I. R. of IRAN

2003

Country profile
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (formerly called the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention) was set up in 1997, combining the United Nations for International Crime Prevention and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme. It was established by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to enable the Organisation to focus and enhance its capacity to address the interrelated issues of drug control, crime prevention and international terrorism in all its forms. The mandate of the Office derives from several conventions and General Assembly resolutions, and the Office's technical cooperation programme aims to help improve the capacity of Governments to execute those international commitments. The Office is headed by an Executive Director, appointed by the Secretary-General, and is co-located with the United Nations Office at Vienna, of which the Executive Director also serves as the Director-General.

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I.R. of Iran
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I. GENERAL SUMMARY STATISTICS (relevant to the drug and crime problem)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>I.R. of IRAN</th>
<th>Summary Statistics</th>
<th>Comparative aggregate average:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index Rank (2001)</td>
<td>98/162</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of country, (sq.km)(1999)</td>
<td>1,633,190</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arable land, (sq.km)(1999)</td>
<td>168,370</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (million)(2000)</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth, (%)(1998)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>77.00</td>
<td>64.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life-expectancy at birth (1999)</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age 15 and above, (%) (2000)</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>80.50</td>
<td>66.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age 15 to 24, (%)</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>18.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Growth, (%)(1999)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita, PPP $ (1999)</td>
<td>5,884.0</td>
<td>23,410.00</td>
<td>3,530.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total external debt, % of GNP (1998)</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population living below national poverty line (1994-2000)</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income distribution ratio, (20% richest / 20% poorest)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (1997)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>7.0(OECD)(98)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth unemployment rate</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>12.8(OECD)(98)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure on health, (% of GDP)(1998)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population with access to health services, (%)(1999)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors per 100,000 people (1992-1995)</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>246.0</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS cases per 100,000 people (1997)</td>
<td>(..)</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate (1998)</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined enrolment ratio (primary, secondary, tertiary)(1999)</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>61.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio per 1,000 people (2000)</td>
<td>281.0</td>
<td>1,005.0</td>
<td>185.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television per 1,000 people (2000)</td>
<td>163.0</td>
<td>621.0</td>
<td>162.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone lines per 1,000 people (2000)</td>
<td>149.0</td>
<td>524.0</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet hosts per 1,000 people (1998)</td>
<td>250.00</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank, UNDP, DESA, FAO.
II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE DRUG AND CRIME SITUATION

For centuries, Southwest Asia has been involved in the cultivation of opium poppy for local consumption. Iran, too, had up to 33,000 hectares under cultivation prior to the Islamic Revolution in 1979. However, following swift remedial action by law enforcement bodies, cultivation was totally eradicated by the end of 1980. The eradication of opium poppy cultivation did not however, solve the drug related problems of the newly established Islamic Republic. The relocation of opium production to Afghanistan and, until the late 1990s, to Pakistan, resulted in the transformation of Iran into a major transit corridor for opium and morphine towards illicit heroin refineries in Turkey. As far as drug consumption was concerned, the severe policy adopted by the Government only temporarily ceased the old tradition of opium consumption. Today, Iran is affected by an alarming drug abuse problem that affects nearly 2% of its population. Despite the world leading position of Iranian law enforcement agencies in terms of opium, morphine, and heroin seizures, traffickers have not released their pressure on the country’s eastern borders, where over 3,100 law enforcement officers lost their lives in confrontations with heavily armed trafficking bands since 1979. In recent years the trafficking issue in border areas has further deteriorated, becoming a major security issue for the Iranian Government.

In 2001, the narcotic problem continued to rank very high among the priorities of the Iranian Government. The excellent advocacy efforts carried out by the national drug control inter institutional specialized body, the Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ) and its Secretariat, started to yield significant results in 2001. The operational approach to the drug issue has indeed started to shift from the traditional supply reduction and punitive approach to a more modern, balanced approach under which the requirements of drug demand reduction are duly considered and met, and responsibilities and operational tasks are shared with NGOs, voluntary associations and, more generally, civil society. Complementary to this important shift is the development by Iranian authorities of alternative development/crop substitution initiatives in Afghanistan’s opium poppy producing areas. The implementation in Afghanistan of the opium poppy ban in 2000 had important outcomes in Iran in terms of both supply of and demand for illicit narcotics. The positive effects of the reduced supply, viz. the dramatic reduction of opium and morphine seizures and by the steady price increases (up to 600%), were overshadowed by the hastened shifting in patterns of consumption with the consequent increase of heroin abuse as a substitute for opium.

The importance of the drug issue for the Iranian Government was duly reflected by the high priority given to the narcotic issue at the international conference on Afghanistan and its reconstruction. A consistent part of the US$ 560 million pledge by Iran to the reconstruction of Afghanistan would be channelled to crop substitution projects. Prior to September 11th and the fall of the Taliban regime, Drug Control Headquarters had delivered some US$ 6 million in-kind assistance to Afghan farmers of Helmand Province who had eradicated their opium poppy cultivation.

In 2001, important events occurred in the area of crime control and the overall administration of justice. For the first time, cases of corruption and economic crime reached courts and the pages of national newspapers. The acknowledgment of the widespread nature of corrupt practices in both the private and public sector shook Iran’s power structures to the highest echelons. This incident also revealed that corruption and economic crime posed a major threat to national security. By way of response, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, established a high level inter-institutional body chaired by the President, tasked with the responsibility of devising appropriate counter-strategies. In the same vein, a slow but comprehensive reform of the judicial system began with the reestablishment of the office of the public prosecutor. This way followed by a revision of criminal sanctions applying to sentenced drug abusers and an upgrading of the juvenile justice system.
In the year 2001, the strategy of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Iran focused on two main elements: first, supporting the dynamism of Iranian foreign policy in the area of narcotic control by facilitating technical and non-technical contacts between Iranian drug control agencies and with institutional and non-institutional counterparts of the international community. Second, consolidating the role of UNODC as a centre of excellence for technical and strategic matters, and supporting the internal debate on the drug issue through advocacy the provision of direct support to NGOs and civil society in general. As far as 2002 is concerned, the two above-mentioned strategic objectives will continue to form the cornerstones of UNODC operations in Iran. They will, however, be updated in accordance with the policy directives and initiatives approved in Vienna HQ. In this context, particular attention will be given to the Afghan issue, the finalization of UNODC activities in the Caucasus, and the strengthening of drug control cooperation in the Gulf Region. In addition, increased attention will be given to the expansion of the technical cooperation and reporting mandates of the Office to the areas specific to crime prevention.
III. SUMMARY STATISTICS

a) Drugs

Cultivation
No cultivation of illicit narcotic plants is reported to take place in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Production
No production of illicit narcotics is reported to occur in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Potential manufacture
No manufacture of illicit narcotics is reported to occur in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Drug seizures in Kg

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>1,986</td>
<td>2,894</td>
<td>6,030</td>
<td>6,189</td>
<td>4,001</td>
<td>-34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphine</td>
<td>10,430</td>
<td>18,949</td>
<td>22,291</td>
<td>22,764</td>
<td>20,764</td>
<td>8,668</td>
<td>-57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium</td>
<td>149,577</td>
<td>162,414</td>
<td>154,454</td>
<td>204,485</td>
<td>179,053</td>
<td>81,061</td>
<td>-55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashish</td>
<td>13,063</td>
<td>11,096</td>
<td>14,376</td>
<td>18,907</td>
<td>31,581</td>
<td>46,084</td>
<td>+46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Annual prevalence of drug abuse (as a percentage of age 15 and above)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opiates</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulants (Amphetamine type)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...Other drugs</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


b) Crime
No data is available from official sources.

- Budget/financial resources in US$
  - Police         n.a.
  - Prosecution    n.a.
  - Courts         n.a.
  - Prisons        n.a.
IV. THE YEAR IN REVIEW: MAIN EVENTS

a) Major political and economic events
Despite the landslide victory of President Khatami at the presidential ballot in June 2001\(^1\), and the large majority of seats held by reformers in the National Parliament, the long awaited reforms did not materialise in 2001. This generated a feeling of discontent in the general public, and of frustration among political activists and business operators. The continuous fights between the Parliament and the Council of Guardians almost paralysed legislative functions that, \textit{in absentia}, were carried out by the Expediency Council chaired by former President Rafsanjani. The closing down of newspapers and magazines, and the prosecution of their editors by the Tehran judiciary not only continued during 2001, but was accompanied by a number of actions targeting dissenting pressure groups and student leaders.

In this context, the role and position of President Khatami was continuously questioned and challenged. Overruled by the judiciary and the establishment, questioned by his voters and the parliament, President Khatami expressed a number of time his own discontent about the progress of his plans and the concrete capability of his Government for delivering what promised during the electoral campaign.

Under President Khatami the I. R. of Iran regained credibility and trust within the international community. The prompt reaction of President Khatami to the September 11 terrorist attack, the wise neutrality adopted during the following military campaign, and the constructive attitude offered to the United Nations in providing a political solution to the Afghan crisis were the final steps of a successful re-positioning strategy which made the I.R. of Iran a balancing partner in a troubled region.

In 2001, relations with the US did not progress as many expected following the re-election of President Khatami and the election of President Bush. On the contrary, the recent developments\(^2\) jeopardized President Khatami’s projects. If the unofficial rapprochement consequent to the Afghan crisis gave the illusion of a narrowing of distances between Washington and Tehran, the escalation of violence in the Middle East (and the two countries’ opposite positions in the matter) and the US Administration latest remarks on Iran and the “axes of evil” definitely brought to an end any possible dialogue, at least for the time being.

The latest US assessment of Iran, and its consequent policy options, was not shared by the EU (both an institution and as individual member states), as well as by the international community at large. Iran détente foreign policy proposals in the region yielded indeed significant results: the September 11\(^{th}\) terrorist attack and the Afghan crisis suggested the other major regional powers (Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) take a much more cooperative look at Iranian proposals. Europe, for its part, continued with its “constructive dialogue” approach. Business opportunities in the oil sector coupled with the US embargo on investments in Iran constitute a strong incentive for European and non-European economies to foster their bilateral contacts with the I.R. of Iran.

In the economic field, the stabilization of the price of oil between US$ 18 and US$ 22 per barrel enabled a smooth running of fiscal policies, and enabled Iran to proceed with an important re-

\(^1\) President Khatami obtained more then 21million votes, viz. 77% of total votes.
\(^2\) In January 2002, in his annual speech “State of the Union” President Bush included Iran into the so called “axis of evil”-together with Iraq and North Korea- because of their programs to acquire or develop nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. He also accused the Islamic Republic of trying to destabilize neighbouring Afghanistan, and to have sheltered Al Qaeda terrorists running away from Afghanistan.
payment of its foreign debts\textsuperscript{3}. The national currency, the Iranian Rial, was not affected either by dollar fluctuation or recession news from the major economic markets. Nevertheless, the major and most pressing problems affecting the Iranian economy, viz. unemployment, unbalances in income distribution, and dependency on oil revenues, could not find significant solutions. According to available data, unemployment stands at 3 million to 3.5 million individuals, viz. some 13\% of the Iranian active population\textsuperscript{4}, and some 700,000-800,000 jobs per year ought to be created just to absorb the wave of new job applicants joining the market as a result of the baby boom of the 1980s. Even if sufficient new jobs were created, Iranians would not have bright economic prospects for the future. According to a recent report published by the Iranian Statistical Centre, annual per capita income stood at Rials 7.177 million (equivalent to US$ 905) in 2000, with an estimated inflation rate of 11.5\% in 2001. According to the same report, about 15\% of the population live below poverty line.

b) Drugs

Two major events marked the development of the drug issue in Iran in the year 2001: the implementation of the opium poppy ban in Afghanistan, with its related consequences on the Iranian internal markets; and the re-election of President Khatami, who reconfirmed the high priority of the drug control issue in his new presidential tenure, and voiced his commitment to the policies and strategies devised by the Secretariat of the Drug Control Headquarters.

b.1. Overview of illicit narcotic supply and demand

The implementation of the opium poppy ban by Taleban authorities did not come as a surprise to Iranian drug control authorities, who, already in late 1999, had initiated talks with the authorities of Helmand Province for launching crop substitution projects. Delivery of immediate in-kind assistance started in early 2001, and continued until September 11\textsuperscript{th}. Under Iranian bi-lateral assistance, some US$ 6 million in-kind inputs, including fertilizers, agricultural tools, seeds, fuel, agricultural heavy machinery, food and medicines, were delivered and/or made ready for delivery to 15 districts of Helmand Province\textsuperscript{5}.

Following the September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attack and the military campaign in Afghanistan, the Iranian Government was very active in pushing the drug issue as a priority within the overall reconstruction plans for Afghanistan devised at the Bonn, Berlin and Tokyo Conferences. Iran pledged US$ 560 million to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and clearly expressed its intention of devoting a part of it to drug control (both crop substitution and creation of the Afghan Anti-Narcotic Police).

The implementation of the opium poppy ban had dramatic repercussions on both the supply of and demand for illicit drugs in Iran. Starting from mid-2001, the price of opium on the Tehran market skyrocketed from US$ 400 per kilo in December 2000 to US$ 2,500 in April 2001\textsuperscript{6}. From June onward, prices for opium stabilized around US$ 1,600 per kilo. However, the quality of marketed opium deteriorated. Morphine almost disappeared from the market. Heroin, on the other hand, maintained a stable price, particularly at street market level. Its quality, however, progressively decreased...

\textsuperscript{3} According to latest information, Moody’s, the credit-ranking agency, intends to upgrade Iran’s rating to B1 from the 1999 assigned B2 rating. In January 2002, the launch of €500million eurobonds by the Iranian central bank was very well received by both national and international financial markets.

\textsuperscript{4} Independent estimates, however, put unemployment at least 20\% of the active population.

\textsuperscript{5} The targeted districts are as follows: Baghram, GarmSir, Kajaki, Kharneshin, Musa Qala, Nade Ali, Nowzad, Washir, Gereshk, Marja, Nare, Zangin, Dishow, Share Wali, Yachni.

\textsuperscript{6} Latest available prices, unofficially reported to the UNODC Office in February 2002, showed a fall of opium prices. News about resumption of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan have certainly pushed down prices as shown also from data collected by UNODC in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Considering, however, the most recent trends in seizures at Iranian eastern borders, the fall of prices may indicate the desire of Iranian drug traffickers to eliminate available opium stocked inside the country.
The availability of heroin on internal markets could be explained due to the following factors:

- Existence of stocks in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, which were put on the market in order to meet the unattended demand for opium;
- Improved risk-benefit relation of heroin smuggling and peddling versus opium.

As far as drug trafficking is concerned, available figures confirm previous analysis about the overall reduction of illicit drug supplies entering Iran from its eastern frontiers. A more in depth look at anti-drug trafficking operations in Iran in the year 2001 suggests, however, the following considerations:

- While large shipment of opiates almost disappeared, particularly in the second half of 2001, trafficking in either hashish or small quantities (1 to 5 kilos) of heroin continued;
- The implementation by the Iranian Anti-Narcotic Police of regular mopping up operations in major urban centres increased the total figure of seizures perpetrated in the country. Narcotics seized during these operations, however, could have entered the country prior to the opium poppy ban and been held in stock within Iran;
- Large shipments of hashish were seized by the Anti-Narcotic Police in Sistan/Baluchestan Province confirming the different features and economic function of drug smuggling operated by Afghan armed groups on the north eastern border, and local ethnic groups and tribes on the South Eastern borders (see more below under “trafficking routes”);

The dramatic changes on the supply side coupled with the renewed attention by the Iranian Anti-Narcotic Police to the dismantling of internal markets had a dramatic impact on the demand for narcotic drugs in the country. Iranian drug consumers have been estimated at some 2 million, with 800,000 to 1,200,000 as addicted opiates abusers.

Faced with a situation of poor street supply and very high prices, opium abusers have been forced to either look for treatment and rehabilitation services or to shift to substitute narcotics (heroin or synthetic opiates such as buthromorphine and methadone). High prices of available opiates on street markets, and deterioration of their purities have further pushed heroin abusers to injecting from smoking. Intravenous drug abuse (IDU), previously limited to particular high-risk groups (inmates in prison and homeless), increased in 2001, justifying concern by the Iranian authorities about a possible HIV epidemic. Moreover, the combination of injecting and low purity caused a 70% increase in drug-related deaths (2,106 recorded cases) compared to the previous year.

b.2. Overview of national drug control policy

The re-election of President Khatami yielded positive outcomes for the drug control efforts of the Government of Iran. The re-elected President chaired the autumn meeting of Drug Control Headquarters and on that occasion reiterated his wish to directly supervise the inter-institutional coordination work required for addressing the drug issue in the country.

The 2000 DCHQ Secretariat’s policy, aimed at the very root causes of the drug issue through crop eradication in Afghanistan, received further impetus with the transfer of ongoing and future technical cooperation tasks to the Iranian Ministry of Agriculture, and with the linking of the opium poppy cultivation issue to the overall agro-industrial development of Afghanistan.

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7 The Afghan crisis following the 9/11 attack and the deployment of Iranian military forces along Iran’s borders with Afghanistan certainly deterred trafficking of narcotics.
8 According to Drug Control Headquarters estimation, the Iranian opium markets absorb annually between 700 to 800 tons of opiates.
9 According to available statistics intravenous drug abuse is the main cause for HIV/AIDS infection, accounting for 69% of total recorded cases.
In November, the Expediency Council reviewed and amended the legal disposition applying to the financing of DCHQ Secretariat and its operation. Starting on the Iranian New Year (21 March 2002), the DCHQ budget would be directly inscribed into the Government budget and submitted for the approval of the national parliament. 

Finally, work started on the revision and update of the 1988 anti-narcotic bill, together with a new drug control national strategy. According to information available to this Office, the new law and its operational strategy would shift the focus of the current anti-narcotic campaign from supply (and repression) to demand reduction (and rehabilitation of drug users). In addition, NGOs and the private sector would be asked to join the drug control campaign, particularly in the areas of treatment and rehabilitation of drug abusers.

According to the available data of Iranian law enforcement agencies, 311,984 individuals were arrested in 2001. This figure included 112,236 smugglers, 196,573 drug addicts, and 3,176 foreign nationals. As far as gender is concerned, 97% of the arrested were males, while 3% were females.


c) Crime and corruption
No data currently available to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime as far as crime in Iran is concerned. On the basis of press releases and other unofficial information, however, the following general remarks can be made:

- Drug-related convictions account for some 60% of current inmates in Iranian prisons; bank fraud, bounced cheques and burglary are the other most common causes for custodial conviction;
- Data on violent and property crimes reported at police stations indicate a considerable upward trend in the last ten years;
- Provincial data for the period 2000 - 2001 suggest a close correlation between murder and drug trafficking, with the Provinces of Sistan/Baluchestan, Khorasan, and Kerman respectively ranking second, third, and fourth after Tehran;
- Press reports denounced the existence of prostitution racketing with international links mainly to the Gulf Region.

The fight against corruption became a crucial element of President Khatami’s re-election campaign in 2001 and has been at the centre of the public’s attention ever since. The extent of corrupt practices at different levels of the Iranian administrative sectors caused Leader Khamenei himself to address the matter several times in his speeches to the nation, as well as to call all Iranian institutions to wage an all-out campaign against economic corruption. In late 2001, the judiciary commenced hearing a big trial against a businessman who claimed he “donated” large amount of money to members of parliament and government institutions.

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10 Previously, DCHQ budget was made mostly from revenues from selling assets and seized narcotics to the local pharmaceutical industry. The dramatic drop in seizures in 2001 financially jeopardized the implementation of approved plans.
11 The Supreme Leader of IR of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, on 30th April 2001 issued an eight point decree calling for the establishment of an “Anti- Corruption Misappropriation Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs” The decree clearly and unambiguously stated that “all individuals, organisations and institutions, no matter who supervises them or whom has appointed their administrators , including those appointed by the Supreme Leader” must be held accountable. The Special Headquarters for Examining Economic Offenses established under the decree is composed by the following offices/institutions: the Presidency, Parliament Speaker, Head of Judiciary, Minister of Information, Head of the Management and Planning Organisation, Head of the State Investigation Organisation, Head of the Justice Department in Tehran, Minister of Commerce, and a representative from the national parliament.
The urgency of addressing the issue of corruption in Iran is not limited to ethical considerations only, but finds its soundest justification in the peculiar structure of the Iranian economy. The flow of capital controlled by para-statal and private finance institutions, unofficial credit funds, illegal exchange houses and contraband, are obstacles to the sound planning of the Iranian economy. Experts from the Ministry of Economy and Finance estimate that the “unofficial sector” controls 50% to 54% of the national internal product. The same experts estimate the annual capital turnover of the Iranian “unofficial sector” at around US$ 39 billion - almost 17% more than the total government budget in 1998-1999. The current legal system contemplates a range of penalties to be applied to corruption-related crimes. For example, Article 49 of the Iranian Constitution clearly spells out that funds generated through irregular and unlawful activities must be confiscated and punitive measures be applied against offenders.

Iran is a signatory to the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime.

V. GENERAL SETTING

Major characteristics of the country (relevant to the drug and crime problem)

With a population of over 65 million, of which 60% is below 26 years and fairly well educated, an immense wealth in oil and natural gas reserves, and a prestigious history, the I.R. of Iran can legitimately aspire to become an important regional power in East Asia. Being a natural gateway for Asian civilizations toward Europe (and vice-versa), the I.R. of Iran has shared with Turkey the leadership of the most illuminated and powerful Muslim civilizations. After twenty years of international isolation and autarchy consequent to the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, the I.R. of Iran seems to be back on its feet and ready to regain not only its cultural, political and economic power, but also propose itself as a model for other Muslim countries facing the dilemma of combining modernity and religion. A difficult road, however, awaits the legitimate aspirations of Iran and its citizens.

The I.R. of Iran of the third millennium is indeed something different from the country that deposed the Pahlavi royal family and the system of privileges and the inequality that characterized the Shah’s regime. It is also different, however, from the country that occupied the US Embassy and fought an eight-year long war against Iraq. The economic and political stability of the last 10 years have indeed eroded the strong ideological drives of the revolution and of the Iran-Iraq war period, leaving room for deep self-criticism of the achievements of the revolution by ordinary Iranians. Fairly endowed in infrastructures, and with a well developed social welfare system reaching the majority of its citizens, today, the I.R. of Iran faces the problem of the natural aging of its welfare and wealth redistribution systems, of its infrastructures, and of its justice system, as well as all the socio economic problems typical of newly developed economies, where the fast growth of its population (and of its demands) could not be met timely. The excessively rapid urbanization process (the population of so-called “big Tehran” has been estimated at over 12 million people, i.e. some 20% of the total Iranian population; the second largest town, Mashhad in Khorasan Province, with a population of some 3 million) has been accompanied by the usual dysfunctions of similar processes, namely the disruption of the traditional social control and solidarity mechanisms, the appearance of marginalized neighborhoods, and the emergence of an

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12 Dr. S. Sahraian, Production: The Road in Front of the Sixth Parliament, Ma’aref Printing, 2000.
13 Article 49 of the Constitution states: “The government has the responsibility of confiscating all wealth accumulated through usury, usurpation, bribery, embezzlement, theft, gambling, misuse of endowments, misuse of government contracts and transactions, the sale of uncultivated lands and other resources subject to public ownership, the operation of centres of corruption, and other illicit means and sources, and restoring it to its legitimate owner; and if no such owner can be identified, it must be entrusted to the public treasury. This rule must be executed by the government with due care, after investigation and furnishing necessary evidence in accordance with the law of Islam.”
working class of rootless youngsters\textsuperscript{14}. These radical changes have also affected the middle/upper classes who have not found yet a clear collocation into the new socio economic context.

However, the I.R. of Iran does not lack the financial and intellectual resources needed to face these challenges. In 2001, GDP real growth was projected at some 4\%, inflation fell to 11.5\%, and external debt to US$ 7.8 billion (from US$ 10.2 billion of 2000). The younger population of the new Iran is well educated (over 60\% of the total population is below 26). Women play a significant public role and have access to significant public and private positions. Despite the campaign carried out by the conservative establishment on many independent newspapers and magazines, the written mass media have enjoyed a good degree of (relative) freedom in the latest four years and are well supported by the general public\textsuperscript{15}. The National TV station (IRIB) broadcasts four different channels and is watched all over the country and abroad (via satellite)\textsuperscript{16}. The same applies to radio broadcasting. Iranian cinema is not only amongst the most rewarded worldwide but also very widespread in the country, both in term of audience and productions. The internet has become a major urban youth feature in Iran too: together with its economic consequences (hardware shops, software houses and internet-cafés are blooming all over the country, becoming one of the main economic opportunities for the Iranian youth) and the internet revolution also reflects the strong wish of the Iranian youth for more freedom and contact with the rest of the world.

VI. DRUG SITUATION

Production and cultivation
No licit or illicit cultivation of narcotic plants is reported to take place in the territory of the I.R. of Iran. In January 2002, however, the national new agency - IRNA - reported on the eradication of some two hectares of opium poppy by police forces in Sistan/Baluchestan Province.

Manufacture
No reports seem to indicate the existence of illicit drug manufacturing in the I.R. of Iran.

A large part of the opium seized by law enforcement authorities is used by the national pharmaceutical industry for manufacturing licit drugs, mainly codeine. The possibility of leakage from the licit into the illicit opiate markets also exists.

Trafficking
Iran is still one of the main conduits for illegal substances, namely opium, hashish, heroin and morphine base, which originate in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and destined for markets in Europe and the Gulf Region (Annex 1.a). According to rough estimates by the Iranian drug control authorities, some 50\% of the total opiate production of Afghanistan transits the Iranian territory. A portion of it (700 to 800 tons\textsuperscript{17}) is supposedly absorbed by the Iranian internal market. The majority of the opiates are smuggled out of the country for further processing and forwarding to Europe and the Middle East.

\textsuperscript{14} Contrary to all expectations, the phenomenon of street children is starting to become evident in Tehran. Green House, an NGO affiliated to the Municipality of Tehran, treated some 5000 difficult children from March 1999 to April 2000.

\textsuperscript{15} All Iranians are said to read at least one daily newspaper a day.

\textsuperscript{16} Satellite TV receivers and antennas are still forbidden in Iran. Recently, however, an overall tendency towards tolerating them has been registered.

\textsuperscript{17} The quoted figure has been suggested by the research department of the Drug Control Headquarters. Independent sources however, put the internal Iranian demand at much higher levels.
Drug seizures in Kg 1999-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>6,030</td>
<td>6,189</td>
<td>4,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphine</td>
<td>22,764</td>
<td>20,764</td>
<td>8,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium</td>
<td>204,485</td>
<td>179,053</td>
<td>79,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashish</td>
<td>18,907</td>
<td>31,581</td>
<td>46,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>1,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>253,274</td>
<td>238,593</td>
<td>139,814</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The analysis of the seizures suggests the following considerations:

- The sudden reduction of opium poppy production in Afghanistan has been immediately reflected in terms of seizure of opiates in the territory of Iran. Reports on individual seizures and the current prices of opium in the Iranian illicit markets seem to indicate that if large stocks of opium were held in Afghanistan they were not made available for consumer markets in 2001.
- The flow of heroin may indicate an improved processing capability of trafficking organisations in Afghanistan.
- The steady increase in hashish seizures supported by figures on the number of seizures could be taken as a good indicator of the situation on the supply side of traffickers in 2001. The reduced availability of opium may have forced trafficking rings in diversifying their smuggling operations and embracing equally risky but less lucrative items like hashish.
- The increase in hashish seizures may also be taken as a reliable indicator for both the efficiency and commitment of Iranian law enforcement agencies, and the unquestionable importance of the Iranian corridor as the preferred trafficking route for illicit drugs from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Europe and the Gulf Region.

Entry Trafficking Routes (Annex I.b)
There are three main trafficking routes through the I.R. of Iran: Northern, Southern, and Hormuzgan.

Northern Route - Khorasan Province (Annex I.c)
With an area of over 315,000 km² Khorasan Province borders Turkmenistan to the north and northeast, Afghanistan to the east, the provinces of Mazanderan, Semnan, Esfahan, and Yazd to the west, and the provinces of Kerman and Sistan/Baluchestan to the south.

Due to its proximity to Afghanistan, Khorasan Province hosts a large number of Afghan refugees and is one of the major transit points for illegal Afghan migrants. The mountainous and desert nature of the area, coupled with the low density of population, make the control difficult, if not impossible, for law enforcement. The authorities have identified some 90 illicit entry points along the border with Afghanistan.

Identified trafficking routes originating from Khorasan:


Trafficking in Khorasan is mostly carried-out by Afghans. Crossing the border mainly by foot, they operate both in large and small-armed groups. Larger groups often resort to kidnapping and murdering of civilians in order to ensure the logistic support of locals. Smaller groups (2 to 4
individuals) usually carry up to 10 kg of heroin/opium per person; larger groups carry several hundred-kilo consignments using donkeys and camels.

In 2001, and according to preliminary analysis by the Iranian Anti-Narcotic Police based on seizures, trafficking along the Northern route decreased. Mashhad, and the Mashhad-Tehran road, however, continues to be one of the preferred trans-shipment points for illicit drugs entering Iran from both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Southern Route-Sistan/Baluchestan (and Kerman) Province(s) (Annex 1.d)

With a land surface of 178,431 km$^2$ and a population of 1.7 million, the Province of Sistan/Baluchestan borders the Sea of Oman to the south, Pakistan and Afghanistan to the east, Provinces Kerman and Hormuzgan to the west, and the Province of Khorasan to the north. The Province is divided into seven main districts (and seven main towns). Zahedan District, where the provincial capital Zahedan is located, has a population of 420,000. There are 6,500 villages in the Province.

According to the 1999 Human Development Report, Sistan/Baluchestan is Iran's poorest province, with the lowest Human Development Index (HDI), Gender Development Index (GDI) and poverty index in the country. Out of a total population of 1.7 million, 300,000-350,000 are refugees/immigrants (Afghans) and 20,000 people are the local nomads. Sistan/Baluchestan's inhabitants live in a sparse area lacking water and good land, and where concentrated populations are very distant from one another (average distance is 65 km$^1$). The landscape is mostly sandy desert with bare hills and scarcely any vegetation. 20% of the population lives below the extreme poverty line. Nearly 810,000 people are considered literate (or 48%), of which 58% are men and 42% women.

The long border with Pakistan (976 kilometers) and the history of the territory and ethnic groups inhabiting it have characterized the overall development of Sistan/Baluchestan Province. Its ethnic roots can be traced into the nomadic tribes generally identified as Baluchis and Sistanis that were and still are distributed between the Iranian, Pakistani, and Afghan territories. Fierce and rebellious to any kind of foreign domination they have managed to preserve their cultural and economic independence throughout the histories of Iran and Pakistan.

According to Iranian law enforcement authorities, 50 smuggling routes are currently in use in Sistan/Baluchestan. Key locations are identified as Mirjaveh, Zahedan, and Iranshahr.

Identified trafficking routes originating from Sistan/Baluchestan:
2. Sistan/Baluchestan-Khorasan.
3. Sistan/Baluchestan-Bandar Abbas and/or Hormouzgan (Gulf area)-Fars-Khozestan.

 Trafficking in Sistan/Baluchestan is carried out by large well-armed motorized convoys. Different local groups (tribes) may join the traffickers against the law enforcement units operating in the area. Contrary to Khorasan, the tribal links do ensure the overall support for the traffickers by local communities. More recently, the improved law enforcement coordination on both sides of the Iran-Pakistan border, and the apparent shortage of opium and opium derivatives on the Afghan and Pakistani markets, are forcing the trafficking groups to engage in the less lucrative smuggling of hashish. In 2001, the southern route accounted for the largest volume of seizures by the Iranian Anti-Narcotic Police (63% of opium, 57% of morphine, 68% of heroin, 85% of hashish).

$^1$ There are 4,909 km of roads of which only km 1,544 are asphalted.
Hormouzgan Route
The Hormouzgan Province is situated at the Gulf shores in the vicinity of the Sea of Oman. The provincial capital, Bandar Abbas, is the most important Iranian international port. Ferries link Bandar Abbas to Dubai. TIR trucks and lorries enter the port for loading and unloading commercial goods and cargos. Good roads link Bandar Abbas to the central part of Iran and a railway directly links Bandar Abbas to the Tehran-Istanbul and Tehran-Damascus railways. Because of its role of a commercial port, Bandar Abbas is an easy trans-shipment point for both outgoing deliveries of illicit drugs to destinations in Europe and in the Gulf region, and for incoming chemical precursors destined for illicit refineries in Afghanistan.

Identified trafficking routes originating from Hormouzgan:

1. Gawater port (Pakistan) - Sistan/Baluchestan-Chabahar port.
2. Gawater port (Pakistan) - Bandar Abbas port-Khozestan.

Smuggling through the Hormuzgan route takes place either by speed boats and small vessels or by the use of the land vehicles through Sistan/Baluchestan. Recent reports from the Anti-Narcotic Forces of Pakistan confirm concerns by Iranian law enforcement of the increased use of this route for illicit shipments to the coasts of both Iran and Oman.

Exit routes
As far as exit routes are concerned, the traditional exit points at the border with Turkey have now been complemented with a number of new routes, which also reflect the increased integration of Iran within the region and the rest of the world. Accordingly, these routes can be identified as follows:

Western route
The oldest and most common trafficking route: Tehran/Central Iran-West Azerbaijan Province-Urumiyeh border post-Turkey.

In recent years the following new routes have complemented the usual and direct route through Urumiyeh:


Northern route
This new trafficking route is used both for circumventing the Iranian law enforcement checkpoints and for shipping illicit drugs directly to the CIS countries, particularly to the Russian Federation. Khorasan Province-Turkmenistan.

Southern route
Illicit drug consignments, mainly hashish, flow through this route towards the Gulf Region, the European and North American markets, as final destinations of small consignments. The routes include:

1. Bandar Abbas-United Arab Emirates.
2. Iranian sea coast-Kuwait.

Eastern route
The Eastern route is mainly directed to the Middle East markets: Khozestan and Kermanshah Provinces-Iraq.
Other exit routes/trafficking methods

a. Swallowing is becoming a common method of smuggling illicit drugs into Iran. In 2000, the Iranian law enforcement authorities seized 1,089 kg of illicit drugs (opium - 849 kg; heroin - 233 kg; hashish - 3 kg) on 4,460 human carriers. Of the arrested, 87% were males, 13% females. 7% of all arrested traffickers were foreign nationals (mostly Afghans).

b. Seizures of opium and heroin by the Iranian Customs in outgoing mail parcels continued in 2001 totalling 42.5 kg in 82 cases. The main destination countries of parcels containing illicit drugs were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Quantity in KG</th>
<th>N. of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 2000, the Iranian Customs service of Fars Province seized 127.5 kg of opium concealed in a shipment of marble statues destined for the US through Dubai.

c. National and international Iranian airports are more often used by traffickers for both internal and international smuggling of drugs. In 2000, the Iranian law enforcement authorities arrested 1,601 individuals and seized a total of 222 kg of drugs (opium 187 kg; heroin 23 kg; hashish 17 kg). Of this, 95 kg was destined for foreign countries. The airports involved were Tehran (37%), Kerman (24%), Zahedan (18%), Bandar Abbas (8%), Chabahar (7%), and Zabol (5%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Quantity in KG</th>
<th>N. of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Diversion of drugs and precursors

In 2001, reports from both treatment and rehabilitation facilities and the Anti-narcotic Police pointed to the appearance on the Iranian illicit markets of synthetic opiates such as methadone and buthromorphine. According to Anti-narcotic Police reports, seized synthetic opiates are not included in the Iranian pharmacopoeia and consequently entered the country illicitly. On the other hand, the large supply of seized opiates to the licit pharmaceutical industry and the consequently easy availability of opium derived pharmaceutical products, mainly codeine, in Iranian pharmaceutical retailers could enable under-the-counter sales of these products.

19 Zahedan, Zabol, and Chabahar belong all to Sistan/Baluchestan Province.
The trade in chemical precursors is currently not under any specific control by the Iranian law enforcement agencies. From January to October 2001, the Iranian Customs Service seized 20,440 litres of acetic anhydride in two different operations. All seizures of acetic anhydride took place at Iranian ports in the Gulf Region. Seized precursors were bound for Afghanistan.

**Drug prices**

Prices reported below are hereby presented for providing a general outlook of the illicit drug market in Iran. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime collected them through different unofficial sources whose full reliability cannot be assured/guaranteed by this Office.

### Prices on Tehran market in hundred of US$ per 1kg

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>01.01</th>
<th>02.01</th>
<th>03.01</th>
<th>04.01</th>
<th>05.01</th>
<th>06.01</th>
<th>07.01</th>
<th>08.01</th>
<th>09.01</th>
<th>10.01</th>
<th>11.01</th>
<th>12.01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opium</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12-13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16-17</td>
<td>13-14</td>
<td>14-15</td>
<td>15-16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15-16</td>
<td>17-23</td>
<td>17-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphine</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroin*</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>15-18</td>
<td>44-50</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>32-37</td>
<td>35-38</td>
<td>40-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashish</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>6-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All prices refer to heroin with purity at up to 50% but January and March (purity up to 20%)

**Demand**

The Government’s most recent estimates on drug consumption in Iran, based on case enumeration using secondary data, indicate that about 1.2 million people (in a population of 62 million) are regular drug users or are dependent on drugs, mostly opiates. The same official sources estimate the overall number of domestic drug users at some 2 million.

A further source of information emanates from data related to drug screening before marriage and applications for Government posts (mandatory under Iranian law): in this case results show that 1.5% of those screened proved positive for opiate abuse.

In 1998-1999, UNDCP and the Prevention Department of the Social Welfare Organisation, Ministry of Health, implemented the first drug abuse Rapid Situation Assessment (RSA) study in an effort to better assess the nature and extent of the situation. Undertaken in ten major urban sites of the country, the results of the RSA indicate that the prevalence figures for severe forms of drug abuse, particularly opiates, varies between 1-2% of the general population. The research concentrated solely on problematic drug abuse, without even trying to estimate the extent of recreational/occasional use of drugs among the Iranian population. The sample population used included abusers in T&R centres (32%), prisons (35%), and on the street (33%).

The common drugs of abuse are opium (*thariac*), opium residue (*shire* and *sukhte*) and cannabis (*hashish*). The opiates described were traditionally smoked in opium pipes in old Persia and are still the major drugs of abuse in Iran. Opium is also consumed orally, often dissolved in tea. A small proportion of users inject opium by dissolving it (or its residue) in water (*blackwater opium*). Because of its traditional nature, the use of opium is considered less serious than the use of heroin by both Iranian law and the general public. Cause for alarm is the increase in heroin consumption, where users sniff, smoke and inject it. There are, however, significant regional differences as far as the spread of heroin abuse is concerned: for instance, in Kermanshah (bordering Iraq) reported heroin abuse stands at 66.7%; in Tehran it stands at 57.3%; and in Semnan (Caspian Sea) at 3.3% only. The same applies to the number of IDU, which was reported to be particularly high in Mazandaran (Caspian Sea) with a prevalence rate of 30.8%, followed by Tehran (26.7%). The most

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20 It is worth mentioning that in this latest case, persons screened knew the implications of the test results. Therefore, likelihood of under-detection using this source of data is high.
common reasons cited for switching from opium to heroin, and from smoking to injecting are: a) “opium not giving enough “high”; b) “opium becoming costly and unavailable”; and c) “availability and affordability of heroin”. A small proportion reported to have used pharmaceutical substances (codeine). Countrywide RSA findings suggest that 21.9%, of the total number of drug abusers had injected opiates (heroin or opium residue).

As the profile of the ordinary Iranian drug abuser is concerned, the cited RSA indicates the following:

- Age of abusers: 68.1% between 20 and 40 years of age.
- Principal age of drug abusers: 33.6 (+/-10.5) for males and 37.7 for females (the youngest drug abuser reported in this study was 12 years old).
- Gender: 93.4% males-6.6% females.
- Marital status: 56.7% married-34.6% single.
- Literacy rate: 12.4% illiterate, 33.8% middle school education.
- Occupation: 24.4% labourers; 20.5% unemployed.
- Source of income for drugs: a major proportion of the interviewed reported illegal means of income as well as being supported by their families.

The rising trend of IDU is a matter for serious concern among Iranian health authorities. Recent data representing recorded cases of HIV/AIDS and the forms of transmission indicate that 67% of HIV/AIDS transmission was caused by drug injecting. This phenomenon is of particular concern in the penitentiary system where needle sharing seems to be practiced more often.

In addition to HIV/AIDS, drug use is associated with the following health problems:
- 27.3% drug users reported sexually transmitted diseases;
- 17.7% of reported other diseases such as hepatitis, abscess, tuberculosis or endocarditic

Data on drug-related deaths by the Statistics and Computer Department of Drug Control Headquarters show an upward trend in recent years with 2,345 recorded cases in 2001 against only 1,378 in 2000. The steady increase in drug related deaths could easily be explained in the light of the effects of the Afghan opium poppy ban on the demand for illicit drugs on the Iranian market. According to unofficial sources, the purity of street heroin sold in Iranian markets ranges between 2 and 7%.

As far as drug treatment is concerned, 88 out patient treatment centres were operational with 350 specialist staff in 2001. Over 100,000 drug abusers were detoxified at these centres during the past three years. Nine residential therapeutic communities modelled according to the so-called Synanom treatment and rehabilitation methodology were due for opening in late 2001-beginning of 2002.

In 2000, an agreement was reached among the different drug control and health related institutions on the establishment of the DARIUS National Drug Abuse Institute. Once operational, the Institute is expected to function as the main monitoring and specialized expertise centre for all drug demand reduction programmes in Iran.

There are many private treatment clinics. Advertised in many daily newspapers, some of these clinics promise immediate freedom from drug dependency. As far as NGOs are concerned, Narcotic Anonymous is very active in I.R. of Iran with about 3000 members throughout the country. Other

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21 viz. 262,800 individuals.
22 Unemployment rates among drug abusers varied significantly between different Provinces, e.g. in Semnan it was 6.5% and in Tehran 32%.
23 35 more, compared to 1999.
NGOs, such as AFTAB Community and Drug Control Community, have recently initiated counselling and rehabilitation programmes.

Number of referrals to the rehabilitation centres of the State Welfare Organisation 1984-1998

Costs and consequences
Quantifying the cost of the drug issue in Iran throughout a period of some 20 years is almost an impossible task. Direct and indirect costs indeed mix, making impossible any sound quantification of them. According to an estimate from Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ), the construction and maintenance of fortifications erected at the country’s eastern border cost US$ 900 million. Total costs for the whole drug issue would top, according to the same source, some US$ 1 billion per year. According to an estimate by the Bureau for Social Studies of Tehran and included in the chapter related to Tehran of the ODCCP Study on Illicit Markets, direct costs by government agencies in 1998 topped 1,136,428 millions Rials, equivalent to US$ 142 million at the current exchange rate of US$ 1 to Rials 8,000\(^24\).

In 1999, DCHQ operation received a total budgetary allocation of US$ 116 millions. Drug Control Headquarters global expenditures for 2000 were quoted at US$ 250-300 million.

As far as 2001 is concerned, according to unofficial sources the budget requested by the Secretariat of DCHQ for its 2002 operations would top some US$ 150 million.

Money laundering
The Islamic oriented banking system of Iran, the non-convertibility of its currency, and the isolation of its economy make the Iranian market unappealing to money launderers. Accordingly, no ad hoc legal and banking provisions prescribe any specific control on capital and goods flowing to and from Iran. The situation, however, is gradually changing. The legalization of a free exchange market in 2000 has revealed the existence of a large under world of free changers who evade government control. In addition, the opening up of a number of free trade zones\(^25\) further increases the possibility of laundering operations through contraband and importing of electronics, home appliances, and luxury items.

\(^{24}\) US$ 324,693,817 at the official exchange rate of US$ 1 to Rials 3,500. The reported total includes as follows: Supply reduction Rials 605,737,884,995; Treatment, rehabilitation and legal expenditures Rials 385,819,975,000; Prevention and awareness campaigns Rials 115,170,500,000.

\(^{25}\) Private banks will be allowed to open offices in the new free trade zones.
In 2000, the Supreme Leader denounced economic crimes and corruption as major threats to the Iranian economy and called for the launch of a national campaign. The Leader’s call resulted in the creation of the Special Headquarters for Examining Economic Offences chaired by President Mohammad Khatami, and including as permanent members the highest Iranian authorities from the executive, legislative and judicial powers. In 2001, a draft bill on money laundering was completed and submitted to the competent judicial authorities for review.

**VII. CRIME SITUATION**

**Main characteristics**
Almost free from the usual crimes typical of modern societies, the I.R. of Iran is discovering how painful modernization can be. Rapid urbanization and its socio economic effects have eroded the societal control and solidarity mechanisms, which had regulated the growth of the I.R. of Iran in the latest 20 years. Nevertheless, crime in Iran has not reached levels comparable to countries with a similarly large population and at a similar developmental stage. On the basis of the little scattered information available, crime in Iran can be divided into two main categories, viz. drug-related and non-drug related. Within this latter category financial and acquisitive crimes represent the most common criminal violations (Annex IV).

In 2001, 269,259 individuals were arrested in Iran on drug related charges. Of them, 121,742 were indicted for smuggling-dealing crimes, and 144,578 for consumption related crimes. 75% of them were involved in opium related crimes. 3% of total were women (8,077), and 1.1% (2,939) foreign nationals.

In 2001, the total number of inmates jailed in Iran was 157,808. Out of these, some 96,000, (viz. 60%) were serving sentences related to narcotic crimes. Out of this figure almost 80,000 were sentenced for either trafficking or dealing in narcotic drugs. In prison, no separation is made between common offenders, drug traffickers and drug abusers. According to the cited Rapid Survey Assessment, 59% of the interviewed drug abusers had at least one criminal conviction record against them, 51.9% had more then one conviction.

The majority of foreign convicts are from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey, and Turkmenistan.

**Foreign Inmates for Drug-Related Crimes in Prisons of the I.R. of Iran (December 2001).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>3,843</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As far as Iranian inmates are concerned, their high number indicates both the spread of drug trafficking and retailing among all Iranian ethnic groups and social strata. However, the lion’s share of detainees is from the lower and middle strata of society, especially from Provinces that are poverty stricken. The worsening of economic conditions for the lower strata of the Iranian

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26 The established Special HQs includes as members the Iranian Parliament Speaker, the Chief of Judiciary, the Minister for Information, the Head of the Management and Planning Organisation, the Head of the State Investigation Organisation, the Head of the Justice Department in Tehran Province, the Minister of Commerce.

27 Other interesting statistics of RSA state that 57.5% were imprisoned at the time of the study, 52.1% had been in prison on drug abuse charges, 16.5% had been in prison on drug trafficking charges, 11.7% for violence, 7.3% for theft, and 5.9% on other charges (e.g. prostitution, kidnapping, jaywalking, etc.).
population, as well as that of Afghanistan, may easily push more individuals into the hands of drug trafficking organisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Iranian Traffickers and Dealers</th>
<th>Addicts</th>
<th>Foreign Traffickers and Dealers</th>
<th>Total Arrested</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>50,957</td>
<td>25,367</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>77,104</td>
<td>28.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khorasan</td>
<td>12,503</td>
<td>22,066</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>35,009</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esfahan</td>
<td>6,345</td>
<td>12,925</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>19,486</td>
<td>7.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fars</td>
<td>8,030</td>
<td>7,072</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>15,243</td>
<td>5.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khozestan</td>
<td>4,463</td>
<td>7,171</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11,679</td>
<td>4.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamedan</td>
<td>2,021</td>
<td>8,542</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10,568</td>
<td>3.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilan</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>7,942</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8,868</td>
<td>3.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yazd</td>
<td>2,885</td>
<td>4,853</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>7,988</td>
<td>2.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazandaran</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>4,230</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>7,249</td>
<td>2.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.Baluchestan</td>
<td>3,360</td>
<td>3,190</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>6,820</td>
<td>2.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerman</td>
<td>4,122</td>
<td>2,322</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>6,820</td>
<td>2.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hormouzgan</td>
<td>4,798</td>
<td>1,733</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>6,627</td>
<td>2.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kermanshah</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>3,024</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,324</td>
<td>2.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markazi</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>5,243</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6,361</td>
<td>2.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorestan</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>4,128</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,498</td>
<td>2.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qom</td>
<td>3,272</td>
<td>1,772</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>5,128</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golestan</td>
<td>1,584</td>
<td>3,340</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4,975</td>
<td>1.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazvin</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>3,946</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4,262</td>
<td>1.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>2,270</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3,442</td>
<td>1.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semnan</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>2,362</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2,892</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaharmahal</td>
<td>1,653</td>
<td>1,198</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,853</td>
<td>1.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Azerbaijan</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,785</td>
<td>1.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordestan</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>2,021</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,772</td>
<td>1.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boshehr</td>
<td>1,585</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2,378</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardebil</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>1,381</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,027</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanjan</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>1,395</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,687</td>
<td>0.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohkiloyeh</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>1,102</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilam</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basij Forces</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>121,742</td>
<td>144,578</td>
<td>2,939</td>
<td>269,259</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Centre of Iran, National Statistic Report, 2001

Trends

The deterioration of economic conditions for a large proportion of the crime population, coupled with the unchecked process of urbanization, point at the likely increase of violent crime and property offences. The above is further reinforced by the ongoing changes in drug consumption patterns and the spread of heroin abuse, often associated with a new stigmatisation of heroin abusers. In this context, the higher incidence of petty crime (including stealing of cars, car audio equipment, etc.) has been described by the general public as a direct consequence of heroin abuse.

Also associated with drug abuse and the deterioration of general socio economic conditions is the emergence of a widespread commercial sex trade. Parallel to it but not necessarily related to sexual exploitation are press reports about a growing trafficking/smuggling of human beings into and from Iran. Due its peculiar geographical location as bridge between Asia, Europe and the Middle East, human beings are smuggled into Iran from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and smuggled from Iran to the Arabian Peninsula and the south Mediterranean Region. The phenomenon should not be seen as anything new in terms of natural development of international drug criminal activities.
networks. On the opposite, the lower risk associated with smuggling of human beings compared to smuggling of narcotics represents a very attractive business alternative to drug trafficking bands in control of the southern drug smuggling routes.

VIII. POLICY

A. Drugs

1. National drug control framework

1.a. Convention adherence


1.b. Legislation

The Anti-Narcotics Drug Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1988, covers all aspects of drug control. It includes cultivation, production, import, export, possession, consumption, distribution, sale and maintenance of premises for the use of drugs. It also creates offences for assisting the escape of, or giving protection to, drug offenders already subject to prosecution, and destroying or concealing evidence.

In November 1997, the Expediency Council amended the 1988 legislation with a view to making it more responsive to new aspects of the internal drug problem. Penalties range from fine and lashes (personal consumption), to death sentence (trafficking)(see Annex 4). The implementation of capital punishment is, however, subject to a number of judicial requirements aimed at ensuring the de jure and de facto correctness.

A new narcotic control law was drafted in 2001.

1.c. Drug control institutions

The Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ) is the main policy-making body responsible for planning, coordinating and monitoring different aspects of the anti-drug campaign, including measures for countering drug entry, drug supply, drug transit, programmes for the treatment and rehabilitation of addicts, cultural affairs and public awareness measures, as well as drug demand reduction.

Established in 1988, the DCHQ is headed by the President of the I.R. of Iran and comprises of the following members:

1. State Attorney-General
2. Interior Minister
3. Minister of Intelligence
4. Minister of Health, Treatment and Medical Education
5. Minister of Education
6. President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)
7. Commander-in-Chief of the Police of the I.R. of Iran
8. Head of Tehran’s Islamic Revolutionary Court
9. Head of the Organisation for Prisons and Penitentiaries
10. Commander of Basij Force
11. Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance

Unofficial sources from the UNHCR Office in Iran reported a steady increase of smuggling of human beings in the immediate aftermaths of the 9/11 crisis. It is interesting to note that the same period recorded a dramatic drop of smuggling of narcotics, particularly opiates, through the Iranian eastern borders.
28 Provincial Councils, composed of the provincial representatives of the central DCHQ, and headed by provincial governors, are responsible for the implementation of national policies and strategies in their respective Provinces. Reporting to the Secretary of DCHQ, they receive annual allocations for drug control activities. In 2001, President Khatami chaired the meeting of DCHQ and expressed his wish to personally supervise the implementation of the drug control policy adopted by DCHQ. President Khatami’s decision strengthened the position of the Secretary of DCHQ, who will be acting on his behalf in all matters related to the coordination of the national drug control effort. In this context, the DCHQ Secretary will also rely on the advice of six Specialized Technical Committees established in 2000.

1.d. Main characteristics of national drug control policy

Iran’s drug control policy is based mainly upon a general criminal oriented view of the drug abuse and trafficking issue. In recent times however this severe, repressive approach has made room for social and health related positions that view at the drug consumption phenomenon as a social disease. The main elements of this policy may be summarized as follows:

- Cultivation and production of all types of illicit drugs are forbidden and harsh punishments are inflicted on violators.
- Drug abuse is a criminal act *per se*; however, if a drug abuser refers to treatment centres, he/she would be pardoned and be immune from prosecution. Conversely, recidivists and traffickers would be severely punished and jailed for anti-social behaviors.
- Drug trafficking, importing, exporting and distributing are considered serious criminal acts susceptible to severe punishments, including capital punishment and long-term imprisonment.
- Demand reduction activities, including prevention and treatment of drug abuse, should be part of the general drug control policy of Iran.

2. Licit Control (drugs and precursors)

The Ministry of Health is the entity responsible for importing raw materials and pharmaceutical preparations, as well as for monitoring domestic production and retail distribution. There are more than 30 drug (pharmaceutical companies) manufacturers in Iran. Some of these manufactures are

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29 The Committees and their responsibilities may be summarized as follows:
I. Committee on Countering the Entry of Drugs and Border Control: advising on policies aimed at countering the entry of drugs; formulating plans for border control; and preparing reports for consideration by DCHQ on measures taken.
II. Committee on Demand Reduction: design and advise on policies relating to cultural affairs, public awareness and public education with the aim of preventing drug abuse; Advising on joint projects, envisaging regional and international campaigning; and planning for the implementation of approved policies.
III. Committee on Supply Countering: taking appropriate measures for ending drug distribution; advising on counting distribution networks; and enhancing control on roads and passageways.
IV. Committee on Treatment, Rehabilitation and Vocational Training: advising on policies related to treatment, rehabilitation and social reintegration of addicts; formulating plans for vocational training, employment, educational and counseling models and mobilising public contribution for the constructing of facilities for vocational training and counseling centres; ensuring the supply of medicine and medical substitutes for drug addicts and abusers; and taking care of the living condition of inmates within available resources.
V. Committee on Intelligence and Operation: drafting guidelines on policies related to intelligence and operational tasks; ensuring respect of priorities and coordination in control operations.
VI. Committee on Legal and Judicial Affairs: evaluating the current law and regulations and draft amendments with regard to prevention of drug-related crimes, money laundering control, controlled delivery, extradition of criminals, etc.; assessing the implementation of Anti-Drug Law and its compatibility with legal principles and advising on possible amendments to the Anti-Drug Law; examining impediments on enhanced implementation of the Anti-Drug Law; and producing legal analyses with respect to the principles of international law applicable to bilateral or multilateral MOUs, regional and international agreements, Conventions, etc.
allowed to buy seized opium and morphine for producing codeine and morphine based pharmaceutical preparations (capsules, pills, injection ampoules).

The Health Ministry auditing section is responsible for overseeing the quantities of produced drugs and their regular distribution into the official market (hospitals and pharmacies). Hospitals and health clinics are supposed to keep inventories, and inspections by the MoH are conducted scheduled on a monthly basis.

Despite the above, an open parallel market for pharmaceutical preparation does exist in Tehran and the major Iranian towns. On these markets buyers can purchase a variety of pharmaceutical preparations, both nationally produced and imported (legally and illegally), including psychotropic substances, morphine pills and ampoules, and a range of codeine type drugs, etc.

3. Supply reduction
The Iranian Police Forces report to the Minister of the Interior and are responsible for all law enforcement activities related to drug control. These include enforcing the ban on the cultivation of opium, suppressing the illicit traffic in drugs and precursors (including border control), and identification of distribution networks in Iran. They also arrest drug addicts and deliver them to courts. Police Forces are deployed throughout the country and are employed in all aspects of policing, having different Directorates to meet the many requirements of modern policing. All recruits to the service receive at least basic drug awareness training.

Within the organisation, there is an Anti-narcotics Directorate that has its headquarters in Tehran, with staff also being deployed at provincial level under the command of provincial heads. At that level, a senior officer, normally a Colonel, is deputed as being responsible for drug issues. He has under his command a number of drug specialists who are employed in investigations into major drug traffickers. In addition, these officers take over cases where seizures have been made by other members of the Iranian Police.

Specially trained drug enforcement staff are utilised at all levels as described. Regular communication takes place between the Directorate at HQ level and the Provincial commanders. In 2000, and as a follow up to the UNDCP/DCHQ regional meetings of international Drug Liaison Officers (DLOs) posted in Pakistan and Turkey, the Anti-narcotic Directorate set up a special Intelligence Exchange Unit responsible for coordinating operations and ensuring follow up and feedback to information received from DLOs abroad.

A computerized national drug information system is located within Drug Control Headquarters. It is a repository for all records and is used as a tool for strategic planning in relation to both trafficking and abuse. Details, including photographs of all persons arrested, together with all drug seizures, are forwarded from provincial level where central records are maintained. Intelligence profiles of individuals and criminal groups are maintained. Records include all aspects of drug control other than ongoing operational intelligence that is held in the Anti-narcotics Directorate’s computer system. At the end of an investigation, this information, too, is added to the central system. Forensic Science Laboratories are available in each Province. In 2000, and as a follow up of the UNDCP-DCHQ cooperation, the Secretariat of DCHQ established a Regional Information Exchange Unit, responsible for clearing and dispatching all official information related to drug law enforcement operations in the country.

There are a number of other organisations that play a minor role in drug control. They include the Intelligence Ministry, the Revolutionary Corps, the Army, the Customs service and the Basij (Voluntary Forces), who make seizures on an occasional basis and have drug control as part of their written mandate. However, such cases are passed to the Anti-narcotic Police for follow up action.
and investigation. That said, the Customs Service is located in a number of key areas, seaports, airports, and land border crossings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Quantity Kg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>109,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs*</td>
<td>20,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Intelligence</td>
<td>14,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Corps &amp; Basij</td>
<td>14,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>1,530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Inclusive of 20,440 Kg Acetic Anhydride


4. Demand reduction

An overview of the laws passed on drug control in Iran demonstrates the limited orientation on demand reduction. According to the 1988 Anti-Narcotics Law, drug abuse was considered a criminal act. Accordingly, all abusers had to quit within six months and DCHQ was assigned to prepare proper facilities for that purpose. In 1998, the amended Anti-Narcotics Law introduced a more realistic approach to drug dependence. Under article 15 of the amended law, drug abuse is still a criminal act; however, drug abusers under treatment are not susceptible to punishment. The law also introduced different penalties for larger scale traffickers and small dealers. For the first time, the subject of drug abuse prevention appeared in the law, albeit implicitly. Nevertheless, many issues related to demand reduction, including the organisation and distribution of responsibilities, were left unexplained.

The 1998 amendment to the Narcotic law and the inclusion of DDR as integral part of the national drug control policy paved the road to some important developments: in the first half of 1998, 33 outpatient clinics were set up by the State Welfare Organisation in 5 Provinces, and drug prevention programmes were launched with the active participation of the Radio and Television Organisation, and Ministry of Education. Also in 1998, a Five-Year Plan of Action for DDR was adopted. Its main objectives are promoting drug abuse prevention at all levels of society and expanding treatment and rehabilitation facilities for drug abusers and addicts.

DRR activities nationwide include the following:

1. Drug prevention multi-disciplinary plans of action at provincial level.
2. Publishing posters and educational books for physicians, counsellors, teachers, parents and drug addicts.
3. Installation of billboards with different drug prevention messages.
4. Increasing the number of outpatient centres and diversifying treatment and rehabilitation methodologies.
5. Developing self-referring organisations and Narcotic Anonymous centres.

30 Primary drug prevention is considered to belong to cultural activities, while secondary and tertiary prevention are conceived as health related. Accordingly, drug prevention campaigns are implemented by a number of institutional players such as the Ministry of Education, Culture and Islamic Guidance, IRIB, Sport Organisation, etc. Secondary and tertiary prevention is implemented by the Department of Social Welfare Organisation and the Ministry of Health.

31 Specific objectives of the programme are: reducing social acceptability of drug use; promotion of socio-cultural bases and facilitating access of all members of the society to protective skills; early protective measures for at-risk individuals; preventing illegal use of drugs and medicines; providing drug abuse treatment facilities for all volunteering and identified clients; providing continuous aftercare services and facilitating social reintegration; reducing secondary harms of drug abuse like HIV/AIDS; and reducing criminal acts committed by drug abusers.
7. Conducting research on the drug situation, as well as prevention and treatment methods.
8. Setting up of a data bank on drug abuse.
9. Broadcasting of TV and radio awareness programmes including video-clips, TV miniseries, news coverage of scientific gatherings and conferences, special reports and documentaries, totaling up to 10,000 minutes on the nationwide network, and 25,000 minutes on provincial broadcasters.
10. Sensitizing the public to the dimension of the drug issue and the efforts made by authorities through domestic and international seminars, gatherings, and exhibitions in various cities on drug prevention programmes. Informing the public of the cost and achievements of the fight against drug trafficking by Law Enforcement Forces.
11. Mobilising the national press.

5. Money laundering control measures
With regard to measures against money laundering, the only applicable legal provision is contained into paragraph 11 of a Decree adopted by the Council of Ministers on 12 August 1998. According to this Decree, Iranian banks are obliged to implement necessary controls over money orders made in foreign exchange, and ensure the soundness of the source of such money. No information on the implementation of this regulation is available.

6. International Cooperation
The dynamism of the Iranian foreign policy in the field of drug control is well shown by the many bilateral agreements negotiated and recently signed, as well as by the participation of the I.R. of Iran in global and regional drug control initiatives.

Bilateral agreements
In 2001, the Government of Iran signed Memoranda of Understandings (MOUs) with the Governments of the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and Serbia and Montenegro, and ratified the quadripartite MOU with Armenia, Georgia, and UNDCP. MOUs were negotiated with the Governments of Austria, Australia, Hungary, Germany, Rumania, Slovenia, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, Tajikistan, and Ukraine.

Other drug control bilateral instruments (MOUs, agreements, etc.) currently operational between Iran and other Governments include: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, India, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela. The Government of Iran is part of two Southern Caucasus quadripartite MOUs on Cooperation in Drug Control and Activities against Money Laundering, brokered by UNDCP and signed respectively by Armenia, Georgia, Iran and UNDCP, and Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran and UNDCP.

Meetings and conferences
- International conferences of Drug Liaison Officers (DLOs).
In 2001, the Secretariat of the DCHQ of Iran, with the support and assistance of the UNDCP Office for Iran, hosted the third Conference of Drug Liaison Officers posted in Pakistan and Turkey, as part of its activities to promote regional cooperation in anti-drug efforts. The meeting was held in Kish Isle, on November 2001. Delegates from both regional and western law enforcement agencies received an overview of the illicit drug trafficking situation in the region and discussed practical ways for setting up, and then improving, the exchange of information and intelligence.

- "Six Plus Two" Group - Afghanistan
Iran is an active member of the "Six Plus Two" Group on Afghanistan and regularly attends its meetings at the UN Headquarters in New York.
ECO-Drug Control Coordination Unit (DCCU)
The Government of the I.R. of Iran is one of the co-founders of the Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO), the headquarters of which are located in Tehran. In this context, it participated actively in the process leading to the approval of the ECO Plan of Action on Drug Control (11 May 1996), which provides a comprehensive and multi-disciplinary framework for drug control measures at national and regional levels, as well as in the launch of the UNDCP-ECO Drug Control Coordination Unit.

Bilateral activities
In 2001, the French and Iranian Governments agreed on a second phase of a technical cooperation project launched in 2000, in which French technical inputs were provided to the Sniffer Dog Academy of the Iranian Anti-Narcotics Police. Some additional 10 dogs will be added to the 12 already provided, together with ancillary equipment and training.

Other bilateral technical cooperation projects are currently under implementation with the UK Customs and Excises, and the Australian Federal Police.

In 2001, the I.R. Iran-Pakistan bilateral law enforcement meetings continued to be held under the UNDCP-supported cross-border cooperation project.

B. CRIME
1. National crime prevention network
1.a. Organised Crime Convention adherence (once adopted)
Iran is a signatory to the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime.

The I.R. of Iran endorsed the resolution adopted by the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice of 1995 “Action Against Corruption”. Anti-corruption strategies focus on prevention through community mobilisation and the formulation for and implementation of codes of conduct for public officials.

The I.R. of Iran has several times reaffirmed its support to two important anti-terrorism multilateral documents issued so far, namely GA resolutions 46/5 of December 1991 and 49/60 of December 1994, as well as to the declaration annexed to the latter resolution on measures to eliminate international terrorism. In this context, it is worth noting the emphasis placed by the Iranian Government on the links between international terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, and money laundering.

1.b. Legislation
Mostly based on the French criminal code of 1810, the first Iranian criminal code was issued in 1925. Amended in 1973, it was used up to 1982 when it was replaced by the national law introducing Sharia and the Islamic law in the I.R. of Iran. Nevertheless, many of the articles and procedures of the original penal code are still in use by Iranian courts.

With the exception of a period during which the criminal justice system was governed by the implementation of four strictly Islamic oriented laws, the current Iranian penal law system is built around the Penal Law of July 1991. Its 497 articles replaced the penal dispositions of the main

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32 The Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO) was renamed as such in 1985. Its origin goes back to 1964, when Turkey Iran and Pakistan established the Regional Cooperation for Development. Current ECO membership includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, I.R. of Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

33 The four laws were: “Law of hudud and qisas” August 1982, preparing the introduction of Sharia: “On Islamic punishments”, of October 1982, introducing the Main principles of Sharia; “Law of diyat” of December 1982; and “law of ta’zirat” of August 1983, which introduced some new elements among the classical sharia cases.
three Sharia laws. In 1996, the fourth law of the revolutionary era was cancelled too and replaced by a 232-article law. At the time of this law’s issue, the legislature seized the opportunity to compile the new Iranian penal code, composed of 729 articles.

In contrast to the public nature of penal law in Western countries, the overall conception of penal legislation in the I.R. of Iran is strongly influenced by the Islamic belief that penal sanctions should first compensate victims and secondly proscribe anti-social behaviour. Accordingly, victims of crimes (and their relatives) can directly influence the final execution of a penal sentence by either granting pardon or agreeing on financial compensations with the convict.

1.c. Crime control institutions
Crime control is a prerogative of the judicial system. In discharging its function, the judicial system makes use of several law enforcement agencies including the Iranian Police, the revolutionary guards, and the Basij (voluntary police).

1.c.a. The Judiciary and the court system
The structure of the court system has gone through drastic organisational revisions from 1978 to 1994 and from 1995 to the present. The present structure of the Judiciary is as follows:

i.) Supreme Court: the highest court in Iran with the task of supervising the proper application of laws by the lower courts, as well as ensuring uniformity in judicial procedures (Article 161 of the Constitution). The Head of the Judiciary, in consultation with the judges of the Supreme Court, nominates the Chief of the Supreme Court who, among other qualifications, must be a specialist in Islamic Law.

ii.) Court of Administrative Justice: under the supervision of the Head of the Judiciary this court has a mandate to investigate complaints by private citizens against actions by public institutions and organs (Article 173 of the Constitution).

iii.) Court of Appeal: it is the second instance court competent for reviewing cases decided by public and revolutionary courts. A three-member panel exercises the judicial power of the Court of Appeal. In the year 2001-2002, 216 court sittings settled a total of 40,013 out of 345,746 pending cases.

iv.) Public Courts: these courts are mandated to deal as first instance tribunals with both civil cases and criminal offences that are not under the mandate of revolutionary courts. In the year 2001-2002, 2,260 public courts settled a total of 4,377,160 cases.

v.) Revolutionary Courts: since 1995, the mandate of the Revolutionary Courts has been vastly expanded and now includes jurisdiction over various offences including: crimes against national security, narcotic drugs, waging “war on God and corruption on earth”, terrorism, state related embezzlement, bribery and profiteering, and all the acts that undermine the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A single judge exercises prosecution and sentencing responsibilities. Settled cases at the Revolutionary courts can be referred to the courts of Appeal. 226 Revolutionary courts were in operation in Iran in 2001-2002.

vi.) Clerical courts: these courts are entrusted with the task of dealing with clergies’ misdeeds. Clergy court cases are heard on the basis of religious laws, as well as the ordinary laws of the country. A special chamber of the Clerics hears appeals and the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the cleric courts’ verdicts. Defence lawyers have to be chosen from among designated clergy and hearings are not public.

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34 Since then, however, new penal laws have been issued expanding the penal code to new cases.

35 Till 1994, the structure of the lower court systems included (i) Revolutionary Courts, (ii) Public Courts: Civil Courts, Special Civil Courts, 1st Class Criminal Courts, 2nd Class Criminal Courts, (iii) Courts of Peace: Ordinary Courts of Peace, Independent Courts of Peace, and (iv) Supreme Court of Cassation. Special Civil Courts were established to adjudicate over family related matters.
Military courts: are mandated to investigate crimes committed in connection with military or security duties by members of the Armed Forces, the Police, and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (SEPAH).

The office of the military prosecutor and the military courts form part of the judiciary and are subject to the same principles that regulate the judiciary (Article 172 of the Constitution).

No official figure is currently available about the number of judges. Unofficially, however, their number is quoted to be around 3,500. Judges are generally drawn from the legal profession, law enforcement personnel, and religious schools. The number of judicial support personnel is not available.

Judges receive on the job training that includes various elements of public and criminal code laws at the Research and Training Centre of the Judiciary. In addition, the Judiciary runs a specialized school, the Faculty of Judicial Sciences & Administrative Services, the objective of which is to prepare young jurists for judicial careers.

No information is available regarding training for judicial support personnel.

1.c.b. The Office of the General Prosecutor

After the ratification of the law establishing public and revolutionary courts in 1994, the prosecutors’ offices at the courts were disbanded and their functions and powers entrusted to judges of courts. Under such a system, judges act as prosecutor, magistrate and also the authority that issues final verdicts.

Nevertheless, the figure of Prosecutor General was retained but its functions were limited to reviewing courts’ verdicts when cases were referred to the Supreme Court.

1.c.c. Effectiveness, efficiency and integrity of the judicial system

As far as the effectiveness, efficiency and integrity of the judicial system is concerned, the core problem seems to lay in the unbalance between pending and settled cases that results in overburdening of courts. In 2001, five million cases were pending in the courts.

The excessive load of unsettled cases in courts is the cause of a considerable increase in the average length of cases. The current judicial procedures (applicable to both criminal and civil cases), according to which the same judge has to carry out preliminary investigations, trial and issuance of the final verdict (with the exception of some parts of the investigation phase, which are undertaken by other judiciary personnel), further reduce the capabilities of courts to reduce the volume of pending cases.

The excessive volume of cases to be settled also affects the quality of the administration of justice. The continued pressure on judges to settle cases forces them to shorten both the time and attention devoted to the different phases of cases. As a result, procedural errors and the denial of justice are lamented by the general public. Attorneys at law often advise their clients to resort to extra judicial means of resolving (civil) disputes rather than referring them to the justice administration.36

36 According to the efficiency and integrity indicator for the legal environment indicator developed by Mauro that ranks 68 countries on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 being very bad and 10 being very good), Iran scores quite poorly with very low with 2 regarding the efficiency of judiciary and 3,25 regarding the levels of corruption (Mauro, 1995/Business International 1980-83).
1.c.d. Law enforcement agencies responsible for crime control

The I.R. of Iran Police Forces

The creation of the first modern police force in Iran dates back to some one hundred years ago. At that time, King Nassereddin entrusted a Belgian police officer, Mr. Count Dobbin, with the establishing of a modern Iranian police force similar to the ones operating in European countries. The resulting system, which was operational till the Islamic Revolution of 1979, included two main agencies, namely the City Police, responsible for keeping the order of cities and urban areas, and the Gendarmerie, responsible for policing rural and border areas.

After the WWII, the United States provided substantial help to Iran in strengthening its law enforcement and military forces. In late 1940s, Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, a West Point graduate and the New Jersey first superintendent of the state police, helped to organise and train the National Iranian Police. This technical cooperation continued also after the 1953 coup, and expanded to include also the area of national security secret services (with the infamous SAVAK - National Security and Intelligence Organisation). In the twelve years following the 1953 coup, Iran received US$ 767 million in direct grants, US$ 496 million in credits, and US$ 1.7 million under the Agency for International Development’s Public Safety Programme for the training of Iranian police. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the United States trained 179 Iranian Police officers at the International Police Academy in Washington, DC, under the auspices of AIDS Public Safety Program. In 1978, the National Police operated with approximately 200,000 men, a figure that has not fluctuated much since. Operative from the Gendarmerie, were reckoned at nearly 74,000 in 1978.

By the victory of Islamic Revolution, a new police agency revolutionary unit called “Islamic Revolutionary Committees” was established and entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining domestic security and defending values of the Islamic Revolution. The overlapping of operational mandates of this new agency with those of the City Police and Gendarmerie was solved by a national law in 1991 under which the three police agencies were merged into the Disciplinary (or Law Enforcement) Forces. In 2002, the Disciplinary Forces were renamed as I.R. of Iran Police.

According to the 1991 law, the Police Force is part of the armed forces under the command of the Supreme Leader, who directly appoints the Commander of the Police. Administratively speaking, however, the Police Forces are affiliated to the Ministry of Interior, and the Minister of Interior holds the title of acting Commander-in-Chief.

The I. R. of Iran Police consists of three separate and almost independent units, namely:

a) Command [or operational] units;

b) Security and Intelligence unit;

c) Ideological and Political unit.

It is further dived into 18 operational departments:

1. Enforcement
2. Border Control
3. Special Operations
4. Intelligence and detective
5. Traffic Police
6. Sea Police
7. Air Police
8. Electronics and Communication
9. Engineering
10. Computers

[37] Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf was father of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. that lead American armies in the 1991 Persian Gulf War against Iraq.)
11. Health and Therapeutics Department
12. Logistics and Maintenance
13. Administration
14. Legal unit
15. Finance unit
16. Islamic Guidance and Culture unit
17. Art
18. Security and counter-intelligence

The operational mission of the Police Force includes the following:
- Restoring and maintaining public order and personal security and welfare of the citizens;
- Fighting against insurrection, terrorism and other acts detrimental to the State security (in cooperation with Ministry of Intelligence);
- Maintaining security during legal gatherings and acting against illegal gatherings;
- Collecting intelligence and information related to the national security (in cooperation with other national intelligence agencies);
- Providing protection and security services to sensitive and important civil premises and facilities;\[^{38}\];
- Providing security protection to high-ranking Iranian or foreign officials;\[^{39}\];
- Collecting illegal and unauthorized firearms;
- Acting as the enforcing agency of the Judiciary in the following areas:
  - Illicit drugs;
  - Smuggling;
  - Indecent acts;
  - Prevention of crime;
  - Exposure of crimes;
  - Investigation and inspection;
  - Keeping the crime evidence;
  - Arresting suspects and criminals;
  - Enforcing and servicing judicial awards;
  - Identifying individuals and scientifically investigating evidences;
  - Inspecting and controlling borders;
  - Matters related to passports, entry and establishment of foreign nationals;
  - Matters related to traffic control;
  - Matters related to public military service;
  - Cooperating with INTERPOL;
  - Cooperating with other military and civil entities and bodies of the country.

In 1968, the first group of 50 women interested in choosing a military career was admitted to the Police Faculty. This first group graduated in three years as 2nd lieutenants. The first women police were employed at various positions including the Secret Police and the Traffic Control Department. Women were not admitted to military careers after 1981. Only recently women have been readmitted to police careers. At present, over 200 women are studying at “Kowthar Police Complex”.

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\[^{38}\] This mandate is shared with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which is entrusted with the security of the most sensitive governmental premises.
\[^{39}\] Same as above.
consisted of 350,000 officers organised in battalion-size units. In the 1990s, IRGC Pasdaran were endowed with small naval and air elements, and by 1996 the ground and naval forces were reported to number 100,000 and 20,000, respectively. By 2002, and under President Khatami Government, the IRGC was downsized to around 120,000 troops.

Presently, IRGC Pasdaran ground forces include 13 regional commands. There are 15 infantry and 4 armoured divisions, as well as many independent battalions. The Corp naval forces have kept their approximately 20,000 men power and are located in five island bases of the Gulf Region and maintain coastal defence.

The IRGC Pasdaran are under the command of the Supreme Leader, who directly appoints the IRGC Commander.

Mobilisation Resistance Forces “Basij”
The Basij (Mobilisation Resistance Forces) was first mobilised during the Iran-Iraq war under the control of the IRGC Pasdaran. In a 1985 report by the Iranian News Agency, Hojjatoleslam Rahmani, Head of the Basij Forces of the Pasdaran, was quoted as stating that there were close to 3 million volunteers in the paramilitary force receiving training in some 11,000 centres. During the Iran-Iraq war the Basij were particular famous for their courage being the almost exclusive manpower used for the so-called "human wave" attacks against the Iraqis, particularly around Basra. On April 1995, and in a move believed to indicate a shift in the trust of the ruling elites from the IRGC Pasdaran to the Basij Force, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini appointed a civilian, veterinary surgeon Hassan Firuzabadi, to the rank of Full General in Command of the Basij Forces, placing him above both Brigadier-General Mohsen Rezai, Commander-in-Chief of IRGC Pasdaran, and Brigadier General Ali Shahbazi, Commander-in-Chief of the regular armed forces.

Present Commander of the Basij Forces, Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi, recently claimed that over 1 million volunteers are under his command in 130 cities and 1,500 mosques throughout Iran.

According to the law and despite of their paramilitary character, some units of the Basij Forces have their operational prerogatives extended to the enforcement of law and the prevention of crime in the country. In particular, they are responsible for ensuring the due respect of the Islamic code of conducts by ordinary citizens.

Also the Basij Forces are under the command of the Supreme Leader, who directly appoints the Basij Commander.

1.d. Corruption
The Iranian legal system does indirectly and directly contemplate the offence of corruption (mainly identified as the corruptive behaviour of public officer) into its criminal code. Its first sources can be found into the Quran and into several Sunnas that constitute respectively the first and second source of Islamic legislation. As the Iranian positive law is concerned, only passive bribery was considered a punishable crime under article 3 of the 1988 “Act on the aggravation of punishment for bribery, embezzlement, and fraud”. In 1996, however, active bribery too became a criminal offence under the article 592 of the Islamic Punishment Act.

A number of conditions are set into the two legislative acts in order to qualify as punishable corruption. First, passive bribery can be ascribed to public officers only. Second, the act is punishable when the bribed does/refrains from doing an act related with his/her official functions. Third, something having a monetary value has to be transferred from the briber to the bribed.

For example, verses 187/II and 62-63V.
Finally, according to article 592 of the Islamic Punishment Act, the briber must act “knowingly and deliberately”. The same consciousness of the illicit behaviour is not a requirement for passive bribe.

Recently a number of criminal proceedings on cases of economic crimes involving prominent figures of the political and business circles have highlighted the permeability of the system to corruption41.

1.e. Organised Crime
No intelligence reports available to the UNODC Office in the I.R. of Iran indicate the existence of mafia type Iranian international criminal organisations. On the other hand, ethnic based trafficking networks do operate within the country, particularly on its eastern borders and in its South Eastern Provinces. All information available to this Office seems however to indicate the subordinate role played by these Iranian groups with respect to foreign drug trafficking networks, which subcontract to Iranians the transport of illicit shipments through the Iranian territory.

1.f. Main characteristics of national crime prevention strategy
The current crime prevention strategy of the I.R. of Iran is influenced by the ongoing reforms affecting the Iranian society as a whole. In this context, the strict application of traditional penal laws and mechanisms designed for the resolution of conflicts is increasingly subject to a rethinking of the system of penalties, as well as to a redefinition of the balance between individual and state interests and moral values. In this context, individual behaviours traditionally sanctioned by stiff penal provisions are progressively dealt as minor offences by courts and sentenced via administrative penalties. In the same vein, most of the courts refrain (in principle) from implementing cruel punishments as prescribed by the Sharia.

2. Extradition agreements
Iran had concluded extradition agreements with a number of countries before the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Of these, agreements with Pakistan, Turkey and France are still legally in force but apparently are not practiced. According to Islamic principles, Muslims can not be judged under non-Islamic laws and by non-Muslim judges.

In 1997, Iran signed an extradition agreement with the Republic of Azerbaijan, which was recently ratified by the Iranian Parliament. The agreement, however, only provides for repatriation/exchange of nationals sentenced to prison terms rather than extradition of wanted/convicted individuals.

In 2000, the Parliament also ratified agreements on judicial cooperation in civil and criminal proceedings with the governments of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation.

3. Terrorism
3.a. Background information
The I.R. of Iran has had a relatively active history of terrorism due to the revolution in the late 1970’s and its aftermath and repercussions. The I.R. of Iran has been a victim of terrorist attacks while also being seen by some countries as being a state sponsor of terrorism. The I.R. of Iran has been given credit for its constructive role in other areas. The I.R. of Iran has claimed that it arrested over 250 Al Qaeda suspects and has confirmed that in 2001 it deported approximately 20 people.

41 A court is currently trying a 29-year-old businessman, Shahram Jazayeri, in a 38-billion-rial fraud case, as well as on charges of disrupting the state economy and bribing several officials. Jazayeri, the prime suspect of the corruption case, openly disclosed the names of several political figures—despite orders by the court to avoid naming individuals. According to press reports the financial scandal coincided with the arrest of a number of ‘Aqazadehs’ (sons of masters). Referring to the issue, the Chief of the Iranian Judiciary, Ayatollah Shahroudi, said, “We started the anti-corruption campaign from ourselves.”
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has reportedly said that it regards terrorism as a global menace that requires a global and comprehensive approach to combat. The I.R. of Iran supports taking a broader view of terrorism and developing, on the basis of international law, short-, medium- and long-term strategies for cooperative efforts at national, regional and international levels to fight terrorism and address its root causes.

3.b. Relevant incidents and activities
The I.R. of Iran considers itself a victim of terrorism. The Government of Iran reported in its reply to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, established pursuant to the Security Council resolution 1373, that the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MKO) terrorist group committed 99 acts of terror inside Iranian territory in the last eight months of 2001. The report stated that these attacks resulted in the death or injury of 21 civilians.

Examples of initiatives and developments related to counter terrorism

The Iranian president Khatami offered his condolences to the US, following the attacks of 11 September 2001.

The I.R. of Iran reports that it has passed a long list of laws that outlaw some activities referred to in UNSC Resolution 1373. The Ministry of Justice is contemplating possible new legislation that may assist in better conforming to the obligations arising from Security Council Resolution 1373, including on the topic of money laundering.

Domestic
Following the passage of Resolution 1373, The I.R. of Iran established the Coordinating National Committee in order to facilitate the implementation of the resolution. The Committee is composed of senior representatives from major ministries.

Bilateral
In April 2001, a meeting between the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Iranian President Khatami resulted in the signing of the Tehran Declaration, which called for enhanced bilateral cooperation, especially against international terrorism, and demanded a stronger international legal regime to fight terrorism.

In 1988, The I.R. of Iran and Turkey established the “High Security Commission” to coordinate efforts against, and exchange of information about, terrorism, and in particular activities related to the terrorist group PKK.

Multilateral
The I.R. of Iran has pledged to close its borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan to stop the movement of Taliban and Al Qaeda into its country. It has done this by reinforcing military forces placed at border crossings.

The I.R. of Iran assisted in the Bonn Conference of late 2001, which led to the creation of the Afghan Interim Authority.

As of December 2001, Iran had not reported any suspicious bank accounts that could be frozen in pursuance of Resolution 1373.
3.c. Multi-lateral instruments pertaining to the prevention and suppression of international terrorism

The I.R. of Iran is party to five universal instruments pertaining to the subject of combating and suppressing international terrorism:

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X. ANNEXES
   I. Maps of trafficking routes
      Annex I.a.

I.R. of Iran: Entry and exit drug trafficking routes

Source: UNODC.
Annex I.b.

Eastern borders land trafficking routes

Source: UNODC.
Annex I.c. Khorasan Province - Northern land trafficking routes

Source: UNODC.
Annex I.d. Sistan/Baluchestan - Southern land trafficking routes

Source: UNODC.
II. TEN YEARS OF IRANIAN DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS IN FIGURES

Total Seizures Opiates and Hashish in Iran 1990-2001

Seizures 1990–2001 (Kg.):  Opium = 1,319,857; Morphine = 174,324; Heroin = 34,492; Hashish = 172,173

Armed confrontation with traffickers 1996-2001

Iranian Law Enforcement Officers killed in action against drug traffickers

IRANIAN ANTI-NARCOTIC LAW AS AMENDED IN 1998
(AS AMENDED BY THE EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL ON 25 OCTOBER 1998)

The below summary has been prepared by the UNODC Office in Tehran and does not entail any responsibility from the Government of the I.R. of Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Art.n</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
<th>Special Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>Penal (year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lashes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Cultivation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>First: 10-100 m Rials</td>
<td>Second: 50-500 m Rials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>First: -</td>
<td>Second: 30-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Possession of seeds</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1-10 m Rials</td>
<td>1-30 m Rials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Possession, smuggling of opium, cannabis</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Up 50gr: up to 4 m Rials</td>
<td>50 to 500gr: 4-50 m Rials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50-500gr: 20-74</td>
<td>500gr-5kg: 50-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Transport, concealment, storage of cannabis, opium</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Up 50 gr: up to 3m Rials</td>
<td>50 to 500 gr: 5-15 m Rials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50 to 500gr: 10-74</td>
<td>500gr-5kg: 40-74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20-100 kg: 50-74</td>
<td>5-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>over 100kg: 2 m per kg</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recidivism: confiscation all assets</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. Recidivism art.s 4 and 5 (more then 5 Kg)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Second time: incr. 1and half</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Third time: incr. twice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fourth time: incr. 2 and half</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Etc.</td>
<td>From second time: 74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>See remark</td>
<td>In addition to the prescribed punishments the culprit will be temporary (first time 6 months, second 1 year) or permanently dismissed (third time).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* upon discretion of the court

Possession, smuggling, sale, transport, distribution of heroin, morphine, cocaine | 8   | Up 0.05 gr: 500,000-1m Rials | 0-05-1gr: 2-6 m Rials | 1-4gr: 8-20 m Rials | 4-15gr.: 20-40 m Rials |
|      |       | 15-30gr: 40-60 m Rials | over 30gr: confiscation all assets |
|      |       | Up 0.05 gr: 20-50 | 0.05-1gr: 30-70 | 1-4gr: 30-70 |
|      |       | 4-15gr.: 30-74 | 15-30gr: 30-74 | over 30gr: - |
|      |       | 10-15 | - | Yes |

Armed smuggling | 11  | - | - | - |

Smuggling in prisons barracks or T&R centres | 12  | - | - | - |

Association by commercial companies in drug smuggling | 13  | Revoking license and confiscation of company assets |

UNODC
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment of and permission to use of narcotics in public places</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>5-10 m Rials suspension of license for 1 year recidivism: confiscation</th>
<th>20 to 74</th>
<th>1-2</th>
<th>recidivism: 2 to 4 times as first sentence. Gov. officials: permanent dismissal.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addiction</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Addicts are &quot;permitted to go to legal centres of MoH for T&amp;R&quot;. Addict in T&amp;R centres are protected from prosecution during the T&amp;R period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addicts under art.s 4 and 8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1-5 m Rials</td>
<td>1-5 m Rials</td>
<td>Recidivism: 74</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption by non addicts</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Art. 4: 1-5 m Rials</td>
<td>Art. 8: 2-10 m Rials</td>
<td>Art. 4: 20-74</td>
<td>Art. 8: 50-74</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraphernalia for drug production or consumption</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Production: Confiscation of tools</td>
<td>1-5 m Rials</td>
<td>Prod.: 10-50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association with drug offenders (protection, facilitation of escape, etc.)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1/5 to 1/2 of the punishment provided for the offender.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>If life, 4-10 year prison and 30 to 74 lashes. If death, 10-15 year prison, and 30 to 74 lashes. If family relative, punishment will not exceed 1/10. Law Enforcement Personnel: permanent dismissal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary destruction or concealing of evidences</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1/5 to 1/2 of the punishment provided for the offender</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>If life, 4-10 year prison. If death, 8-20 year prison.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planting of fake evidences</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Maximum punishment provided for the same offence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False accusation</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20 to 74</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets and prop.s of escaped convict</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Confiscation (vehicles to the law enf. Agency which carried out the specific operation)</td>
<td>Subject to the existence of “enough evidences” of their illicit source.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fines and funds collected</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>All fines and funds collected under this act are deposited in an account opened by Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance. Disbursements must be approved by the Drug Control Headquarters.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fines</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Fines not paid are transformed to jail sentence. However, jail terms cannot exceed 10 years.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death sentences</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Death sentences issued according to this act must be confirmed by the Chairman of the Supreme Court or the Prosecutor General.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Control HQ</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>The DCH is presided by the President and is in charge of: executive and judicial operations; prevention and enlightenment. Its membership includes: the President: the Prosecutor General; the Ministers of Interior, Information, Health Education, Culture and Islamic Guidance; the Manager of the I.R. Iran Broadcasting; the Commander in Chief of the Law Enforcement Forces; the Head of Teheran’s Islamic Rev. Court; the Head of the Org. of Prisons and Penitentiaries; the Commander of Bassij. The President can assign a representative for the DCHQ meetings. The Gov. shall allocate annually a budget to DCHQ.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confiscation</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>In the cases of confiscation, characteristics of all assets and the excluded ones for the use of family must be included in the order.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary detention</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>It cannot exceed four months.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitigation and collaboration</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Sentences can be mitigated to half of their minimum, life to 15 years. Death sentence can be subject to amnesty. Collaboration with law enforcement agencies are considered for mitigation of sentences.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precursor control</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>The article applies to anybody who voluntary manufactures, purchases, sells, maintains, carries, imports, exports, precursors intended for illicit manufacturing of narcotic drugs, Codeine and Methadone. Punishments are the same specified in article 5.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iran Drug Related Deaths - 1994- 2001