

**Annex 1 [Note verbale reference: CU 2023/225/DTA/CEB/CSS]**

***“Links between corruption and other forms of crime”***

States parties are invited to provide relevant information in line with paragraph 22 of resolution 9/1<sup>1</sup>, in which the Conference:

*Encourage[d] States parties to further explore and enhance their knowledge of the **links between corruption and other forms of crime, in particular organized crime and economic crime, including money-laundering, including during times of emergencies and crisis response and recovery**, to better strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability, and invite[d] the secretariat, within existing resources, to compile a report in this regard on the voluntary information provided by States parties and submit it to the Conference at its tenth session [emphasis added].*

States parties may wish to take a broad view of “other forms of crime” when responding to this questionnaire, which may include all forms of organized crime and economic crime, as well as other crime, among others.

**Contact Information**

Please provide contact details for potential follow-up questions. Contact details will be treated confidentially.

*Country:* Italy

*Government Agency:* Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

*Department:* Directorate General for Global Affairs- Rule of Law Diplomacy

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<sup>1</sup> In July 2022, the secretariat sent out note verbale CU 2022/264(A)/DTA/CEB/CSS inviting States parties to provide information on good practices and challenges concerning international cooperation to further prevent, identify, investigate and prosecute corruption during times of emergencies and crisis response and recovery, in line with paragraphs 22 and 23 of resolution 9/1 entitled “Sharm el-Sheikh declaration on strengthening international cooperation in the prevention of and fight against corruption during times of emergencies and crisis response and recovery”. As at 11 October 2022, the secretariat had received responses from 23 States parties, which were analysed in a note prepared by the secretariat, entitled “Best practices and challenges concerning international cooperation in combating corruption during times of emergencies and crisis response and recovery, and efforts to further explore and enhance knowledge of the links between corruption and other forms of crime” [CAC/COSP/EG.1/2022/CRP.1]. Responses were received from the following States parties: Australia, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chad, Chile, Egypt, El Salvador, European Union, France, Georgia, Italy, Mexico, Myanmar, Panama, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Türkiye and the United States of America.

## Questionnaire

Corruption may contribute to impunity for other types of crime by providing the leverage to facilitate and execute them, and to make them invisible, and often exacerbates those crimes through the involvement of powerful elites and individuals. Corrupt behaviour (such as violating duties, accepting or transferring bribes, and facilitating transactions, as well as ignoring or failing to follow-up on information that a crime may be taking place) may serve an enabler of other crimes by allowing for the enrichment of criminals and incentivizing individuals in the public and private sector to facilitate their operation. Other crimes can therefore flourish and in turn provide a basis for a wide range of corrupt behaviour.

*This questionnaire is structured into two parts: Part 1 considers steps taken to understand the links between corruption and other forms of crime, while Part 2 focuses on the measures aimed at responding to corruption linked with other forms of crime.*

### I. Understanding the links between corruption and other forms of crime

1. Has your country undertaken any analyses or assessments to better understand the interlinkages between corruption and other forms of crime, including typologies of crime and how corruption may be used to facilitate and enable organized crime, economic and other crime, and vice versa? **YES/NO.**
  - a. If **YES**, was such analysis carried out through formal risk assessments or other methods? Please describe.

The analysis has been carried out (and is still carried on) at different levels, with different methodologies and by various actors and authorities, whose outputs are then collected and summarized in the periodic report by the competent Antimafia Commission of the National Parliament.

The analysis process, thus, encompasses publications by academies, central and local authorities (National Anticorruption Authority, Universities and post-graduation courses, law enforcement agencies and police forces (e.g. Guardia di Finanza, National Police, Carabinieri and the Antimafia Investigative Directorate (DIA), which is a joint forces investigative body devoted to the antimafia investigations) or regulatory bodies like the Italian FIU.

The results are to be found on open web sources and are targeted to various aspects of the possible interconnections between corruptive and criminal activity (e.g. bribery finalized to influence the decisions of local/central administration, to gain public tenders/procurements, etc.).

Methods of analysis can, therefore, change in accordance to the kind of analysis which is carried out: the one done by LEAs is more “case-oriented” while the one provided by academies, FIU and local authorities is based on risk indicators and more specific parameters.

It has to be underlined that in all Italian universities (in particular in sociology, law, politics, economy faculties) specific masters on prevention and contrast to the organized crime and corruption are organized (see, as example, here: <https://www.sp.unipi.it/it/bando-master-in-analisi-prevenzione-e-contrasto-della-criminalita-organizzata-e-della-corruzione/>), which is also a very important way to arise awareness and prepare the future leadership to deal with such phenomena.

With specific regard to money laundering, the Italian AML/CFT preventive system is generally recognized as a point of strength and of reference for combating not only money laundering but also related criminal phenomena such as, primarily, organized crime, corruption and tax evasion,

as associated predicate offences. The interlinkages among the mentioned criminal activities were also highlighted in the FATF Mutual Evaluation of Italy of 2016, that recognized Italy's system as having a strong legal and institutional framework, a sound understanding of the risks and, in general, a good degree of policy cooperation and coordination among authorities.

In accordance with the FATF Recommendations and the European AML/CFT Directives, Italy conducted in 2014 and updated in 2018 its National Risk Assessment.

With the aim to determine the potential risks of money laundering in connection with the proceeds of criminal activity and to identify weaknesses in the prevention, investigation and suppression mechanisms, both the "NRA exercises" brought to light the significant threat that money laundering poses to the national economy. This is due to the gravity of the predicate crimes, among which bribery and corruption, fraudulent bankruptcy, tax fraud and other corporate crimes, often conducted by organized crime, were of the outmost relevance.

A new update of the exercise is currently ongoing, to take into account new threats or significant emerging vulnerabilities. The persistent gravity of the threats related to corruption confirms the importance of a rigorous and well-structured system for preventing and combating money laundering and associated predicate offences in Italy

2. Please list the main typologies of other crime that have interlinkages with corruption in your country.

Drug trafficking

Money-laundering

Human trafficking

Migrant smuggling

Firearms trafficking

Crimes that affect the environment

Trafficking in cultural property

Cybercrime

Terrorism

Other forms of economic crime, organized crime or other crime with links to corruption (**please list**)

Tax evasion (control and checks avoidance)

bribery finalized to influence the decisions of local/central administration (obtaining specific trade licenses, commercial authorizations, etc.)

bribery finalized to gain public tenders/procurements

3. Please provide examples of corruption linked to these other crimes.

<https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/fraud-scheme-least-eur-440-million-italy-halted>

<https://www.eppo.europa.eu/en/news/italy-public-official-convicted-corruption-confiscation-over-eu500-000-ordered>

<https://www.eppo.europa.eu/en/news/operation-italy-against-criminal-group-under-investigation-massive-vat-fraud-12-arrests>

Please elaborate if you have or had any cases of the following in your country:

A. Corruption as an enabler of crime

- a. Cases of public officials abusing their office to facilitate criminal activity or to protect certain criminal individuals and entities – or to gain support from them – for example, by providing funding or protection or to gain and control public resources?

**YES**

- b. Cases of corruption being used to facilitate other types of crime, such as trafficking in persons, illicit trade or smuggling of drugs across borders? For example, have any cases involved the following:

the issuance of permits, licenses, visas or documents for border crossings

the purchasing of firearms

bribery of border agents

falsification of data in public registries

other

bribery of public agents to obtain legal permits of stay in the national territory

- c. Cases of corruption in public procurement to advance the interests of public officials and their associates? Cases of officials giving preferred access to contracts and tenders to their associates in cases involving other crimes?

**YES**

- d. Cases of the protection of victims of crime and corruption being impeded by corruption involving public officials or persons in the private sector?

**NO**

B. Corruption and crime linked to political patronage

- a. Criminal individuals and entities attempting to use corruption to obtain access to political leadership or to gain power and influence, such as through:

political party financing

trading in influence

other

- b. Cases of crime and corruption being used to attempt to influence or disrupt elections?

**YES**

- c. Cases of criminal involvement, including through the use of corruption, to attempt to influence appointments of public officials to build dependency?

**YES**

C. Corruption to make organized and other crime invisible

- a. Cases of criminals and their associates using proceeds of crime and corruption for personal enrichment and to conceal the origin of the crimes and for money-laundering? In particular, cases of concealment of ownership being used to facilitate corruption and other forms of crime?

**YES**

- b. Cases of corruption being used to impede investigations, prosecutions and adjudications of organized and other crime, such as through bribery or allocation of political and other favors to law enforcement and judicial officers? Are there cases of corruption linked to organized and other crime not being pursued by the authorities ('blind eye')?

YES, in the first case and NO in the second case.

- c. Cases of individuals and entities using corruption and other crimes to generate the funds needed to buy protection from the police? Cases of corruption in law enforcement authorities used to shield organized crime?

NO in the first case; YES in the second case, but limited to single officers/agents in very rare cases.

- d. Cases of law enforcement being impeded due to a lack of information and data, as well as reporting of crimes related to corruption?

**NO**

- 4. Has your country collected data or statistics to track and/or analyze trends related to the links between corruption and the types of crime outlined in Question 2 above?

**YES**

- a. Are these data analysed and used systematically, such as in prevention and investigations or prosecutions?

YES they are, but the systematic use to prevent and investigate corruption and/or organized crime is carried out specifically by the national police forces and law enforcement agencies (D.I.A., the Antimafia Investigative Directorate), because it is up to them to proactively (and actively) make use of the case-based information they possess in order to prevent and tackle crime. Other bodies have the task to make a post factum-analysis, whose results are obviously paramount to determine the political and operational choices in order to better orient the legislative process, the setting up of administrative procedures and countermeasures to hamper possible illicit behaviours that could lead to corruptive and/or serious criminal activity.

- b. Please describe any methodologies used for strengthening measurement and terminological clarity, and achieving a deeper understanding of the different contexts (e.g. in times of peace or in emergencies or conflict situations) and sectors (e.g. law enforcement, border crossing, immigration, intelligence and security, procurement), as well as any corruption or organized crime threat assessments that take into account the interlinkages between corruption and other forms of crime.

The best way to set up a comprehensive and harmonized understanding of a criminal phenomenon is to identify the stakeholder and the actors interested in preventing and tackling it. When we have therefore to analyse the possible interlinkages between corruption and other forms of crime, under any circumstances, the best way is to create a common language and commonly acknowledged definitions and descriptions of such phenomena.

At national level, those definitions are provided through legislative acts by the competent parliamentary commissions, through auditions of all relevant LEAs, stakeholders, actors and academics, in order to have clear and unique descriptions of criminal behaviours and criminal procedures, harmonizing them with the definitions and procedures produced at international level.

At international level the competent authorities have to promote the national way of defining what mentioned above: so the process is always going on bilaterally, with positive influence on both levels.

During the recent pandemic Italy took the initiative (through the Ministry of Interior – Department of Public Security – Directorate of Criminal Police – Service for International Police Cooperation), to organize with EUROPOL an international law enforcement forum to monitor and analyse the possible changes in the criminal behaviour because of the lockdown measures and the related increase of subsidy and funds to private and legal persons to mitigate the drastic reductions of trades.

This forum took place in September 2021 in Rome and successfully provided a case analysis of the possible criminal infiltration on the legal economy, also through corruption, to obtain the above mentioned funds. The forum was followed by a second edition in March 2022 in The Hague (NL), which targeted organised crime threats against the NextGenerationEU recovery fund. Representatives from EU Member States, the European Commission, the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), Eurojust, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and the Recovery and Resilience Task Force attended the forum that had an operational approach, focusing on prevention and enforcement while maintaining and stepping up international cooperation.

Special attention was paid to the 'green transition' and the 'digital transformation' elements of the recovery plan, given the scope of NextGenerationEU funds distributed in these two key areas.

First forum:

(<https://www.poliziadistato.it/articolo/roma-forum-contro-linfiltrazione-criminale-nei-fondi-del-next-generation-eu>)

Second forum:

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/nextgenerationeu-law-enforcement-forum>

5. Has your country collected data or statistics to track and/or analyse trends concerning international cooperation in this regard? **YES.**

The Italian Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) plays a pivotal role in the prevention regime, particularly in the early, “pre-investigative” or intelligence gathering stage. It is also entrusted with the centralized task of receiving, analysing and disseminating STRs and also exchanging information with foreign counterparties. The international cooperation is an essential function for the analysis of financial flows, which could also be related to underlying international corruption phenomena, that increasingly cross national borders, affecting multiple jurisdictions. In this context, the international cooperation channels between the UIF and foreign FIUs is an invaluable resource for the successful prevention and investigation of corruption and financial crimes (in this respect, please consider that cooperation among

FIUs happens regardless of the prior identification of a specific predicate crime, that is outside the perimeter of FIUs' mandate).

UIF seeks the cooperation of foreign counterparts both in support of its own analyses, in cases where suspicious activities feature significant links with other jurisdictions, and to pursue domestic cooperation with law enforcement agencies or prosecutors. These latter cases occur when UIF is required to contribute to ongoing investigations by providing financial information, either from STRs or from foreign FIUs, which can be used to foster intelligence or prepare mutual legal assistance requests. The outcomes of the a.m. FATF Mutual Evaluation of Italy, conducted in 2016, showed that UIF is effective in providing cooperation to its foreign counterparts and is active in requesting information from other FIUs in support of its analyses.

The use of structured, protected and dedicated international and European networks (the Egmont Secure Web and the FIU.NET) has been increasing constantly; this allows for speed and efficiency.

Please find below statistics on exchanges of information made by the UIF in the recent years.

Requests sent by UIF to foreign FIUs					
	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Information required by the judicial authority	367	438	575	364	334
Information required for internal analysis	715	525	475	470	456
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.082</b>	<b>963</b>	<b>1.050</b>	<b>834</b>	<b>790</b>

- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.

Requests/spontaneous communications received and responses provided					
	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Egmont network	594	621	695	872	776
FIU.NET channel	602	729	851	825	881
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.196</b>	<b>1.350</b>	<b>1.546</b>	<b>1.697</b>	<b>1.657</b>
<b>Responses provided (1)</b>	<b>1.681</b>	<b>1.862</b>	<b>2.246</b>	<b>2.528</b>	<b>2.358</b>
<b>Communications sent to investigative bodies</b>	<b>3.070</b>	<b>2.533</b>	<b>3.296</b>	<b>3.608</b>	<b>3.800</b>

11. (1) Refers to responses to requests for information and feedback on spontaneous communications provided when necessary

- a. Please elaborate and share any findings with regard to the good practices and challenges in international cooperation with regard to countering corruption as it relates to other forms of crime

In terms of international cooperation, Italy is an active Member State of the most relevant law enforcement organizations and agencies playing at global level. The best practices that have a good effect on the positive achievement on corruption and or transnational organized crime investigations, encompassing both the legislative and the procedural level, are:

- legislative level:
  - clear multilateral and/or bilateral rule of law through Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, MoUs;
  - harmonized legal frameworks;
- procedural level:
  - setting up of joint investigative teams (according to UNCTOC, UNCAC and EUROJUST rules and terms of reference);
  - personal knowledge between investigators/prosecutors;

Within the Egmont Group of the FIUs, the UIF coordinated in 2021, in cooperation with the FIU Armenia, a project on “The Financial Intelligence Units' role in the fight against the laundering of proceeds of corruption within the context of the Covid-19 pandemic”. The exercise was in line with the priorities of the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, as determined by the Italian G20 Presidency in the same year.

The final document of the project found out that criminals exploited the crisis to increase their power and influence over communities, public bodies, and the economy when Governments enacted emergency COVID-19 response plans or were unable to put adequate responses in place.

Participant FIUs’ provided detailed information on detected corruption-related risks and associated mitigating measures, relevant case examples, lessons learned, emerging best practices to prevent and tackle corruption-related crimes, future challenges. The project team also identified other possible avenues or mechanisms available to reporting entities to support their efforts in identifying suspicious financial activity potentially linked to corruption.

For details, please find here the link to the paper:

[https://egmontgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/FIU-Role-in-Fight-Against-ML-of-Corruption-Proceeds\\_COVIDContext\\_Public\\_Final.pdf](https://egmontgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/FIU-Role-in-Fight-Against-ML-of-Corruption-Proceeds_COVIDContext_Public_Final.pdf)

6. Has your country taken any steps at national, regional or local levels to better understand and study the linkages between corruption and other crimes, such as criminological research, training or awareness raising?

**YES** (please see Answer I.1.a.)

- a. If **YES**, please elaborate, providing examples.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ANALYSIS

<https://direzioneeinvestigativaantimafia.interno.gov.it/relazioni-semestrali/>

ACADEMIC STUDIES:

[https://www.unirc.it/documentazione/materiale\\_didattico/1465\\_2013\\_352\\_18101.pdf](https://www.unirc.it/documentazione/materiale_didattico/1465_2013_352_18101.pdf)



<https://www.sp.unipi.it/it/bando-master-in-analisi-prevenzione-e-contrasto-della-criminalita-organizzata-e-della-corruzione/>  
<http://www.siepweb.it/siep/wp/en/the-effects-of-mafia-infiltration-on-public-procurement-performance/>  
<https://www.bvdinfo.com/it-it/blog/business-development-and-strategy/indicatori-per-la-valutazione-del-rischio-infiltrazione-criminale-ai-tempi-del-covid-19>  
<https://iris.unive.it/retrieve/handle/10278/3747687/256891/Di%20Cataldo%20Mastrorocco%202021.pdf>

#### CENTRAL AUTHORITIES AND BODIES:

[https://www.giustizia.it/cmsresources/cms/documents/Tavolo\\_4\\_Mafie\\_corruzione\\_e\\_pubbliche\\_amministrazioni.pdf](https://www.giustizia.it/cmsresources/cms/documents/Tavolo_4_Mafie_corruzione_e_pubbliche_amministrazioni.pdf)  
[https://www.esteri.it/en/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/temi\\_globali/anticorruzione/](https://www.esteri.it/en/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/temi_globali/anticorruzione/)  
<https://www.anticorruzione.it/documents/91439/0f6d1e21-8e67-aa52-f241-e352a0d42c72>  
<https://www.anticorruzione.it/gli-indicatori>

#### LOCAL AUTHORITIES ANALYSIS:

[https://www.regione.toscana.it/documents/10180/23864036/Libro%20Sintesi4R\\_2019\\_v3.pdf/5727e94c-12c6-84b2-c5f0-f05c88a83ae0](https://www.regione.toscana.it/documents/10180/23864036/Libro%20Sintesi4R_2019_v3.pdf/5727e94c-12c6-84b2-c5f0-f05c88a83ae0)

Disclaimer: the above mentioned open source links are only intended to provide evidence of the ongoing formal analysis process existing in Italy on the interlinkages between corruption and organized crime and cannot be considered as exhaustive. Other info are easily to be found on the internet in official websites.

7. Which aspects of corruption as it relates to other forms of crime do you consider require further research, and what are the gaps in knowledge or understanding that, if addressed, could facilitate countering these crimes?

A specific focus should be put towards the CO's infiltration into the legal economy through corruption, finding out all the possible risk indicator. The case-based analysis on the behaviour of the TCOs has shown how they are interested and indeed already very active in laundering the illicit proceedings of crime, infiltrating the legal economy through illicit means (corruption, loan sharking, etc.) to dominate a local economy and erasing the fair trade in a specific area. This generates the possibility to control such areas not only from an economic point of view, but also from a social point of view. The criminal organization are seen by the local population as a substitute of the legal institutions to provide them with working places and opportunity to earn money, in such a way that the organized crime is able to gain consensus and to be seen as a better choice in relation to the representative of the national/local institutions and authorities. This toxic environment interferes with the building up of a civic sense and a positive public spirit.

## II. Measures aimed at responding to corruption linked with other forms of crime

8. Has your government adopted or utilized any measures at national, regional or local levels aimed at **preventing** corruption linked with other forms of crime? YES
  - a. If **YES**, please elaborate. *Measures may include:*

- ✓ safeguards in specific sectors (e.g. law enforcement, border crossing, immigration, intelligence and security, procurement, local officials)
- ✓ development of targeted strategies, policies, action plans at national or sectoral level specifically addressing the links between corruption and other crime
- ✓ establishment of dedicated institutional frameworks
- ✓ specific rules, codes of conduct, or standards of transparency and integrity for public officials who are most exposed to the risk of being involved in crime and corruption
- ✓ systems for the disclosure of assets and private interests
- ✓ control mechanisms, such as internal approval systems to avoid having one-to-one meetings
- ✓ controls on issuances of visas, work permits, firearms licenses
- ✓ the use of information and communication technology (ICT) based tools to prevent (or detect) such crimes
- ✓ awareness raising and prevention measures for public officials that are vulnerable to corruption and other forms of crime
- ✓ other

It is worth noting the peculiar status that some offices of the public administration assume under the AML/CFT Italian preventive system. According to the law, public offices that handle certain types of administrative procedures in specific public sectors (for example, public procurement and public contracts, public funding, etc.) are obliged to notify the UIF about any data or information concerning suspicious transactions, in accordance with instructions and indicators issued by the UIF. This kind of reporting mechanism could be of extraordinary relevance to allow the detection of suspected corruption-related money laundering, even within the public sector.

As the contribution of the public administrations to the AML/CFT system, in terms of number of communications of suspicious operations sent to the UIF, still remains limited, the UIF took on many initiatives to stimulate the public offices' capacity to intercept suspicious phenomena or and activities, so as to further involve the public sector in the AML system. In particular, in recent years the UIF issued indicators and instructions to facilitate the public administration in this particular type of reporting activity (April 2018). Furthermore, it held seminars and training meetings to increase the sensitivity of public offices as regards the correct fulfilment of their AML duties. Useful opportunities for cooperation have been developed with some Municipalities and National and Regional public bodies. In addition, starting from 2021 a training course on AML for the benefit of public administrations has been organized in cooperation with the National School of Administration-SNA (under the joint scientific responsibility of the UIF and the School), to raise awareness among public administrations on the importance of the prevention of money laundering in the public sector. Relevant activities are currently ongoing: the UIF participates, together with the same SNA, the Anti-Corruption National Authority-ANAC and other institutions, in projects on the prevention of corruption and the promotion of an "integrity culture" within the framework of the 5th National Action Plan for the Open Government Partnership, coordinated by the Public Function Department. Initiatives are also underway, among other things, to reach a better integration between AML and anti-corruption activities and to explore mechanisms to make the AML cooperation from the public offices more effective.

9. Has your government adopted or utilized any measures aimed at **detecting, investigating and prosecuting** corruption linked with other forms of crime? YES

a. If YES, please elaborate. *Measures may include:*

- ✓ legislation criminalizing all forms of corruption related to other types of crime
- ✓ legislation providing for the liability of legal persons for their role in corruption linked to other forms of crime
- ✓ measures to identify beneficial owners of legal persons
- ✓ specialized investigative techniques
- ✓ strengthened institutional frameworks, including the establishment of dedicated bodies (such as those mandated to identify links between corruption and other crime), task forces or coordination mechanisms between authorities responsible for corruption and other crime
- ✓ capacity-building, including targeted training and peer-learning for relevant authorities
- ✓ measures to enable the identification, confiscation, tracing or seizure (and, where relevant, return) of assets that are proceeds of corruption-related crimes
- ✓ mechanisms to address the role of professional gatekeepers (*i.e.* financial, legal, accounting or other relevant professionals) in the transfer of proceeds of corruption and other crime
- ✓ measures aimed at encouraging the protection or participation of actors outside the public sector, including:
  - ✓ reporting mechanisms, legal protections and incentives aimed at encouraging persons to report corruption and other crimes
  - ✓ measures to protect victims, witnesses, and cooperating offenders
  - ✓ measures aimed at ensuring the investigation and prosecution of acts of violence committed against journalists and civil society actors whose professional activity relates to corruption linked with other crimes
- other

10. Has your government adopted or utilized any measures aimed at facilitating **international cooperation** and the rapid exchange of information for cases that have interlinkages between corruption and other forms of crime? **YES**

a. If **YES**, please elaborate. *Measures may include:*

- ✓ the implementation of mutual legal assistance through digital means
- ✓ measures aimed at enhancing the efficiency of extradition mechanisms
- ✓ the use of electronic communication channels or networks
- ✓ the use of joint or parallel investigations or the bilateral sharing of capacity and expertise on investigating and prosecuting corruption offences linked with other forms of crime
- ✓ cooperation with other countries or multilateral, international or regional bodies to address corruption linked with other forms of crime
- ✓ accession to bilateral, regional or multilateral treaties and agreements.
- other