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## **Executive Summary**

# **Participatory Self-Evaluation of the Country Programme for Afghanistan 2012-2015**

AFGU04, AFGF98, AFGK61, AFGK62, AFGK63, AFGK64,  
and AFGK65  
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Independent Evaluation Unit

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#### Disclaimer

Participatory Self-Evaluations (PSEs) are carried out by UNODC staff who are entrusted with the design and delivery of a project/programme, with the participation of the stakeholders who are directly involved in or benefitting from the project/programme. From this perspective, PSEs by nature reflect the subjective views of UNODC staff and other stakeholders involved or benefitting from the programme – as such it differs from In-Depth Evaluations which have a strong independence element and focus on accountability over learning.

Initially designed as an In-depth Evaluation (IDE) of the Afghanistan Country Programme, the IDE could not take place due to security and administrative constraints. At the risk of not undertaking a mid-term evaluation at all, there remained a short window of opportunity for the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) to adapt and devise a dedicated methodology for a programme of this scope: the Programme Participatory Self-Evaluation (PPSE) methodology.

The PPSE methodology strengthens internal validity by inviting external stakeholders to provide their views and test hypothesis formulated by UNODC. Along these lines, the overall evaluation design was strongly based on participatory engagement and triangulation of findings from programme managers, including provincial coordinators, Government and donor counterparts and similar exercises elsewhere in the region (COAFG Inter-Divisional Mission, COAFG Audit, Afghanistan Cluster evaluation, Evaluations of Pakistan and Iran CPs). This self-evaluation model therefore put the onus on programme managers, who had the main responsibility for the quality of the final product, promoting self-reflection and learning. The role of IEU in relation to this PPSE was to facilitate, compile inputs and support throughout the self-evaluation process.

This design was only made possible with the strong facilitation role provided by an IEU team with recent evaluation experience in Afghanistan and the region as well as representation by the Chief of the RSEWCA – therefore limiting any replication possibility.

It is the responsibility of IEU to respond to the commitment of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) in professionalizing the evaluation function and promoting a culture of evaluation within UNODC for the purposes of accountability and continuous learning and improvement. To respond to this accountability mandate, this PPSE will feed into the final In-Depth Evaluation of the Afghanistan Country Programme which is planned to take place in 2015.

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This publication has not been formally edited.



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# GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABP	Afghan Border Police	CP	Country Programme for Afghanistan 2012-2015
ADR	Afghanistan Drug Report	CPAN	Child Protection Action Network
ADRS	Afghanistan Drug Reporting System	CPD	Central Prison Department
AL	Alternative Livelihoods	CSO	Civil Society Organization
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy	CSSP	Corrections System Support Program
AOTP	Afghan Opiate Trade Programme	DDR	Drug Demand Reduction
BCP	Border Crossing Point	ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
BLO	Border Liaison Office	EUPOL	European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
CBM Measure	Confidence Building Measure	EWG	Expert Working Group
CCM	Country Coordination Mechanism	FANC	Foreign Anti-Narcotics Community
CCP Programme	Container Control Programme	FCR	Full Cost Recovery
CDU	Counter Narcotics Developmental Unit	FEEP	Framework for the Engagement of External Parties
CENTCOM	US Central Command	FO	Field Office
CJTf	Criminal Justice Task Force	GOIRA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
COAFG	Country Office Afghanistan	GPML	Global Programme against Money Laundering
CCPCJ	Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice	HACCA	HIV/AIDS Coordination Committee
CNC	Counter Narcotics Center	HMIS	Health Management Information System
CND	Commission on Narcotic Drugs	HOO	High Office for Oversight
CNPA	Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan	IDE	In-Depth Evaluation

IDM	Inter-Divisional Mission	MOJ	Ministry of Justice
IDTT Teams	Inter-Divisional Task	MOPH	Ministry of Public Health
IDU	Injecting Drug User	MRRD	Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development
IEU Unit	Independent Evaluation	MTT	Mobile Training Team
IOM	International Organization for Migration	NDCS	National Drug Control Strategy
IP	Implementing Partner	NPP	National Priority Programme
IPA	Integrated Programming Approach	NSP	National Solidarity Programme
IPCB	International Police Coordination Board	OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
IRDC	Inter-Regional Drug- Control Approach	OST	Opioid Substitution Therapy
ITS	Information Technology Services	PAU	Police Advisory Unit
JRC	Juvenile Rehabilitation Center	PCU	Port Control Unit
JSSP	Afghanistan Justice Support Program	PMM Module	Project Management
JUNTA	Joint UN Team on HIV	PPI	Paris Part Initiative
LOA	Letter of Agreement	PPSE	Programme Participatory Self-Evaluation
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan	PSE	Programme Steering Committee
MCN Narcotics	Ministry of Counter	ROCA	Regional Office for Central Asia
MDP Plan	Ministerial Development	RP	Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries
MIT	Mobile Interdiction Team		
MOI	Ministry of Interior		

RSEWCA	Regional Section and Europe and West and Central Asia	ToT	Training of Trainer
		TPB Branch	Terrorism Prevention
SOP	Standard Operational Procedure	UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
SP	Sub-Programme	UNCAC	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
SPF	Strategic Programme Framework	UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
SPTC	Sub-Programme Technical Committee	UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
SPU	Strategic Planning Unit		
TA	Technical Advisor	VCT	Voluntary Counseling and Testing
TI	Triangular Initiative	WCO	World Customs Organization
TMAF	Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework		



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Background and Context

Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of illicit opium and heroin. For the past decade, the country has accounted for an estimated 90 percent of global illicit opiates, fuelling local instability and insurgency, transnational organized crime, local, regional and global drug consumption and HIV/AIDS. The UNODC opium survey results of 2013 revealed that opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan reached a record high of 209,000 hectares in 2013 outstripping the earlier record in 2007 of 193,000 hectares, and representing a 36 per cent increase over 2012.<sup>1</sup> This illicit drug production, consumption, trade and its resultant economy creates multiple challenges for Afghanistan and beyond. With more than 1 million drug users and 5 percent of the population involved in drug cultivation, Afghanistan pays a very human high cost for its illicit drug problem.<sup>2</sup>

The prognosis for the future is not positive. In 2013, the World Bank stressed that large financial inflows outside the Afghan budget and fragmented aid in a situation of weak governance have been major sources of rent, patronage and political power. The political and security context associated with the 2014 Transition period will be determined by Afghanistan's stability and ability to build upon the gains of the last decade especially in relation to institutional-building. The fact that Afghanistan will remain an aid-dependent state poses a potential risk for Afghan actors to look towards the illicit economy in all its forms - as witnessed by the increase in 2013 of opium cultivation for the third consecutive year - to fill the financial gaps created by the decrease of international aid. The linkages between insurgency, the illicit drug economy, weak governance and corruption will further influence Afghanistan's capacity to reach peace and good governance in the near future.

## Main Objectives of the Programme

It is to address this very challenging context that UNODC has one of its largest field office operations globally in Afghanistan with an institutional memory going back to 1989.<sup>3</sup> The Country Office Afghanistan (COAFG) launched the Country Programme for Afghanistan (CP), initially planned until 2014 and then extended until December 2015. The objective of the CP is to strengthen the capacity of the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GOIRA) to address the issues relating to drugs and crime in the country. Through the CP, UNODC aims to contribute to the stability and development of Afghanistan by an integrated approach, which aims to identify and address all aspects of the drug and crime situation through advocacy in the policy arena and through implementation in the field, including the efforts to counter illicit drug economy, and to strengthen rule of law, alternative livelihoods targeting households dependent on illicit cultivation for survival, and assistance to people affected by drug use and dependence.

## Main Challenges for the Programme

Internal interlocutors in COAFG consistently identify the biggest challenge of operating in Afghanistan as some of the internal systems and processes (related to human resources procedures,

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<sup>1</sup> Afghanistan Opium Survey, UNODC and MCN, 2013.

<sup>2</sup> UNODC Country Programme for Afghanistan 2012-2014

<sup>3</sup> As a spin-off of the Regional Office in South-West Asia, based in Islamabad (Pakistan), in 1989 UNODC opened a satellite office in Peshawar (Pakistan) to carry out cross-border operations in Afghanistan. The Office of the Representative was established in Kabul in 1991 while the project office remained in Peshawar. Due to security concerns and civil war, the office was again relocated to Islamabad, Pakistan in 1992. With the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 and the establishment of the Afghan Interim Government following the Bonn Agreement, the country office was reopened in Kabul, Afghanistan in 2002.

procurement, grants/FEEP, delegation of authority etc.). In addition, insufficient consultation and little engagement of the field in the development and rolling out of key new regulatory initiatives have been considered similarly problematic – including, the Full Cost Recovery (FCR) model and the Framework for the Engagement of External Parties (FEEP). Another concern for programme implementation relates to implementing in a high-risk post-conflict environment, which necessitate significant physical and procedural security measures involving high costs and constrain UNODC staff travel to some of the key CP priority regions and sites.

Finally, working with the GOIRA has its own challenges due to the high turnover of key and trained staff, which results in the need for constant advocacy and sensitisation to build a rapport of trust and secure commitment to undertake policy and operational interventions. The Transition year (2014) has been particularly tricky due to the phasing out of the old administration and the anticipated induction of the new Government through a protracted electoral process.

## Scope of the Evaluation

This evaluation is formative in nature as it is undertaken at mid-point of the CP implementation (from June 2012 to December 2015) and it intends to assess achievements and improve the performance for the remainder of the CP implementation. This evaluation covers the four SPs of the Afghanistan CP within an overall evaluation of the CP. The exercise comprises of two tiers: at one level assessing the CP holistically, and at another, looking into the specifics of the four SPs individually. At the former, focus is placed on governance arrangements, results-orientation, alignment with the RP and Thematic Programmes, as well as with Global Projects, and coherence with other non-UN led initiatives.

## Evaluation Methodology

The objective of the Afghanistan Programme Participatory Self-Evaluation (PPSE) was to promote self-learning, foster transparency, enhance ownership of evaluation results and commitment to implementing recommendations. It provided COAFG with an opportunity to take a step back and reflect on the programme.

This evaluation exercise was initially designed as an In-depth Evaluation (IDE), however, given certain security and administrative constraints, the IDE could not take place. At the risk of not undertaking a mid-term evaluation at all, there remained a short window of opportunity for undertaking a PPSE. The Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) devised a dedicated methodology to strengthen the internal validity of the participatory approach through inviting external stakeholders to provide their views and test hypothesis formulated by UNODC. Despite this, PPSE's have an inherent bias and are not independent exercises reflecting the subjective views of UNODC staff and other stakeholders involved in, or benefiting from, the programme. This self-evaluation model therefore puts the onus on programme managers, who had the main responsibility for the quality of the final product.

The PPSE design and implementation, with the verification of findings through consultations with external stakeholders, was made possible with the strong facilitation role provided by a two-member IEU team with recent evaluation experience in Afghanistan and the region. IEU ensured that all stakeholders involved in the programme had the opportunity to provide inputs and that all differences were recorded in the report.

There were a few limitations to the PPSE that are worth mentioning and limited the quality and inclusiveness of the process. Due to the fact that the evaluation modality was changed very close to the start of the evaluation, IEU and COAFG had limited time to prepare. In addition, some internal and external interlocutors were unresponsive towards the process and were requested repeatedly for feedback. A few interlocutors were missed in the initial information-gathering phase and had to be reached out to at a later stage. The focus group discussions with GOIRA counterparts delivered mixed results as some of those nominated did not have adequate experience with the CP. The written inputs submitted by UNODC staff were of a varied quality and certain aspects needed considerable redrafting.

Finally, it is important to note that though it is challenging to measure progress towards the CP outcomes - mainly due to the lack of comparability and use of indicators measuring the effectiveness of the CP over the last two years – this was overcome through utilisation of secondary source of information.

## Evaluation findings

### (a) Design

The CP was a shift away from an earlier model where COAFG operated through a series of stand-alone projects that had individualised linkages with different parts of GOIRA. The streamlined integrated programming model was an improvement over the previous project-based approach as it simplified management through single project codes instead of multiple projects that required individual GOIRA approvals. Substantively the design created opportunities for cross-fertilization and multiplying effects for inter-connected issues and responses otherwise looked in isolation (i.e. better efficiency in substance and utilization of financial resources). Relationships with counterparts in the GOIRA have also improved as a result of this integrated design as these have become defined by the CP's governance framework. At the same time, it is worth mentioning that the CP's integration is limited by the fact that the design and functioning of corporate UNODC programme management systems and processes remains project-based. In addition, this integration has been more pronounced in some SPs over others.

The CP design process was consultative and involved key counterparts at different levels at HQ and in Afghanistan. Different vehicles were used to inform the CP development in 2011 and 2012 – these included the 2008/2009 evaluations, the Kabul Process (development of benchmarks), survey reports delivered as part of ongoing projects, e.g. corruption or opium surveys. In addition, alignment with UNODC strategic tools (e.g. Strategic Framework, Medium Term Strategy and Thematic Programmes) was ensured – see the Relevance section. The CP is also well aligned with the Thematic Programmes and Global Programmes derived from them and benefits from their financial and technical contributions.

The CP logical framework was devised using theory of change models in various consultative processes including with the Strategic Planning Unit (SPU) and IEU. The Regional Section of Europe, West and Central Asia (RSEWCA) regularly supported COAFG throughout the CP development process. Although CP indicators were revised since their initial formulation, they remain predominantly quantitative with no baseline, which makes measurement of change and reporting at the outcome level challenging and attribution difficult. Revision of the indicators needs to be prioritized in order to make the logical framework an effective management tool. Following the revision, a retroactive baseline collection should be conducted and maintained. Finally, options to consider linking the logical frameworks of the CP, RP, and the IRDC should be considered through a viable corporate solution.

### (b) Relevance

All internal and external stakeholders expressed no doubts regarding the relevance of the CP to the counter-narcotics and governance challenges faced by Afghanistan as it enters the Transition to Transformation decade (2014-2024).<sup>4</sup> The GOIRA regularly refers to drug and crime control as a national policy priority but suffers from uneven political will, resulting in existing national and international approaches not giving sufficient importance to counter-narcotics. It also lacks resources to implement these policies itself and remains largely reliant upon international actors. While UNODC has remained a minor financial player on counter-narcotics and criminal justice, it has been able to establish itself beyond its financial outlay at the policy level through its technical expertise, pilot programming and awareness-raising on the importance of the illicit economy.

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<sup>4</sup> Afghanistan: From Transition to Transformation, World Bank, July 2012, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/07/01/afghanistan-transition-transformation>

The CP is relevant to UNODC strategic documents and in line with UNODC integrated programming approach and strategic frameworks.<sup>5</sup> At the national level, COAFG is aligned to the Kabul Process, which articulated and operationalized the National Priority Programs (NPPs)<sup>6</sup> as integral to the achievement of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS).<sup>7</sup> The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) gives narcotics only marginal attention and UNODC continues to advocate for the inclusion of counter-narcotics priorities into the current TMAF framework, through revised principles and goals.

The CP governance monitoring mechanisms - Programme Steering Committee (PSC) and Sub-Programme Technical Committee (SPTC) - ensure the continued relevance of the CP as solutions to identified needs and problem profiles are formulated, agreed with GOIRA partners, and reviewed in these meetings. The CP's governance model is primarily based at the federal level in Kabul although SPTC meetings also do take place in certain provinces and are convened by the GOIRA. It is commendable that UNODC has been able to affect change at the provincial level and should look towards supporting the GOIRA in expanding the coverage of these meetings to more provinces and encourage their regularity and effectiveness further.

The CP is conceived as a building block of the RP. According to internal assessment, the RP and the CP are both relevant and complementary and the programmes work well together. It is evident that positioning the CP and RP teams together in one office has contributed to this strong complementarity - COAFG has housed the RP Secretariat since October 2011. With the move of the RP Coordinator to Tashkent in the Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA) due to cost-efficiency considerations<sup>8</sup> and security concerns, there need to be concerted efforts to ensure that this relationship is not negatively affected. In addition, COAFG is concerned at the lack of clear institutional prioritization between the CP, RP and IRDC, which creates a challenge of funding competitiveness. There need to be fundraising strategies that satisfy these concerns and allow for optimal implementation of both vehicles.

(c) Efficiency

COAFG is one of the largest UNODC Country Offices. The donors to the CP are Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, OFID, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. In April 2014, the total amount of funds raised and implemented since the start of CP implementation stood at US\$ 52,766,141 million (from an overall budget of US\$ 124,786,900) of which US\$ 20,171,494 have been implemented. This flags the two-fold challenges the CP faces regarding both fundraising and implementation - with only a year and a half of programme life cycle remaining, only around 42% of the overall budget has been raised. Of this amount, only 38% has been implemented. These are two of the most important issues related to

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<sup>5</sup> Medium Term Strategy (MTS) for 2008 - 2011:

<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V07/806/72/PDF/V0780672.pdf?OpenElement> and <http://www.unodc.org/documents/about-unodc/UNODC-strategy-July08.pdf>

Medium Term Strategy (MTS) for 2012 - 2015:

[http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/CCPCJ-ECOSOC/CCPCJ-ECOSOC-00/CCPCJ-ECOSOC-12/ECOSOC-res\\_2012-12.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/CCPCJ-ECOSOC/CCPCJ-ECOSOC-00/CCPCJ-ECOSOC-12/ECOSOC-res_2012-12.pdf)

UNODC Strategic Framework for 2012-2013: [http://www.unodc.org/intranet\\_pa/docs/Strategic\\_Framework\\_2012-13.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/intranet_pa/docs/Strategic_Framework_2012-13.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> The 22 NPP represent a new commitment in the Afghan national development strategy as civilian and military responsibilities are transferred from international partners to the GOA and civil society organizations. The NPPs presented at the Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan aim to empower all Afghan citizens and their institutions to contribute to improved service delivery, job creation, equitable economic growth, public revenue generation, the protection of the rights of all Afghan citizens, and a durable and inclusive peace. The 22 NPPs are grouped into 6 clusters: Governance, Peace, Human Resource Development, Infrastructure Development, Private Sector Development and Agriculture and Rural Development.

<sup>7</sup> ANDS focuses on three priority areas, namely: (I) Governance, Peace and Stability, (II) Sustainable Livelihoods: Agriculture, Food Security and Income Opportunities, and (III) Basic Social Services: Education, Health, Water and Sanitation. ANDS defines counter-narcotics as a cross cutting issue.

<sup>8</sup> Including alleviating the excessive burden on COAFG, benefitting from stronger financial and administrative support capacities available elsewhere; and reducing overhead costs

efficiency of COAFG operations. Currently a review of programme size and operational set-up is being undertaken to address the situation.

Overall fundraising has been affected by the funding preferences of donors, which have resulted in the current COAFG portfolio as being skewed heavily in the favour of law enforcement work. There are numerous unfunded and partially funded outcomes and outputs, which challenge the very notion of integrated programming.<sup>9</sup> Another challenge with donors is the high cost of delivery in Afghanistan – security takes up 8-10% of the budget in addition to PSC (13%) and the new FCR adds close to another 10%.<sup>10</sup> There are major concerns in COAFG related to the implementation of the FCR - by transferring costs which were previously covered by PSC to projects, there is a perception that UNODC risks costing itself out of the market. COAFG needs to continue sustaining its visibility and credibility with the donor community, especially in light of 2014 Transition and beyond. It is important this messaging ensures that donors also recognize the importance of soft-earmarking and multi-year pledges to the ethos of the integrated programming approach. Given that some of the traditional donors to UNODC (for instance, Canada) are scaling back their support to Afghanistan in general, COAFG needs to target new possible donors in a strategic manner.

On the other hand, COAFG has faced challenges in implementing its programme that have resulted in lower and delayed delivery rates (than anticipated). These limitations are related to internal regulations for human resources, procurement, grants, delegation of authority etc. In other cases, such as construction work, UNODC has not been efficient and in the absence of corporate guidelines regarding such work, has been improvising where it can. The lack of established corporate mobility and rotation policies (only communicated in April 2014 with implementation expected not before 2016) and cumbersome recruitment processes are part of the reason behind the delays in filling in the international posts in COAFG. This issue of internal processes not being conducive to implementation in the field is an institutional challenge and has been flagged in the cluster evaluations as well as the 2013 Audit report. While some progress has been witnessed since the launch of FEED and the Career Development and Mobility Framework, it is too early to witness concrete and positive impact, but should be monitored carefully in the coming months.

Although COAFG and the RP jointly invested in systems for programme monitoring and reporting through PMM with ITS through the course of 2013, this did not advance beyond the pilot phase. Any future system should consider, among other things, integration of the different levels of UNODC assistance (e.g. linking their logical frameworks). Despite efforts towards PMM development, two major donor counterparts of UNODC were critical of COAFG's information sharing and reporting and encourage more sustained and regular interactions. Further to the cluster evaluation recommendations, COAFG should invest in regular and high-quality reports through a centralized M&E team responsible for ensuring regular and strong communication COAFG has progressed on joint M&E with GOIRA through rather well-received joint monitoring visits, which should be continued and expanded where possible.

Ethical risk transfer in the monitoring of programmes needs to be closely considered under some SPs to allow for other implementing partners (IP) to do the work on behalf of UNODC and put in place proper monitoring systems for provincial work. Another important issue related to the short-term and long-term monitoring of COAFG capacity-building efforts. COAFG should invest in process and impact evaluations of capacity-building and systems such as those developed by COPAK could be considered.

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<sup>9</sup> Unfunded outcomes/outputs are as follows: SP1 Outcome 1, Output 1.2, Outcome 2, Output 2.3; SP2: Outcome 1, Output 1.1, 1.3, Outcome 2, Output 2.1, 2.2,2.3, 2.4, 2.5, Outcome 3, Output 3.2, 3.3, 3.4,3.5, 3.6,3.7; SP3: All outputs are partially funded; SP4: Outcome 1, Output 1.5, Outcome 2, Output 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, The rest of the outputs are partially funded.

<sup>10</sup> The full cost recovery principle demands that all the costs that can be attributed to a specific intervention (programme or project) funded from extra-budgetary contributions, should be financed by this very same intervention.

In conclusion, COAFG has a few efficiency good practices that are worth replicating where possible, including basing the RP Secretariat in Kabul, good cooperation with UNODC Headquarters, for instance through the interdivisional task teams (IDTT), co-location of three UNODC Offices with the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) provincial offices in Jalalabad, Faizabad and Mazar.

(d) Effectiveness

Evidence collated from differed sources (described below) shows that the CP has made progress in achieving its outcomes and in raising the profile of counter-narcotics and illicit economy issues in Afghanistan through extensive capacity-building training and workshops, various roundtables and discussion platforms and evidence-based research and advocacy. On the policy side, UNODC has been successful in: (i) advocating for the illicit economy to be the post-transition counter-narcotics framework and (ii) developing counter-narcotics national policies with the GOIRA. This policy advocacy focus (with related implementation review) needs to be maintained and possibly scaled up further in conjunction with the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). The new United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2015-2019 process has absorbed elements of the illicit economy in its five pillars. UNODC should be integrating the illicit economy narrative in the CP, in order to better support the UN family efforts into this area.

In addition, the CP and the RP and the global programmes have benefited each other operationally and substantively through joint activities and pilot initiatives. There are of course still opportunities for further integration, for instance with the Global Programme against Money Laundering (GPML) for countering illicit financial flows.

Finally, it is important to note that the caveat that it is challenging to measure progress towards the CP outcomes for the four SPs - mainly due to the lack of comparability and use of indicators measuring the effectiveness of the CP over the last two years.

### **Sub-Programme 1: Research, Policy and Advocacy**

SP1 on Research, Policy and Advocacy supports capacity development of the MCN in the areas of crop monitoring, research, inter-agency cooperation and provincial outreach. *Significant output achievements as verified through triangulation of sources were as follows:* transfer of survey implementation activities to the Survey and Monitoring Directorate of MCN accomplished; capacity building plan and strategy developed for survey and research; drug-related research products produced<sup>11</sup>; Afghanistan Drug Reporting System as a central data repository system designed; establishment of the MCN Research Department supported; training/capacity-building in various areas including research and survey methods conducted; NDCS revised and evidence-based thematic policies completed; 10 Mentors/Technical Advisors (TA) and 23 Mentors (Technical Support Instructors) recruited; 34 provincial offices equipped and supported; Technical Working Groups at the provincial level supported; and participatory M&E of projects conducted.

Deriving from the above outputs and through triangulation with other sources of information, effectiveness under SP1 is assessed as follows by this PPSE:

- COAFG is producing valuable and unique research and reports to understand the drug situation in Afghanistan including through advanced and complex surveys and methodologies.

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<sup>11</sup> (i) Afghanistan Annual Opium Survey; (ii) Afghanistan Annual Opium Winter Risk Assessment Surveys (Phase I and II); (iii) Afghanistan Poppy Eradication Verification Report (weekly and final); (iv) Afghanistan Drug Price Monitoring Report (monthly); (v) Afghanistan Annual Cannabis Survey (last report published in 2012); and Afghanistan Drug Report 2013.

- COAFG has been successful in transferring specialized research and survey skills to the GOIRA through mentorship, capacity-building and team co-location with the eventual aim of transfer of capacity to GOIRA.
- Key policies of the GOIRA have been devised and drafted through the technical support provided by this SP.
- The bifurcation of AFGK63 and AFGK65 from the predecessor project vehicle of AFGI87 has not worked out in practice – the two still the same SPTC. Following the split, Outcome 3 of SP1 (AFGK65) has been unsuccessful in raising funds.

## **Sub-Programme 2 - Law Enforcement**

SP2 supports national law enforcement partners in Afghanistan in specific niche areas such as border management, capacity development of the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) and precursor control. *Significant output achievements as verified through triangulation of sources were as follows:* Training of Trainer (ToT) Five-week Basic Investigators Training (BIT) Course implemented; 30 training missions by the UNODC mentored Mobile Training Team (MTT) conducted; UNODC training modules approved by GOIRA; Advanced Intelligence Course developed and delivered; Airport security course developed and delivered; CNPA Forensic Laboratory equipped, trained and mentored; BLO facilities being established; and three Mobile Interdiction Teams (MDTs) established in the provinces based on the best practices identified through activities in Kabul.

Deriving from the above outputs and through triangulation with other sources of information, effectiveness under SP2 is assessed as follows by this self-evaluation:

- SP2 technical assistance has seen operational impact through an increase in seizures although attribution cannot be concretely established.<sup>12</sup>
- In the sensitive law enforcement arena, the CP has provided inter-agency cooperation between both Afghan units/departments and other regional actors as a unique policy and coordination service that only UNODC can assist with.
- Mentorship is a key component of the UNODC approach and CNPA counterparts continue to require assistance in developing operational and administrative initiatives in an incremental manner.<sup>13</sup>
- Train-the-trainer sessions are incorporated to ensure sustainability of SP2 activities and are complemented by the integration of a code of ethics for law enforcement agencies, introducing principles from the anti-corruption work of the SP3 on Criminal Justice.
- SP2 needs to establish a programme of work to counter illicit financial flows. This could be done in close coordination with GPML, TPB and SP3 on Criminal Justice.

## **Sub-Programme 3: Criminal Justice**

SP3 on Criminal Justice aims to re-establish the rule of law, building integrity, addressing impunity, and developing a professional judicial culture. *Significant output achievements as verified through triangulation of sources were as follows:* Training on various criminal justice substantive areas (including the pebal code) conducted; legal and anti-corruption awareness campaigns carried out; construction of three buildings in three provinces completed; survey on trends and patterns of corruption conducted; United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) implementation

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<sup>12</sup> Significant increases have been observed in the number of seizure cases for most illicit substances. Between March 2009/March 2010 March 2012/March 2013), the following increases in seizures were observed: heroin (250.4%), opium (212.6%), hashish (328%), morphine (88.9%) and alcohol (1900%). UNODC/MCN Afghanistan Drug Report 2013.

<sup>13</sup> COAFG has provided assistance to the CNPA since its formation in 2003. From a starting point of 30 staff, the CNPA has grown to approximately 3,000, and now has a presence in all of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.

review on Afghanistan supported; assessment of national law and development of national capacity to incorporate international norms into national law supported; famous local musician as a UNODC Goodwill Ambassador appointed; literacy and vocational training for prisoners and other enhanced services in target prisons and Juvenile Rehabilitation Centers (JRCs) provided; and vocational equipment for training on carpentry, tailoring and welding to the Kabul JRC delivered.

Deriving from the above outputs and through triangulation with other sources of information, effectiveness under SP3 is assessed as follows by this self-evaluation:

- The SP has promoted and supported criminal justice reform in order to align Afghanistan's laws to international standards with a focus on anti-corruption efforts effectively and this role is well-regarded by national and donor counterparts.
- Despite no funding, UNODC was able to support legislative reform in an impressive manner including on the penal code and coordinate with the GOIRA and the donor community by acting as the secretariat to a weekly justice reform committee.<sup>14</sup>
- UNODC's foray into construction work is assessed in a mixed manner by its donor counterparts and similar future efforts should be considered cautiously.

#### **Sub-Programme 4 - Health and Livelihoods**

SP4 on Health and Livelihoods aims to address the needs of drug affected communities, offering AL streams to poppy/cannabis growing households and persons affected by drug use and dependence including injecting drug users, with special focus toward vulnerable groups such as injecting drug users and populations in closed settings. *Significant output achievements as verified through triangulation of sources were as follows:* four local NGOs for provision of drug treatment services sub-contracted; treatment services established in six provinces; training programmes (including ToT) in the areas of drug demand reduction and drug-related HIV/AIDS conducted; training programmes (including ToT) in the areas of project management and M&E conducted; winterization strategy developed; monitoring tools developed; HIV prevention, treatment and care services including to females/children in prison settings provided; second IBBS survey in 5 provinces supported; agri-business missions between countries to boost trade linkages and AL supported; cross-border collaboration supported; special AL projects for women supported through successful gender mainstreaming; integrated and innovative projects in support of the Food Zone Programme developed with MCN; training/mentorship to MCN and partner ministries on National AL Policy provided; and the development of an MOU between Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development (MRRD) and MCN facilitated.

Deriving from the above outputs and through triangulation with other sources of information, effectiveness under SP4 is assessed as follows by this self-evaluation:

- A strong network has been established between the UNODC IP organizations to support, facilitate and supplement each other in the provision of services to drug users.
- To-date, the lack of political commitment from the concerned ministries to facilitate and support Opioid Substitution Therapy (OST) has hampered scale-up efforts.
- Struggles with project implementation related to HQ procurement processes reduced AL work implementation down to a trickle in 2013. While the AL component of SP4 has developed a governance mechanism that allows it to adapt to security and access difficulties and to re-prioritise, COAFG needs to carefully monitor the implementation of FEEP and the extent to which it facilitates timely delivery.
- Despite significant gains in the launch of a national AL policy and major AL programmes that involve many ministries, some key ministries and programmes still do not consider counter-narcotics adequately. This requires additional advocacy work by UNODC.

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<sup>14</sup> The Criminal Law Reform Working Group will continue drafting the Penal Code for the coming year or two.



#### *(e) Partnerships and cooperation*

COAFG generally has strong relations with national counterparts. This is reflected in the strong appreciation expressed by key stakeholders for the UNODC leadership and management in various focus group discussions that took place in preparation for this PPSE. Partnerships with the GOIRA have been advanced through the CP governance model (PSC and SPTCs) as well as dedicated policy and technical committees, boards and working groups across a spectrum of thematic areas. Apart from institutionalizing regular exchange, the new CP governance structure has also expanded the number of counterparts UNODC works with in Afghanistan. There are some critiques of the usefulness of governance meetings and COAFG should consider intensifying its engagement and advocacy with national counterparts in advance of meetings.

The CP has seen significant growth in its linkages with regional initiatives since the launch of the RP. This includes the expansion of initiatives under the Triangular Initiative (TI), the establishment of the AKT Initiative, Istanbul Process and Sochi Process, among others. While the TI and AKT have seen some operational outcomes, there has been limited growth under the others.

Similarly, proactive engagement with donors has resulted in supportive relations and resource mobilisation. Given that the 2014 Transition is likely to be accompanied by a drawdown in financial commitments by the traditional UNODC donors in Afghanistan, COAFG should consider building partnerships with new donors, which would require renewed awareness-raising and sensitization. Other partners, from NGOs and academia are also supportive of COAFG and would like to see partnerships further grow.

#### *(f) Potential Impact*

The vision of the CP is to strengthen the capacity of the GOIRA to reduce the consequences of drugs and crime in the country. This is an ambitious vision given the size and scope of the CP versus the scale of the problem in Afghanistan. The most likely way for the CP to achieve impact is by getting other agencies and actors to take up the counter-narcotics and illicit economy agenda through active and high-level advocacy and awareness-raising.

To effectuate impact, the following six points capture the essence of UNODC's approach in Afghanistan: 1- Messaging and fostering broader partnerships beyond the current 'silo approach'; 2- Consolidating and building on tangible progress within counter-narcotics institutions; 3- Integrating agricultural policy (bottom-up); 4- Understanding the political economy; 5- Increasing the risk environment (top-down); and 6- Actively involving international and regional actors.

#### *(g) Sustainability*

The prospects for the long-term sustainability of UNODC mandates in Afghanistan are strong. Counter-narcotics is a national, regional and international priority for Afghanistan, and the country has stated its commitment to continue drug supply, demand and harm reduction in various international fora. However, there is understandably a lack of national capacity to resource, sustain and invest in such efforts, which may impede sustained progress in this area absent external support. Ownership is also a challenge in the context of high turn-over and sometimes low responsiveness of some GOIRA counterparts. Some of UNODC's work is advancing on the premise that GOIRA will take over implementation entirely in the coming year - this is especially in the case of surveys and drug treatment work. The long term viability of this should be constantly monitored and UNODC's role should adapt accordingly.

The short-term sustainability prospects for the CP are uncertain from a financial stand-point. Donors acknowledge that the failure of counter-narcotics is not a failure of UNODC but of the entire international community. However, a general decrease in donor engagement in Afghanistan could also impact UNODC. There may be an opportunity for UNODC to position itself in the coming years with the illicit economy approach and funding may increase as a result. Nonetheless, continued engagement by UNODC is critical. However, if UNODC systems are not fully responsive to field operations' needs and COAFG cannot absorb the funding, or UNODC prices itself out of the market following the implementation of FCR, the sustainability of UNODC operations may be in question.

(h) Innovation

COAFG is operating in the country worst affected by UNODC mandate areas and matched by unparalleled aid flows. This has provided numerous opportunities for programme managers to conceive and implement innovative approaches.

From a review perspective, RSEWCA in coordination with COAFG has been mapping major counter-narcotics related events, outcomes and institutional positions in Afghanistan and the surrounding region from 2010 to 2013. This measure aims at providing an overview of UNODC work and especially its impact, visibility and recognition in a plethora of *fora*, entities and publications. On the programme management side, using the experience with excel-based Expense Monitoring System (EMS) as well as with the Regional Programme Portal, the team in Kabul worked on the development of a new corporate monitoring and reporting system, known as the PMM, with ITS (see section on Efficiency).

On the substantive side, UNODC's mentorship approach has been innovative and cross-cuts several SPs. By co-locating UNODC teams with GOIRA counterparts, COAFG has been able to strength collaboration and coordination in a unique manner. In addition, COAFG has provided tailored and highly-technical support in surveys work and its law enforcement approaches.

Despite security restrictions, COAFG has come up with unique responses to reach the remote areas of Afghanistan such as through the SP2 Mobile Training Teams reaching front-line law enforcement officers in remote areas to provide specialized Afghan to Afghan training.

(i) Gender and human rights

Work on gender and human rights in Afghanistan is naturally challenging due to the cultural context and the fallout from the Taliban years. While society is evolving, there is a need to have an incremental approach, which involves local engagement and awareness-raising. There was little standard setting on human rights from HQ until 2012 and on gender in 2013, and therefore little guidance and frameworks for the CP to mainstream gender and human rights into operational interventions. Nonetheless, human rights and gender considerations have been considered across the different SPs to varying degrees. While GOIRA counterparts are on average, satisfied with UNODC work on gender and human rights, donor counterparts encourage more direct engagement. COAFG has been involved in the UN Human Rights Task Force and has prioritized the recruitment of female staff in all of its programmes and encouraged the GOIRA to do the same where possible – notwithstanding the lack of interested female candidates at times. To illustrate its current mainstreaming efforts and expand these further, COAFG should develop a programme strategy for Gender and human rights, with risks and mitigation measures identified.

## Lessons Learned

The CP has provided an opportunity for UNODC to learn the following lessons:

1. The scale of the illicit economy and the related drug problem is too large for the CP to impact in and of itself. Small actors like UNODC with implementation limitations can most effectively magnify the impact of their interventions by having other actors advocate on their behalf.

2. Responding to drugs as an exclusively supply control and demand reduction issue is not working and corporate reflection on how to re-orient global drug strategy is critical. The broadening of the counter-narcotics debate to appeal to development and larger bilateral actors is a critical part of the process. This has been a critical role that UNODC has been playing in Afghanistan in the last few years.
3. Internal coordination gaps are costly and impair effectiveness of interventions. The lack of progress on PMM and the impact of FCR are indications of the fall-out of working in a siloed manner. Similarly, HQ substantive sections can only respond appropriately to field needs when they are well informed and consulted on programme design and implementation.
4. Mentoring and co-locating with Government counterparts are efficient in terms of financial viability, help UNODC build strong relationships with national counterparts, and transfer capacity in an effective manner.
5. UNODC needs to engage in corporate reflection on how to engage with conflict countries where flexibility is required and costs are often unpredictable – including and especially on security. Implementation rules of engagement should be established at the design stage to ensure maximum value for money in such contexts.
6. Programmes need to incorporate sound qualitative outcome and impact evaluation tools and systems at the design stage. Without a comprehensive strategy providing coherence and provision for alignment of training activities there is a risk of not delivering the most effective types of training and services.
7. UNODC programmes succeed when support is targeted at policy or specialist areas. However, whenever UNODC has sought to build infrastructure then there have invariably been delays. Simply, this is because the skills and resources required to deliver these activities were not readily available within UNODC; they are not core business for the organization. Where UNODC was able to corral the efforts of others, to ensure commonality, interoperability with meeting Afghan requirements, then delivery has been considerably more effective.

# SUMMARY MATRIX OF FINDINGS, EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings <sup>15</sup>	Evidence (sources that substantiate findings)	Recommendations <sup>16</sup>
<b>Key recommendations</b>		
<b>Overall Country Programme</b>		
<p>1. The withdrawal of NATO forces in 2014 marks a watershed in the recent history of Afghanistan and requires a recalibration by all actors present in the country of their role and aims. It also marks a transformation in the counter-narcotics dialogue in Afghanistan (largely due to the failure of counter-narcotics policies) to encompass the wider illicit economy perspective.</p> <p>UNODC has played a major policy advocacy role in this regard over the first half of CP implementation. However, there still remains room for further policy focus on counter-narcotics in the Kabul Process, TMAF as well as inclusion in larger GOIRA programmes as well as monitoring of policy implementation.</p> <p>At this point, it is the only the UNDAF, which provides an operational framework to advance the illicit economy approach. The UNODC programme structures remains the same as initially conceived and consideration of incorporation of the illicit economy framework within the different CP and RP structures has not yet taken</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>1. Priority Setting and Comparative Advantage:</b></p> <p><b>1.a.</b> COAFG to continue and enhance its policy advocacy role on the illicit economy and the importance of a long-term approach on counter-narcotics, including with the newly elected Government to ensure that the counter-narcotics agenda is appropriately addressed.</p> <p><b>1.b.</b> COAFG, RP and WCA FOs to begin coordinating on the design of the next phase of their respective programmes so as to capture the illicit economy mandate in a coordinated manner.</p> <p><b>1.c.</b> COAFG to utilize the UNDAF 2015-19 to coordinate on joint programming on the illicit economy with other UN agencies and also to expand the reach of its work to the broader development framework.</p>

<sup>15</sup> A finding uses evidence from data collection to allow for a factual statement.

<sup>16</sup> Recommendations are proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, or efficiency of a project/programme; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. For accuracy and credibility, recommendations should be the logical implications of the findings and conclusions.

place.		
<p>2. With only a year and a half of programme life remaining, only around 42% of the overall budget has been raised with many programme outputs unfunded.</p> <p>There is a lack of clear institutionalization prioritization between the CP, RP and other vehicles, which creates a challenge of funding competitiveness.</p> <p>COAFG has a high cost of delivery in Afghanistan: security takes up 8-10% of the budget in addition to PSC (13%) and the new FCR adds close to another 10%. The internal perception in COAFG is that the FCR was not strategically handled and that it is likely to affect UNODC competitiveness in Afghanistan.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>2. Financial model and fundraising</b></p> <p><b>2.a.</b> COAFG, RP Secretariat, RSEWCA and CPS to rapidly enhance fundraising efforts to address the upcoming deficit of resources. Unfunded and under-funded thematic areas to receive particular attention. New donors to be targeted given scale-back by traditional donors.</p> <p><b>2.b.</b> COAFG, RSEWCA and CPS to closely coordinate the fundraising approach between the different vehicles of the IRDC, RP and CP.</p> <p><b>2.c.</b> COAFG should monitor the process of implementation of FCR carefully in the field, continue engagement with donors and communicate any issues immediately to HQ to work constructively together to find solutions.</p>
<p>3. COAFG, like all other actors in Afghanistan, has invested heavily in security and this will increase in the coming years also due to the possible reduction of UNAMA, which will put a higher burden on UNODC.</p> <p>In order to continue to be able to implement despite security challenges limiting access and mobility, UNODC will need to utilize implementing partners (IP) or third party contracts.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>3. Security and risk-environment</b></p> <p><b>3.a.</b> UNODC (COAFG, RSEWCA and CPS) keep donors informed of the increase in the cost of business in order to avoid post-facto charges to pledges.</p> <p><b>3.b.</b> COAFG to ensure ethical risk transfer through regular interaction between IPs and security section of COAFG to ensure that sufficient measures have been undertaken by the IPs to protect UNODC's reputational interest, prevent security-related delays and ensure the security of the staff and assets deployed.</p> <p><i>See 3.c. in Important Recommendations for additional point.</i></p>
<p>4. COAFG is struggling to maintain its current portfolio size due to challenges with implementation modalities. AL work, in particular,</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>4. Implementation modalities</b></p> <p><b>4.a.</b> DM and COAFG to jointly report on progress made on the recommendations of the IDM, cluster evaluations and 2013</p>

<p>slowed down to a mere trickle in 2013. This is an institutional challenge and has been flagged in the cluster evaluations and the 2013 Audit report.</p>		<p>Audit related to implementation systems.</p> <p><i>See 4.b. and 4.c. in Important Recommendations for additional points.</i></p>
<p>5. The integrated CP is an improvement over the previous project-based approach as it simplifies management; enhances effectiveness and efficiency; creates cross-fertilization and results in multiplying effects. There are many instances of effective integration within the SPs and between the different SPs.</p> <p>However, the integrated CP model has its limitations in practice. The donors – barring some exceptions - have not embraced the approach in its entirety and there is limited movement towards soft earmarking and multi-year pledges.</p> <p>The missing gap of CP is that there has been no adaptation of UNODC systems and processes to the integrated programme needs. However, adjustments are required in UNODC financial management/monitoring systems, PROFI and IMIS for better, automated and straightforward monitoring.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>5. Integrated Programming</b></p> <p><b>5.a.</b> COAFG to ensure integration between ongoing projects and sub-programmes, e.g. restructuring SP1 2016 onwards to avoid potential administrative and reporting inefficiencies and re-merge AFGK63 and AFGK65.</p> <p><b>5.b.</b> COAFG should explore opportunities for further integration between SPs including on research and illicit financial flows.</p> <p><b>5.c.</b> UNODC (OED, DO, DTA, DPA, DM, Field Offices) to further define integration between and within Global, Regional and CPs at the management, systems and substance levels (roles and responsibilities), e.g. see Recommendation <b>6.c.</b></p> <p><i>See 5.d. in Important Recommendations for additional point.</i></p>
<p>6. There is good integration between the CP and the RP at the substantive level and joint and innovative activities were carried out. This was primarily due to the fact that the RP Secretariat was based in Kabul.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>6. Inter-linkages with UNODC assistance</b></p> <p><b>6.a.</b> COAFG and RP to set into place coordination mechanism in order to ensure that the move of the RP Coordinator to Tashkent in the Regional Office for Central Asia (ROCA), there need to be concerted efforts to ensure that this relationship is not negatively affected.</p> <p><i>See 6.b. and 6.c. in Important Recommendations for additional points.</i></p>
<p>7. Two major donor counterparts of UNODC have</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA;</p>	<p><b>7. Monitoring and reporting</b></p> <p><b>7.a.</b> COAFG to invest in</p>

<p>been critical of COAFG’s information sharing and reporting and encourage more sustained and regular interactions.</p> <p>Although CP indicators were revised since their initial formulation, they remain predominantly quantitative, which makes measurement of change and reporting at the outcome level, especially considering the attribution issue. Reporting through indicators is also problematic due to missing baselines.</p>	<p>Questionnaires</p>	<p>regular and high-quality reports for improved communication.</p> <p><b>7.b.</b> COAFG and SPU needs to revise CP indicators to ensure the right balance between quantitative and qualitative to make the logical framework an effective management tool.</p> <p><b>7.c.</b> COAFG to undertake a retroactive baseline collection process following the revision of indicators utilizing the extensive information it generates in-house.</p> <p><i>See 7.d. and 7.e. in Important Recommendations for additional points.</i></p>
<p>8. The CP governance mechanism ensures the continued relevance of the CP. However, the regularity of these meetings has been mixed mostly due to coordination challenges with the GOIRA. In addition, the GOIRA nominees at the meetings sometimes do not match the intended roles.</p> <p>Some GOIRA bodies that are not primary line ministries of UNODC have expressed concerns with lack of engagement and consultation in advance of programme design and implementation.</p> <p>The CP has set up governance meetings in some key provinces under its mandate areas and these are now convened by the MCN.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>8. Governance</b></p> <p><b>8.a.</b> COAFG to ensure that each SPTC has its own pool of local experts in each thematic area that should remain until the CP ends in 2015 (excluding GOIRA rotations).</p> <p><b>8.b.</b> COAFG should consider intensifying its engagement and advocacy with national counterparts in advance of governance meetings to the quality of the outcomes is higher.</p> <p><b>8.c.</b> COAFG should ensure more regular, systematic and intensive relationship building with partners that are not the primary line ministries for UNODC.</p> <p><b>8.d.</b> COAFG should support the GOIRA in expanding the coverage of SPTC meetings to more provinces and encourage their regularity and effectiveness further.</p>
<p><b>Important Recommendations</b></p>		
<p><b>Overall CP</b></p>		
<p>9. Mentorship and UNODC/GOIRA co-location are two of COAFG’s best practices in capacity-building tailored to the very specific context of Afghanistan.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>9. Capacity-building</b></p> <p><b>9.a.</b> COAFG should consider options for replication of co-location with GOIRA where else possible.</p> <p><b>9.b.</b> COAFG should monitor</p>

<p>Some of UNODC’s work is advancing on the premise that GOIRA will take over implementation entirely in the coming year. This is especially in the case of surveys and drug treatment work.</p> <p>There is no long-term monitoring of the impact of training and capacity-building activities.</p>		<p>the likelihood and impact of hand-over of responsibilities to GOIRA in surveys and drug treatment and its role should adapt accordingly.</p> <p><b>9.c.</b> COAFG to invest in process and impact evaluations of capacity-building efforts.</p>
<p>There was little standard setting on human rights from HQ until 2012 and on gender in 2013, hence there was little guidance and frameworks to mainstream gender and human rights into operational interventions.</p> <p>Nonetheless, human rights and gender considerations have been considered across the different SPs to varying degrees through various activities and approaches. While GOIRA counterparts are on average, satisfied with UNODC work on gender and human rights, donor counterparts encourage more direct engagement.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>10. Gender and Human rights</b></p> <p><b>10.a.</b> COAFG should develop a programme strategy and concrete operational plans for gender and human rights (modules in existing workshops, etc.), with risks and potential mitigation measures identified.</p> <p><b>10.b.</b> COAFG should intensify its policy-level engagement on human rights and gender issues at the appropriate fora with GOIRA jointly with donor/bilateral counterparts to magnify the impact of its advocacy.</p>
<p>3. The CP project document had a risk assessment matrix identifying remedial measures. This was the first of its kind and has been assessed as a positive although simplistic tool.</p>		<p><b>3. Security and risk-environment</b></p> <p><b>3.c.</b> COAFG to ensure SP project documents and concept notes incorporate their own specific risk strategies to reflect their substantive focus and challenges.</p>
<p>4. After much delay, FEEP was launched in 2014. COAFG was involved in the feedback process for FEEP. FEEP provides opportunities for engaging more with civil society and academia in programme implementation.</p> <p>UNODC has faced challenges in implementing construction work in Afghanistan.</p>		<p><b>4. Implementation modalities</b></p> <p><b>4.b.</b> DM to coordinate reporting on the challenges and opportunities of working through FEEP from the Field after a six-month launch period.</p> <p><b>4.c.</b> HQ (DM and DO) to advice on guidelines and processes for engaging in construction work.</p>
<p>5. Despite the usefulness of the IDTTs, there remain gaps</p>		<p><b>5. Integrated Programming</b></p>



<p>in COAFG-HQ coordination which hampers integration efforts and overall efficiency.</p>		<p><b>5.d.</b> RSEWCA to strengthen the regularity and scope of IDTT meetings.</p>
<p>6. The IRDC is perceived by COAFG as a HQ-driven vehicle with insufficient engagement of key COAFG staff in IRDC meetings) potential complications and crowding out of current funding mechanisms.</p> <p>Good collaboration with the other Global Programmes is ongoing such as with the Global Container Control Programme, Afghan Opiate Trade Project and the DDR and HIV/AIDS global programmes.</p>		<p><b>6. Inter-linkages with UNODC assistance</b></p> <p><b>6.b.</b> HQ to ensure clearer modus operandi for engagement with the field for the IRDC to have stronger ownership from the field (further to the CP Pakistan recommendation).</p> <p><b>6.c.</b> SPU and ITS to explore options to link the logical frameworks of the CP, RP, and the IRDC through a viable corporate solution.</p>
<p>7. Joint monitoring visits with national counterparts and donors have been well received and commended for their value into planning and implementation.</p> <p>While UNODC has signed a number of MOUs with GOIRA counterparts, the evidence of the status of their implementation is weak.</p>		<p><b>7. Monitoring and reporting</b></p> <p><b>7.d.</b> COAFG to expand and increase the organization of joint monitoring visits to project sites with GOIRA and donor counterparts.</p> <p><b>7.e.</b> COAFG to ensure systematic monitoring of the implementation of MOUs signed with GOIRA is considered and reported upon.</p>
<p><b>Sub-Programme 1</b></p>		
<p>11. Due to the increased cost of surveys in recent year on account of security cost, increased salaries and FCR, the budget of the project has increased considerably. The existing donors of the project have expressed their inability to increase funding to cover the cost of all surveys. As a result a decision was taken to discontinue the ORAS and cannabis surveys.</p> <p>The outcomes of AFGF98 and those outlined in the CP document are different and the outcome team is obliged to report on both and this is not necessarily an efficient option.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>11. Surveys</b></p> <p><b>11.a.</b> COAFG to focus on cost-effective options such as price reporting and expand to cover the neighboring countries. For example, jointly with the RP, options to collect prices from neighboring countries should be considered in conjunction with the price monitoring systems already existing in the region.</p> <p><b>11.b.</b> COAFG to streamline the outcomes of the two vehicles (AFGF98 and CP) for efficiency purposes.</p>
<p>12. This outcome has faced significant funding challenges</p>		<p><b>12. Research</b></p> <p><b>12.a.</b> COAFG to consider placing this outcome as a cross</p>

<p>in late 2013, which have halved the team size and left it without any international staff. These human resource limitations have had an impact on implementation.</p> <p>Despite commendable cross-cutting efforts between the different research vehicles, there are opportunities to build further integration into the research efforts.</p>		<p>cutting issue across the CP in the next phase to address the funding situation and would allow each SP to allocate funds for priority research topics.</p> <p><b>12.b.</b> COAFG, AOTP, PPI, RP SP4 to further collaborate and coordinate on research projects and initiatives.</p>
<p>13. The bifurcation of AFGK63 and AFGK65 from the initial project vehicle of AFGI87 has not worked out in practise. There is a natural synergy between the two which remains despite the split– the two even share the same SPTC. Outcome 3 of SP1 (AFGK65) has suffered from a lack of funding and hence has been unable to implement the extent of its workplan.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>13. Capacity-building</b>  <b>13.a.</b> Same as Recommendation 5.a.</p> <p><b>13.b.</b> COAFG to partner with key provincial line departments for an indirect presence in poppy growing and insecure provinces.</p>
<p>Sub-Programme 2</p>		
<p>14. Mentorship is a key component of UNODC approach and CNPA counterparts continue to require assistance in developing operational and administrative initiatives.</p> <p>In order to better advance the illicit economy challenges within the enforcement framework, there needs to be an effort to counter the financial flows that accompany the illicit drug trade.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>14. Operational capacities</b>  <b>14.a.</b> COAFG to continue the mentorship programme until local capacity has been built.</p> <p><b>14.b.</b> COAFG to include an additional output in building capacity against illicit financial flows.</p>
<p>15. The specialized assistance provided through SP2 introduces a focus on establishing and maintaining inter-agency cooperation between both Afghan units/departments and other regional actors. In the law enforcement arena, this is a unique service that only UNODC can assist with and has been effective in advancing.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>15. Border management</b>  <b>15.a.</b> COAFG, FOs and RP need to coordinate better on BLOs and promote the concept more vigorously.</p> <p><b>15.b.</b> COAFG to invest in stronger systems to coordinate better with other international actors working on border control.</p>

<p>The BLO concept is well conceived and establishing BLOs in six border locations provides solid basis for success. However, its role in cross-border liaison has suffered from funding shortfalls and political sensitivities.</p>		
<p>Sub-Programme 3</p>		
<p>16. The SP has promoted and supported criminal justice reform in order to align Afghanistan's laws to international standards including its Penal Code</p> <p>The SP commenced construction of three buildings in three provinces – a district court in Balkh, the provincial judicial department building in Bamyan and a district court in Herat. Construction of the three buildings will be completed within 2014.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>16. Criminal justice reform</b>  <b>16.a.</b> COAFG to extend cooperation with TPB for technical assistance in legislative reform to update criminal law and promote international cooperation.</p> <p><b>16.b.</b> Same as Recommendation #4.c.</p>
<p>17. To date, the Outcome 7 has yet to be funded as major donors consider political commitment within the Afghan Government against corruption still insufficient, and would like to first see the incoming Government's anti-corruption commitment.</p> <p>Despite lack of funding, the SP still tried to achieve Outcome 7 based on in-kind contribution and collaboration with ongoing UNODC anti-corruption and counter-terrorism projects.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>17. Anti-corruption</b>  <b>17.a.</b> COAFG to actively pursue the new Government post-elections to take on an anti-corruption platform.</p> <p><b>17.b.</b> Joint initiatives, with other UN agencies, to be explored for fundraising.</p>
<p>18. Out of the seven total outputs, only five have been funded. This may be because there is a dearth of interest among major donors, except Japan, the SP's only donor, to support prisons and other detention facilities, which may cut across sensitive discussion on human rights violation.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>18. Prison reform</b>  <b>18.a.</b> COAFG to coordinate with other UN partners, especially UNAMA and UNDP, which have their own sections or programmes to support penitentiary reform.</p> <p><b>18.b.</b> COAFG to keep abreast of, and advocate for, human rights in prisons settings with national and international</p>

		counterparts (e.g. ICRC).
<b>Sub-Programme 4</b>		
<p>19. GOIRA counterparts and NGOs are facilitating each other in the provision of space and utilizing the services of the trained national staff for cascading trainings, this has made trainings more cost effective both at the Provincial and National levels.</p> <p>For sustainability purposes and long-term transfer of capacity, integrating these services within the GOIRA primary health system is a policy goal for UNODC.</p> <p>Without collecting and analyzing treatment outcomes, related services are being provided in a vacuum.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>19. DDR</b></p> <p><b>19.a.</b> COAFG to explore supporting training centers in the four regions of Afghanistan for capacity development through training-of-trainers from the target institutions.</p> <p><b>19.b.</b> COAFG to work for integrating the drug treatment services in the primary health clinics of the targeted areas for easy access and continuum of care.</p> <p><b>19.c.</b> COAFG to build the capacity of GOIRA and NGOs to monitor the effectiveness of their services through research and data collection on a regular basis.</p> <p>See Recommendation 21.a.</p>
<p>20. Lack of political commitment from the concerned ministries to facilitate and support programmes like Methadone maintenance has hampered scale-up efforts.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>20. HIV</b></p> <p>COAFG to (in close coordination with WHO) to carry out advocacy with the concerned ministries for meaningful dialogue on scaling up of OST in Afghanistan.</p>
<p>21. Despite significant gains in terms of the development of a national AL policy and major government programmes that involve many ministries, some key ministries and programmes in Afghanistan still refuse to add CN elements (even if it is just awareness raising) to their programmes.</p> <p>AL work is most closely aligned to the illicit economy approach and can be broadened to address wider development concerns with other actors.</p> <p>Struggles with project implementation related to HQ-Procurement reduced AL work implementation down to a trickle in 2013.</p>	<p>Literature review; Interviews with staff; GOIRA; Questionnaires</p>	<p><b>21. Alternative Livelihoods</b></p> <p><b>21.a.</b> COAFG to closely monitor the impact of FEEP on implementation of AL and DDR work in Afghanistan.</p> <p><b>21.b.</b> COAFG to re-package AL work into the illicit economy debate and approach alternative livelihoods from a wider development angle including in relation to the illicit economy.</p> <p><b>21.c.</b> COAFG to continue to advance its “Participatory Approach” to AL project design, development, M&amp;E and impact assessment.</p>