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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

BUILDING AND STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE TO ORGANIZED CRIME AT TIMES OF CRISIS

ANNEX TO THE ORGANIZED CRIME STRATEGY TOOLKIT



UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME

Building and strengthening resilience to organized crime at times of crisis

Annex to the Organized Crime Strategy Toolkit



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BUILDING AND STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE TO ORGANIZED CRIME AT TIMES OF CRISIS

Overview

The number and impact of the crises¹ facing the world is increasing and intensifying, with no clear sign of abating. Humanitarian reporting points to an increase in both the frequency and the severity of extreme weather events, catalysed and exacerbated by climate change.² The United Nations reckons that two thirds of the world's cities with populations of over five million are located in areas at risk of sea-level rise.³ The World Bank estimates that 143 million people could be forced to leave their countries to escape the impacts of climate change by 2050.⁴ More countries are experiencing violent conflict, with conflicts also becoming more protracted and disproportionately affecting vulnerable demographic groups, particularly (but not only) women and girls.⁵ Crises are also becoming intertwined with clashes over increasingly scarce natural resources. Scarcity of natural resources constitutes a humanitarian crisis in its own right, causing displacement, fuelling instability and threatening governance. The economic impact of crises is also felt around the world, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) placing the cost of the COVID-19 pandemic to the global economy at around \$12.5 trillion through 2024.⁶

Unsurprisingly, such crises continue to offer strategic opportunities and “entry points” for organized criminal groups around the world. Governance vacuums and/or a breakdown in formal governance systems provide organized criminal groups with opportunities to increase their local influence as well as to subvert, co-opt or even take over State functions, such as the delivery of key services, thus increasing these groups’ legitimacy, influence and relative power. Organized criminal groups will continue to exploit climate change for the purpose of generating profit, both by consolidating their control over the supply of vital commodities such as water and food and by offering smuggling services to migrants fleeing increasingly arid or flooded regions around the world. Fragile and conflict-affected contexts often fuel war economies, which typically feature the manufacturing of and trafficking in weapons and drugs, illegal mining and trafficking in wildlife, timber, metals or minerals and other natural resources. Financial crises offer further opportunities for cash-rich organized criminal groups to infiltrate licit economies by securing investments at discounted rates, recruit new members among pockets of poverty and unemployment, and

¹ These are defined as abnormal events, acute situations or shocks, including conflict, human-made and natural disasters, climate emergencies, pandemics and financial instability.

² Tracy Carty and Lyndsay Walsh, *Footling the Bill: Fair Finance for Loss and Damage in an Area of Escalating Climate Impacts*, Oxfam Briefing Paper (Oxford, United Kingdom, Oxfam International, 2022). www.oxfam.org/en/research/footling-bill-fair-finance-loss-and-damage-era-escalating-climate-impacts.

³ United Nations, “The climate crisis: a race we can win” (2020). www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2020/01/un75_climate_crisis.pdf.

⁴ Kanta Kumari Rigaud and others, *Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration* (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2018). <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29461>.

⁵ United Nations, “A new era of conflict and violence” (2020). www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2020/01/un75_conflict_violence.pdf.

⁶ Macro Matters, “IMF sees cost of COVID pandemic rising beyond \$12.5 trillion estimate”, Reuters, 20 January 2022. See also United Nations Development Programme, “From the frontlines: the women activists fighting for equality amid crisis” (November 2022). <https://feature.undp.org/from-the-frontlines/>.



increase their legitimacy and support base, such as through the provision of small loans and microfinancing to struggling businesses. This latter activity became a feature of the COVID-19 pandemic, during which time technologically savvy organized criminal groups rapidly diversified by trafficking in falsified medical products and engaging in related crimes, including (online) fraud involving medical products (see spotlight, below).

Spotlight: exploitation of the COVID-19 pandemic by organized crime

Organized criminal groups around the world were quick to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic. In Italy, for example, elements of the Mafia provided “welfare” support and financial assistance to struggling businesses, ultimately increasing their leverage over these businesses’ economic activities, including for the purposes of money-laundering.^a In numerous regions, organized criminal groups extended this kind of support to the wider local community, while also enforcing social distancing measures and actively participating in the wholesale distribution of both real and falsified medical products.^b Organized criminal groups also diversified their operations, including by turning to cyberspace to exploit opportunities created by large-scale digital onboarding and digital dependence, while at the same time consolidating their territorial hold over areas having a more limited State presence.^c

^a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “The impact of COVID-19 on organized crime”, Research Brief (Vienna, 2020).

^b Alberto Aziani and others, “COVID-19 and organized crime: strategies employed by criminal groups to increase their profits and power in the first months of the pandemic”, *Trends in Organized Crime*, vol. 26, No. 2 (September 2021).

^c Robert Muggah, “The COVID-19 pandemic and the shifting opportunity structure of organized crime”, in *A Multidisciplinary Approach to Pandemics: COVID-19 and Beyond*, Philippe Bourbeau, Jean-Michel Marcoux and Brooke A. Ackerly, eds. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2022).

This context calls for a coordinated and focused response aimed specifically at bolstering States’ resilience to the exploitation of crises and disasters by organized crime. Admittedly, the concept of resilience – or the capacity to maintain core functions and values in the face of disturbance⁷ – has been the subject of much debate and, at times, criticism. For example, some theorists have argued that the term, which largely originated as an ecological concept, “serves more the role of a cultural metaphor than that of a well-developed scientific concept.”⁸ At the same time, a growing body of evidence points to the correlation between factors such as structural cohesion, “elasticity” and lower levels of social vulnerability and a State’s ability to cope with and rebound from structural pressure and shock. Moreover, research highlights the notion of “social resilience” – or the (more specific) capacity of people and communities to deal with and recover from stresses and crises⁹ – as being critical to the overall response of States at times of crisis.¹⁰ On balance, then, the concept still offers a useful starting point for testing overall exposure to and preparedness for these same crises, including with a view to closing down opportunities for organized crime to take hold.

⁷ Matthew Wills, “Resilience: the basics of a concept”, JSTOR Daily, 23 May 2020, <https://daily.jstor.org/resilience-the-basics-of-a-concept>.

⁸ Sissel H. Jore, “A conceptual adequacy analysis of terrorism resilience”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol.46, No.1 (2023), pp. 1–20.

⁹ Alan H. Kwok and others, “What is ‘social resilience’? Perspectives of disaster researchers, emergency management practitioners, and policymakers in New Zealand”, *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, vol. 19 (2016), pp. 197–211.

¹⁰ This logic has increasingly been translated into both strategic guidance and United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), which emphasize the gendered risks posed by armed conflict.

Spotlight: the gendered dimension of crises

There is growing evidence and recognition of the acute gendered risks that crises (ranging from natural disasters to conflict) pose, particularly to women and girls. For example, displacement caused by disasters has been estimated by the United Nations Environment Programme to lead to a 20 per cent to 30 per cent increase in human trafficking, while the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) has warned that disasters or conflict may increase the exposure of women to trafficking as families are disrupted and livelihoods are lost.^a Similarly, Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) emphasizes the gendered risks posed by armed conflict, including the fact that “women and children account for the vast majority of those affected by armed conflict”.

^a Christian Nellemann, Ritu Verma and Lawrence Hislop, eds., *Women at the Frontline of Climate Change: Gender Risks and Hopes, A Rapid Response Assessment*, (Nairobi), United Nations Environment Programme, 2011.

Accordingly, *this annex focuses on strategy and policy responses and interventions aimed at increasing resilience to organized crime during crises*, which range from war, political instability, conflict, climate emergencies and pandemics to financial volatility and deteriorating security situations. It follows a multisectoral logic and is primarily meant as an aid to policy planners, although it might be of interest to a range of different stakeholder communities, such as criminal justice practitioners, conflict responders and non-governmental organizations. It borrows from and supplements the conceptual framework developed in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) *Organized Crime Strategy Toolkit for Developing High-Impact Strategies*.¹¹ In order to contextualize the findings, the annex focuses on the various responses and approaches that could be adopted to increase resilience to organized crime within the context of five different crisis scenarios, among others that are also possible:¹²

- (a) Conflict and chronic instability of the security situation (at the national and regional levels);
- (b) Pandemics and public health emergencies;
- (c) Climate and extreme weather emergencies;
- (d) Rapid financial downturns and economic emergencies;
- (e) Spiralling criminal and gang violence.

In keeping with this framework, this annex is organized around four pillars: *preventing* the exploitation of crisis by organized criminal groups; *pursuing* and containing organized crime threats at times of crisis; adopting high-impact *protection* measures; and *promoting* collaborative and inclusive responses to address the phenomenon. It also builds on existing guidance and best practice, including the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, which outlines four priorities for action to prevent new and reduce existing (disaster) risks: understanding risk; strengthening risk governance; investing in risk reduction; and enhancing preparedness for effective responses, as well as to “build back better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.¹³ Furthermore, and as alluded to above, it seeks to

¹¹ Published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in September 2021, <https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/en/st/strategies/strategy-toolkit.html>. The annex also reflects a series of structured workshops conducted with international experts held in Bangkok in February 2023.

¹² It is recognized that crises can take many other forms than these scenarios, such as technological disruptions, infrastructure failures, mass cyberattacks and refugee crises (including those resulting from the listed scenarios).

¹³ Available at www.undrr.org/implementing-sendai-framework/what-sendai-framework.

promote best practice, including by advocating a “whole-of-society approach” in responding to crises and emergencies.¹⁴

Towards a resilience framework

Taken together, the resilience literature highlights the need for an approach that spans across a continuum or “pathway” that starts with preparation and effective early warning and builds up to effective crisis response and recovery mechanisms as well as longer-term, post-crisis regeneration.¹⁵ These components and phases of the resilience continuum are interwoven across the four pillars mentioned above (and outlined in the figure below) and are associated with a range of corresponding objectives and activities. They can also be broadly overlaid onto a “crisis curve”, which typically features a rapid escalation in the crisis culminating in a climax (or “tipping point”), followed by a gradual reduction and/or resolution of the crisis (depending, of course, on the context and character of the emergency).¹⁶

Understanding resilience as a pathway



The value of analysis

Developing an understanding of the risk and threat landscape as well as of relevant responses requires the production of strategic as well as longer-term foresight analysis. Such an approach can help to identify and detect potential shocks before they emerge and reveal some of the ways in which organized criminal groups may exploit crises to their advantage, drawing on their existing access and influence in any given context (see below). The value of analysis is at least as important after a crisis has broken out,

¹⁴ See, for example, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, *The UK Government Resilience Framework* (December 2022), www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-government-resilience-framework-the-uk-government-resilience-framework-html.

¹⁵ See A.M. Aslam Saja and others, “A critical review of social resilience properties and pathways in disaster management”, *International Journal of Disaster Risk Science*, vol. 12, No. 6 (November 2021), pp. 790–804.

¹⁶ Some crises and emergencies – ranging from conflict to the climate to financial collapse – may of course be much more chronic or drawn out.

as it provides a means of monitoring how criminal elements respond and adapt to these same emergencies. Correspondingly, the knowledge and insights gained through strategic and, ideally, multidisciplinary analysis can inform the crisis response, as well as the efficacy of policy, programming and security interventions.¹⁷

Effective strategic analysis as a cross-cutting requirement

Strategic analysis, monitoring and predictive assessments constitute a critical component of prevention, while also helping to inform the delivery and efficacy of subsequent responses. Such analyses can also take the shape of “lessons learned” processes aimed at taking stock of previous crises, how crisis response mechanisms performed and areas for potential improvement. To be cognizant of the ways different people are impacted by organized crime and crisis scenarios, these analyses should also rely on intersectional considerations and gender-disaggregated data.^a Key components of this kind of analysis might cover the following elements and areas:

- *An understanding of how organized criminal groups have exploited and taken advantage of previous crises*, including for the purposes of further embedding themselves within societies.
- *Short-, medium- and long-term developments and changes in the strategic (threat) environment*, including potential sources of social, political, health and economic upheaval and how organized criminal groups are adapting to these changes.
- *Factors allowing for crises and instability to breed, ferment and grow*, as well as how these factors offer strategic opportunities for organized crime.
- *Structural, infrastructural and social vulnerabilities, including within identifiable geographic hotspots* (localities within which different vulnerabilities or enabling conditions coalesce).

^aSee, for example, the UNODC toolkit on mainstreaming gender and human rights in the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which is to be published in 2023.

Spotlight: the European Union approach to foresight analysis

Strategic analysis has increasingly been used as a tool for identifying trends in and the evolution of the threat of organized crime and for informing policy responses. For the European Union, this has involved an innovation-centred and data-driven approach to mapping and forecasting patterns in organized crime, including those facilitated by technology. The European Union approach also seeks to leverage the access, data and expertise of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). Furthermore, the approach looks to integrate tools such as artificial intelligence and other innovative technology in order to facilitate the analysis of large data sets.^a

^aThis work has been partly catalysed by the European Union Innovation Hub for Internal Security, which is a collaborative network aimed at supporting the innovation labs of European Union agencies, member States, the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission and other relevant entities in the delivery of innovative, cutting-edge products.

¹⁷For a more detailed overview of best practice in conducting strategic analysis, UNODC is currently finalizing a practitioner’s guide on strategic analysis of organized crime, which is soon to be published.

Developing a multi-pillar, cross-sectoral response

Building resilience along the crisis continuum requires a combination of objectives and corresponding activities. Cross-cutting examples of these objectives and activities are organized in this section under the four pillars defined in the UNODC *Organized Crime Strategy Toolkit*: prevent, pursue, protect and promote. These are once again provided as considerations to assist the development of comprehensive and resilient strategic frameworks against organized crime.

PREVENT

Prevention within the context of increased resilience – including to the spread of organized crime – can largely be thought of as attempting to address or contain future and emerging risks *before* they appear or, more likely, escalate into full-blown emergencies. Such an approach, which is calibrated around the logic of “prevention is better than cure”, requires the ability to detect and diagnose sources of potential stress that might be rapidly exacerbated at times of crisis. Rapid global urbanization, moreover, highlights the need for developing preventative measures, specifically within cities, while at the same time ensuring that other vulnerable communities and settlements are not left behind in crisis planning and mitigation efforts.

Objectives (examples)	Components and requirements
<p>Enhance the preparedness and coping capacities of societies in the face of potential shocks.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Learn from previous experiences at the local, national, regional and global levels – including with respect to how organized crime spreads at times of crisis^a – and transform or adjust existing systems, responses and plans accordingly. ● Identify and address structural stresses, drivers of instability and systemic vulnerabilities across the political, social, economic, infrastructural and health sectors that may be exploited by organized criminal groups. This is likely to involve an understanding of the sectors that are most prone to corruption and infiltration at times of crisis. ● Develop and employ counter-narratives to thwart the influence of organized crime and attempts to subvert, co-opt or take over State functions.^b ● Ensure the presence of (both security and non-security) State functions in vulnerable areas to prevent governance gaps from forming or broadening in case of crisis. ● Embed best practice and knowledge on inclusive and gender-responsive peacebuilding,^c which may also help to address some of the drivers of organized crime at times of crisis.
<p>Encourage and build cohesion, including within communities and urban areas.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Increase understanding and evidence relating to the characteristics of resilient communities, including the importance of addressing corruption at all societal levels and identifying risks within cyberspace. ● Encourage engagement on potential crises across society, working with civil society organizations and the private sector. ● Adopt inclusive and gender-responsive governance approaches that reflect the needs and interests of minority groups. ● Identify and address likely physical and online recruitment pathways into organized criminal groups in times of crisis (e.g. as a result of unemployment or a lack of economic opportunity). ● Develop inclusive and gender-responsive strategies for the reintegration of ex-combatants and members of organized criminal groups in communities and the economy.^d

Develop a proactive approach to the early identification of organized crime activity during times of crises.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Introduce early warning systems and analysis capabilities, drawing on all available data sources (quantitative and qualitative). ● Harness these same systems to alert the population and local authorities to emerging dynamics and organized criminal groups' activities. ● Ensure that reporting on emerging risks within vulnerable sectors is shared with relevant partners using all available channels (e.g. media, social media, civil society platforms and local/community influencers). ● Engage with the private sector to identify exploitation of supply chains and markets by organized criminal groups during times of crisis.
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^aThis includes, as alluded to above, exploiting governance vacuums and providing basic services, as well as expanding illicit operations.

^bFor example, a recent research article that focused on organized crime in Italy, identified three types of counter-narrative: “rejecting unethical entrepreneurship”, “denying organized crime fascination” and “making the pervasiveness of organized crime governance irrelevant”. Fabio Indio Massimo Poppi, “Principii obsta: strategies of narrative resistance to Italian organized crime governance, *Deviant Behavior* (2023).

^cSee, for example, International Organization for Peacebuilding, “Track 6: a strategy for inclusive peacebuilding”, 10 October 2017, www.interpeace.org/2017/10/strategy-inclusive-peacebuilding/.

^dRelevant guidance in this context is provided by the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, including a module on “Women, gender and DDR”. Available at www.unddr.org/the-iddrs/.

Spotlight: establishing early warning systems

Early warning systems vary significantly in terms of complexity and sophistication but can play an important role in crisis and disaster reduction.^a Although such systems are found and utilized most commonly within the context of extreme weather emergencies, they are also being applied increasingly to more complex issues, such as armed violence and financial instability. One key lesson drawn from existing early warning systems is that these need to involve local communities and sources of reporting. Here, the spread of communication technologies and platforms such as social media as well as geospatial analysis tools is making the collection and visualization of such insights more achievable as well as accessible.^b Early warning systems also require frameworks and accompanying monitoring systems that assess risk and associated indicators in key areas and sectors, such as (in this case) relating to the overall territorial control of organized criminal groups, their diversification into new illicit business areas, recruitment patterns and the spread of organized crime violence.^c Moreover, early warning systems go hand in hand with promoting (public) risk awareness, including through the timely dissemination of information across societal sectors.

^aSee, for example, European Climate -options/establishment-of-early-warning-systems. Adaptation Platform Climate-ADAPT, “Establishment of early warning systems”. Available at <https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/metadata/adaptation>

^bThe Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) early warning hub constitutes a good example of this sort of approach to data visualization (see <https://acleddata.com/early-warning-research-hub/>).

^cAn interesting example in this ambit is the UNODC Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring System used to produce annual information on the levels of illegal crop cultivation. These basic data are used to conduct spatial analysis that makes it possible to evaluate changes in the cultivation of illegal crops in different areas, while also providing information on deforestation, loss of flora and fauna and degradation of soils – and therefore better plan relevant interventions.

PURSUE

Experience of recent crises – ranging from the COVID-19 pandemic, which was exploited by criminals for financial gain (see above), to outbursts of criminal violence at times of crisis – demonstrates the need for measures aimed at containing security risks that arise once structural shocks are already under way. Activities under the PURSUE pillar can be applied to proactively tackle and disrupt organized crime manifestations and occurrences “at the source” and contain their spread.

Objectives (examples)	Components and requirements
Respond to emerging organized crime security and stability threats at a time of crisis.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Maintain “track and trace” and other monitoring and intelligence systems to stay ahead of threat trajectories. ● Identify and actively address potential triggers and catalysts for the spread of organized crime, at both the macro and community levels (such as the emergence of black markets selling illicit goods). ● (Depending on the context) identify and engage with local (political) power brokers with the ability to influence events, including organized crime dynamics, on the ground. ● Demonstrate the ability to take criminal justice and humanitarian action even at times of crisis in order to contain emerging threats stemming from criminal and violent non-State actors. In some contexts, this may require the introduction of specialist courts and/or anti-corruption units. ● Ensure that emergency services and the security sector have processes in place for operating during times of crisis, thus preserving core State functions and legitimacy. This also links to the establishment of effective governance structures as a preventative measure (see Prevent section, above). ● Develop mechanisms to rapidly expand efforts aimed at tackling criminal finances, corruption and illicit financial flows to contain the spread of war, conflict and crisis economies.

Spotlight: weapons collection programmes

A number of useful lessons on curbing the spread of small arms and light weapons, including to organized crime elements, can be drawn from different contexts around the world as well as from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes.^a In Mali, for example, United Nations-coordinated disarmament efforts in the late 1990s were credited for their participatory and inclusive design, as well as for recognizing the needs of local civilians (including a need to ensure basic levels of security in exchange for the surrender of weapons).^b Conversely, the programmes that were the most ineffective were those that did not recognize local needs or that only served the interests of a particular subsection of society. In Uganda, for example, ex-combatants of the Lord’s Resistance Army had few incentives to surrender their weapons in light of the poor market conditions in the communities within which they were due to be reintegrated, despite the offer of skills training and credit schemes.^c Finally, the Western Balkans Small Arms and Light Weapons Road map, announced by the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2018 to curb the proliferation of weapons in the region, achieved some considerable successes, which were in large part a product of enhanced inter-State cooperation, including in the form of joint operations that focused on countering the illicit flow of weapons and ammunition across State borders.^d

^aOn the interrelations between DDR and organized crime, see the relevant module of the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (module 6.40), developed by the Department for Peace Operations. Available at www.unddr.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/IDDRS-6.40-DDR-and-Organized-Crime.pdf.

^b*Exchanging Weapons for Development in Mali: Weapon Collection Programmes Assessed by Local People* (United Nations publication, Sales No. G.V.E.04.0.14).

^cSee, for example, Erin Baines, Nadine Harris and Kyle McCleery, “‘Death is painful so it is better to be holding a gun’: the socio-ecologically situated dis/rearmament decisions of formerly abducted persons in northern Uganda”, *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol.10, No. 5 (October 2010), pp. 625–645.

^dSee www.seesac.org/salw-control-roadmap-seesac/.

PROTECT

Clearly, the unpredictable nature of shocks within today's modern, hyperconnected world suggests that these may not always be easily detected even through advanced analytical capabilities. For this reason, there can be no substitution for effective physical and social adaptive coping responses and, critically, *protective* measures once such shocks occur.¹⁸ These therefore constitute the focus of the PROTECT pillar.

Objectives (examples)	Components and requirements
Protect critical State functions, services and infrastructure.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure the continued ability to deliver basic services (e.g. medical, water, governance and waste disposal) at times of crisis, including in more remote localities, also ensuring that organized criminal elements do not take over these services. Moreover, gender-responsive provisions may need to be integrated in such interventions in order to ensure that all individuals have access to these services. • Ensure that critical transport, energy and communications infrastructure is safeguarded, including for the purpose of providing humanitarian assistance. • Ensure that correctional facilities continue to provide opportunities for reintegration and rehabilitation of offenders, including by respecting the rights of persons deprived of liberty^a and removing opportunities for organized crime to take hold within prisons. • Take protective measures to ensure that criminals do not (further) exploit cyberspace as a conduit for illicit operations and recruitment at times of crisis.
Protect vulnerable segments of the population from (further) harm.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raise awareness of risks (e.g. of extortion and physical and sexual abuse by organized criminal groups) and of mitigating actions, including via targeted communications campaigns. • Identify and provide measures for alleviating suffering at a time of crisis, including via the provision of emergency aid. • Focus on protecting the means of survival and allowing the population to resume their livelihoods and access markets and services without fear of reprisal, taking account of gender dynamics (such as in contexts where women are financially dependent on men who have been killed in conflict).^b • Ensure/adopt legislative provisions and mechanisms for gender-responsive victim assistance, protection, compensation and restitution.

^aOn this topic, see the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) (General Assembly resolution 70/175, annex).

^bThis also carries the benefits of reducing dependency on organized crime as a source of revenue and aiding wider economic recovery efforts.

PROMOTE

The PROMOTE pillar within the context of bolstering resilience to crises and shocks is centred around increasing political, institutional and technical cooperation and coordination across the different levels and layers of society and adding coherence to the overall response. It also emphasizes the need for developing and testing response plans, systems and processes in advance of crises.

¹⁸ See, for example, Markus Keck and Patrick Sakdapolrak, "What is social resilience? Lessons learned and ways forward", *Erdkunde*, vol. 67, No. 1 (2013), pp. 5–19.

Objectives (examples)	Components and requirements
Ensure the effective coordination and delivery of crisis and emergency responses, while “crime proofing” recovery processes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Develop standard operating procedures and agile crisis response plans covering (and connecting) relevant sectors. ● Clarify institutional mechanisms (e.g. crisis response cells and law enforcement task forces) and their links to the various levels of government and international partners. ● Create and maintain clear communication and coordination systems and processes at the regional, national and subnational levels. ● Engage and raise awareness of response plans, including through routine exercises. ● Recognize and close down opportunities for organized criminal groups to exploit post-crisis recovery efforts and contexts – such as by acquiring (re)construction contracts and/or purchasing companies and property at discounted rates – by adopting adequate legislation/regulations and concluding relevant public-private partnerships.
Adopt a community-centric and politically sensitive approach to resolving crises and averting organized criminal gains.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Develop plans for inclusive and gender-responsive political dialogue and ceasefire processes, recognizing the risks of organized crime embeddedness in post-crisis contexts (e.g. when negotiating political settlements). ● Encourage mediation, violence reduction and outreach activities using local brokers and influencers as appropriate (e.g. civil society, cultural influencers, women’s groups, religious institutions and local community leaders).^a
Test and refine response plans through an inclusive approach that combines domestic and international engagement.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Conduct simulations and exercises in order to test different elements of existing response plans, including with international and regional partners. ● Socialize response plans with different sectors of society (e.g. private sector, women’s and other interest groups and civil society) in order to secure buy-in, including at the community level.

^a This also supports the goals of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security.



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