MID-TERM EVALUATION REPORT

Project Number:
AFG/J55

Project Title:
Integrated Border Control Project in Western and Southwestern Afghanistan

Thematic area:
Counter-Narcotics Enforcement

Country:
Afghanistan

Independent Evaluator
Everett Erlandson

Reviewed and Edited By:
Stuart A. Steinberg, J.D., L.L.M
Enhanced International Law Enforcement Consultant
UNODC, COAFG

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
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Independent Project Evaluations are scheduled and managed by the project managers and conducted by external
independent evaluators. The role of the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) in relation to independent project
evaluations is one of quality assurance and support throughout the evaluation process, but IEU does not directly
participate in or undertake independent project evaluations. It is, however, the responsibility of IEU to respond to
the commitment of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) in professionalizing the evaluation function and
promoting a culture of evaluation within UNODC for the purposes of accountability and continuous learning and
improvement.

Due to the disbandment of the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) and the shortage of resources following its
reinstitution, the IEU has been limited in its capacity to perform these functions for independent project evaluations
to the degree anticipated. As a result, some independent evaluation reports posted may not be in full compliance
with all IEU or UNEG guidelines. However, in order to support a transparent and learning environment, all
evaluations received during this period have been posted and as an on-going process, IEU has begun re-implementing
quality assurance processes and instituting guidelines for independent project evaluations as of January 2011.
**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABP</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACM</td>
<td>Anti-Coalition Militias</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>Anti-Government Elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMTF</td>
<td>Border management Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOA</td>
<td>Government of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTA</td>
<td>Long Term Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFQ</td>
<td>Request for Quotation</td>
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<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Security Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Summary Table of Findings, Supporting Evidence and Recommendations.

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<th>Findings: identified problems/issues</th>
<th>Supporting evidence</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1. Construction delayed due to attacks on construction workers, ABP officers and equipment at Nimroz construction site.</td>
<td>ABP report that Anti-Coalition Militia force attacked base, claiming ABP officer wounded and multiple pieces of equipment destroyed May 2009.</td>
<td>Better intelligence required prior to construction along with security to ensure completion of construction of the base is required. Better review of ABP reports due to conflicting evidence on nature of the attack, who the attackers were, whether an officer was wounded and the amount of equipment damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Difficulties experienced in securing cooperation from UNDP with administrative support for external activities causing delayed implementation.</td>
<td>UNDP refused to certify blueprints for Chelmariz garrison in September 2008 because of engineer’s credentials</td>
<td>UNDP needs better understanding of this project and its goals. Better vetting process by UNDP when hiring professionals who must have certain credentials. Request support from UNODC management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Delays by finance, administrative and logistical sections at UNODC and UNDP.</td>
<td>Payroll and other finance issues. Procurement process unwieldy.</td>
<td>Appoint independent international evaluator to look at problems and recommend necessary changes. Changes recommended must be implemented, absent compelling reasons. “Things have to go slowly” is no longer an acceptable response for needed change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Training activities would be more effective for Nimroz trainees if these could be accomplished at Zaranj ABP battalion base, instead of at ABP Zone 4 Headquarters in Herat.</td>
<td>Commanders are reluctant to release trainees for training outside of their own Zone.</td>
<td>Begin training of Nimroz ABP trainees in Zaranj until construction at Chelmariz completed. Accomplish complete, detailed cost benefit analysis of conducting training in Zaranj versus Herat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. RFQs and required LTAs for all required items—tactical equipment, facilities, vehicles, maintenance and other infrastructure—submitted within first six months, but acted on by UNDP in an untimely manner.</td>
<td>UN procurement process is cumbersome and fails to process requests in a timely and reasonable manner.</td>
<td>UN streamlines their process. UN needs better understanding for need to rapidly prioritize and process RFQs and LTAs for projects related to remote counter-narcotics policing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Training efforts and ultimately effective interdiction is adversely affected due to low pay and support received by ABP officers from the GOA.</td>
<td>Officers are involved with, for instance, narcotics trafficking and other smuggling, in order to earn enough money to support themselves and their families</td>
<td>ABP officers’ pay must be brought up to the same level as pay for the ANA and the ANP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Logistics issue of moving equipment and supplies from Kabul to Nimroz and Herat is taking too long and has become a drain on Project financial resources.</td>
<td>ABP transportation of equipment previously occurred when needed and at no cost. Now happens based on ABP schedule. Costs incurred for ABP vehicle fuel and payment of drivers.</td>
<td>UNODC Country Representative Afghanistan should discuss with ABP HQ and MOI to secure delivery of equipment using regular ABP convoys that travel to these remote areas.</td>
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2. Summary Description of the Project Including Project Objectives.

Nimroz Province is the main gateway for opium, morphine and heroin smuggling out of Afghanistan, with as much as 40% of the nation’s illegal opium crop exiting the country from this area. The elders and Mullahs of the region have reported that over 10,000 kilograms of narcotics pass through this part of Nimroz every week. This is one of the most important strategic pathways for narcotics trafficking from Helmand, Kandahar and Farah Provinces (which are the highest opium growing and
collection centers in the country), through southern Nimroz, into Iran and further on to markets in the West. The primary reason Nimroz has become the main narcotics smuggling route out of Afghanistan is because there are no law enforcement authorities stationed in the area where the major trafficking corridors are located. The local unit of the Afghan Border Police has left the region because of lack of support, manpower, training, equipment and facilities.

AFG/J55 is aimed at reestablishing the rule of law in this strategically important border area. The project will provide the necessary infrastructure to facilitate the Afghan Border Police and other counter narcotics agencies in a regional border enforcement undertaking. The project activities include the construction of a Regional Border Security Garrison, located at Chelmariz, which would serve not only in the sense of a traditional border post, but also as a regional center that can support 100-200 police personnel. This enhanced base of operation will be strategically placed at the cross roads of the Nimroz smuggling routes, close to the Iranian and Pakistan borders, yet with enough of a buffer zone to enable counter narcotics forces to act in a highly mobile manner. This concept would also allow ABP units, after concluding their operations, to return to a secure base in order to reorganize and recover in a relatively protected environment. This new and improved counter narcotics concept for Afghanistan will put an adequate number of properly trained and equipped police officers in a strategically important location, and better enable them to interdict drug smugglers who currently move freely through this area.


In order for AFG/J55 to succeed, better security and provision of resources must be provided to protect and secure the base under construction at Chelmariz. For this to occur, the Project requires more comprehensive support from UNODC, UNDP, the UN, itself, and offices within those agencies that are responsible for procurement, human resources and security decisions.

In particular, the lengthy delays in the procurement and hiring processes are simply unconscionable; there is no excuse for this virtual lack of support for a project that is attempting to deal with the single-most important thing that is wrong with Afghanistan: narcotics trafficking and the resulting corruption at all levels of the GOA, criminal acts and racketeering within Afghanistan and the concomitant transnational crime and health problems caused solely by the production and processing of opium poppy. Decisions regarding security, particularly the ability of J55 team members to travel to and from Nimroz Province, are clearly being made in a vacuum without consideration of the grave necessity of the Project’s ability to reach an operational capacity. UNDSS should consult with the International and National Project Coordinators before making final decisions relative to J55 team members’ security and travel restrictions that essentially shut the project down.

4. Lessons Learned and Best Practices.

Exceptional ABP officers must be identified and placed in positions of leadership after receiving advanced training. This is a task that must be undertaken by the MOI and the commanding general of the ABP. Better security must be provided for UNODC-sponsored projects in remote locations in order to avoid the type of situation caused by
the attack on the base being constructed in Nimroz Province. It is unfair to the donors for such programs to see a project begun and then, essentially, abandoned because of a lack of appropriate security and the unwillingness of DSS to allow UNODC project members to travel to locations deemed unsafe. In relation to the attack at Chelmariz, it was discovered that corruption was behind the attack and that it was not anti-government elements. To date, no action has been taken to bring those involved to justice since the ABP unit providing security abandoned the Chelmariz site and now, essentially, will not leave their base in Zaranj. In the future, international security forces, like Gurkhas provided by private security contractors, should be contracted with for projects in remote locations.

Prior training, experience and professionalism of contractors and national staff, have greatly contributed to the success of AFG/J55, despite the problems with finishing the construction of the ABP base at Chelmariz in Nimroz Province. UNODC and UNDP should use the same criteria in selecting and retaining staff that are responsible for procurement and human resources. It has been our observation that when serious mistakes are made in these offices, there are no consequences. Thus, J55 continues to have problems hiring contractors within a reasonable period of time (the process is much too wieldy), and with lengthy delays in the procurement process.

Project staff have made a concerted effort to personally visit locations where the men they train are ultimately assigned and they do so on multiple occasions. Although sites like those in Herat are easily accessed, many of the sites manned by the ABP are in remote locations, with limited access other than by travel across desert terrain and virtually non-existent or extremely debilitated roads. J55 has travelled to every site where the men they train might be stationed, have stayed with them and broken bread with them. This has resulted in an undeniable bond and respect on the part of the ABP, especially at the highest command levels, and with the MOI, for the national and international staff of J55. “Winning the hearts and minds” means something more than learning a few phrases in Pashto or Dari; it means treating Afghans with respect, dignity and as equals.

With the urging of the Project, ABP posts began to allow the Kuchi to use their deep-water wells, provided by UNODC donors, in order to fulfill their constant requirement for water for their herds of sheep and goats. Because many of the ABP posts and the men who man them take their jobs seriously, have been willing to fight the scourges of drugs and criminality, and have provided protection for the Kuchi people, they now make their camps near ABP bases. During a visit to one Kuchi gathering by members of the European Commission and UNODC, the elders and Mullahs told them that “the only police [they] trust is the [Afghan] Border Police.

5. Recommendations, Conclusions and Implications for UNODC.

Prior to construction in these remote, dangerous locations, more emphasis should be placed on intelligence gathering by the appropriate GOA, NGO or military agency in the AOR regarding ACM activity and the potential for an attack in order to make intelligent judgments about advance security preparations.
In order to ensure that construction of the base at Chelmariz is completed, international security forces must be hired to protect IOM contractors, unless the ABP is going to provide security forces that will stand and fight, if necessary, in the event of an attack by AGEs, or by criminals bent on extorting agreements to provide local security contractors. One force the ABP could provide for security, if the proper GOA authorities would support the idea, would be the men under the command of ABP commander at Robat-e-Jali. The third alternative would be to bring in members of the Zone 4 Quick Reaction Force from Herat, who were trained by this project’s predecessor, AFG/H16. The base at Chelmariz, to the extent that construction begins, again, should be redesigned to include a number of pre-fabricated buildings in order to get the project back on schedule by speeding up the construction process.

Due to the security concerns, training of the Nimroz trainees is planned to be at the Zone 4 facility provided in Herat until the Chelmariz facility comes on-line. While in principle this is a solid concept, realities on the ground in Afghanistan are that commanders are reluctant to release trainees to attend training for an extended period of time in a different zone. It would therefore serve the project better if training activities could be accomplished at Zaranj ABP battalion base, instead of at ABP Zone 4 Headquarters in Herat.

In order for the purpose of AFG/J55 to succeed in Nimroz Province, all aspects of support for the ABP must be greatly increased at all levels of the GOA, particularly the commander of the ABP and the offices of the MOI and President Karzai. ABP officers’ pay must be brought up to the same level as pay for the ANA and the ANP. Facilities, sanitary conditions, medical benefits and sufficient food must be provided to all ABP officers, particularly those assigned to remote location along the Iranian and Pakistan borders. Without such government support, the ABP will continue to be an inferior, partly corrupt unit within the ANSF since officers will continue to be involved with, for instance, narcotics trafficking and other smuggling, in order to earn enough money to support themselves and their families.

UNODC must take a firm lead in seeing that the matters described, above, are discussed with the GOA and implemented as soon as possible.

Administrative and support functions to be provided to the project, particularly by UNDP but also including UNODC’s own administrative support staff, are proving problematic. Steps to make the procurement and hiring processes more in tune with the needs of UNODC counter-narcotics projects should not primarily be focused on picayunish and inconsequential issues that do nothing to propel the projects forward. There should be definitive limits set on the length of time agencies such as UNDP can take to make decisions on procurement and hiring. Without trainers, and without proper equipment, hired and purchased in a timely fashion, all aspects of projects like AFG/J55 suffer needless consequences.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Context

During the 1990s and into the new millennium, Afghanistan established itself as the main source of illicit opium and heroin which is trafficked and consumed throughout the world. By the end of the 1990’s, Afghanistan accounted for approximately 70% of the global illicit opium production. It is estimated that along the trafficking chain, about half a million people have been involved in the trade in illicit Afghan opiates and the overall annual value of this product is estimated to be US $30 billion. Currently, it is believed that approximately 90% of the world’s opium supply is processed in Afghanistan.

Drug control, crime prevention and countering terrorism are on the top of the political agenda at all international forums related to Afghanistan’s recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction. At the conference on “Afghanistan and the International Community - A Partnership for the Future”, held in Berlin, from 31 March to 1 April 2004, participants declared to be committed to the vision of a secure, stable, free, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan, as laid out in the Afghan Constitution. Being aware that drug trafficking poses “a serious threat to the rule of law and development in Afghanistan, as well as to international security,” the participants agreed that Afghanistan and the international community would concentrate their efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate this threat.

At the Paris Pact Consultative Group meetings from 2003 – 2008, it was agreed that strong support should be given to Afghanistan to promote regional cooperation to stop the smuggling of narcotics out of the country. From January 31 - February 1, 2006, fifty-one participating countries, eleven organizations and thirteen observer countries crafted The Afghanistan Compact. In it, “[t]he Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community” formulated a counter-narcotics strategy whose essential elements include improved interdiction [and] law enforcement…; enhanced cooperation among Afghanistan, neighboring countries and the international community on disrupting the drug trade;…and building…provincial counter-narcotics institutions…[Emphasis added]. [1/

As one of its benchmarks and timelines, the participants in The Compact determined that, by the end of 2010, the Government of Afghanistan would “strengthen its law enforcement capacity at [the]…provincial level…” and, thereby, “increase the amount of drugs seized or destroyed and processing facilities dismantled…” [Emphasis added]. [2/ The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) states that in order to carry out the principles stated in The Compact,

By...the...end [of] 2010, a fully constituted, professional, functional and

1/ The Afghanistan Compact, “Building on Success: The London Conference on Afghanistan,” (31 January – 1 February 2006), pp. 4, 16 [hereinafter, “The Compact”]. It should also be noted that the Doha II Conference on Border Management in Afghanistan, held on 27 and 28 December 2006, concluded that Afghanistan must have well-trained and equipped border police services that are able to cooperate with other security services, as well as the border police and security elements of its neighbors.

2/ The Compact, supra, at 6.
ethnically balanced...Afghan Border Police...will be able to meet the security needs of the country effectively...and the Government will strengthen its law enforcement capacity at...[the]...provincial level..., resulting in a substantial annual increase in the amount of drugs seized or destroyed and processing facilities dismantled. [3]

With these principles in mind, it is well established that Nimroz Province is one of the main gateways for narcotics being smuggled out of Afghanistan with as much as 40% of the nation’s illegal opium crop exiting the country from this area into Iran and, thereafter, to locations throughout the world. [4] The Thematic Evaluation states that, “There is a gaping hole along the border of the province of Nimroz...and the Islamic Republic of Iran. [hereinafter, “Iran”].” [5] It is the strategic pathway for narcotics trafficking from Helmand, Oruzgan, Kandahar and Farah Provinces, the largest opium producing and collection centers in Afghanistan. International consultants, the National Project Coordinator and ABP personnel, including then ABP commander, General Abdur Rahman, made a 15-day border assessment in March – April 2008. According to the tribal and village Elders and Mullahs they met with during this trip, more than 10,000 kilograms of narcotics pass through Nimroz every week during the peak trafficking season.

Outside of Zaranj, the provincial capital, there is virtually no law enforcement authority, with the exception of the outpost at Robat-e-Jali, in the far southwestern corner of Afghanistan, which is, literally, “the only law south of the Helmand River.” The Border Police have, essentially, pulled out of the region, including the ABP garrison construction site at Chelmariz in Chahar Borjak District, and withdrawn to Zaranj, because of the lack of security and support, ACM and traffickers’ attacks, and lack of manpower, training, equipment and adequate facilities.

J55 is aimed at re-establishing the rule of law—another aim of The Afghanistan Compact and the ANDS—in this strategically important border area by, initially, constructing an ABP garrison at Chelmariz capable of housing 100 – 200 men. The Project will provide the necessary infrastructure and security to allow the Afghan Border Police and other counter-narcotics agencies to function as a true regional border enforcement authority. This enhanced base of operations is strategically placed in the crossroads of the Nimroz smuggling routes, close to the border, yet with enough of a buffer zone to enable counter-narcotics personnel to act comprehensively and in a highly mobile manner with the training and equipment provided by UNODC. The base allows ABP personnel, after concluding their operations, to return to a secure base in order to reorganize and recover in a well-planned, defensible environment. The Project’s improved counter-narcotics concept for this region of Afghanistan will put an adequate number of properly trained and equipped police officers in a strategically important location, enabling them to interdict drug smugglers who currently move freely through this area, thereby, accomplishing major tenets of The Afghanistan Compact and the ANDS.

1.2 Purpose and Objective of the Evaluation

The purpose and objective of the evaluation are the same: to determine what the Project has achieved to date and if it is attaining its goals successfully and efficiently, taking into account the often difficult conditions on the ground in Afghanistan, and particularly in Nimroz Province. Furthermore, the evaluation intends to generate information that will be used to improve Project implementation in the Western and South-western regions of Afghanistan. In this regard, the extent to which the needs of the beneficiaries are being met, as well as what has been achieved to date in terms of impact and sustainability, will also be assessed.

The evaluation will seek to identify lessons learned and good practices from the Project’s implementation, to date, which will be used to improve current and future planning, implementation and management. In this regard, the evaluation must seek to measure the Project’s achievements, outcomes and impacts, both positive and negative. Moreover, the evaluation assesses whether this Project can be successful in creating a professional police agency in Nimroz Province that is able to establish and maintain the rule-of-law; interdict the smuggling of narcotics, precursor chemicals, weapons, munitions, explosives, human trafficking and illegal goods; and create a bond of trust and partnership with the citizens they serve and are sworn to protect. Finally, the evaluation intends to examine whether time, money and resources are being wisely utilized. This necessarily comprehends looking at whether the donors are getting value for the funds they have contributed to the Project.

It must be noted that during the course of this Project some aspects will, no doubt, change, largely due to the fluid and kinetic security situation in Nimroz Province, which will necessarily cause the Project to be revised. This has already occurred once as a result of an attack on the base under construction. The evaluation will attempt to identify some areas that might have to be adjusted to further the Project’s successful completion.

1.3. Executing Modality/Management Arrangements

While in close liaison with UNODC Headquarters’ Regional Section of the Partnership in Development Branch (PDB), the UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan will execute the project. Technical advice will be received from the Anti-Trafficking Section (ATS), the Department of Security Services (DSS) and the Human Security Branch (HSB). UNDP will provide the procurement and administrative staff services as requested by UNODC. Additional expert advice will be provided through the assistance of the Senior Law Enforcement Advisor, national and international project coordinators, international consultants and the other J55 staff members.

This is a technical assistance project and will be implemented in close collaboration with the Afghan Border Police, the Ministry of the Interior and other ministries, other counter-narcotics agencies, as well as donors, neighbors on the border and other involved stakeholders. It is expected that the coordination of activities, strengthening of efforts and sharing of competencies and expertise will also take place with UNAMA, other relevant UN agencies, and governmental and non-governmental organizations. The aim of this is to optimize the impact of the project.

6/ It should be noted that J55 has necessarily subsumed the ongoing aspects of the H16 Project, “Strengthening Afghan-Iran Drug Border Control and Cross-border Cooperation (SAID),” as well as the Border Liaison Office Pilot Project in Islam Qala and Torkham.
1.4. Scope of the Evaluation

The evaluation focuses primarily on the following:

- Have the guidelines of the Project concept been adhered to?
- Have the accomplishments of the Project, to date, been verified and documented?
- Has the quality of the implementation process been successful?
- Will the Project be sustainable and, if so, how will that be done?
- Will the Project contribute to a priority concern of UNODC?
- What problems have been identified and how will they be addressed and resolved?
- Is the current design of the Project technically sound?
- Are the results of implementation of the Project, to date, useful and relevant and are the planned objectives attainable?
- How well do the Project objectives reflect the specific nature of the problem and needs of counter-narcotics border control capacity and policies in Afghanistan?

All of these considerations are analyzed within the objectives of the current counter-narcotics and rule-of-law priorities and action plans of:

- The Government of Afghanistan.
- The Afghanistan Compact.

1.5. Evaluation Methodology

The original evaluation was carried out by an International Law Enforcement Consultant hired specifically to perform the evaluation. As a result of shoddy preparation and failure to follow the required format, UNODC Vienna rejected the original evaluation and returned it to UNODC Afghanistan for proper preparation. The review and editing was carried out by an Enhanced International Law Enforcement Consultant who is contracted with the Law Enforcement Section of the UNODC Afghanistan Country Office. He was not, however, involved in any way with the planning of J55, or H16, or their implementations, during the time-frame covered by this Mid-Term Evaluation and was not in Afghanistan at the time of the original evaluation. To be fair, however, it should be noted that he will be involved in AFG/J55 in the future as a trainer and mentor in his areas of expertise: Crime Scene Investigations and Improvised Explosive Devices/Ordnance Identification, and has recently participated in meetings concerning the redesign of the construction of the base at Chelmariz under J55.

This evaluation assesses the extent to which UNODC assistance for J55 has contributed to building the capacity of the ABP along the border with Iran and Pakistan, particularly in Nimroz Province. To achieve that aim, the evaluator addressed important questions relating to relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of activities, on the basis of which lessons were drawn and recommendations for improvements were made.
The evaluation was conducted by:

- Reading background documents produced by UNODC, including the Thematic Evaluation, the Rainbow Initiative Green Paper, the Triangular Action Plan and the Central Asia Strategic Program Framework.
- Reading documents produced by the Government of Afghanistan, the US State Department and the US Department of Defense.
- Reading The Afghanistan Compact.
- Reading the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).
- Reviewing web pages of relevant organizations and agencies and reading documents related to counter-narcotics issues in Afghanistan.
- Reading the AFG/J55 “Project Document,” July 2007, written by International Project Coordinator, Anthony W. Oliver, and National Project Coordinator, Daud Saskai.7
- Reading numerous reports related to AFG/H16.
- Reading Final Report on the Use of Canadian Funds, 1 April 2007 to 31 March 2009.
- Interviews with specialists at the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan, including the International Project Coordinator, the Regional Project Coordinator, the National Project Coordinator, one of the International Law Enforcement Consultants, the Senior Law Enforcement Advisor and two National Project Assistants, including the Assistant responsible for procurement for J55 and H16.

During the evaluation a limiting factor was the security situation in Afghanistan, particularly in the South-West Province of Nimroz which prevented free travel and access to the project site and excluded interviews with all those benefiting from project activities. The inability to access activities first hand forced the accessor to rely largely on third party reports which is not ideal for an activity of this nature.

2. ANALYSIS AND MAJOR FINDINGS

2.1 General Comments

The implementation of this Project as it was originally conceived—construction of an ABP garrison at Chelmariz and training and equipping a 100-200-man police force—has suffered several setbacks. First, there was a problem with the engineering plans for the construction of the base. For construction purposes, UNDP required certification of the plans by an engineer with an international credential.8 This will necessitate the hiring of a second engineering firm with an international credential to review and certify the plans.

7/ Originally, the Project was titled, “Establishment of Regional Center for the Afghan Border Police in Nimroz Province.” It is now titled, “Integrated Border Control Project in Western and Southwestern Afghanistan,” as a result of the consolidation of J55 and the ongoing mentoring and sustainment of AFG/H16. Both projects, now J55, deal with all border issues and the training, equipping and mentoring of the ABP along the entirety of the Western and Southwestern border.
8/ As I understand it, UNDP, in the design RFQ, did not require an international credential for the design plans.
for construction purposes. This has never been a requirement in the past and the same engineer has been used successfully on other aspects of J55, as well as H16, all of which are still fully functional and have had no failure of infrastructure. This, in turn, has directly facilitated capacity building for the ABP and Afghanistan.

Second, the security situation in Nimroz, and particularly at the garrison construction site at Chelmariz, has greatly deteriorated. On May 2, 2009, the Chelmariz site was attacked, purportedly by ACM forces. It was reported that one ABP officer was wounded and that several pieces of construction equipment were destroyed. Later facts that have surfaced imply that the attack may well have involved ACM forces and corrupt locals whose interest is furthering the trafficking of narcotics through this strategic location. It was also reported that the locals involved in the attack wanted private security operators hired from the local community.

Third, the logistics situation has become problematic. In the past, J55 and H16 were able to have materiel of all types transported from Kabul to Herat, or Nimroz, without difficulty and by utilization of local ABP personnel and trucks. There was no cost for this service, understandably, because the Project was providing resources for their capacity building. Because of the deteriorating security situation in the provinces along the Western and Southwestern border, this is no longer possible. It is now necessary to pay for fuel and drivers, in both directions, and on a schedule that is convenient for ABP HQ, Kabul. This has increased the cost of getting needed equipment, vehicles, food and other materiel to where they are needed in support of counter-narcotics operations.

2.2 Overall Performance Assessment ( Appropriateness, Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency)

Based upon the standards outlined in the original project document, the objective and outputs are being achieved, despite the setbacks noted, above. The activities of the J55 team in support of the ABP have, for the most part, been successful and have been accomplished on time. This is due, in no small part, to the efficient preparation and support of the UNODC Country Office Afghanistan, the Senior Law Enforcement Advisor, and the International and National Project Coordinators, as well the technical assistance provided by International Law Enforcement Consultants and the additional support from the entire J55 staff and the other law enforcement components of UNODC Kabul. The program design for J55 is logical and sensible, given the objective of the Project and the expected outputs. All necessary logistics, despite the transportation problem noted, above, have been properly executed.

The work of the J55 team has been well facilitated due to the successful planning, outputs and lessons learned on H16. In addition, the well developed relationships between the J55 team, IOM and the important personalities in the ABP and the MOI have greatly assisted in the Project’s accomplishments, to date. Within the framework of the six outputs delineated in the Final Report on the Use of Canadian Funds for the Period 1 April 2007 to 31 March 2008, much has been accomplished, although not at the level hoped for by the time of this report. However, given the security and logistics problems encountered, it is remarkable that the Project has progressed to its current level of attainment and this can only be attributed to the dedication of all stakeholders in the objective of J55 to disrupt the flow of narcotics and precursor chemicals in Afghanistan and the countries on its borders.
Most importantly, as a result of the activities of J55, the operational capabilities of the ABP have been enhanced and strengthened along the Western and Southwestern borders of Afghanistan with Iran and Pakistan. Once the engineering and security situation is resolved at Chelmariz, there is no question that the garrison will be quickly completed and training and operations will begin shortly thereafter. As a result, the capacity of the ABP and the GOA to attain the Project’s objective will expand exponentially, helping to instill the rule-of-law and a deeper bond with the local population in a region that can only be currently described as lawless and dysfunctional.

2.3 Attainment of Objectives

The objective of AFG/J55 is to disrupt the flow of narcotics out of Afghanistan and into Iran and Pakistan, as well as to stop the importation of precursor chemicals across the borders of the three countries. This will be accomplished by increasing the capabilities and capacities of the ABP in establishing the rule-of-law in Western and Southwestern Afghanistan, and particularly along its borders with Iran and Pakistan. In this regard, the six identified outputs expected from the Project’s successful implementation are being attained, although at a slower pace than was expected by the time of this report.

Output 1 primarily involves the completion of the ABP garrison at Chelmariz and the training and equipping of the 100-200 men who will be stationed there. Despite the May 2, 2009, attack on the construction site, the outer defensive wall, the defensive ditch and the deep water well are on target to be completed in the near future. Once the security and engineering construction plans problems are resolved, the base will be quickly completed. In terms of training and equipment, the necessary experts have been hired and most of the needed equipment has been purchased and is in proper storage pending opening of the base for training and operations.

The problem with the plans concerns UNDP’s civil engineer’s refusal, since the fall of 2008, to certify the blue prints until they are first certified by a civil engineer with an international credential. Until UNDP signs off on the plans, construction on the buildings cannot begin. It is difficult to comprehend UNDP’s position on this issue since J55 and H16 have used the same engineer on numerous other construction projects that have been successfully completed with superior results. It is believed that this problem is engendered as a result of a catastrophic engineering failure on one project wholly unrelated to J55, and engineering problems on other projects, and whose design and implementation were not by the J55 engineer.

The J55 National Project Coordinator brought these concerns to UNODC management meetings beginning in September 2008. At the latest meeting in February 2009, three recommendations were made by the National Project Coordinator:

1. Commission another UN organization that has internationally accredited civil engineers on its staff to submit a new set of blueprints at a cost approximated at 15 - 25% of the total project cost.

2. Commission a local company with internationally accredited civil engineers on its staff to review, adjust and certify the set of existing blueprints that could be
presented to UNDP for approval. This could take approximately two months at a cost of $20-25,000.

3. The third suggestion was to commission a local engineer who is internationally accredited and have that person review, adjust and certify the existing blue prints. This would be the quickest and least expensive method.

The UNODC Country Representative Afghanistan approved the second measure and assigned this matter to the UNODC Deputy Country Representative. The outcome of this matter is unknown at this time.

When initially approved the project consisted of four outputs that were to be achieved namely:

i. The Regional Border Police Center is built and operating in Nimroz province. The Center’s police are trained, equipped and the unit is staffed with qualified officers, in order to perform effective policing and drug interdiction operations in the most prolific narcotics trafficking area in Afghanistan;

ii. Mobile Interdiction Teams are established, equipped and trained, and effectively conduct drug interdiction operations;

iii. A compatible radio communication system is established, to link the Regional Center to Area Border Posts, Brigade, Battalion and Company Headquarters; and

iv. Establishment of required offices and facilities, located in Kabul and Nimroz.

In December 2008, in order to support regional activities being carried out under the Rainbow Strategy, the project was revised to include two further outputs:

i. Regular operational level meetings between Afghan Border Police and counterparts in neighbouring countries as appropriate; and

ii. Enhancing and strengthening the operational capabilities of the Afghan Border Police at western/south-western borders of Afghanistan with Iran and Pakistan through provision of equipment, training and supplies.

In terms of Outputs 2-6, the following have been accomplished:

- Equipment for the Mobile Interdiction Teams has been procured.
- Equipment for compatible radio communications between ABP units and with counter-narcotics agencies in Iran and Pakistan has been procured.
- Offices and facilities for J55 have been established in Kabul. Due to the limited nature of activities being undertaken in Nimroz, staff from the Kabul office covered these assignments. A Nimroz office will only be established once activities are ongoing on a permanent basis.
- Regular meetings of counter-narcotics personnel working at the operational level have occurred between the ABP and its counterparts in Iran and Pakistan.
- The operational capabilities of the ABP at locations along the Western and Southwestern border with Iran and Pakistan have been enhanced and strengthened as a result of the provision of equipment, training and supplies to ABP outposts, many in remote and extremely dangerous locations.

2.4. Achievement of Program/Project Results and Outputs
Despite setbacks caused by security and logistical problems, AFG/J55 became operational in January 2008 and construction began on time at the ABP garrison site at Chelmariz. All relevant equipment was purchased and delivered and is in storage at Zaranj and Herat. Arrangements are being made to move equipment from Herat to Zaranj as required by ABP needs and training requirements. The regional border police center construction design underwent a full review and assessment to ensure the design structure meets ABP requirements. The initial plans for construction were presented to the MOI as well as command and control staff of the ABP. The site plan and design of the regional garrison have been approved and the required land has been allocated by the GOA. Detailed reports for the implementation of construction activities have been developed and shared with national and international counterparts.

After the approval of the design plan for the garrison, the construction of the outer defensive wall, ditch, fence and deep water well was commenced by IOM in early 2009. Despite the May 2, 2009, attack, it is believed that the construction being done by IOM will be completed by the end of July 2009. Once the defensive wall is in place, there will be a secure perimeter from which to operate and manage construction of the various buildings. In addition to construction of the garrison, a detailed equipment plan has been prepared for fully equipping the base and the police forces that will be stationed there.

A detailed analysis of training needs was accomplished in February 2008. On the basis of the needs assessment, training and mentoring programs for J55 were prepared based upon the successful program in Herat under H16. Seventy police officers were identified by ABP and received training during 2008. Additionally, 300 officers from the ABP Quick Reaction Force were also trained. All trainees were issued relevant equipment during their training. As a result of the training instituted under J55 on the Western and Southwestern border, the operational capacities of the ABP have been strengthened and more interdiction operations are being conducted. The arrest and seizure data in the Herat area have increased significantly. As a result of J55 training, mentoring and the provision of appropriate materiel, the operational planning by the ABP in the targeted border area has become much more effective and efficient and, therefore, better focused on the difficult and often dangerous tasks required in narcotics and precursor interdiction.

A basic police intelligence system has been developed for the ABP and is being integrated into the training and operational programs being carried out under J55. The same system is expected to be utilized nationwide by ABP elements executing criminal intelligence collection. In coordination with the UNODC Precursor Control Project (AFG/I85), precursor test kits and precursor training under J55 has been provided to the ABP on the Western and Southwestern border. A number of precursor chemical seizures have been reported for 2008 and during the first quarter of 2009. A community policing program was developed as part of the mentorship program, which has been implemented by the Project team in Herat.

ABP officers and J55 team members have carried out regular missions and visits to the borders and villages in the AOR in order to provide support and deliver ad-hoc humanitarian assistance and establish trust and confidence with the local population. As a result of this program, local village leaders and Mullahs meet with ABP command and control staff on a regular basis. This has resulted in the civilian community providing information to the ABP on suspicious activities in the border regions. During the second quarter of 2008, as a result of information provided by locals, a large weapons and
munitions cache was seized by the ABP. There is no doubt that this materiel was to be used against NATO/ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces. Since this time, additional seizures have been made and there is every reason to believe that these successes will continue as a result of the efforts of the ABP, leading to stronger bonds with the local population and increasing the capacity of the GOA to interdict narcotics and precursor chemicals.

Under the framework of the Triangular Initiative, and based upon the agreed recommendations at the ministerial level for law enforcement cooperation between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, a workshop at the technical level was organized by J55 in Kabul in June 2008. The purpose of the workshop was to discuss the modalities and compatibilities of cross-border telecommunications. Another meeting to finalize agreements on telecommunications issues is expected to be held in Pakistan in order to define and agree upon the type of communication equipment to be used, common frequencies for information and intelligence sharing, as well as the modalities under which information and intelligence related to narcotics and precursor trafficking can be shared. Once agreements have been achieved by the three countries, UNODC will assist in the establishment of the system under J55. UNODC and J55 will assist in monitoring activities to ensure that the information gathered is shared at the tactical level when deemed necessary.

2.5. Implementation

In order to implement the objective of AFG/J55, the following have been, or are being, accomplished:

- Project document approved by the Afghanistan Minister of Interior in September 2007.
- An International Project Coordinator has been hired who has extensive experience in project management in the field of narcotics and precursor chemical interdiction.
- The International Project Coordinator works closely with other relevant technical experts in UNODC, especially those involved in other law enforcement projects such as H16, G38, H10, I77 and I85.
- A National Project Coordinator, International Field Coordinator, relevant international consultants and a support staff have been hired for administrative, procurement, financial and operational matters necessary for the implementation of the Project’s activities. An office in Kabul is fully operational.
- Interpreters have been hired to translate training documents into the appropriate language and, if necessary, to translate during meetings with national counterparts.
- Required enhanced police equipment RFQ submitted on 28 February 2008, with a projected cost of $627,531.00. Equipment list revised, reviewed and agreed upon by the command staff of the Afghan Border Police.
- Construction design of the ABP garrison at Chelmariz underwent a full review and assessment to ensure that the design structure will meet agreed upon requirements. The initial plans for construction have been drafted.
- A detailed, fresh assessment mission to the location of the garrison at Chelmariz was undertaken at the end of March 2008. The International Project Coordinator,
the National Project Coordinator and the International Field Coordinator took part in this endeavor to ensure progress continues as planned.

- **J55** staff has developed the enhanced training program as required. The draft training doctrine documents are completed and under revision.
- Preparations for translation into the local language have been initiated.
- The International Field Coordinator is developing a program for ABP instructors using the “Train-the-Trainers” method. He has identified officers with leadership potential and is mentoring them in order to mold them into model ABP trainers who will continue the training process throughout the ranks of ABP units.
- J55 consultants have developed a concept to maximize the operational capabilities of the ABP. Officers will be trained to run an operations center that will track all operations conducted by the ABP in order to focus resources as required to facilitate mission success.
- To improve the quality of life and standards of professionalism of the ABP, J55 consultants are conducting training verification assessments on a regular basis. This includes a focused, disciplined procedure for daily police conduct at the remote border posts. As these standard operating procedures become the rule, rather than the exception, the process will be expanded to include all elements within the ABP Western and Southwestern region.
- In regard to regional cooperation, regular meetings are conducted with UNODC law enforcement experts from Pakistan and Iran to ensure compatibility of equipment provided; cooperation of the three countries in regular, joint patrolling operations along the border; having common radio communication frequencies; and sharing information regarding narcotics and precursor chemical trafficking along the Western and Southwestern border.
- In order to further implement the objective of J55, the following have been accomplished or completed:
  - Procured all necessary standard drug and precursor chemical testing kits.
  - Procured required optical, night vision and surveillance equipment.
  - Recruitment of consultants responsible for designing the required radio communication network.
  - Implementation of a field assessment mission by J55 consultants in cooperation with the ABP and the Ministry of Interior.
  - Procurement of required radio communication equipment (HF&VHF).

### 2.6 Institutional and Management Arrangements

A number of key coordination and planning meetings have been conducted to establish the needs of the ABP and stakeholder commitments to J55. The MOI and ABP command are fully in support of this project as a result of these detailed meetings. The list of required radio communication equipment has been developed in close consultation with the radio communication department of ABP, as well as the international community supporting the ABP in Kabul. The ABP command has committed to make J55 a show-piece for the international community in order to demonstrate what can be accomplished when provided with the right tools and flexibility.

The UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan ensures due coordination and regular consultation with international counterparts such as the European Union Police Mission, the Border Management Task Force, the Provincial Mentoring Team, as well as donor countries and relevant agencies supporting the objective of J55.
J55 is subject to oversight and audit by the United Nations Office for Internal Oversight Services and the United Nations Board of Auditors. UNODC will coordinate the implementation of such oversight and audits and will follow up on the implementation of agreed recommendations. The present Project document may be modified by written agreement between the parties concerned.

Administrative and support functions to be provided to the project, particularly by UNDP but also including UNODC’s own administrative support staff, are proving problematic. Steps to make the procurement and hiring processes more in tune with the needs of UNODC counter-narcotics projects should not primarily be focused on picayunish and inconsequential issues that do nothing to propel the projects forward. There should be definitive limits set on the length of time agencies such as UNDP can take to make decisions on procurement and hiring. Without trainers, and without proper equipment, hired and purchased in a timely fashion, all aspects of projects like AFG/J55 suffer needless consequences.

3. OUTCOMES, IMPACTS AND SUSTAINABILITY

3.1. Outcomes

The standard by which to measure whether J55 is making progress is found in the Project’s objective as outlined in the Project Document:

To enhance and enable the capabilities and capacity of the Afghan Border Police and the allied agencies involved in counter-narcotics efforts, by building a strategically located operating base in the most prolific smuggling area in Afghanistan. The police [base] will be located in southern Nimroz Province to enforce the rule-of-law with a fully manned, trained and equipped Afghan Border Police unit.

This objective was generalised in the first project revision to read as follows:

To disrupt the drug flow and the flow of precursor chemicals between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan by enhancing the capabilities and capacity of the Afghan Border Police to establish rule of law in Western/Southwestern Afghanistan.

An additional two outputs were added at this time to reflect the project’s engagement in wider regional issues associated with drug trafficking in the tri-border area between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, but the focus remained on providing support to ABP as stated in the original objective.

Upon the completion of J55 the following anticipated outcomes are expected:

- The ABP regional garrison at Chelmariz is completed, fully operational and relatively secure from attack by ACMs, narcotics and precursor chemical traffickers, and organized crime cartels (Output 1).
- The police staff, including well-trained officers and NCOs, will have been selected, and trained units are fully functional (Output 1).
• All ABP personnel at the garrison are fully equipped with appropriate tactical gear, communications systems, narcotics and precursor testing kits, and vehicles and motorcycles capable of high-speed pursuit in desert terrain (Output 2).
• ABP personnel are fully engaged in the interdiction of narcotics and precursor chemicals, weapons, munitions, explosives and human trafficking throughout the region (Output 2).
• The ABP is fully engaged with its counterparts in Iran and Pakistan, including the sharing of information (Output 5).
• The ABP and its cross-border counterparts regularly conduct operations together on both sides of the border (Output 5).
• Community policing is a regular part of the service provided by the ABP, resulting in increasing respect for the ABP and meaningful bonds of trust with the local population (Output 1).
• The local population provides the ABP with actionable information leading to seizures of narcotics, precursor chemicals, weapons, munitions, explosives and individuals involved in human trafficking (Output 1).
• J55 will serve as a model for the entire ABP, greatly enhancing their capacity for bringing the rule-of-law to Afghanistan (Output 6).
• Mobile Interdiction Teams are fully functional and effectively conducting interdiction operations (Output 2).
• A compatible radio communications system has been established to link the garrison to area border posts, brigade, battalion and company headquarters (Output 3).

3.2. Impacts

The primary anticipated impact of this project is the creation of a professional police agency in a lawless region of Afghanistan that will interdict narcotics and precursor chemicals along the major trafficking routes in the country, thus, leading to greatly increased seizures, arrests and convictions. This, in turn, will create respect among the local population for the rule-of-law as they see that the ABP is professional, respectful and conscientious in the performance of their sworn duty “to protect and serve.” Furthermore, removal of narcotics and precursor chemicals from the illicit market deprives ACMs with the funds needed to purchase weapons, munitions and explosives to be used against NATO/ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces. In addition, the seizure of narcotics removes them from the supply chain, thus, helping to alleviate, if only in a small way, the serious national health issues of addiction, HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis C.

An additional impact will be the creation of close relationships with Iran and Pakistan in the counter-narcotics battle, with each country assisting the other in this important undertaking. This, in turn, will help in the international struggle against terrorism and in easing certain tensions that exist between the three countries.

3.3. Sustainability

If the J55 concept is to succeed in the long term, and become an integral part of the ABP, it is will be necessary to have donor support for many years. This is due to the realistic consideration that the GOA does not currently have the funds available to support the ongoing necessity for the police services provided by the ABP at the level required to make a serious dent in narcotics and precursor trafficking in this region.
than likely, the GOA will not have necessary financial resources until the rule-of-law has been firmly established in the Western and Southwestern region, the borders are relatively secure, income from taxes collected at the border are greatly increased, and the security threat in the border region is diminished. Continued donor support will also be required in order to sustain the equipment provided, by providing funds for repairs and maintenance.

It a simple fact of life in Afghanistan, given the corruption at all levels of government, that new facilities, equipment and training will not be enough to stop corrupt practices in the ABP. It is, thus, believed that mentoring and continual training, as well as financial support from the international community, will be necessary for at least the next ten years. Sustainment, maintenance procedures and long term plans for scheduled repairs need to be part of future procurement, training plans, force structure designs, and facilities management. Without this important organizational multiplier, the quality of the operational capacity of the ABP will deteriorate rapidly after initial facilities and training are provided. If given the necessary financial support, there should be a significant, far reaching improvement in the ABP’s ability to accomplish the objective of J55 within the next five years.

Long term, regular mentorship is also going to be a critical factor. In this regard, the “Train-the-Trainers” program is a paramount undertaking in terms of sustaining the initial training and mentoring performed during the first six months of an ABP officer’s entrance into the J55 program. In order to assist in this effort, the J55 Project team is formulating a regular refresher training program that will be done by J55 trainers and the ABP trainers who have been mentored by J55 personnel. Like the issues noted, above, these programs will require long-term financial support. Broad support by a variety of international actors will ensure the continued provision of necessary training and mentoring to the ABP long after J55 has accomplished its objective. It is reasonable to assume that with continued international support, sustainment of the ABP will occur, both human and institutional capacity building will be enhanced and the people of Afghanistan will have new-found respect for the ABP.

4. LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

4.1. Lessons Learned

The basic concept behind J55 is giving the ABP the necessary skills and equipment to restore the rule-of-law in Western and Southwestern Afghanistan by interdicting the flow of narcotics and precursor chemicals in the region. The J55 Project team learned from its work on H16, now under the aegis of J55, that the truly exceptional ABP trainees, NCOs and officers have to be identified and placed in leadership positions after receiving advanced training. The MOI needs to be encouraged to recruit NCOs and officers at all levels of the ABP who are of the caliber of General Aube, the former commander of the 6th Brigade (now Zone 4) in Herat.9/

In regard to the May 2, 2009, attack on the construction site at Chelmariz, it was determined that better security needs to be provided during the initial construction phase.

9/ General Aube was, in fact, assassinated in December 2006 for making it clear that he intended to eliminate corruption in his command.
in remote locations. Therefore, since the ABP in some locations still cannot be relied upon as a result of connections to ACM forces and traffickers, thought must be given to hiring private security for these locations such as the Gurkhas required by UNDSS at sites where UNODC personnel work and live and the security risk is high. In addition, the Project learned that prior to construction in these remote, dangerous locations, more emphasis should be placed on intelligence gathering by the appropriate GOA, NGO or military agency in the AOR regarding ACM activity and the potential for an attack in order to make intelligent judgments about advance security preparations.

In further regard to the issue of corruption within certain elements of the ABP, J55 learned that there was a major discrepancy about what was reported to have happened when the construction site at Chelmariz was attacked, and what may have actually occurred. Information developed subsequent to the attack by a member of a different ABP unit than the one charged with security of the construction site, determined that the attack was not, in fact, carried out by ACM forces or traffickers. Instead, it is believed that the attack was launched by individuals who wanted a local private security contractor to be hired to protect the site. In the future, more effort should be placed upon ensuring the accuracy of any report from the ABP personnel who reported this incident.

4.2. Best Practices

The members of the J55 Project Team are all experts in their fields, with extensive experience in police and military operations, often conducted in remote areas where conflict with armed insurgents or criminals is a possibility. There can be no doubt that AFG/H16, conducted largely by the same personnel now involved with AFG/J55, was largely successful because of the dedication, professionalism and expertise of the international project and field coordinators and consultants. The same should be noted in regard to the entire national staff, as well.

UNODC Law Enforcement has designed an approach to counter-narcotics operations that has been proven to make change possible and to increase the capacity of the GOA in the fight against narcotics and precursor chemicals, as well as the smuggling into Afghanistan of weapons, munitions and explosives. Other UN organizations that are executing similar efforts need to review the strategies employed in J55 and H16. As an example, varied approaches to resolve the gaps in training and mentorship can be linked together to be more efficient, resulting in better long-range solutions.

AFG/J55 team members have made a concerted effort to personally visit locations where the men they train are ultimately assigned and they do so on multiple occasions. Although sites like those in Herat are easily accessed, many of the sites manned by the ABP are in remote locations, with limited access other than by travel across desert terrain and virtually non-existent or extremely debilitated roads. J55 has travelled to every site where the men they train might be stationed, have stayed with them and broken bread with them. This has resulted in an undeniable bond and respect on the part of the ABP, especially at the highest command levels, and with the MOI, for the national and international staff of J55. “Winning the hearts and minds” means something more than learning a few phrases in Pashto or Dari; it means treating Afghans with respect, dignity and as equals. These are ideals that should be an everyday occurrence for all UNODC staff involved in counter-narcotics training and mentoring programs.
The other side of the equation noted in the above paragraph is in building trust and respect between the ABP and the communities they serve. In all aspects of life in Afghanistan, not just in relation to counter-narcotics, the people must believe in their government institutions and want to support them. Thus, the J55 Project, as well as its predecessor, H16, along with their ABP counterparts, has invested time and energy in building strong relationships with the local population, including nomadic tribes such as the Kuchi. The Kuchi once avoided the ABP entirely because they believed the ABP could not be trusted and that they were no better, in many cases, than the drug smugglers and criminals who made life difficult for them.

With the urging of the J55 Project, ABP posts began to allow the Kuchi to use their deep-water wells, provided by donors to UNODC, in order to fulfill their constant requirement for water for their herds of sheep and goats. Because many of the ABP posts and the men who man them take their jobs seriously, have been willing to fight the scourges of drugs and criminality, and have provided protection for the Kuchi people, they now make their camps near ABP bases. During a visit to one Kuchi gathering by members of the European Commission and UNODC leadership, the elders and Mullahs told them that “the only police [they] trust is the [Afghan] Border Police.” Enhancing the capacity of the GOA necessarily means investing time with the local population in a meaningful and constructive way. All elements of UNODC counter-narcotics programs and the other agencies involved in this struggle can learn from the example set by J55.

4.3. Constraints

The most serious constraint standing in the way of the ABP becoming a first-rate, professional counter-narcotics force lies in the failure of the GOA to understand and act upon the serious nature of the need for greatly increased support for every aspect of this most important segment of the Afghan National Security Forces. While not meaning in any way to denigrate the importance of the functions of the Afghan National Police, the Afghan National Army, and the other military and law enforcement agencies of the GOA, the ABP is truly the first line of defense against everything that is wrong with Afghanistan. It has been well established by UNODC, and every agency and entity that has looked at the primary “root of evil” in Afghanistan, that narcotics trafficking is the single thread that runs through almost every aspect of corruption, criminality and terrorism in the country.

The lawless nature of most areas along the border with Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and China is a direct result of the almost complete lack of a professional, vital and dedicated law enforcement agency in these areas whose major responsibility is to stop the flow of narcotics over the borders. The answer to this problem, and to virtually every aspect of corruption and criminal enterprise that is endemic to most institutions in Afghanistan, lies in the willingness of the GOA change the dynamic of how it sees and treats the ABP and its men. One need only review the UNODC publication, Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium (October 2009), to understand that what is written, here, is no exaggeration.

The ABP senior command has constantly talked about the need for quality recruits. Because of all the issues listed, below, they are forced to recruit from the least educated segment of the population: men who are often completely illiterate, or functionally illiterate. These are men who come in large part from the poorest villages where people
are desperate for any type of employment, no matter how bad the pay is, no matter the
lack of any benefits in the case of death or injury, no matter how dangerous the job./\(^\text{10}/\) In
addition, in the impoverished areas along and near the borders where many recruits
come from, their families have connections with traffickers and, thus, they have no
incentive to act against them. ABP senior staff has commented that it is no surprise that
many ABP officers have no motivation or pride in their jobs, that they are corrupt and that
in order to support their families and supplement the grossly inadequate pay they
receive, they are often involved in the very criminal activity they are sworn to fight.

This is the reality in the ABP:

- Low pay—between US $70 – 120.00 per month. Far lower than pay for the
  ANA and the ANP. There has never been an explanation by the GOA for
  this gross and inequitable disparity in pay.
- No death benefit, no disability pay, no retirement pension. Families of men
  killed in action receive nothing.
- Terrible living conditions: substandard, unhealthy and unsanitary.
- Inadequate food supplies and food is often of poor quality. Some posts are
  limited to meat only three times a week, and meals mainly consist of rice
  and whatever local fruit and vegetables may be available. This is wholly
  inadequate for men who live and work in a demanding, stressful, high-risk
  environment.
- Serious and inexcusable delays in paying officers. Complaints from some
  officers that they have received less than one-third of their pay in a six-
  month period.
- Promises of pay and benefits reform that never occurs.
- Inadequate medical care, both at the ABP bases and on the operational
  level. ABP men have died because of the inability to get med-evac support.
- Inexcusable procurement and finance problems in processing requests for
  life-supporting equipment. ABP men have died from hypothermia because
  of the lack of winter clothing.
- Lack of adequate resources for hygiene and food storage, often leading to
disease and an inability to work.

Short term policies and actions will not be enough to achieve the goals of a self-
sustaining, effective and accountable ABP. There is no excuse on the part of the GOA for
the lack of support, both financial and political, for the ABP. If capacity in all aspects of
life in Afghanistan is to improve, the GOA must, once and for all, take a courageous
stand against narcotics trafficking and provide adequate resources for the ABP.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Issues Resolved During the Evaluation

\(^{10}/\) In 2007, the last year for which accurate figures are available, the ABP had more than 900 men
killed fighting narcotics traffickers and ACM forces. In more than nine years, NATO/ISAF has lost some
1,500 soldiers. In their own struggle against narcotics traffickers, Iranian counter-narcotics police
agencies have had more than 3,000 men killed in the past thirty years.
• An engineering firm with an international credential was engaged to work with the design engineer to review his plans, identify problems with the design and make needed corrections.
• Steps are being taken to engage a contracted security force for the construction site at Chelmariz which, in all likelihood, will be a Gurkha contingent like those who guard the UNODC offices and housing compounds in Kabul.
• Consultations have begun with IOM to restart construction of the base at Chelmariz.
• Equipment procurement issues pertaining to the base at Chelmariz have been resolved with UNDP. The RFQ for additional tactical equipment has been awarded and delivery of materiel is expected shortly.

5.2 Actions and decisions recommended

During H16, police trainees were recruited from many parts of Afghanistan and not just from the poorest villages where recruits were illiterate and unmotivated to move against drug traffickers who had connections to their families and villages. The recruits for H16 were of high caliber and committed to the objectives of H16 and J55. By enlisting recruits with no ties to Nimroz Province, in most cases, they would presumably have no direct ties to local traffickers and, therefore, be far less likely to be susceptible to corruption.

Because most of the ABP in Nimroz Province are unprepared and unwilling to adequately defend the base under construction at Chelmariz, it appears that there are three options for resolving this problem and one of them must occur immediately. First, J55 should be authorized to hire a private security contractor such as the Gurkhas used by UNODC at their office in Kabul and which are deployed at safe compounds like UNICA. Additional funding—estimated to be US $250,000.00 for six months—should be authorized and secured if this option is chosen. The second option is that the UNODC Country Representative for Afghanistan would meet with the MOI and General Noorzai, commander of the ABP, and request that they order a fully trained and experienced ABP contingent from Zone 4 in Herat, known to be loyal and uncorrupt, to be deployed to Chelmariz. These are men who were trained and mentored by H16. The third option would be for the MOI and ABP commander to discuss the security situation at Chelmariz with the commander at Robat-e-Jali in the Southwestern corner of Nimroz Province. As a result of the relationship with J55 project members, security may be provided during the construction and training of the initial trainees at Chelmariz base.

The design of the Chelmariz base must be reconsidered in order to rapidly restart and complete construction so that training can begin. It is recommended that the barracks and immediately necessary outbuildings be prefabricated structures which can be quickly assembled and made operational when delivered to the construction site. The building now designated as the advisors’ barracks would be utilized as the temporary administrative and training building and the advisors would live in a section of one of the buildings currently designated barracks. If this were to occur, training could begin in short order at Chelmariz. It is believed that if this plan if presented to the MOI and the ABP, they will approve it.

The MOI and, no doubt, President Karzai and the parliament, must be pushed to provide the support for the ABP that is needed to forcefully engage narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan. This means, primarily, that salaries for ABP officers must be substantially
increased in order to eliminate the possibility of corruption among the ranks from top to bottom. Adequate funding must be provided for appropriate quantities and types of food, medical care, sanitary food and personal hygiene facilities, and death and disability benefits, including dependents’ benefits for the families of men killed in action. It simply can no longer be justified under any political rhetoric that matters such as this must be slowly developed. The time has come for the GOA to take a serious, forceful stand against narcotics trafficking and the endemic corruption it fosters at all levels. J55 staff is researching the possibility of instituting an incentive-based program that would provide underpaid ABP officers more motivation to execute the required policing efforts in remote and dangerous areas served by the Project. Current restraints of such a remote project require extra incentive programs to maximize efforts toward realizing of the objective and outputs set forth in Project documents. More importantly, the ABP line officer is paid less than members of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police—as little as US $70 per month—is posted in remote locations and often has meager and poor stocks of food. They have no health insurance and no survivor benefits if they are killed in the line of duty. It is believed that an incentive program, where seizures and arrests lead to convictions, will help stem the high desertion rate and corruption in the ABP. The excuse, offered by the GOA, that it would be unfair to the ANA and the ANP to give such payments only to the ABP, is nonsensical and without merit given the objective and critical importance of counter-narcotics operations.

Procurement and finance issues for UNODC counter-narcotics programs must be streamlined and made less tedious in relation to UNDP involvement, as well as the involvement of the UNODC finance section. It appears that UNDP, and perhaps other UN agencies and personnel in UNODC, see the counter-narcotics programs as paramilitary in nature and, therefore, somehow antithetical to UN policy and objectives. This attitude may be filtering down from Vienna and other international locations from personnel formerly associated with UNODC Kabul. It appears that this attitude is engendered by the reality that the international consultants are exclusively drawn from former members of the police and military agencies. These are individuals with experience in the kind of training and tactical operations that are required if a competent border police force is to be stood up to ensure the rule-of-law in this environment. Perhaps there are people in the UN who do not understand the nature of counter-narcotics operations and who refuse to accept the fact that these operations often involve armed conflict between the traffickers and the ABP, which result in the loss of life and serious injury on the part of the ABP. This attitude must be ended immediately and both the UNODC Country Representative for Afghanistan and the UNODC Executive Director should make this patently clear to all UN agencies and personnel at all levels.

6. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

Based upon the success of H16, there is no question that J55 will provide a new presence in Nimroz Province in the form of a well-trained, motivated and professional counter-narcotics police force that will operate out of the UNODC planned and constructed base at Chelmariz. As was noted above, the H16 model will result in greatly increasing the capacity of the ABP in this region of major drug trafficking routes and, thereby, assist the GOA in ridding the nation of corruption, criminality and terrorist activity. In addition, with further close cooperation with Iran and Pakistan, there is every reason to believe that joint operations between the three neighbors will result in a serious
impact in the battle against transnational narcotics and precursor chemical trafficking, as well as the smuggling of weapons, munitions, and explosives, people, and all forms of illegally imported goods. More importantly, a strengthened ABP will be a catalyst for the collection of larger sums of taxes along the border in Nimroz Province as the border posts are manned by the trainees from the Chelmariz program.

If J55 is given the ability to recruit quality trainees, there is no question that the program will be as successful as the one in Herat. The ability of the J55 team to get things done, even in the face of adversity, has been remarkable. Despite the security issue at the base at Chelmariz, the project is back on track and will, no doubt, be completed in a timely fashion. The security situation will ultimately be resolved and fully sufficient in all aspects in order to protect the construction crews, the trainees and consultants. Procurement issues have been resolved and all needed training, living needs and tactical equipment is already in storage, or is in the process of being purchased. Thus, once the base is completed, training and operations against traffickers will begin in short order.

It is almost impossible for outsiders to comprehend the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and this is particularly so in the remote and treacherous desert terrain in Nimroz Province. The fight against narcotics and precursor chemical trafficking has proven to be difficult, dangerous and fraught with obstacles.

Both The Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) cite corruption as the major impediment to the country’s development. The ANDS particularly noted that Afghanistan cannot achieve growth without “eliminating the criminal economy...”\(^1\)\(^\text{11}\). It further states that, “[t]he weakening of the State and the growth of the drug industry has led to the criminalization of much of the Afghan economy.”\(^\text{12}\) Two years earlier, the GOA enacted the Law on the Campaign Against Bribery and Corruption (2004), which “address[ed] the entrenched illicit economy.” Thus, the ANDS made it clear that,

![Image](image-url)

[The GOA] will provide security with the direct support of the international community. We will establish a legitimate monopoly on...law enforcement that provides a secure environment for the fulfillment of the rights of all Afghans...\(^\text{13}\)

Unless these pronouncements are to be no more than flowery words, the international stakeholders and uncorrupted segments of the GOA, particularly within the ABP, must take a stand and declare that a successful conclusion of the struggle against the criminal elements in Afghan society will be reached, no matter how difficult the struggle. AFG/J55, as was H16, is a forceful step in this direction.

\(^{11}\) ANDS, supra, p. 4.
\(^{12}\) Id. at p. 11.
\(^{13}\) Id. at p. 12.
Annexes

1. Organizations and Places Visited and Persons Interviewed

   (A) Places Visited
   1. ABP, Zone 4 Brigade HQ, Herat.
   2. ABP battalion HQ at Islam Qala and border posts along the Western and Southwestern border.
   4. ABP HQ, Kabul
   5. U.S. Embassy, Kabul
   6. Ministry of Interior, Kabul

   (B) Persons Interviewed
   1. Ms. Christina Oguz, UNODC Country Representative Afghanistan
   2. Ms. Elisabeth Bayer, Senior Law Enforcement Advisor, UNODC, Kabul
   3. Lex Henderson, Executive Mentor, Minister of Interior
   4. General, M. Yonus Noorzai, Commander, ABP
   5. Ken Biser, BMTF, Director, U.S. Embassy, Kabul
   7. G.J. “Dutch” Vollmer, BMTF, Mentor, U.S. Embassy, Kabul
   8. CPT James W. Hendon, CSTC-A, ABP, Mentor to Gen. Noorzai
   9. Jeffrey A. Silk, DEA, Special Agent, Kabul
   10. Katsui Kaya, IOM, Kabul
   11. Anthony W. Oliver, International Project Coordinator, J55
   12. Daud Saskai, National Project Coordinator, J55
   13. Mike Kijowski, International Field Coordinator, J55
   15. Rashid Abedi, National Project Assistant, J55

2. Relevant Materials

   2. Final Narrative Report for European Commission Funding, AFG/H16.

3.1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION.

Nimroz is the cornerstone province and main gateway for opium/morphine/heroin smuggling out of Afghanistan with as much as 40% of the nation’s illegal opium crop exiting the country from this area. This is one of the most important strategic pathways for narcotic trafficking from Helmand, Kandahar and Farah Provinces (which are the highest opium growing/collection centers in the country), through southern Nimroz, into Iran and further on to the markets in the West. This happens because there are no law enforcement authorities stationed in this area. The local Border Police has left the region because of lack of support, manpower, training, equipment, and facilities. The elders and Mullahs of the region have reported that over 10,000 Kilos of narcotics pass through this part of Nimroz every week.

The project aimed at re-establishing the rule of law in this strategically important border area. The project provided the necessary infrastructure to facilitate the Afghan Border Police and other counter narcotics agencies in a regional border enforcement undertaking. The project activities included the construction of a Regional Border Security Garrison, which serves not only in the sense of a traditional border post but also as a regional centre that can support 100-200 personnel. This enhanced base of operation is strategically placed in the cross roads of the Nimroz smuggling routes, close to the border, yet with enough buffer ground to enable the CN forces to act in-depth and in a mobile manner. This concept also allows for the law enforcement teams, after concluding their operations, to return to a secure base in order to reorganize and recover in a relatively protected environment. This new and improved counter narcotics concept for Afghanistan puts an adequate number of properly trained and equipped police officers in a strategically important location, and enables them to interdict drug smugglers who currently move freely through this area.

The project’s total budget is $3.98 million US Dollars, with a purpose to disrupt the drug flow and the flow of precursor chemicals between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan by enhancing the capabilities and capacity of the Afghan Border Police to establish rule of law in Western/South-western Afghanistan resulting in increased seizure in the area of responsibility (AoR).

The evaluation should examine progress achieved in light of these objectives but also taking into account the conditions under which implementation occurred.

3.2. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION.
The overall purpose of this evaluation is to determine what the project has achieved to date and if it has attained its objectives successfully and efficiently, taking into account the often difficult conditions on the ground in Afghanistan and to generate information that will be used to improve project implementation in western/south-western region of Afghanistan. In this regard, the extent to which the needs of the beneficiaries are being met as well as what has been achieved in terms of impact and sustainability should also be assessed.

The evaluation will seek to draw lessons and good practices from the project implementation which will be used to improve the current and future project planning, design and management. Furthermore, the evaluation must seek to measure the project’s achievements, outcomes and impacts, both positive and negative.

3.3. EVALUATION SCOPE.

The evaluation shall focus mainly on the project’s concept, design, implementation, results, outputs, outcomes and sustainability. The evaluation should appraise:

(a) Project concept and design:

The evaluation should analyse whether and how the project contributed to a priority area or comparative advantage for UNODC. It should review the problems identified by the project and the corresponding strategy chosen in order to address these. The evaluation should also encompass an assessment of the relevance and attainability of the objectives and of planned outputs, activities and inputs, as compared to other cost-effective alternatives. An analysis of the clarity, logic and coherence of the project should also be conducted. Some of the questions that this evaluation should address are:

• Are the objectives of the project aligned with the current policy priorities and action plans of Government of Afghanistan, Compact, Afghanistan Development Strategy, and UNODC mandates?
• Is the design of the project technically sound? Are the project objectives clear, realistic and coherent in terms of collectively contributing to the achievements of the Strategic Programme Framework and Afghanistan Development Strategy, and other strategic instruments?
• Are the results and objectives useful, relevant and attainable?
• Are response activities and implementation strategy appropriate for meeting stated objectives, with a focus on assessing project elements directly related to capacity building, coordination and sub-contract performance?
• How well do the project objectives reflect the specific nature of the problem and needs of counter-narcotics border control capacity and policies in Afghanistan?
• Are the objectives of the project aligned with the UNODC Triangular Action Plan?

(b) Objectives, outputs, impact and sustainability:

The evaluation should seek to determine whether results have been achieved, and if not fully, whether there has been some progress made towards their achievement. Taking
into account these factors; the overall impact of the project should be assessed. This should also encompass the likely sustainability of results and benefits as well as the project’s contribution to human and institutional capacity building. The beneficiaries’ perception towards the achievements should be taken into consideration, as appropriation is an important factor in determining sustainability. Another fundamental aspect in result sustainability is beneficiary capacity building (have the beneficiaries gained the necessary tools and skills?). Furthermore, financial sustainability should also be assessed (for instance, once the project is terminated, will the benefits be self-sustainable?). Some of the questions that this evaluation should address are:

- To what extent the project contributed to the achievement of Afghanistan Compact and or Strategic Programme Framework and Afghanistan Development Strategy? What are the reasons for the achievements and non-achievement of objectives?
- Have improvement of leadership skills been enhanced at institutional and individual levels?
- Has the operational capacity (skills and service delivery) of the Afghan Border Police been increased through training and improvement of working conditions?
- Has a mentorship system and mechanism to be composed of experts been set-up? Has it helped the day-to-day operation through creation of a mentorship mechanism, to oversee and advise on all aspects of the proceedings as well as on the administration of the Afghan Border Police?
- Was training material produced and is it available for further future use by the Government and concerned authorities?
- Are the objectives of the project contributed to regional programmes under the umbrella of the Triangular Initiative?
  - Has the project carried out activities laid down the in the Triangular Action plan?
  - Have the regional meetings been facilitated to strengthen cross border cooperation?
  - Has there been a tangible result from the activities carried out within the region?

(c) Overall implementation process:

The evaluation should assess how effectively/efficiently project planning and implementation have been carried out so far. This includes assessing the extent to which organizational structure, managerial support and coordination mechanisms used by UNODC effectively support the project. Efficiency should be analyzed namely as the project’s capacity to achieve the desired effects at an acceptable cost when compared to alternative approaches reaching the same effects. The role played by the field office in the development and implementation of the project or programme should also be assessed. The evaluation will analyse problems and constraints encountered during implementation as well as the quality and timeliness of inputs and the efficiency and effectiveness of activities carried out to date. Some of the questions that this evaluation should address are:
• Were alternative less costly interventions modalities considered in designing this project? Do they exist? To what extent has UNDP been efficient, effective and transparent?

• Are there less costly methods which could achieve the same outcome/impact at the beneficiary level?

• To what extent was a transparent operating environment and accountability of government established?

• To what extent have partnership been sought with other relevant actors (including UN-agencies) and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance?

• Was there effective coordination among government, UNODC and other implementing partners including donor countries & task forces established as coordination bodies?

• Has adequate and appropriate backstopping support been provided by field and HQ staff (administrative / managerial support and coordination)? Have partner institutions fully and effectively discharged their responsibilities?

• What are the positive and negative, intended and unintended, effects of interventions on people, institutions and the physical environment?

• What are the perceptions of the different stakeholders, especially government of Afghanistan, implementing partners, other UN agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors, about the overall impact of UNODC’s project activities?

• How were project internal UNODC factors affecting effectiveness, including human resources logistic support, and the predictability and regularity of resources and flexibility of the budget (UNODC constrains)?

• How are project external factors like limits on access to interventions sites, human resource constraints etc. impacted on effectiveness (security situation)?

• How is the project monitored?

• Has a risk mitigation strategy been developed if any, stipulated in the log frame?

(d) Lessons learned from the concept, design and implementation of the project, as well as good practices:

Recommendations may also be made in respect of issues related to the implementation and management of the project. The evaluation shall assess in what ways the project design and/or delivery can be improved to enhance its effectiveness. The evaluation should identify the key elements, assumptions and risks for the development of similar initiatives in other regions. Some of the questions that this evaluation should address are:

• To what extent have the findings and recommendations from the past project evaluations been followed up and implemented to address some of the challenges already identified.

• Do the project interventions have a potential for scaling up or replication?

• What are the outstanding needs of the Afghan Border Police and involved institutions?
3.4. EVALUATION METHODS.

The evaluation team should present a detailed statement of evaluation methods or the approach used to identify information sources and collect information during an evaluation, and to analyse the data. The evaluation methods will include:

(a) Document review: this will comprise of all major documents, such as the project documents, progress and monitoring reports, terminal narrative reports, as well as assessments, manuals developed under the project etc. (desk study)

(b) Field assessment missions to Kabul and Herat

(d) Meetings, interviews, and focus group related to the work of the Afghan Border Police.

(e) Request selected Border Police staff to complete and submit a questionnaire prepared by the Evaluators.

Before the field mission, the Evaluators are to prepare an evaluation methodology, including questions and questionnaires that are acceptable to UNODC. Following the completion of the fact-finding and analysis phase, a draft evaluation report will be prepared by the Evaluators and presented to UNODC within the stipulated timeframe and in accordance with UNODC standard evaluation report outline (please refer to item 6). The draft report should include, inter alia, a detailed statement of the evaluation methods used during the appraisal. Inputs from UNODC should be recorded and taken into account by the Evaluators, as relevant and appropriate.

3.5. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION.

This project evaluation takes place simultaneously with another counter narcotics project evaluation, namely AFG/H16 - Strengthening Afghan-Iran Drug border control and cross border cooperation (SAID). Therefore, this project evaluation shall be conducted by a team of International Experts (Evaluators) who have relevant and complementary skills for tasks. In particular, the Evaluators should have excellent knowledge in counter narcotics with the focus on border control. The tasks will be divided between the two evaluators as follows:

Evaluator A: Will look at the technical side of the project implementation such as impact of the project implementation, delivery of the services to the beneficiary etc.

Evaluator B: Will more look at how the project is being managed at the UNODC. He/she will be evaluating the internal UNODC sections' support to the project, financial flows, reporting, monitoring etc.

The Evaluators should hold an advanced degree in law, social sciences or relevant field and have proven experience on above key issues, preferably with the United Nations in postings in post conflict areas. In addition, the Evaluators should also meet the following criteria:
1) Be familiar with the project implementation in international organizations in a United Nations mission.

2) Have experience in conducting independent evaluations and or assessments.

3) Have at least 10 years relevant professional experience with at least 2 years of director level Law enforcement or security forces experience in an international environment. Evaluator should have expertise with Training police trainers, high level counter narcotics investigation, Police intelligence, judicial officer experience in post conflict settings. Work with international Border control law enforcement also is a plus.

4) Have obtained a post-graduate degree in a relevant area or equivalent international law enforcement experience; i.e. Deputy Director of United Nations program or pillar effort, or Deputy commissioner level experience in international United Nations Missions

5) Possess excellent analytical, drafting and communication/writing skills in English.

The Evaluators are selected by the UNODC Vienna, in consultation with the Country office of Afghanistan. Coordination is to be sought also with the Europe, West and Central Asia Unit, TCS II/DO and the Independent Evaluation Unit, in UNODC Vienna, using the agreed criteria and drawing expertise from the roster of experts.

3.6. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

This evaluation will be a joint effort between the evaluation team and UNODC. As for substance, it is critical that the evaluation should be carried out independently by the Evaluators and they conduct a thorough evaluation covering all aspects of the project objectives, achievements, implementation and management. The Evaluators will have access to all relevant documents and the UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan will provide the required support for the Evaluators during the evaluation. The UNODC officials responsible for briefing of the Evaluators are:

**UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan:**
- Representative
- Deputy Representative
- International Project Coordinator
- National Project Coordinator
- International Mentors in the field

**UNODC Head Quarters in Vienna (Austria):**
- Chief, Technical Cooperation Section II
- Project Coordinator, Europe, West and Central Asia Unit

UNODC Country Office will secure office space, administrative basic support, and travel arrangements for the Evaluators during his/her stay in Kabul. UNODC will also assist with accommodation bookings, visa facilitation etc....
Time Frame & Tentative programme for the Evaluators:

The Evaluator will be recruited for 5 weeks to carry out the evaluation.

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<th>Programme &amp; Activity*</th>
<th>Days Required</th>
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<td>Preparation of methodology/questionnaires + Desk-review</td>
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<td>HQ Briefing</td>
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<td>Travelling to Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Desk-review of documentation at COAFG</td>
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<td>Meetings/interviews with Ministries, Departments, UN Agencies and relevant stakeholders., visit to project intervention sites</td>
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<td>Incorporating the UNODC comments in the report and preparing the final draft</td>
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<td><strong>Total Working &amp; Travel Days</strong></td>
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Note*: Detailed itinerary and programme will be prepared upon arrival and in consultation with the Evaluators.

Deliverables of the evaluation (for each project):

1) Evaluation plan and detailed terms of reference with methodology;
2) Evaluation draft report with findings;
3) Final evaluation report.

Payment:

The Evaluators will be issued a consultancy contract and paid as per the common UN rules and procedures. The final payment will be made only after the acceptance of the final draft of the evaluation report by UNODC HQs and the Country Office for Afghanistan.

Evaluation report:

The evaluation report should be inline with UNODC’s evaluation policy and handbook and follow the standard UNODC report outline that is listed below:

1) Evaluation summary (maximum 4 pages).
2) Introduction.
3) Background (Project description).
4) Evaluation purpose and objective.
5) Evaluation methodology.
6) Major findings.
7) Lessons learned (from both positive and negative experiences).
8) Constraints that impacted project delivery.
9) Recommendations and conclusions.