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FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

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AFG/G76

Project Title:
Alternative Livelihoods, Capacity Building
at National and Regional Level

Country:
Afghanistan

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Table of Contents

List of Acronyms	iii
Summary matrix of findings, supporting evidence, and recommendations	1
Executive Summary	4
a) Description of the project	4
b) Major findings of the evaluation	4
c) Lessons learned and best practices	5
I. Introduction	6
A. Background and Context of the Project	6
A.1. The AL Context in Afghanistan	7
A.2. UNODC's Counterpart Ministry: An Overview of MCN and PDCN Functions and Capabilities ...	10
B. Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation.....	14
C. Evaluation Methodology.....	14
D. Limitations to the Evaluation.....	15
II. Major Findings	16
A. Immediate Objective 1: Capacity Building	16
B. Immediate Objective 2: Mainstreaming CN/AL Objectives.....	18
C. Immediate Objective 3: Strengthen AL Coordination Mechanisms	18
D. Immediate Objective 4: National Expertise on M&E and Impact Assessment for CN/AL.....	18
E. Immediate Objective 4: The AL Database.....	19
F. Partnerships: Synergistic or at Cross-Purposes?	19
G. The Overall Implementation Process.....	21
i. Rationalizing Procurement: UNDP-UNODC Functionality Reaches a Nadir	21
ii. UNODC's Provincial Coordinators	23
iii. UNODC's Provincial AL Experts.....	23
iv. Brief Responses to the TOR's Remaining "Implementation Process" Bulletpoints	23
H. Project Concept and Design.....	25
i. Assessing the Impact of G76: The Project Logframe	25
ii. G76 and UNODC's Comparative Advantage in AL.....	26
iii. G76 and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy	26
iv. G76 and the Afghanistan Compact	27
v. G76 and the 2008 UNODC Thematic Evaluation	27
vi. Sub-Contract Performance	27
vii. Incorporation of Recommendations from the G76 Mid-Term Evaluation (Sept. 2007)	27
III. Lessons Learned and Best Practices	28
IV. Constraints that Impacted Project Delivery	30
V. Conclusions and Final Recommendation.....	30
Appendix A: TOR.....	31
Appendix A: List of People Interviewed	38
Appendix C: The PRR vs. the MCP	41

List of Acronyms

ABP	Afghan Border Police
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADP/E	Alternative Development Program/Eastern Region (formerly ALP/E)
AKDN	Aga Khan Development Network
AKF	Aga Khan Foundation (a division of AKDN)
AL	Alternative Livelihood(s)
ALP/E	AL Program/Eastern Region (USAID)
ALWG	AL Working Group
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
ARD	Associated in Rural Development
AREU:	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
ASI	Adam Smith International (embedded in MCN)
CARD	Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development Facility (DFID)
CDC	Community Development Council (formed under MRRD's NSP)
CHA	Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (an NGO)
CN	Counter Narcotics
CNAT	Counter Narcotics Advisory Team (a directorate within MCN)
CNTF	Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (end date December 2008)
COAFG	UNODC Country Office, Afghanistan
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DDA	District Development Assembly
DEcon	(Provincial) Department of Economics
DEW	(Provincial) Department of Energy and Water
DFID	(UK) Department for International Development
DG	Director-General
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GAA	German Agro-Action (aka Deutsche Welthungerhilfe)
GIRA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GPI	Good Performance Initiative
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)
HDI	Human Development Index
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform Civil Service Commission
IDEA	Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives (USAID)
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
GPI	Good Performers Initiative
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LDC	Less/Lesser/Least Developed Countries
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
MCN	Ministry of Counter Narcotics
MCP	Management Capacity Program (administered by the WB under IARCSC)
MEW	Ministry of Energy and Water
MoWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs
MPA-N	Mint Producers Association - Nangarhar
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NABDP	National Area-Based Development Programme (under MRRD)
NDCS	National Drug Control Strategy (MCN, 2006)

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRAP	National Rural Access Programme (under
MRRD) NSP	National Solidarity Programme (under MRRD)
NVDA	Nangarhar Valley Development Authority (a MAIL
directorate) OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAR	Public Administration Reform Programme (a component of
IARSC) PDAIL	Provincial Department of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
PDC	Provincial Development Council
PDCN	Provincial Department of Counter Narcotics
PIC	Public Information Campaign
PRR	Priority Reform and Restructuring (a component of the PAR)
PRRD	Provincial Department of Rural Rehabilitation and
Development RED	Rural Enterprise Development
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WATSIP	Water, Sanitation, and Irrigation Programme (under
MRRD) WB	The World Bank
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme

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Summary matrix of findings, supporting evidence, and recommendations

Findings: problems and issues identified	Supporting evidence	Recommendations
1. G76 is mostly efficient, with some few exceptions.	Delivery of services to MCN has been made; the AL database has been set up; alternative livelihood working groups are sporadically meeting; CN public information campaigns are raising awareness and having positive impact; cooperative structures with WFP have been created, but the UNODC partner is dissatisfied, with one of the joint activities.	Greater emphasis on educating and training UNODC national staff, both at Kabul and provincial levels, will yield efficiency increases; increased national staffing levels will provide better service delivery as well as gender mainstreaming; better interfacing with UN sister-agency coordinated activities is needed. UNODC management should work with national staff to identify key areas of training needs and address this through annual training and skills development planning utilizing such resources as UN skillport. Examples of training needs include, but should not be confined to, exposure to projects and best practices in other countries to counter the effects of 30 years of near-isolation.
2. However, G76 has not proven to be effective in its current operational mode.	MCN remains functionally inoperative in many areas, and lacks operational mandates in the eyes of other line ministries, resulting in its not being fertile ground to accept UNODC input.	Greater quasi-daily mentorship of MCN staff may result in gains in effectiveness, but because of high staff turnover rates once training is certified, this is not assured; UNODC, while not neglecting MCN, needs to expand its influence and cooperation with other line ministries.
3. Hence, unfortunately, the overall impact of G76 must be classified as low insofar as MCN capacity building and especially for AL are concerned.	Retention of information provided to MCN staff through training was low, therefore the improvement in staff capacity at MCN was minimal. There was limited practical coordination on AL at the provincial level and no direct support for AL activities. These factors meant there was limited knowledge of UNODC's mandate and activities among respondents interviewed, giving a general perception of low impact.	Headcount training, where often attendees are present only to pocket the daily allowance and exit with a certificate, must end – objective testing must be instituted; UNODC and donors must cooperatively respond more adaptively to evolving circumstances, rather than remain anchored in non-functional modes; AL pilot projects, firmly attached to CN conditionality, ought to be fielded to increase UNODC's impact, visibility, and stature in Afghanistan.
4. Sustainability of G76 activities is proving to be elusive.	Limited capabilities among MCN civil servants, and the inhibitory environment in which it works, means that MCN's independently fulfilling its mandate remains a distant promise, despite the	Broadening UNODC's working relationship with Government to include other line ministries, especially MAIL – which has a functioning AL Directorate – is imperative; extending partnerships

Findings: problems and issues identified	Supporting evidence	Recommendations
	considerable capacity building efforts to-date. MCN has demonstrated near-zero capability to mainstream CN into line ministries' planning.	with additional UN agencies will bolster sustainability; AL pilot projects should build coalitions with international actors, as called for in the project design.
5. One-off training courses have limited efficacy.	Retention of knowledge by course participants was found to be low.	The means of delivering "capacity-building" must be reconsidered. If MCN staff capacity is to be built, contact with the trainees must occur on a routine basis; this may also mean that at times UNODC hand-holds MCN personnel.
6. There is little evidence to suggest that learning from prior evaluations has taken place.	The mid-term evaluations of G76 concluded that MCN's ability to absorb "capacity building" is very limited, yet this was apparently not taken seriously into consideration.	With all the personnel changes that occur in any organization, and in particular in the stressful Afghan milieu, institutional memory tends to get lost. A synopsis of findings from all evaluated projects, such as this very matrix, should be consulted prior to project development as a matter of course.
7. As designed, the G76 logframe was unusable in regard to measuring outputs and outcomes.	There are few measurable outcome indicators in the logframe, with too many instances occurring of unusable metrics such as "expedited" or "in place".	Robust logframe methods have now existed for many years, but the capacity to draft logframes needs to be strengthened significantly.
8. Overall, UNODC project staff performed well, especially in regard to the efforts expended for the capacity building component.	UNODC staff that received training could recount the knowledge and were using the skills to strengthen field level programming. Yet results proved non-durable because of inherent weaknesses within MCN.	Training of UNODC staff should continue on a routine basis, with objective measurements of results embedded. Training of MCN personnel must continue, regardless of the "revolving door" syndrome; it is to be borne in mind that even if trainees leave MCN, most will continue working in Afghanistan, and thus while not ideal, UNODC is helping build the nation's capabilities.
9. Merely providing the infrastructure for a project component, such as G76 did for the AL Database, does not automatically confer viability.	The AL database is rife with errors and omissions, and cannot be considered at all useful; indeed, it is used only by top MCN officials as a statistics-generating tool, but output data cannot be labeled either as relevant or accurate. The foundation for this outcome is that MCN is not regarded by too many entities, from NGOs to Government, as having the	There are two choices available: (a) close down the database, to prevent misunderstandings that will arise from its use; or (b) revamp it in its entirety, while seeking close collaboration with the Ministry of Economy, the government entity that is issued with the mandate to collect the required data.

Findings: problems and issues identified	Supporting evidence	Recommendations
	mandate to request data.	
10. Partnerships with others, including UN agencies, were weak limiting the efficacy of joint programmes.	The partnership with WFP resulted in that agency concluding that UNODC did not fulfill its role adequately. Moreover, UNODC selected the project locations, where in one instance the community did not require food assistance.	The goals, outputs, and outcomes of each partnership project should be considered by the team, and roles of each member clarified. Minutes need to be maintained to assure smooth delivery as new staff arrive to take on responsibility for delivery.

Executive Summary

a) Description of the project

As is widely recognized, Afghanistan's cultivated poppy fields contribute 80-90% of the global supply of illicit opium, compounded by an increasing sophistication to produce heroin within the country. Cultivation of cannabis as a cash crop remains prevalent in many areas as well. Cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs contributes "tax" income to the insurgency, affecting Afghanistan's political, social, and economic stability. Hence, Project G76 was planned to connect the international community's desire for drug control with Afghanistan's stated aim to reach the same goal, and its ability to deliver counter-narcotics coordination and programming. The main objective of G76 was to increase the capacity of the Islamic State of Afghanistan to effectively and systematically 'mainstream' the counter-narcotics dimension and analysis into key National Development Programmes (NDPs) and facilitate the proper targeting, planning, coordinating, monitoring and impact assessment of Alternative Livelihoods (AL) in, but not limited to, poppy growing areas and areas "at risk." The mainstreaming strategy included the following key elements:

- **Livelihoods Analysis:** Strengthening the network of AL national experts in the UNODC regional offices to compile relevant data and to develop a data collection and analysis system that enables stakeholders to better understand the livelihoods and the development needs of small farmers in commonly identified targeted areas of opium poppy cultivation – or those areas at risk of cultivating poppy- with a view to channelling this information into joint programme development with partners.
- **Project Facilitation:** Forming strategic partnerships with international stakeholders on specifically targeted AL projects and activities, improving and strengthening the interventions' outcome and impact through pooling the required multi-dimensional expertise to address the multi-functional role of opium poppy in rural household by phasing and improved targeting of interventions.

b) Major findings of the evaluation

1. The evaluation mission held extensive discussions with Government, key CN donors, implementing agencies, and potential strategic partners at both Central and Provincial levels. The key issues emerging from these discussions are that the effectiveness of MCN and its provincial directorates remains low, albeit heterogeneous across the provinces, government capacity remains weak, and that UNODC remains relatively invisible on the alternative livelihood radar screen.
2. In regard to CN/AL, most entities interviewed pointed to the continued lack of coordination and aptitude at the Provincial level. While CN advocacy has improved at the community level, with the Provincial Departments of Counter Narcotics (PDCN) working well in some provinces in regard to pre-planting dissemination of public information, in other provinces the Department is dominated by and has taken a back seat to the US State Department-funded Counter Narcotics Advisory Team (CNAT). Field activities by Government Line Ministries are proceeding apace, but mostly without CN coordination from PDCN. Moreover, these field activities usually have very little to do with AL per se, i.e., bolstering household incomes in communities that have stopped growing opium poppy or have had their poppy fields eradicated, and are focused instead on building community assets.
3. Furthermore, geographic distribution of such projects is the primary theme of providers. Linking projects together in a coherent manner so as to provide the basis for changes to, or support of livelihoods is the exception rather than the rule. Even very large agricultural development projects, with some specific exceptions for commodities in high demand such as pomegranate, do not seem to have developed a strategy for distribute marketing, import substitution, or sustainable export promotion for the more pedestrian products.

4. Concomitantly, agencies remain under significant pressure to show immediate results for CN success in Afghanistan, resulting in huge capital inflows for “development projects” that results in UNODC’s efforts in CN/AL being swamped. Who is most listened to at a roundtable is the person with the largest resources, and this is clearly not UNODC. UNODC should try to offer intellectual leadership on CN/AL matters, rather than try to compete with the large players. Unfortunately, most of the entities interviewed were unaware of UNODC’s activities in the CN/AL arena, bringing to the forefront the need for UNODC to raise its AL profile.
5. UNODC needs to develop a mechanism to reinforce its AL activities, one that is flexible enough to adjust itself to a heterogeneous environment while at the same time providing the support to its provincial staff, which in turn are tasked with building PDCN capacity in CN/AL. Understanding the spatially and socially variable fragility of populations who have stopped growing poppy is one aspect of an overall CN/AL strategy, but this must be aligned with a coherent demand reduction strategy to further remove the probability of a return to poppy cultivation.
6. One means by which UNODC can influence CN/AL strategies both at the provincial level as well as nationally/internationally is to begin implementing selected AL pilot projects in specific sectors and geographic locales that have, for whatever reason, “fallen through the gap” of the much larger actors in the AL sector (or alternative development, AD, as is now frequently used by several major donors). A strong CN conditionality must be imposed on such activities, and high visibility ensured through frequent reports on progress to all stakeholders, current and potential. Specific projects should be “marketed” to individual donors at the Kabul and home-country level as appropriate, in line with donor interest, in order to build a successful AL portfolio that UNODC can use to reinforce its CN/AL standing in Afghanistan.
7. Most entities interviewed, even UNODC and MCN/PDCNs themselves, acknowledge that the capacity building component of G76 did not have the results that were anticipated. The way UNODC supports MCN/PDCNs has to be fundamentally restructured, such that sporadic training courses with unmeasured outcomes are substituted by training courses with objective performance measures, supplemented by routine mentoring activities.

c) Lessons learned and best practices

8. The fundamental lesson to be learned both by UNODC and the donor community is the need to be adaptable to prevailing circumstances. The international community entered the country in 2001 with the best intentions to rebuild, revitalize, and turn the economy to licit crop production, only to be faced with the evidence, time and again, that Afghanistan may well be unique in its particular circumstances.
9. To illustrate what this means requires some explication. The evaluation notes a statement made not long ago by a US military trainer in which, in exasperation, he commented that training recruits for the Afghan Army is like trying to train a class of five-year olds. While this might be dismissed by skeptics as analytically flawed and hyperbolic, it may then be more noteworthy that Richard Holbrooke recently commented on the training of the Afghan Police; after six years of effort, he noted wryly, 85% of police recruits enter the course illiterate, and leave the course illiterate. He made it a point to ask how, then, can the international community expect them to verify identification and other documents?
10. Such hurdles are hardly unique to the uniformed branch of Government. They also permeate almost all levels of civilian administration to a appreciable degree, in some cases to such a degree that the best-designed capacity-building initiatives, that is, the primary output of the G76 project, are predictably likely to fail.

11. Hence, the evaluation does not fault the G76 project for its attempts to build capacity. This is exactly what is needed to ensure a functioning and functional civilian administration. Where the lesson was not learned quickly enough, perhaps, and in line with Paragraph 8, is that the Project showed little adaptability. In the face of multiple avenues of evidence, and most likely constrained by explicit or implicit donor expectations, G76 did not evolve so as to be capable of delivering its outcomes in MCN, in the PDCNs, with the AL database, and for the AL objective.
12. The only logical conclusion in such circumstances as described in Paragraphs 9-11 would be to upgrade efforts in “capacity building” to become direct mentorship on a quasi-daily basis. Of course, the problem with this approach is that UNODC could easily fall into the trap of becoming the PDCNs in which staff would be effectively embedded.
13. There is a significant gap between expected international standards of research capability and that available amongst national professional staff in Afghanistan. This is a common problem in LDCs that typically lack the educational institutions and resources that exist in advanced nations. UNODC needs to institutionalize a commitment to strengthening the capacity of its top national professional staff. UNODC should assess its national professional staff needs and make provision to strengthen national professional staff competency through formal workshops or via online courses. The effectiveness of these courses and retention of knowledge should be tested as a means to continually improve such support and also as a means to assess staff competency.
14. Vis-à-vis the desire for partnerships with other UN agencies, G76 undertook joint projects with WFP, one of which was not well managed by UNODC. In order to strengthen this partnership, UNODC should carefully review the problems experienced to ensure lessons are learned and mistakes are avoided in future joint projects.
15. There is great potential for synergy when working with other UN agencies, hence the concept of collaboration should be actively pursued as a best-practice.
16. The 2008 Thematic Evaluation has had minimal influence on the structure and functioning of I87. Few of its recommendations were incorporated into a revised G76 project plan; this could possibly have much to do with real or perceived donor inflexibility as much as an evasion or dismissal of recommended actions. The same holds true in terms of including findings from past programme evaluations, one of which, for example, noted the failure of “capacity building” vis-à-vis MCN. Project creation and revisions may well be proceeding on the basis of memory of what has been written, rather than via a careful consideration of prior performance. A best practice would be to take the time – as a team – to review successes and failures of the past, and build from this knowledge-base.

I. Introduction

A. Background and Context of the Project

17. Capacity building of MCN field staff through the G76 project was designed to systematically “mainstream” the counter-narcotics dimension and analysis into key National Development Programmes (NDPs) and to facilitate the targeting, planning, coordinating, monitoring and impact assessment of Alternative Livelihoods (AL) in, but not limited to, poppy growing areas and areas “at risk”. The mainstreaming strategy included the following key elements:
 - Livelihoods Analysis: Strengthening the network of AL national experts in the UNODC regional offices to compile relevant data and to develop a data collection and analysis system that enables stakeholders to better understand the livelihoods and the development needs of small farmers in commonly identified targeted areas of opium poppy cultivation – or those

areas at risk of cultivating poppy- with a view to channelling this information into joint programme development with partners.

- **Project Facilitation:** Forming strategic partnerships with international stakeholders on specifically targeted AL projects and activities, improving and strengthening the interventions' outcome and impact through pooling the required multi-dimensional expertise to address the multi-functional role of opium poppy in rural household by phasing and improved targeting of interventions.
18. The G76 project, which commenced in 2006, had a series of objectives that changed over time in response to the developing needs of MCN as they came to the forefront. Initially, the project intended to build a network of national AL Experts in AL at both central and provincial levels in MRRD as well as in MCN, but an early decision was made to focus activities on (but not exclusively on) MCN since activities at MRRD were being covered by others. The purpose of this objective was to mainstream CN into the Ministries' planning. A secondary objective was consensus building on a common AL approach, and the integration of this at the centre and in the provinces; concomitantly, this component called for the integration of ALWGs into the various coordination bodies at the centre and in the provinces, especially in regard to proper sequencing with eradication measures. The penultimate component of the project as it was initially planned was to set up an M&E system with a CN/AL impact assessment capacity, which included the updating of an AL Database (founded by a previous UNODC project) at the centre, fed by data from the provinces. Finally, the project was to use evidence-based CN/AL policy/strategy development via farmer-intention and baseline surveys, as well as strategic studies.
 19. The first project revision called for a feasibility study to be undertaken, via a consultant, on which other crops could be introduced into the Afghan agricultural system to substitute for opium poppy. (The study was never fielded, however, due to improved understanding of the reduced potential of specific medicinal crops in Afghanistan.) At this time, the project's duration was also extended by three months, to reflect the date of actual arrival of the international AL Advisor at his duty station.
 20. The second project revision, made at the beginning of 2008, was proposed to bring G76 in line with UNODC's Learn, Disseminate, Apply strategic vision for AL in Afghanistan. It called for strengthening the livelihoods analysis capabilities of the AL experts in three provinces in the form of needs assessments in areas growing, or prone to grow, poppy. This information was to be channelled into joint programme development with partners, particularly WFP, and especially in regard to phasing and improved targeting of interventions.
 21. The final project revision, dated November 2008, a month prior to G76's termination, was the no-cost bridging mechanism between G76 and its follow-on, I87. It calls for a focus on providing information that improves the understanding of linkages between drug control and development, especially as regards improved targeting of AL assistance. It calls for continued effort on coordinating AL activities at the provincial level, and mainstreaming AL into policies and initiatives. And finally, it indicates that G76 will further develop and facilitate initiatives with strategic partners.

A.1. The AL Context in Afghanistan

22. In "It's the economy, stupid" (April 18, 2009, page 73), The Economist underscores lessons learned by the US in jump-starting Iraqi private-sector investment. In particular, the interim American government effectively shut down Iraq's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by restricting their access to cash, cutting employees' pay by 60%, and barring the government from doing business with them. But a robust private sector failed to emerge, and in 2006, after unemployment and underemployment rates reached 50%, the US changed track, plowing \$100 million over the next two years into Iraq's SOEs.

23. Coordination of US policies in Iraq and Afghanistan does not seem to be occurring, except on a military level. What was discovered to be relevant, indeed vital, in Iraq has not been implemented in Afghanistan, given the size of the USAID's budget and priorities in Afghanistan. A case in point is the \$118 million spent on ADP/E and the further Phase I \$150 million programmed for IDEA in the Eastern Region, with a strong geographic emphasis on Nangarhar Province. Meanwhile, the SOE of the Nangarhar Valley Development Authority (NVDA), once employing 7,500 skilled and semi-skilled workers on maintaining its primary canal, 31 secondary canals, and 4 state farms (the famous olive and citrus groves of Nangarhar), lies moribund, despite Italy's assistance in providing oil extraction machinery and a new computerized line for jarring olives and other vegetables.
24. The reason for expounding on the situation vis-à-vis SOEs is that it illustrates more than one misconnect, chief among them that there appears to be such a plethora of often divergent goals (in M&E parlance, "outputs") among the international community that a coherent strategy ("outcome") fails to emerge. For example, it would seem to be the case that donor policymakers do not clearly envisage what it is they want to achieve in eastern Afghanistan: Is it import substitution, and if so, how, since there appears to be no marketing strategy in USAID's IDEA mega-project? Is it sustainable livelihoods, or just a temporary absorption of labour in order to deprive the Taliban of recruits? Will it indeed be the goal to provide alternative livelihoods or, instead, is the outcome to be community development? Is it the case that the mantra of privatization takes such precedence over rational alternatives that logical policymaking is simply drowned under the weight of dogma? Given the lessons learned in Iraq, how is it that providing permanent employment opportunities to 7,500 people plus a potentially very large cohort of out-growers across the Province appears not to be under discussion?
25. Of course, the answer lies embedded in the competing agendas of the many actors currently mobilized in Afghanistan, whether they have a CN/AL polity or instead assiduously strive to avoid the appearance of engaging in CN/AL in any way whatsoever. This evaluation recognizes that this multiplicity of actors, several of them very well endowed with funds, has placed UNODC in a very different role if compared with the dominant one the Office enjoys in Southeast Asian or South American contexts. Hence while lessons learned in those settings can (and should) be applied in Afghanistan where appropriate, it is necessary to point to the fact that as far as AL is concerned, UNODC – given its relatively meagre funding – encounters resistance from larger, better-resourced actors when the Agency has tried in the past to make its views heard. The new leadership of COAFG has a robust, coherent, and well-integrated vision for AL, one that should drive the debate on CN/AL strategies, mirroring the way in which WFP has succeeded in focusing the humanitarian community on a globally acceptable definition for "food insecurity."
26. UNODC's definition of AL (with minor modification by the evaluator) is that it consists of rural development targeting farming households whose illicit crop is scheduled for voluntary elimination or forced eradication, or in a worse case, whose illicit crop has already been eradicated. As a corollary, these households have a sustainable livelihood stream when they can cope with, and recover from, shocks and stresses – specifically the abrupt cessation of poppy cultivation and/or trafficking – without depletion of their natural resource base or household assets, and where they do not switch available labour to illegal off-farm activities.
27. UNODC's definition is inherently a short-term one, even though it considers the issue of sustainability. The concept is centred on providing an immediate alternative income stream to that previously provided by poppy as a basis from which to build, through various subsequent development initiatives, a broader set of household options (be they on- or off-farm based). But even sustainability, which is usually thought of as having long duration, can have a very short-term referent. The poppy plant provides not only opium, but also edible oil and a

biomass fuel for heating and cooking. In one village in Badakhshan the evaluation considered, the voluntary cessation of poppy cultivation had not just an immediate impact on food security in regard to expensive-to-replace cooking oil, but a serious adverse natural resource consequence: the stripping of bushes and trees from surrounding mountains to provide a replacement biomass fuel, and subsequent loss of topsoil, which has a cause-and-effect relationship that has induced the need for a UNODC-WFP partnership for stabilizing gully erosion in the village's irrigated lands through the building of gabions. In another very remote village in Badakhshan the evaluation mission visited, opium was primarily own-consumed by the cultivators themselves, 50 households of a total of 150. Albeit induced by the threat of eradication, the voluntary end of poppy cultivation has resulted in a cascade of asset sales by addicted households, reducing many to begging for their daily bread from family and neighbours, since what little assistance has been provided through AKF's implementation of the NSP has not been complemented by more than a token demand reduction treatment of three days duration.

28. International actors may have a different view of what constitutes AL. For example, USAID now refuses to use the term AL, preferring instead Alternative Development – so much so that they changed the name of a project midstream from ALP/E to ADP/E. GTZ takes a longer-term and perhaps too broad a view that AL consists of facilitating change from an opium-based economy to an alternative economic and social system.¹ But systems changes generally occur only after a tipping point is reached, a community consensus that reversion to the status quo ante is not going to happen. Of 17 CDCs polled (see Appendix B), only one focus group discussion this evaluation conducted in Balkh Province suggested that this tipping point is close, even if opium cultivation has ceased; communities hold in reserve the option to revert to poppy cultivation should their economic well-being remain uncertain or unimproved, even though they recognize the illegality of the act as well as its haram nature.² Why this level of uncertainty prevails after so many years of development interventions and CN/AL emphasis is twofold: (a) with perhaps the rare exception to-date such as CRS' integrated programme in Herat Province,³ most interventions are scattershot in nature, often prompted by the priorities set by the CDCs themselves but in a situation absent any external leadership or inputs, such that (b) the assistance delivered is seldom related to AL per se.
29. The fact that AL is so poorly understood conceptually by both donor nations and GIRA suggests a missed opportunity to lead the debate on UNODC's part. The MCN-chaired ALWG in Kabul deliberated over what constitutes an AL project, concluding that any rural development project is an AL project. Reflection should suggest that this is not the case, even if the project consists of a school or clinic; generally, these are projects at the community development level, which may have spin-off benefits to some household's economies after a period of several years. Inarguably, schools and clinics (and perhaps even hammams,⁴ which appear on CDC priority lists especially in Herat Province) have a positive effect on HDI, but such HDI improvements will have low correlations with the immediate needs that AL is meant to address.⁵ Similarly, new bridges or rehabilitated roads by themselves will have scant impact on household economies if there is no produce replacing opium to take to

¹ "Progress" has scant value in a society where change is seen as a threat. Advances have to be made in terms acceptable to people whose traditions continue to proceed unbroken over timespans of centuries, and who remain mistrustful of any proposal that could interfere with tribal rights and loyalties.

² Haram is anything that Muslims consider to be forbidden by Islamic law.

³ DFID's about-to-commence 3-year, £30 million CARD project is built on the concept of sustainable and integrated approaches, ones that seek to mimic the opium economy through the provision of credit and agricultural inputs. It is relatively confined geographically, however, targeting 6 Districts in 3 Provinces in Year 1, expanding to 32 of Afghanistan's 314 districts by the end of Year 3.

⁴ Public hot-water baths.

⁵ Hence the UNODC's October 2008 Alternative Livelihoods Database Analysis Report, which seeks to relate AL investments and levels of opium poppy cultivation, cannot be reliably used.

market; water from repaired canal systems can as readily be used to grow opium poppy as any other crop.

30. COAFG may be able to recapture a leadership role in defining AL and implementing AL projects, as recommended in the following sections, but it is incumbent on the organization to bear two things in mind: first, the coordination necessary for AL implementation should start in-house, such that the AL group is routinely both aware of and providing inputs to the other Sub-Programmes within the Office. Second especially given the Afghan context, the Office needs to retain its strategic common vision, so that UNODC's working definition of AL must be extended to include a demand reduction component, conceivably wrapping it around the concept of negating household asset depletion.
31. Some readers may regard as pedantic this suggested course of action, but this evaluation believes that it has a function – that of keeping the context in mind when designing interventions. UNODC's Rainbow Strategy 'Blue Paper,' citing NDCS, stipulates that "the elimination of opium poppy cultivation must be effectively sequenced with the broader stabilization effort" – a sequencing that most strongly suggests that AL must come prior (or possibly in parallel with) infrastructural improvements having an HDI outcome. While at first glance axiomatic, an understanding of proper sequencing as the conditionality for success seems to elude many organizations working on CN/AL projects. Pointing to the ease with which households may revert to poppy cultivation, the NDCS subsequently recognizes that "no sustainable reduction in cultivation... will be possible until farmers have access to sufficient legal livelihoods,"⁶ implicitly stating that there are no quick-fixes or "magic bullets" to provide a durable end poppy production. This evaluation seeks to remind UNODC, especially in light of ongoing Project AFG/J55 (the integrated approach for the Western Provinces), that missing from the NDCS argument above – focused as it is on farmers – is mention of replacement livelihoods for the lancers and the small-scale smugglers active in the western region.⁷

A.2. UNODC's Counterpart Ministry: An Overview of MCN and PDCN Functions and Capabilities

32. In accordance with Article 52 of the Counter Narcotics Law, the MCN shall coordinate all CN activities throughout Afghanistan. A key feature of Article 52 is that responsibility for implementation of the CN Law lies with each of the line ministries according to their individual mandates, using the NDCS as a strategic template for their activities. Hence MCN is not directly responsible for implementation, but is instead charged with coordination of CN/AL efforts, as well as with monitoring and evaluation. The MCN's NDCS (Feb 2006) identifies eight 'pillars' to group activities around common objectives: alternative livelihoods, demand reduction, eradication, public awareness, law enforcement, criminal justice, international and regional cooperation, and institution building.
33. It is becoming increasingly clear as time passes that even three years after finalization, line ministries have neither comprehended nor absorbed the guidance offered by the NDCS; furthermore, MCN itself doesn't understand the document, and fails to champion it. It is not uncommon that such a disconnect exists, since the concepts contained in these strategic visions (NDCS being one of several, the most well-known of which is the Afghan National Development Strategy, ANDS) were mostly conceived and written in English by international consultants, with subsequent translation into Dari and Pashtu.

⁶ Italics not in original document

⁷ The District Administrator in Kohsan District, Herat Province (one of the target provinces in this Western Provinces initiative) informed the evaluation mission that by his estimate, 500 young men move to Helmand Province each spring from his District to participate in lancing activities.

34. UNODC's AL projects have included a component of NDCS short-course training offered to MCN and other GIRA departmental staff in the provinces, but there is no evidence, when speaking to the staff, that there has resulted any appreciable degree of content absorption by the trainees.
35. Furthermore, since MCN has neither funds to disburse through independent field projects (i.e., it is not a "line ministry") nor enforcement mechanisms, other GIRA Ministries and Departmental staff tend therefore to view it as more of an impediment to their planning than as a strategic partner for CN/AL activities. On the other hand, MCN has interpreted its "CN mainstreaming" role as well as its CN/AL coordination task as a mechanism through which to control the activity of others. This has led to a logjam both at the Centre and at Provincial level, with initial friction between MCN and other Ministries morphing over time into a dismissal of MCN and PDCNs as irrelevant.
36. This sense of irrelevancy is heightened in those provinces where CNAT is active. CNAT was designed initially as a one-year project to build MCN and PDCN capacity in seven key poppy-growing provinces, but is now in its third year. In some cases, it is obvious that the Governorate and the Provincial line departments have come to view CNAT as representing MCN, although CNAT is but a US State Department-funded project within the Ministry. MCN itself has perhaps inadvertently strengthened this view.
37. Because MCN and the PDCN are sidelined in this manner, it is difficult indeed for staff to gather the inputs necessary for the AL Database, both in the Provinces and at the Centre. Often Line Ministries, as well as NGOs, refuse to divulge information regarding their projects to PDCN, claiming that they fulfil their reporting obligations by reporting their activities to the DEcon, as GIRA regulations stipulate. There is overlap between UNODC's I87 efforts to build an AL Database and efforts undertaken by the Ministry of Economy. If the AL database is to continue, coordination between the MCN and Ministry of Economy should be addressed. The way the AL database is currently operating means it is likely to be incomplete.⁸
38. PDCNs are tasked with convening the monthly ALWGs, and act as the Chair. In one Province, members of the ALWG voted for a Chairperson affiliated with a different Department, and when shown the GIRA regulation specifying that the chair is to be the PDCN Director or his designate, gradually ceased attending. In another Province, attendees of the ALWG complain of disorganization and lack of clarity, and that the PDCN can't even provide an agenda for the meeting – hence they are reluctant to "waste time" in showing up. In yet another Province, the ALWG has not met for six months, the last three of which were because everyone in the PDCN (including the cook!) were actively involved in eradication efforts, the initial three of which PDCN staff were "too busy" planning for the eradication effort.
39. Balkh Province offers an example of the way in which the relationship between MCN and the Governor can become contentious. While the precise circumstances and roles of the players not completely transparent to the evaluation mission despite triangulation efforts, the gist of the matter is that there are two PDCN Directors in the Province. The original incumbent

⁸ To illustrate perhaps with greater clarity the lack of coordination and the willingness to share planned project activities, consider that DEW in Herat Province is set to implement an ADB loan for 16 major canals off the Hari Rud (river), plus the Indian Government-financed Selma dam. Once completed – and the project has already started this year – an additional 40,000 ha of land will be supplied with irrigation water. A dispassionate observer might conclude that this is significant indeed, given that the irrigable land along the Hari Rud will more than double in extent. The evaluation mission was therefore surprised to learn that PDAIL in Herat is unaware of these plans, as is DEcon. GIRA expenditure data and project information may circulate among Ministries at the Centre, but whether such data reliably enter the Ministry of Economy's central database is questionable.

entered the PRR process and upon exit, MCN reappointed him to his post. Purportedly it may have been the very next day that MCN appointed a new MCN Director to Balkh. From this point forward, the stories diverge: either the original incumbent went to the Governor to ask that the Governor – a very powerful figure throughout the Governorate and Province – verify who is Director, and was reassured that only he holds that position; or the Governor refused to acknowledge the presence of the new Director sent from Kabul. Regardless, the presence of both these “Directors” raises the political stakes for all other actors – including UNODC – who routinely interact with the PDCN. Interactions with the “official” Director dispatched from Kabul risks irking the Governor, whereas interactions with the original incumbent risks further marginalizing MCN.

40. PDCNs away from the spotlight of being among the former heavily dependent poppy growing provinces may fare even less well. Facilities for PDCN officers are sometimes lacking to the point that they are unable to perform their functions properly. Additionally, the technical training of the staff members seems to be insufficient and the number of staff members might be too low to perform all the activities demanded by the PIC. There are also doubts regarding the level of entrenchment of the PDCN concept within the MCN.
41. The paltry annual budget of PDCNs suffices the inability of the Department to function appropriately. While overstaffed for the work that is actually achieved, the low budget (Badakhshan: \$16,000/year; Herat: \$40,000/y; Nangarhar: \$19,000/y, to cover salaries, utilities, office space, vehicle maintenance and fuel) guarantees that little can get done. MCN directives specify that the vehicle is to be used to provide the PDCN Director with his daily transport requirements, resulting in the vehicle being mostly confined to the city. Charged with MCN’s monitoring role in the Provinces, the PDCN’s AL Manager has no way to take on this task unless someone offers him a ride.
42. PDCNs complaining about a lack of fuel as the handicap for their monitoring or data gathering functions underscores their low capacity vis-à-vis their own procedures. It is not the role of UNODC to provide running costs for the PDCNs, but that of the MCN itself. UNODC frequently points PDCN Directors in the right direction, but so far there has been no resolution to this issue. At least partly, this is due to a failure within MCN at both central and provincial levels to more fully comprehend the relevant functions of the other.
43. Low and uncompetitive salaries were so pervasive throughout GIRA that the World Bank took on coordination of donor funds for the PAR programme, including the response component of salary rationalization through PRR. In principle, PRR slots are competitive and meritocratic, and incumbents cannot go through the process and be re-appointed to the same location in which they apply for eligibility. In practice, things may work differently, but regardless of issues surrounding transparency, what has emerged in this evaluation is that the process can take many months to decide on an applicant’s status. Meanwhile, PDCN staff can be chronically underpaid, especially in relation to salaries awarded to others. Salary discrepancies drive the process of constant staff turnover: once having built up their personal “capacity,” GIRA staff – including MCN and PDCN – all-too-frequently seek other employment opportunities outside of the civil service, leaving positions vacant sometimes for months at a time (including, e.g., the MCN AL Director, which at the time of writing this report has been vacant for eight months).
44. The result of all these factors is a self-reinforcing downward spiral. Many MCN and PDCN employees are disgruntled, disillusioned, demoralized, and demotivated. PDCN staff complains that MCN offers them no guidance, provides them with neither workplans nor

ToRs; they feel cast adrift.⁹ Their attendance at the office has become simply a means to draw salary, and absenteeism is rife. Their willingness to monitor MCN-funded CNTF projects is compromised, especially if these are in remote areas.

45. It is important to understand that the above list is a broad generalization, and that exceptions exist. The evaluation mission has concluded that the PDCN in Herat Province functions well, and is respected throughout the layers of Government, from the Governor himself through the line ministries to the District Administrators.¹⁰ Morale within the Department remains high, and PDCN's PIC is considered to have been a vital and successful component both in poppy eradication and elimination efforts in the Province, thereby generating much anticipated GPI funding. Notably, however, the PDCN in Herat operates in the absence of a CNAT team in the Province. Furthermore, its Director – a former Governor of Farah Province – is a charismatic and dynamic leader and manager, with good connections throughout the Province, allowing him the “space” to adopt an activist stance. The same situation prevails for the PDCN in Balkh Province, where the original PDCN Director (see discussion above on the dual Directors, paragraph 39) has excellent relations with the Governor, PDCN is a key member of the five-unit CN Working Group the Governor set up,¹¹ and where the CN strategy has successfully eliminated from the Province not just opium poppy but also cannabis, a centuries-old tradition as opposed to just the few years of poppy cultivation. In part, the ability of the Balkh PDCN to function relatively well can be attributed to the Governor shutting out CNAT from any more than the “A” in its title suggests, – i.e., inviting it to participate in CN planning in its advisory capacity, but not permitting it to act as a stand-in for the PDCN. This stands in sharp contrast to the passive role of PDCNs in other Provinces, as alleged by line ministry staff.
46. Lest the Herat and Balkh exceptions paint an overly optimistic picture, international contractors embedded in MCN have a glum view of MCN's capacity to implement its mandate. They contend that the creation of a Ministry from a Directorate under the President has allowed the President to represent CN as “not my problem” and other Ministers to shirk their CN responsibilities. Concomitantly, the internal structure of MCN has been stacked with the ethnic group producing and trafficking the majority of opium Afghanistan grows (see footnote 1), resulting in its morphing into a toothless tiger, little more than a social welfare scheme wherein staff does little actual work, further weakening it politically. MCN has no ability to force Governors to implement CN in the provinces, which has therefore become a role assumed by the IDLG.¹² Moreover, so poorly had MCN's procurement department performed that the Ministry of Finance retracted its budget midyear, leaving it with the ability to pay only salaries from October 2008 to the time of writing.
47. Such deficiencies are recognized by senior management in MCN, but with a slightly different nuance. Obligations from other sources have been cited as a key source, which further decrease the capabilities of staff members. Tasked also with consolidating line ministries reports on CN strategies, they are able to accomplish little else.

⁹ In part, this is attributable to the fact that MCN insists on hardcopy for all official correspondence between the PDCNs and the Center, in a country without a functioning mail service. It can take 4-5 months for a reply to be received from Kabul to any request or concern.

¹⁰ But this is due to the current Director of PDCN. Before the current incumbent took up his post, the Governorate was barely aware that MCN had a presence in Herat Province. Some officials viewed CN/AL partners as competitors, and became entirely focused on acquiring project funding.

¹¹ Comprised of the PDCN, UNODC, CNAT, the CN Police, and ANP Intelligence.

¹² Nonetheless, the IDLG can have tremendous influence. After a year of work, at a cost of around \$1 million, IDLG refused to endorse the February 2008 Herat Medium-Term Counter Narcotics Plan, 1387-1389, placing the strategy in limbo.

48. In part, the CNTF was designed with the idea behind it that allowing MCN to distribute money, as other line ministries do, would empower it. Conceptually a rational response, in the end the CNTF became the cause of considerable friction between Governors and the Ministry, as promises made locally could not be delivered because the money was never – or only much belatedly – delivered. However, such tardiness was not MCN's fault; UNDP's management and disbursement of the funds proved so cumbersome that it took 12 months or more to release money to the provinces for planned allocations. This functionality deficit within UNDP is reiterated in paragraphs 86-98, the discussion of the UNODC-UNDP relationship.

B. Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation


49. A consultancy was undertaken from 27 April to 15 June 2009 in order to review the projects entitled "Alternative Livelihoods Capacity Building at National and Regional Level," "hereafter referred to as G76 and the subject of this report, as well as Strengthening Provincial Capacity for Drug Control," hereafter referred to as I87.
50. More specifically, the purpose of the evaluation of G76 is to determine what the project had achieved, and whether it had attained its objectives successfully (and efficiently, effectively, and sustainably), while taking into account the difficult conditions under which work continues in Afghanistan, as described above.
51. The time period for the evaluation was from the project's inception in February 2006 to its termination in December 2008.
52. One aim of this final evaluation is to improve the management and implementation of the follow-up I87 project through the remainder of its lifetime, i.e., until December 2010, and for COAFG to use the lessons learned to improve the planning, design, and management of future projects. In this regard, the extent to which the needs of the beneficiaries are being met as well as what has been achieved in terms of impact, relevance and sustainability will also be assessed.
53. The evaluation will also draw lessons as well as good (and bad) practices from the projects' implementation that will be used to improve the management and implementation of the project during the remainder of the project period. The findings of the evaluation will also be used by the Afghanistan Country Office to improve the planning, design and management of future projects. Furthermore, the evaluation will also measure the projects' achievements, outcomes, and impacts, both positive and negative.

C. Evaluation Methodology

54. Beyond a desk review of all applicable project and other relevant documents, interviews were held with key informants at both national and provincial levels; a total of 127 entities (individuals or groups) were consulted from among GIRA counterparts and other line ministries, the Afghan uniformed services, donors and donor-funded project managers, NGOs, community members, the nascent private sector, and of course UNODC itself, as well as personnel of other UN Agencies. A full list is provided in Appendix B, while the map below shows the Provinces where these were conducted, marked with a red diamond. Note that the discussions were not limited by a fixed-format questionnaire – as can be appreciated, given the wide array of respondents, a single survey instrument would not have been functional. Instead, interviews were open-ended and free-ranging, covering a large number of interlinked topics, but focused primarily on the issue of the G76 project's efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability, taking into account both cultural constraints and the

unique challenges that prevail in Afghanistan. While the evaluator had worked in Afghanistan for a year prior to undertaking the evaluation and therefore had a fundamental understanding of the Afghan context prior to starting the evaluation, as time progressed and more was learned the interviews naturally became much more complex and wide-ranging.

55. CDCs were interviewed 17 times, as focus group discussions, two of which (because the people adhere to the Ismaili sect, permitting contact by unrelated males) were women's CDCs. Security considerations did not permit the evaluation to proceed to the south, in particular to Kandahar, location of the fifth UNODC Provincial Office. The other four provinces in which UNODC offices are located were visited, and their 187 programmes evaluated (viz. Nangarhar, Badakhshan, Balkh, Herat), and in the case of the Balkh office, Jawzjan and Faryab provinces as well, which fall under Balkh's purview.



56. The interviews with the individuals proceeded with questions specific to those people's expertise, and were focused on CN/AL aspects and the role of MCN and the PDCN, in some cases as well as on UNODC's role and comparative advantage. The array of individuals contacted, having such a broad range of affiliations, militated against having a standardized questionnaire.
57. With the CDC focus groups, discussions were centered on farming systems, opium poppy cultivation and its cessation, and the role played by development interventions in maintaining poppy-free farming systems. Two WFP-UNODC projects were also visited, one in Badakhshan, the other in Balkh Provinces; in each case, a CDC focus group was convened. However, while the evaluation was able to visit one district in Badakhshan that had had a small amount of poppy cultivated this year, which has been subsequently eradicated, none of the major poppy growing districts could be accessed because of security concerns.

D. Limitations to the Evaluation

58. The sole limitations to the evaluation were security-related. Kandahar, location of one of UNODC's five provincial offices, and a major opium poppy cultivating and trafficking province, could not be accessed because of severely limited UN Department of Security Services (UNDSS)-approved accommodation. In Nangarhar, UNDSS prohibited road travel

without the use of two armoured vehicles and police escorts, which was next-to-impossible to arrange for longer than a few hours, since the vehicles had to be loaned from other UN Agencies. At the time of the evaluation, UNODC had no such vehicles itself in Nangarhar.

II. Major Findings

59. It is difficult, indeed at times impossible, to disaggregate G76 from I87 activities; the two projects were ultimately merged, but before that occurred, I87 paid for some G76 salaries after funds had run out. The discussion below may therefore not be entirely exclusive to G76, and reflects the difficulty of separating the two projects.
60. The findings below, while discouraging in terms of the desired outcomes and sustainability of G76, must be taken in light of the unique working conditions in Afghanistan, as elaborated in paragraphs 32-48 above. But this is not the sole underlying difficulty, for the same lack of capacity that is the result of the collapse of the country's educational system burdens UNODC itself. While the staff at the UNODC Provincial Offices are undeniably smart, and may indeed have a wealth of practical experience from prior to the start of the civil war, in general they have missed out on the past 30 years of modern practices and advances, whether in agronomy (and other physical sciences) or in the social sciences. The result has been that UNODC has had to train its own staff in the implementation and use of tools such as focus-group discussion practices, before the staff could itself train or attempt to mentor its MCN and PDCN counterparts. Techniques such as focus-group discussions require a certain mindset, one that adroitly explores avenues leading off from interviewees' responses, and one which cannot be "trained": this can be acquired only through experiential learning over time.
61. High-ranked MCN insiders themselves acknowledge the Ministry's shortcomings, and are able to perceive that little durable gain has resulted from G76 activities. This realization is also commonly expressed by UNODC staff involved in G76 (and I87), both in Kabul and in the provinces. The initial concern that low baseline capacity existed at MCN and the PDCNs emerged in the first G76 Annual Progress Report in 2006.

A. Immediate Objective 1: Capacity Building

62. Have leadership and technical skills been enhanced within MCN at institutional and individual levels? Has the operational capacity (skills and service delivery) of MCN increased through training and improvement of working conditions? Has a mentorship system been set up? Has the creation of a mentorship mechanism helped the day-to-day operations to oversee and advise on technical issues as well as on the administration of MCN? Was training material produced and is it available for future use by the Government and concerned authorities?
63. The linkage between MCN and UNODC's research activities is weak and should be much stronger. Comprehension within MCN can be improved through regular workshops on research results.
64. Not many visible achievements have been made when it comes to MCN capacity building. A key problem here is limited continuity and follow-up, which is not the sole responsibility of UNODC, but an issue of mutual responsibility. Furthermore, UNODC's mentorship has been lacking in some regards.
65. While the ability of MCN to function well has been severely compromised in the years since its formation, as described in paragraphs 32-48, one should not disregard the weakness of the links between UNODC and the MCN. Where UNODC may have fallen short in realizing its goals in G76 is in not paying attention to the inherent weaknesses in the MCN, which have been well known for some years now. Whatever "capacity building" has come to mean, it can't achieve its goals through occasional three- to five-day training workshops that have no

follow-up. This is axiomatic within most of the LDC, but in a country such as Afghanistan with its recognized immense gaps in educational attainment and hence a very small cohort of professional-caliber civil servants, the idea that capacity could be built in short-order should have been rather quickly retired.

66. The lack of basic skills has occasionally been detrimental to the ability of MCN staff to benefit from the workshops provided by UNODC.
67. UNODC has been unable to sufficiently develop the PDCN capacity in the five provinces in which it has Provincial Offices, due to poor coordination – attributable at least in part to the two organizations residing in different buildings. When G76 commenced, MCN and UNODC were housed in the same building, to the considerable consternation of the UN Security Team. A decision to physically separate the two was taken after the UN demanded close inspection and registration of visitors, which MCN contended impaired their ability to function since it would make conspicuous and endanger visitors to their premises, especially those wishing to more-or-less anonymously report drugs activities. The decision to physically separate premises also detached routine daily contact, compromising the ability of PDCN staff to retain their newly gained knowledge. Without this daily handholding, as practiced by others involved in Afghan capacity building (such as CRS with PDAIL in Herat, and ARD with MoWA), the predictable outcome of little gain was indeed realized.
68. Potential areas where improved knowledge and cooperation would be an asset for MCN and PDCN staff are related to understanding the nature and essence of projects, from writing a proposal to project cycle management to assessing outcome; the meaning of sustainability; the implications of effectiveness and efficiency; and M&E.
69. In regard to M&E trainings, the information intake by trainees seems to have been too limited at times. In this regard, item A3 in the G76 logframe stipulates an indicator for the outcome of national expertise in AL centrally and regionally to be that of the availability of trained AL experts within MCN (and by inference, also at the PDCN level). The stipulated means of verification are, however, meaningless, for they do not, and intrinsically cannot, quantify or evaluate “training” in any way whatsoever.¹³ The only way to measure acquisition of the trainings’ information content is through an objective test. The mere issuance of a Certificate, as is common in Afghanistan and also practiced by UNODC, warrants and means nothing, except that the certificate can be used by its recipient to “prove” prowess when subsequently job hunting for a better-paid position.
70. In summary, it would be unfair to conclude without caveat that UNODC has had little impact on MCN’s capacity, as it unquestionably faced an uphill struggle because of very low initial capabilities within the Ministry and its provincial directorates, constant turn-over of personnel, and often a disempowered, demoralized staff. (To a degree, high turnover and low starting points can be applied to other line ministry staff, several of which were included on various short-course UNODC offered.) On the other hand, the operational mode UNODC selected, an essentially hands-off one offering sporadic trainings and periodic staff visits, could never have been optimally strategic given the Afghan context.

Findings are:

- a. That mentorship requires routine physical contact on virtually a daily basis, even if this means that for practical purposes UNODC staff performs the counterpart functions at MCN/PDCN during the first months or even years of this partnership.
- b. That attainment of this capacity must be measured appropriately, with perhaps some incentive (monetary or not) provided to those achieving a certain standard, while

¹³ This problem with the logframe is pervasive, and is discussed in greater detail in paragraphs 112-117.

concomitantly asking trainees to sign a commitment to remain at their post for a certain period.¹⁴

- c. That training materials should be in Dari for the North, Pashtu for the South, in both hard copy and electronic format, and archived throughout UNODC and its provincial offices as well as MCN and its provincial directorates. The start-level of any new training course should be considered at most times to be at a basic launch point, i.e., at levels that a primary school graduate is capable of grasping.¹⁵
- d. That careful thought should be given as to which GIRA Ministry(ies) should be UNODC's counterparts. UNODC should expand its influence on CN/AL into other line ministries, notable MAIL, MRRD, and MEW, as well as MoWA. This is a reversion back to the original plan of G76, never realized, to include MRRD and possibly MAIL in the project.

B. Immediate Objective 2: Mainstreaming CN/AL Objectives

- 71. The complication inherent in mainstreaming CN/AL objectives revolves around the difficulty of getting the major actors to acquiesce as to what constitutes CN/AL. This is covered in paragraphs 22-31.

C. Immediate Objective 3: Strengthen AL Coordination Mechanisms

All development assistance is coordinated/targeted centrally by MCN (G76 logframe, A8).

- 72. The main coordinating mechanism, the ALWG, was never an effective means to coordinate AL. To a large degree, the meetings degraded over time to become mere rote recitations of project activities. Part of this is once more due to the complex donor and NGO environment in Afghanistan, which in some ways can almost be characterized as competitive in nature, driven by undertones of political dogma. Part is, in fact, due to the lack of capacity imparted to the MCN and the PDCNs; in some cases, PDCNs called ALWG meetings without distributing an agenda, did not know how to chair them, and had no mechanism for collating and disseminating outcomes. Gradually, interest and attendance slipped, such that at the last ALWG meeting held in Kabul in November 2008, even UNODC failed to show, according to MCN.

D. Immediate Objective 4: National Expertise on M&E and Impact Assessment for CN/AL

- 73. While UNODC expended considerable effort on training M&E expertise, little of it had a durable outcome. This can be ascribed to the low baseline capacity of short-course attendees, the difficulty in translating a complicated topic like M&E into local languages, and the lack of subsequent practical experience, which adversely affected retention of knowledge. Without an underlying philosophy of M&E well established, people cannot be expected to understand how to conduct a proper impact assessment.

¹⁴ Implemented only through a culturally appropriate honour system, there would be no enforcement of this commitment.

¹⁵ This runs the risk of being misinterpreted as a derogatory reference to Afghan capabilities, but it is in no way intended as such. The reality is that many faculty at Kabul University, the country's premier tertiary institute, have themselves only a Bachelor's degree from an Afghan institution, and were unable to keep up with advances in thought and science over the past 30 years of war. Until the real gains realized by across-the-board post-2001 educational efforts become discernibly entrenched within Government, the fact remains that many GIRA personnel have been poorly educated in secular subjects, if at all. Hence there is the need for training to start at very basic levels.

E. Immediate Objective 4: The AL Database

A database on past and current AL and development interventions upgraded, updated (G76 Logframe, A11).

74. The MCN AL database was upgraded but, is scarcely used. MCN demands are limited to requests to provide visiting parliamentarians with a list of AL projects in his or her jurisdiction. UNODC has used the information in compiling a report comparing poppy cultivation areas with AL financial inputs, but since neither an accurate definition of what constitutes AL nor a complete AL dataset exist, the results must be viewed very circumspectly indeed.
75. Serious limitations prevail as a consequence of staff turnover in this department of MCN, as in its other directorates. Since January 2009 until the evaluation mission arrived in early May, four qualified staff, trained in India, have quit their jobs because of low salaries, citing an inability to survive on \$160 per month.
76. The database at this juncture is severely compromised. Until the end of 2007, UN agencies routinely provided information on their activities to the AL Directorate at MCN, but no longer; it is also likely that USAID expenditures were never adequately tracked.
77. In principle, inputs to the database are now expected to arrive from MCN's provincial directorates, but the evaluation mission found that in practice that MCN staff is unable to collect data. NGOs, for example, must report their activities to the DEcon in each province in which they are active, and having done so, adopt the attitude that they have discharged their duty. Submitted as hardcopy in a standardized format, the data provided are highly variable insofar as project details are concerned. In some instances, large international NGOs painstakingly outline each project in detail, but in others, usually local NGOs, the generalizations and sparseness of input render any attempt at disaggregation of activities futile. These voluminous reports are then entered into MS-Excel or MS-Access, depending on the familiarity of the DEcon staff member with one or other of these. Concomitantly, line ministries' projects are transparent only if implemented through an NGO (rather than a private company) that then reports to DEcon; evidently, the Ministries do not appear to have a culture of sharing information even among themselves.¹⁶
78. In summary, the AL database as it now stands has a design flaw that needs to be "fixed" if UNODC is to use it; it is incomplete; and it duplicates efforts made elsewhere, both by DEcon and by UNAMA, which also collects project-related data in the provinces.

Recommendations are:

- a. That UNODC decides whether to close down or retain the database as part of on-going I87 activities.
- b. That if retained, data acquisition should be merged with the efforts of the Ministry of Economy, and the resultant database used more as a Management Information System tool than for simple accountancy, as is its current function.

F. Partnerships: Synergistic or at Cross-Purposes?

...[E]stablishment of UNODC/WFP partnership aimed to facilitate the development of effectively sequenced and well-targeted alternative livelihood projects addressing the priority needs of vulnerable and resource poor households (G76 logframe Outcome #2 (revised)).

¹⁶ A case in point is an ADB loan that is being used to construct a 16-canal system off the Hari Rud in Herat Province, centered upon the Indian-financed Selma dam. When complete, the irrigable area in the Province will more than double, from 35,000 ha to 75,000 ha. DEW in Herat informed the evaluation mission that work has already started on the new system. When the mission asked both PDAIL and PRRD whether they knew of this, both responded negatively.

79. The evaluation mission visited two communities where a joint UNODC-WFP food-for-work implementation was taking place.¹⁷ One, in Khash District, Badakhshan, was installing gabions in a gully that is eating away at the community's irrigable land, and threatens to undermine the village itself, is unquestionably required and successful. Its CN component is correlated with the fact that it was the ending of poppy cultivation and the loss of the villagers' primary source of biomass fuel for cooking and winter heating, the poppy stalk and capsules, that has triggered the gully's expansion. To replace this biomass, villagers have torn up the surrounding hillsides, harvesting an *Artemesia* species that has the majority of its biomass in its root system, as well as any uncultivated tree that happens to be within reach. The net result has been accelerated sheet and splash erosion of soil, with faster and more turbid watercourses, and thus the fast growth of the gully.
80. The second UNODC-WFP project, in Dehdadi District, Balkh, stands in sharp contrast to the above. The project was one that rehabilitated a canal, in a district immediately adjacent to Mazar-e Sharif, in a well-watered flatland community. The initial indicator that this project may have been unnecessarily prioritized was that the community centre in which the CDC focus group was held was stacked with plastic-draped sacks of WFP wheat that had not been distributed to beneficiaries since delivery two months ago. This would have been the time of the deepest food insecurity, the "lean season" that usually occurs prior to the first harvest.
81. What went wrong in the selection of the Dehdadi community is now difficult to pin down. WFP states that it specified in the initial agreement with UNODC that if a community was to be selected, it must be food insecure. Concomitantly, the WFP Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping Officer stated that Dehdadi is one of the best-off districts in not only Balkh, but the entire country (a fact visually verified by the brief vehicular cruise through the District that the evaluation made). What may have prompted the choice of Dehdadi is not chronic food insecurity, but the acute food insecurity that was due to the two years of severe drought that particularly affected Balkh. However, there are communities in Balkh along the Charikar Canal that assuredly were much more adversely affected by this drought and cessation of poppy cultivation, ones where entire households abandoned the community to move elsewhere – usually the very last strategy ("out-migration") on a traditional coping mechanisms continuum.
82. Oddly, the Priority Needs Assessment commissioned by UNODC (released October 2008), contracted to SIC, paints a very different picture of food security, suggesting that Dehdadi District is particularly food insecure, based on a metric of dietary diversity. Dietary diversity is considered as a reliable proxy for food insecurity across the food security community. Hence it may indeed have been the effects of the drought that is leading this indicator, though it remains opaque as to why this metric was so much greater in Dehdadi than in Charbolak.
83. UNODC's role in the partnership was to provide information on where poppy has been eradicated, such that the food-for-work project can act as a gap-filler prior to emplacement of AL activities. Part of the problem is that the longevity of poppy is not necessarily a component that is considered, part is ignorance of the extent to which households are dependent on it, and part, finally, to not fully comprehending that eradication is but one way that poppy stops, the other being (so as to use the same first letter "e") elimination, i.e., uncoerced and voluntary cessation of poppy cultivation. Dehdadi only cultivated poppy for 3-4 years, according to the CDC, was not dependent on it having turned over just a tenth of their land area to poppy, and abruptly stopped its cultivation voluntarily after the GIRA ban came into force, motivated by its well-educated Mullah and his anti-poppy religious message. Moreover, reported the community, in contrast to the SIC report, it gets two crops a year from its irrigated lands.

¹⁷ While the preparatory phase may have been undertaken as part of G76, the continuum between G76 and I87 has meant that the physical work and food deliveries progressed beyond the closure of G76 in December 2008.

84. Who suggested Dehdadi as a suitable site is no longer ascertainable, but two things about the partnership proved an irritant to WFP: first, at the macro-level, UNODC was supposed to provide “technical support,” and what this means was never fully explained or clarified, leaving WFP uncertain as to how to proceed with the relationship; second, at the local level, the WFP Area Office is perturbed that UNODC never once undertook a joint assessment, never engaged with them on a routine basis, and may have inadvertently given the local population the impression that UNODC’s involvement implied a cash-for-work activity, rather than the food that was the outcome.
85. This critique should not be misinterpreted as indicating that UNODC-UN Sister Agency partnerships are beset by irredeemable problems, because of course they are not. Properly structured, they are a powerful tool, but this is exactly the take-home message from the Dehdadi project: they need to be properly thought out and structured, with everyone aware of their roles and responsibilities as well as the synergistic potential of the collaboration.

Recommendations are:

- a. That UNODC needs to rebuild its partnership with WFP, but should clarify what its roles and responsibilities are, specifically in regard to targeting communities where real, and substantial, forced eradication has taken place.
- b. That each joint project should have had an annotated checklist, so that future evaluations can comprehend the choice of the site.
- c. That UNODC should consider how best to build joint partnerships with other UN Agencies with complementary programmes.

G. The Overall Implementation Process

i. Rationalizing Procurement: UNDP-UNODC Functionality Reaches a Nadir

To what extent has UNDP been efficient, effective, and transparent? Were alternative less-costly intervention modalities considered in designing this project? Do they exist?

86. UNDP’s rules and regulations for financial disbursement has helped derail the CNTF, MCN’s flagship (and sole) means of distributing largesse, and almost the only reason for its being acceded a seat at the table when line ministries meet in the provinces. A statement as strong as that is not unwarranted and unjustifiable hyperbole, for the same rules and regulations, writ smaller of course, are also responsible for an immense sense of frustration within UNODC, having consumed staff time unnecessarily, prompted a mission from Vienna and a consultant’s resignation, and hampered the progress of G76 and its successor, I87.
87. While appraising CNTF is beyond the scope of this evaluation, it is worthwhile to take a little time to understand the role UNDP had in CNTF’s demise, because it is precisely attributable to undelivered promises MCN made in regard to CNTF disbursements that the Governorates and District Administrators now find themselves steadily losing credibility with the grassroots. That this loss in credibility can have a tremendous impact on the sustainability of CN has to be recognized; ultimately, promises alone do not alleviate hunger.
88. Understanding the context in which CNTF operated is vital to understanding why its intended performance was such a vital component in the CN campaign. The sums awarded are not (on a provincial basis) all that significant, reaching only \$3 million in Badakhshan, for example; but larger sums have been “promised” (by whom and how is not at all clear), ranging as high as \$10 million for other provinces. CNTF was established in order to incentivize Governorates to eliminate poppy cultivation by whatever means, either voluntary or forced. In turn, the Governors and PDCN staff during PICs promised targeted farmers a “reward” for ceasing poppy cultivation, usually in the form of some significant infrastructure project, or via the formation of farmers’ cooperatives, the provision of a tractor. Hence CNTF can be seen to be, in a way, an augmentation of NSP activities (NSP is the primary development initiative across non-Taliban controlled territory), but with a specific CN theme. In principle this is all

simple and straightforward, but in practice at the grassroots level, it all gets wrapped in one package, labeled “promises.” And interestingly, the label “CNTF” and all that is associated with its failure to deliver is still current; only a single government official mentioned GPI, the programme that is CNTF’s successor, implying that the ghost of CNTF still lingers.

89. The importance of this point cannot be overstated: it can be assumed that all current and future CN/AL activities are now, or will be, tarred with the CNTF brush. This is now a high hurdle to clear.
90. The process worked as follows: UNDP developed complicated forms for CNTF – the sophistication necessary to complete these is on par with that of “a World Bank Ph.D.” There is simply no way for local government to connect with CNTF without external assistance, which UNAMA was able to provide. However, once the forms were duly filled in, even then approval for a single project would take a year, much longer if the forms were returned for any reason. By this time, continuity had been lost as people moved on, or rotated through positions.
91. The same procedural issues dominate the relationship between UNODC and UNDP. The AL consultant resigned in frustration effective the end of May 2009, having had little work since November 2008, when he submitted a tender for his survey via UNDP. Not only did the tender and approval process take three months (from November until late February), but then it was nearly another three months until the contract was finally signed.
92. The evaluation finds that UNODC’s relationship with UNDP revolves around the fact that UNDP treats UNODC as a project, rather than as an organization. UNDP manages more than 100 projects, and is daily bombarded with paperwork from these. UNODC’s requests simply get stacked in the pile, without prioritization, and are dealt with in-turn. But following this procedure can take months, as exemplified by the AL Consultant’s case. UNODC has had the experience of waiting a month merely to obtain the UNDP Resident representative’s signature. Such delays are damaging UNODC’s reputation, and with it MCN’s; one example is the new PDCN building in Badakhshan, where UNDP is insisting on UNODC hiring an international engineer to certify \$45,000 of grading work, unanticipated in the original procurement because the original intended worksite was flat, but the land eventually allocated by Government is hilly. Until UNODC follows UNDP procedures, the money will not be released, and the contractor remains unpaid.
93. Any procurement >\$2,500 must pass through UNDP; this has resulted in instances where approval for purchasing \$10,000-worth of computers took six weeks. If UNODC wishes to offer a training course with costs >\$30,000, it must advertise a tender. The responses are opened at UNODC and evaluated, then passed on to UNDP. But rather than rubber-stamping them at the weekly procurement committee meeting, UNODC is required to defend its choice, and even then, report COAFG staff, 50% are rejected, which means UNODC must start the process afresh.
94. If planned expenditures are >\$300,000, UNDP sends the procurement request to its New York Headquarters; in the case of MCN’s Kabul training centre, construction work was delayed eight months awaiting UNDP’s response.
95. Similar procedures and their concomitant delays prevail with UNDP’s HR and Finance sections. Before January 2009, monthly petty cash disbursements to UNODC’s provincial offices were limited to just \$1,000, which often meant that these offices would be operating without cash resources. The monthly allocation has now been increased to \$2,500, alleviating some of the burden. This sum remains insufficient to run a training course, however, and reimbursement takes a month or longer.
96. Such problems have been common ones between the two organizations over the past five years. Any attempt by UNODC to redress the problem via direct appeal to UNDP is said to have backfired, with UNODC’s forms replaced on the bottom of the pile.

97. Aware of the difficulties early on, COAFG attempted to acquire a direct account but, the evaluation was informed, Headquarters denied this request. Vienna sent a mission to evaluate the relationship, but to COAFG's consternation, findings were to "follow UNDP rules and procedures."
98. It is not the place of a project evaluation to suggest a way forward for an issue that transcends the project itself; the evaluator is of the belief that this item was inserted into the mission's TOR deliberately, so as to flag once more the adverse implications of the UNODC-UNDP relationship.

ii. UNODC's Provincial Coordinators

99. The four of the five Provincial Coordinators the evaluation mission met left a very positive impression. Essentially tasked in the beginning to be logisticians to support local missions and those arriving from Kabul, all four have commendably grown through their own initiative and auto-didacticism to fill a crucial role, that of intermediary between UNODC and the Governorate.
100. The evaluation mission finds it important to further strengthen their roles through broadening their knowledge base, providing background reading and beginning-level short-courses in subjects such as microeconomics and development theory. By so doing, the provincial AL Experts will have someone attuned to local conditions with whom to exchange ideas.

iii. UNODC's Provincial AL Experts

101. The four of the five AL Experts the evaluation mission met appear to be working to the best of their capabilities, but these remain limited in scope and depth. Some appear at first sight to be more dynamic than others, but this may be a function more of the limitations of their personal knowledge bases than any inherent inability to get the work done. And as with MCN and its PDCNs, the training UNODC offers to its own staff owns little in the way of mentorship, focusing instead on short courses that may not be particularly well absorbed.
102. One recent example is the crop gross margins training offered to the AL Experts at the beginning of 2009. Well-intentioned advice to conduct the effort by means of a focus-group discussion, which has the advantage of, through internal regulation mechanisms, arriving at a quasi-average outcome for a community, the training was off-target because the experience-based learning that would allow the AL Experts to adequately conduct and manage such discussions has not yet been attained. Furthermore, the method by which to transfer the information collected verbally to a quantitative Excel spreadsheet generated more confusion than enlightenment. Hence the only way to acquire the highly relevant, sorely needed (for evidence-based strategies) information is via the much more time-consuming household-level questionnaire, based on a pre-defined survey instrument and sampling methodology, one via which the AL Experts can readily transfer the data to spreadsheets without much intervening thought and interpretation.

Recommendation:

The evaluation mission finds it important to further strengthen the roles of both the Provincial Coordinators and the Provincial AL Experts through broadening their knowledge base, providing background reading and beginning-level short-courses in subjects such as microeconomics and development theory. In addition, and importantly, the National Project Coordinator and other project staff will need to individually mentor each AL Expert intensively over time, to ensure that knowledge acquisition transmutes into a working skill set.

iv. Brief Responses to the TOR's Remaining "Implementation Process" Bulletpoints

Are there less costly methods which could achieve the same outcome/impact at the beneficiary level?

103. There are no methods of service delivery that would prove less costly vis-à-vis achieving the same outcome/impact at MCN and its provincial directorates, since the services provided must be continuous rather than sporadic, as noted in paragraph 65. The mentoring campaign suggested in paragraph 70 and the subsequent recommendations will also see expenditures increase, e.g., on fuel for shuttling between the UNODC and PDCN premises. MCN further suggested that one of their staff will better acquire evaluation techniques if he can accompany a professional evaluator in the course of his mission; this evaluation endorses the request in principle, and opportunities should be extended as warranted, with the expectation that MCN's costs would need to be met.

To what extent was a transparent operating environment and accountability of government established?

104. In terms of transparency, none whatsoever, as the case of the dual PDCN Directors in Balkh suggests. It is likely that UNODC requests for greater transparency would be stonewalled, but accountability could and should be promoted. For example, MCN personnel should be asked to take objective tests at the end of training courses. MCN should be held accountable for its decision-making, with UNODC no longer acting as a rubber-stamping donor.

To what extent have partnerships been sought and established with other relevant actors (including UN agencies) and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance?

105. Other than with WFP, as described in paragraphs 79-85, no programmatic partnerships were established.

Was there effective coordination among government, UNODC and other implementing partners, including donor countries?

106. There was, and continues to be, no effective coordination among actors. Major CN/AL donor countries especially are driven by their own domestic and foreign-policy agendas, and are at times reluctant to share information, never mind accept partnership, with the UN.

Has adequate and appropriate backstopping support been provided by the UNODC headquarters and the Field Office in Kabul (administrative / managerial support and coordination)? Have partner institutions fully and effectively discharged their responsibilities?

107. The evaluation mission has not encountered any negative sentiments regarding backstopping support provided by Vienna, with the exception of what COAFG considers to be the null response of the mission tasked with smoothing procurement (paragraph 97). Partner institution WFP has discharged its responsibilities fully but, as paragraphs 79-85 underscore, not necessarily effectively in some instances, while very effectively in others.

What are the positive and negative, intended and unintended, effects of interventions of the projects on the beneficiary MCN staff and institutions?

108. MCN and PDCN persons interviewed all express their appreciation and gratitude for UNODC's G76 efforts, which while perhaps falling short on sustained achievement, certainly have had no negative effects. The unintended consequence of building capacity is that once trained, competent staff found work with other organizations offering higher salaries, resulting in a constant outflow of quality personnel away from the Ministry.

What are the perceptions of the various stakeholders, including the Government of Afghanistan, implementing partners, other UN agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors, about the overall impact of UNODC's project activities?

109. GIRA, outside of MCN, is not very aware of UNODC, and as noted in paragraph 40, some provincial directorates may be unsure of PDCN's existence. Since UNODC is only a minor player in respect to AL, line ministries such as MAIL, MRRD, and MEW find it to be

peripheral, if visible at all. Most other UN agencies at provincial level are cognisant of UNODC's role with the PDCN. Major donors do not see an impact from G76's AL component, but are more willing to recognize that MCN plays a significant role in the CN message being disseminated.

How have internal UNODC factors affected project effectiveness, including human resources, logistic support and procurement?

110. On the one hand, an absence of sufficient human resources has adversely affected the efficacy of the project. On the other hand, the reporting requirements in differing formats of the project donors have tied up the CN National Project Coordinator so that he is unable to focus on his other duties. A reports officer would seem to be warranted. In combination, several staff members, both national and international, are stretched beyond full capacity. Logistics support and procurement are an office-wide issue, hardly confined to G76 alone. COAFG is bound to UNDP for many administrative functions, and as described in paragraphs 86-98, there are indeed significant problems in this relationship.

How have factors external to the projects, including security, governance, limits on access to project sites and human resource constraints, impacted on effectiveness?

111. The security situation and absence of GIRA in rural areas of the South and East have severely hampered G76's effectiveness in Kandahar, somewhat less so in Nangarhar where Jalalabad city has no travel restrictions. Unfortunately, even in the North and West, the same situation prevails in some areas that continue to grow poppy, making it difficult if not impossible for G76 to function effectively in those districts. In other cases it is the overly conservative stance on travel taken by the UN Department of Safety and Security that reduces effectiveness; one such example that affected the evaluation mission directly was the temporary closure of Argu District for three days in Badakhshan because of a single shop having burned down one night.

H. Project Concept and Design

i. Assessing the Impact of G76: The Project Logframe

112. Correct project design is the starting point to evaluation of project outcomes and the assessment of impact. Unfortunately, the design of G76 has failed to meet internationally accepted norms as to what constitutes a valid logical framework ("logframe").
113. First, Goals (what is being called the Objective here) and Objectives (called Outcomes here, an acceptable label) should be stated in terms of the changes to the system or beneficiaries, NOT the process.
114. Hence, "Project Objective: To develop a system of ongoing support to the National Drug Control Strategy wherein the drug control and development interface is analyzed and findings are disseminated and applied, and in so doing strengthen the capacity of the AL stakeholders to better coordinate, target, implement and assess Alternative Livelihoods programs" is not a valid goal (or objective). This should be framed instead as something akin to "Increased capacity of the AL stakeholders to better coordinate, target, implement, and assess Alternative Livelihoods programs."
115. Next, the indicators are also faulty; for example, "A2: Agencies and programs supported by expert knowledge from the livelihood analysis" should be replaced by an indicator that reflects the (revised) goal.
116. The above comments apply to all outcomes – all of the indicators are vague, undefined, and off-target. For G76 to be evaluated as it should be at the end of its life, all outcomes needed to be completely rewritten, and the ambiguous terms ("well supported," "coordinated,"

“properly phased,” etc.) all need to be made specific so that an evaluator can actually measure them. Indicators selected, if not measurable, have no use.

117. Finally, the column labeled Assumptions should include assumptions of what will be true rather than a list of risks, which is what are listed here. Assumptions are better stated in positive terms. Hence, “C1: Non-availability of the required funding” becomes “C1: Required funding will be available.” This is a proper assumption, because if one were to assume that the original assumption is the case, why start the project?

ii. G76 and UNODC’s Comparative Advantage in AL

118. COAFG’s April 2009 Draft Country Strategy, page 20, stipulates that UNODC’s comparative advantage is in understanding the relationship between the opium economy and rural development. This evaluation mission is uncertain whether this implies, as it seems to, that other rural development actors don’t understand the relationship between the two, because such an assertion, even if implicit, is patently false. AREU has painstakingly documented the rise and fall of the opium economy in different locations across the country, tracking input and output factors longitudinally over several years, and the results of these studies are available to all interested parties on-line, cost-free.
119. A rewording of this statement might be along the lines of, “UNODC’s comparative advantage is in understanding the relationship between loss of household income as a consequence of abandoning the cultivation of opium and the need to bridge this to sustainable income-generating activities with relatively short-term alternative livelihoods.” A statement of this type, even if not verbatim, comes much closer to the core of UNODC’s fundamental comprehension of its AL mission, since as discussed in paragraphs 22-31, many actors seem not to fully grasp what AL is, or is supposed to accomplish.
120. Despite G76’s fielding of assessments, it has not performed well to-date in analyzing the opium economy’s effect at the local level, nor (as shown by the discussion in paragraphs 79-85) in assisting other UN agencies in developing well-targeted interventions. Nor has G76 been in a position where its advice to Governorates might have had an impact – this is generally achieved through PDCs, of which the PDCNs are putatively a member; however, UNODC’s linkage to PDCs is nebulous at best, given the low capacities of the PDCNs.
121. UNODC’s other comparative advantage is the appeal of the Blue Flag. It will assuredly take a while to build a reputation as a knowledge-led organization, but UNODC has the potential as a Blue Flag agency to assume intellectual leadership of the AL sector. In achieving this, the ability to fund project activities plays only a minor role, so that the statement on page 20 of the Draft Country Strategy that “[r]ural economic development is a wide field in which UNODC is dwarfed by other donors,” while true, actually becomes moot.

iii. G76 and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy

122. The ANDS is a medium-term strategic plan for 2008-2013. A measure of how internally inconsistent and contradictory the document truly is (the reason for this is that parts of it were forcefully taken over and written by USAID consultants) can be seen by comparing two sub-sections, one on pages 44/45 (Responding to the challenges of the opium economy) and the other on page 54 (Narcotics). In the former, the ANDS suggests that “The government should focus on sensible rural development, instead of short-term alternative livelihoods programs.” In the latter, just nine pages later, the ANDS states that “[t]he Government’s strategy... addresses issues such as the development of economic infrastructure, demand reduction,

poppy eradication, countering drug trafficking and establishing alternative livelihood programs.”¹⁸ Resolving this dichotomy is not the place of a single UNODC project.

iv. G76 and the Afghanistan Compact

123. The Afghanistan Compact is an agreement signed in London in January 2006 between Afghanistan and the international community. It reiterates that development will proceed according to the ANDS pillars. It spotlights CN as a cross-cutting priority, wherein it calls for the “...wider provision of economic alternatives for farmers and labourers in the context of comprehensive rural development; and building national and provincial counter-narcotics institutions.” The G76 project was designed to further these goals, inasmuch as AL can be regarded as the initial component of a “comprehensive rural development” strategy.

v. G76 and the 2008 UNODC Thematic Evaluation

124. Volume 2 (Alternative Livelihoods Programme) of the May 2008 Thematic Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Provided to Afghanistan by UNODC first recommends that UNODC’s AL efforts should be focused on the provinces, which G76 did, in part. Its second suggestion, that UNODC must develop strategic partnerships with competent local entities experienced in rural development has not been adopted so far (WFP, UNODC’s only strategic partner thus far, is engaged in humanitarian response rather than rural development), but if this evaluation’s roadmap is adopted, this will also be true.
125. The third finding regarding donors adopting flexibility vis-à-vis UNODC’s rational use of their resources is not germane to this evaluation, but as an offered comment, the fact that project revisions have been endorsed would suggest that this is indeed the case.
126. The fourth recommendation is the one that this project has paid least heed to: that UNODC should not be involved in delivering construction or equipment or in strengthening institutions since other donors “should do that.” This current evaluation finds that MCN is the natural partner of UNODC, and should be supported in every way possible where it comes to building capacity although – as discussed in great detail above – using methods and structures very different to those now being implemented.
127. The final recommendation is that UNODC should have a say in how the CNTF is used and should facilitate access to it. Regrettably, UNODC has been unable to implement the first of these very good suggestions, even by proxy through PDCN Directors, while international UNAMA personnel in the provinces have been the facilitators for local government due largely to the difficulty in filling the forms for access to CNTF funds, as discussed in greater detail above.

vi. Sub-Contract Performance

128. Altai Consulting was retained to upgrade the AL Database, but as discussed in paragraphs 74-78, this exercise proved to be quite futile.

vii. Incorporation of Recommendations from the G76 Mid-Term Evaluation (Sept. 2007)

129. The G76 mid-term evaluation proposed three interlinked components to constitute a new strategic approach for COAFG’s AL activities: (1) socio-economic analysis; (2) public information and advocacy; and (3) AL small project facilitation. Small project facilitation, inasmuch as it would have required funding and the administration of such, was considered by COAFG and shelved; it was considered beyond UNODC’s purview in Afghanistan.

¹⁸ Text is not italicized in the original document in either case.

130. For the socio-economic analysis component, the mid-term evaluation recommended that UNODC should play a greater role in the synthesis, analysis, and dissemination of the causative factors underlying the rise and fall of poppy cultivation in different areas. It was suggested that the role of UNODC's provincial offices be expanded beyond that of collecting AL data to collating and analyzing information from all available sources to build knowledge on how AL/development activities contribute, directly or indirectly, to a decline in poppy cultivation. One salient point made is that the information then (and even now) free-floating in the provinces concerning rural livelihoods is not being grounded, and lessons learned not ploughed back into AL efforts.
131. The mid-term evaluation suggested an initial stage of gap analysis from existing data sources (again, to reiterate, at provincial level), followed by a commissioning of further work with research organizations, such as AREU. In addition, recommended the evaluation, UNODC should hire a livelihoods analyst for each of its provincial offices, to feed the analysis into the Provincial Development Plans. Finally, to better link AL in Afghanistan with UNODC's AL efforts in the rest of the world, the evaluation recommended setting up a Wiki-type system for information searches and exchange.
132. These suggestions were not followed up, primarily because they slipped through the crack during the turnover of the international project manager. The AL Analyst post is projected to be field-tested in one province through the I87 project. UNODC is implementing a research project under I87 with AREU, but in general, (a) that organization does not want to raise its profile to where it is a known associate of UNODC, and (b) its research projects and outputs don't fit well into the immediate needs of a CN campaign – the field components are typically of long duration, and most non-academic audiences find its often tardy reports difficult to comprehend.
133. For the second component, i.e., results-driven PIC and advocacy campaigns based on findings from the livelihoods analyses, there has been a concerted effort directed at PIC implemented via the I87 project. Naturally, since the analytical component was not implemented, this PIC does not have a "lessons learned" element.

III. Lessons Learned and Best Practices

134. The lessons learned from the implementation of the project thus far centre on the issue of sustainability, both in terms of UNODC's partner Ministry's institutional memory and in terms of the broadly defined AL component of G76. In terms of best practices recommended for adoption both by UNODC and the donor community, paramount is the need to be adaptable to prevailing circumstances. The international community entered the country in 2001 with the best intentions to rebuild, revitalize, and turn the economy to licit crop production, only to be faced with the evidence, time and again, that Afghanistan may well be unique in its particular circumstances.
135. To give a wider example: training projects may sometimes be too limited to provide Afghans with useful skills, which allow them to function properly within the Afghan government, as envisioned by the international community.
136. Such hurdles are hardly unique to the uniformed branch of Government. They also permeate almost all levels of civilian administration to a appreciable degree, in some cases to such a degree that the best-designed capacity-building initiatives, that is, the primary output of the G76 project, are predictably likely to fail.
137. Hence, the evaluation does not fault the G76 project for its attempts to build capacity. This is exactly what is needed to ensure a functioning and functional civilian administration. Where the lesson was not learned quickly enough, perhaps, and in line with paragraph 8, is that the Project showed little adaptability. In the face of multiple avenues of evidence, and most

likely constrained by explicit or implicit donor expectations, G76 did not evolve so as to be capable of delivering its outcomes in MCN, in the PDCNs, with the AL database, and for the AL objective.

138. The only logical conclusion in such circumstances as described in paragraphs 9-11 would be to upgrade efforts in “capacity building” to become direct mentorship on a quasi-daily basis. Of course, the problem with this approach is that UNODC could easily fall into the trap of becoming the PDCNs in which staff would be effectively embedded.
139. While UNODC’s provincial and Kabul-level national staff are justifiably classifiable as top-rate, this applies only if compared to the overall Afghan context. Unfortunately, their knowledge base, ability to conceptualize, and capability to understand how to conduct research remains low, due only to a lack of educational opportunities during the past three decades of war, not because of any deficiencies in intelligence. UNODC needs to institutionalize procedures that allow it to ascertain where such gaps exist and take steps to redress these, either through formal workshops or via on-line courses. Continuance of contracts can then be partially based on success in measurable knowledge- and skills-acquisition – that is, via tests and exams.
140. Vis-à-vis the desire for partnerships with other UN agencies, G76 undertook joint projects with WFP that left WFP feeling uncertain whether it would repeat such endeavours. UNODC must be able to maintain its promised role in such partnerships.
141. There is great potential for synergy when working with other UN agencies, hence the concept of collaboration should be actively pursued as a best-practice.
142. The 2008 Thematic Evaluation has had minimal influence on the structure and functioning of I87. Few of its recommendations were incorporated into a revised G76 project plan; this could possibly have much to do with real or perceived donor inflexibility as much as an evasion or dismissal of recommended actions. The same holds true in terms of including findings from past programme evaluations, one of which, for example, noted the failure of “capacity building” vis-à-vis MCN. Project creation and revisions may well be proceeding on the basis of memory of what has been written, rather than via a careful consideration of prior performance. A best practice would be to take the time – as a team – to review successes and failures of the past, and build from this knowledge-base.
143. Despite good intentions from the start, UNODC may have unfortunately worked at marginalizing itself. As a noted and influential CN/AL researcher acerbically remarked, it was the World Bank that drew up the CN guidelines for national programmes, not UNODC.
144. At present, the needs of MCN and the PDCNs are no different than when G76 started. Capacity building has achieved few durable results so far; however, the potential to bring MCN and its directorates up-to-speed certainly exists. Therefore the following are recommended as best practices to be implemented in future/continuing work with MCN:
 - Durable capacity in GIRA Ministries and UNODC provincial offices can only be built with a sustained and continuous effort.
 - Incentives must be provided to successfully trained GIRA personnel to prevent a brain drain.
 - Training of individuals must have objectively measurable outcomes, such as pass/fail tests.
 - UNODC projects’ M&E components have to be designed using state-of-the-art logframe construction, which requires backstopping from Vienna if sufficient in-house capabilities do not exist in the country offices, so that in turn proper project design can be embedded at MCN.
 - In relation to the MCN AL Database, fully functional data gathering processes can be established only with appropriate authority for the gathering party, whether explicit or implicit.

IV. Constraints that Impacted Project Delivery

The beneficiary's constraints (the beneficiary being MCN and the PDCNs) are discussed in detail in paragraphs 32-48, and the braking effect of UNDP as the administrative partner in paragraphs 86-98. An additional constraint is the security situation in Kandahar. It steadily became increasingly impossible to work not just in the rural areas of the Province, but in the city itself, since UNODC staff is subject to the common UN security system's regulations.

V. Conclusions and Final Recommendation

Despite good intentions and considerable effort, at its closure the G76 project was far from achieving its goals. "A trained network of national experts in alternative livelihoods and its mainstreaming is established in the MCN" remains but a distant dream, as is "trained and experienced national expertise on M&E and impact assessment... to monitor and advise key National Development Programs" at the provincial level of MCN, where much work remains to be accomplished. The build-up of capacity in UNODC's provincial offices has proceeded much more smoothly, but again the integration of activities with the PDCNs has not in any way produced a sustainable institutional impact. Even among those provinces where PDCNs are effective, the gain in institutional capacity seems tenuous: it is underpinned by a charismatic, well-connected Director. When these individuals leave their positions, it will be in doubt as to whether the realized gains will persist.

During internal discussions the evaluator held in COAFG, it became evident that the lessons learned from this final evaluation of G76, as well as the mid-term evaluation of I87, will be taken on-board. The evaluation mission has no doubt that this will assist the I87 project to reach a more satisfactory conclusion by December 2010 than the one elaborated upon in this document.

JOINT TERMS OF REFERENCE

FOR

FINAL EVALUATION

Project AFG/G76

Alternative Livelihoods Capacity Building at National and Regional Level

AND

MID-TERM EVALUATION

Project AFG/I87

Strengthening Provincial Capacity for Drug Control

UNODC COUNTRY OFFICE AFGHANISTAN

1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Project AFG G76

Capacity building of MCN field staff through the project was designed to systematically “mainstream” the counter-narcotics dimension and analysis into key National Development Programmes (NDPs) and to facilitate the targeting, planning, coordinating, monitoring and impact assessment of Alternative Livelihoods (AL) in, but not limited to, poppy growing areas and areas “at risk”. The mainstreaming strategy included the following key elements:

- **Livelihoods Analysis:** Strengthening the network of AL national experts in the UNODC regional offices to compile relevant data and to develop a data collection and analysis system that enables stakeholders to better understand the livelihoods and the development needs of small farmers in commonly identified targeted areas of opium poppy cultivation – or those areas at risk of cultivating poppy- with a view to channelling this information into joint programme development with partners.
- **Project Facilitation:** Forming strategic partnerships with international stakeholders on specifically targeted AL projects and activities, improving and strengthening the interventions’ outcome and impact through pooling the required multi-dimensional expertise to address the multi-functional role of opium poppy in rural household by phasing and improved targeting of interventions.

Project Duration: February 2006 to December 2008

Project Budget: USD 1,250,000

Project AFG I87

The purpose of this project is to strengthen the institutional and operational capability of the Provincial Directorates (PDs) of the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN). The project works closely with the staff of MCN PDs in the five target provinces (Herat, Balkh, Badakhshan, Nangarhar, Kandahar) to improve their organisation and to involve them increasingly in planning, monitoring and evaluation of drug control related issues, particularly AL development assistance. The role of provincial offices of MCN will be extended to assisting provincial administration mainstream counter narcotics strategies into their provincial development plans. This project also aims to develop the counter narcotics capacity of UNODC at the provincial level. By strengthening the UNODC Provincial Offices (POs), the project seeks to ensure the existence of an effective and sufficient institutional frame-work and mechanism at provincial levels, capable of providing technical support/expertise to the increasing needs of the Afghan government and aid agencies in all sectors of drug control. The strengthening of drug control capacity at provincial level, for MCN with UNODC support, is needed to sustain the momentum of counter narcotics efforts, and to support the ongoing and planned development assistance to ensure the mainstreaming of the counter-narcotics dimension and analysis into key development programmes at national and provincial levels. The project will support the establishment of coordination network and data base units in PDs to ensure the regular update of the AI database established at the MCN in Kabul. This project is currently being revised with a further extension and expansion of building, training and equipping of the PDs of MCN in all 34 provinces and the UNODC provincial offices in the five key provinces mentioned above. This revision will also include a counter narcotics information campaign to rural communities as well as farmer training and the launching of a public information campaign on AL.

Project Duration: November 2006 to September 2009

Project Budget: USD 8,467,971

2. PURPOSE OF THE TWO EVALUATIONS

The overall purpose of this evaluation is to determine what the projects have achieved and if they have attained their objectives successfully and efficiently, taking into account the difficult conditions in Afghanistan and to generate lessons. In this regard, the extent to which the needs of the beneficiaries are being met as well as what has been achieved in terms of impact, relevance and sustainability will also be assessed.

The evaluation will also draw lessons as well as good (and bad) practices from the projects' implementation which, in the case of the Mid-term Evaluation of I87 will be used to improve the management and implementation of the project during the remainder of the project period. The findings of the evaluations of both projects will also be used by the Afghanistan Country Office to improve the planning, design and management of future projects. Furthermore, the evaluation will also to measure the projects' achievements, outcomes and impacts, both positive and negative.

3. EVALUATION SCOPE

The evaluation will focus mainly on the projects' concept, design, implementation, results, outputs and outcomes. The evaluation should appraise:

(a) Projects concept and design:

The evaluation should analyse whether and how the projects contributed to a priority area or comparative advantage for UNODC within the country strategy for Afghanistan. It will also review problems identified by the projects and the corresponding strategy chosen to address these. The evaluation will also encompass an assessment of the relevance and attainability of the objectives and of planned outputs, activities and inputs of the two projects as compared to other cost-effective alternatives. An analysis of the clarity, logic and coherence of the projects will also be conducted. The key overarching questions to be addressed by this evaluation include:

- Are the objectives of the projects aligned with the current policy priorities and action plans of the Government of Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Compact, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, the Afghanistan National Drug Control Strategy and the UNODC mandate and regional and national strategies?
- Do the projects reflect the findings and recommendation of the 2007 UNODC Thematic Evaluation and have they contributed to the recommended follow-up actions?
- Is the design of the projects technically sound? Are the projects' objectives clear, realistic and coherent in terms of contributing to the achievements of the Strategic Programme Framework and Afghanistan Development Strategy, and other strategic instruments?
- Are the activities and implementation strategy appropriate for meeting the stated objectives of the projects, with a focus on assessing project elements directly related to capacity building, coordination and sub-contract performance?
- As the two projects are closely related and form a continuum from the headquarters of MCN in Kabul through to the field offices at provincial level, what synergies, if any, have developed between the projects during implementation and what lessons have been learned from the process?
- How well do the projects' objectives reflect the specific nature of the problems and needs of alternative development and counter narcotics policies in Afghanistan?

(b) Objectives, outputs, impact and sustainability:

The evaluation will determine to what extent the planned project results have been achieved, and, in case of non-achievement, to what extent there has been progress towards their achievement. Ultimately, the overall impact of the projects will be assessed (against the indicators given in Annexes 1 and 2): this will encompass the likely sustainability of the results and benefits as well as the projects' contribution to human and institutional capacity building at MCN – including the benefits of the capacity building (i.e. have the beneficiaries gained the necessary tools and skills?). The beneficiaries' perception of the projects' achievements will be assessed as an important factor in determining sustainability. The key questions to be addressed by the evaluation are:

- Have leadership and technical skills been enhanced within MCN at institutional and individual levels?
- **G76:** Has the operational capacity (skills and service delivery) of MCN increased through training and improvement of working conditions?
- **I87:** Has the operational capacity (skills and service delivery) of the PDs of MCN been increased through training and improvement of working conditions?
- **G76:** Has a mentorship system been set-up? Has the creation of a mentorship mechanism helped the day-to-day operations of MCN?
- **I87:** Has a mentorship system been set-up? Has the creation of a mentorship mechanism helped the day-to-day operations to oversee and advise on technical issues as well as on the administration of the PDs of MCN?
- Was training material produced and is it available for future use by the Government and concerned authorities?

(c) Overall implementation process:

The evaluation will assess how effectively and efficiently the planning and implementation of the two projects has been carried out. This will include assessing the extent to which organizational structure, managerial support and the coordination mechanisms used by UNODC effectively support the projects. The role played by the UNODC field offices in the development and implementation of the projects will also be assessed. The evaluation will analyse problems and constraints encountered during implementation as well as the quality and timeliness of inputs and the efficiency and effectiveness of activities carried out. The questions to be addressed include:

- Were alternative less costly interventions modalities considered in designing this project? Do they exist? To what extent has UNDP been efficient, effective and transparent?
- Are there less costly methods which could achieve the same outcome/impact at the beneficiary level?
- To what extent was a transparent operating environment and accountability of government established?
- To what extent have partnerships been sought and established with other relevant actors (including UN-agencies) and synergies been created in the delivery of assistance?
- Was there effective coordination among government, UNODC and other implementing partners, including donor countries?
- Has adequate and appropriate backstopping support been provided by the UNODC headquarters and the Field Office in Kabul (administrative / managerial support and coordination)? Have partner institutions fully and effectively discharged their responsibilities?
- What are the positive and negative, intended and unintended, effects of interventions of the projects on the beneficiary MCN staff and institutions?

- What are the perceptions of the various stakeholders, including the Government of Afghanistan, implementing partners, other UN agencies, bilateral and multilateral donors, about the overall impact of UNODC's project activities?
- How have internal UNODC factors affected project effectiveness, including human resources, logistic support and procurement?
- How have factors external to the projects, including security, governance, limits on access to project sites and human resource constraints, impacted on effectiveness?

(d) Lessons learned from the concept, design and implementation of the projects, as well as good practices:

Recommendations will also be made in respect of issues related to the implementation and management of the projects. The evaluation shall assess in what ways the projects' design and/or delivery can be improved to enhance their effectiveness. The evaluation will also identify the key elements, assumptions and risks for the development of similar initiatives in other regions. Some of the questions to be addressed are:

- To what extent have the findings and recommendations from the past project evaluations been followed up and implemented to address some of the challenges already identified.
- Do the projects' interventions have a potential for scaling up or replication?
- **G76** What are the outstanding needs of MCN?
- **I87:** What are the outstanding needs of the PDs of MCN and other involved institutions?

4. EVALUATION METHODS

The evaluation will present a detailed statement of evaluation methods and the approach to be used to identify information sources and to collect and analyse information during the evaluation. The evaluation methods will include:

- (a) Document review: this will comprise of all major documents, such as the project documents, progress and monitoring reports, terminal narrative reports, as well as assessments, manuals developed under the project;
- (b) Field assessment mission to Kabul and key provinces;
- (d) **G76:** Meetings, interviews, and focus group related to the work of the Afghan Border Police.
- (e) **I87:** Meetings, interviews, and focus group related to the work of the PDs of MCN.
- (f) The completion of a questionnaire prepared by the evaluator (and approved by the UNODC Country Office) by selected national counter narcotics staff.

Before the field mission, the evaluator will prepare an evaluation methodology, including questions and questionnaires that are acceptable to the UNODC country office. Following the completion of the fact-finding and analysis phase, a draft evaluation report will be prepared by the evaluator and presented to the UNODC country office within the stipulated timeframe and in accordance with UNODC standard evaluation report outline (Item 6 below). The draft report will include a detailed statement of the evaluation methods used during the appraisal. Inputs from the UNODC country office will be recorded and taken into account by the evaluators, as relevant and appropriate.

5. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

The project evaluations of AFG G76 and AFG I87 will take place simultaneously. The evaluator should have excellent knowledge of alternative development issues within the counter narcotics framework in Afghanistan.

The evaluator should hold an advanced degree in a relevant field and have proven experience on key issues, preferably in Afghanistan. In addition, the evaluator should also meet the following criteria:

- 1) Be familiar with the project implementation in international organizations.
- 2) Have experience in conducting independent evaluations and or assessments.
- 3) Have at least 10 years relevant professional experience in counter narcotics and legal issues in post conflict settings.
- 4) Have obtained a post-graduate degree in a relevant area.
- 5) Possess excellent analytical, drafting and communication/writing skills in English.

6. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

This evaluation will be a joint effort between the evaluator and UNODC. As for substance, it is critical that the evaluation should be carried out independently by the evaluator who should conduct a thorough evaluation covering all aspects of the projects' objectives, achievements, implementation and management. The evaluator will have access to all relevant documents and the UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan will provide the required support for the evaluator during the evaluation.

The UNODC officials responsible for briefing of the evaluator are:

UNODC Country Office for Afghanistan:

- Representative
- Deputy Representative
- Counter Narcotics Programme Manager
- International Project Coordinator
- National Project Coordinator

UNODC Country Office will secure office space, administrative basic support, and travel arrangements for the evaluator during his/her stay in Kabul. UNODC will also assist with accommodation bookings, visa facilitation etc....

Time Frame & Tentative programme for the Evaluator:

The evaluator will be recruited for 6 weeks spread over a period of 8 weeks.

Programme & Activity	Days Required	Tentative dates
Preparation of methodology/questionnaires + Desk-review	3	1 – 3 April
Travelling to Afghanistan	2	4 - 5 April
Briefing by Country office staff	1	6 April
Desk-review of documentation at COAFG	3	7 – 9 April
Meetings/interviews with Ministries, Departments, UN Agencies and relevant stakeholders., visit to project intervention sites	25	10 April 4 May

Field mission	10	TBD but between above dates
Returning home	2	5 – 6 May
Preparation of the draft reports (2)	5	7 – 11 May
Break		
Incorporating the UNODC comments in the two reports and preparing the final drafts	2	20-21 May
Total Working & Travel Days	43	12 April – 21 May

Note: Detailed itinerary and programme will be prepared by UNODC Afghanistan in consultation with the evaluator upon arrival in Kabul.

Deliverables of the evaluation:

- 1) For each project: an evaluation plan and detailed terms of reference with methodology;
- 2) Debriefing on initial findings of the two evaluations with stakeholders prior to departure from Kabul;
- 3) Draft final evaluation report with findings for Project G76
- 4) Draft mid-term evaluation report with findings for Project I87;
- 5) Final evaluation reports.

Payment:

The Evaluator will be issued a consultancy contract as per the common UN rules and procedures. The final payment will be made after the acceptance of the final draft of the evaluation report by UNODC HQs and the Country Office for Afghanistan.

Evaluation reports:

The evaluation reports should be in line with UNODC's evaluation policy and handbook. The outline of the reports, to be agreed with the Afghanistan Country Office, should include the headings listed below:

- 1) Evaluation summary (maximum 4 pages)
- 2) Introduction
- 3) Background (Project description)
- 4) Evaluation purpose and objective
- 5) Evaluation methodology
- 6) Major findings
- 7) Lessons learned (from both positive and negative experiences)
- 8) Constraints that impacted project delivery
- 9) Conclusions and recommendations

Appendix B: List of People Interviewed
(Alphabetic by Affiliation)

	Name	Affiliation	Position / Location
1	Dagerman Hashur	ABP	Commander, Aqina border, Faryab
2	Asadullah	ABP	Deputy Commander, Islam Qala border, Herat
3	Hamid Zay	Afghan Saffron	Managing Director
4	Abdul Malik	AKF	Engineer, Yumgan District, Badakhshan
5	Sayid Mohamed Shewa	AKF	Manager, Yumgan District, Badakhshan
6	Romin Fararoon	AKF	Planning and M&E Coordinator, Badakhshan
7	Shah Mahmood	ANP	CN trained officer, Aqina border, Faryab
8	Paula Kantor	AREU	Director
9	Paul Fishstein	AREU	Former Director, consultant
10	Zane Kanderian	ASI	Country Director
11	Alnoor Maherali	Canadian Embassy	Second Secretary (Political)
12	Iskan village	CDC (female)	Jurm District, Badakhshan
13	Charmhargzistan village	CDC (female)	Yumgan District, Badakhshan
14	Shumkarchi village	CDC (male)	Argu District, Badakhshan
15	Merkaz Dehdadi	CDC (male)	Dehdadi District, Balkh
16	Sansiz village	CDC (male)	Faizabad District, Jawzjan
17	Chunge Kayemakhchi village	CDC (male)	Jurm District, Badakhshan
18	Iskan village	CDC (male)	Jurm District, Badakhshan
19	Debala village	CDC (male)	Karokh District, Herat
20	Pushtaju village	CDC (male)	Karokh District, Herat
21	Deepore village	CDC (male)	Khash District, Badakhshan
22	Moghulha village	CDC (male)	Khash District, Badakhshan
23	Gowhar Shad Sharki village	CDC (male)	Kohsan District, Herat
24	Islam Qala Shomali village	CDC (male)	Kohsan District, Herat
25	Yakhcheu village	CDC (male)	Shahada District, Badakhshan
26	Qala-e Bakhtan village	CDC (male)	Surkhrud District, Nangarhar
27	Sabz Abad village	CDC (male)	Surkhrud District, Nangarhar
28	Charmhargzistan village	CDC (male)	Yumgan District, Badakhshan
29	Mohamed Wahid Waqfi	CHA	Field Office Manager, Herat
30	Mohamed Akbar	CNAT	AL Officer, Badakhshan
31	Zahurodin	CNAT	AL Officer, Badakhshan
32	Ross Ballantyne	CNAT	Chief International Advisor for Strategy
33	Laila Martin	CNAT	International Advisor, Badakhshan
34	John Cole	CNAT	International Advisor, Farah
35	Cheryl Morgan	CNAT	International Advisor, Nangarhar
36	Chris Corsten	CNAT	International Advisor, Nangarhar
37	Mohamed Khalid	CNAT	Team Leader, Badakhshan
38	Matt McGarry	CRS	Country Director
39	Khash District	DDA	Badakhshan
40	Abdul Naser Aswadi	DEcon	Director, Herat
41	Sayed Qias Saeedi	DEcon	Director, Nangarhar
42	Mohamed Sanuallah	DEcon	Head
43	Sayed Hassan Fazli	DEW	Deputy Director, Herat
44	Anna Morgan	DFID	Growth and Livelihood Programme Manager
45	Lemonia Chatzigeorgiou	Eureka Group	Research Director

46	Mohammed Aqa	FAO	Assistant Representative
47	Aqil Saidwahidullah	FAO	National Area Agronomist, Herat
48	Mohamed Zia Aria	FAO	Northern Region Seed Coordinating Officer
49	Rudolph Strasser	GAA	Country Director
50	Mohmand Akbar	GAA	Deputy Project Manager, Nangarhar
51	Alexander Schrade	GAA	Programme and Monitoring Manager
52	Norbert Burger	GAA	Programme Manager, Nangarhar
53	Khairullah Anoush	GIRA	Andkhai District Administrator, Faryab
54	Abdul Jabar Mossadeq	GIRA	Argu District Administrator, Badakhshan
55	Daulat Mohamed	GIRA	Baharak District Administrator, Badakhshan
56	Itzhak Zai	GIRA	Deputy Governor, Nangarhar
57	Asiladin Jami	GIRA	Executive Director, Herat Governorate
58	Gowhar Khan	GIRA	Faizabad District Administrator, Jawzjan
59	Baz Mohammed Ahmadi	GIRA	Governor, Badakhshan
60	Hashim Zari	GIRA	Governor, Jawzjan Province
61	Zabihullah Akhtary	GIRA	Head, Sectoral Services, Balkh Province
62	Ahmad Haftbala	GIRA	Kohsan District Administrator, Herat
63	Peter Foerster	GTZ	Team Leader, Project for AL
64	Shuma Fukumura	JICA	Project Formulation Advisor, Nangarhar
65	Hiroshi Maeda	JICA	Project Formulation Officer, Balkh Province
66	Haseeb Kabiri	MCN	AL Database Officer
67	Mohamed Nabi Hussaini	MCN	Director General, Policy and Coordination
68	Abdul Wahab Nassimi	MCN	Provincial Relations & Coordination Director
69	Firiba Majid	MoWA	Director, Balkh Province
70	Mohamed Nader	MPA-N	Deputy Manager
71	Abdulwahab Tourabi	MRRD	Manager, Badakhshan WATSIP Project
72	David Mansfield	n/a	Independent consultant, counter narcotics
73	Sarob village	opium addicts	Yumgan District, Badakhshan
74	Jumagol Momand	NABDP	Provincial Project Manager, Badakhshan
75	Ruin Khanoush	Nejad (NGO)	Medical Director, demand reduction, Faryab
76	Farid Zaman Safi	Nejad (NGO)	Project Manager, demand reduction, Faryab
77	Humayun Rahmani	NRAP	Head, Badakhshan
78	Abdullah Haq Ahmad	NVDA	Deputy Director
79	Ghulam Gul	NVDA	Factory Director
80	Ismail Haiderzadeh	PDAIL	Director, Herat
81	Abdul Rashid Amani	PDAIL	Director, Jawzjan Province
82	Mohamed Hussin Safi	PDAIL	Director, Nangarhar
83	Mohamed Nabi Sadri	PDAIL	Director, Sar-e Pul Province
84	Bashir Ahmed	PDAIL	Head, Research and Extension, Herat
85	Mahbub Jamili	PDCN	Admin/Finance Officer, Badakhshan
86	Sayed Qambar Fakeri	PDCN	AL Manager, Badakhshan
87	Mohamed Afzal	PDCN	AL Manager, Herat
88	Mohamed Naim Safi	PDCN	AL Manager, Nangarhar
89	Abdul Jamal Hadaftand	PDCN	Director, Badakhshan
90	Gholam Jailani Daqiq	PDCN	Director, Herat
91	Mohamed Yakob Mohmand	PDCN	Director, Nangarhar
92	Mohamed Ajan	PDCN	Finance Officer, Nangarhar
93	Rahimshah Qarlag	PRRD	Deputy Head, Badakhshan

94	Mohamed Yusuf Uraz	PRRD	Director, Jawzjan Province
95	Ahmad Walid	PRRD	Director, Nangarhar
96	Mark Miller	UK Embassy	CN Communications Advisor
97	David Belgrove	UK Embassy	Head of Counter Narcotics Team
98	Ravshan Bakoev	UNAMA	Civil Affairs Officer, Balkh
99	Dejan Stepanovic	UNAMA	Governance Officer, Balkh
100	Mohamed Hakim	UNAMA	National Head of Office, Badakhshan
101	Seif Kibayasi	UNAMA	Officer-in-Charge, Herat
102	Marcus Williamson	UNDP	Advisor to IDLG
103	Hussain Jalili	UNODC	AL Coordinator, Badakhshan
104	Mohamed Azim	UNODC	AL Coordinator, Balkh
105	Ahmed Wahid Fayed	UNODC	AL Coordinator, Herat
106	Bahram Mohmand	UNODC	AL Coordinator, Nangarhar
107	Andrew Weir	UNODC	AL International Consultant
108	Nazir Qayoom	UNODC	AL National Project Coordinator
109	Ahmad Zubair Farouqi	UNODC	CN National Project Coordinator
110	Patrick Halewood	UNODC	Counter Narcotics Program Manager
111	Jean-Luc Lemahieu	UNODC	Country Representative
112	Elizabeth Bayer	UNODC	Deputy Country Representative
113	Anthony Oliver	UNODC	Project Coordinator, Border Task Force
114	Anthony Oliver	UNODC	Project Coordinator, Law Enforcement
115	Mohamed Alem Yaqubi	UNODC	Provincial Coordinator, Badakhshan
116	Lutfrahman Lutfi	UNODC	Provincial Coordinator, Balkh
117	Altaf Hussein Joya	UNODC	Provincial Coordinator, Herat
118	Mohamed Alam Ghalib	UNODC	Provincial Coordinator, Nangarhar
119	Jonathan Greenham	USAID	Chief-of-Party, ADP/E
120	Qazi Azmat Isa	WB	Senior Rural Development Specialist
121	Sebastian Eckhardt	WB	Task Leader, Civil Service Reform
122	Hom Chhetri	WFP	Head of Area Office, Balkh
123	Abdi Farah	WFP	Head of Program
124	James Feeney	WFP	Head of Sub-Office, Badakhshan
125	Sven Thealin	WFP	Head of Sub-Office, Herat
126	Liu Dageng	WFP	Program Officer, Nangarhar
127	Ahmad Shah Shahi	WFP	Vulnerability Assessment & Mapping Officer

Appendix C: The PRR vs. the MCP

Since it was common for GIRA personnel to refer to the PRR and MCP in what seemed to the evaluation mission to be an interchangeable manner, it can be concluded that they are confused by the terminology. So as to clarify for future evaluations what these programmes are, they are briefly outlined below.

The PRR is run by the IARSC without any foreign observers, but had WB involvement in its design. It was intended as a measure to reform the civil service and support organizational development in designated sub-units of GIRA (initially the ones declared mission-critical, such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy), and to undertake a reorganization of each sub-unit's tashkil (staff structure) to align more closely with its functions. Concomitantly, the PRR modernized the Human Resources departments of these sub-units such that precise job descriptions were published, and job-related grades established that had clearly defined pay scales. In principle, this removed sinecures and nepotism from the reformed sub-units, as well as promotion based solely on seniority.

The PRR proved so much in demand that it rapidly grew from selected sub-units to encompass entire Ministries.

In 2007, the PRR was supplanted by a Government-wide "pay and grading" policy through the enactment of the Civil Servants Law. While PRR did not legally exist any longer, it had a delayed demise – up to the end of 2008, new Ministries and Directorates were admitted into the process.

PRR and its replacement are meritocratic in nature, with resultant pay scaled consistently across all GIRA Ministries. Its top pay scale is AFG 35,000 per month (\$700).

The MCP, by contrast, is a World Bank-administered project that can be thought of as essentially a salary augmentation process of three-years duration. MCP is the successor to two other programmes, Lateral Entry and Afghan Expatriate. Both, as well as MCP, aim to place highly qualified individuals in advisory roles or in high Ministerial positions, although an amendment soon to be implemented will add \$5 million to fund 46 technocrat positions for ANDS oversight at the lower Grades 3 and 4. MCP prior to this had a budget of \$30 million for supporting a projected total of 241 positions; to-date, it has released \$10 million of this total for 70 positions, with salaries ranging from \$1500 to \$7000 per month (albeit the average salary is \$2800/month). Positions are at the Director and Director-General levels, i.e., Grades 1 and 2.

While the selection process for MCP is based on criteria that the Ministries themselves develop, the WB has a strong oversight role in that it oversees these criteria, endorses the IARSC's final selection, and clears TORs. The TORs must always include a skills transfer component.

The IARSC procedures for MCP are administered and led by a strong individual, according to the WB, someone who is able to reject political manipulation of these positions. However, according to an MCN insider, the Minister has refused to sign his endorsement of some MCP postings.