functions of the project (described in Relevance above) meant that a large amount of highly relevant data were not able to be obtained. These limitations extended into areas where national counterparts had received programming support. Key details are provided in Annex I, which provides an extended analysis of technical issues concerning Uganda.

One headline difficulty elaborated there is worth noting briefly. The MEL system for the project was limited to the extent that neither the project team nor UPS was able to provide the ET with basic data on numbers of prisoners considered to be VEPs for each year of programming (2019-22), due to not tracking such data. In the process of review and comment on the Final Report, UPS supplied these data (reproduced below), but they were not available to the ET during the evaluation phase and it remains unclear if they were available to the UNODC project team during the programming period.

**Table 4. Violent Extremist Prisoners (VEP) in Uganda prisons 2019-2022**

Population census date	Number of prisons holding VEPs	Total VEP population
31 Dec 2019	5	136
31 Dec 2020	1	78
31 Dec 2021	4	188
31 Dec 2022	4	227

Separate but further difficulties worth highlighting here concerned triangulation. In particular, while it is clear that national counterparts appreciated supports such as the RNA tool, in some KIIs and written responses to questions, national counterparts claimed benefits from the supports that surpass anything that a given support (e.g., a tool) was ever designed to do or indeed has the capacity to do. Thus, what follows below is an effort to carefully assess on the basis of all information the effectiveness of delivery in Uganda. Often this means that full conclusions are difficult to draw, but the ET has been sensitive to the many and often significant challenges within which this project was undertaken.

The project ran in Uganda from 2019 to 2022. 2019 was mostly taken over by the scoping mission. The analysis below works off the Uganda country work plan signed between the UPS and UNODC on 22 January 2020. Some confusion is present in the RBM work plan, which freely mixes output and outcome nomenclature. The work plan lists five outcome areas, with the first three mislabelled as Outputs 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2, and the second two correctly designated Outcome 1.3 and 1.4. The first relates to project relevance, broadly, but also the way the work plan for the member state was attuned to needs and national context, while the remainder addresses effectiveness squarely understood.

**Output 1.0: Project implementation effectively prepared in line with national needs, and its results and lessons learned widely disseminated**

As reflected also in the Relevance above, there is **clear convergent evidence from national strategy documents and multiple stakeholders across the criminal justice, donor, and civil society spaces that Uganda had significant national need and unmet demand for support in the area of VEPs.** The National Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism, finally published in 2022, recognises prisons as a high-risk site for radicalisation and UPS as a key contributor to the overall PCVET national effort (see, §3.1.2, and §6.1.15). Similarly, the PCVET Action Plan, adopted in 2022, but in development since 2017,<sup>42</sup> identifies prisons as one of just 13 action areas for national focus (Action area 9) and points to many of the project's objectives, such as categorisation of VEPs and sharing of information/ intelligence, as key priorities. KII interviews were unanimous in supporting the project as a timely and much needed response to these areas of need. One national counterpart working directly with VEPs, for example, said they could "attest and confirm that it was very relevant and timely" and that they have been "really crippled by the challenge of managing the VEPs".

<sup>42</sup> KII interview

The evaluation team reviewed the fit between the adopted project design (reflected in the work plan), the nature of Uganda's national needs and context, and the international guidance that provides direction on evidence-based practice. Here, **the evidence for effective practice is somewhat weaker and questions may be asked about the appropriateness of the project design to national conditions on the ground and to funding objectives.** There are several aspects to this. Most important is that the selected approach, which rests on general criminal justice reform, appears to be one of the more difficult, or circuitous, and diluted routes to securing the funded outcomes (on a targeted spend per-VEP basis). This is largely because of the very low number of VEPs (c. 200) in a system of eventually 67,000 prisoners, meaning that resources were spread widely rather than focused directly on VEPs.<sup>43</sup> This is echoed in the comments of one donor, previously cited in the Relevance section above, who remarked that "the project was supposed to focus on the de-radicalisation of prisoners, but the project conducted a high number of trainings on general prison management and never reached the point to de-radicalise prisoners". An extended discussion of this question is provided in Annex 1.

### **Output 1.1: Strengthened security and safety mechanisms and capacities in prison and amongst prison staff including through improved coordination with other relevant stakeholders**

**The evidence base for establishing this desired outcome is clear, including both normative elements related to general prison administration captured in the NMRs, and PCVE best practice principles** that emphasise the value and importance of coordination with stakeholders both within the criminal justice system (e.g., police) and without it (e.g., CSOs).<sup>44</sup> Programming under this outcome was spread across six outputs and indicators. The indicators, however, suffer from numerous problems. Without descending into a micro analysis, these can be summarised as tending to be output rather than outcome focused (meaning that, together, they build only to a picture of what was delivered, not what was achieved, or what changed, such as '*strengthened* safety and security'). They tend often to be exceedingly vague (e.g., 'prison intelligence system operational by June 2021' –and do not mention where or if this is in pilot prisons or nationally), and sometimes seemingly arbitrary (e.g., '60% implementation rate of security audit recommendations').

**Formal, structured information sharing between UPS and other agencies, including police, was not evident during data collection and field visits,** although impressionistic/ perception data from government counterparts and drafted policy and practice documents certainly pointed towards focused activity and future potential.

**A prison security audit checklist and supporting guidance documents were delivered as zero drafts to UPS, for appropriate modification to national context and conditions.** An international expert was retained as a consultant to develop these prison security audit frameworks and checklists. The delivered material is very high quality and reflects general good practice, in the sense of reflecting international best practice, with a need then for national counterparts at UPS to hone it for national context.

**Unfortunately, though adopted in draft form by UPS,<sup>45</sup> it appears the *Audit Checklist* has neither been piloted nor applied in practice by UPS.** KIIs with various stakeholders cited lack of funds for this, as well as lack of planned mentoring activities in which the international consultant would support UPS in auditor competence training and pilot efforts.

**Dedicated UPS intelligence units at HQ, regional and prison level were another element of the overall architecture.** The ET was told by KIIs that these were in place, though independent evidence of that (e.g., in agency organograms), or activity by such units (e.g., compiled intelligence assessments) was not visible. Thus, the in-practice status and function of these units could not be determined, but signs look positive.

**Early progress in intelligence sharing may have been slowed by non-prison stakeholders' uncertainty of the value of prison-based intelligence on/with/from VEPs.** More than one KII remarked how violent

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<sup>43</sup> Prison population increased from 57,000 at programme inception to more than 67,000 by the close of 2021 and into 2022. UNODC/UNOCT/CTED (2019) SCOPING MISSION TO UGANDA: On the implementation of the joint UN global programme on "Supporting the management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalisation to violence in prisons" (2019-2021); UPS (2021) Monthly Statistics Summary, December 2021.

<sup>44</sup> UNCTED (n.d) CTED Analytical Brief: Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Prison Violence. Dean, C. and Kessels, E. (2018) Compendium of Good Practices in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders. Global Center on Cooperative Security.

<sup>45</sup> Uganda Prisons Service (no date) *Draft Intelligencer Audit Checklist*.

extremist attacks since the project's inception have sharpened intelligence agencies' appreciation for the value of prison-based intelligence. Further, it was felt by KIIs that work done under this project directly supported subsequent inter-agency information flow and thus the broader Ugandan PCVE strategy.

Having said all that (and this will become a constant refrain of the evaluation), given the short time project period (driven by a late start and early termination), given the disruptions of COVID-19, and given the many other capacity constraints to which prisons and other actors in the intelligence community are subject, **the ET finds here good evidence of the building blocks for change being laid in place**, even if change itself (as envisaged in aims and indicators) remains something for the future.

**The project successfully included VEP-focused staff training components and embedded sustainability through integration of training into standard UPS curricular and (a still-to-be-fully-realised) model of bespoke delivery.** Ensuring human resource capacity so that staff can make sense of and implement many of the changes envisaged and supported by the programme is important. As such, project reporting indicates that training in pursuit of this goal took place over the course of the project and triangulated evidence from KIIs and training resource materials confirms this.

### Quality of inputs

An international consultant was retained to develop training materials in support of PCVE to be integrated into the activities of PATS. **A review of these training materials showed them to be excellent, to reflect relevant international standards and norms, to be aligned with national legislation and policy frameworks, and overall to be very suitable.** The integration of these materials was to be achieved via two mechanisms: first, topics on PCVE of relevance to prison officer training were to be developed for integration into PATS training of new prison officer recruits; and second, the same topics were to be covered via dedicated short courses for targeted existing staff at the pilot prisons. This second element is particularly important since the criminal justice training literature illustrates that new-recruit training struggles to produce change when faced with embedded cultural norms in the workplace. A detailed technical analysis of the training elements of the project is provided in Annex I. This is critical to understanding how future programming can improve (perhaps substantially) the present training approach, but too detailed for the present discussion.

**Separately, a high-quality e-training module supporting prison officers' knowledge and understanding of the NMRs was supplied to UPS** via UNODC HQ in Vienna. This module is an established learning modality and subject to the observations made below appears to be high quality and appropriate to address the widespread violations of human rights in Uganda prisons reported to independent human rights monitoring groups.<sup>46</sup>

### Evidence of integration into sustainable practice

The ET was able to review the detailed VEP-focused content to be integrated into the ordinary prison officer training curriculum. **FGD with UPS PATS leadership and personnel reassured the evaluation team that this integration had been done**, though we did not see the amended training materials ourselves.

**The Bespoke Training component was not developed to a point of sustainability during the programme period.** It was developed, the international consultant conducted Train the Trainer training with 36 UPS staff (though 10 of them have now left their roles), an initial course with 97 Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) from pilot prisons was used to pilot the Bespoke model, but it has since languished based on UPS resource constraints.

**Possibly as many as 1000 trainees have begun the NMRs e-training during their residence at PATS, but the online nature of the course presents significant barriers to sustainability.** UNODC data indicates that only 133 prison officers have completed the course, which stands against 2,936 in Kazakhstan, and 625 in Tunisia.

### Independent evidence of training effects or impacts

**No monitoring and evaluation of training effects were programmed and no work has been undertaken to ascertain what difference training has made to on-the-job behaviour or, more broadly, to institutional cultures** (e.g., around attitudes to human rights compliance). This is particularly unfortunate, given what

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<sup>46</sup> US Department of State (2019) *Uganda 2019 Human Rights Report*; US Department of State (2022) *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uganda*. Advocates Sans Frontiers (2023) *Protecting Constitutional and Procedural Rights of Pre-Trial Detainees through Access to Justice in Uganda: A Baseline Survey*. Brussels: ASF.

the evidence-based training literature shows of the tenuous value of 'deliver and forget' approaches to training. This whole area of programming focuses on *strengthened* capacity, but the effectiveness of the project in achieving that change is impossible to determine.

### **Output 1.2: Improved systems and skills in prison administration to individually assess the risks and needs of VEPs as a basis for allocation and programming**

This outcome objective reflects established good practice both in programming for VEPs and more broadly in programming for prisoner risk assessment and allocation within general prison populations.<sup>47</sup> Country preparedness reports (for risk-need assessment and classification decision making) were prepared for all three beneficiary member states by an expert international consultant. **The Uganda classification preparedness report was presented to national counterparts in December 2019.** Titled *Framework for Prisoner Classification Tools and Standard Operating Procedures: Recommendations for the Uganda Prisons Service*, it is a **very high-quality piece of work**. It reflects a mix of international best practice, proposals that well integrate aspects of the Ugandan national context, and a clear cascade of both development work and – importantly – decisions that national counterparts would need to take. It proposes a sequence of initial intake screening, more elaborate but generalised (i.e., all-offenders focused) RNA, and supplementary VEP assessment, plus several related processes and activities.

**While this report was delivered quite early in the project, it preceded by only weeks the onset of COVID-19, with its associated lockdowns and the closure of penal facilities.** Understandably, the focus of prison management swung to the health crisis unfolding and some project funding was repurposed for pandemic fighting purposes.

**Based on initial workshops and discussions with UPS counterparts, the international consultant delivered draft intake classification and RNA tools.** In a converging piece of work, a second consultant, working under CTED, supported evidence-based decision-making around risk-need assessment through the development of an analytical brief. As a **publicly available best practice analytical brief produced for CTED**,<sup>48</sup> the report supported both programming work and wider knowledge dissemination. It noted that data limitations regarding VEPs make assessment and programme allocation for rehabilitation inherently difficult. Without data, there can be no evidence-based decision-making or programming. Thus, both consultants to the project reinforced the importance of collecting local data as a component of effective decision-making around both generalised and VEP-focused assessment.

**Plans to pilot the delivered intake and RNA tools in the six prisons did not come to pass.** It has been difficult for the ET to establish exactly what was done with the tool. We were informed that it is in use at two of the pilot prisons (later updated to five prisons), but that different forms of the tool have been adopted: at least one institution the draft submitted by the consultant is being used; at least one other, modifications have been made to reflect local conditions. These reflect administrative use, not piloting. Piloting involves short-term use and data collection leading to tool refinement and finalisation.

**The current use of the tool appears to be ad hoc, and there is currently no data on what type of results it is producing.** As a matter of urgency some systematic stock take and recalibration back to the pathway outlined in the report *Framework for Prisoner Classification Tools and Standard Operating Procedures: Recommendations for the Uganda Prisons Service* should be undertaken. A technical discussion of these matters can be found in ANNEX I.

**In relation to this outcome, the indicators selected were in some cases more useful but not wholly so.** On the one hand, an indicator that records a system improvement indicated by the availability of new system elements (e.g., availability of SOPs) is good and worthwhile. SOPs and user guides for the intake and risk-need assessments, for example, are visible and of high quality. Overall, however, the outcome errs on the side of simply stating programme delivery objectives and the element of change is not well reflected in either it or its indicators.

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<sup>47</sup> On VEPs see: UNCTED (n.d) *CTED Analytical Brief: Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalisation to Prison Violence*. Dean, C. and Kessels, E. (2018) *Compendium of Good Practices in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders*. Global Center on Cooperative Security. On risk-need assessment and prison programming best practice for non-VEP prison populations, see Bonta, J. and Andrews, D. (2023) *The Psychology of Criminal Conduct*, 7<sup>th</sup> edition. London and New York: Routledge.

<sup>48</sup> UNCTED (n.d) *CTED Analytical Brief: Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalisation to Prison Violence*.

Finally, **evidence of work undertaken under 1.2, and triangulated data suggests almost all activity focused on the classification and assessment element, with little visible evidence of links to intervention-allocation decision making** and the necessity that programmes are suitable and available. This seems to have been a result of the many intervening factors noted earlier, including COVID-related delays, the closure of penal facilities, and UNOCT/UNCCT's decision not to approve a second no-cost extension due to the UNOCT's senior management decision. We heard converging views from KIIs in different capacities and agencies that the decision not to approve the second no-cost extension undermined trust in the funders' commitment to reform, given the hard work national counterparts had put in and the massive stresses and dislocations they had had to deal with during COVID-19.

**Outcome 1.3: Enhanced capacity of prison administrations to deliver inter-disciplinary disengagement interventions on social reintegration of prisoners including VEPs**

**Once again, in broad terms, the outcome goal seems coherent, laudable, and evidence-based** (see footnote references for 1.2 above). However, since ordinary prisoners would not be offered interdisciplinary *disengagement* interventions, it is unclear if the objective is to enhance capacity for general programming or VEP-focused programming. Some key informants suggested an implicit model of VEPs that they are essentially the same as other offenders and, as such, what's good for the general prisoner population should be good for VEPs. This was stated as a fact, yet the evidence base for it is not readily apparent and is not cited in the prodoc where the justification for outcome 1.3 is set out.

**None of the indicators link in any clear way to an independent measure of 'enhanced capacity', and no indicator addresses what seems to be at the heart of the intended outcome, which is the emergence of interdisciplinary engagement interventions in the selected Ugandan prisons.** Once again, the syntax is also less than clear, referring to 'prison administrators' delivering such inter-disciplinary interventions, when one might expect that specialist therapeutic practitioners, as well as faith-based practitioners, rather than administrators, would be drawn upon to deliver 'disengagement' interventions.

Leaving this to one side, **it appears that very little activity occurred under this outcome**, and in KIIs with government counterparts nothing was offered up to suggest that progress was made under this head. Once again, it is probably a case of all the manifold complicating factors, such as Covid-related and funding issues, that account for this.

**Output 1.4: Improved social reintegration prospects of prisoners, including (former) violent extremist prisoners through solid post-release services and/or the resort to alternatives to imprisonment in suitable cases**

**This outcome recognises the importance of the transitional prison-community bridge and includes a number of appropriate indicators**, including wide availability of services to VEPs, interagency coordination of pre-and post-release services, and engagement with the public in communities of return.

Unfortunately, as with 1.3, little activity took place under this outcome. **Where work was done, it was in the area of decongesting prisons**, under the rationale that solving overcrowding is a key first step toward freeing resources for VEP focused activities.

**The funded activity involved pro bono legal aid support provided by the Uganda Law Society to fast-track resolution of petty-offence cases of pre-trial detainees.** Project reporting states that 410 pretrial prisoners received legal aid and sensitisation about their legal options. Within this, 39 prisoners had their cases concluded while a further 23 prisoners were released when prosecutors withdrew their case. The pro-bono legal aid services provided under the project also enabled 14 prisoners to receive bail while another 122 had their cases concluded and were sentenced to community service as an alternative to imprisonment.

**Based on KIIs it appears that additional benefits also flowed from this small exercise.** These included increased awareness among advocates of best practice in the legal defence of petty cases, as well as improved links between the Uganda Law Society and UPS that may lay the groundwork for further pro bono work in support of prison decongestion.

**Provision of legal aid to pre-trial detainees has a solid evidence base for effectiveness in prison decongestion in Africa, including Uganda itself.**<sup>49</sup> However, both the scale and the timelines to achieve impacts on prison population place the present small study in the class of a proof-of-concept attempt, rather than something that might produce outcomes benefitting VEPs in the programming period. Thus, this seems to be an important ancillary activity offering scope for scaling up in the future.

## SUSTAINABILITY

### EQ 6: To what extent have the project benefits continued beyond the end of the project?

*Out of the three member states, Kazakhstan has the most evidence of sustainability. The project built strong local ownership there. By integrating the VEP management modules into the curriculum, Kostanay Academy will continue delivering these courses. All 8 pilot prisons institutionalised the RNA tools. The Kazak government's decision to implement the psychology-related component of RNA in all prisons will facilitate its scaling out. The sustainability of the project deliverables is less evident in Uganda, except for the training modules introduced at PATS. The ET cast doubt about the sustainability of the project benefits in Tunisia due to the lack of opportunity to verify their continuity.*

The sustainability of the project benefits varies among the beneficiary member states due to differences in the launch dates, the level of government ownership, the progress of piloting instruments, and the capacity of prison administrations to implement reforms.

There are strong indications of sustainability in **Kazakhstan**. The most sustainable part is the project deliverables at the Kostanay Academy. First, three VEPs management courses designed for psychologists, VEP inspectors, and prison officers are now an integral part of the national curriculum. These courses will continue to be offered to the prison staff from across Kazakhstan. Kostanay Academy is the only educational institution in the country that trains and re-trains prison staff. Second, the Center for Training of Prison Officers in the PCVE, created with the project support, has been integrated into the Academy's structure and is now fully funded by it. These three VEP-related courses are delivered by the Center. Third, the project increased the capacity of the Academy's instructors (16 people). During FGD, they unanimously admitted that the project significantly enhanced their capacity in VEPs management, which was not taught in the past. According to the FGD, they also improved their teaching skills as the project's workshops also addressed this topic. The major pool of instructors—13 of 16 trained—continue teaching these courses; 3 left (e.g., rotation to other jobs). The Academy has the capacity, interest, and resources to build on the started processes, thereby sustaining the project's benefits. Overall, the project's exit strategy to strengthen the training institutions' in-house capacity to deliver PVE-related courses was appropriate and viable.

The RNA tool represents another strong element of sustainability in Kazakhstan. Prison visits and interviews showed that the RNA tool continues to be used in all 8 pilot prisons. In addition, staff commitment to using it was evident in that they continued to review and revise it so it matched their capacities and needs. In 2023, a psychology-related component of the RNA was mandated for all prisons in Kazakhstan by the Minister of Internal Affairs' Order. This decision will facilitate scaling out of the RNA tool throughout the country. Training courses and materials created with the project's support at Kostanay Academy will be instrumental in scaling out this process. Moreover, the project increased the capacity of a large number of prison staff, including psychologists and VEP inspectors, to use the RNA tool, as discussed in Effectiveness. According to Kostanay Academy, their post-training assessment surveys show that prison staff deepened their knowledge of the RNA tool as well as safety audits, and other VEP-related topics.<sup>50</sup> This finding was echoed during prison visits, when prison administrations

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<sup>49</sup> For a review of evidence, including cost-benefit analysis, see Manuel, C., Manuel, M. and Stewart, S. (2021) *Advancing SDG16.3.2 by Investing in Prison Paralegals to Cut the Number of Unsentenced Detainees in Low Income Countries*. ODI Policy Brief. London: ODI. See also: Open Society Justice Initiative (2012) *Improving Pretrial Justice: The Roles of Lawyers and Paralegals*. New York: Open Society Foundation, including references and country examples therein.

<sup>50</sup> It was reported during FGD with the Kostanay Academy, that they conduct a post-training assessment at the end of each course.



acknowledged the strengthened capacity of their staff. It is expected that they will continue using their new acquired knowledge.

Procurement of equipment for workshops in pilot prisons to develop prisoners' skills and refurbished rooms for family meetings, including renovated children's rooms are other elements of sustainability. The new equipment procured for the prison workshops enhanced the skills of prisoners, including VEPs. The acquisition of new skills facilitated their entry into the workforce after their release. One vivid example is a male prisoner from Pavlodar, who was able to open a furniture enterprise upon his release. According to the interview, he is now employing 20 people, including 6 ex-prisoners, two of whom are ex-VEPs. He stated that the new furniture equipment procured by the project as well as prison-based counselling with psychologists enabled him to start a furniture business and smoothly reintegrate into society. While such case studies are instructive, high-quality empirical monitoring of post-release outcomes (e.g., using control groups or propensity score matching) will be necessary to understand longer term impacts and thus shape future sustainable policy and practice.

Although the Security Audit Framework were approved in May 2022 by the Prison Committee's Chair, the ET found the security audits requiring further support to become integrated into the prison operations and therefore, be more sustainable. They were piloted only in two prisons and not scaled out within the project period. Yet, the project established the foundation for extending the use of security audits to more prisons through the new initiatives. UNODC mobilised funding from the US government for a new programme called '*Returning FTF Detention*', which is introducing security audits developed by the project in other prisons of Kazakhstan. Moreover, it will digitalise security audits, as the paper-based application was seen as the constraint in the project. In addition, prison authorities contacted the EU Office in Kazakhstan to enlarge their knowledge of human rights aspects in the architecture of new prisons. This is seen by the donor as the continuation of the Kazakh government's efforts to improve physical security, a component of the security audit. The EU TAIEX Project later sponsored a study tour of prison authorities to Spain to learn the EU requirements in planning, designing and constructing prisons. These follow-up actions show the commitment of prison authorities to improve the safety and security of prisons, fostered by the project. Overall, the project in Kazakhstan built strong local ownership, which is conducive to its sustainability. The project planning and implementation were closely coordinated with the Kazakh prison authorities at all stages, and this engagement ensured a sense of project ownership.

As the project started late in **Uganda**, there is less evidence of sustainability there in comparison with Kazakhstan. COVID-19 and early project termination were further factors that impeded sustainability. As discussed in Effectiveness, the audit checklist and the RNA tools were not piloted: at least five pilot prisons are using the RNA tools without piloting and refinement, albeit to a limited degree. While lack of digitisation was cited as a reason for lack of wider use, it is critical that the tool should not be digitised before it is piloted, data collected, and the tool suitably refined in light of that data. Ongoing data collection is also required to ascertain tool validity in the longer term. In addition, the Intelligence Policy Framework developed by the project was not signed between UPS and the Ugandan Police Force. Nevertheless, the project ensured the buy-in of UPS in the project's approaches and established close cooperation with the prison authorities. The UPS senior officers regrettably informed the ET that the early project termination prevented them from finalising the piloting processes and using the intended mentorship and resources for fuller integration of the new tools.

The project established the foundation for VEPs management processes in Uganda, which are now supported by a new project funded by the EC and the Government of the Netherlands. The UNODC Kampala Office mobilised additional funding to launch this project in 2023. It is built on the VEP's project, thus, ensuring its continuity. Similar to the VEPs Project, the new project focuses on security audit, RNA, rehabilitation, and CSOs engagement, and works with the same six pilot prisons in Uganda. It will also support the implementation of the Intelligence Policy Framework developed by the project. The UPS's support of the approaches introduced by the VEPs Project facilitated the initiation of the new project.

Training courses on VEPs management at PATS, along with the training manual, represent the sustainable element of the project. Six modules on PCVE were integrated into the PATS curriculum, including the Human Rights module, and were delivered to the recruits. Around 5000 recruits have already completed these PCVE modules, and future recruits will also be trained. The project also increased the capacity of 36 instructors of PATS with 26 continuing to teach there. The increased capacity of these instructors is another facet of the project sustainability.

The bespoke course (one-week training) was developed with UPS by the project to introduce the prison staff not attending PATS to the basics of PCVE. This included conceptual, legal, policy, and ethical aspects, as well as PCVE techniques such as assessment, classification, rehabilitation, and reintegration. It was delivered to the first cohort of in-serving staff (97 NCOs), but not rolled out further due to the shortened duration of the project and UPS resource constraints.

The project played a crucial role in advocating for the inclusion of VEPs issues in the Ugandan PCVET strategy, which is also a sign of sustainability as it will be implemented by the government. In addition, ICT and other equipment provided to UPS and PATS are being used to support the VEPs' management-related interventions and beyond.

The sustainability of the project benefits in **Tunisia** is not evident. Given the lack of evidence to demonstrate the implementation and ongoing use of the security audit and RNA tools in pilot prisons, or any policy to replicate them in other prisons, the sustainability of these deliverables remains unclear. The functionality of the Centre for Research and Studies of Violent Extremism is also unknown. The Tunisian authorities regarded the VEP-related information as highly sensitive, which restricted the project staff from verifying the work of the Center or any tool proposed by the project. The ET also lacked the opportunity to communicate with the Tunisian government for verification. Moreover, ownership of the project by the Tunisian government was jeopardised by political changes, cabinet reshuffles, and other factors detailed in the Effectiveness section. In addition, there is no evidence that the CSOs Network on Preventing Violent Extremism in Prisons, which the project promoted, is still functional.

A high number of Tunisian prison staff (267 in total), including female officers, attended workshops on security audits, prisoner classification, RNA, rehabilitation, post-release services, and human rights.<sup>51</sup> There is an anticipation that they will use the newly gained skills in managing VEPs to some degree.

It is also worth noting that the project served as a catalyst for a more comprehensive programmatic approach to addressing the issue of VEPs within UNOCT/UNCCT. More specifically, it led to UNOCT/UNCCT launching several additional initiatives to gain a deeper understanding of the VEPs phenomenon, including a project on global statistics and data on VEPs and a project on exploring alternative sanctions for violent extremist offenders in Indonesia funded by the Government of Japan.

## HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER EQUALITY, DISABILITY INCLUSION, and LNOB

**EQ 7: Were human rights and gender-sensitive indicators built into the intervention? If so, to what extent have data been captured against these?**

*Human rights considerations permeated all aspects of the project. Promotion of NMRs in managing and treating VEPs was central to the project design. Human rights indicators were embedded into the project design. Nevertheless, specific indicators to measure the project impact on the enjoyment of human rights by VEPs or improvements in the behaviour of prison staff in treating VEPs were missing. The project did not monitor and document the performance of existing indicators related to human rights promotion. Gender-sensitive indicator, specifically gender representation in capacity-building events, was built into the project design and was systematically reported.*

The project design was informed by human rights principles. In particular, it was centred on the human rights and rule of law principles, supporting Member States to strengthen their compliance with human rights obligations. The project design and implementation were also anchored on the Human Rights-Based Approach's pillar necessitating to analyse the capacity gaps of duty-bearers (prison services) in meeting their obligations and to address this gap. In particular, the project outcome aimed to increase the capacity of prison staff to effectively manage VEPs through utilising tools (e.g., RNA) developed to promote human rights compliance. The project outputs were also geared to support the fulfilment of the human rights of VEPs by using security audits, prison-based rehabilitation, and post-release services. The results of integrating human rights into these tools are discussed in the next chapter.

<sup>51</sup> Performance Monitoring Table for Tunisia, project document

In terms of human rights indicators, Ugandan and Tunisian work plans integrated one specific indicator, *“Prison conditions improved in line with NMR”* (Output 1.1 indicator). The project intended to contribute to the improvement of prison conditions by supporting the development of safety audits. Some other output indicators were also associated with the advancement of the human rights of VEPs. For instance, one of the Output 1.4 indicators was *“to increase the number of prisoners benefitting from post-release services”*. Post-release services aim to assist prisoners to reintegrate into society, thereby minimising limitations on their socioeconomic or political rights. Another indicator of the Output 1.4, which is *“the number of cases in which non-custodial sanctions are applied to returning FTFs,”* was also linked with the promotion of the human rights of prisoners. It is related to measures promoting alternatives to imprisonment in order not to deprive FTFs of their right to liberty and enable them to access community-based support for reintegration.

However, the project lacked more specific indicators to measure the project's effects on the enjoyment of human rights by VEPs. In particular, there were no indicators to capture a decrease or increase in human rights violations (e.g., torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment of prisoners), or improvements in the behaviour of prison staff in treating VEPs. Moreover, the project lacked systematic monitoring and reporting on the performance of existing output and outcome indicators linked with human rights promotion. The reluctance of the member states to disclose statistics on VEPs and security/safety-related issues also contributed to the lack of data. Member States were cautious in handling and sharing data related to VEPs. These all impeded the ET from assessing the progress made in attaining these indicators. Further, the project design, which focused on duty bearers, silenced VEPs themselves and their capacity to contribute to the project MEL through engagement on how they experienced changes, if any, to human rights compliance by those holding power over them.

In terms of gender-sensitive indicators, the project outcomes and outputs, along with their associated indicators, did not explicitly reference the WPS agenda, the WPS National Actions Plans (NAPs) or CEDAW. As detailed in sections below, the gender-specific needs of female VEPs were addressed through the development of gender-specific RNA tools and the initiation of gender-specific rehabilitation programmes, which were implemented only in Kazakhstan. Additionally, gender perspectives were integrated into the prison training programmes in Kazakhstan and Uganda. However, the only gender-specific indicator set by the project was a target of 30% women's participation in capacity-building activities across four Outputs 1.1-1.4 for Uganda and Tunisia. Unlike human rights indicators, the project systematically captured information on this indicator. The project encouraged women's participation by stressing this need in their communication with government authorities, as evidenced by KIIs. Table 6 shows the project attained the set target of 30% in Uganda. While Kazakhstan did not set up a gender-sensitive indicator in its work plan, the project encouraged women's participation. On average 30.3% of women took part in workshops, ToTs, and training courses in Kazakhstan

**Table 5. Female Participants in Capacity-Building Events in Uganda and Tunisia**

Outputs	Output Target	Actual participation, Uganda	Actual participation, Tunisia	Actual participation, Kazakhstan
Output 1	30%	24.4%	16.3%	32.9%
Output 2		27%	24.2%	29.5%
Output 3		No training	No training	27,6%
Output 4		41%	13%	31,3%
<b>Average</b>		<b>30.8%</b>	<b>17.8%</b>	<b>30.3%</b>

Source: the ET's calculation based on the project documents

Participation of female prison officers in trainings and workshops aligned with the WPS National Action Plans (NAP) of three MSs. In particular, one of the objectives of Kazakhstan's WPS NAP is to increase participation of female officers from the security and defence sector in capacity-building events, prioritizing indicators that measure the number of women trained,<sup>52</sup> The WPS NAP of Uganda for 2021-2025 aims to educate all the security sector officers, including women, on human rights. The project's indicator of ensuring that at least 30% of training participants were women corresponded to this NAP, as these women also received training on human right.<sup>53</sup> The participation of female prison staff in capacity-

<sup>52</sup> <http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Kazakhstan-NAP.pdf>

<sup>53</sup> <https://wipcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/NAP-III-Popular-Version.pdf>

building events is indirectly linked with Tunisia's WPS NAP for 2018-2020.<sup>54</sup> It aimed to promote the women's involvement in governance and decision-making as a strategy to confront terrorism. The enhanced capacity that the project sought to achieve facilitates greater opportunities for women to access decision-making and engage in governance.

Moreover, in Kazakhstan, the UNODC e-learning course on the NMRs was completed by 32% female prison and security officers out of a total of 2,936 officers. The absence of the female pilot prison in Tunisia could be one of the reasons for the lower women percentage there. In Tunisia, the project targeted female prison staff working in women's prisons. Since prison services typically have more male staff, and these percentages of women participants in Uganda and Tunisia are positive.

In addition, the project provided gender-disaggregated data regarding the composition of the project's Working Group (WG) members. For example, 23% of the Interagency Working Group on Prisoner Classification in Uganda were women.

While equal participation and representation are supporting factors for achieving gender equality, alone they are insufficient".<sup>55</sup> UNODC guidance is clear on this. For example, it stipulates that in establishing gender sensitive indicators, "sex ratios alone are insufficient indicators for gender equality".<sup>56</sup> Therefore, the project also intended to develop gender-sensitive RNA tools and gender-responsive disengagement programmes, the outcomes of which are discussed in the section below.

#### **EQ 8. To what extent has the project supported and resulted in strengthened respect for the NMRs?**

*The project supported NMRs through training modules introduced in Kostanay Academy and PATS, capacity-building events, and promotion of the UNODC online course on NMRs. As a result, a large number of prison staff in three beneficiary member states raised their awareness of NMRs. The RNA tools and disengagement programmes derived from the RNA findings, provided the prison staff in Kazakhstan with more integrated approach in addressing the needs of prisoners, including their medical and mental health concerns. However, the absence of specific project indicators and an ineffective MEL system hindered the ET to gauge the extent of changes in respect for NMRs. At the same time, evaluation findings suggest that human rights violations are less prevalent now in pilot prisons in Kazakhstan due to the greater and intensified exposure to NMRs as a result of the project interventions.*

Since the NMRs were a fundamental theme, the project promoted them through an array of interventions. First, the project promoted [the UNODC e-learning course on NMRs](#) in three beneficiary member states. In **Kazakhstan**, the project cooperated with Kostanay Academy to translate this course into Kazakh, which was subsequently certified by UNODC. This translation expanded access to this course for the native-speaking prison and security officers, enabling them to complete the e-course in Kazakh. The course eventually became a mandatory part of the training curriculum at Kostanay Academy. As noted in Effectiveness, 2,936 security officers completed this course during the project period, and an additional 2,000 officers after the end of the project (around 5,000 in total). According to KIIs, Kazakhstan became a champion in the Central Asian region by reaching the highest number of graduates from this e-course. Other Central Asian countries (e.g., Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) are learning from the experience of Kostanay Academy in institutionalising the NMR course. The government counterparts noted that Kostanay Academy has become a centre of training excellence for VEP management, including human rights of prisoners.

Moreover, all three training modules on VEPs management start with human rights norms, including NMRs, to increase human rights awareness of the prison staff. These courses also cover Bangkok and Tokyo Rules.

In **Uganda**, the project promoted the e-learning course on NMRs through PATS, resulting in 133 security officers obtaining their course completion certificates between 2019-2022. While positive in one respect, just 133 completions in Uganda compared to 2,936 in Kazakhstan align with national counterparts' widely held view that the e-learning modality significantly reduces the course's potential uptake, and by that, the impact of the NMRs on Ugandan prisons. Beyond the e-learning course, however, one of the six training

<sup>54</sup> <https://www.cawtarclearinghouse.org/storage/4632/National-Action-Plan-1325.pdf>

<sup>55</sup> UNODC (2020) *Mainstreaming Gender in Justice Projects/Programmes: Briefing Note for UNODC Staff*. Vienna: UNODC. p.12

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

modules on VEPs management introduced in PATS is the Human Rights course. It highlights national, regional, and international human rights norms, including NMRs. Moreover, the second module on the Treatment of Inmates also emphasises humane treatment and refers to the NMRs. Other modules such as Social Rehabilitation and Reintegration also outline the importance of human rights in treating prisoners, including VEPs. These modules have become the required courses for all recruits of PATS.

In **Tunisia**, the project was one of the first international projects to introduce the UNODC e-learning course on NMRs among prison staff, according to the ex-project staff members. In total, 625 security officers completed it within the project period (2018-2022). Several interviewees remarked that this e-course and other workshops devoted to human rights norms were among the few project areas receiving full government backing. The government counterparts encouraged prison staff to complete this e-course. In 2022, the project team was informed by the prison authorities that this e-learning course was integrated into their prison staff training curriculum. The ET was unable to verify this information with the Tunisian authorities.

In three beneficiary member states, the NMRs were also covered at numerous workshops with at least one session focusing on human rights norms, particularly NMRs. The project used these events as an opportunity to raise awareness among prison staff about the importance of complying with international standards in prisoner treatment. RNA tools and security audits were also based on human rights and NMRs. The RNA tools also took into account the recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Terrorism to promote human rights. As a whole, all these interventions demonstrate that the project supported the NMRs. However, the key question is whether these activities contributed to changing the attitudes of prison staff towards prisoners, including VEPs, and resulted in the reduction of human rights abuses, which are still the cases in these three beneficiary member states.<sup>57</sup>

The key issue is the lack of project monitoring results and assessment of the effects of conducted interventions and trainings. This limited the ET from determining the extent of respect for the NMRs by the prison staff or assess changes in strengthened respect for NMRs. Face-to-face interaction with the prisoners, including VEPs, was not a part of this evaluation to determine the level of these changes.

Meanwhile, the data collected by the ET, which include prison visits and interviews, provide evidence of improved conditions for prisoners and increased human rights mainstreaming on prison service practice in **Kazakhstan**. The enabling factor was the RNA tools. They continue to be used in all 8 pilot prisons. The prison staff noted the RNA tools assist them in taking a comprehensive and integrated approach to address the needs of prisoners, including their medical and mental health concerns with attention to gender considerations. The RNA tools were found to be instrumental in identifying treatment, education, and medical programmes to better meet the needs of prisoners. As a whole, the evaluation findings suggest that while prisons are places where violations still occur, they are less prevalent now in Kazakhstan, and this trend was stated to have been enhanced by the project. An interview with an ex-prisoner also shows that the project contributed to reducing tensions between prisoners and prison staff. He admitted the prison staff started "to respect more the rights of prisoners". The project interventions such as the use of RNA tools, capacity-building events, and human rights awareness activities are the aspects contributing to this outcome. Moreover, the project refurbished rooms for meeting the family members, including children's rooms, renovated premises for rehabilitation work with psychology counsellors and made other refurbishments to improve conditions for prisoners.

In **Uganda**, RNA tools are being used in five prisons, but there appear to be two versions (both unpiloted) of the tool operating, and the extent of their use remains unknown. While in Uganda the RNA has no specific elements related to violent extremism, it was seen as a necessary element to enhance existing reception procedures and tools, enabling increased standards of classification, categorisation, and sentence planning in accordance with standards and guidance in the NMRs. This would also, if applied, provide a better platform for specialised assessments, notwithstanding the comments in Effectiveness above regarding the balance between such general penal reform goals and the funded objectives of delivering VEP-focused change.

The effects of project interventions on the level of respect for the NMRs in **Tunisia** are unknown.

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<sup>57</sup> 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kazakhstan, Tunisia, and Uganda, the US Department of State. Available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/>

**EQ 9: To what extent has there been institutional change conducive to systematically addressing human rights, inclusiveness, and gender considerations?**

*The project achieved more results in Kazakhstan in building long-term mechanisms to systematically address human rights and gender considerations. It was attained through institutionalising RNA tools in pilot prisons, including gender-responsive assessments, training courses capturing both HR and gender aspects, as well as gender-specific rehabilitation programmes. In Uganda, the PATS' mandatory modules serve as enduring elements for the systematic sensitisation of the recruits and future prison staff about human rights, gender, and LNOB principles.*

**Human rights:** The above section discussed the extent of institutional changes introduced by the project in addressing human rights in three beneficiary member states. In a nutshell, **Kazakhstan** established more sustainable processes. These included human rights training at Kostanay Academy, including a mandatory UNODC e-learning course on NMRs, and RNA tools to be replicated soon in new prisons of Karaganda. Moreover, the psychological part of the RNA will be rolled out in all prisons of the country. In **Uganda**, the PATS' two mandatory modules, *Human Rights* and *Treatment of Inmates*, which incorporated human rights norms and NMRs, represent the sustainable instrument to address human rights among the recruits. In **Tunisia**, the project placed significant emphasis on human rights norms in its capacity-building activities. However, the project lacked data if this knowledge was translated into actions and changed the attitudes of prison management and operations to adhere to human rights standards. In other words, the institutional changes in Tunisia are largely unknown. Annex 1 (Extended Findings) provides more details on institutional changes conducive to systematically addressing human rights in three beneficiary member states.

In addition, the project delivered a high number of capacity-building activities related to human rights. On one side, it is reasonable to expect that the prison staff, who completed them and particularly, the UNODC e-learning course, have raised their awareness of the NMRs. In three beneficiary member states, a total of 3,758 security officers, including prison staff, completed the e-course on NMRs during 2018-2022. It is also expected that prison staff, who completed the newly developed VEPs courses at Kostanay Academy (600 prison officers), also learned about NMRs. Post-training assessments conducted by Kostanay Academy showed that prison staff improved their knowledge, including human rights norms. A large number of recruits in PATS (around 5,000 people), who passed through the new VEP training, might have increased their understanding of NMRs as well. The project also organised awareness-raising meetings and Nelson Mandela Days in pilot prisons in Kazakhstan and Uganda. However, as noted above, awareness-raising does not always lead to behaviour change. In addition, it is often hard to apply new knowledge when the prisons face so many challenges (e.g., overcrowding or resource constraints to improve prison conditions), or where organisational culture on the prison wing, ground level opinion-leaders, and other factors are not clearly aligned with the intended changes.<sup>58</sup>

**Gender:** The project addressed the gender-specific needs of female VEPs, using various strategies, while their results varied among the member states. First, the project integrated gender-specific questions into RNA tools (e.g., questions on pregnancy). The RNA tools were further piloted in the female prison in Kazakhstan and continue to be used there. During data collection in Uganda the ET were informed that the RNA tools were piloted in only two prisons, neither of which were women's. No reasons were given for this, but later correspondence during finalisation of the Final Report listed Luzira Women's Prison as a pilot site. No further information on the type or duration of use, or nature of the piloting was provided. Piloting results are unknown for Tunisia.

Second, the project mainstreamed gender perspectives into the prison training programmes in Kazakhstan and Uganda. VEPs management course at Kostanay Academy, which was designed for prison-based psychologists, included Bangkok rules. The course provides guidelines for the treatment of women prisoners and non-custodial measures for women offenders. In addition, the course addresses differences in providing treatment to female and male VEPs. The training materials continue to be used to sensitise the prison staff about gender-responsive approaches. In Uganda, the *Human Rights* module extensively covers the Bangkok rules and discusses the healthcare needs of female prisoners, pregnant women, and women with children. In Tunisia, the project organised a workshop for prison staff and CSOs focusing on the special needs of female prisoners, and gender-sensitive prison management. However,

<sup>58</sup> For an extended discussion of these factors, including the empirical evidence base, see the Uganda section of Effectiveness, above.

the project did not get to the stage of developing training modules on VEPs management in Tunisia to include the Bangkok rules.

Third, the project intended to implement gender-specific rehabilitation programmes, but succeeded only in Kazakhstan. The project supported vocational training and procured equipment for manicure and makeup artistry in the female prison in Kazakhstan. The prison administration officers stated that these project's inputs contributed to the employment of female prisoners after their release. They also noted these workshops will be used in the future, and funds are sought to procure materials. In Uganda, no gender-responsive prison-based social rehabilitation programmes were implemented, except for the procurement of gender-specific items during COVID-19. Notwithstanding that, in Uganda the initial roundtable on reintegration had a strong gender focus, though no follow up was possible for the implementation of roundtable recommendations in the absence of a second no-cost extension. In Tunisia, no gender-specific rehabilitation work was carried out.

Fourth, as discussed in the previous section, a relatively high percentage of female prison staff (e.g., slightly over 30% in Kazakhstan and Uganda) took part in the capacity-building events. This indicates that female prison officers also learned about the new VEP-management approaches and processes to apply them in treating female VEPs.

All these interventions show that the gender perspectives were mainstreamed into the project design and implementation. Yet, the results are distinct, with **Kazakhstan** having made more institutional changes to support gender considerations systematically.

It is noteworthy that the project encouraged the recruitment of female trainers, experts, and staff. In all three beneficiary member states, as well as at the UNODC headquarters office, project coordinators were women. This indicates that gender considerations were factored into the staff composition in order to promote women to leadership project positions.

**LNOB:** One of the approaches to promote LNOB principals was via training modules. In Uganda, for example, a *Human Rights* course extensively covers vulnerable prisoners, including prisoners with mental health care needs, prisoners with disabilities, LGBT prisoners, juvenile prisoners, and older prisoners. The course highlights specificities and requirements in treating and providing services to these groups of prisoners to prevent any form of discrimination against them. Sensitising recruits, the future prison staff, about LNOB principals is crucial in changing their attitudes toward vulnerable categories of prisoners.

In addition, the RNA tool is responsive to LNOB values. It integrates questions to assess physical and mental health needs of prisoners, enabling the prison officers to take appropriate actions. In particular, it includes questions on physical disability of prisoners, mental health issues, literacy deficits (basic reading and writing skills), and language limitations. In this light, the RNA tool helps to establish those factors that may impact a prisoner's ability to adjust to a correctional setting or participate in rehabilitation activities, and implement necessary interventions.

However, a large amount of international best practice recognises the importance of working directly with those that programming is intended to benefit (e.g., in the form of reduced extremist violence risk, or lower threat of radicalising influence). Including VEPs in the indicator architecture (e.g., via their perceptions of improved management or safety, better tailoring of rehabilitation services, etc.) would have embedded the LNOB principle of beginning with the furthest behind first, and with the emerging UN consensus on the importance of incorporating prisoner voices to support evidence-based policymaking.<sup>59</sup> While the project framed national counterparts as beneficiaries, the effects of change among those beneficiaries would always have to flow via VEPs themselves to turn into anything meaningful. Thus, VEP exclusion from the project indicator and MEL process was far from ideal, since it obviously denied project planners any insight at all into what effects their programming was having on the ultimate target group of the work.

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<sup>59</sup> 14 March 2023, UN Open-ended intergovernmental expert group meeting on model strategies on reducing reoffending: Working paper by the Secretariat, p.17. E/CN.15/2023/13

## CONCLUSIONS

The project came at the right time in view of the challenges and capacity gaps in managing VEPs in three beneficiary member states. The project's alignment and relevance were anchored in a number of global strategies and instruments, such as *GCTS*, the *UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*, the *UN Security Council Resolution 2396*, and the *NMRs*. The project was also pertinent to the UN Capacity-Building Implementation Plan for Countering the Flow of FTFs, which was developed in close coordination with CTED. The evaluation found the project relevant to the national contexts and policy priorities of the three beneficiary member states. It was also pertinent to the needs of prison systems to enhance the capacity of prison staff to manage VEPs, using new instruments and approaches such as RNA tools, and security audits.

The project design was informed by UNODC's previous experience in prison management, its Handbook on the VEPs Management, and NMRs. The project architecture offered a holistic four-pillared approach for managing VEPs, but largely centred on the delivery of activities and activity-related indicators over substantive outcomes. The MEL was not effectively managed to demonstrate effectiveness at the outcome (as opposed to activity) level.

The evaluation confirmed that the project was flexible to adapt to COVID-19, but fell short in adapting to the changed political landscape in Tunisia. Finally, the joint implementation modality changed over time, when UNODC took a stronger role in project implementation towards the end of the project. Furthermore, the ET found overwhelming feedback during the data collection that the UNODC played a central role in the project implementation, using, or establishing, its field presence and previous experience in prison management and criminal justice reform while UNODC brought its specialized knowledge and resources to the project.

There is evidence of good effectiveness of the project, with a number of contributing factors. These included: the benefits of longer duration implementation (e.g., from when a project team was in place and work plans agreed upon); the lesser extent and scope of COVID-19 interruptions and national authorities' capacity to pivot to online implementation; the existing capacity and resources of beneficiary state prison administrations; and their capacity to engage simultaneously in four thematic areas. Given that this was notionally a five-year programme, it is notable that the implementation period in Uganda, for example, accounting for a slow start and very disruptive COVID-19 restrictions, was probably about 18 months. Effectiveness ranges from high to low both within and across beneficiary member states. More success was found in the first two output areas than in the third and fourth for a variety of reasons, including truncated programming timelines, delivery schedules, and UNOCT/UNCCT's decision not to approve a second no-cost extension due to its senior management decision. Some of what was effective was general reform work, rather than VEP-targeted reform. In some cases, there was very effective development that, while not reaching planned targets, provides a platform for some of the intended results if further funding is secured in the future. The capacity of authorities to simultaneously manage (and absorb) multiple complex reforms affected the project's effectiveness.

Effectiveness was supported by the high calibre of technical assistance, though some elements would have been more effective if they had more carefully considered the applicability in the local context and re-adjusted due to the change of the context (Tunisian case). Less effectiveness was found in the use of security audits, but the project was effective in working on related reforms such as interagency cooperation on security matters. Where new approaches related to RNA were proposed, they worked best where they built upon existing practice and were developed in partnership with working groups that included suitably qualified national expertise as well as national authorities. RNA tools are empirical instruments and their actual utility is unknown until local data on administration and effectiveness are collected, yet no such minimum-standard systems were visible.

Work on rehabilitation and reintegration was very uneven across the project. Progress and effectiveness were far more obvious where there was a baseline of enabling policy and practice, and work in this area was more mature. In those contexts, where prison administrations were under immense systemic stress or had overwhelming numbers of prisoners associated with violent extremism, getting started in these areas was much more challenging and less was achieved. There are significant and important achievements from the project that are of a very high standard, and this is even more noteworthy when considering the external factors, including COVID-19.



In terms of sustainability, it varied among beneficiary member states due to differences in the launch dates, and the level of government buy-in, ownership and capacity to implement such extensive reforms. Early project termination also jeopardised the sustainability of the project. Kazakhstan has the most evidence of sustainability where the project built strong local ownership. The inclusion of VEP management courses into the national curriculum and operationalisation of the RNA tools in all eight pilot prisons are the elements of sustainability. There was also policy support (orders by the Minister of Internal Affairs) for replication of the psychology-related component of RNAs in all prisons in the country. In Uganda, the sustainability of the project deliverables is less evident, except for the training modules introduced at PATS. The project benefits are not evident in Tunisia.

The project design and implementation were guided by human rights principles, including NMRs. Increasing the capacity of prison staff to meet their obligations as per international norms, such as NMRs, was the idea behind the project architecture. The project promoted human rights through a wide range of interventions. These included training modules at Kostanay Academy and PATS, capacity-building event, and promotion of the UNODC e-course on NMRs. Moreover, project instruments (e.g., RNA tools, security audits, or in-prison rehabilitation programmes) intended to advance the human rights of VEPs and other prisoners. However, indicators to measure the project's impact on the enjoyment of human rights by VEPs or improvements in the behaviour of prison staff in treating VEPs were not developed. Because of this missing element and the ineffective MEL system to assess existing indicators related to human rights, the ET was unable to assess the extent of changes with respect to NMRs. Nevertheless, the evaluation findings indicate that human rights violations are becoming less common in pilot prisons in Kazakhstan, which may be partially due to the greater and intensified exposure of prison staff to NMRs as a result of the project interventions.

To promote gender equality, the project targeted female prisons and women prison officers. The project encouraged the participation of female prison staff in capacity-building events. The project results in mainstreaming gender considerations varied among member states. Kazakhstan progressed more by launching and operationalising gender-sensitive RNA tools. It also implemented gender-specific rehabilitation programmes by delivering vocational training and workshop equipment for female prisoners. In addition, mandatory training courses in Kostanay Academy covered Bangkok rules. In Uganda, the PATS' compulsory modules sensitise the recruits about gender perspectives. However, the project in Uganda did not implement gender-specific RNA tools or disengagement programmes largely due to COVID-19 and early project termination.

The LNOB principals were highlighted in training modules. These courses focus on specific requirements in treating vulnerable prisoners such as prisoners with mental health care needs, prisoners with disabilities, LGBT prisoners, juvenile prisoners, and older prisoners. These courses aimed at raising awareness of prison recruits of the rights of these groups and preventing any form of discrimination against them. The project also developed RNA tools that integrated LNOB values. However, VEPs were not included in the project architecture and MEL processes to enable both the project and ET to assess the project's effects on them.

## LESSONS LEARNED

1. **Progress towards effective management of VEPs and prevention of radicalisation to violence in prisons is viable.** Projects that benefit from comparable MS experience, where human rights and a gender sensitive approach are integral, with an appropriate range of targeted interventions, implemented in a timely fashion, through high-quality relationships with MS, leveraging non-state stakeholders and using a broad cohort of suitably qualified and experienced experts, can lead to significant and positive change in the management and treatment of VEPs.
2. **Alignment of project and policy frameworks:** Operational and procedural changes with adaptations in staff practice in a prison system are much more likely to deliver progress and planned change when there is conceptual clarity and directives issued at a policy level of the national partners. This is particularly so in a project like this with complex, evolving, and sometimes contentious issues within the PCVE continuum and where government strategy and policy documentation are still in draft.
3. **Continuity of human resources:** When dealing with complex and sensitive programming areas that are viewed as national security issues by the authorities, implementing agencies benefit from project team stability, timely appointments and retention of staff, to enable the establishment of trusting professional relationships. Where this was evident in the project, it was seen as a

contribution to positive progress and where absent was cited as a contributory factor to limited project progress.

4. **Technical assistance inputs:** Where inputs such as proposed tools or techniques are provided by the project, the greater extent to which national authorities and national experts contribute to their development, adaptation, testing, and application is of positive consequence to their final integration and the quality of their use within a system. This is even more essential in the PCVE sector where the emergence of VE needs PCVE responses that directly address the contextual push and pull factors and do not rely on blue-print PCVE lessons from contexts where relevance and comparability to the MS are limited.
5. **Procurement:** When procurement processes are delayed and there is no clear explanation to national authorities, it undermines trust and harms levels of cooperation. In the project where it was timely and focused and filled very specific gaps, it was shown to support and catalyse positive reform.
6. **Equally relevant does not correspond to equally important:** Issues that are clearly relevant because they correspond to the government-documented strategies or are identified as areas of need, simply because prison systems have multiple and complex needs, do not always mean equally shared priorities between all project stakeholders. In this project, issues that were legitimately deemed relevant did not always have equal weighting or importance for the authorities. The development of country work plans assisted in prioritization at the commencement of the project to reflect this and was a positive approach.
7. **High-quality results-based management (RBM) design supports effective programming.** A programme logic clearly communicated by theories of change assists, guides, and makes transparent why the things done are being done, including via reference to evidence-based empirical research underpinning programme approaches and choices, in addition to normative instruments.
8. **Delivering training does not correspond to creating change.** Training delivery and effectiveness measurement may fail to reflect evidence-based best practices. Programme planning should include independent measurement of training effects, such as behavioural change among prison officers, to evidence outcome-level change.
9. **Indicator data supports in-programme MEL:** Establishing from inception a database of high-quality indicators allows programme managers to track progress towards programme goals and supports responsive and adaptive programme management.<sup>60</sup> In a project like this where some anticipated indicators are less accessible, IAs, donors and authorities should reach an agreement from early in implementation to find and agree on alternatives and incorporate these into project documentation, monitoring and reporting.
10. **Better planning for the joint implementation modality:** To ensure greater coherence in projects jointly implemented by UN agencies, sufficient time should be allocated during the inception phase for the planning and distribution of implementation functions through MoU's or workplans to support achievement of overall project objectives. The evaluation findings show that such planning should be based on the comparative advantages, field presence, and technical expertise of each agency.
11. **Project adaptability due to changing context:** Implementation of the project in three different MS demonstrates that when projects face changes in political context or confront complex bureaucracies, employing adaptive decision-making allows adjustments to work plans and re-allocation of resources into areas that can bring more effective change for the beneficiaries.

## **GOOD PRACTICES**

The evaluation captured the following good practices:

1. **Prison programmes that are rehabilitative in nature and intent and that respond to a range of risk-associated needs identified in a robust and multidimensional assessment process. This should include rigorous individualized assessment utilizing evidence-based methods, as well as taking into consideration, where appropriate, intersectional factors including, but not limited to, gender, age, religion, ethnicity, socio-economic status. This process should include integrated safeguards, ensuring it addresses the multifaceted and interlinked issues and concerns of**

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<sup>60</sup> For example, see Serpe, L., Ingram, M., & Byom, K. (2022). Nimble adaptation: Tailoring monitoring, evaluation, and learning methods to provide actionable data in complex environments. *New Directions for Evaluation*, 2022, 97–106.

- prisoners.** Relying on one approach would be insufficient. This comprehensive practice, promoted and in some cases utilized by the project, contributed to encouraging prisoners' pro-social choices and supported their disassociation with violent extremism.
2. **Staff and prisoner relationships are essential for positive PCVE outcomes.** The project's emphasis on staff attitudes and behaviours and the support of a whole institution approach, with the aim that all prison and custodial staff work in a way that supports PCVE outcomes, was a good and essential practice.
  3. **The work to support a robust, nuanced, and safe assessment of risk to lead to not only rehabilitative interventions but also appropriate custodial conditions and treatment was an important practice to ameliorate the likelihood of an unnecessarily punitive or stigmatizing experiences for prisoners.**
  4. **PCVE rehabilitative approaches that focus on VE-related risk and needs but in addition, address prisoners' needs associated with regular welfare concerns, such as legal status and family contact, was a good practice as it contributed to enhancing relationships between prisoners and state officials. It also can be an accessible pathway to addressing more complex prisoner issues and concerns related to association with violent extremism.**
  5. **The partnerships with civil society for post-release support mitigated the limitations of the absence of state capacity in some communities and locations. Such an approach reduces some of the stigmatization for former prisoners or returnees if they are deemed to be 'under observation or control'.**
  6. **Project activities and approaches that recognized prisons do not operate in a silo but are part of both the justice and security architecture, reflect good practice in that prisons alone cannot deliver positive PCVE outcomes.** Issues such as security and intelligence, case back log and legal representation, and community reintegration require robust and systemic interagency cooperation. This good practice was enhanced when it promoted the establishment of documented processes and tools to guide and deliver interagency cooperation.
  7. **Project activities that unpacked complex issues and disabused myths (e.g., 'VE is just about religion', 'women cannot have VE agency', 'all those who are associated with VE have mental health conditions') were very positive practices in addressing understandings that may lead to stigmatization and ill-considered approaches and treatment.**
  8. **Societal norms and legislation related to gender are of huge influence on the experiences of women, especially in rehabilitation and reintegration efforts. Activities tailored to account for these influences demonstrated good practices.**
  9. **New approaches, processes, and tools developed through the project's support benefitted from the good practice of testing, supported rollout, and monitoring, which refined and improved them and built confidence in their utility and application.**
  10. **Exit strategy to invest in the development of training modules:** Prison systems in the three beneficiary member states face high staff turnover and rotation and this is likely to be the case in other countries as well. In this situation, training materials and courses serve as sustainable instruments to sensitise new prison staff to basic and innovative techniques in VEP management. When these new courses are officially integrated into training institutions, they contribute to a viable project exit strategy.
  11. **Establishing partnerships with prison authorities** is crucial to launching and implementing projects on a sensitive topic such as VEPs management. This also facilitates building local ownership, one of the preconditions for sustainable project results.

## RECOMMENDATIONS<sup>61</sup>

### 1) Technical assistance inputs

All technical assistance inputs (e.g., processes, tools, policies, training materials) must be developed to be context specific and fit for purpose (e.g. accounting for national practice, regulation and resources).

<sup>61</sup> As the project has already ended, all recommendations are formulated to benefit the future projects in this field. All these recommendations are fairly low cost and developed to improve the project management practices as well as procedures in planning, MEL systems, procurement, and other areas. If improved, they will have impact on all projects.

Effectiveness	Priority Level: High
Responsibility: Implementing Agencies (IA) project teams	Timeframe for Implementation: Short term
<p>Each technical assistance input should go through various stages of development, with quality control exercised by the implementing agencies' project team. Steps should include testing inputs for organisational cultural and practice influences, capacity and regulations. These steps should also include robust and thorough engagement with national authorities and experts to assist development, test the inputs and revise them, as required. Technical assistance inputs that involve documented elements should further be officially adopted through a formal process that integrates them once finalised (e.g., ministerial directive or Gazette).</p>	

<b>2) Policy framework</b>	
<p>Projects related to violent extremism should ensure that there is a shared conceptual clarity with all levels of the national authorities and partner agencies.</p>	
Relevant Conclusion # (or Criteria): Effectiveness	Priority Level: High
Responsibility: IA HQ teams and project teams	Timeframe for Implementation: Short term
<p>Briefing events and high-level roundtables with apex management of the relevant government department or agency should be part of the very initial activities of any such project that addresses complex issues. The IAs should take the due diligence to directly link concepts, terminology, and practices to existing legislation and regulation to foster an enabling environment. Parallel or later work with operational staff should reference, and be based upon, agreements from these higher-level meetings. An apex management technical working group should be operational and regularly serviced by the IA to contribute to a whole agency approach. IA should where possible, run such events with other present UN agencies, to emphasise consistency.</p>	

<b>3) Human resources and procurement</b>	
<p>Human resource planning, timely recruitment, and efficient procurement should be applied to contribute to positive outcome, and reduce the likelihood of harm to the project progress, as well as implementing agency and donor reputations.</p>	
Relevant Conclusion # (or Criteria): Effectiveness	Priority Level: High
Responsibility: IA HQ and Regional Office	Timeframe for Implementation: Short-term

The IA should undertake a detailed review of the gaps during implementation to maintain project team posts as operational and to understand the obstacles to effective procurement performance. Findings should be used to enhance future project planning and implementation.

**4) Relevance and prioritization**

In projects with predetermined broad thematic areas, prioritisation, approaches and activities in those thematic areas must be influenced to the greatest extent possible by national authorities.

Relevant Conclusion # (or Criteria): Relevance, Effectiveness, and Lessons Learned

Priority Level: High

Responsibility: IA HQ and donors

Timeframe for Implementation: Short to long term.

The IAs and donors to collectively engage with national authorities when issues arise and beyond formal coordination or steering meetings, to ensure they have the opportunity to hear directly views and justification for suggested prioritisation and approach. Where there is a viable justification from authorities that fits within the financing agreement parameters, adjusted focus and sequencing of thematic areas should be considered as an important strategy for getting started and building momentum.

**5) High-quality RBM design supports effective programing**

Project design and implementation documentation should include theories of change appropriate to different conceptual levels (e.g., impact level, outcome level, activity - such as training), and where technical assistance is planned the empirical evidence-based literature supporting programme approach and anticipated outcomes should be visible and linked to SMART indicators and a MEL system for data capture.

Relevant Conclusion # (or Criteria): Relevance and Effectiveness

Priority Level: High

Responsibility: IA HQ teams and Project Teams

Timeframe for Implementation: Long term

IA to develop or reinforce support systems for project teams and compliance management at the project approval stage to ensure alignment with RBM guidance and the visibility of empirical evidence-based citation supporting technical assistance design, anticipated outcomes, and risk mitigation strategies.

**6) Delivering training does not correspond to creating change**

With training forming a lynchpin of this and many other projects, it is crucial that it should be designed and measured in accordance with criminal justice training best practice and that program planners should be supported to achieve this.

Relevant Conclusion # (or Criteria): Effectiveness

Priority Level: High

Responsibility: IA HQ management, HQ teams and Project Teams	Timeframe for Implementation: Long term
UNODC should support program design capacities both centrally (in Vienna) and in field offices by (a) developing and continually updating best practice guidance based on the professional-training research literature, including with respect to training-effect measurement and training-effect maintenance; and (b) ensuring appropriate compliance systems for alignment with this guidance are in place in project approval systems.	

<b>7) Indicator data supports in-programme MEL</b>	
Flexible, adaptive and responsive programme management rests on a high quality MEL system grounded on SMART indicator data	
Relevant Conclusion # (or Criteria): Relevance and effectiveness	Priority Level: High
Responsibility: IA HQ management, HQ teams and Project Teams	Timeframe for Implementation: Long term
From the project inception, a MEL database should be constructed and suitably resourced, including via specialised MEL staff expertise, to support programme managers to track the effects of their activity and where appropriate make responsive and adaptive shifts to work plans. A modifiable template for such a MEL system should be developed and made available. It should be rolled out with suitable technical support, and provision should be made (e.g., via fields for entering hyperlinks) for source verification, such as to member states' documents or statistical collections. It should include capacity for appropriate graphic data representation (e.g., figures, pivot tables) to support dissemination of results to both direct and indirect beneficiaries of programming.	

<b>8) Better planning for the joint implementation modality</b>	
Within the framework of a joint implementation modality, well-coordinated projects can lead to sustained collaboration and joint efforts for scale-up.	
Relevant Conclusion # (or Criteria): Relevance	Priority Level: Medium
Responsibility: IAs HQ management	Timeframe for Implementation: Medium-term
At the project planning stage, implementing agencies should devote sufficient time to discussing the role of each agency in the implementation of project interventions (e.g., through the organisation of an inception workshop). Planning should be a consultative process. The outcome of such discussions should be the development of a work plan outlining the responsibilities of each agency for the delivery of concrete project activities, as well as the sequence of engagement. This will help to establish a common understanding of functions, build trust, and avoid heavy lifting imposed on one agency. M&E approaches and responsibilities should be agreed upon and planned for at an early stage. It is also advised to develop a work plan with milestones to gauge each entity's delivery of planned interventions.	

<b>9) Project adaptability due to the context change</b>	
As countries are sometimes prone to political turbulence, changes in cabinets or legislation, projects should be ready to adjust their work plans to the changed context quickly and effectively.	
Relevant Conclusion # (or Criteria): Relevance and Effectiveness	Priority Level: Medium

Responsibility: IA HQ management, HQ teams, and Project Teams	Timeframe for Implementation: Medium-term
<p>Since projects are often implemented in a complex political environment, it is recommended to assess new risks, and thereafter, make necessary modifications to the work plan. Realistic performance indicators should be developed. A flexible and agile approach allows the accommodation of changes to develop interventions better tailored to the changed landscape. The proposed changes to the project design should be widely discussed with the donor(s) as well as national counterparts. Rapid revision can increase ownership and cost-effectiveness. It also implies that a country-by-country approach should be applied in regional projects targeting several countries, which have distinct capacities and resources of government agencies.</p>	

<b>10) Targeted strategies for the broad integration of human rights, gender equality, and LNOB principals into projects</b>	
To effectively promote cross-cutting issues, projects should design and implement targeted strategies	
Relevant Conclusion # (or Criteria): Human rights, gender equality, disability inclusion, and LNOB	Priority Level: High
Responsibility: IA HQ management, HQ teams, and Project Teams	Timeframe for Implementation: Short to long term
<p>Since human rights, gender equality, and LNOB considerations are not always effectively integrated into projects, it is essential for the IAs to develop and implement specific strategies. First, the project objectives and outcomes should explicitly address gender and human rights issues, while the project framework should detail how they will be assessed. In this regard, developing measurable indicators to track progress, including impact on gender equality and human rights, should be essential components of the M&amp;E system. Additionally, involving the Human Rights and Gender Units in the project design process is crucial. Their expertise can help shape the project proposal and ensure that gender, human rights, and LNOB considerations are embedded from the outset. Establishing a formal review process where draft project proposals are examined by the Gender and Human Rights Section prior to approval will be beneficial. This step will provide feedback and ensure alignment with best practices.</p>	

<b>11) Relevance of national HR, LNOB and gender standards</b>	
Highlighting national benchmarks and guidance on HR, LNOB and gender provides additional traction to advocacy using international standards and good practice	
Relevant Conclusion # (or Criteria): Human rights, gender equality, disability inclusion, and LNOB	Priority Level: Medium
Responsibility: IA HQ management, HQ teams, and Project Teams	Timeframe for Implementation: Medium-term
<p>Human rights, gender equality, and LNOB considerations and approaches within projects should build explicitly on those elements that exist within the national legal framework and regulation in combination with international human rights standards, guidance and good practice. Reliance only on international standards misses the opportunity to utilize existing and accepted national standards related to human rights, gender equality, disability inclusion, and LNOB.</p>	

<b>12) Local gender norms</b>	
Customs and norms related to gender at a national and even a local level can have a very specific influence on programming and activities involving women	

Relevant Conclusion # (or Criteria): Human rights, gender equality, disability inclusion, and LNOB	Priority Level: Medium
Responsibility: IA HQ management, HQ teams, and Project Teams	Timeframe for Implementation: Medium-term
Gender equality can be deeply impacted by very specific and localized law and custom. Projects should ensure that gender-based programming and activities fully account for these local and national factors. Therefore, prior to planning actions intended to be supportive of women associated, however, with violent extremism, a full analysis on the specific gender legislation and customs must be undertaken.	

<b>13) Enhancing capacity of project teams and beneficiary MS on human rights, gender equality, and LNOB considerations</b>	
To effectively implement strategies aimed at promoting human rights, gender equality, and LNOB considerations, it is crucial that the project teams and beneficiary MS have the necessary capacity	
Relevant Conclusion # (or Criteria): Human rights, gender equality, disability inclusion, and LNOB	Priority Level: High
Responsibility: IA HQ management, HQ teams, and Project Teams	Timeframe for Implementation: Short to long term
Enhancing capacity of project teams and beneficiary MS on human rights, gender equality, and LNOB considerations is vital for their effective mainstreaming and reaching impactful outcomes: This can increase awareness and facilitate effective mainstreaming of these considerations into project design and interventions, thereby helping to reach the objectives set in these areas. Capacity building will also enhance commitment of the MS to these principles throughout the project lifecycle and beyond.	

<b>14) Partnerships with CSOs should incorporate do no harm principles</b>	
Where CSOs are involved in programmes which are at the nexus of security and social welfare, IAs should mitigate any potential negative response to CSOs from government	
Relevant Conclusion # (or Criteria): Human rights, gender equality, disability inclusion, and LNOB	Priority Level: High
Responsibility: IA HQ management, HQ teams, and Project Teams	Timeframe for Implementation: Short to long term
IA partnerships with CSOs working on sensitive PCVE issues, particularly rehabilitation and reintegration, should have safeguards in place, e.g., transparency, protocols and documented permissions to ensure that their legitimate activities, as protected under international human rights law, are not restricted by the Government and to ensure protection and avert risks for the CSOs working in this space. Early programme development and consultation with MS where such work might be implemented should include mutual awareness raising of unintended impact of CT measures on credible and legitimate CSO initiatives.	



# ANNEXES

## ANNEX I. EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

### EFFECTIVENESS

#### External influences:

**Kazakhstan:** In March 2019, the President of Kazakhstan since its independence in 1991, resigned, and the Chairman of the Senate, assumed the presidency. The Senate Chairman won the subsequent presidential election in June 2019<sup>62</sup>. A change in such a long-standing leader naturally affected operations of the government and its officials. These changes were followed by protests, which occurred regularly during the project duration<sup>63</sup> and culminated in January 2022 with a state response that included deploying the military. These circumstances would have hindered engagement with officials involved with security matters and access to places of detention.

**Tunisia:** The project in Tunisia was implemented during a time of highly disruptive political change and just after a period of social unrest and protest.<sup>64</sup> During the project period, there were three presidents, including one acting following the death of the incumbent in July 2019. A new President took office in October 2019 and implemented measures that changed the country's political landscape, including the suspension of parliament in 2021, which remained suspended for nearly two years.<sup>65</sup> Within the project duration, there were four Prime Ministers and changes at a ministerial level were frequent. This degree of change of officeholders is usually accompanied by adjustments in policy, strategies, and external relationships. Of direct consequence for the implementation of the project was the requirement to establish relationships with new officials, in particular where those officials were responsible for the authorisation and implementation of the activities. KIIs reported that from 2021, decisions that had previously been delegated to the Prison Administration now had to be authorised by the Minister of Justice as well, adding another level of political and administrative transaction that was of consequence to the rate of implementation. KIIs also reported that since 2021 almost all sectors of international cooperation have become more complicated due to adjustments in approach by the government, and this was specifically seen with great intensity in international cooperation related to prisons and PCVE. During COVID-19, the prison service expressed additional humanitarian needs to which the project responded. In addition, the adjustment by the government to remote working was reported by KIIs as slow, partly due to inadequate ICT capacity and resources, but also reflecting the general hesitancy of engagement by authorities at that time.

**Uganda:** The presidential election in January 2021 resulted in the re-election of the incumbent and the continuation of the Commissioner General of Prisons, though as is typical during election times, the project was still required to accommodate a lull in activity while officials were otherwise occupied.

An unforeseen and consequential event was the bombings in Kampala in November 2021 claimed to have been carried out by ISIS affiliates, IS's Central Africa Province (ISCAP), known locally as ADF. The government identified ADF as the perpetrators of a number of attacks and planned attacks throughout 2021<sup>66</sup>. Attacks like this resulted in justice and security agencies very much focusing on the aftermath, with access to prisons being reduced and a prompt reconsideration of government priorities and approaches, all meaning that ongoing initiatives were slowed. During COVID-19, the urgent need to pivot to a temporary humanitarian response was very clear and the project adapted well (see further details below). While not VEP specific, there is strong logic in addressing such urgent needs and some of the pre-conditions for meaningful VEP interventions. In terms of ICT capacity to continue project activities, Uganda's resources were not robust enough to ensure a seamless transition to remote working. In

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<sup>62</sup> <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/why-nazarbayev-resigned-and-what-happens-next>

<sup>63</sup> <https://cabar.asia/en/analysis-of-protests-in-kazakhstan-2019-2022>

<sup>64</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/11/tunisia-hundreds-arrested-violent-protests-army-deployed-cities>  
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/1/26/tunisia-austerity-protests-go-on-amid-wave-of-arrests>

<sup>65</sup> <https://www.dw.com/en/tunisia-parliament-has-first-session-since-2021-suspension/a-64971651#:~:text=Over%20a%20year%20and%20a,out%20by%20Saied's%20new%20constitution.>

<sup>66</sup> <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2021/11/analysis-islamic-state-targets-uganda-with-bombings.php>

addition, restrictions on gatherings, transport,<sup>67</sup> and the closure of schools for nearly 2 years<sup>68</sup> had an impact on the possibility of gathering officials to a greater extent than in other locations.

## **EFFECTIVENESS FINDINGS FOR KAZAKHSTAN**

### **Output 1.0.: Project implemented in line with national needs, and project results and lessons learned widely disseminated**

**The project focused very much on national needs.** As reported in Relevance, KIIs overwhelmingly confirmed the issues, priorities and approaches identified in the 2018 scoping mission and during implementation addressed national needs. Issues related to more prisoners being identified and categorised as having extremist ideology, the influence of this prisoner cohort on other prisoners, the absence of an evidence based approach to understanding the risks and needs of these prisoners, the lack of nuanced in approach to this cohort of prisoners in terms of their conditions and treatment, the absence of meaningful rehabilitative opportunities both in terms of psychosocial counselling, employment and relationships outside of prison, and the gaps in provision of all of post release services were all noted as significant themes. There was, however, repeated concern noted by KIIs that legislation, and sometimes unreformed approach related to detention, highlight ongoing gaps related to emerging good practice and international standards relevant to VEPs. The work plan was officially agreed in March 2019.

**The comprehensive approach of the project was highly appropriate in meeting national needs.** The multiple approaches of the project, different sub-components, variety of types of support and activity – new approaches, documented tools, integrating these into policy and regulation, human capacity building, and materials and equipment support were confirmed as highly effective in addressing the range of needs. This holistic approach in addressing multiple and different needs mirrors programming practice guidance.<sup>69</sup> Within this context it was emphasised by KIIs that the high standards of implementation by the UNODC project team in Astana was much valued and an essential element of highly effective delivery. Throughout the duration of the project, various interagency and high-level fora were convened. These included specific working groups and a project steering committee. These were convened early within the project implementation, and the project steering committee met regularly.

These fora were also the opportunity to disseminate project ideas, lessons, and results. Dissemination was also supported through working directly with prison authorities. There were high level events also related to the International Day for NMRs and the final conference in Kazakhstan, which brought together prison officials from Uganda and Tunisia.

**The project met needs that were identified in Government PCVE programmes and strategy.** The project was relevant to the State Programme on Countering Religious Extremism and Terrorism identifying clearly some of the needs the project intended to address, and partially indicating an outline of some of the approaches. This is just to reiterate one more aspect from this strategy:

*Convicted persons in prisons to be provided with information and awareness raising counter-propaganda. Institutions of the penal and correctional system are supported with operational measures aimed at the prevention and suppression and spread of radical ideology.<sup>70</sup>*

The government had a commitment to which the project was aligned and the project had the opportunity to work with the government to develop interventions.

### **Output 1.1.: Strengthened security and safety mechanisms and capacities in prison facilities through improved coordination with other relevant stakeholders**

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<sup>67</sup><https://www.bristol.ac.uk/policybristol/policy-briefings/uganda-covid19-response/#:~:text=The%20threat%20of%20COVID%2D19,March%202020%20and%20January%202022.>

<sup>68</sup><https://www.exemplars.health/emerging-topics/ecr/uganda/how-did-uganda-respond-to-the-covid-19-pandemic>

<sup>69</sup> See more chapter 3, Operational Guidelines on the preparation and implementation of EU financed actions specific to countering terrorism and violent extremism in third countries, European Commission, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 2015

<sup>70</sup> (un-official web translation).

**Formal and institutionalised improved coordination towards safety and security was not evident through the data collection of the evaluation. There was however considerable activity that intrinsically required more, or prompted time-bound, coordination.** Work supported by the project that increased coordination included multi-agency and multi-disciplinary participation in capacity building activities, interagency working groups, interagency training modules, the prison audit process that depends upon different stakeholders, the development and sharing of data and information across agencies, and specific training development activities such as with Prosecutor General's Office (GPO) on inter-agency cooperation and information sharing.

**The application of the security audits required and initiated new types and levels of coordination and assisted the authorities to identify security related needs.** The joint work of the Interagency Working Group (IWG) for the security audit demanded the interagency sharing of data and new cooperation through the development and piloting of the audit. The majority of IWG members were from the Prisons Committee, and others from the Department on Countering Extremism, GPO, National Security Committee, Committee on Religious Affairs, and Ministry of Information.

**The security audit is valued by prison authorities.** The prison Security Audit Framework, its Checklist and Reporting Guidelines developed with the project support were endorsed on 18 May 2022 by the Order of the Chair of the Prison Committee. The audit was developed and tested in two pilot prisons (one medium-risk security prison and one high-risk security prison) in the designated pilot phase. The term pilot phase means that all activities under this umbrella are seen as time bound and to an extent experimental, this influences what happens with the innovation and practices, such as the security audit.

**A platform for strengthening security has been introduced through the piloting of security audits.** There was good progress in the development, the beneficiary revision and testing of the audits though the audit has not delivered the fullest potential. Government officials reported that some of the findings of the pilots had enabled them to identify gaps, some of which had been addressed (e.g., the introduction of new security scanners). Conceptually, there remains some uncertainty how it relates to existing inspection functions and its overlap, if any, with existing financial audit processes. There remain needs and opportunities to ascertain how existing and discreet intelligence analysis can be integrated and contribute to the audit process. The manual application of the audit (paperwork) is also seen as an area which is a limitation, and the process of digitalisation could enhance its applicability and frequency of use.

**The project has contributed to a flow of data and wider involvement of government departments in the sector.** The activities that generate new data and the project's approach of supporting interagency involvement was much appreciated by KIIs. The improved flow of higher quality data (e.g. more government departments having an increased awareness and understanding of the relevant issues) was noted by KIIs as instrumental in the strengthening of security. The broadened range of government agencies with involvement for PCVE in prisons is positive: it somewhat diminishes a purely security focus and has added a rights-based approach in relation to this category of prisoners<sup>71</sup>. This is seen as a direct contribution to strengthened safety mechanisms for prisoners.

**Safety and security have been strengthened through a broader awareness of a human rights approach to prison management.** KIIs noted that awareness raising alone will not deliver a human rights compliant system nor alone improve security, but stated that human rights awareness was an essential part in reforms needed and contributed to the progress they observed. While not an activity unique to the project, during the project period and with the encouragement of project staff, around 3,000 security officers (e.g., prison staff, policemen, GPO's staff, and investigators) completed the NMRs online course. Kostanay Academy translated this course into Kazakh. Since the project's completion, an additional 2,000 security sector officers completed the NMRs course, bringing the total number of officers, including prison staff, to 5000.

#### **Output 1.2: Improved systems and skills in prison administration to individually assess the risks and needs of VEPs as a basis for allocation and programming**

**The staff in the pilot prison have improved skills to individually assess the risks and needs of VEPs and use that assessment data for good prison management and programming for prisoners. Within the pilot prisons, there is widespread use for all categories of prisoners of the RNA tools.** The RNA tool was

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<sup>71</sup> For more on the benefits of a whole of government approach, see Compendium of Good Practices Measuring Results in Counter-Terrorism and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, 2023

developed through the provision of technical assistance using good international practice – reflecting learning and expertise for established comparable practice,<sup>72</sup> building upon existing relevant practices already officially used within the penitentiary systems (the RNA tool is aligned with Article 95 of Kazakhstan's Penal Code "Assessing Prisoner's Behaviour for Individualisation of Punishment") and has been adapted to the Kazak context through the input and expertise within the IWG for RNA.

**The RNA tools and processes build on some existing national practice, which is important for its introduction and long-term acceptance.** The users of the RNA tool in Kazakhstan are committed to its ongoing implementation and improvement as evidenced by the efforts to adjust and enhance based on the lessons learned through its use within the pilot phase. The users of the tool (prison staff in Karaganda and Pavlodar male and female prisons as well as Prison Committee officials) spoke very positively of the technical assistance and training they had received and the new skills and knowledge they had gained for their work. The new approach incorporated and built upon existing national relevant practice which was described as a key factor in its utility, and acceptability and would contribute to its sustainability.

**The RNA tools have contributed to the individualisation of treatment of prisoners in particular those who are categorised as VEPs.** The risk and needs process and tools piloted additional elements that address association with violent extremist organisations. Those specific findings feed into risk reduction measures and sentence planning. The previous practice described to the ET reflected the generalised categorisation and treatment of this cohort of prisoners. The application of the RNA tools reveals a range of needs and guides interventions in support of VEPs. The interventions for prisoners associated with violent extremism are more tailored to some of the needs identified through the RNA.

**Scaling out the RNA tool.** Within at least one of the pilot provinces (Karaganda), the RNA tool will in addition be used in the prisons that were not initially part of the pilot phase.

**The RNA tool and process require enhancement and improvement for its fullest effectiveness.** There are procedural adaptations that need to be further tested, finalised, and reflected in regulation. Some of the issues to be addressed include sequencing of the completion of the assessment process by the different professional groups, who have responsibility for them, and a process by which all the assessments and findings are combined into an overall rating or some such benchmarking. The transfer of health services inside prisons to operate under the Ministry of Health requires further work with that Ministry and its personnel to ensure the health section of the RNA tool is formally completed in a timely fashion and to a high standard and in coordination with the other professional groups, who have responsibility for it. The paper-based method currently used for the RNA was reported by KIIs as an impediment to its effectiveness. This could be overcome through some digitising, which would also offer the opportunity to gather relevant information from existing databases and store assessment results in a systematic manner.

### **Output 1.3: Enhanced capacity of prison administrations to deliver inter-disciplinary disengagement interventions on social reintegration of prisoners, including VEPs**

**Prison staff have an enhanced capacity to deliver interdisciplinary disengagement interventions for social reintegration as a result of project support.** In the prisons, where RNAs have been implemented, the prison authorities and their partners have a better understanding of appropriate interventions they should and could deliver for the disengagement of all prisoners, including VEPs. The disengagement interventions as a result of enhanced assessment processes can be more tailored to the individual needs of prisoners. Kostanay Academy has developed new materials that focus on the psychology of VEPs in its re-training courses, which is now the core element of the teaching programme. Based on technical assistance from the project, the Prison Committee revised the documented role of Religious Counsellors and how they approach their work, drawing upon lessons learned and good practice guidance.

**Staff have benefited from training and mentoring in RNA.** KIIs reported that the training they had received, online, in person and through testing and mentoring was of direct positive consequence in their related work. The training modules for this work included:

- for psychologists working with VEPs and other prisoners;
- for PVE inspectors (theologians);
- for prison officers.

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<sup>72</sup> Handbook on The Classification of Prisoners, UNODC 2020

They are integrated into the curriculum and training resources of Kostanay Academy and delivered by the Center for Training of Prison Officers in the PCVE, which was officially established in 2019 with project support. The training materials that had been used and will continue to be used to improve the knowledge and skills of relevant staff responsible for disengagement activities. These curriculum and materials integrate key international standards such as the NMRs, Bangkok, Beijing, and Tokyo rules.

**The provision of materials and equipment has improved the quality of the disengagement services available in pilot prisons.** Audio visual equipment enhanced the work of religious counsellors. It has allowed them to deploy a wider range of, and more engaging, material related to alternative narratives. The refurbishment and materials provided to pilot prisons related to psychosocial services, including counselling extended the range of interventions for disengagement for prisoners including the VEPs. The enhanced environment for these activities, supported by the project, was reported by authorities in the prison to have increased prisoners requesting services from these professional groups.

**The provision of materials and equipment for skills development has increased the numbers of prisoners, including VEPs participating in disengagement services.** Before the project, in one of the pilot prisons only 5 prisoners worked in the furniture workshop. With project support, this has increased to 40, including up to 17 VEPs. Prisoners gained income from their work and increased skills. Work is still required to establish sustainable mechanisms for skills development interventions, which are not self-funding. For example, the nail manicure workshop, which had been very popular with women prisoners, has temporarily ceased operation whilst the prison service sought further funds to replenish raw materials. Those skills acquisition interventions, which were based on a business model whereby the products generate income to sustain the activity, were not identified as having such challenges.

#### **Output 1.4: Improved social reintegration prospects of (former) VEPs through solid post-release services and/or the resort to alternative to imprisonment in suitable cases**

**There was limited obvious change that indicated improved social reintegration prospects of former VEPs.** In terms of sequencing pilot activities, post-release services logically come after RNA and rehabilitation services inside prison. This output would have been implemented later, and therefore, was more vulnerable to delays of COVID-19 and the shortened duration of the project in the absence of the second no-cost extension. A total of three of the eight activities in this output were cancelled due to the absence of the second no-cost extension:

- *Develop a format for individual post-release plans for prisoners*
- *Piloting individual post-release plans for prisoners*
- *Develop training modules on the preparation of individual post-release plans for prisoners.*

**There were some discreet positive changes that can act as a good starting point for improved reintegration. Prisoners had improved conditions for family contact.** Prisoners and their families benefited from the project provision of materials to increase viability and enhance conditions of prisoner and family visits. Prior to release and of direct consequence to reintegration, fostering or reestablishing positive family and community benefits are of the key contributing steps<sup>73</sup>.

**Prisoners used vocational skills gained through project support and were able to secure employment post release.** In Pavlodar, prisoners, including VEPs have found employment in a furniture workshop and were able to gain an income to contribute to their stable reintegration.

#### **Outcome: Increased capacity of prison staff to effectively manage violent extremist prisoners and to prevent radicalisation to violence in prison system of Kazakhstan**

**There is overwhelming information that identifies increased capacity of prison staff.** Some of this increase in capacity is seen to have a direct positive influence on the effective management of VEPs and the prevention of radicalisation to violence in the prison system of Kazakhstan (processes, approaches, and skills that prompt an enhanced understanding of VEPs), and positive adaptations in their conditions and treatment (individualisation and a broader scope of risk and needs response delivered to a higher

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<sup>73</sup> See Chapter Six: Connecting with Friends, Families and Communities, Council of Europe Handbook for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, 2016

standard). The extent to which staff effectively manage VEPs and prevent radicalisation to violence in the prison system is not only dependent on these factors and the overall national counter-terrorism and PCVE approach. General conditions of detention and what happens in the community also influence prisoners' attitudes and behaviours.

**Staff capacity has been increased to good effect in relation to security audits. The piloting of the process offers increased options for safety, security, and good prison management.** In May 2022, the Prison Security Audit Framework, its Checklist, and Reporting Guidelines were endorsed by the Order of the Chair of the Prison Committee. The fullest benefits of this innovation require some further adaptations, enhanced application through linking the audit to existing databases for ease of use and capturing existing relevant data, ensuring discreet intelligence analysis can feed into the audit, training to support its rollout to other provinces, and procedural enhancements such as its digitalisation.

**Staff capacity and delivery have been increased in the application and use of results from RNA and this enhances capacity related to management of VEPs.** Assessing risks and identifying needs (responses) to address those risks are core elements in the management of VEPs in terms of conditions and treatment. They also offer a key contribution to the prevention of radicalisation in prisons.

**Staff capacity and delivery of rehabilitative services have increased, which contributes to the prevention of radicalisation to violence in prison and contributes to the likelihood of more effective management.** The higher quality of delivery through new staff knowledge and skills, the increased range of rehabilitative activities, and the improved quality have led to more and according to KIIs, increased willingness of VEPs to be involved. The importance of the willing involvement of VEPs in constructive activities organised by the government is seen as an important indicator and part of the disengagement process. The reports from KIIs of the increased willingness of VEPs to engage with psychosocial services is also a meaningful indication of increased capacity to effectively manage VEPs and to prevent radicalisation to violence in the prison system.

**Staff capacity through training has been enhanced through all aspects of the project and within several key government agencies.** Staff rotation, including retirement, however, depletes the pool of trained staff in the key functions. Integrating some of the modules into the curriculum as has happened with the Kostanay Academy is a good start in ameliorating the negative consequences of staff rotation and loss of knowledgeable staff. Other steps will be required to maintain adequate levels of trained staff while new approaches, systems, and tools are integrated and institutionalised.

## EFFECTIVENESS FINDINGS FOR TUNISIA

The depth and details of findings related to effectiveness in Tunisia reflect the very limited opportunities for data collection. Effectiveness in Tunisia was influenced by multiple factors over and above the consequences of COVID-19. There were extensive and profound political changes in the period of implementation, which are well documented, go well beyond what was anticipated in the project document in terms of assumptions, risks, and mitigations. Some of the consequences of the political change did manifest themselves in ways that undermined the assumptions of the project:

**Table 6. Project Assumptions and Their Changes**

<b>Assumptions documented in Prodoc</b>	<b>What happened in Tunisia</b>
1. Governments of all beneficiary countries are willing to engage with the project. Situations of internal instability and/or critical incidents do not affect national ownership of the project	Internal instability affected engagement with the prison authorities
2. The project is able to implement technical assistance services in line with assessment results and/or evidence-based practices and relevant expertise, without excessive political interference	Additional layers of decision making in partners slowed implementation rate
3. Sensitivities surrounding the issue of radicalisation and violent extremism and of its manifestation in prison settings do not undermine the project's access to prisons in general, and to VEPs in particular	PCVE became an increasingly sensitive issue for the authorities. Access to prisons was not always possible, in line with a general

	reduction in willingness of the government to engage on this topic
4. Solid partnerships and communication channels built on trust and mutual respect are established with relevant counterparts, in particular prison administrations, in all beneficiary countries	Changes in officials and incomplete project staffing hindered the opportunity to build trust and mutual respect, and limited partnerships and communication
5. All beneficiary institutions show active commitment and buy-in to the project, as evidenced by, inter alia, the allocation of sufficient and stable human resources for training and other activities	Less active commitment resulted in authorities not attending some planned events
9. The project time scale is realistic and its overall budget sufficient to achieve the outputs and specific objective. The Project Steering Committee supports project management in its work.	The delays experienced made the time scale unrealistic

While the political changes and its (absence of decision makers, changing decision makers, changing decision making processes and authorisations) are demanding resource (time) expensive for a project to deal with and are beyond the project's control, there were project-controllable elements that exacerbated the impact of these occurrences. Based on evaluation findings, three issues are identified which made it more difficult to manage these external issues and which, on balance, contributed to the slow and incomplete progress towards the Tunisia outputs.

**1) Incomplete staffing complement.** For the duration of the project in Tunisia, a staff team of three was planned: a full-time Project Manager, 75% time; a Project Officer, and a 40% Finance Assistant. There were significant gaps in this planned staffing model. For instance, from Sept 2020 to March 2021, there was no Project Manager, with much of the burden of backstopping this role being taken by the Project Officer with support from Vienna HQ. The Tunisia monitoring table at this time indicates little activity, particularly the sort that would have required substantial participation of the authorities (notwithstanding the consequences of COVID-19). KIIs stressed that authorities' optimal engagement is when they have regular contact with project officials and there is time to build a trusting relationship, particularly when dealing with such sensitive issues as surrounding violent extremism. The roles of Project Officer role and Finance Assistant were not fully staffed for the duration of the project. Delays in recruitment and contracting were mentioned by KIIs, with recruitment functions being fulfilled by UNODC Vienna (broadly for international staff) and the UNODC Regional Office in Cairo (broadly for national staff).

**2) Procurement delays.** In terms of building trust and meeting and managing expectations, KIIs reported that discreet procurement (material, equipment and costs of works outside existing framework agreements) was subject to extraordinary delays, which frustrated beneficiaries and undermined the work to build the essential trusting relationships. The ET understands that this type of procurement is done through the UNODC Regional Office in Cairo, but has no means to explore why there were such delays.

**3) Project inflexibility.** The third factor in the control of the project and its donors that KIIs close to the project reported was that authorities' perception of project rigidity, which did not adapt to adjustments in beneficiary needs. In the absence of the opportunity to meet with authorities in the evaluation, the ET does not have clear detail on the nature of proposed adjustments nor the means to assess the reasonableness of the adjusted needs of the authorities, though KIIs close to the project noted the authorities' perception and that this further undermined the nature of cooperation and delayed processes of engagement, authorisation and implementation. Project flexibility was also suggested to have been an impediment in other ways. Limited progress of the project and engagement with authorities should have prompted practical reflection, communication with donors, and proposed adjustments with mutual plans and actions to overcome the causes of slow implementation.

The final element related to effectiveness which was similar for all countries, but seems to have been compounded in Tunisia due to the relatively slow progress of implementation, was the absence of the second no-cost extension, which is reported as resulting in 12 of the 56 activities not being completed. It is also worth noting of the 56 activities, six were reported as complete through participation of authorities in the final conference in Kazakhstan in September, 2022. The ET does not have means to find if completion of so much through this one event was always planned. Other activities, while reported as complete, do not have descriptions that convey a real sense of completeness. While in principle a second

no-cost extension would have offered time and resources to make more progress, it is unclear, accounting for external and internal issues, how much more would have been achieved in Tunisia.

Overall, in terms of completion being one measure of effectiveness, progress in Tunisia looks limited. In addition, the absence of evidence from authorities of the adoption and implementation of reforms is a further challenge in making findings for effectiveness. The ET notes that the inability to get clear information and feedback from the authorities, which is similar to their tentative engagement during periods of implementation, does not necessarily mean things are not being done. The ET further notes that problems with implementation have not been found to be attributable to staff involved with implementation, finding that implementing staff worked with innovation, resilience and to high professional standards, despite all the problems encountered during implementation.

### **Output 1.0.: Project implemented in line with national needs and project results and lessons learned widely disseminated**

**The project was designed in line with national needs.** The scoping mission report records the prison authorities identified the following priority areas: (i) providing support to the implementation of project Tawassol;<sup>74</sup> (ii) strengthening capacity of prison staff to prevent and counter violent extremism in prisons and manage violent extremist prisoners, including some safety and security capacities; (iii) supporting development and implementation of disengagement interventions for all prisoners, not only focusing on violent extremist prisoners, to avoid granting of special status to VEPs; (iv) improving contacts of prisoners, including VEPs with the outside world (families, community, civil society, etc.) and (v) strengthening capacity of state bodies to provide support to prisoners during their re-entry into society.

The prison authorities, within the larger approach developed by the Ministry of Justice of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, identified capacity building and the development of a pilot project for the rehabilitation and reintegration of VEPs, which too are consistent with the needs addressed through the project.

**There was incomplete data collection to fulfil meaningful dissemination of lessons.** The limited information sharing by authorities and implementation MEL tending to rely upon activity recording and reporting, limited the usefulness of results or lessons to be disseminated.

### **Output 1.2.: Strengthened security and safety mechanisms and capacities in prison facilities through improved coordination with other relevant stakeholders**

**Inputs were provided by the project to strengthen safety and security measures, though it was not possible for the ET to find that the authorities had fully utilised or continue to use the project inputs.** Pilot security audits were conducted by UNODC and the authorities. Subsequently, as reported in the project documents authorities stated that follow up would be undertaken by them.

The Centre for Research and Studies of Violent Extremism research centre was established with project support. In principal, the centre would be the facility to enhance the development of policies and capacity of governments to respond to VEP in prisons. KILs were either not able to confirm the continuing functionality of the centre or indicated that it was not operational.

### **Output 1.2: Improved systems and skills in prison administration to individually assess the risks and needs of VEPs as a basis for allocation and programming**

**The project provided a range of technical inputs to contribute to RNA assessment for VEPs.** The project convened meetings and awareness raising events with authorities to facilitate enhanced RNA processes and techniques. It was not possible for the ET to establish if the authorities have adopted or been using this assistance in the management of VEPs. The ET was informed that the authorities were working in parallel with the other development partners on the same issue, but had no details to allow comment on

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<sup>74</sup> According to the scoping mission, Tawassol project emphasises the importance of an individualised approach supported by the reinforcement of familial and social contributions meant to prepare detainees for release and reintegration in their social environment. The project also ensures prisoners are provided with vocational training and the possibility to develop a personalised professional plan intended to provide economic opportunities essential for the prevention of recidivism and social reintegration.



complementarity or if the authorities used or not the inputs from other development partners. KIIs reported that there was already some basis for RNA used by authorities and that the technical assistance provided did not optimally build on existing practices. One of the planned missions on technical assistance related to RNA had to be cancelled in the absence of authorisation.

**Output 1.3: Enhanced capacity of prison administrations to deliver inter-disciplinary disengagement interventions on social reintegration of prisoners including VEPs**

**The project undertook activities that could contribute to the enhanced capacity of prison administrations to deliver inter-disciplinary disengagement interventions on social reintegration of prisoners, including VEPs.** Work was done on the establishment of a working group, technical documentation on rehabilitation and roadmaps, and promoting the role of CSOs. In the absence of feedback from the authorities, it is not possible to find that these activities have been utilised to deliver or if the changes in capacity have been used.

In the final report under this component, Tunisia is mentioned only six times, making it the lowest-mentioned country. Several of Tunisia's mentions are tied to meetings with other development partners. This alone does not mean work was weak, and the reporting may have been incomplete, though it would appear unusual to the ET that profound activities and achievements were not included if they could be reported.

**Output 1.4: Improved social reintegration prospects of (former) violent extremist prisoners through solid post-release services and/or the resort to alternative to imprisonment in suitable cases**

**The project undertook activities that could contribute to the improved social reintegration prospects of (former) VEPs through solid post-release services and/or the resort to alternative to imprisonment in suitable cases.** However, these activities, which included seeking to increase knowledge and skills, addressing strategic communications, and seeking to foster partnerships between authorities and CSOs, appear to have been insufficient and failed to attract full participation from authorities to have made a meaningful contribution. Logically, these events would have followed an implementation sequence, which means they come after the earlier outputs and later in the project cycle. This also appears to have resulted in this output being most heavily curtailed by the absence of the second no-cost extension.

**Outcome: Increased capacity of prison staff to effectively manage VEPs and to prevent radicalisation to violence in prison system of Tunisia**

**There was sufficient activity to suggest that there is enhanced staff capacity to effectively manage VEPs and to prevent radicalisation to violence in the prison system of Tunisia.** However, it is not possible to find that this capacity has been, or is, used for the effective management of VEPs or the prevention of radicalisation. The scope and intensity of activity that was finally implemented seems insufficient to become embedded in policy and practice and this in part stems from the lack of success in building a policy level appreciation of the value of the project support. Without the policy level appreciation, the practical level implementing will have been hindered. Some of the activity, while relevant to the outcome, were insufficiently specific to the outcome. While there were consistent reports from KIIs of the challenges and the limited productive engagement at a political and policy level, that was equally matched by the positive, though indirect reports, of appreciation of the project support and willingness to try new approaches by front-line staff working inside prisons.

## **EFFECTIVENESS FINDINGS FOR UGANDA**

In this technical Annex, the following four issues are addressed:

- 1) Data availability, quality, and MEL systems
- 2) Fit between programme architecture and local needs and conditions
- 3) Design of training in the project
- 4) Effectiveness of the risk tool

### **1. Data availability, quality, and MEL systems**

At numerous points in the evaluation of effectiveness in Uganda it was not possible to determine precisely what outcomes the project had produced due to lack of data or conflicting data. For example, the ET was unable to determine how many RNAs had been carried out with the project-delivered instrument, what the results were of any assessments, or how had they informed beneficiaries' programming decision-making. This kind of problem was widespread. As will be discussed further below, some of the difficulty can be explained by factors outside programme control, such as the intervention of COVID-19, but others rest on factors within control. One example is an overly linear approach to programme delivery (cf. identification and parallel programming of must-be-linked elements) that, given the truncated timeframe, resulted in cases of only half-developed programme elements (e.g., an RNA tool without a data capture system) that undermined effectiveness.

Overall, the ET found many instances where attention to basic MEL and broader data capture left scope for improvement. In the course of data collection for Uganda, for example, the ET made several attempts through the project team and directly to the UPS to gather basic data on the numbers of prisoners considered to be VEPs for each year of programming (2019-22). This proved impossible. When the ET did receive (undated) data from the UPS of the VEP population, it was belatedly determined to be for early 2024. Subsequently, in the phase of MS comment on the Final Report of this evaluation, data were supplied (see p.37 above) but it is unclear if these were available to the UNODC project team during the programming period. Significantly, the ET received no data from the Ugandan project team related to this request. As a result, we only have data from the 2019 scoping mission which found 158 statutory VEPs. There were at that time undefined means for counting prisoners who could legitimately be considered as associated with VE, but it is also unknown how much that has changed or if at all. The more recent figures from UPS show 159 statutory prisoners and an additional 155 assessed as associated with VE, leaving questions about the location of the remainder of the predicted 350 additional VEPs reported at inception time. Notably, the ET has no information to allow it to comment with any credibility if the 158 counted in 2019 are the same prisoners as the 159 counted in 2024. Nor was the ET able to ascertain how (i.e., by what standardised and rigorously applied criteria) the additional 155 were assessed/ identified. Though a written response to this question has been received, it has proven difficult to interpret. More finessed questions, such as regarding the number of prisoners per year being identified as newly radicalised within the prison (i.e., not counted as VEP on reception, but radicalised over the course of their sentence and thus counted in the additionally assessed group), seem to be well beyond the scope of the answer at this point in time.

The apparent absence of year-by-year VEP population data and the limited value of what has been presented to the ET raises concerns related to basic standards of programme monitoring and reporting. The ET recognises the partner agency may be more hesitant to supply information to those not direct staff of the UNODC office and that they may be counting things a bit differently now than in 2019, so tracking data over a period of time might be challenging. What is more of a concern is the absence of any feedback from the Ugandan project team after repeated requests. This suggests that UNODC has not tracked these basic data – i.e., VEP population – throughout the project's duration, which is arguably a minimum prerequisite for programme monitoring.

The ET was not able to ascertain if before the project team was recruited (and had immediately to commence implementation to make up for the delays not of their causing), an agreement had been made between the IAs and the UPS regarding what data (e.g. VEPs numbers) would be regularly provided by the authorities. The ET also acknowledges that the Ugandan project staff are now employed by other programmes, resulting in their limited availability to promptly address the ET's requests. The late evaluation of this project was obviously a barrier for the ET.

Further problems emerged in triangulation. In particular, while it is clear that national counterparts appreciated supports such as the RNA tool, in some KIIs and written responses to questions, national counterparts claimed benefits from the supports that surpass anything that a given support (e.g., a tool) was ever designed to do or indeed has the capacity to do. Thus, what follows below is an effort to carefully assess on the basis of all information the effectiveness of delivery in Uganda. Often this means that full conclusions are difficult to draw, but the ET has been sensitive to the many and often significant challenges within which this project was undertaken.

## 2. Fit between programme architecture and national needs and conditions<sup>75</sup>

The crux of the question of the project's specific (i.e., design-level) relevance to Uganda and thus its attending work plan concerns the fit between the adopted project architecture, the nature of national needs and context, and the overarching, international normative guidance and evidence-base which provides direction.

**The evidence for effectiveness here is rather weaker and questions may be asked about the appropriateness of the project architecture to national conditions on the ground and to funding objectives.**

In the words of national counterpart, even today they are still unsure if “we have done more harm by taking them to prison than the benefit they have got” from it via access to a fertile bed of radicalisation opportunities. There are several points to unpack from this statement that concern the relevance of design. First, we should note that while possibly a valid reflection of widely held views within the Uganda PCVE landscape, it is perceptual, rather than empirical data, and the extent to which in-prison radicalisation leads to actual extremist violence is something on which there is little good evidence, anywhere, and a matter on which wise minds continue to differ. Nevertheless, revisiting the broad approach of mixing VEPs in the general prison population in further project planning may be beneficial.

Second, the project approach adopted (for known VEP management, VEP identification, countering in-prison radicalisation, and establishing conditions for VEP disengagement, rehabilitation and social reintegration) appears *prima facie* to be one of the more difficult, circuitous, and diluted (on a targeted spend per-VEP basis) routes to securing outcomes for the less than 200 VEPs in a system of eventually 67,000 prisoners. This is echoed in the comments of one donor, previously cited in the Relevance section above, who remarked that “the project was supposed to focus on the de-radicalisation of prisoners, but the project conducted a high number of trainings on general prison management and never reached the point to de-radicalise prisoners”.

**This reflects choices that the ET have been unable to hear a consistent account of in the many meetings held with a wide variety of key stakeholders.** A project design supporting some variety of separation of VEPs, and the focusing of resources and outcome 1.1--1.4 work therein, would have multiple supports, including in: (a) UNODC guidance, which points to considerations such as the quality and capacity of existing infrastructure, VEP population size (and relatedly, overcrowding in the general population), base-levels of staff skill and degree of financial headroom in the choice to separate or disperse VEPs, thus opening the option for a more focused, separation-based approach; (b) the established national practices of one of the donors, the Netherlands, which prefers a separation approach; and (c) discussions within the Ugandan National Action Plan Task Force (which supports the National Strategy on PCVET), which in 2021 put a recommendation for separation as an option to ministers. This was subsequently adopted in 2022 under Action 9 of the National Action Plan: “to prevent [VEP] prisoners from influencing others to carry out extremist and terrorist acts (e.g. by opening up for the possibility of placing them in special units where they cannot exert a radicalising influence on others)”. Clear assessment of the costs and benefits of pursuing separation or dispersal in Uganda, where a relative handful of VEPs are confined in a very large, overcrowded and resource and capacity constrained system, were not visible in project risk assessment and prodoc material. This would have been helpful and might be reconsidered in the future.

Third, the chosen project architecture thus advanced on the target of making measurable changes in the management and outcomes of roughly 200 VEPs via a project of largely general penal reform within an overcrowded prison system (that rose from 57,000 prisoners in 2019 to 67,000 2022). This architecture undoubtedly included VEP-focused activities, such as under Output 1.1, focusing on increasing the capacity, quality and effectiveness of intelligence sharing on VEPs. Under the same output the prison audit checklist developed for and fine-tuned with the UPS (see further below) also contained a VEP module. Many of the general reform initiatives are unquestionably laudable and address huge unmet need, such as increasing human rights awareness via development of e-training on the NMRs (in a jurisdiction that is regularly cited for significant and persistent violations in US State Department reports); or such as development of a generic (non-VEP focused) RNA tool based on the Canadian risk-needs-responsivity

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<sup>75</sup> See, relevant to this discussion: Velhuis, T. (2016) Prisoner Radicalisation and Terrorism Detention Policy: Institutionalised Fear or Evidence-Based Policy Making? London: Routledge. Prison population increased from 57,000 at programme inception to more than 67,000 by the close of 2021 and into 2022. UNODC/UNOCT/CTED (2019) SCOPING MISSION TO UGANDA: On the implementation of the joint UN global programme on “Supporting the management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalisation to violence in prisons” (2019-2021); UPS (2021) Monthly Statistics Summary, December 2021. UNODC (2016) Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalisation to Violence in Prisons. Vienna: UNODC. See §4.3 – Allocation and accommodation. van der Heide, L. and Kearney, O. (2020) The Dutch Approach to Extremist Offenders. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism.

approach to general offender population risk assessment and treatment allocation. All of these are discussed further below. But as the sections below will illustrate, while the ET found much evidence of penal reform *activity*, we struggled to find independent evidence of measurable change in VEP-specific *outcomes* when evaluated against the national-need landscape. For example, while intake and RNA tools were invested in by the project, the general prison reform approach led to a focus on ordinary prisoner intake and risk assessment, and while VEP risk assessment was suggested logically to follow via a "supplementary assessment" tool, time had run out and money was all spent long before VEP assessment was ever able to be directly addressed. It is also possible that many VEP outcomes are 'in the pipeline', such as the impacts of integrating VEP matters into general prison recruit training. But it is an inescapable conclusion that the major gains the project demonstrates below come in the form of general penal reform, rather than outcomes or potential impacts readily visible and specifically related to VEPs. This point bears some further elaboration and (to avoid repetition) is considered in light of rationales such as 'building from the base' in the conclusion to 1.1 below.

**Overall, the project architecture appears designed to produce general criminal justice reform effects, rather than targeted effects producing visible and measurable outcomes reflected in the strengthened (i.e., measurably changed) management of VEPs and decreased (i.e., measurably changed) radicalisation during the project period.** Interviews with UNODC staff converged on an argument that in conditions of low capacity, efforts must 'build from the base'. This is absolutely true and correct. High level training and systems cannot work if staff and procedures lack the fundamentals and foundations. However, it is quite possible that the base from which skills and capacities should be built out might be a specialist VEP-focused cadre of custodial and programmes staff. This is particularly salient given the fractional size of the VEP population (about 200 prisoners) relative to size of the overall prison population (currently close to 77,000) and thus the thousands of prison staff across whom funding must be diluted if a general criminal justice reform approach is adopted. This adopted path seems to pose great challenges to producing measurable, material impacts on the management of the handful of VEPs in Uganda prisons during the project period. This point will not be laboured. But it does point to a potential tension in UNODC thinking between its role in promulgating normative instruments and generalised criminal justice reform on the one hand, and project design aligned to the **funded target** of generating change (improvement) in the management of VEPs within a project period. Undeniably, challenges of shortened programming periods, COVID-19, UNOCT/UNCCT's decision not to approve a second no-cost extension, and other factors had impacts on what could be achieved within that project period. But the wider point of general vs specific targeting is one that should reward further discussion, including with donors.

### 3. Design of training in the project<sup>76</sup>

Under output 1.1 an international consultant was retained to develop training materials in support of PCVE to be integrated into the activities of PATS. **Review of these training materials showed them to be excellent, to reflect relevant international standards and norms, to be aligned with national legislation and policy frameworks, and overall to be very suitable.** The integration of these materials was to be achieved via two mechanisms: first, topics on PCVE of relevance to prison officer training were to be developed for integration into PATS training of new prison officer recruits; and second, the same topics were to be covered via dedicated short courses for targeted existing staff at the pilot prisons. This second element is particularly important since the criminal justice training literature illustrates that new-recruit training struggles to produce change when faced with embedded cultural norms in the workplace. For example, as long as three decades ago, longitudinal studies of police recruits illustrated that while Academy training could reduce some unwanted dispositional characteristics, such as ethnocentrism and prejudice,

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<sup>76</sup> See, relevant to discussion below: Wortley, R. and Homel, R. (1995). Police Prejudice as a Function of Training and Outgroup Contact: A Longitudinal Investigation, *Law and Human Behaviour*, 19: 305-317. US Department of State (2019) *Uganda 2019 Human Rights Report*; US Department of State (2022) *2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Uganda*. Advocates Sans Frontiers (2023) *Protecting Constitutional and Procedural Rights of Pre-Trial Detainees through Access to Justice in Uganda: A Baseline Survey*. Brussels: ASF. For review of training's very slim evidence of effectiveness in criminal justice, see Ross (2017), who summarises the training literature going back to the 1980s that concludes: "10% of the money spent on training resulted in transfer [to the workplace] ... about 40% of trainees failed to transfer knowledge and skills immediately after training with as much as 70% failing to transfer after 1 year" (p.24). See also a high-quality experimental evaluation of probation officer training by Bonta et al. (2019). They concluded that after six months "The audio recordings [of probation officers working with clients] showed inconsistent changes in officer behaviour and no differences in recidivism between the clients of the experimental and control probation officers" (p.397). See: Bonta, J. et al. (2019) A conceptual replication of the Strategic Training Initiative in Community Supervision (STICS), *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 15: 397-419; Ross, E. (2107) *An Examination of the Individual and Work Environment Factors Impacting Transfer of Training among North Carolina Probation Officers*. North Carolina State University. Nguyen, H. et al. (2017) Confidence Matters: Self-efficacy Moderates the Credit that Supervisors Give to Adaptive and Proactive Role Behaviours. *British Journal of Management*, 28: 315-30.

subsequent placements into the workplace undid all that progress and measurably increased negative dispositions above recruits' pre-Academy levels.

Evidence-based practice therefore supports this model of attending to existing prison officer knowledge and culture as well as that of recruits. But, at the same time, the evidence base places large demands on training planners to ensure recruit training is balanced with *targeted* re-training of established staff who may hold quite different attitudes and workplace cultural norms. The balanced model also requires workplace training to be targeted at those who will be directly supervising and making evaluative judgements of newly trained prison officers' decisions and competencies. This is discussed in further detail below under 1.2 in the context of prison officer confidence.

**Separately, a high-quality e-training module supporting prison officers' knowledge and understanding of the NMRs was supplied to UPS** via UNODC HQ in Vienna. This module is an established learning modality and subject to the observations made below appears to be high quality and appropriate to address the widespread violations of human rights in Uganda prisons reported to independent human rights monitoring groups.

#### Evidence of integration into sustainable practice

The ET was able to review the detailed VEP-focused content to be integrated into the ordinary prison officer training curriculum. **FGD with UPS PATS leadership and personnel reassured the evaluation team that this integration had been done**, though we did not see the amended training materials ourselves. PATS staff reported that all recruits passing through the School (i.e., now well beyond the project's close) received this content as part of their training. New recruits, we were told, number many thousands, with the number 5000 being given as an estimate of those who have passed through the new VEP-integrated training. While NMR e-training focuses on aspects of human rights in prison management, PATS staff pointed out that most elements of this were also covered in the dedicated Human Rights module that all recruits receive and that is now augmented by VEP-specific elements.

**The Bespoke Training component was not developed to a point of sustainability during the programme period.** It was developed, the international consultant conducted Train the Trainer training with 36 UPS staff (though 10 of them have now left their roles), an initial course with 97 Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) from pilot prisons was used to pilot the Bespoke model, but it has since languished based on UPS resource constraints. This is unfortunate since effective evidence-based training of recruits requires a balanced, or barbell, approach. It requires the likes of NCOs at receiving institutions to be equally knowledgeable and equipped. Otherwise, as the training literature shows, training effects rapidly disappear and may even be replaced by seriously undesirable attitude formations.

**Possibly as many as 1000 trainees have begun the Nelson Mandela Rules e-training during their residence at PATS, but the online nature of the course presents significant barriers to sustainability.** UNODC data indicates that only 133 prison officers have completed the course, which stands against 2,936 in Kazakhstan, and 625 in Tunisia. This sustainability issue was conveyed to the ET during KIIs with stakeholders within and beyond the PATS institute. The lack of widespread access to the internet among prison staff, and the distinctly intermittent quality of power and challenges of bandwidth for those who do manage to get access, means that the course has not reached anything like its potential audience. The ET was told that requests had been conveyed to UNODC HQ in Vienna for an offline version to be supplied. However, it is understood that technical difficulties mean this has not been possible to achieve, at least to date.

#### Independent evidence of training effects or impacts

**No monitoring and evaluation of training effects were programmed and no work has been undertaken to ascertain what difference training has made to on-the-job behaviour or, more broadly, to institutional cultures** (e.g., around attitudes to human rights compliance). This is particularly unfortunate, given what the evidence-based training literature shows of the tenuous value of 'deliver and forget' approaches to training. This whole area of programming focuses on *strengthened* capacity, but the effectiveness of the project in achieving that change is impossible to determine. UPS PATS staff were alive to the disconnect observed here, but resource constraints appear to hamper even case study-size efforts to address the knowledge gap. It is strongly recommended that any further work on training take an evidence-based approach and include appropriate MEL components with independent measures of outcomes, and ideally too impacts and wider changes occurring in the prison workplace.

One of the 1.2 indicators seek to measure training effects in terms of confidence among those trained. This is an indicator of trained prison officers' confidence 'to manage VEPs in a safe, secure and humane

manner', and that to be evidenced by pre/post surveys. It is important to understand, however, why confidence should matter. Reading the prodoc, the evaluation team could find no reference to the evidence-based training literature to justify such choices. Instead, it would appear to be an example of an indicator being created because it seems intuitively right (that confidence should matter and thus should be measured).

**There is, however, a training literature on confidence, and it shows that a need to be thoughtful and careful about what kind of confidence we seek** (i.e., in relation to what sort of task performance). Some of the key issues here are highlighted in a recent study of junior doctors in emergency room contexts where, like prison officers working with VEPs, the issues are serious and three types of task behaviour need to be distinguished (see below). Doing so is necessary to ensure that the important and desired forms of on-job performance can be developed, and then recognised and rewarded by supervisors. Indeed, what this area of training research suggests is that prison officers dealing with serious offenders need to develop not only fixed task behaviours (like how to undertake an intake assessment), but also adaptive and proactive role behaviours. As such, in situations like VEP management, prison officers' confidence in rote fixed task behaviours is less important (and probably much less attributionally predictive of effective on-job performance) than confidence in adaptive and proactive behaviours. Yet, attention to this literature shows that the behaviours we desire for effective VEP management are frequently misinterpreted and go unrewarded (and thus unreinforced) by supervisors (e.g., through recognition such as 'well done to spot that'). This occurs because the supervisors themselves are not trained to make these important distinctions. This is why the barbell approach to training discussed in 1.1 above is critical to ensuring training success. Without it, prison officer confidence in the adaptive and proactive capacity will very often, the evidence shows, be interpreted on the job as threatening to institutional cultures, too much 'rocking the boat', or attempting ingratiation.

**In other words, training for confidence is a very complex area, and recognition of that is not visible in the present programme documentation, training architecture, or measurement system.** The ET would thus encourage in future programme planning stronger attention to evidence-based practice and clearer description of that in supporting programme documentation.

**This detour into the evidence-based training literature illustrates some important points for the evaluation of programming effectiveness in Uganda.** It illustrates that broad generalist training programming, including not 'connecting the dots' between both trainees' and supervisors' performance and conduct, is likely to produce at best uncertain and unpredictable results. Further, while programme planners might point to this training element as but one part of a multidimensional effort, the risk remains that 'broad brush' approaches that eschew precision for ease and volume ultimately reflect a 'rough enough is good enough' approach. This is surely not what programme planners intended, but without attention to evidence based practice it becomes a heightened risk.

#### **4. Effectiveness of the risk-need assessment tool<sup>77</sup>**

The objective of developing a risk-need tool reflects established good practice both in programming for VEPs and more broadly in programming for prisoner risk assessment and allocation within general prison populations. Country preparedness reports (for risk-need assessment and classification decision making) were prepared for all three member states by an expert international consultant. **The Uganda classification preparedness report was presented to national counterparts in December 2019.** Titled *Framework for Prisoner Classification Tools and Standard Operating Procedures: Recommendations for the Uganda Prisons Service*, it is a **very high-quality piece of work**. It reflects a mix of international best practice, proposals that well integrate aspects of the Ugandan national context, and a clear cascade of both development work and – importantly – decisions that national counterparts would need to take. It proposes a sequence of initial intake screening, more elaborate but generalised (i.e., all-offenders focused) RNA, and supplementary VEP assessment, plus several related processes and activities.

**While this report was delivered quite early in the project, it preceded by only weeks the onset of COVID-19, with its associated lockdowns and the closure of penal facilities.** Understandably, the focus of prison

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<sup>77</sup> See for relevance to discussion in this section: Bonta, J. and Andrews, D. (2023) *The Psychology of Criminal Conduct*, 7<sup>th</sup> edition. London and New York: Routledge. Ministry of Justice (2024) *The Actuarial Prediction of Sexual Reoffending: Responding to Changing Offending Patterns*. London: Ministry of Justice. Gutierrez, L., Helmus, L. M., & Hanson, R. K. (2016). What we know and don't know about risk assessment with offenders of indigenous heritage. *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, 3(2), 97–106. Shepherd, S. M., Adams, Y., McEntyre, E., & Walker, R. (2014). Violence risk assessment in Australian Aboriginal offender populations: A review of the literature. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, 20(3), 281–293. Tamatea on culture and risk-needs assessment in Ward et. al (2022) Urgent issues and prospects in correctional rehabilitation practice and research, *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, 27: 103-28.

management swung to the health crisis unfolding and some project funding was repurposed for pandemic fighting purposes. This funded a variety of institutional basics, but more substantively, also the creation of ICT suites that would allow communication between trial courts and prisons, meaning that prisoners' limited access to justice was to some degree ameliorated during the COVID-19 lockdown period. KIIs with government counterparts found wide appreciation of this funding and support, of donors' flexibility and the timeliness with which support, including computers and AV gear, were delivered. During prison visits, the ET was able to view one such suite and engaged in an online interview that demonstrated its sustainable effectiveness.

**Based on initial workshops and discussions with UPS counterparts, the international consultant delivered draft intake classification and RNA tools.** In a converging piece of work, a second consultant, working under CTED, supported evidence-based decision making around risk-need assessment through development of an analytical brief. As a **publicly available best practice analytical brief produced for CTED**, the report supported both programming work and wider knowledge dissemination. It noted that data limitations regarding VEPs makes assessment and programme allocation for rehabilitation inherently difficult. Without data, there can be no evidence-based decision making or programming. Thus, both consultants to the project reinforced the importance of collecting local data as a component of effective decision-making around both generalised and VEP-focused assessment.

**Plans to pilot the delivered intake and RNA tools in the six prisons did not come to pass.** It has been difficult for the ET to establish exactly what was done with the tool. We were informed that it is in use at two of the pilot prisons, then later that the number was five, but that different forms of the tool have been adopted: at one institution the draft submitted by the consultant is being used; at the other, modifications have been made to reflect local conditions. It is important to note that routine administrative use and piloting are separate processes: there is no indication that the RNA tool has been piloted, data collected and analysed, and suitable refinements made to produce a finalised tool. At one institution, for example, visited by the ET, we were informed that the tool was in use, that it was helpful and well valued, but that no data on its use were being collected, neither numbers assessed, risk scores produced by the tool (critical to understanding its validity), how linkages were being made to programme allocation decisions, etc. Further, it was suggested to us that the tool was helping identify VEPs. Yet the tool is not designed to do that, so these comments are difficult to interpret. The ET observed that the tool was being used in paper form and potential digitisation was mentioned as a longer-term goal. It was also suggested to the ET that follow-on funding might allow proper piloting in the future, which would logically precede the digitisation process. Indeed, to properly norm the tool for the Ugandan environment, a series of empirical questions would need to be addressed, and policy decisions made, such as in relation to the cut-off scores (e.g., separating medium from high risk) so that the tool identified cohorts of prisoners across the risk continuum in numbers that sync with other service features, such as rehabilitation programme availability.

The current use of the tool appears to be ad hoc, and there is currently no data on what outcomes it is producing. As a matter of urgency some systematic stocktake and recalibration back to the pathway outlined in the report *Framework for Prisoner Classification Tools and Standard Operating Procedures: Recommendations for the Uganda Prisons Service* should be undertaken. It is worth reinforcing here some observations implicit in the *Framework* report, so that they may be appreciated by the wider audience that will have access to this evaluation report.

First, the risk-needs tool is not VEP-specific and follows a model developed within Canadian corrections that has since been widely adopted globally for ordinary offenders. The consultant provided examples of supplementary VEP-focused tools, including a Nigerian tool that should, prima facie, be readily amenable for Ugandan tailoring and use. Thus, the assessment architecture designed by the consultant included moving directly to institute a VEP-focused tool. In KII interviews with a range of stakeholders, the importance of this did not seem to be recognised. Indeed, more worryingly, some KIIs and providing written responses to the ET understood the delivered tool to be a VEP-identification tool.

Second, the validity and practice-based utility of the (delivered tool) approach developed by the Canadians (see e.g., literature on the Levels of Supervision Inventory – Revised, or LSI-R, the “central eight” risk domains, and the broad risk-need-responsivity approach) lies in the fact that it is evidence based. As the consultant observed, the item structure of tools like the LSI-R, whether in Canadian versions or those adopted and normed overseas, rests on quantitative empirical associations between domains and items in the tool and recidivism (e.g., the domain of companions, or an item on antisocial associates). These domains are so well established as empirical correlates of recidivism in advanced western liberal societies as to be labelled ‘criminogenic domains’ there. Yet, evidence shows that such tools must be constantly

evaluated for their accuracy as national offending patterns change over time. For example, the English sexual offence prediction tools have recently required recalibration as their accuracy declined over just a few years. Even more importantly, however, the empirical associations relied upon by the tools (for their validity) are much weaker for some groups, such as indigenous/ ethnic populations, even when those groups are living in the exact same society and wider culture as mainstream offenders. The applicability and validity of the consultant-delivered RNA tool to Uganda and Ugandans is thus entirely unknown. It should be assumed that validity probably is at best moderate. But given the vast divide that separates the cultural traditions, norms and experiences of Ugandans from those of an 80% urbanised Canadian population (from whom this broad tool structure was derived), it should be a priority to seek empirical assessment of validity at the earliest opportunity. In considering this, and what needs to be done, it should be remembered that risk assessment is not an end in itself. It is simply a means to effective risk management. Non-European correctional practitioners and clinicians have emphasised the importance of risk management plans having cultural ecological validity, something they assert cannot be achieved by simple application of western tools to non-western cultural groups.

## **HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER EQUALITY, DISABILITY INCLUSION, AND LNOB**

### **HUMAN RIGHTS, GENDER EQUALITY, DISABILITY INCLUSION, and LNOB:**

**EQ 9: To what extent has there been institutional change conducive to systematically addressing human rights, inclusiveness, and gender considerations?**

**Human rights:** The extent of institutional changes in addressing human rights differs from one country to another. The project achieved more progress in **Kazakhstan** by establishing sustainable human rights training at Kostanay Academy. Prison staff, including VEP inspectors and psychology counsellors, are educated on human rights concepts through three VEP-related courses. They also take a mandatory UNODC e-learning course on NMR. Furthermore, the RNA tools developed in line with the human rights norms continue to be used in all pilot prisons. The pipelined replication of the RNA tools in new prisons of Karaganda and scaling out its psychological part in all prisons of the country can contribute to safeguarding prisoners' rights. The evaluation findings also show that the safety and security of prisoners were strengthened through a broader awareness of a human rights approach to prison management, as discussed in the Effectiveness.

In **Uganda**, the project promoted the UNODC e-learning course. The PATS' two mandatory modules, *Human Rights* and *Treatment of Inmates*, incorporated human rights norms, including NMRs. All recruits to the PATS take this course, which is crucial for human rights education in the prison system. The inability of the project to implement a security audit and RNA tools in pilot prisons, as a result of the early project termination and other reasons highlighted in the previous sections, prevented it from establishing long-lasting mechanisms for the advancement of human rights.

In **Tunisia**, a high number of security officers, including prison staff (in total, 625) completed the UNODC e-learning course on NMRs. However, the ET was unable to verify if this course is now mandatory in the Tunisian prison training institutions or not. The project placed significant emphasis on human rights norms in its capacity-building activities in Tunisia and other two member states. However, the project lacked data if this knowledge was translated into actions and changed the attitudes of prison management and operations to adhere to human rights standards. In short, the institutional changes in Tunisia are largely unknown.



## ANNEX II. TERMS OF REFERENCE

Category of evaluation: Joint Independent project evaluation (UNOCT/UNODC)

Type of evaluation: Final

Project: Supporting the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalisation to Violence in Prisons

Programme/project number: N/A

Date of issue of ToR: 28 September 2023

### EVALUATION PROFILE

<b>Programme/Project/Intervention Timeframe</b>	May 2018 to April 2022
<b>Geographic Focus</b>	Multi-country (Kazakhstan, Tunisia, Uganda)
<b>Linkages to UNOCT Strategic Plan and Programme Framework UNGCT Pillars, Global Programmes, Thematic Programmes</b>	Pillar I of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288) and Output 1.1 of the UNCCT Five-Year Programme (2016-2020)
<b>Linkage to SDG targets</b>	SDGs 16, 17, 3, 4, 5, and 8
<b>Primary Implementor</b>	UNODC
<b>Implementing Partner(s)</b>	UNOCT/UNCCT Global Programme on Prosecution, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (PRR), United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED)
<b>Funding Partner(s)</b>	European Union, Kingdom of the Netherlands, UNOCT
<b>Primary Rightsholders (beneficiaries)</b>	Prison staff
<b>Total Approved Budget (USD)</b>	USD \$8.7 million
<b>Total Overall Budget (USD)</b>	USD \$8.7 million
<b>Total Expenditure to Date (USD)</b>	USD \$8.7 million
<b>Evaluation Manager</b>	Sidonie Roberts, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Specialist, UNOCT/UNCCT
<b>Timeframe for Evaluation</b>	July 2023 to June 2024
<b>Evaluation Budget</b>	USD \$50,000
<b>Number of Independent Evaluators planned</b>	Two
<b>Type and Year of Past Evaluations (if any)</b>	Mid-term evaluation completed in February 2022

### BACKGROUND

#### Context:

Violent extremist prisoners (VEPs) pose a great challenge for prison systems as they can spread extremist ideologies to a large pool of potential recruits and coordinate terrorist attacks outside of the prison. This undermines prison security and safety, as well as compromises one of the core objectives of imprisonment, namely the protection of society from crime. They also undermine the rehabilitative objective of imprisonment. An additional concern is how to manage VEPs and prevent prison

radicalisation considering the increasing flows of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). Approximately 30,000 FTFs from about 100 countries are involved with groups associated with Al-Qaida, including a reported 4,000 recruits from Western Europe.

Since the adoption of Security Council resolution 2178 (2014), which obligates the criminalization of the act of travelling abroad and its financing for the purposes of planning, perpetrating or participating in terrorist acts and/or the provision or receipt of terrorist training, an increasing number of Member States are facing the likely prospect of returnees serving prison sentences in their country of origin. In the same resolution, the Security Council underscores the importance of preventing radicalization and recruitment of individuals into terrorist groups and becoming FTFs, as well as the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism.

In its Presidential Statement 11 of 2015, the Security Council expressed concern that recruitment efforts by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) increasingly target women and youth, and stressed the need for Member States to work together with local communities and civil society leaders to develop comprehensive solutions, including programs in prisons. It also called on the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Office to develop a capacity building implementation plan to counter the flow of FTFs, including priority recommendations for assistance needs of the most affected Member States, such as the need to support disengagement efforts in prisons as part of the global efforts to counter the FTF phenomenon.

In Resolution 2396 (2017), the Security Council called upon Member States to develop and implement comprehensive prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies and protocols, in accordance with their obligations under international law, including with respect to FTFs, as well as the spouses and children accompanying returning and relocating FTFs, and to do so in consultation with local communities, mental health and education practitioners and other relevant civil society organisations. It also requested UNODC and other UN agencies to continue to provide requesting Member States with the necessary technical assistance in this regard.

In the same resolution, the Security Council further called upon Member States to take all appropriate action to maintain a safe and humane environment in prisons, develop tools that can help address radicalization to violence and terrorist recruitment, develop risk assessments to assess the risks of prison inmates' susceptibility to terrorist recruitment and radicalization to violence, and develop tailored and gender-sensitive strategies to address and counter terrorist narratives within the prison system, in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights law, and taking into account the UN Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

In its Resolution 68/127,<sup>10</sup> the General Assembly affirmed that violent extremism constitutes a serious common concern for all Member States, and called for a comprehensive approach to address its underlying conditions, in full compliance with human rights and the rule of law.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, in the Fifth Review Resolution of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,<sup>12</sup> the General Assembly expressed concern about the danger of recruitment and radicalization to terrorism, including in prisons and especially among women and the youth. It also called upon Member States to address the threat posed by FTFs, including by developing rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for returning FTFs.

Recognising that the threat posed by violent extremism requires a unified response, the UN Secretary-General presented his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism to the General Assembly in January 2016. The Plan of Action emphasizes the risk of radicalization in prisons, including as a result of inhumane detention conditions and the inhumane treatment of inmates, and stresses the need for safeguards to be put in place to prevent the spread of extremist ideology in prisons.<sup>16</sup> It also encourages Member States to consider the need to reform national penitentiary systems to prevent and counter radicalization in prisons based on human rights and the rule of law.

#### **Evaluation Subject:**

The project titled "Supporting the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalisation to Violence in Prisons" (hereafter referred to as the VEPs Project), was delivered by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in collaboration with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), and the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED). The project was funded by UNOCT, the European Union and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for a total of USD \$8.7 million over a five-year period of May 2018 to April 2022.

The project aimed to increase the capacity of prison staff to effectively manage violent extremist prisoners and to prevent radicalization to violence in prison systems in Kazakhstan, Tunisia, and Uganda.

The project delivered activities under four thematic areas:

- Safety and security
- Risk and needs assessments
- Social reintegration
- Prison-based rehabilitation

The types of activities that were implemented in each beneficiary country are summarised below.

Thematic area	Kazakhstan	Tunisia	Uganda
<b>Safety and Security</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Regular meetings to discuss and revise standard operating procedures (SOPs) on data collection and information sharing in prison facilities</li> <li>● Support with the development of a framework for security audits</li> <li>● Training on data collection, information sharing and dynamic security</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Development of SOPs to strengthen data collection and exchange of information in prisons</li> <li>● Support with the development of a framework for security audits</li> <li>● Training on security audits</li> <li>● Training on data collection, information sharing and dynamic security</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Development of SOPs to strengthen data collection and exchange of information in prisons</li> <li>● Training on security audits</li> <li>● Training on data collection, information sharing and dynamic security</li> </ul>
<b>Risk and Needs Assessments</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Review of existing risk and needs assessment methodologies and development of new tool</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Review of existing risk and needs assessment methodologies and development of new tool</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Development of a prisoner classification system</li> <li>● Work with the Uganda Prison Service to strengthen risk and needs assessment protocols and regulations</li> </ul>
<b>Social Reintegration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Development of modules, and conduct training on prison-based social reintegration programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Review of SOPs for reintegration programmes in prisons</li> <li>● Development of modules, and conduct training on prison-based social reintegration programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Development of national rehabilitation and social reintegration policy documents</li> </ul>
<b>Prison-based Rehabilitation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Development of training modules on post-release plans for prisoners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Development of training modules on post-release plans for prisoners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Establishment of post-release services for prisoners</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Organisation of awareness-raising activities for prison staff on preventing radicalisation to violence in prisons</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Organisation of awareness-raising activities for prison staff on preventing radicalisation to violence in prisons</li> </ul>	
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**Key Stakeholders:**

- Prisoners
- Prison staff
- Government representatives from the Member States of implementation
- UN implementing partner representatives
- Donor representatives

**EVALUATION PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

**Evaluation Purpose:**

The joint evaluation is needed to assess the performance of the VEPs Project for accountability and learning purposes. The project’s donors have requested an independent evaluation, and the evaluation also provides an opportunity to inform future programming on prison management.

**Evaluation Objectives:**

- To assess the performance of the VEPs Project
- To identify the barriers and enablers of success
- To identify lessons learned that can inform future programming on behalf of UNODC and UNOCT
- To contribute to the evidence base regarding the effective management of violent extremist prisoners

**Main Users of Evaluation Results:**

Program managers within UNODC and UNOCT, Member States, other practitioners as well as donors.

**Evaluation Scope:**

The joint evaluation will assess the project’s achievements, focusing on both process and outcomes. It will cover the entire duration of the project, all three Member States of implementation (Kazakhstan, Tunisia, Uganda) and all four of the Project’s thematic areas.

**EVALUATION CRITERIA AND KEY QUESTIONS<sup>78</sup>**

The joint evaluation will be conducted based on the following OECD-DAC criteria and associated key evaluation questions<sup>79</sup>, and in line with UNOCT’s Evaluation Handbook and guidelines.

<sup>78</sup> The list of the evaluation questions was modified based on the Evaluation Inception Report.

<sup>79</sup> <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

**Relevance:**

- How well does the VEPs Project align to the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS)?
- How responsive was the VEPs Project to the needs and priorities of the three Member States?
- To what extent were the activities included in the Project design relevant to achieving the Project's objectives?
- To what extent was the project design and implementation informed by a context analysis including considerations regarding human rights and gender equality, young people and vulnerable groups?

**Effectiveness:**

- How has the VEPs Project contributed to the GCTS?
- To what extent has the Project achieved its intended outcomes and objectives?
- To what extent were unintended effects (positive or negative) observed, including for women, men and vulnerable groups?

**Sustainability:**

- To what extent have Project benefits continued beyond the end of the Project?
- To what extent has there been institutional change conducive to systematically addressing human rights, inclusiveness, and gender considerations?

**Human rights, gender equality, disability inclusion and leaving no one behind:**

- Were human rights and gender-sensitive indicators built into the intervention? If so, to what extent have data been captured against these?
- To what extent has the project supported and resulted in strengthened respect of the Nelson Mandela Rules? To what extent has there been institutional change conducive to systematically addressing human rights, inclusiveness, and gender considerations?
- To what extent has the risk mitigation measure according to which "All activities will be subject to a detailed human rights compliance and risk assessment/mitigation strategy in line with the overall principle of do no harm" (appearing in the project document) been implemented? To what extent has the project increased the likelihood that rights holders (those holding rights in the context of the project, e.g. prisoners) claim their rights? And that duty-bearers (those bearing obligations in the context of the project, e.g. Member States via prison services) fulfil their obligations?

## METHODOLOGY

The joint evaluation will adopt a mixed-methods approach, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis. While the exact methodology will be finalized in the Inception Report and Evaluation Plan, data collection methods may include:

- Review of existing programme documentation
- Review of existing programme data, as well as existing national statistics
- Surveys
- Interviews
- Focus groups

The Evaluation Team will be responsible for designing a final theory of change, logic model and evaluation matrix, outlining the Project's intended outcomes, as well as relevant indicators and appropriate data sources.

It is envisioned that data collection will occur, at least partly, in person, during field visits in the three Member States of implementation. To facilitate this process, it is recognised that language support (i.e. independent translation and interpretation into Russian, French and/or Arabic) may be required, depending on the language skills of the Evaluation Team.

The Evaluation Team will be expected to ensure that the voices and opinions of both men, women, and other marginalised groups, such as people with disabilities, are heard. The Evaluation Team will be

expected to include disaggregated data (e.g. by age, sex, country of origin, ethnicity, disability, and other relevant factors) in the reporting deliverables.

## DELIVERABLES AND TIMEFRAME

The evaluation incorporates nine deliverables as outlined below. The timeframe for the evaluation is detailed overleaf.

**Draft Inception Report and Evaluation Plan:** The Evaluation Team will prepare a Draft Inception Report and Evaluation Plan to confirm the theory of change, logic model, evaluation framework, evaluation criteria and key evaluation questions. The Draft Inception Report and Evaluation Plan will also detail the proposed methodology for data collection and analysis, and will include copies of proposed data collection tools. The Evaluation Team will use the template provided in the [UNOCT Evaluation Handbook](#) and will ensure compliance also with UNODC’s Evaluation Policy and related evaluation requirements.

**Final Inception Report and Evaluation Plan:** Following review by the EMG and ESC, the Evaluation Team will incorporate feedback into a Final Inception Report and Evaluation Plan for approval. The Final Inception Report and Evaluation Plan will need to be approved by the EMG before data collection commences.

**First Draft Evaluation Report:** Following data collection and analysis, the Evaluation Team will prepare a First Draft Evaluation Report. The Report will be reviewed by the EMG, to ensure it aligns with organisational – i.e. UNOCT and UNODC – and UNEG norms and standards in evaluation.

**Second Draft Evaluation Report:** Following incorporation of feedback on the First Draft, the Evaluation Team will prepare a Second Draft Evaluation Report. The Report will be reviewed by programme management representatives on the ESC, with a particular focus on fact checking.

**Third Draft Evaluation Report:** Following incorporation of feedback on the Second Draft, the Evaluation Team will prepare a Third Draft Evaluation Report. The Report will be translated into relevant languages and distributed to CLPs for their feedback. All members of the EMG and ESC will also have a chance to review the Third Draft and provide any final feedback.

**Final Evaluation Report:** Feedback on the Third Draft will be considered by the Evaluation Team and a Final Report will be issued. The Final Evaluation Report will need to be approved by the EMG and will need to follow UNOCT’s clearance process: Chief of Section -> Evaluation Compliance Unit (ECU) -> Office of the Under-Secretary General (OUSG) -> Under Secretary General (USG).

**Draft Evaluation Brief and slides for presentation of findings:** Following approval of the Final Evaluation Report, the Evaluation Team will prepare a Draft Evaluation Brief using the template provided in the [UNOCT Evaluation Handbook](#). The Evaluation Team will also prepare PowerPoint slides to facilitate the presentation of findings to relevant stakeholders.

**Final Evaluation Brief and slides for presentation of findings:** Following incorporation of feedback on the Draft Evaluation Brief and slides by the EMG and ESC, the Evaluation Team will prepare a Final Evaluation Brief and slides. The Final Evaluation Brief and slides will need to be approved by the EMG before the presentation of findings.

**Presentation of findings:** Following approval of the slides, the Evaluation Team will present the findings of the evaluation. One presentation will be made to an internal audience (primarily UNODC and UNOCT representatives), and a second presentation will be made to a larger audience including CLPs.

### Schedule

Stage	Task	Timing	Responsibility
Stage 1 – Initiation	Confirm budget	w/c 3 Jul 2023	UNOCT
	UNOCT/UNODC meet to confirm next steps	w/c 3 Jul 2023	UNOCT/UNODC
	Brief donor on next steps	w/c 24 Jul 2023	UNOCT/UNODC
	Draft TOR	w/c 17 Jul 2023	UNOCT

<b>Stage 2 – Terms of reference (TOR) and identification of evaluation team</b>	Review TOR	w/c 17 Jul 2023 to w/c 31 Jul	UNOCT/UNODC/ UNOPS
	Finalise TOR	w/c 8 Aug 2023	UNOCT
	Propose Evaluation Team	w/c 3 Jul 2023	UNODC
	Agree on Evaluation Team	w/c 3 Jul 2023	UNOCT/UNODC/ UNOPS
<b>Stage 3 – Recruitment</b>	Recruit Evaluation Team	w/c 14 Aug to w/c 2 Oct 2023	UNOPS
<b>Stage 4 – Desk review/Inception report</b>	Inception meeting with Evaluation Team	13 September 2023	Evaluation Steering Committee
	Desk review materials provided to Evaluation Team	w/c 2 Oct 2023	Evaluation Manager (UNOCT)
	Secure approvals and buy-in for data collection with three Member States	w/c 2 Oct to w/c 6 Nov	UNODC
	Produce Draft Inception Report and Evaluation Plan*	w/c 9 Oct & w/c 16 Oct 2023	Evaluation Team
	Review Draft Inception Report and Evaluation Plan	w/c 23 Oct 2023	EMG and ESC
	Produce Final Inception Report and Evaluation Plan*	w/c 30 Oct 2023	Evaluation Team
	Approve Final Inception Report and Evaluation Plan	w/c 6 Nov 2023	EMG
<b>Stage 5 – Data collection and analysis</b>	Data collection and analysis	w/c 13 Nov to w/c 4 Dec	Evaluation Team
	Presentation of preliminary findings	w/c 11 Dec	Evaluation Team
<b>Stage 6 – Draft report</b>	Develop First Draft Report*	w/c 8 Jan to w/c 29 Jan 2024	Evaluation Team
	Review First Draft Report (M&E technical review)	w/c 5 Feb & w/c 12 Feb 2024	EMG
	Develop Second Draft Report*	w/c 19 Feb & w/c 26 Feb 2024	Evaluation Team
	Review Second Draft Report (PM review)	w/c 4 Mar & w/c 11 Mar 2024	ESC
	Develop Third Draft Report*	w/c 18 Mar & w/c 25 Mar 2024	Evaluation Team
	Translate Third Draft Report	w/c 1 Apr 2024	UNOPS
	Review Third Draft Report (core learning partner review)	w/c 8 and w/c 15 Apr 2024	EMG/ESC/CLPs
<b>Stage 7 – Final report, evaluation</b>	Develop Final Report*	w/c 22 Apr & w/c 29 Apr 2024	Evaluation Team

<b>brief and presentation</b>	Complete management response	w/c 22 Apr & w/c 29 Apr 2025	Evaluation Steering Committee
	Approve Final Report	w/c 6 May 2024	EMG
	Translate Final Report	w/c 13 May 2024	UNOPS
	Develop Draft Evaluation Brief and slides for presentation of findings*	w/c 20 May 2024	Evaluation Team
	Review Draft Evaluation Brief and slides for presentation of findings	w/c 27 May 2024	EMG/ESC
	Develop Final Evaluation Brief and slides for presentation of findings*	w/c 3 Jun 2024	Evaluation Team
	Approve Final Evaluation Brief and slides for presentation of findings	w/c 10 Jun 2024	EMG
	Presentation of findings	w/c 17 Jun 2024	Evaluation Team
	Publish Final Evaluation Report and Final Evaluation Brief	w/c 17 Jun 2025	UNODC
<b>Stage 8 - Evaluation follow-up</b>	Prepare evaluation follow-up plan	w/c 17 Jun 2026	Evaluation Steering Committee
	Implement evaluation follow-up plan	w/c 17 Jun 2027 and onwards	UNODC/UNOCT as relevant

\*Indicates deliverable

## EVALUATION MANAGEMENT

The evaluation will be overseen by an Evaluation Management Group (EMG) in coordination with an Evaluation Steering Committee (ESC).

The role of the EMG is to:

- Ensure an independent evaluation process, meeting UNEG norms and standards.
- Review and clear all deliverables.

The role of the ESC is to:

- Provide quality assurance of all evaluation deliverables.
- Ensure both organisations (UNODC and UNOCT) are in agreement with the evaluation process.

It should be noted that:

- The Evaluation Manager will act as the Secretariat of the EMG and ESC meetings, coordinate inputs from members of the EMG and ESC, and manage the relationship with the Evaluation Team.
- Members of the EMG and ESC will provide inputs to the review of all deliverables.
- Final deliverables will need to be approved by the EMG and follow UNOCT's clearance process: Chief of Section -> Evaluation Compliance Unit (ECU) -> Office of the Under-Secretary General (OUSG) -> Under Secretary General (USG).
- UNOPS will manage procurement and payment for completion of services.

The EMG and ESC will be made up of the following members (see overleaf).

The evaluation will also involve three groups of core learning partners (CLPs), whose roles have been outlined overleaf.



Organisation Name	Title	Role in EMG	Role in ESC	
<b>UNOCT</b>	Sidonie Roberts	Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, Global Programme on PRR	Secretariat Evaluation manager	Secretariat Evaluation Manager
	Larissa Adameck	Head of Unit, Global Programme on PRR	-	Member Programme management representative
	Derin Kayalar Alasulu	Head of Evaluation and Compliance Unit (ECU), Office of the Under-Secretary-General (OUSG)	Member Independent evaluation function representative	Member Independent evaluation function representative
	Josephine Mwenda	Programme Management Officer, ECU, OUSG	Member Independent evaluation function representative	Member Independent evaluation function representative
<b>UNODC</b>	Vera Tkachenko	Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer	-	Member Programme management representative
	Philipp Meissner	Inter-regional Advisor and Focal Point for Prison Reform	-	Member Programme management representative
	Emanuel Lohninger	Evaluation Officer, Independent Evaluation Section (IES)	Member Independent evaluation function representative	Member Independent evaluation function representative
	Moritz Leonhard Schuberth	Associate Evaluation Expert, IES	Member Independent evaluation function representative	Member Independent evaluation function representative
<b>UNOPS</b>	Pooja Pokhrel	Project Manager, Development and Special Initiatives Portfolio	-	Member Procurement representative
	Carolina Caceres Sicard	Project Manager, Development and Special Initiatives Portfolio	-	Member Procurement representative

### Core Learning Partners

### Role

UNODC Gender Team and the UNOCT Gender and Human Rights Section	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Review this TOR</li> <li>● Participate in key informant interviews to inform the development of the Inception Report and Evaluation Plan</li> <li>● Review the Draft Inception Report and Evaluation Plan</li> <li>● Attend the presentation of preliminary findings</li> <li>● Review the Third Draft Report</li> <li>● Attend the presentation of findings</li> </ul>
Representatives from the two primary donors: the European Union and the Kingdom of the Netherlands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Review this TOR</li> <li>● Review Third Draft Report</li> <li>● Attend the presentation of findings</li> </ul>

Representatives from the three Member States of implementation: Kazakhstan, Tunisia and Uganda

- Review Third Draft Report
- Attend the presentation of findings

## EVALUATION TEAM

The Evaluation Team will be made up of three independent consultants. The Evaluation Team will not act as representatives of any internal or external party and must remain impartial. They must not have been involved in the design and/or implementation, supervision, and coordination of and/or have benefited from the programme/project or theme under evaluation. Furthermore, the Evaluation Team shall respect and follow the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for conducting evaluations in a sensitive and ethical manner.

The qualifications and responsibilities for each consultant are specified in the Evaluator Terms of Reference. The Evaluation Team will report to the Evaluation Manager who is responsible for ensuring that appropriate clearance and approval – by the EMG – is obtained for all evaluation deliverables.

The Evaluation Team will be issued consultancy contracts by UNOPS and paid in accordance with UNOPS rules and regulations. Payments will be made by deliverable and only once cleared by UNODC's IES and UNOCT's ECU. Deliverables which do not meet UNODC, UNOCT and UNEG evaluation norms and standards will not be cleared.

Role	# of consultants	Specific expertise required
Evaluation Expert (Team Lead)	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Expertise in conducting process and outcome evaluations</li> <li>● Expertise in conducting human-rights-compliant and gender sensitive evaluations</li> <li>● Experience conducting evaluations of counter-terrorism or related programmes</li> <li>● Experience conducting evaluations in at least one of the regions of implementation</li> </ul>
Substantive Experts	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Expertise in prison management, with a focus on VEPs</li> <li>● Experience in at least one of the MSs of implementation</li> </ul>

## SUBMISSION AND SELECTION PROCESS

Due to the time-sensitive nature of the evaluation, UNOCT and UNODC have identified appropriate consultants from UNODC's evaluator database. UNOCT will transfer the funds to UNOPS who will manage procurement.

## ANNEX III: EVALUATION MATRIX

Criterion: Relevance				
Evaluation Question: How well does the VEPs Project align with the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS)				
Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The VEPs project was relevant to the GCTS' objectives and Pillars 1 and 4	<p>Stakeholders report on the project's relevance to the GCTS.</p> <p>The project design supports the GCTS implementation.</p> <p>Project activities addressed the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism (GCTS Pillar 1) and promoted measures to ensure respect for human rights for prisoners and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (GCTS Pilar 4)</p>		<p>UNODC and UNOCT Program Managers and local project staff</p> <p>Project documents, including project proposal, logical framework, and progress reports</p>	<p>Remote and in-person Interviews</p> <p>Document review</p>
Evaluation Question: How responsive was the VEPs Project to the needs and priorities of the three Member States?				
Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The project served the interests of the three beneficiary countries	<p>Prison authorities and other national counterparts report on the project's alignment with the beneficiary countries' priorities</p> <p>Project stakeholders report on the alignment of the project with the national policies and strategies</p> <p>The project assisted in meeting the needs of prison authorities, line ministries (Ministries of Justice and Interior), training</p>		<p>Prison authorities and other national stakeholders (CSOs, and Training Academies)</p> <p>UNOCT and UNODC Program Managers and local project staff</p> <p>Project documents, including project proposals, logical framework, and progress reports</p>	<p>Remote and in-person Interviews</p> <p>Document review</p> <p>FGDs</p>

	institutions, and CSOs providing post-release services			
<b>Evaluation Question:</b> To what extent were the activities included in the project design relevant to achieving the project's objectives?				
<b>Assumptions to be assessed</b>	<b>Indicator/Success Standards</b>	<b>Baseline (if applicable)</b>	<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Methods and tools for data collection</b>
The logical framework shows the causal linkages between activities, outputs, outcomes, and objectives, with lower-level results leading to the achievement of higher-level outcomes	<p>Project design is based on evidence, research, and lessons learned, while the country-specific work plans are based on the Scoping Mission results (country assessments)</p> <p>The logical framework is well-formulated with objectives, outcomes, and outputs being clear, coherent, measurable, and realistic</p> <p>National stakeholders in each country report significant involvement in design of activities and influence on alterations on workplans and activities when necessary</p>		<p>UNODC, UNOCT and CTED Program Managers and local project staff</p> <p>Project documents, including project proposals, national scoping mission reports from 3 countries, logical framework, and progress reports</p>	<p>Remote and in-person Interviews</p> <p>Document review</p>
<b>Evaluation Question:</b> To what extent was the project design and implementation informed by a context analysis including considerations regarding human rights and gender equality, young people, and vulnerable groups?				
<b>Assumptions to be assessed</b>	<b>Indicator/Success Standards</b>	<b>Baseline (if applicable)</b>	<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Methods and tools for data collection</b>
The project design and implementation were based on the UN evidence-based reports as well as country-specific assessments, which included perspectives on human rights and gender equality, young people, and vulnerable groups.	The desk review shows that the project design was centred on evidence-based analysis, encompassing issues of human rights, gender equality, young people, and vulnerable groups.		Project documents, including UN strategies and frameworks based on evidence, project proposal, scoping mission reports, and progress reports	<p>Remote and in-person Interviews</p> <p>Document review</p>

			UNODC, UNOCT, and CTED Program Managers	
<b>Criterion: Effectiveness</b>				
<b>Evaluation Question:</b> How has the VEPs Project contributed to the GCTS?				
<b>Assumptions to be assessed</b>	<b>Indicator/Success Standards</b>	<b>Baseline (if applicable)</b>	<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Methods and tools for data collection</b>
The project results contributed to the implementation of GCTS's Pillars 1 and 4	<p>Prison authorities report that the project improved their capacity to manage the VEPs in a humane manner.</p> <p>The site visits confirm the application of the project's refined security SOPs that demonstrate a balance of physical, procedural, and dynamic security in prisons.</p> <p>The number of VEPs who have undergone an individualized risk and needs assessment increased since the project launched this instrument in pilot prisons.</p> <p>The prison staff, who completed the online training course on the Nelson Mandela Rules, report that they apply their newly gained knowledge in their daily activities.</p> <p>The site visits confirmed that the project enhanced the provision of rehabilitation, reintegration, and disengagement programs to VEPs and other prisoners by the prisons and external stakeholders.</p>		<p>Project documents, including project proposal, and progress reports</p> <p>UNODC and UNOCT Program Managers and local project staff</p> <p>Prison authorities and other national stakeholders (CSOs and Training Academies)</p>	<p>Remote and in-person Interviews</p> <p>Document review</p>

**Evaluation Question:** To what extent has the Project achieved its intended outcomes and objectives?

<b>Assumptions to be assessed</b>	<b>Indicator/Success Standards</b>	<b>Baseline (if applicable)</b>	<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Methods and tools for data collection</b>
The majority of the project's outputs and outcomes were achieved in Kazakhstan and Uganda, and to a lesser extent in Tunisia	<p>Prison authorities and other national counterparts report that the project improved the capacity of prison staff to effectively manage VEPs.</p> <p>Site visits confirm that the project strengthened the security and safety mechanisms and capacities in prisons, and improved systems and skills in prison administration to individually assess the risks and needs of VEPs.</p> <p>Prison authorities and other national counterparts report that the project improved the social reintegration prospects of (former) violent extremists through solid post-release services and/or the resort to an alternative to imprisonment</p>		<p>Project documents, including project proposal, and progress reports</p> <p>UNODC and UNOCT Program Managers and local project staff</p> <p>Prison authorities and other national stakeholders (CSOs and Training Academies)</p> <p>Prison statistics</p>	<p>Remote and in-person Interviews</p> <p>FDGs,</p> <p>Site visits</p> <p>Document review</p>

**Evaluation Question:** To what extent were unintended effects (positive or negative) observed, including for women, men, and vulnerable groups?

<b>Assumptions to be assessed</b>	<b>Indicator/Success Standards</b>	<b>Baseline (if applicable)</b>	<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Methods and tools for data collection</b>
In addition to the prison agencies, a large number of officers from law enforcement agencies completed the online training course on the Nelson Mandela Rules and other project trainings. As a result of the new knowledge gained, the Nelson Mandela rules were applied beyond the prison system (e.g., probation agencies)	<p>More than 6,000 security officers completed the training course on the Nelson Mandela Rules</p> <p>Trained prison personnel report the utility of new knowledge from project training</p>		<p>Project documents, including project proposal, and progress reports</p> <p>UNODC Program Managers and local project staff</p> <p>Prison authorities, Police, and Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs</p>	<p>Remote and in-person Interviews</p> <p>Document review</p> <p>Site visits</p>

**Criterion: Sustainability**

**Evaluation Question:** To what extent have Project benefits continued beyond the end of the Project?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The project built local ownership, increased the capacity of beneficiary countries, and established SOPs that will endure beyond the project's end	<p>Prison authorities report that the project increased the capacity of a large number of prison staff in three countries, who continue using their newly acquired knowledge.</p> <p>FGDs show that the project enhanced the capacity of training institutions, developed new training modules, and helped to incorporate them into national curricula, which are the elements of sustainability.</p> <p>Site visits demonstrate that the PCVE Prison Staff Training Center at Kostanay Training Academy and the Research Centre on PVE in Tunisia continue functioning.</p>		<p>Project documents, including quarterly and annual progress reports</p> <p>UNODC Program Managers and local project staff</p> <p>Prison authorities, Training Academies</p>	<p>Document review</p> <p>Remote and in-person Interviews</p> <p>FDGs, Site visits</p>

**Evaluation Question:** To what extent has there been institutional change conducive to systematically addressing HR, inclusiveness, and gender considerations?

Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The project developed and institutionalized Individual Risks Assessment Frameworks for VEPs in target prisons that systematically address human rights, inclusiveness, and gender considerations	Site visits show that institutionalized individual risks and needs assessment for VEPs are regularly conducted in pilot prisons, and results from the risk assessment are used safely.		<p>Project documents, including quarterly and annual progress reports</p> <p>Prison authorities</p>	<p>Document review</p> <p>In-person Interviews, Site visits</p>
The project integrated human rights, gender, and inclusiveness in modules/courses developed	Human rights, gender, and inclusiveness considerations were incorporated into		Kostanay Training Academy and Prison Academy and Training School in Uganda.	FDGs, site visits, document review

under the project and they became a part of the national curricula	modules/courses of training academies in Kazakhstan and Uganda			
Human rights, gender, and inclusiveness principles were considered by the project in disengagement, rehabilitation, and social integration activities, but their full implementation was constrained by the project's early end	Human rights, gender, and inclusiveness considerations were a part of the project's disengagement, rehabilitation, and social integration activities		Project documents, including quarterly and annual progress reports  UNODC Program Managers and local project staff; CSOs, prison authorities	Document review  In-person Interviews, site visits

**Criterion: Human rights, gender equality disability inclusion and leaving no one behind**

**Evaluation Question:** Were human rights and gender-sensitive indicators built into the intervention? If so, to what extent have data been captured against these?


<b>Assumptions to be assessed</b>	<b>Indicator/Success Standards</b>	<b>Baseline (if applicable)</b>	<b>Sources of Information</b>	<b>Methods and tools for data collection</b>
Human rights and gender-sensitive indicators were incorporated into the project	Human rights and gender considerations were integrated in the tools, training materials, SOP developed under the project  Project reporting contains information on the number of male and female participants for every capacity-building event, as well as other relevant human rights and gender considerations/lessons learnt identified by the Project during implementation  Gender-sensitive SOPs and Individual Risk Assessment Tools were developed for the male and female prisoners  Disengagement, rehabilitation, and social integration activities were separately developed for male and female prisoners		Project documents, including quarterly and annual progress reports  Project materials and outputs (SOPs, training courses/modules, etc.)  Prison authorities  Project staff	Document review  In-person Interviews  FDGs  Site visits

**Evaluation Question:** To what extent has the risk mitigation measure according to which “All activities will be subject to a detailed human rights compliance and risk assessment/mitigation strategy in line with the overall principle of do no harm” (appearing in the project document) been implemented?



Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
The project assistance was based on respecting the principle “Do no harm”, by ensuring that project interventions do not cause human rights violations, exacerbate divisions between institutions and communities, and worsen existing problems	<p>Project staff report that human rights compliance and risk assessment/mitigation strategies were used and monitored in line with Operational Guidance of the EU’s Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, as stated in the project document</p> <p>Project staff and CSOs report positive consequences related to “do no harm principles”</p>		<p>UNODC program managers and local project staff</p> <p>Project documents</p>	<p>Remote and in-person Interviews</p> <p>Document review</p>
<b>Evaluation Question:</b> To what extent has the project increased the likelihood that rights holders (those holding rights in the context of the project, e.g. prisoners) claim their rights? And that duty-bearers (those bearing obligations in the context of the project, e.g. Member States via prison services) fulfil their obligations?				
Assumptions to be assessed	Indicator/Success Standards	Baseline (if applicable)	Sources of Information	Methods and tools for data collection
Through the development and implementation of Individual Risk and Needs Assessment of VEPs and other prisoners, the project provided the means for prisoners to claim their rights and for the duty-bearer to do proper allocation and programming for them	<p>Project stakeholders, prison authorities, and CSOs report that the individual Risk and Needs Assessment of VEPs and other prisoners are conducted systematically and are gender and age-sensitive</p> <p>Project stakeholders (prison authorities and CSOs) report that prisoners’ access to rehabilitative interventions has been increased and enhanced</p>		<p>Prison authorities</p> <p>UNODC local project staff</p> <p>CSOs</p>	<p>Remote and in-person Interviews</p> <p>Document review</p>

## ANNEX IV: PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK



## ANNEX V: EVALUATION TOOLS

### Interview guides

**This is a framework which includes a range of questions, and the exact questions will be determined by the ET depending on KII and the knowledge of stakeholders about the project**

The United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have commissioned an independent final joint evaluation of the project titled “*Supporting the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalisation to Violence in Prisons*” (the VEPs Project). The project was implemented in Kazakhstan, Tunisia, and Uganda during 2017-2022.

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the project’s relevance, level of achievements, sustainability, and integration of HR and gender aspects. The evaluation also seeks to identify gaps in the project implementation, and lessons learned that could inform the design and management of future UNODC and UNOCT projects.

The evaluation is carried out by a team of external independent evaluators, consisting of a Lead Evaluator (Ms. Aida Alymbaeva) and two Substantive Experts (Mr. Paul English and Mr. Mark Brown).

Confidentiality and informed consent: This interview is confidential, with all information received being anonymized. No individual will be quoted nor will the organization they represent be identified. The data collected will only be used for evaluation purposes. Your participation in the interview is voluntary and you may withdraw from it at any moment. This interview will take about 1.30-2 hours.

**Introduction by the interviewer:** “Do you have any questions before we begin? Can I please confirm that you consent to be recorded?” [Turn on recording and confirm consent to be recorded has been obtained].

### **Interview questions for project staff:**

#### **Introduction:**

- Could you please describe your role in the project?

#### **Relevance:**

- Can you briefly talk about the project background? Was the project designed based on the context analysis including considerations regarding human rights and gender equality, young people and vulnerable groups (research, or evaluations from past programming)?
- How were UNODC, UNOCT and CTED involved in the project formulation?
- How well does the VEPs Project align with the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS), Women, Peace and Security agenda, international human rights norms and standards?
- To what extent was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the three beneficiary countries? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being not relevant and 5 highly relevant and then explain your response:

1    2    3    4    5

- Please give examples of legislation, strategy, and policy sources where they exist including national CT/PCVE strategies and action plans, 1325 NAPs)

#### **Safety and security component:**

- Was any MoU concluded between prison authorities and other criminal justice agencies in these countries to improve coordination and information-sharing?
- Did the project enhance or establish the prison intelligence function in pilot prisons, including female prisons? How has the project addressed the human rights challenges (privacy in particular) that may arise from the prison-intelligence function?
- Were the new security audits developed and conducted in all three countries, incl. female prisons? What were the differences between male and female prisons?
- Were the security audit recommendations implemented by pilot prisons? (e.g., according to the project logframe, it was planned to implement 60% of security audit recommendations by the end of the project). Did the security audit include specific human rights and gender recommendations and/or

mainstream human rights and gender and if yes, were these recommendations implemented by pilot prisons?

- Did the project help to refine other SOPs to maintain a proper balance between physical, procedural, and dynamic security? Were these regulations gender-sensitive? How have these SOPs integrated human rights issues in line with the Nelson Mandela Rules (NMRs)?
- To what extent did the project as a whole enhance the security and safety mechanisms and capacities in pilot prisons and among prison staff in all three countries? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response:

1    2    3    4    5

- In your view, did the project fully integrate human rights when enhancing such mechanisms?
- To what extent did the project increase the capacity of training institutions in three countries to design and deliver PVE-related courses for prison staff?
- Did the project assist in developing training courses on the above topics? Were these courses integrated into regular prison staff induction and/or curriculum of the training academies? Were these courses human rights-based and gender-sensitive?
- Is there evidence that the prison staff, who completed the online training course on the NMR, or new trainings supported by the project, apply their knowledge?

#### **Risk and needs assessment component:**

- To what extent, did the project enhance the capacity of prison staff and the WG's members on risk and needs assessments, classification, and allocation?
- Did the project help to develop or refine existing risk and needs assessment protocols (e.g., prisoner classification frameworks or risk assessment tools for VEPs)? Were there any female prisons?
- Were these risk assessment SOPs gender-sensitive and or human rights-compliant?
- Do you have data on the number of VEPs who have undergone an individualized risk and needs assessment since the project's inception? Do you know what happened in the prison or with the prisoners as a result of risk and need assessment? How did you monitor this?
- To what extent did the project as a whole improve the systems and skills to conduct individual assessments of the risks and needs of VEPs? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response:

1    2    3    4    5

- Did the project help to launch the Research Centre on Preventing Violent Extremism in Prisons in Tunisia? Is this centre still functional? Did this centre develop any evidence-based policy?

#### **Prison-based rehabilitation**

- Did the project establish an interdisciplinary treatment management team in every pilot prison? Are these teams still functional?
- Did the project enhance the capacity of prison administrations to design and deliver interdisciplinary disengagement interventions for VEPs? If yes, what were the new or enhanced interventions that were delivered for prisoners? Were the interventions different in male/female prisons?
- Did the project raise awareness and enhance capacity of prison administrations and staff to design and deliver such interventions in line with the Nelson Mandela Rules?
- As a result of the project, were the new rehabilitation and social reintegration programs developed for VEPs in 3 countries? Were they gender-sensitive? (Were they different for men or women detainees?) Were they based on the NMRs and human rights-compliant?
- To what extent did the project enhance the provision of rehabilitation, reintegration, and disengagement programs by the prisons? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response:

1    2    3    4    5

- Were the disengagement interventions available for 50% of all VEPs, who desired to take part? (Was there any difference observed between women and men prisons?)
- Did the project assist in improving the coordination between pre- and post-release service providers?

### **Social reintegration**

- Did the project help the pilot prisons to establish and/or enhance post-release services for prisoners and former VEPs, incl. specific counselling and mentorship programs? Are there any differences in available services for women and men?
- What was the project's progress in developing alternatives to imprisonment for FTFs?
- Did the project foster engagement of CSOs in rehabilitation and post-release support for VEPs? What was the actual progress in the three countries?
- Was there an increase in the number of prisoners benefitting from post-release services? (the project planned for a 40% increase). Were there any differences between men and women? To what extent did the project help to establish and/or enhance post-release services for prisoners and former VEPs, in coordination with public/non-governmental agencies and/or develop the resort to an alternative to imprisonment? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response:  
1    2    3    4    5
- Were there any differences between men and women?
- Did the project enhance the capacity of prison officers and press services to communicate the positive impact of disengagement interventions on public safety? What examples are there of officials using this capacity?

### **Overall effectiveness:**

- What was the purpose of including three countries from three distinct regions in this project?
- What have been the barriers and enablers to success?
- What other changes (positive or negative, intended or unintended) did the project make as a result of its activities, including for women, men, vulnerable individuals or groups and people with disabilities?

### **Sustainability:**

- To what extent has local ownership within three countries been achieved?
- To what extent have project benefits continued beyond the end of the project? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response:  
1    2    3    4    5
- To what extent has there been institutional change conducive to systematically addressing human rights, inclusiveness, and gender considerations?

### **HR, GE, Disability Inclusion, and LNOB:**

- Did the project implement concrete actions to ensure equal participation and representation of women?
- Were human rights and gender-sensitive indicators built into the intervention? If so, to what extent have data been captured against these?
- To what extent has the project supported and resulted in strengthened respect for the NMRs? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response:  
1    2    3    4    5
- To what extent has the risk mitigation measure according to which "All activities will be subject to a detailed human rights compliance and risk assessment/mitigation strategy in line with the overall principle of "do no harm" been implemented?
- To what extent has the project increased the likelihood that rights holders (those holding rights in the context of the project, e.g. detainees and prisoners) claim their rights? And that duty-bearers (those bearing obligations in the context of the project, e.g. Member States via prison services) fulfil their obligations?

### **Lessons learned:**

- What were the strengths and weaknesses of the project design and implementation? What aspects and/or activities of the project would you change if it were to start now?
- What lessons can be learned from the implementation of the project in order to improve the performance and effectiveness of similar projects?

### **Other issues:**

- Would you like to add anything else?

## **Interview questions for government counterparts**

### **Introduction:**

- Could you please describe your role in the project?

### **Relevance:**

- To what extent was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of your agency and country? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being not relevant and 5 highly relevant and then explain your response:

1    2    3    4    5

- Did the project support the policies and strategies of your country? If so, which?

### **Safety and security component:**

- To what extent did the project help to increase coordination and information-sharing between prison authorities and other criminal justice agencies in your country?
- Did the project activities lead to the signing of the MoU between your service and other criminal justice agencies to improve coordination and information-sharing?
- Did the project enhance or assist in establishing the prison intelligence function in your prison(s) in line with international human rights norms and standards?
- Did the project assist in developing and conducting the new security audits in your prison(s)? Did these security audits integrate human rights considerations? Were the security audits the same in male and female prisons?
- Were the security audit recommendations implemented by your prison(s)? What percentage of the security audit's recommendations were implemented in your prison(s)? Was there any difference in the implementation of these recommendations in male and female prisons?
- Did the project help to refine other security-related regulations to maintain a proper balance between physical, procedural, and dynamic security? Were these regulations gender-sensitive? Were these regulations in line with international human rights norms and standards (NMRs)?
- As a result of the project interventions, to what extent were the security and safety mechanisms and capacities within the prison and among the prison staff improved? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response:

1    2    3    4    5

- Did your prison(s) benefit from the training services of the Kostanay Training Academy/the Prison Academy and Training School (Uganda) on PVE-related topics? In what way?
- Is there evidence that the prison staff, who completed the online training course on the Nelson Mandela Rules, or other project supported training, apply their knowledge?

### **Risk and needs assessment component:**

- Did the project enhance the capacity of prison staff on risk and needs assessments, classification, and allocation?
- Did the project enhance the understanding of prison staff of the Nelson Mandela Rules related to risk and needs assessments, classification and allocation?
- What was the status of risk and needs assessment for VEPs in your prison system before the project?

- Did the project help to develop or improve existing risk and needs assessment protocols (e.g., prisoner classification frameworks or risk assessment tools for VEPs)?
- Were these SOPs gender-sensitive? (Were they different for men or women detainees?) Were these SOPs human rights-compliant and in line with the Nelson Mandela Rules?
- How many pilot prisons have developed or refined existing risk and needs assessment protocols? Were they different in male and female prisons?
- To what extent did the project as a whole improve the systems and skills to conduct individual assessments of the risks and needs of VEPs? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response:  
1    2    3    4    5
- Do you have gender-disaggregated data on the number of prisoners or VEPs, who have undergone the risk and needs assessments in your prisons(s)?
- Did the project help to increase the IT capacity of your prison services?

### **Prison-based rehabilitation**

- Did the project help to establish an interdisciplinary treatment management team in your prison(s)? Are these teams still functional?
- Did the project enhance the capacity of your prison(s) to integrate human rights in the design and delivery of interdisciplinary disengagement interventions for VEPs?
- Did the project support the development of rehabilitation and social reintegration programs for VEPs? (Were they different for men or women detainees?) Were these strategies human rights-compliant?
- To what extent did the project enhance the provision of prison-based rehabilitation, reintegration, and disengagement programs by the prisons? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response:  
1    2    3    4    5
- For what proportion of VEPs were these disengagement interventions accessible?
- Did the project assist in strengthening the engagement of your prison(s) with external stakeholders involved in the disengagement and rehabilitation of VEPs, including civil society?
- Did the project assist in improving the coordination b/n pre- and post-release service providers?

### **Social reintegration**

- To what extent did the project help to establish and/or enhance post-release services for prisoners and former VEPs, incl. specific counselling and mentorship programs, in coordination with public/non-governmental agencies and/or develop the resort to an alternative to imprisonment? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1= not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response.  
1    2    3    4    5
- Were these programs gender-sensitive? Are there any differences in available services for women and men?
- Are the rehabilitation programs available for the “regular” prison population?
- Was there an increase in the number of prisoners benefitting from post-release services? (the project planned for a 40% increase) Were there any differences between men and women?
- Did the project increase the capacity of prison officers and press services to educate the public about the positive influence of disengagement interventions on public safety?

### **Overall effectiveness:**

- What factors hindered or facilitated the project’s success?
- What other changes (positive or negative, intended or unintended) did the project make?

### **Sustainability:**

- To what extent have project benefits continued beyond the end of the project? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1= not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response.  
1    2    3    4    5
- Does your agency (prison) have the capacity, interest, and resources to build on the started processes?

- To what degree did your agency change its policies or practices to improve HR & GE fulfilment as the project's interventions (e.g. new services, greater responsiveness, resource re-allocation, improved quality, etc.)?

**HR, GE, Disability Inclusion, and LNOB:**

- From what you observed how were human rights considerations incorporated into the project activities?
- Did you or your agency know about the Nelson Mandela Rules before the project?
- If yes, did the project increase your awareness about these rules? Did you or your officers apply the new knowledge in your work? Can you give us examples?
- If no, did the project broadly introduce these rules among your officers? Did you or your officers apply the new knowledge in your work? Can you give us examples?
- To what extent has the project supported and resulted in strengthened respect for the Nelson Mandela Rules? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1=not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response:

1    2    3    4    5

**Lessons learned:**

- What lessons were learned from the project implementation in order to improve similar projects in the future?
- What were the strengths and weaknesses of the project design and implementation?
- What should be adjusted, dropped off, or reinforced to deliver better results in future projects?
- Were any lessons learned from the implementation of the project in male and female prisons?

**Other issues:**

- Would you like to add anything else?

**Interview questions for donors:**

**Introduction:**

- Could you please describe your role in the project?

**Relevance:**

- Was the project pertinent to the EU's/Government of Netherlands' priorities? If so, which?
- To what extent was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the beneficiary countries? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being not relevant and 5 highly relevant and then explain your response:

1    2    3    4    5

- Has the project addressed relevant human rights and gender considerations, in its design and implementation?

**Effectiveness:**

- What are the project's most tangible results?
- In your view, to what extent did the project enhance the capacity of prison authorities in three countries to effectively manage VEPs and prevent radicalization to violence within their prison systems in line with international human rights norms and standards, in particular the Nelson Mandela Rules? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1= not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response:

1    2    3    4    5

- In your opinion, which project results were achieved and which were not? What were the reasons for non-achievement?
- What were the facilitating and hindering factors in achieving the project results?



- What other changes (positive or negative, intended or unintended) did the project make as a result of its activities?

#### **HR, GE, Disability Inclusion, and LNOB:**

- To what extent, did the project support and result in strengthened respect for human rights, including the Nelson Mandela Rules, gender equality, disability inclusion, and the LNOB? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1= not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response:  
1   2   3   4   5
- In your view, did the project successfully engage with civil society in the fields of prison management of VEPs, disengagement, rehabilitation, and social reintegration?
- What were the major achievements and major shortcomings in addressing HR, GE, vulnerable individuals or group and people with disabilities needs, including any facilitating or hindering factors?

#### **Sustainability:**

- To what extent have project benefits continued beyond the end of the project? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1= not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response.  
1   2   3   4   5

#### **Lessons learned and good practices:**

- What are the key lessons learned that could inform future EU/Dutch government projects in this field?
- What were the strengths and weaknesses of the project design and implementation?
- What aspects and/or activities of the project would you change if it were to start now?

#### **Other issues:**

- Would you like to add anything else?

### **Interview questions for cooperating partners:**

#### **Introduction:**

- What activities did your organization participate in as a project partner?

#### **Relevance:**

- To what extent was the project relevant to the needs and priorities of your country and organization? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being not relevant and 5 highly relevant and then explain your response:  
1   2   3   4   5
- Did the project support any national policies and strategies? Which one?
- Was there any relevance between this project and your strategies/activities?

#### **Effectiveness:**

- What were the main achievements of your partnership with this project?
- Which intended project results were not achieved? What were the reasons for non-achievement?
- What were the facilitating and hindering factors in achieving the intended results?
- What other changes (positive or negative, intended or unintended) did the project make as a result of its activities?

- In your view, to what extent did the project enhance the capacity of prison authorities to effectively manage VEPs and prevent radicalization to violence within the prison system in line with international human rights norms and standards, in particular the Nelson Mandela Rules? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1= not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response:

1 2 3 4 5

- What changes in prison and for prisoners can you comment on that have resulted from any enhancements in capacity?

#### **HR, GE, Disability Inclusion, and LNOB:**

- To what extent, did the project support and result in strengthened respect for human rights, including the Nelson Mandela Rules, gender equality, disability inclusion, and the LNOB? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1= not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response:

1 2 3 4 5

- Did the recommendations/tools you worked with factor in gender considerations? Were recommendations/tools tailored depending on whether it was male or female prison?

#### **Sustainability:**

- To what extent have project benefits continued beyond the end of the project? Please rate your response on a scale from 1 to 5 (1= not at all to 5= very much) and then explain your response.

1 2 3 4 5

#### **Lessons learned and good practices:**

- What were the strong and weak sides of this project?
- What are the project's main lessons learned that could inform future projects in this field?
- What should be adjusted, dropped off, or reinforced to deliver better results in the future?
- Did you observe any differences in implementation of the project in male/female prisons?

#### **Other issues:**

- Would you like to add anything else?

### **[Guide for focus group discussions](#)**

#### **FGD for Police/Training Academies in Kazakhstan and Uganda**

##### **Introduction:**

Welcome everybody, and thank you for coming today. My name is Aida Alymbaeva and this is my colleague, Paul English. We are conducting an independent final joint evaluation of *“Supporting the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalisation to Violence in Prisons”* (the VEPs Project). The project was implemented by UNODC and UNOCT in cooperation with CTED in Kazakhstan, Tunisia, and Uganda during 2017-2022. We are conducting this focus group as part of the information collection for our evaluation. I will be leading today's discussion, and my role is to ask questions, keep to the timeframe, and make sure that you all have the chance to share your knowledge and experience. My colleague, Paul, will help with managing the discussion, and will also be taking notes. The session will last for about 1,5 hours in total.

##### **Purpose of FGD:**

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the project's relevance, level of achievements, sustainability, and HR and gender aspects. The evaluation also seeks to identify gaps in the project implementation, and lessons learned that could inform the design and management of future UNODC and UNOCT projects.

We know that your Training Academy cooperated with the project in developing new courses, creating new training materials, and delivering courses for the prison staff on PVE-related topics. We would like to talk about your experience with the project.

### **Confidentiality:**

This FGD is confidential, with all information received being anonymized. No individual will be quoted nor will the organization they represent be identified. The data collected will only be used for evaluation purposes. Your participation in the FGD is voluntary and you may withdraw from it at any moment. We will make an audio recording of the session to ensure that we don't miss any of your answers. Information recorded today will be deleted once we finalize our data analysis. Don't you mind if we record our discussion? (Note: We will commence recording if every FGD participant agrees to it. One member of the ET will take notes if some FGD participants object to the recording).

### **Focus Group Rules:**

We will follow several practical guidelines during this session:

- We want everyone to express their opinions about the discussion topics. We are interested in different points of view. There are no right or wrong answers. We just want to understand your views.
- Feel free to agree or disagree with what other people say, while respecting their views.
- Sometimes we will go around the table to share views on a topic. You can always "pass" if you prefer not to comment on that particular topic.

**Participant introductions:** Now, let's go around the room and have each of you introduce yourselves; give your first name or a nickname.

**Discussion:** Now let's talk more about the project, its relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and its human rights/gender/LNOB and inclusiveness dimensions in greater detail.

- **Was the project relevant to the needs of your Training Academy? Why?**  
[Probes: Was the project relevant to the mission and strategic objectives of your Academy? Was it relevant to your academic curricula?]
- **What were the main achievements of your partnership with this project?**  
[Probes: Did the project enhance your capacity? Did the project assist in developing the new courses? Did you have direct involvement in development of the courses? If so, how did this work? Were these courses integrated into your curricula? Did the project assist in creating new training guides and materials?]
  - **Which intended project results were not achieved? What were the reasons for non-achievement?**  
[Probe: What were the facilitating and hindering factors in achieving the intended results?]
- **What other changes (positive or negative, intended or unintended) did the project make as a result of its activities?**  
[Probes: Did the project help to establish or enhance partnerships with other government and non-government agencies, as well as other actors? Did the project assist in learning new teaching methods and practices?]
- **Did the Training Academy enhance the capacity of prison staff to effectively manage VEPs and prevent radicalization to violence within the prison system in line with international human rights standards, in particular the Nelson Mandela Rules?**  
[Probes: How many training courses did you deliver to the prison staff since the project started partnering with your Academy? How did the participants of the training respond to the new course content on PVE?]
- **Did your mainstream human rights, gender equality, disability inclusion, and the LNOB into your training courses and training materials?**  
[Probes: Were these topics presented as cross-cutting issues in your training courses? Did you develop specific modules on these topics in your training courses? Were there any differences in the modules/tools intended for staff in male/female prisons? Please provide a concrete example]

- **To what extent have the project benefits continued beyond the end of the project?**  
[Probes: Are you continuing to deliver training courses on PVE-related topics for the prison staff? Is the new Training Center on PVE still functional in your Academy? Are the targeted instructors still teaching in the Academy? Does the Academy have the capacity, interest, and resources to build on the started processes?]

- **What were the strong and weak sides of this project?**

[Probe: What aspects and/or activities of the project would you change if it were to start now?]

- **What are the project’s main lessons learned that could inform future projects in this field?**

[Probe: What should be adjusted, dropped off, or reinforced to deliver better results in the future?]

**Closing Remarks:** Thank you very much for participating in this FGD. The information you have provided has been very helpful. It will be used for our evaluation. Are there any questions that we can answer before we end the session?

Thank you again for your help. We appreciate your time and your knowledge.

## Observation Guide

**Rules:** Prior to each site visit, the nature and extent of the activities relevant to each prison will be clarified by the UNODC project staff. On arrival at each site, the relevant activities that are part of the observation visit will be confirmed and clarified with prison authorities at the site. Due to personnel changes, it might be that prison staff and prison administration representatives, who were not part of the project, now have responsibility for the tasks and approaches supported by the project.

In some parts of prisons, writing materials may not be permitted. Observers are guests of the prisons and will abide by the prison regulations and security procedures. When writing materials are not permitted, observers should take the first available opportunity to confer, compare, and document observations. The use of recording devices during discussions will be discussed with UNODC prior to each visit. In the event that recording devices are not used, observers should at the first available opportunity after such visits confer and compare recollections and notes.

Most observation visits will start with an introduction to the senior official and conclude with a final meeting with the same senior official or their delegated representative. The introductory meeting should be the opportunity to confirm the purpose of a visit, nature of the visit, and initial discussions about the context, development, and delivery of the project. Points to cover include:

- introduce members of the ET and interpreter;
- explain the objectives of the visit and the use of information to be collected;
- reassure the person in charge of the place as to the behaviour of the members of the team during the visit (respect for rules and security regulations);
- clarify how the visit is to unfold and how long it will last;
- to what extent if any, will there be interactions with prisoners, and inform that the purpose of the visit is not to interview prisoners;
- observations should not include confidential meetings with prisoners; and
- basic prison data.

The closing meeting will be an opportunity to secure follow-up clarifications from observations.

### **Observation details:**

<b>1. Contextual information</b>	
Date and time of observation:	
Location:	
Observer name:	
Activities to observe relevant to the site visit (e.g., SOPs, tools, rehabilitation rooms, etc.):	

Persons met during a visit (name and role):	
<b>2. Background:</b> status prior to intervention and development/piloting of intervention	
<i>Practical tip: aim to gather information about the key elements of the development of intervention and why it was an important change for the authorities to prioritize.</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>How were things done prior to the intervention?</b> What was the problem/gap that the intervention sought to address?</li> <li>● <b>Who was involved in the development of the intervention?</b> Were any of the current staff involved in development? How did they contribute?</li> <li>● <b>How was the intervention developed?</b></li> </ul>	
<b>Observation findings:</b>	

<b>3. Fidelity:</b> the degree to which the intervention was implemented as it was intended.	
<i>Practical tip: aim to gather information about the key elements of the intervention, which are outlined in project documents, and based on information from KIIs with project staff</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Who delivers the intervention?</b> Is it solely staff of authorities? Are external experts still involved? Links with CSOs?</li> <li>● <b>Where is it delivered?</b> Include the type(s) of location(s) where the interventions occur, including any necessary infrastructure or relevant features.</li> <li>● <b>What resources are required?</b> Are resources of the institution sufficient or do they need to seek more support for ongoing?</li> </ul>	
<b>How and what does the intervention do?</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>What happens during the intervention?</b> Include each of the intervention's activities (for instance, what the activities are) and/or processes used in the intervention, including any enabling or support activities</li> <li>● <b>When does the intervention take place and how much do participants receive?</b> How are beneficiaries/participants selected? Who is eligible and who is not? If there are documented outputs from an intervention, e.g. risks and needs assessment, how are these stored and used to feed into decision-making?</li> </ul>	
<b>Observation findings:</b>	
<b>4. Adaptation:</b> changes made to the intervention during implementation.	
<i>Note: if the intervention has been modified or adapted, describe the changes such as:</i>	
<b>What changes were made (to materials and/ or to procedures and activities)?</b>	
<b>Why were changes made?</b>	
<b>When were the changes made?</b>	
<b>What has been the result of the changes?</b>	
<b>Observation findings:</b>	

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5. **Quality:** how well the intervention components were implemented

**What indicators are there related to the quality of interventions?  
Do human rights seem integral to the interventions?**

***Observation findings:***

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6. **Other comments**

Record anything else that is useful for documenting observations (e.g., availability of relevant personnel, obstacles in communications, unforeseen issues related to access, sufficiency of duration). Are there significant environmental factors that influence the interventions?

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## ANNEX VI: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

### **Internal project documents**

1. Prodoc (the main project document)
2. Project Logical Framework
3. EU Delegation Agreement signed with UNODC, and Addendum No 2. to the Delegation Agreement
4. Funding Agreement signed between UNODC and the Government of the Netherlands
5. Memorandum of Agreement signed between UNODC and UNOCT
6. Scoping Mission Report for Kazakhstan
7. Scoping Mission Report for Tunisia
8. Scoping Mission Report for Uganda
9. Country Work Plan for Kazakhstan
10. Country Work Plan for Tunisia
11. Country Work Plan for Uganda
12. Inception Report, Year 1-2 (1/12/2017 – 30/09/2019)
13. Inception Report, Year 1-2 (1/12/2017 – 30/09/2019)
14. Progress Narrative Report, Year 1 (1/12/2017 – 30/11/2018)
15. Progress Narrative Report, Year 2 (1/12/2018 – 30/09/2019)
16. Progress Narrative Report, Year 2 (1/01/2019 – 31/12/2019)
17. Progress Narrative Report, Year 3 01/10/2019 – 30/09/2020)
18. Progress Narrative Report, Year 4 01/10/2020 – 31/12/2021)
19. Final Progress Report/Achievements Report (2018-2022)
20. Q1 2019 - VEPs Progress Report
21. Q2 2019 - VEPs Progress Report
22. Q3 2019 - VEPs Progress Report
23. Q4 2019 - VEPs Progress Report
24. Q1 2020 - VEPs Progress Report
25. Q2 2020 - VEPs Progress Report
26. Q3 2020 - VEPs Progress Report
27. Q4 2020 - VEPs Progress Report
28. Q1 2021 - VEPs Progress Report
29. Q2 2021 - VEPs Progress Report
30. Q3 2021 - VEPs Progress Report
31. Q4 2021 - VEPs Progress Report
32. Q1 2022 - VEPs Progress Report
33. Q2 2022 - VEPs Progress Report
34. Performance Monitoring Table for Kazakhstan (Excel)
35. Performance Monitoring Table for Tunisia (Excel)
36. Performance Monitoring Table for Uganda (Excel)
37. Minutes of the Project Steering Committee, including Minutes of the meetings between UNODC and UNOCT staff
38. Mid-term Evaluation Report
39. Communication and Visibility Plan
40. Overall Project Budget
41. Certified Financial Report

### **Project documents for Kazakhstan**

42. Minutes of the Project Steering Committee
43. Orders by the Chairman of the Kazakh Prison Committee authorizing piloting of security audits
44. Minutes of the WGs on Security Audit
45. Security Audit Checklist prepared by the project international consultant
46. Activity reports on piloting results of security audits in pilot prisons
47. Activity reports prepared by national and international consultants on piloting security audits
48. Minutes of the WGs on RNA

49. Legislative review of the national legislation related to the existing RNA instruments prepared by the national consultant
50. Guidelines on the Prisoner Risk and Needs Assessment and Classification Tool in the Prisons of Kazakhstan prepared by the international consultant
51. Comments on the draft Prisoner Risk and Needs Assessment and Classification Tool provided by the local consultant
52. Feedback on Revised Intake Risk Assessment Tool for Prisoners provided by the international consultant
53. Minute of the WG on Social Integration of VEPs after Their Release
54. Agendas, lists of participants, and activity reports for the public project launch event, workshops (online and offline), webinars, ToTs, launch of the Research Center on VEPs Management at Kostanay Academy, CSOs Forum, Media Workshop, Nelson Mandela Conference, Final Project Conference and other capacity-building and awareness raising events
55. Media reports, including videos, posted on the websites of the UNODC, its regional offices, the European Union, and Kazakh media outlets on the VEPs Project.

#### **Country documents for Uganda**

56. Reports on needs assessment of the selected pilot prisons
57. Concept Note (initial and revised versions) on Restructuring Uganda Prisons Service Intelligence
58. Rapid Assessment for Restructuring Uganda Prisons Service Internal Intelligence
59. Draft Ugandan Prisons Service Intelligence Policy Framework
60. Ugandan Prisons Service Draft Operational Framework of Intelligence Policies, Objectives, Training, Procedures and Standards Including a Methodology for Conducting Intelligence Audits in Prisons, and an Intelligence Standards Checklist
61. Draft Work Plan for the Implementation of Human Intelligence Development Operation Between Uganda Police Force and Uganda Prison Services
62. PATS's PCVE Training Modules (draft course structures, draft 6 PCVE training modules, activity reports by international consultant, and ToT reports)
63. PATS' Be-spoke Courses
64. Prisoner Assessment and Classification Tools: User Guide
65. Road mapping exercise – pilot of prisoner classification framework in UPS
66. Self-Study Guide for Prisoner Assessment and Classification Prepared for the UPS
67. Needs assessment: pre-trial prisoners interview protocol and questions
68. Dynamic risk (need) factors assessment – convicted prisoners interview protocol and questions
69. Prisoner Assessment and Classification Tools Booklet (Pre-Trial Prisoners)
70. Prisoner Assessment and Classification Tools Booklet (Convicted Prisoners)
71. ICT equipment and furniture handover to UPS for piloting prisoner classification and COVID-19 relief
72. Rehabilitation and Reintegration Roundtables activity reports
73. Agendas, lists of participants, and activity reports for the public project launch event, workshops, ToTs, sensitizing meeting on NMRs, Retreat of the Restructuring Prison Intelligence WG, meetings and consultations with UPS, Roundtable Meeting for CSO's working on Prison Reform and PCVE, Meeting with members of the National Technical Committee on PCVE and others
74. Activity reports for the services delivered by CSO "Legal Aid" for Legal Aid Project
75. Media reports, including web-stories, tweets, and videos about the project activities.

#### **EXTERNAL PROJECT DOCUMENTS**

##### **Normative documents:**

76. UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Biannual Reviews
77. UN Security Council Resolution 2396 dated December 2017
78. UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. 2015
79. UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (the Tokyo Rules), 1990
80. UNEG Norms and Standards for Evaluation
81. UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation
82. UNEG Guidance on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation



83. UNEG Guidance on Integrating Disability Inclusion in Evaluations
84. UNODC Guidance Note for Evaluators: Gender-responsive Evaluations in the Work of UNODC
85. UNODC Guidance Note for Evaluators: HR Mainstreaming in UNODC Independent Evaluations
86. UNODC Guidance Note for Evaluators: Inclusive Evaluations
87. UNOCT Strategic Plan and Programme Framework and Biannual Reviews
88. UNOCT Evaluation Handbook, quality assurance checklist, and templates
89. UNOCT Evaluation Policy and Gender Mainstreaming Policy
90. The Bangkok Rules, "The United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders", 2010
91. Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, Global Counter Terrorism Forum, 2012

#### **Guides and Handbooks:**

92. Compendium of Good Practices Measuring Results in Counter-Terrorism and PCVE, United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, 2023
93. Compendium of Good Practices in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, Global Centre on Cooperative Security, 2018.
94. The Prevention of Recidivism and the Social Reintegration of Offenders, UNODC, 2018
95. A Human Rights Approach to Prison Management, International Centre for Prison Studies, 2009
96. Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons, UNODC, 2016
97. Handbook on the Classification of Prisoners, UNODC 2020
98. Handbook for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, Council of Europe, 2016
99. Operating secure, safe and orderly prisons, A Human Rights Approach to Prison Management, International Centre for Prison Studies, KCL, 2009
100. Operational Guidelines on the preparation and implementation of EU financed actions specific to countering terrorism and violent extremism in third countries, European Commission, Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace 2015
101. Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, GCTF
102. UNODC Mainstreaming Gender in Justice Projects/Programmes: Briefing Note for UNODC Staff.
103. Understanding the Role of Gender in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism Good Practices for Law Enforcement, OSCE, 2019
104. Women in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, UN Women, 2021
105. Council of Europe Handbook for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalization and Violent Extremism

#### **National Strategies:**

106. Kazakhstan's State Program on Countering Religious Extremism and Terrorism for 2018-2022 (in Russian language)
107. Tunisian First Report for 2016-2019 on Implementation of the National Counter Terrorism Commission
108. Uganda Prisons Service (no date) *Draft Intelligence Audit Checklist*

#### **Reports:**

109. Bonta, J. et al. (2019) A conceptual replication of the Strategic Training Initiative in Community Supervision (STICS)
110. CTED Analytical Brief: Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prison
111. CTED Supporting the management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalization to violence in prisons in Uganda: Desk Research Report, 2019
112. Country Reports on Terrorism, US Department of State, 2017
113. Dealing with Radicalisation in a Prison and Probation Context, Practitioners Working Paper
114. Dean, C. and Kessels, E., Compendium of Good Practices in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders. Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2018.

115. Manuel, C., Manuel, M. and Stewart, S. (2021) *Advancing SDG16.3.2 by Investing in Prison Paralegals to Cut the Number of Unsentenced Detainees in Low Income Countries*. ODI Policy Brief. London: ODI.
116. Ministry of Justice, *The Actuarial Prediction of Sexual Reoffending: Responding to Changing Offending Patterns*. London: Ministry of Justice, 2024.
117. Open Society Justice Initiative, *Improving Pretrial Justice: The Roles of Lawyers and Paralegals*. New York: Open Society Foundation, 2012.
118. UN Open-ended intergovernmental expert group meeting on model strategies on reducing reoffending: Working paper by the Secretariat, 2023
119. van der Heide, L. and Kearney, O., *The Dutch Approach to Extremist Offenders*. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2020.

**Academic literature:**

120. Bonta, J. and Andrews, D. (2023) *The Psychology of Criminal Conduct, 7<sup>th</sup> edition*. London and New York: Routledge
121. Detention Policy: Institutionalized Fear or Evidence-Based Policy Making? London: Routledge.
122. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 15: 397–419
123. Gutierrez, L., Helmus, L. M., & Hanson, R. K. (2016). What we know and don't know about risk assessment with offenders of indigenous heritage. *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, 3(2), 97–106.
124. Nguyen, H. et al. (2017) Confidence Matters: Self-efficacy Moderates the Credit that Supervisors Give to Adaptive and Proactive Role Behaviours. *British Journal of Management*
125. Shepherd, S. M., Adams, Y., McEntyre, E., & Walker, R. (2014). Violence risk assessment in Australian Aboriginal offender populations: A review of the literature
126. Shepherd, S. M., Adams, Y., McEntyre, E., & Walker, R. (2014). Violence risk assessment in Australian Aboriginal offender populations: A review of the literature. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, 20(3), 281–293.
127. Tamatea on culture and risk-needs assessment in Ward et. al (2022) Urgent issues and prospects in correctional rehabilitation practice and research, *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, 27: 103-28
128. Ross, E. (2107) *An Examination of the Individual and Work Environment Factors Impacting Transfer of Training among North Carolina Probation Officers*. North Carolina State University.
129. Yaacoub, Salim. "British and Lebanese Prisons: Are They Fertile Breeding Ground for Terrorism?" *Journal of Strategic Security* 11, no. 3 (2018)
130. Wortley, R. and Homel, R. (1995). Police Prejudice as a Function of Training and Outgroup Contact: A Longitudinal Investigation, *Law and Human Behaviour*, 19: 305-317

## ANNEX VII: STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED DURING THE EVALUATION

10	Implementing agency, UNODC	Male: 4 Female: 6
5	Implementing agency, UNOCT	Male: 1 Female: 4
1	Associated partner, CTED	Male: 1
6	Donors	Male: 3 Female: 3
20	Government counterparts in Kazakhstan	Male: 13 Female: 7
18	Government counterparts in Uganda	Male: 13 Female: 5
5	CSOs in Kazakhstan	Male: 3 Female: 2
2	CSOs in Tunisia	Male: 1 Female: 1
5	CSOs in Uganda	Male: 2 Female: 3
7	Consultants	Male: 4 Female: 3
1	Ex-prisoner	Male: 1
<b>Total: 80</b>		<b>Male: 46 Female: 34</b>

## ANNEX VIII: SHORT BIO OF THE EVALUATION TEAM

**Aida Alymbaeva** has worked as an evaluation consultant for UNODC, UNESCAP, UNICEF, OSCE, EC, USAID, Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Search for Common Ground, Hans Siedel Stiftung, and other international organisations. She has also experience in project management by working with UNDP. Aida published a number of articles concerning the security sector reform in Central Asia. She is also a member of the Editorial Board of Connections, a quarterly journal published by the Partnership of Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institute, Marshall Center, Germany. Aida holds an MS in Public Policy from Rochester Institute of Technology, USA. She speaks English, Russian and Kyrgyz. She is based in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

**Mark Brown** is a prisons and evaluation consultant, as well as a member of the School of Law at the University of Sheffield in the UK, and an Honorary Senior Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne, Australia. He has researched prisons and other forms of punishment and confinement in Oceania and South Asia mainly. He has been a consultant to UNODC's evaluation function - the Independent Evaluation Section - for a number of years, evaluating programmes in Africa, West Asia, and Central Asia. He also supports UNODC research capacity on prisons. In the past he has worked on SSR, including for DCAF, and from time to time advises national governments on the intersection of crime and conflict, most recently in Myanmar.

**Paul English** is an independent international penal reform expert. He has over 25 years of experience in this sector. He holds an MSc (econ) in International Development Planning and Management. He has worked for the UNODC, International Office for Migration, Civipol, the British Council, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office UK, Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe, Council of Europe, Open Society Justice Initiative, and Penal Reform International, where for seven years he was the Executive Director. He has since 2014 worked extensively on issues related to PCVE, detention, and programmes for and management of prisoners. He is regularly requested to contribute to international activities related to detention and PCVE.