




UNITED NATIONS
Office on Drugs and Crime

RESULTS OF A PILOT SURVEY OF FORTY SELECTED ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS IN SIXTEEN COUNTRIES

September 2002



GLOBAL PROGRAMME AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

GLOBAL PROGRAMME AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

Results of a pilot survey of forty selected organized
criminal groups in sixteen countries

September 2002



UNITED NATIONS
Office on Drugs and Crime

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION
 - 1.1 Background
 - 1.2 Overview of the report
 - 1.3 Defining transnational organized crime
 - 1.4 Monitoring global organized crime trends
 - 1.5 Distinguishing between criminal groups, clusters and markets

2. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
 - 2.1 Methodological challenges
 - 2.2 Data acquisition
 - 2.3 Data reliability
 - 2.4 Cross-country comparisons of organized crime groups

3. PROFILE OF ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS SURVEYED
 - 3.1 Profile of the groups
 - 3.1.1 Structure
 - 3.1.2 Size
 - 3.1.3 Violence
 - 3.1.4 Ethnic and social identity
 - 3.1.5 Activities
 - 3.1.6 Transborder operations
 - 3.1.7 Corruption
 - 3.1.8 Political influence
 - 3.1.9 Cross-over between licit and illicit activities
 - 3.1.10 Cooperation with other organized crime groups
 - 3.2 Summary of key characteristics
 - 3.3 Cross-referencing selected variables

4. TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS
 - 4.1 Why develop typologies?
 - 4.2 Typology 1: ‘Standard hierarchy’
 - 4.3 Typology 2: ‘Regional hierarchy’
 - 4.4 Typology 3: ‘Clustered hierarchy’
 - 4.5 Typology 4: ‘Core group’
 - 4.6 Typology 5: ‘Criminal network’
 - 4.7 Linking the typologies to criminal clusters

5. WAY FORWARD
 - 5.1 Project overview and assessment
 - 5.2 Problems and prospects

APPENDIX A: Standardized questionnaire used to gather the data.

APPENDIX B: Overview of each of the 40 criminal groups surveyed.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Globalization and growing economic interdependence have encouraged and promoted the transformation of crime beyond borders in all parts of the world. Improved communications and information technologies, increased blurring of national borders, greater mobility of people, goods and services across countries, and the emergence of a globalized economy have moved crime further away from its domestic base. The nature of organized crime in the contemporary world then cannot be understood separately from the concept of globalization.

In 1998, in recognition of these factors, the Member States of the United Nations decided to establish an *ad hoc* Committee for the purpose of elaborating a comprehensive international Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). The *ad hoc* Committee succeeded in drafting four international legal instruments -- the Convention and three Protocols on Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants and Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms -- that will facilitate the prevention and combating of transnational organized crime. Through the ratification of these instruments several new legal concepts and mechanisms will be adopted by the State Parties who ratify the Convention. Of importance in this regard, is the criminalizing of participation in the activities of a criminal group itself. Importantly too, the Convention will provide a basic framework of cooperation across a large number of countries in the fight against organized crime.

Critical to the implementation and monitoring of the TOC Convention will be the ability to access reliable information on international organized crime trends. Adequate information on ongoing developments from a global perspective may provide a useful marker against which progress can be measured and changes in the nature of organized crime assessed. At the same time, an international effort to collect data on developments in organized crime around the globe would provide a platform for the work of a wide ranging number of individuals and governments who are increasingly adopting more systematic ways of acquiring information on organized criminal groups.

Beyond the establishment of an overall measure to assess trends in organized crime, the development of a more comprehensive system of classification and the ongoing collection of data on criminal groups provides a useful tool for both law enforcement officials and prosecutors. Information on various criminal groups serves not only to inform counterparts in other countries what kind of criminal groups are being investigated in specific states, but allows information on the activities of similar groups to be compared. If combined with data about institutional arrangements and strategies of states in addressing crime, it provides insights into the viability of measures and strategies adopted in tackling various types of criminal groups. Important to note here is that by providing a standard set of agreed upon definitions, for example for the term "organised crime group" and for offences such as "trafficking in human beings", the Convention and its Protocols have in effect established a base-line for future research and analysis. If all the countries which

ratify the Convention use the same terminology and definitions, the task of comparative analysis is made much easier.

To further the debate on measures and instruments to collect data on organized crime trends at an international level, this report presents the findings of a survey of 40 selected organized criminal groups in 16 countries and one region. The survey was conducted by the Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) in an attempt to both build the knowledge base on organized crime groups, and to develop a comparative framework for the study of the phenomenon. The mechanism in which the data was collected and analyzed is explored below and the findings presented. Among other results, the data has allowed the development of a typology of organized criminal groups.

1.2 Overview of the report

The introduction of the report begins with a short review of the definition used for transnational organized crime by the TOC Convention. This is particularly important as it sets the scene for a more detailed discussion of the nature of the actual criminal groups themselves. This is followed by a brief review of the provisions of the TOC Convention in respect of monitoring and information collection on transnational organized crime groups.

The introduction concludes by arguing for a clear distinction between criminal groups as individual entities – the key focus of this report – and clusters of criminal groups such as the often identified Russian Mafia or West African organized crime problems. This distinction between groups and clusters is of some importance to the report, which argues that the collection of information on transnational organized crime must focus on the lowest possible level, that of the criminal groups themselves. While criminal clusters may contain specific characteristics – indeed, these are presented at various points in the report – they do not on their own constitute valid research categories for the study of organized crime.

The second section of the report gives an overview of the mechanics of the project itself. It is noted here that the gathering of data on organized crime groups in a number of countries, constitutes a significant research challenge. The section thus begins with a preliminary examination of some of the methodological obstacles involved in such work. This is followed by a short review of the survey methodology used and the general approach adopted.

The third section of the report provides an overview of the data gathered on each of the groups in question. Details of all the groups are presented in respect of a number of key variables. These include: structure, size, activity, level of transborder operations, issues in respect of identity, level of violence and corruption used, extent of political influence, penetration into the legitimate economy and the degree to which the group in question cooperate with other organized criminal groups. The results of the selective cross-referencing of some of the most prominent of these variables against each other is also presented.

The fourth section uses the information that has been gathered to present five possible standard typologies of transnational organized crime groups. The characteristics of each of the typologies is presented and illustrated by the inclusion of examples from the groups that have been collected.

The report concludes with an examination of the possibilities for future data collection on transnational organized crime groups at an international level.

1.3 Defining transnational organized groups

The diversity of criminal actors and organizations has made consensus about the definition of “organized crime” difficult. It has been argued that organized crime groups differ from other crime groups in that they specialize in enterprise as opposed to predatory crimes, have a durable hierarchical structure, employ systemic violence and corruption, obtain abnormally high rates of return relative to other criminal organizations, and extend their activities into the legal economy.¹ According to this interpretation, criminal groups that do not meet these five conditions are not ‘organized crime’. Others have opted for a broader definition: “Organized crime consists of organizations that have durability, hierarchy and involvement in a multiplicity of criminal activities”.² Nevertheless, arguments as to what constitutes organized crime and what does not have occupied a central position in the debate, and are critical to efforts to monitor developments from an international level.³

The concept of transnational crime – essentially criminal activity that crossed national borders – was introduced in the 1990s. In 1995, the United Nations identified eighteen categories of transnational offences, whose inception, perpetration and/or direct or indirect effects involve more than one country.⁴ Subsequently, the UN promoted a survey among Member States, which asked respondents to list cases of transnational organized crime in their respective jurisdictions. However, only a few were able to provide satisfactory, unequivocal answers. National legislation lacked clear definitions of this type of crime and held blurred distinctions between the national and transnational nature of offences.

The debate in the *ad hoc* Committee on the elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime did not lead to consensus on a definition of “organized crime” or to a list of crimes that would constitute such a phenomenon. As a result, State representatives agreed to focus on the characteristics of actors rather than of acts. The proposal of some delegates to include an enumerative or indicative list of offences was rejected. It was felt that transnational organized groups shift from one

¹ R.T. Naylor, ‘Mafias, Myths and Markets: On the Theory and Practice of Enterprise Crime’, *Transnational Organized Crime*, Vol 3, No 3, 1997, p. 6.

² Peter Reuter, *Disorganized Crime: Illegal Markets and the Mafia*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983, p. 75.

³ See R.T. Naylor, *Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance and the Underworld Economy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp.14-18.

⁴ The offences listed included money laundering, terrorist activities, theft of art and cultural objects, theft of intellectual property, illicit arms trafficking, aircraft hijacking, sea piracy, insurance fraud, computer crime, environmental crime, trafficking in persons, trade in human body parts, illicit drug trafficking, fraudulent bankruptcy, infiltration of legal business, corruption and bribery of public or party officials.

activity to another, and that it would be futile, or even counterproductive, to attempt to capture, in a legal text, all criminal ventures in which such groups are engaged at present or may be engaging in the future.⁵

Agreement, however, was reached on what constitutes an “organized crime group” and what is entailed by “transnational crime”. Thus, an organized criminal group is a “structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”⁶ By “serious crime” is meant “conduct constituting a criminal offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty”.⁷

According to the Convention, an offence is transnational if “(a) It is committed in more than one state; (b) It is committed in one state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another state; (c) It is committed in one state but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state; or (d) It is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state”.⁸

It is important to note then that in defining “organized criminal groups” the negotiators of the TOC Convention opted for a broad definition. It was decided not to limit the scope of application to hierarchically structured or mafia type organizations but also to cover more loosely organized criminal groups, committing serious crimes which are transnational in nature. Such a broad definition is sensible given the diversity of the phenomenon. Yet this broad focus significantly complicates any process of monitoring and data collection at an international level on transnational organized crime groups.

1.4 Monitoring global organized crime trends

As will be shown later in the report, the most striking outcome of the organized criminal group data collection exercise is the variety of groups on which information has been collected. The diversity of the groups is perhaps the most startling feature of the data, suggesting that when we talk of transnational organized crime in a variety of localities, we are often in fact referring to very different phenomena. Given the diversity of the phenomenon and the lack of any consolidated information base at international level, the requirement for information and data sharing is specifically recognized by the TOC Convention. This stipulates that states should “consider analyzing, in consultation with the scientific and academic communities, trends in organized crime in [their] territory, the circumstances in which organized crime operates, as well as the professional groups and technologies involved”.⁹ The Convention also urges states to share information on organized crime and specifically

⁵ For an overview of the drafting process, see Dimitri Vlassis, “Drafting the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime”, in Phil Williams and Dimitri Vlassis (eds), *Combating Transnational Organized Crime: Concepts, Activities and Responses*, London: Frank Cass, 2001.

⁶ TOC Convention, Article 2 (a)

⁷ TOC Convention, Article 2 (b)

⁸ TOC Convention, Article 3 (2)

⁹ TOC Convention, Article 28 (1)

recognizes that “common definitions, standards and methodologies should be developed and applied as appropriate.”¹⁰

These factors, and their inclusion in the Convention, constitute a significant challenge for international bodies, specifically the United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), in providing the framework for such analysis and information sharing to occur. Data on organized crime groups across the world is uneven, and often dominated by information from the developed world. There is in contrast a general lack of knowledge on the nature and extent of organized crime groups in the developing world.¹¹ The focus is also generally on organized crime groups which have a high public profile – such as the Russian Mafiya¹² – to the exclusion of a wide range of smaller criminal enterprises which often resemble more complex and fluid networks.¹³

Indeed, the available evidence suggests that new technologies and other developments related to globalization have lowered the barriers to entry in respect of some criminal activities, and have as a result diversified the nature and types of activities that criminal groups are involved in. Thus, if research focuses only on high-profile better known criminal groups it is possible that this work will reflect a declining portion of the reality of organized crime as the situation continues to evolve. It should be noted that one methodological concern – that applies both to this report as well as to other work which attempts to collect primary data on organized crime groups – is that data collected will be biased towards more visible and prominent criminal groups as opposed to less visible, unconventional and smaller groups.¹⁴

The challenge at the international level is to collect information on a phenomenon that has both local (at the level of states) and international dimensions (organized criminal groups by their nature engage in illicit trade across borders). Such interconnectivity between the local and the global has been neatly termed ‘glocal’ by one analyst.¹⁵ At the same time it must be recognized that the nature of organized crime in a range of societies does not resemble the structured hierarchies of the popular imagination. In contrast, and as already emphasized, criminal enterprises are dynamic and often relatively loose structures, making the task of both law enforcement and research and information collection activities more difficult.¹⁶ These features suggest that critical to understanding the data that has been collected is, in the longer term, to develop a

¹⁰ TOC Convention, Article 28 (2)

¹¹ A point of view made for example by Chris Allen, ‘Africa and the Drugs Trade’, *Review of African Political Economy*, 79, 1999, pp.5-7.

¹² See for example, Patricia Rawlinson, ‘Mafia, Media and Myth: Representations of Russian Organized Crime’, *The Howard Journal*, Vol 37, No 4, November 1998.

¹³ Nigel Coles, ‘It’s Not What You Know – It’s Who You Know That Counts: Analysing Serious Crime Groups as Social Networks’, *British Journal of Criminology*, Vol 41, 2001.

¹⁴ For a more detailed examination of the characteristics of criminal networks and some discussion of these methodological issues, see Phil Williams, ‘Transnational Criminal Networks’, in John Acquilla and David F. Ronfeldt (eds), *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy*, Rand Corporation, 2001.

¹⁵ Dick Hobbs, ‘Going Down the Glocal: The Local Context of Organized Crime’, *The Howard Journal*, Vol 37, No 4, November 1998.

¹⁶ Phil Williams, ‘Organising Transnational Crime: Networks, Markets and Hierarchies’, in Williams and Dimitri Vlassis, *op. cit.*

more rigorous system to classify various organized crime groups, both in terms of their structure, activities and the degree of harm which they cause.

Given these factors, consolidated information on emerging trends in organized crime seems indispensable for setting goals, allocating resources and evaluating results. At the regional level, Europol and the Council of Europe issue regular overviews of organized crime trends. No international organization including INTERPOL, publishes regular global reports on the subject. The TOC Convention however lists the exchange of information on patterns and trends in transnational organized crime as one of the main tasks of the Conference of State Parties and its Secretariat. To prepare for this upcoming task was one of the key reasons why CICP began this process of information collection around criminal groups. The key aim of this project is to begin to explore the possible ways in which this can be achieved. By collecting and presenting information on a wide range of criminal groups across a variety of countries, it is hoped to achieve a greater understanding of both the possibilities and difficulties of an international monitoring exercise in respect of transnational organized crime.

Before proceeding it is necessary to draw a distinction between a series of concepts around which there is often some confusion in debates on organized crime. This will serve to clarify the immediate aims of this report.

1.5 Distinguishing between groups, clusters and markets

The core focus of the CICP project has been the collection of information on *specific* criminal groups. Such data must lie at the heart of any understanding of the nature of the phenomenon of transnational organized crime, as it is the criminal groups themselves that constitute the building blocks of the system. The details obtained in respect of this data collection exercise are also more likely to be of use to policy makers and practitioners than the collection and collation of higher level information on trends in organized crime, which can generally be acquired from secondary sources. The building of a substantial data-base on the nature and activities of organized crime groups from across the globe will constitute a significant resource in any future effort to monitor global organized crime trends.

Nevertheless, the exercise of collecting information on individual criminal groups, while important, does not provide a comprehensive enough approach. Two other requirements are necessary. The first is to provide regional assessments of criminal markets around the globe. The second is to trace and monitor trends within the various 'clusters' of organized criminal groups such as for example Russian, West Africa or Turkish criminal groups. While it is recognized that the latter are often shifting and ill-defined categories, they constitute an important building block in providing a comprehensive understanding of the development of organized criminal activity across the globe. Trends and changes in each of these clusters, and the underlying causes as to why individuals from specific geographic locations become involved in organized criminal activity may alter. This shapes in turn the nature and formation of individual criminal groups and the markets in which they operate.

It is worth noting here that there is often confusion between what is termed ‘groups’ and what has, in the context of this study been termed “clusters”. Reviews of international organized crime often collapse the two. That is, by reviewing recent developments in Russian or West African organized crime as if these were *single and inter-connected criminal groups in their own right*. Instead broader criminal clusters, while sharing many similarities in structure and organization among the various groups that constitute them, are not on their own definable criminal groups. They are rather conglomerations of similar criminal groups often simply labeled by the media for ease of reference. Yet these definitional categories do have some value for two important reasons: they provide the ability to identify particular trends amongst the groups that make up the clusters and though analysis in this area remains weakly developed, point to the requirement to examine in greater detail why some ethnic/social or national groups appear to have a greater propensity for the engagement in organized criminal activity than others. Thus, reference is made throughout the report to various criminal clusters. It should be emphasized again however that such clusters are not defined criminal entities with clearly delineated boundaries, but are often complex associations of criminal organizations and individual actors.

The above point is well illustrated by detailed study in the United States of the so-called Russian Mafia submitted to CIGP in the course of the project.¹⁷ This argues that Russian organized crime in the United States is often qualified by the press or viewed by the population as a distinct Mafia even if in reality they do not represent an homogenous hierarchical structure under the leadership of any single individual. Thus, while Russian organized crime is not a single entity in itself in the United States, this terminology is used generically to refer to an association of different loosely structured criminal groups originating from Eurasia (Russia, Armenia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Chechnya, Dagestan and Georgia). The 12 to 15 networks composing Russian organized crime in the United States have a total of between 500 to 600 members. Each of the networks does not have a clear leadership, individuals being identified by their skills and personal characteristics. The connection between the networks is opportunity-driven on an *ad hoc* basis, giving great flexibility. They can rely on a high number of specialists, on financial support or other needed resources and can be quick in responding to new opportunities. This fluid structure explains why Russian organized crime groups are quick at adapting to, and diversifying into, new criminal markets.

Given the above explanation and the example illustrating it, it is hoped that in the long term a standardized system for examining trends in transnational organized crime should consist of three components – that of “groups”, “clusters” and “markets”.

- *Groups*: At the lowest level the collection of data on individual criminal organizations, using the survey methodology already developed. Over time it is hoped that this will provide enough data to develop a more comprehensive system of classification for transnational organized criminal groups, and the level of harm they cause.

¹⁷ A detailed argument to this effect has been published in James O. Finckenauer and Elin J. Waring, *Russian Mafia in America: Immigration, Culture and Crime*, Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998.

- *Clusters*: The next level is the collection of information around the various clusters of criminal groups, often originating from specific geographic localities. While there is some cross-over between the first category above, in that groups which fall into these broad clusters may also be analyzed there, this approach would seek to focus on broad trends within each of these clusters rather than the specific details of any group.
- *Markets*: As already suggested, information on regional criminal markets is essential to any understanding of the development of transnational organized crime groups, and trends associated with this. Such an analysis would examine the commodities, be they people, protection, illicit narcotics or others, which characterize organized crime in various regions. Ongoing regional research projects being conducted by CICP in Central Asia and West Africa constitute important regional pilot studies in this regard.

This layered approach to the study of the problems of organized criminality, with each stage reinforcing the other, provides a comprehensive framework in which to collect information and assess trends. A word of caution however is necessary before proceeding. Building a comprehensive global system to monitor developments in the field of transnational organized crime cannot be achieved overnight. At an international level what is required is the ability to collect and analyze data on organized criminal groups in a sustained manner. Once off surveys of the position are of little use. Like the sweeps of the international victim survey, they are most valuable when they have been completed on a number of occasions, thus allowing not only comparisons across jurisdictions but also across time.¹⁸ Only in this way can a comprehensive system of trend analysis of transnational organized crime be developed.

Given that the process of information collection and analysis of transnational organized crime groups at the international level is still in its infancy, this report focuses specifically on the lowest building blocks of the system, “criminal groups”, on which data on a limited number have been collected.

The section that follows provides a brief overview of the process in which data for the project was collected and analyzed.

¹⁸ See Jan van Dijk, ‘The experience of crime and justice’, in Graeme Newman (ed), *Global Report on Crime and Justice*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

2. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

2.1 Methodological challenges

Collecting information and data on organized crime in a variety of jurisdictions presents a series of difficulties. The process entails a combination of two features which, it has been noted elsewhere, present significant methodological problems.¹⁹ The first is the conducting of cross-jurisdictional or comparative criminology, with all the issues of legal definition and varying interpretation that this presents.²⁰ The second is conducting research on organized crime, acknowledged to contain challenges that are not present in other areas of criminological study.²¹ To combine these two features therefore in a comparative study of trends in organized crime constitutes a challenge for research and analysis.

A related obstacle is the fact that any study of international organized crime (particularly one conducted at the level of the UN which relies on contributions from member countries) has to rely on information generated in individual states, the building blocks of the international system. Yet transnational organized crime, by definition, operates across national boundaries. Information obtained from any one state therefore may only provide a partial reflection of the reality.

For these and other reasons the comparative study of organized criminal groups is not well developed. Literature on the subject is either very general, providing an overview of the key principles or defining features of organized crime and drawing on various examples. Or, it refers to the activities, history and trends of a specific criminal group. *Comparative studies that examine the characteristics of organized crime groups in a variety of societies, having collected primary data on these, are a rare species.* The two reviews of global organized crime completed to date provide only high level overviews of transnational organized crime trends, and while useful, lack the detail of a closer analysis of individual criminal groups.²² There is thus a significant gap in the available data on international organized crime trends, which when filled, would greatly benefit the process of information sharing outlined by the Convention. This was the reason that the CICP project on global organized crime trends was initiated.

¹⁹ See for example Patricia Rawlinson, 'Mafia, Methodology and "Alien" Culture', in R D Kind and E Wincup (eds), *Doing Research on Crime and Justice*, Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1999.

²⁰ For both the advantages and disadvantages of comparative criminology, in this case specifically research on policing, see R. I. Mawby (ed), *Policing across the World: Issues for the Twenty-first Century*, London: UCL Press, 1999.

²¹ See for example the introduction to James O. Finckenauer and Elin J. Waring, *Russian Mafia in America: Immigration, Culture and Crime*, *op. cit.* Also, Dick Hobbs, *Bad Business: Professional Crime in Modern Britain*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

²² These are: Sabrina Adamoli, Andrea Di Nicola, Ernesto Savona and Paola Zoffi, *Organized Crime Around the World*, HEUNI, 1998; and the *International Crime Threat Assessment* produced by the Clinton Administration (http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/crimecontrol.html).

2.2 Data acquisition

The initial challenge faced by the CICIP study was how to gather the data required – and more specifically *which* data. The approach adopted was to send out detailed questionnaires to a selected number of member states of the UN where it was believed capacity existed and information would be available which would be useful to the study. A refined version of the questionnaire used is attached as Appendix A. The issue of what information to collect generated more debates however than the method (the questionnaire) in which it would be acquired. The choice, broadly speaking, was whether to collect information about the general situation of organized crime in any country, or whether to collect data on specific criminal groups. The outcome is effectively a compromise, although leaning more heavily towards the accumulation of data on specific criminal groups. Thus each of the 16 countries²³ which have served as partners in the study, were asked to fill in a detailed questionnaire and provide an analytical overview of the three most prominent organized criminal groups in their country.

The level of prominence of the organized crime groups in question was to be determined by, among other factors, the level of media coverage of that group and the attention it had received by the police or prosecution services. Admittedly this was an imperfect method, relying on the subjective judgement of those completing the survey. While of course other criminal groups which were more effective in their methods of operation and thus would not have received attention in the media or a visit from the police would not be covered, there would also only presumably be sketchy information about their activities in the public realm. In the end information on 40 specific criminal groups was collected.²⁴

The questionnaire itself consisted of approximately 50 variables, under the general themes: name, structure and activities of the group in question; law enforcement responses; ethnic and gender dimensions; the community and social context of the group's activities; the use of violence by the group; its level of professionalism based on information about its *modus operandi* and activities; the use of corruption to facilitate illegal activities; the ability to influence the political process; the group's transnational links, including with other organized crime groups; and finally the role of the group in the legitimate economy.

In addition to identifying and providing information on specific criminal groups, details in respect of a prominent criminal market (such as the trade in illegal narcotics, stolen motor vehicles or the trafficking in human beings) in each country was also requested, so as to provide greater insight into the overall nature of criminal activity. Again, admittedly, this method was not perfect but at least gave some more detailed

²³ In fact 16 countries and one region, the Caribbean. The countries to which questionnaires were sent are: Australia, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, South Africa and the Russian Federation. Data from a similar UNICRI study of countries in Eastern Europe were also added. These are: Lithuania; Ukraine; Bulgaria; Albania and Byelorussia. In the case of China and Mexico detailed information on specific criminal groups was added through the assistance of CICIP staff members with experience on these two societies. In the final analysis some data from countries could not be used, bringing the total number of countries from which information was used to 16.

²⁴ This is less than three per country as in a number of cases fewer responses were received. Some countries however submitted four responses.

information than a simple overview of organized criminal activity in the country, which could in any event be gathered by using secondary sources.

The final obstacle was to select who would be the respondents in each country. A particular problem in comparative research conducted at an international level is that governments are understandably sensitive to how they are portrayed in respect of domestic crime problems and their success in fighting them. In respect of organized crime then, government inputs and documentation should thus be supplemented with information from a variety of other sources. As Hobbs points out “the intransigence [of some analytical accounts] that collude so closely with administrative analysis ignores narrative accounts at the considerable loss of detail, tone and depth”.²⁵ For this reason, the various surveys have been filled out by a variety of respondents, including academic research institutes, law enforcement and intelligence bodies and state research agencies, where it was felt (or where particular ‘experts’ were known to be located) the best results could be achieved. Respondents were also urged to draw on a number of sources.

The following institutions and agencies were involved in the research process: the Australian Institute of Criminology, the Canadian Anti-Organized Crime Division, Ernst & Young in the Netherlands Antilles; the Universidad Nacional of Bogota, the Institute of Criminology and Social Prevention of Prague, the Bundeskriminalamt of Wiesbaden, the Direzione Centrale della Polizia Criminale in Rome, the National Police Academy in Tokyo, the Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Justice in The Hague, the Academy for International Co-operation of the Ministry of Interior in Moscow, the Institute of Security Studies in Cape Town, the National Criminal Intelligence Service in London, and the National Institute of Justice in Washington. UNICRI’s partners in the assessment study were: University of Tirana (Albania), the European Humanities University (Belarus), the Varna Free University (Bulgaria), the Law Institute of the Ministry of Justice (Lithuania) and the National Academy of Sciences (Ukraine). Despite tight-deadlines and often difficult working conditions the respondents of these agencies and institutions were generally able to supply high quality and reliable data on organized criminal groups to the project.

2.3 Data reliability

The collection of information on organized crime groups raises important questions about the reliability of that data. As already discussed above, a growing body of literature examines the difficulties of conducting research on organized crime groups and their activities. Without repeating some of the more general arguments made already, it is worth examining in more detail the process in which data on the forty criminal groups was collected, and some of the problems and challenges in this regard.

During the course of the survey, some effort was made to ascertain the opinion of the various respondents on their perceptions of both problems that they might have had in completing the questionnaire, as well as the degree of reliability that they attributed to their own answers. Thus, the analysis in this section is based largely on an assessment

²⁵ Quoted in Patricia Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, 1999, p. 357.

of these responses. On this basis, three important and inter-linked conclusions can be reached in respect of the quality of the data provided by the survey. First, the sample is skewed towards groups that present a more visible 'public face', given that these groups are more easily identifiable and data collection is generally facilitated by a wider variety of sources. Second, and reinforcing the first point, those indicators which respondents considered to be reliable were more likely to be those on which information was publicly available. Third, given that the main aim of the survey was to develop a comparative perspective between criminal groups, important details about the context, including the social and cultural settings in which organized crime groups operate, have not received enough attention. Each of these issues is discussed in turn.

At the end of the survey questionnaire, respondents were requested to submit ideas as to how the process of data collection could be improved. Surprisingly, there was not any significant cross-over between the responses given by the various correspondents. In only one case did a respondent believe that filling in the questionnaire (or completing the research to do so) posed some physical danger to himself. Issues of safety were not raised by any of the other correspondents. Nevertheless, while they were not highlighted, this factor is something that deserves some attention at the outset as it is illustrative of a wider problem in respect of the survey.

One reason that problems of safety were not encountered is that in most cases the information required was immediately available from 'official' sources such as the police, criminal justice authorities more generally, or the media. In the majority of cases, respondents relied on only a limited number of sources.²⁶ In cases where some difficulty would have been encountered, most notably in respect of financial data, these responses were simply not filled in or listed as 'unknown'. Even in the case of law enforcement agencies that completed the questionnaire, accurate financial data on criminal groups was difficult to come by. None of this is meant to criticize the correspondents, or suggest that they should have taken risks in completing the questionnaires, but simply to state the obvious point, that for the most part, and although there remain some clear exceptions, the groups on which data has been collected have at least some 'public face'. In other words, research is possible simply by reviewing secondary literature, scanning the media or conducting interviews with law enforcement officials. That suggests that smaller and more loosely structured criminal arrangements which do not present a 'profile', are less likely to be represented in the sample.

This is reinforced by an assessment by the respondents themselves of which answers in the survey questionnaire were regarded to be more reliable than others. Almost without exception, a high degree of confidence was expressed in answers such as the size, degree of violence and identity of organized crime groups, on which information is generally available. The same however does not apply to more specific details, however, such as the level of political influence of any groups or the degree to which it engaged in corruption. In particular, the majority of respondents, including law enforcement personnel, were not able to provide detailed financial data in respect of

²⁶ Of interest here is that one of the problems mentioned by some respondents in respect of the questionnaire was the complaint that it was unnecessary to list the data source at the end of each question, as in many case the same sources – either a series of articles or interviews with law enforcement officials – were used to fill in all the responses.

the groups involved, and when estimates were made, they were not viewed with a high degree of confidence. In sum, and perhaps rather obviously, information available from open sources, were regarded to have a high degree of validity, while more detailed information as to the actual operations of criminal groups, such as their financial data or the level to which they have corrupted public figures, was considered to be less reliable, even if sourced from law enforcement agencies.

In the case of some variables, such as that reflecting the level of violence that a criminal groups was involved in, there appeared to be a disjuncture between the general opinions of respondents as to the degree of violence, and specific data required to prove this. Thus, while in many cases respondents answered that the level of violence perpetrated by any criminal groups was high, no detailed figures such as the number of people who have been killed or injured could be provided. This is not to doubt the assertion made by the respondents, but simply to suggest that while an intuitive supposition or a review of open source material may suggest a high degree of violence associated with any criminal group, it is extremely difficult to provide concrete evidence that this is in fact the case. The same problem is applicable also to determining the level of corruption that any criminal group has been involved in. While respondents often stated that they assumed corruption took place, they found little evidence (such as prosecutions of corrupt officials) to prove it.

One area where there was some consensus amongst the respondents was that important issues of context were not easily captured in the questionnaire and attached analytical overview of each criminal group. Thus, respondents suggested that the questionnaire format did not taken into account a variety of factors in respect of which organized crime groups operated, most notable being the social and cultural context in which groups had developed and carried out their operations. The implication was that by attempting to draw out information that could be comparable across societies, the survey isolated organized criminal groups from the context in which they operated, in effect, considering them in a vacuum. While it was suggested by at least one respondent that this problem could be remedied by introducing a narrative paragraph on organized crime and its environment, this on its own is probably not sufficient to remedy the problem.

Analyzing organized crime groups outside of their cultural and social context runs the danger of attributing broadly similar causes for their development in any society, and while these may be accurate, ignores important local causal and contextual issues. Thus, while organized crime groups in the United States, Western Europe, the former Soviet Union and South Africa, may be broadly comparable, important features (such as the particular consequences of the break-up of the Soviet Union or the long term results of apartheid policies in shaping particular types of organized crime), are not taken into account. Perhaps then an important feature of any broader attempt to collect information on criminal groups and their development should be done so at a regional level, allowing a comparison between criminal groups that have all arisen within a similar social context. Such an approach may be critical in respect of a broader monitoring exercise on the nature and extent of criminal groups.

These factors together suggest that that the data gathered by the survey, while useful, is also characterized by important drawbacks. Given the nature of organized crime, however, these are relatively difficult to resolve. Nevertheless they should be

recognized when the data on organized crime groups is presented below. Most importantly, the groups represented in the survey have a higher level of public visibility than other groups, which are probably under-represented. In particular, the latter may apply to groups that have no public profile, are smaller and more networked in their organizational structure. In fact, such criminal enterprises may not even be considered by law enforcement agencies or the media in some societies as criminal groups in the classic sense, despite the fact that they meet the definition of organized criminal groups as given in the TOC Convention.

It should be noted by way of conclusion to this section, that a review of all the questionnaire responses suggests that the most comprehensive answers came from those who had consulted a variety of sources, often comparing and contrasting the information received. In most cases, these questionnaires were completed by academic analysts who had both collected secondary material and conducted interviews with officials working within the criminal justice system. Such multiple use of sources, particularly secondary literature, was often not the case in questionnaires completed by law enforcement officials who generally relied only on internal information, which often lacked a broader contextual background.

2.4 Cross-country comparisons of organized crime groups

The various questionnaire responses give a rich insight into the characteristics of organized crime groups in a number of societies. Each response is interesting in its own right, but the real value of the information for the purposes of this pilot study, and despite the drawbacks outlined above, is the ability to make comparisons across countries and groups.

An initial analysis of the data suggests that some distinction must be made between the various groups analyzed. The majority of the groups that were submitted constitute single criminal entities. These are in effect relatively self-contained groups with a clearly identifiable number of members.²⁷ Thus, for example, a small group engaged in the trade in illegal narcotics from Turkey to the Netherlands whose members have multiple nationalities and who co-ordinate their activities with other criminal groups. A small number of responses did not represent individual groups, but rather categories, or perhaps more accurately clusters (as outlined in Section 1), of organized crime groups. These would include responses covering for example the Russian Mafia in the United States or Nigerian criminal groups in South Africa. In both cases it would be inaccurate to describe these as homogenous criminal groups, they are instead made up of a large number of smaller and often overlapping groups which generally operate independently of each other. Given that these are not the same phenomenon, the one being a cluster of criminal groups, the other the group itself (potentially the building block of a criminal cluster), the two categories have been separated out from each other. For this analysis, only the information on criminal groups has been used.

²⁷ 'Self-contained' should not however imply that there is significant cross-over and co-operation with other groups, but that they constitute a relatively self-contained unit for study. The difficulties inherent in such distinctions however illustrate the extent to which trying to analyze the various component parts of transnational organized crime represents a definitional mine field.

Data on each of the 40 criminal groups was typed into a database and a matrix containing the most important information on the groups constructed. This is illustrated below. The matrix represents both what are regarded as the most critical variables as well as those for which the data was assessed to be more reliable. The level of detail contained in the database has been simplified in order to accommodate all the variables concerned and allow an effective process of cross-country comparison. Such a process inevitably raises problems of classification, and although the various ratings have been applied with as much care as possible (see Section 3), it is possible that some readers may debate the rating that is assigned in any particular case. Any such changes however, are unlikely to change the overall conclusions that have been drawn from the matrix.

Ten variables have been included in the data. A short explanation of each is provided below. More detail of the exact system of ratings is provided in the attached 'Key to the Matrix of Organized Crime Groups', which follows at the end of this section.

1. Structure: An assessment was made of the variety of structures that were present across all of the groups analyzed. Key to the system of rating is the degree of hierarchy present in each group. Thus, the rating system provides a spectrum of alternatives from hierarchical to looser network type arrangements. The various structural forms of the organized crime groups in the survey are important in that they form the basis for the five typologies of organized crime groups presented in Section 4.
2. Size: An assessment of the actual number of individuals involved in the various groups was requested from each of the respondents. In most cases the numbers provided were explicitly stated to be an approximation. Respondents also generally estimated both the core membership of the groups in question, as well as the wider number of associate or other members more indirectly related to the group.
3. Activities: Respondents were asked to provide as comprehensive a list of the criminal activities of the group under examination as possible. In some cases this was clearly a single primary activity around which occurred a cluster of sub-activities, supportive of the primary activity. In some cases there was only a limited number of activities (2/3), while in others there were multiple activities. These distinctions are reflected in the rating system.
4. Transborder operations: A measure of the level of transborder operations was made simply by assessing the number of countries in which the group in question was estimated to be active. While this was not possible in all cases due to the paucity of information on which countries groups were active in, some attempt has been made to provide a rating which gives some indication of limited, moderate or extensive transnational activity.
5. Identity: The classification system for identity attempts to reflect not only those groups regarded by the respondents as having a strong ethnic basis, but also those whose members are drawn from similar social backgrounds, which may in fact cross ethnic identities. While admittedly the definition of a 'similar social background' does not provide an exact mechanism for an objective rating, it was

believed that this was an important distinction to be made from groups clearly based on ethnic ties and allegiances. Thus, while motor cycle gangs may have as members individuals drawn from a variety of ethnic backgrounds, they are predominantly made up of white working class males. Importantly, an attempt was also made to reflect where the group in question clearly had no strong social or ethnic identity.

6. Violence: Respondents were asked to make both a subjective judgement of the level of violence used by the criminal groups, as well as providing some harder evidence of its extent (for example, numbers of business people or police officers killed). From these two measures some assessment was made of the groups use of violence. Importantly, this included both externally and internally focussed violence. Ratings have thus been based on the use of little or no violence, the occasional use of violence or cases where violence is essential to the primary activity of the group in question. The distinction here is of course a subjective one, made by examining the data for each group, and where violence was regarded as being essential to the primary profit accumulating activities of the criminal group.
7. Corruption: As with the assessment of violence, that for corruption relied on both a subjective judgement of its extent, as well as on the presentation of actual cases where individuals had been prosecuted for the offence. Data was not however always available in detail in respect of the latter measure, and so the rating relies heavily on the subjective judgement of respondents. As in the case of violence, the rating attempted to assess whether little or no corruption is used by the group, whether corruption is used occasionally, or whether corruption is essential to the primary profit accumulating activities of the group.
8. Political influence: An accurate assessment of the degree to which any criminal group has political influence is virtually impossible. In most cases the survey relies heavily on respondents own subjective assessments of whether political influence has been present. It is possible on the basis of the information provided to determine at what level of government political influence has occurred. Thus, the rating provides an indication of whether the political process at local or regional/state/provincial level within the country has been influenced; whether this is the case at the national level; or, finally, whether political influence has occurred in countries other than the one in which the respondent is based.
9. Penetration into the legitimate economy: Respondents were asked to assess the level of penetration into the legitimate economy by criminal groups, and provide evidence of their assessment. In most cases such evidence was difficult to acquire and actual hard figures almost impossible. Nevertheless, drawing largely on law enforcement sources, most respondents provided as comprehensive an assessment as possible. A review of these suggested a rating based on three broad categories: no or limited penetration into the legitimate economy; some investment of profits into legitimate activities; and finally, extensive cross-over between legitimate and illegitimate activities. In particular, the latter was assessed by the provision of companies and business sectors where such investment and cross-over occurred.
10. Co-operation with other organized crime groups: As with many of the categories above, the level of cooperation with other organized crime groups (and which

ones) is often difficult to establish. Nevertheless, drawing largely on law enforcement sources, most respondents provided some indications as to the level of cooperation in this regard. The rating system which has been applied makes some distinction between where there was no cooperation at all; cooperation in the base-country (that is, the country where the respondent completed the assessment); co-operation with groups in countries outside of that country; and finally co-operation in both the base country and abroad.

It is clear from the overview of the various categories, and their ratings, as outlined above that the system is not a foolproof mechanism for drawing comparisons between criminal groups. Nevertheless, the survey variables, as is outlined above, constitutes the first attempt to draw an international comparison across criminal groups. Again it is worth emphasizing that while on their own, the data collected on each group is useful, the value added by comparing across groups and societies is significant. Even while the numbers of the groups (40) is not high enough to draw conclusions in all areas and methodological problems in respect of data collection are present, the study does provide an understanding as to how an overall international system of information collection and analysis should be constructed.

A detailed key to the various classifications used is to be found on the following page. Section 3 presents the actual data, beginning with the matrix of criminal groups itself.

KEY TO THE MATRIX OF ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS

STRUCTURE

A - Rigid hierarchy: Single boss. Organization or division into several cells reporting to the centre. Strong internal systems of discipline.

B - Devolved hierarchy: Hierarchical structure and line of command. However regional structures, with their own leadership hierarchy, have a degree of autonomy over day to day functioning.

C - Hierarchical conglomerate: An association of organized crime groups with a single governing body. The latter can range from an organized umbrella type body to more flexible and loose oversight arrangements.

D - Core criminal group: Ranging from relatively loose to cohesive group of core individuals who generally regard themselves as working for the same organization. Horizontal rather than vertical structure.

E - Organized criminal network: Defined by the activities of key individuals who engage in illicit activity together in often shifting alliances. They do not necessarily regard themselves as an organized criminal entity. Individuals are active in the network through the skills and capital that they may bring.

SIZE *This includes not only the group's core membership, but all associated and related individuals.*

A - From 1 to 20 members **B** - From 20 to 50 members **C** - From 50 to 100 members **D** - More than 100

ACTIVITIES *An * has been added when drug trafficking is the primary activity of the group.*

A - One primary activity, other illegal activities supportive of this

B - Two to three major activities

C - Multiple activities

LEVEL OF TRANSBORDER OPERATIONS

A - limited (1 to 2 countries) **B** - medium (3 to 4 countries) **C** - extensive (five and more)

IDENTITY

A - Organization with no strong social or ethnic identity

B - Social-based organization with members drawn from the same social background or with common social interests

C - Ethnic-based or family-based organization with members strictly from the same ethnic group / region / country.

LEVEL OF VIOLENCE *Both internally and externally focussed.*

A - Little or no use of violence

B - Occasional use of violence

C - Violence is essential to the criminal activities (accumulation of profit) of the organization.

USE OF CORRUPTION

A - Little or no use of corruption

B - Occasional use of corruption

C - Corruption is essential to the primary activity (accumulation of profit) of the organization.

POLITICAL INFLUENCE

Data in this category is not always reliable. If corruption is suspected, although there is no evidence that it has occurred, category B-D has been denoted.

A - None **B** - At a local / regional level **C** - At a national level in the country of intervention **D** - Abroad

PENETRATION INTO THE LEGITIMATE ECONOMY

A - None or limited

B - Some investment of profits of crime in legitimate activities.

C - Extensive cross-over between legitimate and illegitimate activities of the group.

LEVEL OF COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS

A - None

B - Cooperation in the base-country

C - External cooperation abroad

D - Cooperation in the base-country and abroad

3. PROFILE OF THE ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS SURVEYED


3.1 Profile of the groups

This section of the report provides a broad overview of the data collected on each of the 40 organized crime groups. It is worth emphasizing again that the data as it is represented here (a series of ratings across 10 categories) provides only an overview of the assessment of each organized crime group. A more detailed overview as well as a descriptive account of each of the groups concerned can be found in Appendix B. The description below provides a general profile of all 40 of the groups under the ten headings contained in the table presented on the following page. These are: structure; size; use of violence; scope of activities; level of transborder operations; corruption; level of political influence; extent of activity in the legitimate economy; and, the degree of cooperation with other organized crime groups.

One initial and important point is worth making before proceeding. *The 40 criminal groups on which data is presented here do not by any means constitute a representative sample. The data represented graphically below therefore provides only a profile of the groups on which information has been presented.* Even so, they allow the drawing of some broader conclusions (however tentative) about the nature, general structural typologies and development of organized crime.

3.1.1 Structure

The questionnaire asked respondents to describe the structure of the criminal group that they had collected data on. These descriptions were used to draw together a number of broad descriptive categories to provide an overview of the varying structures that were outlined. Thus, just under one third of the groups have a rigid hierarchical structure. A further ten have a devolved hierarchical structure. Four groups are conglomerates of a number of hierarchical groups. The remainder (again, about a third) are more loosely organized; either consisting of a core criminal group of individuals or a criminal network. Thus, the overall majority of groups (two thirds) have some form of hierarchy to their structure.



Name	Structure	Size	Activity	Trans-border Activity	Identity	Violence	Corruption	Political influence	Penetration in legitimate economy	Cooperation with other OCG
Italian group – Germany	C	B	B	B	A	B	C	A	C	D
Group with no name – Germany	E	C	C*	A	A	B	A	A	A	A
Group with no name – Germany	D	B	B*	A	C	A	A	A	A	A
Group with no name – Germany	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Verhagen Group – Netherlands	E	B	A*	C	A	B	B	A	A	?
Group with no name – Netherlands	E	B	A	C	C	A	B	A	A	B
Group with no name – Netherlands	D	B	A	B	A	C	A	A	A	A
Group with no name – Netherlands	D	C	B	C	A	C	B	A	B	D
Group with no name – Netherlands	A	C	A*	B	B	B	C	A	C	C
Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs – Australia	B	D	B*	B	B	C	B	A	C	C
The Mc Lean Syndicate – Australia	D	B	A*	C	B	B	B	A	B	D
Japanese Yakuza – Australia	B	B	A	A	C	B	A	D	C	C
The Orange Case – Caribbean	E	A	A*	C	B	A	C	A	B	C
The Dream House Case – Caribbean	D	C	A*	B	A	C	C	A	B	C
The Meij Case – Caribbean	E	?	A	A	A	B	C	C / D	C	A
Fuk Ching Gang – United States	B	C	C	B	C	C	B	D	B	C
La Cosa Nostra – United States	B	D	C	C	C	C	B	C / D	B	?
Clan Paviglianiti – Italy	B	D	C*	C	C	C	B	B	C	C
Sizranskaya Groopirovka – Russia	A	A	A*	B	C	B	B	A	B	?
Group with no name – Russia	A	B	A*	A	C	B	A	A	A	A
Ziberman Group – Russia	C	C	B	B	A	C	B	B	C	?
Group with no name – Russia	A	A	B*	C	A	C	A	A	C	C
VIS-2 – Bulgaria	A	?	C	C	A	C	C	B	C	C
Cock Group – Lithuania	A	B	C*	B	B	C	C	B	C	C
Savlokhov group – Ukraine	A	B	B	B	C	C	C	B	C	C
Juvenal group – Colombia	D	D	A*	C	A	A	C	B	B	C
Hells Angels – Canada	B	D	C*	C	B	C	A	B	B	C
The 28s Prison Gang – South Africa	C	D	C*	A	B	C	C	A	C	D
La Cosa Nostra – Italy	B	D	C	C	C	C	C	C / D	C	D
Licciardi Clan – Italy	B	C	C*	C	C	C	C	C	B	A
Group with no name – Italy	A	?	C*	C	A	C	C	A	A	D
Yamaguchi-Gumi – Japan	B	D	C*	B	A	C	A	C	B	C
The Liu Yong syndicate – China	A	B	B	A	B	C	C	B	C	A
The Zhang Wei syndicate – China	A	D	B	A	B	C	C	B	C	A
The Liang Xiao Min syndicate – China	A	B	B	A	B	C	C	B	C	A
Family organization with no name – Mexico	D	A	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	A
Amezcu Contreras Organization – Mexico	D	D	C	C	C	A	B	B	B	D
Mocha Orejas Organization – Mexico	A	B	A	A	A	C	B	B	A	A
Carillo Fuentes Organization – Mexico	A	D	A*	C	A	B	C	B/C/D	C	D
Arellano-Felix Group – Mexico	C	D	A*	C	A	C	C	B/C	C	D


MATRIX OF ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS

The remainders (one third) are more loosely structured, ranging from small groups of core individuals around which criminal activities are organized, to a series of individuals operating in a more loosely structured criminal network.

While the majority of groups recorded by the survey have a hierarchical structure, it is worth emphasizing, and as already mentioned above, that this does not provide an accurate estimate of the proportion of criminal groups with hierarchical structures. Indeed, it is likely that the number of unstructured groups are undercounted given that hierarchical groups are both more likely to be defined as organized crime by states and are in any event regarded as causing higher levels of harm.


3.1.2 Size

Estimates on the size of organized criminal groups are bound to be beset by problems given issues of secrecy and the difficulties of counting both core and various levels of associate members. Nevertheless, size is a potentially important variable in determining the extent of activities of any group, and thus the degree of harm it may cause. The estimates of size used in the survey were based on a count of not only the core membership of any group, but also as far as possible on the estimated number of associated or related members. This may account for the fact that in most cases the groups listed are relatively large in size. In only four cases was the group less than twenty. In the largest number of cases (14), the numbers of active individuals in each of the groups concerned was estimated at between 20 and 50. Just fewer than half the groups had more than fifty individuals. In a small proportion of cases (3) there was not enough information available to determine a reasonable assessment of the numbers of individuals active in the group.




3.1.3 Violence

Violence is a key defining feature of the majority of organized crime groups represented in the sample. In the largest number of cases (23) violence was classified as being essential to the criminal groups' activities. In an additional 10 cases violence was reflected by the respondents as being used only occasionally or moderately. In only 7 cases were the criminal groups classified as using little or no violence. Thus, while structures and forms of operation may vary markedly, the use of violence (or at least the threat thereof) is an important defining feature of criminal groups.




3.1.4 Ethnic or social identity

One of the potentially most interesting conclusions to be drawn from the data is the degree to which the organized crime groups in the sample have no strong social or ethnic identity. This is the case in less than half of all the groups examined. In the remainder of cases, members are drawn from either the same ethnic group (13 cases) or from the same social background (10 cases). Admittedly, and as already outlined above, the distinctions between these various categories are by no means always clear. But even on the basis of these broad (and admittedly rough) distinctions, it is possible to assert with some degree of certainty that in the majority of cases criminal groups are not tied together by ethnic linkages.




3.1.5 Activities

The assumption is often made that single criminal groups engage in a wide variety of activities, each of them reinforcing the other. Some attempt was thus made in the survey instrument to document in some detail the overall set of activities of each criminal group. What is most interesting from the results, is that the largest number of groups engaged in only *one* primary criminal activity (such as the smuggling of people or illegal narcotics) and although there may be some sub-activities (for example, forgery) essential to the overall goal, these were not carried out in the pursuit of profit but instead aimed at making the primary activity of the group possible. In a number of cases (10), two to three primary activities were listed, and in another 13 (thus, just under one third of the sample), the groups profiled engaged in multiple criminal activities. It should be noted that, and as illustrated in the figure below, a significant proportion of the organized criminal groups have drug trafficking as their main or core activity whichever activity category they fall into.




3.1.6 Transborder operations

While the majority of groups only engaged in one primary activity, this however does not indicate that their activities were geographically confined. In the largest number of cases (just under half of the total number), the criminal groups in question spread their activities across five or more states. Eleven groups engaged in activities across three to four states, while just less than one third of the total number confined their activities to only one or two countries.




3.1.7 Corruption

Given the importance of corruption as a tool for organized criminal groups, the survey also attempted to provide some measure as to the degree to which corruption was important to the operation of each group. Again, the measure was largely based on a subjective assessment of the use of corruption, although in some cases numbers of actual corruption cases were recorded. In just under half of the groups (18 cases), corruption was essential to the primary activity of the criminal group. In just under one third of the groups (12 cases), the groups made use of corruption occasionally. In the remaining instances (10 cases), there was evidence of little or no corruption. Perhaps most significant is the degree to which in the overall majority of cases, corruption is a key element for the undertaking of organized crime activities and that three quarters of the groups use corruption occasionally or regularly. This result underlines the necessity for criminal justice practitioners to establish strategies to fight corruption at the same time as organized crime, the two being intrinsically linked.




3.1.8 Political influence

Closely tied to the issue of corruption and the penetration into the legitimate economy, is the degree of political influence which criminal groups have. In just under half of the surveyed groups, respondents regarded there to be no evidence of any political influence. However one third of the groups were said to have political influence at the local or regional level (14 cases). In 7 cases the organized crime groups in question was regarded to have some influence at national level in the country of intervention and in five cases to have some influence in a country or countries outside of the one where the respondent recorded their activities. In only five cases did a respondent regard political influence to cross more than one category, for example, occurring at local regional and national level (1 case) or at a national level and abroad (3 cases) or at all three levels of government (1 case).




3.1.9 Cross-over between licit and illicit activities

An attempt was made to determine the extent to which the criminal groups surveyed had managed to penetrate the legitimate economy of the country or countries where they were based. The evidence from the groups unsurprisingly suggests a blurring between the involvement of the groups (or individuals associated with them) in both illegitimate and legitimate activities. In the largest number of cases (18) it was recorded that there was extensive cross-over between legitimate and illegitimate activities. In an additional 12 countries there was evidence of the investment of profits from illegitimate activities into some form of legitimate business activity. In the smallest number of cases (10), there was no, or very little evidence, that profits obtained from illicit activities were channeled to legitimate investments, nor that there was an extensive cross-over between legitimate and illegitimate activities.



3.1.10 Cooperation with other organized crime groups

Finally, some attempt was made to assess the degree to which the criminal groups in question cooperated with other organized crime groups. In the largest number of cases (14), respondents believed there to be some level of cooperation with transnational organized crime groups outside of the country where they conducted their activities. In most cases, such cooperation was based on the requirement to obtain illicit commodities (in most cases illegal narcotics) to smuggle into the domestic market where they were active. In only a single case was cooperation recorded solely in the country where the survey of the criminal group itself was conducted. In 9 cases both external and internal cooperation was recorded. In a surprisingly high number of cases (12) there was no evidence of cooperation with other criminal groups. Illustrating the problems of data collection in respect of this category in particular, it was not possible to establish a reliable response in four cases.



3.2 Summary of key characteristics

The most common characteristics of organized crime groups assessed by the survey are thus as follows:

- Two thirds of the groups have a classical hierarchical type of structure while one third are more loosely organized.
- The majority of the groups are of moderate size, with between 20-50 participants.
- Violence is essential to the undertaking of their activities for the majority of the groups.
- Under half of the groups do not have a strong social or ethnic identity while ethnic-based organizations represent less than a third of the organized crime groups.
- The largest number of groups engaged in only one primary criminal activity.
- In the majority of cases groups are engaged in criminal activities in multiple countries.
- The vast majority of the groups make use of corruption, either extensively or occasionally.
- Just under half of the groups are said to have no political influence, while one third of the groups have an influence at the local/regional level.
- Under half of the groups have extensively penetrated the legitimate economy.
- The largest number of groups cooperate with other organized criminal groups, largely as a source of illicit commodities.
- The vast majority of groups make use of corruption, either extensively or occasionally.


These conclusions give a broad overview of the main characteristics of the 40 organized criminal groups under study. However, to facilitate the process of drawing a series of typologies, it is important to cross-reference the main variables identified against each other.

3.3 Cross-referencing selected variables


The data outlined above provides only a one-dimensional overview of the organized crime groups that were selected for study. However, by comparing a variety of selected variables against each other, important insights may be gained which will assist in the development of a more rigorous series of typologies of organized crime groups. For example, and to pose just two questions: Are groups which have a high propensity for violence more likely to be structured in one way rather than another? Do strong social or ethnic ties determine the structure or levels of activity of the organized criminal groups in question? In order to test these and other propositions, data from each of the variables outlined in the description of the criminal groups was cross-referenced against every other variable. In particular, three key variables – structure, violence and identity – appear to be key determinants of a range of other variables.

When the type of structure the groups and their size are cross-referenced, it is clearly shown that the number of individuals that make up any criminal group is a key determinant of the structure of that group. Thus, the larger the number of individuals involved, the more likely the groups are to have a strict system of hierarchical organization. In cases where very large numbers of individuals are involved, the structure most likely to be adopted is that of a devolved hierarchy, with regional structures with a degree of autonomy falling under a centralized system of control. Presumably, the higher the numbers of people involved, the greater the level of hierarchical control and violence are required to ensure internal control.

If structure is cross-referenced against identity the data suggests that the more loosely organized a criminal group, the more likely it is to have no fixed identity. Thus the structural categories of ‘core group’ and ‘criminal network’ have no strict rules concerning the recruitment of members. For criminal groups structured in this way, identity is less important than function or skill. Conversely, the stricter the hierarchy, the more likely the group is to have a strong ethnic or social basis for its organization. A review of the individual overviews of each of the 40 groups (attached as Appendix B) is also illustrative of this. Groups that are described as having hierarchical structures are more likely to have strong ethnic or social identities. The converse generally applies to groups that have looser forms of organization, such as criminal networks. This is illustrated in the figure below, showing that groups with strong ethnic identities (coloured black) are confined to the structural categories of ‘rigid hierarchy’ and ‘devolved hierarchy’.



The level of violence used by the group is strongly correlated to a number of features. Thus, the stronger the level of hierarchy, the more likely the group is to engage in violence. Twenty groups out of the 27 with a hierarchical type of structure have violence as an essential element for the undertaking of their activities. In contrast, none of the five criminal networks under study were reported having violence as a key element to their activity. This could be explained by the fact that criminal networks, thanks to their more fluid and loose structure, can maintain a profile that does not bring them to the attention of law enforcement. Equally, higher levels of violence are also associated with organizations that have strong social or ethnic identities. The most violent groups therefore are generally those which have a hierarchical structure, with a strong social or ethnic identity. This is shown in the figure below, which illustrates the propensity for more hierarchically organized criminal groups to be much more likely to engage in violence as essential to their activities.



Where the trafficking in illegal narcotics is regarded as either the primary activity of a group, or an important core activity, the level of violence practiced by these groups is generally much higher than those not heavily involved in the trade in illegal narcotics. Closely associated to this, is the fact that the higher the level of transnational activities that any group engages in, the higher the likelihood that significant levels of violence characterize that criminal group.

While relatively obvious, it is worth stating that a lack of corruption, no penetration in the legal economy and little or no political influence, are three variables which, given the fact that each determines the level of activity in the other, are all strongly related.

Apart from these factors there is no significant correlation between the remainder of the variables. As has been shown however, three key variables – structure, violence and identity – are key determinants for defining typologies of organized criminal groups. The degree of hierarchical rigidity seems to be of most importance. If structure is correlated across all the other variables the overall result is that the more rigid the hierarchy of any group: the greater the use of violence by the group; the stronger its ethnic or social base; the greater the propensity for corruption to be central to its activities; the more significant the cross-over between legal and illegal activities; and, the more likely the group in question will engage in transborder activities.

While such an analysis is useful in attempting to identify particular characteristics of organized criminal groups, it also runs the risk of reducing a range of complex phenomenon to simply being the function of the way in which the criminal group in question is organized. Factors such as the social or cultural context, which may have important impact upon for example the degree of violence used by any criminal group, can easily be ignored in such an analysis. This drawback has already been explored in the section on data reliability above, it being suggested that some caution is required when proceeding on such a high level comparative study of the nature of organized criminal groups. Nevertheless, the data as presented here does suggest a remarkable degree of coalescence between a range of factors and the degree to which criminal groups are hierarchically organized.

In contrast to hierarchically organized criminal groups, more loosely organized groups are smaller in size, have no particular social or ethnical identity, do not have violence as a necessary element for the undertaking of their activities and are mainly engaged in one or two transborder activities. These networks have as a consequence often been treated as ‘disorganized crime’, and are seldom seen as posing the same threat as hierarchical groups. In fact the opposite is the case. “One of the most significant points about [criminal] networks”, a recent study of the phenomenon has noted, “is that they are not immediately and obviously visible. Criminal networks can hide behind various licit activities, can operate with a lower degree of formality than other types of organization, and can maintain a profile that does not bring them to the attention of law enforcement”.²⁸ Networks should thus be regarded as sophisticated organizational forms with great flexibility and adaptability. Their loose structure makes it more difficult for law enforcement to combat due to the difficulty

²⁸ Williams, ‘Transnational Criminal Networks’, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

of identifying all the players involved and of effectively decapitating the structure, which often simply reconstitutes itself when key individuals are removed.

Such different organization forms, and their varying characteristics, point to the requirement to attempt to establish a limited number of typologies that capture the variety of organized crime groups. This process of cross-referencing different variables serves as an important step in the process. This issue is considered in greater detail in the following section.

4. TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF ORGANISED CRIME GROUPS

4.1 Why develop typologies?

The overview of the data on each of the 40 organized criminal groups gathered above provides some insight into the wide variety of criminal groups present across the 16 countries. At the same time however, it is possible to identify a number of important similarities between the groups in question and thus it is possible from the data which is available to present five broad typologies of criminal groups. It should be noted at the outset that, given the relatively small sample of groups in the survey, these could potentially be supplemented by other typologies. There are three key reasons for compiling a series of typologies from the data:

- Typologies are important in providing greater detail to what is meant by the concept of ‘transnational organized crime’. It is clear from the overview of the groups outlined above the wide variety of structures, activities and potential outcomes that are encompassed by the concept. The identification of different types provides more detail in this respect providing a clear picture of what is entailed by the phenomenon of transnational organized crime.
- The identification of a series of typologies has important policy implications for law enforcement agencies. Different strategies of law enforcement must be used in confronting different types of organized crime groups. The identification of typologies provides a useful means to order the debate in this regard. In particular also the identification of typologies may provide a useful training tool for law enforcement professionals.
- Critical in respect of this project, typologies provide an important mechanism to sort and monitor transnational organized crime trends, by identifying which types are most common in which particular social context. *Important in this regard is that typologies also provide a useful framework in which information on trends can be collected and sorted and where necessary new types or categories within each typology developed.*

The value of the typologies is to counter the public image of organized criminal groups as simply Mafia-type organizations. Law enforcement authorities have long underestimated the harm caused by smaller groups whose capacity to adapt to new markets and profits is higher and whose detection is difficult due to their low-profile and their loose structure. Important also in this regard is to inform the public more generally about the wide variety of forms that organized crime takes. Experience has shown elsewhere that awareness raising among the public about the dangers of organized crime (and how to identify its manifestations) can be an important weapon to fight it.

Whatever the advantages of developing a set of typologies, it must be conceded that the typologies presented here can be reworked and replaced with others. The intention however is to begin a debate as to how data on transnational criminal groups can be collected and ordered. By so doing more sophisticated instruments to

monitor the impact of the TOC Convention on the development and functioning of transnational organized crime groups can be developed.


The five typologies outlined below were identified by reviewing and identifying similarities from all the data that had been collected around the various groups. It must be noted that the structure of various groups remains the core element around which the typologies were developed. While attempts were made to develop typologies separately from how the groups were organized structurally, these did not generally provide a useful method of delineation.²⁹ Thus, the issue of the structure of the groups is critical to determining a series of typologies. While this does not provide an immediate answer to what activities groups engage in, it does however provide a relatively useful guide of *how* these activities are pursued.

The five typologies identified and a short introductory explanation of each are as follows:

- ‘Standard hierarchy’: Single hierarchical group with strong internal systems of discipline.
- ‘Regional hierarchy’: Hierarchically structured groups, with strong internal lines of control and discipline, but with relative autonomy for regional components.
- ‘Clustered hierarchy’: A set of criminal groups which have established a system of coordination/control, ranging from weak to strong, over all their various activities.
- ‘Core group’: A relatively tightly organized but unstructured group, surrounded in some cases by a network of individuals engaged in criminal activities.
- ‘Criminal network’: A loose and fluid network of individuals, often drawing on individuals with particular skills, who constitute themselves around an ongoing series of criminal projects.

Each of these typologies is considered in greater detail below.

4.2 Typology 1: ‘Standard hierarchy’



- Single leader
- Clearly defined hierarchy
- Strong systems of internal discipline
- Known by a specific name
- Often strong social or ethnic identity
- Violence essential to activities
- Often have clear influence or control over defined territory

The standard hierarchy (illustrated diagrammatically above) is the most common form of organized criminal group identified in the sample. It is characterized by a single leader and a relatively clearly defined hierarchy. Systems of internal discipline are strict. Strong social or ethnic identities can be present, although this is not always


²⁹ It should be noted that most typologies of organized crime rely on the structure of the groups themselves as the key organizing principle.

the case. There is a relatively clear allocation of tasks and often some form of internal code of conduct, although this may be implicit and not ‘officially’ recorded. In almost all cases, a standard hierarchical criminal groups will have a *name* to which it is known both to its members and outsiders. The size of such groups can range from relatively small (a few individuals) to several hundred. In most cases however a standard size would be in the region of 10 to 50. Propensity to engage in corrupt activities to facilitate primary activities is high.

Of the 40 groups analyzed in the context of this study, 13 could be classified as fitting the broad profile of this typology. For example, all three groups from China fit this typology. These groups have generally been created around a single individual, who often gives his name to the criminal group. The groups are medium sized (50-200 people) and have a strict hierarchical structure with a code of honor, internal ‘house rules’, and absolute loyalty to the controlling figure. Members are recruited among the criminal underworld and from the ranks of former convicts, but also amongst government officials and civil servants. The use of violence is a key characteristics of their activities. Indeed, many of the groups began their operations with extortion and often engaged in violence (or the threat thereof) to secure profit. Having accumulated wealth, the criminal groups invested in a range of legitimate businesses such as casinos, night-clubs and restaurants. Illegal activities too were expanded (and often carried out under the guise of legitimate business) to include gambling houses, prostitution, cigarette smuggling and racketeering. Corrupt officials, and in some cases political representatives at local level, have been used to secure both influence and protection for the groups.

The other groups that fit this typology are largely from Eastern Europe – Russia, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Ukraine. These are all relatively small in size (two have less than 20 people and three have less than 50 people). They possess a clear hierarchical structure and are characterized by high levels of internal discipline and clearly defined roles for each member. The style of management is generally authoritarian and obedience to the chief is key to the cohesion of the group. The use of violence, including for enforcement purposes within the groups itself, is relatively common. Most of the organized crime groups in question are active in the legitimate economy, mainly the running of, or investment in, private companies. In most cases, hierarchically organized groups appear to exert control or influence within the confines of a specific geographic area.

4.3 Typology 2: ‘Regional hierarchy’



- Single leadership structure
- Line of command from centre
- Degree of autonomy at regional level
- Geographic/regional distribution
- Multiple activities
- Often strong social or ethnic identity
- Violence essential to activities

Although a hierarchical criminal group, with relatively strict lines of command from the centre, there is a degree of autonomy present in regional organizations under the control of the group. This level of autonomy varies, but is generally limited to day to day management issues. In some cases, regional hierarchies appear to operate a 'franchise model' in which regional groups pay money and give allegiance in order to use the name of a well known criminal group, helping to improve their own influence and instill fear into their competitors. The control structure at the centre is often replicated at regional level. Levels of internal discipline are high, and instructions coming from the centre generally override any regional initiatives. Regional hierarchies given their geographic distribution, generally have relatively large numbers of members and associates. Again, given their regional spread they are likely to engage in multiple activities.


One set of criminal groups that illustrates most effectively the regional hierarchy typology is that of outlaw motorcycle gangs, one of which from Australia was analyzed for the purpose of this survey of criminal groups. Outlaw motorcycle gangs have a clearly defined hierarchical structure, divided into sub-groups each operating in specific geographic regions. The basic element of the structure is the Chapter, which operates in a specific local area and is governed by a President. This individual has absolute rule over the Chapter in terms of decision-making and often rules with dictatorial power. Each Chapter has a degree of independence from the others. Drawn largely from the white working class, outlaw motor cycle gangs have a strong social identity. Gangs are generally entirely male. While membership was traditionally granted after a strict internal process (including a period of probation) such procedures have been weakened in some areas, in an attempt to acquire more members. The most highly organized gangs have also targeted prospective members with particular skills (such as lawyers, accountants, realtors or chemists) of value to the criminal operations of the club. Most outlaw motor cycle gangs are governed by rules known as 'by-laws', or a constitution. Some gangs have written codes of ethics. Rules typically require loyalty to the club and condone violence to further the gang's interest. Gang's frequent use of extreme violence is well known and their reputation and demeanor are used to intimidate witnesses and others. A guiding principle of gang membership and activities is an 'outlaw' lifestyle, which may call for anything from mere social rebellion to highly organized criminality for profit. Outlaw motor cycle gangs are prominent in the production and distribution of amphetamines and cannabis. Chapters seek to dominate particular areas with respect to drug manufacturing, drug distribution and prostitution. Rival biker gangs are violently excluded. Some Chapters have now diversified to include such crimes as insurance scams, vehicle theft and trafficking, extortion and other crimes

The Asian organized crime groups outlined in this study (Yamaguchi-Gumi in Japan, Fuk Ching gang in the United States and the Japanese Yakuza in Australia) also belong to this typology. These groups have a hierarchical-type of structure, headed by a leadership structure. Day to day business is left to 'managers' further down the pyramid who act with a level of autonomy and are generally in control of operations in specific geographic areas. Such groups are governed by a variety of rules and norms, draw on members from particular ethnic groupings, and operate with a high level of discipline. In particular, the Japanese groups suggest that some aspects of the franchising arrangement described above may be present, with groups assuming the

name and protection of a prominent criminal group on payment of tributes and allegiance to a controlling body.

All the Italian organized crime groups outlined in the study have a hierarchical structure, headed by a single boss or oligarchy. Most of the groups have a three-tiered organizational structure with a high level controlling a province or a region where all the strategic decisions are taken, a middle level with representatives or families controlling a territory and a lower level of members executing the orders. A strict code of conduct, sometimes based on an oath of loyalty provides cohesion and discipline within the groups and dictates the role and the position of each member within the organization. All the Italian groups considered in the study are relatively large, with their activities spread across several regions. Violence is often key to their activities.

4.4 Typology 3: ‘Clustered hierarchy’



- Consists of a number of criminal groups
- Governing arrangement for the groups present
- Cluster has stronger identity than constituent groups
- Degree of autonomy for constituent groups
- Formation strongly linked to social/historical context
- Relatively rare

A clustered hierarchy is an association of organized crime groups with a governing or oversight body. The groups in question may themselves have a diversity of structures, but generally they are of the ‘standard hierarchy’ type outlined above. The governing arrangement for the group can range from a flexible umbrella type structure, to a more rigid control body. The degree of autonomy of each of the criminal groups that makes up the cluster is relatively high. ‘Clustered hierarchies’ may result when a variety of individual criminal groups come together to divide up markets or to regulate conflict between them. Over time however, the cluster assumes some identity of its own. Given the number of groups involved and the potential geographic diversity it should be expected that any ‘clustered hierarchy’ engages in multiple activities and has a relatively wide membership. ‘Clustered hierarchies’ are relatively rare and may be subject to internal competition or the exploitation of divisions between groups by law enforcement.

Given that clustered hierarchies are formed from a variety of component criminal organizations or gangs, this process is strongly influenced by a range of factors relating to the context and process in which this occurs. This is well illustrated by the example of the ‘28s prison gang’ in South Africa.

Having its origins in South Africa's prisons, and mainly drawing on individuals from a specific ethnic group, the 28s have come to establish their dominance over a number of criminal gangs. The 28s have their origin more than one hundred years ago when they developed as a ruthless prison gang in correctional facilities throughout the country. They forged tightly knit, disciplined and well-structured criminal gangs from amongst inmates. They and other prison gangs (most notably the '26s') vied for the control of the informal trade networks and sexual services on offer within prisons. Once released from prison, many members of the 28s joined street gangs, as over time a direct correlation between membership in the 28s and seniority in street gangs evolved. However the leadership of the 28s continued to be based in prison and as a result it was not yet possible to develop a cohesive criminal formation that could impact effectively on the open criminal market. Only when senior members of the 28s were released from prison, and they happened to have exceptional qualities of leadership, could this take place. This development occurred at the same time as the introduction of synthetic drugs (mainly methaqualone) into the local drug market, and then the opening up of the country's borders as a result of the end of apartheid, bringing new market opportunities and higher levels of profit. The discipline and hierarchical structure of the group, while having its origin in prison culture, has diversified to its operations outside of prison. Key to the process of formation remains the fact that individuals drawn from a variety of criminal activities have been initiated into the gang while in prison. The group while dominant in one province, the Western Cape, operates across South Africa, but in a decentralized way. The different groups are structured and have their own internal hierarchies, but the structures are not uniform across all the component groups. Despite this make-up however there has been clear overall leadership from the centre which relatively strict lines of reporting and discipline throughout the group. At a local level however this is balanced against a relatively high level of decentralized management of day to day operations of profit generating activities.

Two other groups on which information was collected for the study fit this profile.


The first is an Italian dominated heterogeneous network of groups active in Germany. This network is composed of a large number of organizations, different in size and working independently of one another. They are however linked through personal contacts and representatives and at this level coordinate their activities. The governing arrangement in this case is therefore relatively fluid and dynamic. In the areas in which they operate the aim to dominate the sub-contracting market in the construction industry.

The second is the Russian based Ziberman group. The Ziberman group consists of six separate criminal groups, each with a hierarchical structure and definite roles for each member. Co-ordination among the six groups making up the group is achieved by an oversight structure of four individuals. There is a strict code of conduct across the group and the process of achieving internal discipline is characterized by high levels of violence. The Ziberman group first established itself through the illegal trade in tobacco before diversifying their activities into the smuggling of alcohol, gambling and trafficking in stolen vehicles.

It should be noted that despite the fact that the Ziberman group and the 28s consist of several criminal entities, it is seen by both its members and outsiders as a single

criminal group with a diversity of component parts. This is a key requirement in respect of this typology. *A series of groups coordinating their activities would not be considered a clustered hierarchy if they regarded themselves as consisting of completely separate criminal enterprises, which, while attempting to co-ordinate their activities, were often in competition with each other.* The sum in this respect (the Ziberman group and the 28s themselves) must therefore be more important as an entity than the collective parts.

4.5 Typology 4: ‘Core group’



- Core group surrounded by a loose network
- Limited number of individuals
- Tightly organized flat structure
- Small size maintains internal discipline
- Seldom has social or ethnic identity
- Only in a limited number of cases known by a specific name

Criminal groups in this typology generally consist of a limited number of individuals who form a relatively tight and structured group to conduct criminal business. Around this ‘core group’ there may be a large number of associate members or a network which are used from time to time and depending on the criminal activity in question. There may be an internal division of activities among the core members. ‘Core groups’ are generally quite small (in the region of 20 individuals or less) and are more likely to engage in a single or at least a limited number of criminal activities. Internal discipline is maintained through the small size of the group and the use of violence, although the latter is not as prominent as in the standard hierarchy. ‘Core groups’ are most likely to have little or no social identity, and are structure and are run purely for the benefit of the small number of individuals in charge. Such groups often have no name, either for those involved or to outsiders.

Of the 40 groups on which data have been collected in the context of this study, eight can be identified as fitting this typology. These are all loosely structured criminal operations, controlled by a small number of key players, surrounded by a wider circle of people around them. Three of the groups operate in Western Europe (in the Netherlands and Germany), they have no name (in fact a relatively common feature of loosely structured criminal groups) as well as having no distinct social or ethnic base. The two groups active in the Netherlands are mainly involved in the trafficking in human beings. Each member has a specific role in the trafficking process (for example, recruitment, transport, protection and marketing). Such groups are more horizontally structured than hierarchically ordered. The groups include several

nationalities, generally reflecting the make-up of the countries from which they operate. Such groups are strictly profit orientated and opportunistic, shifting from illegal activity to illegal activity on the basis of where most profits can be generated.

A good example of this typology is the McLean Syndicate operating from Australia. Membership of the group is relatively loose and fluid: individuals or groups of individuals coming together on the basis of common economic needs. This means that members may move in and out of the group, as circumstances require. In this way the syndicate is able to constantly draw on new human resources and new skills as required by changing opportunities and markets. Once accepted by the syndicate, the new comer may only associate with syndicate members when his or her particular skills or expertise in a specific field are required. Clearly, the most important requirement of syndicate membership is the ability for other members to trust the person in question. Only key members of the syndicate appear to be required to maintain full-time commitment to the goals of the organization as a whole. Relationships among these key members are built on trust and mutual understanding established over many years of common involvement in illicit ventures. They all have a high degree of professional know-how in the respect of their area of expertise – the illegal importation of cannabis into Australia and other countries. The group is composed of a number of different criminal cells, operating with defined roles, coordinated by persons occupying leadership roles in each of the cells. Various cells from the McLean Syndicate are known to be operating in several overseas jurisdictions outside Australia, including the Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand, Germany, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Singapore. The group can rely upon the availability of ‘enforcers’ and specialists who are used to collect debts – mostly related to payments for narcotics – and to settle disputes within the organization. The ‘enforcer’ uses threats of violence and intimidation to instill a sense of order and to deter other persons outside the group to interfere with the criminal activities of the McLean group.


As in the case of the structured hierarchy, the core group typology is probably one of the most common organizational forms. Of interest, is the fact that law enforcement pressure on a range of more hierarchical structures such as those outlined in typologies 1 and 2 have ensured that some groups have evolved from more highly structured and hierarchical organizations to that of ‘core groups’.³⁰

One important sub-category of this typology should also be touched upon. Relatively loosely organized criminal enterprises like those outlined above, can on occasion assume a corporate structure with a legitimate business front. In effect then, the core group can hold all the credentials of a legitimate business, yet engage in illegitimate activities. The crimes such groups engage in are closely related tied to their apparent involvement in legitimate business. Thus they are dominated by illegal activities such as money laundering or tax and investment fraud. The number of members making up each group is generally small (less than 20) and their level of professional know-how often very high. Such groups are non-violent, with close connections to legitimate economic actors and government authorities. Given their cover as legitimate economic enterprises, and their integration into the legitimate economy, the activities of such groups are difficult to detect by law enforcement agencies.

³⁰ This is an argument that has been made both in respect of the changing nature of Colombian criminal organizations as well as some Mafia groups in Italy.

This sub-category of the core-group typology is best illustrated by one of the German criminal groups (the unnamed group listed in fourth place on the matrix) examined in the course of this study. This involves the activities of a legal front company engaged in investment fraud activities. The core groups involved fits into the typology as outlined above, with the addition of an apparently legitimate legal front. The use of violence is not a feature of the group. Nor is the group based on any identifiable ethnic recruiting process. Despite its external corporate cover, it is internally loosely structured and organized.

4.6 Typology 5: “Criminal network”



- Defined by activities of key individuals
- Prominence in network determined by contacts/skills
- Personal loyalties/ties more important than social/ethnic identities
- Network connections endure, coalescing around series of criminal projects
- Low public profile – seldom known by any name
- Network reforms after exit of key individuals

Criminal networks are defined by the activities of key individuals who engage in illicit activity in often shifting alliances. Such individuals may not regard themselves as being members of a criminal group, and may not be regarded as being a criminal group by outsiders. Nevertheless they coalesce around a series of criminal projects. The nature and criminal success of such networks is heavily determined by individual characteristics and skills amongst those who act as its component parts. Networks usually consist of relatively manageable numbers of individuals, although in many cases different components of the network may not work closely with (or even know each other) but be connected through another individual or individuals. Personal loyalties and ties are essential to the maintenance of the network and are key determinants of relationships. It should be noted however that various individuals within the network do not carry the same weight and the network is generally formed around a key series of individuals (or nodal points) through which most of the network connections run.

Of the 40 groups on which data has been collected, only four of these constitute criminal networks. It should be conceded that while these constitute only a small component of this survey, it is likely that criminal networks are more common, and indeed are a growing phenomenon. Hierarchical structures are more likely to be identified by law enforcement agencies and the hierarchy broken up if specific individuals or small groups at its pinnacle are removed. In contrast, when it comes to criminal networks, law enforcement agencies are more likely to identify the

activities of key individuals, and when they are arrested or prosecuted, the network simply reforms itself around new individuals and activities.

Two of the network groups considered in the context of the study are groups operating from the Netherlands, the remaining two are from the Caribbean. All four groups are loosely organized, with the activities of the leading practitioners constantly interchanging and a broader network of individual criminal contacts being drawn upon in the case of specific criminal operations. The size and the nature of activities of each of the criminal networks varies. The Meij case in the Caribbean involved a single suspect, surrounded by a network of individuals assisting him in his large-scale fraud and forgery enterprise. The criminal networks examined in the study are mainly involved in a single activity (although this is not always the case) and may reconstitute themselves to conduct other activities. The ability of all four groups to conduct the task at hand was highly dependent upon their ability to recruit the available human resources and skills into the network. The Verhagen Group involved in the smuggling of cannabis into Europe, for example went so far as to attempt to recruit one particular skill (the ability to captain a ship) by advertising publicly in the media. The use of violence is not structural to these groups but instrumental and incidental as their main focus resides in the high individual skills of their members.

One criminal cluster (of which there is unfortunately no group represented in the study), that of West African organized crime, provides an important illustration of the networks structure. West African criminal networks – which are made up predominately of Nigerians – have in the last decade have achieved remarkably high levels of market control. The growth of criminal networks from the region have paralleled the process of state decline there and are, among other things, a feature of weak local law enforcement, historic trading networks operating through the region and the presence of a significant West African Diaspora in cities around the world. West African criminal networks engage in a mixture of criminal activities, ranging from advanced fee fraud and other financial scams to trafficking in cocaine and heroin. West African criminal groups, with no specific corporate structure or hierarchy, are classic examples of criminal networks. In part, this is a reflection of the activities in which they are engaged; these are many, inter-connected and often overlapping. People who emerge as prominent players in any criminal network are often those who possess specific skills, have cultivated important contacts (for example with a state official) or who have themselves taken the initiative in bringing together a small group of people to run an illicit business enterprise. While individuals may rise to significance as a crime or drug ‘baron’, in most cases this does not imply that a carefully and clearly structured organization is acting under orders.

Despite the presence of extensive West African criminal networks in a number of places around the world, there is no name or list of names that is referred to. The criminal networks themselves seldom carry any name of their own. This reflects the shifting and essential fluid nature of the networks. Loose and often temporary alliances or associations may be formed around specific ‘projects’. Individuals or small groups of people are best described as nodal points in a larger web of criminal activity. None of this explanation should imply, however, that such a loose network is not the most effective means of doing illegal business. With a flat structure, instant

communication between members (the mobile phone has brought a revolution to both legal and illegal business) and a keen eye on the profit to be made in any deal, such organizations, loose and seemingly unstructured as they are, are highly effective in literally delivering the goods. The added advantage for West African networks is that tracing the operations of such criminal networks is extremely difficult for law enforcement agencies, and when individuals are targeted and identified, the network can quickly reform itself around new players.

4.7 Linking the typologies to criminal clusters

The development of typologies is also important when considering the nature of criminal clusters. Analyses of organized crime often attribute similar characteristics to broad clusters of criminal groups, such as for example the Russian Mafia. While this is true in some cases (see the outline of West African criminal networks above), such generalizations should be treated with caution. This is for two reasons. *First, the groups that make up any criminal cluster may themselves represent a diverse number of typologies. Second, the nature of the criminal groups within any cluster may change dramatically over time, as their operations mature or as criminal markets change.* This is well illustrated by the example of Albanian and Colombian criminal clusters.

The term ‘Albanian organized crime’ is now often used, and indeed Albanians criminal organizations play an increasingly important role in supplying the European drug market. The strategic location of Albania on the drug and people trafficking routes from the east, the weakness of local law enforcement and the size of the Albanian Diaspora (many having fled internal disorder and the war in the Balkans) have all contributed to the phenomenon. Yet the groups which make up the cluster ‘Albanian organized crime’ continue to evolve. While originally many Albanian criminal groups were “reminiscent of the first Calabrian Mafia cells: non-hierarchical and almost always organized around family ties”, such criminal organizations as they mature are increasingly characterized by hierarchical and ethnic based structures. These have a strict code of conduct. Albanian criminal organizations are characterized by high levels of violence that is both internally and externally focussed. A second critical period of change is now occurring with Albanian criminal groups now evolving into more sophisticated structures, with the development of networks between regional criminal groups. Thus, according to a report of the Italian Investigation Directorate for the Mafia, the ‘Albanian Mafia’ is now formed by several criminal groups operating at local level and in contact with each other. This arrangement makes it extremely difficult to identify the ruling group of individuals.³¹

While Albanian criminal groups have modified their structure with the growing of their activities abroad and the diversification into new activities, Colombian criminal organizations after severe repression from law enforcement agencies, reorganized themselves into looser structures.

³¹ Drawn from UNODCCP, ‘Global Trends in Organized Crime’, Internal Report, December 2000, pp. 46-49.

From the mid-1970s until the early 1990s, the illicit cocaine trade was dominated by Colombian criminal organizations, in particular by cartels based in the cities of Medellin and Cali. Law enforcement successes against these two criminal organizations in the early 1990s has led to a fragmentation of the drug trafficking business inside Colombia and the concomitant rise in prominence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations supplying the US market. Nevertheless Colombian organizations remain pivotal in the processing and trafficking of cocaine. Over the last number of years a prominent trends has been the emergence of second tier and small trafficking organizations. In effect the groups that dominated the market in the 1990s have been replaced by a broader-based industry with more participants, although there is a high level of coordination between some organizations. Where drug trafficking operations in the past were dominated by 10 to 15 major organizations and their subsidiary groups, the illegal trade in narcotics is now said to be dominated by 150 to 200 smaller organizations and many other groups made up of as few as 10 people.³²

While the earlier groups were hierarchical organized, with high visibility and political impact, the new groups have more specialized roles and missions among their members, are more tightly and horizontal organized. Success in illegal markets is ensured through both the diversification into a variety of illegal products and markets and the coordination among criminal groups. In short, while the Cartels were much more likely to resemble the structured hierarchies of typologies 1 and 2, the trend is towards more tightly controlled core groups, assisted by a web of individuals engaged in a variety of illegal projects. Such tightly controlled structures, their diversity and sheer numbers, pose new challenges for law enforcement.

These two illustrations again highlight the importance of gathering data on the nature of the criminal groups that make up any cluster. The concluding section of the report which follows provides a brief review of the findings, and based on these, suggests a way forward in respect of the overall task of gathering information on organized crime groups.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 32-36.

5. WAY FORWARD

5.1 Project overview and assessment

This study has sought to draw upon information collected on 40 criminal groups in 16 countries across the world. Information was largely gathered through national correspondents in each of the societies concerned according to a series of established guidelines and topics. The aim of the project was not only to collect information on the criminal groups themselves, but to use the research process as a pilot study to inform any future process of information collection, data exchange and monitoring that would take place under the provisions of the TOC Convention.

A considerable quantity of information on organized crime groups has been collected in the course of the project. A distinction was made at the outset between criminal groups, as presented here, and “criminal clusters” and “criminal markets”. While the study of “groups”, “clusters” and “markets” are essential to a fuller understanding of the phenomenon of transnational organized crime, the focus in this report has been on the nature of the criminal groups themselves – essentially the building blocks of the phenomenon of transnational organized crime. One of the strengths of the data is that it allows, for almost the first time in the study of transnational organized crime groups, the development of a detailed comparative analysis. This has allowed the presentation of the key characteristic of all the groups that have been considered.

One issue worth emphasizing by way of conclusion is that the survey of groups does not have enough representation from more loosely organized groups or criminal networks. This is a serious oversight given the increasing focus on more loosely organized criminal entities by law enforcement bodies and within the academic literature. Two interconnected explanations are possible as to why this is the case. First, is that criminal networks are not yet fully recognized as fully fledged criminal groups in some jurisdictions, and the focus of law enforcement agencies is on the activities of the key individuals which make up the network nodes of the criminal network. Second, hierarchically structured groups may have a higher visibility and cause more harm (although this is in many cases tied to a local area) than more loosely organized criminal operations.

The data allowed the comparison of various characteristics of the groups. While a future larger sample of groups will make this exercise more worthwhile, some conclusions can be drawn. Cross-referencing the structure of the groups against other variables produced the most interesting findings. Thus larger criminal groups were much more likely to have hierarchical structures, while groups made up of relatively few individuals were more likely to be loosely structured. More hierarchical groups were also more likely to have strong ethnic or social identities, while more loosely organized groups were more likely to have no fixed ethnic or social identity. The greater the level of violence used by any group the more likely it was to have a strict hierarchical structure and a strong ethnic or social identity. Groups involved in the trafficking of illegal narcotics displayed higher levels of violence than other groups, particularly those with a diversified array of activities. These tentative conclusions must be tested in future work. More definitive conclusions about the varying features of organized crime groups may also lead to a clearer understanding of the forces

determining the organizational shape of the various groups in different social and cultural contexts.

The data on the 40 criminal groups in many cases reflects the prevailing view of what transnational criminal groups look like and how they act. Nevertheless, in a few specific cases, the presentation of the data suggests that broad generalizations about organized crime groups may not stand up to scrutiny when tested empirically. Thus, the oft made statement that criminal groups engage in a diversity of activities is shown to be true only for a minority of the groups considered in the context of this study. The data from the survey suggests also (although again admittedly the sample is very small) that more loosely organized groups are likely to be smaller and less violent, and thus much less likely to come to the attention of the authorities, hence their potential under-representation in this study.

Relying heavily on this data a series of typologies of organized crime groups were identified. The five typologies identified ranged from more tightly structured groups to more loosely organized criminal networks. Most notably the development of a series of typologies is useful both in illustrating the diversity of criminal groups encompassed by the concept of ‘transnational organized crime’, and in providing a framework for future data collection and analysis.

5.2 Problems and prospects

Presenting the data and providing an overview of its key characteristics begs the question as to how the activities of transnational organized crime groups should be monitored in the context of the TOC Convention. The survey suggests that three broad and initial conclusions should frame any debate in this regard.

First, that there remain considerable methodological obstacles to the implementation of an effective system to monitor organized trends across the globe. The problem of acquiring standardized information on a social phenomenon across a number of societies is clear. Collecting such data on transnational organized crime is made that much more difficult by problems of secrecy and data access. While court files may provide the most reliable sources of data, for example, they often lack information of the broader context in which organized crime operates and are, in most cases, skewed by a clear prosecutorial aim (such as the conviction of a single individual), thus excluding data on other potentially useful issues for research purposes. Added to this, any research and information collection exercise is hampered by the fact that the focus of the research is effectively a moving target: what can be said about a variety of organized crime groups today (notwithstanding delays inherent to any research process) may not be true tomorrow. Already, in the case of this report, the data on each of the groups is now relatively dated (and indeed some groups, as in the case of China (see Appendix B), have been dismantled by the law enforcement authorities) and does not reflect the current position.

Second, is the consistent thread running through the report that highlights the degree of diversity across transnational organized crime groups. It has been emphasized a number of times in the report therefore, that what is meant by ‘transnational organized crime’ may vary considerably from context to context and from group to

group. Media portrayals of hierarchically organized and structured groups with clear leadership figures simply do not apply as a whole to the variety of structures and activities that constitute the phenomenon of transnational organized crime. This diversity is illustrated in this report by the presentation of the five standardized typologies based largely on the structural characteristics of the groups that have been reviewed in this study.

Third, and while it has not been specifically referred to in the context of this study, the issue of the degree to which any information on organized crime trends becomes out of date relatively rapidly. Indeed, and as a brief review of the material in Appendix B illustrates, source material drawn from within the criminal justice system itself is often only made available when organized criminal groups have been broken up and prosecutions begun. Nevertheless, the immediate assumption made when debating how to effectively monitor trends in organized crime is that these must be as recent and up to date as possible. This poses real problem given resource and personnel constraints as to how information can be constantly presented in a timely manner so to be of greatest assistance to policy makers.

The drawbacks inherent in the identification of these issues must however be weighed against the arguments for the collation, analysis and presentation of data on organized crime groups at international level. Without an effective measure of the nature and extent of transnational organized crime from an international level, it will be difficult to systematically assess what progress is being made in countering it. It would seem important to know for instance whether the replacement of hierarchical models by criminal networks as observed in Colombia, will manifest itself in other countries when law enforcement activities increase. At the very least, this pilot study has suggested that some important data can be collected. Moreover, what is critical to the exercise is not only the collection of the data to highlight problems in particular societies, but that when compared and contrasted with each other, some important conclusions can be drawn.

An adequate understanding of transnational organized crime at an international level implies some procedure in which information is collected and analyzed. Closely related to this process of collection is the challenge to present the information in a way that it can best be used by a variety of policy makers, law enforcement officials and researchers working on the phenomenon of organized crime around the world. What may be unrealistic is to promote the idea of a definitive global study on organized crime, rather than on the production of a more dynamic vehicle, allowing both the ongoing publication of findings and the ability for outsiders to access data at any time. Any attempt to establish an ongoing process of information collection therefore must produce an outcome which is not a once off-report but a constantly accessible tool for a wide variety of users. It should for example be possible to access such a collection of data at any time, not being restricted to periodic publications that attempt to provide a snapshot of the exact position of organized crime in the globe at any point in time.

Given the challenges outlined above, it must be conceded that any system of information and collection on global organized crime trends will be a challenging exercise. The continued collection of information on criminal groups however does constitute one way in which the process can be taken forward. An international data

base on a wide variety of criminal groups, and the continuous updating of the typologies outlined above would serve as a useful method of monitoring international developments in the field of organized crime. Such groups must however be drawn from a variety of countries, including both from the developed and developing world.

Such a project would not seek to replicate work that is already being done at an international level by INTERPOL that maintains a database of key suspects. This relates much more closely to the immediate assistance of investigators working in a variety of environments. The database would instead aim to provide information that is not easily available elsewhere concerning the history, context and classification of a variety of criminal groups. If the database is large enough such information could be of considerable value to policy makers and law enforcement officials alike. Given that the emphasis in the area of police data is always on the accessing of real time information, little attention is paid to storing data on groups where law enforcement has been successful at dismantling, or those which have displayed particular characteristics which are no longer present. Collecting and keeping such historical information on organized crime groups will be of great importance in any analysis of transnational organized crime trends.

Critically, the ongoing collection of information on criminal groups would provide the material necessary to produce an effective system for their classification. Already an attempt has been made here to show how even a relatively few groups present the possibility of developing typologies. Such typologies may be central to any monitoring exercise as they provide a means to sort information into categories that are established at the same time as providing the possibility of identifying new typologies (and hence new trends) or more detailed sub-categories within each typology. The collection of information on a large variety of organized crime groups, will also allow, over time, the development of more systematic instruments to measure the harm that individual groups cause. The latter is an issue that requires

What would be important in such an exercise is to ensure that the collection and analysis of information takes place in a sustained manner. The once off collection and publication of data will weaken the credibility of any such instrument. Data collection could be facilitated by the creation of a network of national and/or regional correspondents drawn from a combination of independent research bodies or law enforcement agencies. The ongoing collection of information on criminal groups at the same time as the TOC Convention is in the process of being ratified constitutes an important exercise. In the final analysis however, it is the Conference of State Parties, envisaged under the provisions of the TOC Convention, that will be critical in determining how and with what instruments the implementation of the Convention will be monitored. This pilot study has sought – by collecting data on a variety of criminal groups and proposing a means by which this can be sorted and monitored – to highlight what are the possibilities in this regard.

APPENDIX A

**UNITED NATIONS TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
ASSESSMENT FORM
(Pilot Survey)**

CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION

Respondent Information:

Name (in capital letters, please)

Organization

Mailing address

.....

.....

.....

Telephone/fax/email address:

.....

.....

I. General Questions about Organized Crime in the Country

Please circle the appropriate answer.

1.0 The concern about organized crime (compared to other issues like unemployment, illegal immigration, etc.) is high on the **public agenda** (e.g., according to media coverage, public opinion polls, etc.).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	A	N/A
strongly											strongly
disagree									agree		

1.1 The fight against organized crime is high on the **political agenda** of the present government.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	A	N/A
strongly											strongly
disagree									agree		

1.2 The fight against organized crime is high on the **agenda of the police/security forces**.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	A	N/A
strongly											strongly
disagree									agree		

1.3 In my country the problem of collusion /cooperation between organized crime groups and terrorist/guerrilla groups is a serious one.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	A	N/A
strongly											strongly
disagree									agree		

Comments:

II. Specific Questions on the Organized Crime Group

		Yes	No	Not known
2.0	Is the group defined with fixed members?	()	()	()

2.1 English name, aliases of group/organization; original language name, or acronym:

2.2 Current size of the membership of the group/organization, including the number of imprisoned members:

2.3 Please indicate **all the criminal activities** the group is involved in:

Yes No Not known

2.4 Drug trafficking () () ()

If yes, please indicate the type of drug(s) below:

2.5 Heroin () Cannabis: () Cocaine: () Synthetic drugs:() Other ().....
Specify

Yes No Not known

2.6 Drug manufacturing () () ()

If yes, please indicate the type of drug(s) below:

2.7 Heroin () Cannabis: () Cocaine: () Synthetic drugs:() Other () **Specify:**

Yes No Not known

2.8 Computer crime, including Internet fraud () () ()

2.9 Intellectual property theft, including software piracy () () ()

	Yes	No	Not Known
2.10 Counterfeiting	()	()	()
2.11 Forgery	()	()	()
2.12 Large scale fraud / embezzlement	()	()	()
2.13 Bank Fraud	()	()	()
2.14 Insurance scams	()	()	()
2.15 Money laundering	()	()	()
2.16 Armed robbery	()	()	()
2.17 Vehicle theft and trafficking	()	()	()
2.18 Theft of antiques, jewellery, etc.	()	()	()
2.19 Smuggling of cultural artifacts	()	()	()
2.20 Trafficking in women/children for the sex industry	()	()	()
2.21 Trafficking in human beings for the purpose of labour	()	()	()
2.22 Illegal immigration	()	()	()
2.23 Illegal activities surrounding prostitution	()	()	()
2.24 Kidnapping for ransom	()	()	()
2.25 Extortion, including protection money	()	()	()
2.26 Loan Sharking/Usury	()	()	()
2.27 Firearms (smuggling for profit)	()	()	()
2.28 Firearms (smuggling for political struggle)	()	()	()
2.29 Firearms/ ammunition (manufacturing)	()	()	()
2.30 Explosives (illegal traffic)	()	()	()
2.31 Gambling (illegal schemes)	()	()	()
2.32 Environmental crimes, including illicit			

- waste disposal () () ()
- 2.33 Endangered species (illicit traffic) () () ()
- 2.34 Trading in human body parts () () ()
- 2.35 Other criminal activities () () ()
(please specify) - murder
- 2.36 From those criminal activities, which you have indicated above, please indicate the **main or dominant** activities the group is involved:

2.37 From the activities listed in response 2.36, please indicate with an **AX@** the status of your country:

Main Criminal Activities	Source Country	Transit Country	Country of destination

2.38 Please provide an estimate of the average annual income of the group over the last 3 years:

2.39 From **illicit** activities: US\$ _____

2.39.1 If the figure is **not known**, place an **X** here: _____

2.39.2 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

2.39.3 Please indicate your sources:

2.40 From **licit/legitimate** activities: US\$ _____

2.40.1 If the figure is **not known**, place an **AX@** here: _____

2.40.2 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

2.40.3 Please indicate your sources:

COMMENTS:

III. Organized Crime and Law Enforcement

	Yes	No	Not Known
3.0 Have arrests of group members been made in the last 3 years?	()	()	()
3.1 If yes, how many arrests have been made and for what offences?			
	Yes	No	Not Known
3.2 Have there been any prosecutions of group members in the last 3 years ?	()	()	()
3.3 If yes, how many prosecutions and for what offences?			
	Yes	No	Not Known
3.4 Have there been any convictions of group members in the last 3 years ?	()	()	()
3.5 If yes, how many convictions and for what offences?			
3.6 Please provide any apparent reasons for the failure to convict.			

COMMENTS:

IV. Ethnic and Gender Composition of the Group

4.0 List, in declining order of size, the **nationality or nationalities** of the members of the group?

4.0.1 If the nationality or nationalities of group members are not known, place an **AX@** here _____

4.0.2 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
---------------------	------------------------	----------------------

4.0.3 Please indicate your sources:

4.1 List, in declining order of size, the **ethnicity or ethnicities**¹ of the members of the group?

4.1.1 If the ethnicity or ethnicities of group members are not known, place an **AX@** here _____

4.1.2 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
---------------------	------------------------	----------------------

4.1.3 Please indicate your sources:

4.2 What percentage of the group is male? _____%

4.2.1 If the gender breakdown is not known, please place an **AX@** here _____

4.2.2 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
---------------------	------------------------	----------------------

4.2.3 Please indicate your sources:

COMMENTS:

V. General Characteristics of the Group/Organization

5.0 The group is **prominent** in the country.

¹Ethnicity refers to a group of people or a nation that has some degree of coherence or solidarity and who are aware of common origins, interests and shared experiences.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
 strongly disagree agree strongly

5.0.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

5.0.2 Please indicate your sources:

5.1 The group/organization presently obtains **voluntary support** from its social/ethnic constituency.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
 strongly disagree agree strongly

5.1.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

5.1.2 Please indicate your sources:

5.2 The group/organization is successful in providing **security for group members against law enforcement.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
 strongly disagree agree strongly

5.2.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

5.2.2 Please indicate your sources:

5.3 The group/organization is successful in providing **support and assistance (including legal)** to imprisoned group members.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
 strongly disagree agree strongly N/A

5.3.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

5.3.2 Please indicate your sources:

5.4 The group/organization is successful in providing **social security** (e.g., money, housing, employment) for family members and other dependents of imprisoned/killed group members.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
 strongly disagree agree strongly N/A

5.4.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

5.4.2 Please indicate your sources:

COMMENTS:

VI. Violence of the Group/ Organization

6.0 The group makes **use of violence**.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
 strongly disagree agree strongly N/A

6.0.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

—

—

—

—

—

VIII. General Influence of the Group/ Organization

8.0 The group is able to **influence others with money**.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
 strongly strongly
 disagree agree

8.0.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

8.0.2. Please indicate your sources:

8.1 How many cases of **police corruption** have been associated with the group in the last 3 years? _____

8.1.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

8.1.2 Please indicate your sources:

8.2 How many cases of **judicial corruption** (e.g. corruption of judges, prosecutors and other court officers) have been associated with the group in the last 3 years? _____

8.2.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

8.2.2 Please indicate your sources:

8.3 The group manages to **operate in and from prison**.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
 strongly strongly
 disagree agree

8.3.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

8.3.2 Please indicate your sources:

COMMENTS:

IX Political Influence of the Group/ Organization

9.0 The group is able to **manipulate politicians and the political process** in the country.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
strongly disagree strongly agree

9.0.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

9.0.2 Please indicate your sources:

9.1 The group is able to **manipulate politicians and the political process** abroad.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
strongly disagree strongly agree

9.1.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

9.1.2 Please indicate your sources:

9.2 There are allegations that the group is able to **channel funds to election campaigns**.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
strongly disagree strongly agree

9.2.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

9.2.2 Please indicate your sources:

9.3 There are allegations that the group has managed to get **group members elected to parliament**.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
 strongly disagree strongly agree

9.3.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

9.3.2 Please indicate your sources:

9.4 There are allegations that the group manages to **influence coverage or non-coverage of certain issues in the public media.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
 strongly disagree strongly agree

9.4.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

9.4.2 Please indicate your sources:

9.5 There are allegations that the group is **supporting political terrorism at home.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
 strongly disagree strongly agree

9.5.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

9.5.2 Please indicate your sources:

9.6 There are allegations that the group is **supporting political terrorism abroad.**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
 strongly disagree strongly agree

disagree

agree

9.6.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
---------------------	------------------------	----------------------

9.6.2 Please indicate your sources:

COMMENTS:

X. Transnational links of the Group/ Organization

10.0 The group's network operates in several countries.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
 strongly strongly
 disagree agree

10.0.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

10.0.2 Please indicate your sources:

10.1 Please list the countries where the group is **present abroad** in declining order of importance:

10.1.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

10.1.2 Please indicate your sources:

10.2 Please list the countries where the group **procures** its goods/merchandise/services in declining order of importance:

Goods/Merchandises Services	Country		
_____	_____		
_____	_____		
_____	_____		
_____	_____		
_____	_____	A	N/A

10.2.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

10.2.2 Please indicate your sources:

10.3 Please list the countries where the group **markets** its goods/merchandise/services declining order of importance:

Goods/Merchandises Services	Country	A	N/A
_____	_____		
_____	_____		
_____	_____		
_____	_____		
_____	_____		

10.3.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
---------------------	------------------------	----------------------

10.3.2 Please indicate your sources:

10.4 Please list the countries where the group **launders money** abroad in declining order of importance:

10.4.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
---------------------	------------------------	----------------------

10.4.2 Please indicate your sources:

10.5 Please list the **organized crime groups** abroad with whom the group co-operates.

_____	A	N/A

10.5.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

--	--	--

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
---------------------	------------------------	----------------------

10.5.2 Please indicate your sources:

10.6 Please list the **foreign organized crime groups** in the country with whom the group co-operates.

A N/A

10.6.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
---------------------	------------------------	----------------------

10.6.2 Please indicate your sources:

10.7 What is the nature of the links the group has with foreign organized crime groups? (please tick all that apply)

(a) Use of others' expertise ()

(b) Use of others' facilities ()

(c) Use of others' personnel ()

(d) cooperation in buying or selling commodities ()

(e) Other (please specify)

10.7.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
---------------------	------------------------	----------------------

10.7.2 Please indicate your sources:

10.8 Please list the **foreign governments** who are allegedly providing support or shelter to the group, in declining order of importance:

A N/A

10.8.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

10.8.2 Please indicate your sources:

10.9 Please list the **armed groups abroad** who are allegedly providing support or shelter to the group, in declining order of importance.

A N/A

10.9.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

10.9.2 Please indicate your sources:

Yes No Not known

10.10 Does the group have an identifiable geographical base within the country?

() () ()

(a) If yes, please specify (if known) the region
 or city

10.10.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

10.10.2 Please indicate your sources:

COMMENTS:

—

—

—

XI. Role of the Group in the Legitimate Economy

11.0 The group **has penetrated into the legitimate economy** in the country.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
strongly strongly
disagree agree

11.0.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

11.0.2 Please indicate your sources:

11.1 The group **has penetrated into the legitimate economy** of foreign countries.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
strongly strongly
disagree agree

11.1.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

11.1.2 Please indicate your sources:

11.2 There are **economic partnerships** between criminal and legitimate actors in the country.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
strongly strongly
disagree agree

11.2.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

11.2.2 Please indicate your sources:

11.3 There are **economic partnerships** between criminal and legitimate actors in foreign countries.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A N/A
 strongly disagree strongly agree

11.3.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

11.3.2 Please indicate your sources:

11.4 What percentage of its total assets has the group invested in the **legal national economy**?

_____ % A N/A

11.4.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

11.4.2 Please indicate your sources:

11.5 What percentage of its total assets has the group invested in the **legal economy abroad**?

_____ % A N/A

11.5.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
------------------	---------------------	-------------------

11.5.2 Please indicate your sources:

11.6 What **percentage** of the group's income, that is not used for paying operating expenses and salaries, is **laundered**?

_____ % A N/A

11.6.1 Please indicate below your level of confidence in the response/estimate above.

1 Low Confidence	2 Medium Confidence	3 High Confidence
---------------------	------------------------	----------------------

11.6.2 Please indicate your sources:

COMMENTS:

XII. Analytical Narrative

Using information provided above and any other reliable information you deem relevant, please prepare a **five page** analytical narrative for each organized crime group. The narrative should contain information consistent with the following five headings:

I. Organizational structure:

- I.1. Internal hierarchy and/or division of labour (role differentiation, rank order, tasks diversification);
- I.2. Ability of the group to recruit or diversify its human resources;
- I.3. Rules and conditions of group membership and internal codes of conduct;
- I.4. Primary mechanisms for internal conflict resolution with regard to territorial and market division and other disputes;

II. Violence:

- II.1. Willingness to engage in ruthless violence;
- II.2. Availability of enforcers/specialists in the use of violence;
- II.3. Access to a variety of weapons.

III. Economic resources:

- III.1. Original source of capital accumulation (illegal and/or legal);
- III.2. Subsequent diversification of activities (illegal and legal);
- III.3. Degree of dominance in selected illegal markets;
- III.4. Degree of professional know-how within the group itself;
- III.5 Degree to which some members of the group work primarily in the legitimate economy.

IV. Political resources:

- IV.1. Corruption and/or infiltration of the law enforcement process (police and judiciary);
- IV.2. Manipulation of political parties participating in local and/or national government;
- IV.3. Direct representation in parliament, executive or diplomatic service;
- IV.4. Alliance with armed opposition groups (terrorists, guerrilla, death squads).

V. Response of Law Enforcement Agencies to Organized Crime

- V.1. Re-structuring of law enforcement agencies and operations (including more international cooperation) because of organized crime;
- V.2. Changed law enforcement techniques (more use of undercover personnel, electronic surveillance);
- V.3. Changes in law (e.g., forfeiture) because of organized crime.

VI. The external environment

- V.1. Present level of cultural acceptance of the group/organization=s activities in the social environment in which they operate;
- V.2. Presence of social movements engaged in awareness raising campaigns on organized crime;
- V.3. Role of the press and other mass media in sensitizing citizens on the dangers and threats posed by organized crime on the society at large;

Annex: Improving the Survey Instrument

1. Please provide comments, suggestions, and criticisms of the Survey.

2. We will appreciate receiving any relevant document, publication, report or article which could contribute to the comprehension of the organized crime phenomenon in the country:

Centre for International Crime Prevention
Global Studies on Transnational Organized Crime
United Nations Office at Vienna
Vienna International Centre
P.O.Box 500, Room E1208
A-1400 Vienna, Austria

APPENDIX B


OVERVIEW OF THE 40 CRIMINAL GROUPS SURVEYED

The following are short summaries of each of the 40 organized crime groups surveyed. These are intended to provide a short overview of the nature and background of the groups that constituted the primary material for the study. The summaries are, for the most part, based on information provided by each of the national correspondents. In a number of cases, however, and particularly if there have been notable recent developments, such information has been supplemented to provide a more comprehensive picture of the group. While an attempt has been made to present the information on each group in a consistent way, this has not always been possible given that data in respect of some groups is considered unreliable or is simply unknown. The symbol in the top right hand corner of each group's summary denotes the typology (see Section 4 of the report) to which the group most closely fits.

It should be noted that the summaries are based on information collected in 1999/2000 and that in many cases new events may have changed the nature and operations of the criminal groups in question. Financial figures used in the overviews, referring generally to the estimated profits or turnover of any group, should be read as for the year 1999. In cases where groups were still active in 1999/2000, the summaries have been written in the present tense. It is recognized in these cases that some of the most recent information on the groups may now be outdated. In contrast, approximately half of the groups surveyed no longer existed at the time when information was provided as to their activities. This has been explicitly noted in those summaries where this applies, these being written in any event in the past tense. By presenting the information in this way, the summaries are meant to provide 'a snapshot' of each group at the time in which information was being collected for the project in 1999/2000. Read together, the summaries provide a unique insight into the nature and activities of organized criminal groups from around the world.

Group 1: Italian group - Germany

This hierarchically structured Italian network operates in Germany in the Ruhr-region, Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz and Saarland. It is involved primarily in large-scale tax evasion primarily through illegal employment in the construction industry. Cooperation with other organized criminal groups, penetration into the legitimate economy, corruption and occasional use of violence are characteristic features of the group. The group has no strong social or ethnic identity and has little political influence.



Apart from the core activities outlined above, Group 1 is also engaged in large-scale fraud, money laundering, illegal immigration, smuggling and loan sharking. All of the group's income, excluding operational expenses and salaries, is laundered. The average annual income from illegal activities is estimated at US\$ 43 million.

Group 1 consists of a network of individual cells with highly sophisticated management and business structures. The cells themselves are organized in a series of hierarchies. Criminal offences are all committed by lower ranks within the organization. The group's activities are controlled by Italian organized crime groups (Cosa Nostra). The overall network consists of around 55 members from the following countries: Italy, Germany, Turkey, Yugoslavia, France, Switzerland and Albania. The vast majority of the perpetrators are male. The cells usually operate through the establishment of construction firms where the majority of workers are illegally employed. This avoids providing tax and social security contributions. Consequently, the groups companies offer more competitive prices than other companies that obey the law. Most of the employees are non-EU citizens who have been smuggled into the EU with forged documentation.


Members of the cells making up Group 1 usually operate within a specifically defined region. There are also connections with individuals suspected of links to organized crime in the former Yugoslavia. Connections with Polish organized crime groups within the country have also been detected. Apart from its activities in Germany, the group also operates in Italy, Belgium and France.

In general the group makes use of externally focussed violence only occasionally. However, the level of violence within the cells and between the group's members is regarded as being relatively high. There is evidence that group members have engaged in corruption. The ability throughout the network to influence others with money is high; there have been, for example, reports of gifts given to tax officials in form of expensive technical equipment during tax audits.

The key challenge faced by law enforcement officials is that the main actors are not involved in the actual commitment of the criminal offences. Nevertheless, there have been 17 convictions of group members in the past number of years.

Group 2: Group with no name - Germany

This loosely organized criminal network operates in the region of Bremen and Bremerhaven in Germany. It is involved primarily in the smuggling of cocaine from Venezuela to Germany. Involvement in a wide range of activities, a relatively high membership and occasional use of violence are key features of this group. In contrast, there is low levels of cooperation with other organized criminal groups, few trans-border activities, no strong social and ethnic identity, low penetration into the legitimate economy and little use of corruption.



Apart from its cocaine smuggling activities, Group 2 is also involved in the smuggling of cannabis. Other criminal activities include those related to organized prostitution, large-scale fraud, insurance scams, theft, and smuggling of weapons.

Group 2 is a network with around 100 members. Membership is not fixed, although all of those involved are German nationals. Two thirds of the members are male, with this being the case for all those in leadership positions. Females are either spouses or couriers. The network is very loosely organized without a strict hierarchical structure. The low-level members are not generally protected by individuals at higher levels in the network. The main perpetrators try to control and manipulate inferior group members by providing 'legal assistance'. However, this is generally only to ensure the safety of those at more senior levels. By its nature the network rewards success, with the most active traffickers assuming leadership positions. Members of the network adopt behavior (for example, talking in codes on the phone) in order to evade law enforcement investigative measures.

The network originated when a few young Germans immigrated to Venezuela and began to sell cocaine to their erstwhile partners in Germany who were involved in organized prostitution. The most difficult part of the process has proved to be the smuggling of drugs from Isla Margarita, Venezuela, to Germany. For this purpose couriers are recruited in Germany, who then pretend to be tourists, spending one or two weeks in Isla Margarita. On departing, they smuggle 2-4 kilograms of cocaine in vests especially tailored for this purpose. The recruitment of couriers is based on personal recommendation. The couriers have to share their profits with the recruiters, and are not generally informed about the level of payment they can expect. When required, couriers also smuggle money from Germany to Venezuela.


Violence is only used occasionally, mostly to settle disputes within the group. Nevertheless, the leading figures in the network have a violent reputation, and the threat of violence is used as a source of control. Many group members have guns in case of possible conflicts with other organizations. These conflicts are mainly connected to prostitution related activities.

The group's activities have remained focussed on Venezuela and Germany. Attempts to shift activities to Cuba and Brazil failed, in the case of the former because of law enforcement activities, and in the latter, because of the lack of enduring partnerships.

There is no reliable evidence of attempts to influence others with money and no connections to the political arena. There is little or no crossover with legitimate economic activities. Prosecution of the group has not been successful until recently.

Group 3: Group with no name – Germany

Group 3 operates in the Saxony region in Germany. It is involved primarily in heroin trafficking from Turkey to Germany. The group has a strong ethnic identity, is involved in only a limited number of activities and only occasionally uses violence.



Apart from its core activity of heroin trafficking, the group's other illegal activities include money laundering, illegal immigration, illegal activities surrounding prostitution and gambling.

The group consists of about 15 members, with a core group of five. The core group is headed by a leader, who takes the main responsibility for the group's activities. The group is made up exclusively of Kurds, most of who have family ties or a close friendship with the leader. The leader is ready to use violence, or the threat thereof, towards group members as well as other parties with whom they deal.


The operations of Group 3 are relatively sophisticated, the leader having established a German-Turkish cultural association in order to provide cover for the groups' illicit activities. In addition, an attempt had been made to open Turkish restaurants and use these as an additional camouflage for criminal activities.

The leader purchases heroin in a Turkish village and smuggles the drugs to Germany in his own car through the Balkan region. In order to reduce suspicion he takes his family members with him. The heroin is stored and then distributed in Germany. In addition, drugs are also purchased in Germany itself and then resold. The nephews of the head of the group, as well as a third assistant, are responsible for the preparation of drugs into customer-ready portions. Mainly young Kurdish asylum seekers are used as couriers. Thus, in case of an arrest, these couriers are only liable under the criminal law as applied to young offenders. Young asylum seekers, heavily reliant on the leader for their own welfare, also display high levels of loyalty.

The group's average annual income from illegal activities has been estimated at about US\$ 2 million. There is no evidence that the group has engaged in any form of corruption or has any political influence. So far, three key group members have been convicted for smuggling and trafficking of heroin.

Group 4: Group with no name - Germany

Group 4 operates in the Rhein-Ruhr region in Germany, being primarily involved in large-scale investment scams initiated under the cover of a legitimate brokerage house. In addition, the group is engaged in forgery, embezzlement, bank fraud and money laundering. Given the groups aim, activities and organization, it closely resembles the structure of a legitimate business.




For the conduct of its main illicit activity the group uses the premises of a London based brokerage house. This in turn is organized in an agency structure, with agencies being established in a number of countries. The agencies act as brokers and solicit customers on behalf of the brokerage house. Saleswomen make the first contact to customers via telephone. Another person then approaches the customer in order to convince them to invest. When an investment has been made, an 'adviser' ensures that the customer sticks with the business. A 'loader' then takes over in order to prepare the customer for larger scale investments.

All of the individuals involved in the criminal enterprise have an interest in the growing size of the investment as they earn a percentage of the gains. Once the deal is settled, the customer is requested to transfer the funds to the brokerage. To provide cover for the group's activities, some of the money is used for legitimate business, but the vast majority (estimated at 80 %) is not. To trace investments is difficult due to both the complex bookkeeping used by the group and its close cooperation with brokers. The group's average annual income from illicit activities has been estimated at around US\$ 15 million. The members also operate in Switzerland and the United States.

Group 4 has approximately 30 members from the following countries: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States, Canada, Spain and Austria. The group has a highly sophisticated business structure, with a clear-cut hierarchy. The principal offender previously had a relatively low-level criminal career in organized prostitution and burglary. The membership is exclusively male. Nevertheless some of the associate lawyers and lower level operators are women. It should be noted that at lower levels, many of those 'employed' are not aware of the criminal nature of the group's activities. Partly as a reflection of its cover as a legitimate business, there is no record of violence being perpetrated by members of this group.

Group 5: Verhagen Group - Netherlands

The Verhagen Group was involved mainly in trafficking hashish into the 'Randstadt' (The Hague, Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Utrecht). Key characteristics of this loosely organized group were the extensive use of trans-border smuggling operations and the occasional use of violence and corruption. Apart from drug smuggling, however, the group engaged in a diversity of other illegal activities.



The group imported hashish by sea from Morocco, Lebanon and Pakistan and then distributed it to the Dutch, Danish, British, Belgian and Swiss markets. Other activities of this criminal network included large-scale fraud/embezzlement, theft of large quantities of electronic goods, fraud involving precious materials, trafficking in expensive jewelry as well as fraudulent real estate transactions. Nevertheless, drug trafficking has been the group's primary activity with its estimated annual income from illicit activities estimated at more than US\$ 10 million. The amount of smuggled and distributed hashish is estimated at 30,000 kilograms a year.

The core group consisted of five members, surrounded by approximately 45 associates. Within the core group, two individuals took a leading role: the prime suspect and a second person. The latter was not in fact subordinate to the prime suspect; however, he was ascribed less authority in certain criminal circles than the prime suspect, who was seen as key to the functioning of the group. Associate members comprised couriers, persons taking care of storage and distribution and captains and crewmembers of the ships that transported drugs.

The core members of the group were exclusively Dutch, other members being German, British Asian, African and American. All members were male. The leading persons in the group interacted on the basis of friendship. Hence the group, despite the dominance of the leader, resembled a network rather than a hierarchical organization. The group operated independently, but relied heavily for some aspects of its operations on wider criminal connections. New members were recruited among unemployed persons, students and catering personnel. In specific cases however, particular skills were also contracted in where required; the group, for example, tried to engage a ship captain through a newspaper advertisement. Some close family members of the prime suspect were involved in the illegal activities.


The group had no strict code of conduct. However, a clear ban existed on incriminating other members. Internally the group did not use any violence at all. Even if members did not comply with the standards or the ban on incrimination they were not physically punished but simply put out of work. The members possessed a small number of firearms.

The prime suspect had traded cars in Europe and the United States before he initiated the Verhagen Group. This provided him with intensive contacts to small-scale business activities in other countries. Despite this, the group had no strong overlap with legitimate economic activities. Most of the suspects were employed in the car dealing industry or receiving unemployment benefits.

The group was able to collect important information on the activities of law enforcement agencies, suggesting that some use was made of corruption practices. The operations of the group have been discontinued and several members arrested.

Group 6: Group with no name - Netherlands

This loosely organized group consisted mainly of members from Iran who engaged in smuggling illegal immigrants from that country via Europe to Canada. The group forged official documents both to facilitate their trafficking activities and to sell them to other users. The group had a strong ethnic identity, and cooperated with a series of other criminal groups and networks. The available evidence suggests that only occasional use was made of corruption.



Group 6 smuggled on average 240 to 300 persons per year and transported in total approximately 1,300 persons to Europe and then to Canada, the Netherlands being used a transit point for trafficking to North America. The charge for travel from Iran to Canada was US\$ 10,000 per person and for travel to Europe about US\$ 5,000 per person. The profits of trading in forged documents were approximately US\$ 270 per passport. The total turnover over a period of five years has been estimated at US\$ 2,4 to 2,8 million.

The group was founded by a man from Iran (A) living in the Netherlands who began forging official documents and smuggling illegal immigrants by airplane from Iran via Europe to Canada in 1987. He initially worked on his own. Having achieved some success, he was joined by a former client (B) in 1994, who consequently took over the tasks of establishing contacts with potential clients, maintaining links to Iran and managing the financial aspects of the smuggling activities.


A and B subsequently recruited a number of other individuals, largely friends and family members from Iran, into the group. In turn, those recruited supplied a great number of potential customers and a wide net of contacts. As their activities expanded, further contacts were established with persons in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Canada, who also began smuggling illegal immigrants themselves. Thus, a former client cooperated with A in smuggling immigrants from Europe to Japan. Several persons occasionally provided support; for example, there is evidence that Dutch drug addicts were engaged to steal travel documents. The group made contact with airport staff and employees at embassies, the latter in order to obtain visas.

As every participant profited from these activities and depended on the others in the network there were few internal conflicts; those that did occur being solved without resorting to violence. In any event, the activities of those involved were simply regarded as a profitable way of helping compatriots achieve a better life rather than as serious crimes. A's personal profit is estimated at US\$ 800,000. There is no evidence that the money was invested in the legal economy.

As the result of a disagreement, A and B parted ways, each continuing activities with new groups of associates. Since B's forgeries and travel routes were less professional than those carried out by A, the police detected this network. As a result, 25 persons were arrested, the most important members being convicted. Police investigations in this case ensured that some measures (for example, technical changes in the new Dutch passport) were proposed to prevent smuggling persons and forging official documents.

Group 7: Group with no name - Netherlands

This close knit group, comprising members from the former Yugoslavia, was mainly involved in trafficking in women for sexual exploitation. The group made use of extensive violence, cooperated frequently with other organized criminal groups in the Netherlands and engaged in a relatively high level of cross border activity.



Group 7 recruited women and girls between the ages of 15 and 18 in the Ukraine, Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia by promising them employment in the Netherlands. In some cases, women even were reported to have been kidnapped and kept imprisoned. In addition, those who did not cooperate were threatened with bodily harm or death. The women were transported to Slovenia, where they were provided with false documentation, before being moved on to the Netherlands. On arrival they were sexually exploited for periods up to 10 to 15 hours a day. The women worked under strict surveillance, the money they earned being handed over to core group members. In addition, the group sold women to other prostitution rings and undertook criminal activities such as burglary, bank robbery and dealing in stolen goods. The total profits of the group's leaders are estimated at US\$ 75,500.


The three core members of the group, who resided illegally in the Netherlands, were from the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia). One of them was responsible for selling women to pimps and brothel-keepers, providing protection for the women while working and overseeing surveillance of their activities. The second was responsible for the women's transport to the Netherlands. They each earned at least US\$ 6,100 per month. The third member, a bodyguard, assisted the others. He was not paid but had free lodging and his expenses were settled. Other associate members recruited women, controlled them or arranged 'marriages' with Dutch citizens. Most of the associate members came as illegal refugees from the former Yugoslavia (predominantly Bosnia), many knowing each other before moving to the Netherlands. A significant number had been involved in criminal activities such as burglary, trafficking in drugs and car smuggling. Within this close-knit group members were expected to support each other. If this rule failed the group turned to violence (or the threat thereof) towards its own members.

The three core members were known to be very violent and owned several firearms. The women were treated violently, several being beaten up or raped. In one incident, a woman who gave information about the group to the police was killed by a hired assassin. Threats and acts of violence were also aimed at competitors. Nevertheless, in one specific case the group cooperated with another group from the former Yugoslavia who was engaged in similar activities in a nearby town.

Although there are no indications of large-scale involvement in the legal economy in the Netherlands, the core members owned bars, discotheques and restaurants in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia. One ran an architectural firm. These businesses, however, were for the most part not used as a cover for criminal activities. There is evidence that some police officers and custom officers in the former Yugoslavia and the Ukraine were paid by the group to facilitate the transfer of women to the Netherlands. The activities of the group have been stopped through interventions by the authorities.

Group 8: Group with no name - Netherlands

Group 8's criminal organization operations concentrated on a single town in the Netherlands. The group was involved in trafficking in women from Eastern Europe to the Netherlands for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The group cooperated extensively with other organized criminal groups and made frequent use of violence. The group engaged in some corruption (although this is not regarded as extensive) to facilitate the movement of trafficked persons. Group 8 had no clear social or ethnic identity.



Women trafficked by the group were recruited in Eastern Europe and transported to the Netherlands where they were sexually exploited. In addition, the group also engaged in drug trafficking and manufacture, forgery, money laundering, extortion (generally of the clients of their own prostitutes) and arms trafficking.

The organization consisted of about 80 persons, 3 of whom constituted the leadership group. This group comprised one Dutchman and two illegal immigrants from the former Yugoslavia. The Dutchman owned several buildings where the women he was responsible for were forced to provide sexual services to clients. In addition, he let rooms to the other two core members. Each of the three exploited their 'own' women but also worked together as a group. The core members had contacts to criminal networks and individuals in several other countries, most notably the Czech Republic. Associate members were predominantly from the former Yugoslavia, the Netherlands and the Ukraine. They were responsible for recruiting, transporting, housing or controlling the women, as well as for acquiring false travel and identity documents, collecting money from the women and transferring money to Eastern Europe. The vast majority of associate members were male, although some women were employed as recruiters. The group made use of a series of external service providers, including a lawyer, a tax consultant, bookkeepers and a real estate agent.

The group (which possessed a number of firearms) made extensive use of violence, this being directed mainly against the women forced to work as prostitutes. In addition, violence was also used against external competitors. When another group (Group 7 in this survey) sought to dominate the local sex industry, a conflict arose and Group 8 was driven away. Group 8, however took revenge and encouraged one of the female victims of Group 7 to provide information to the police.


The crossover between the group's illegitimate activities and the legitimate economy were not extensive, although the main suspect owned several properties in the town's red light district.

The group's members were quite successful in influencing others with money. However, or least within the Netherlands, there is little evidence of extensive corrupt practices.

Group 8 has been dismantled and several of its members arrested.

Group 9: Group with no name - Netherlands

This loosely organized criminal group was involved in hashish trafficking in the “Randstadt” region, namely The Hague, Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Utrecht. Although the group largely confined its activities to the hashish trade, it was also engaged in trans-border activities in at least three countries. In this process, the group cooperated extensively with other organized crime groups in both the Netherlands and abroad. In the Netherlands it engaged in numerous business activities in the legitimate economy, making extensive use of corruption and occasional use of violence. Members were mostly drawn from the same social background.



Group 9 procured drugs in Pakistan and to a lesser extent in Morocco. The hashish was transported by sea, concealed in containers and specially prepared pontoons, barrels or sewage-pipes. Sometimes containers were temporarily sunk at sea, to be retrieved later. The hashish was then divided into small portions and stashed in rented houses before being sold. The drugs were mainly distributed to the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Canada. The total amount of hashish smuggled over an 8-year period was estimated at 255,000 kilograms.

Group 9 consisted of about 50 persons, the majority being Dutch citizens. The core group comprised four individuals, each of whom had a particular (although at times overlapping) area of responsibility. One was responsible for organizing the drug deals. The second was engaged in intimidation, shielding activities from law enforcement and debt collection. The third was responsible for the transportation of goods. The fourth dealt with storage and distribution. Other associate members purchased the goods, collected money from buyers and organized financial matters. New members were recruited from a sports club to perform minor jobs, including intimidating individuals working for the group. The group also made use of an external financial advisor. Security within the group was maintained through the establishment of a series of cell structures, each unaware of the activities of others.


The conditions of membership appear to have been based primarily on friendship and previous acquaintance. The group did not engage in ruthless violence. Nevertheless, the threat of violence was used both internally amongst members as well as externally to protect the group's 'business' interests.

There are indications that the group engaged in corruption. In one case, a customs officer was bribed to allow suitcases, each containing large amounts of cash, to pass into the Netherlands unhindered.

Most of the group's members, including the four lead individuals as well as the financial advisor, have been arrested and convicted.

Group 10: Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs – Australia

Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMCGs) or ‘The 1%ers’ form a hierarchically structured series of criminal groups that operate mainly on the East Coast of Australia. These groups are involved primarily in drug production and distribution (mainly of amphetamines and cannabis) as well as in prostitution and trafficking of stolen vehicles. Extensive use of violence and a high level of penetration into the legitimate economy are key features of the groups. The OMCGs cooperate with other organized criminal groups abroad. While occasional use is made of corruption, there is no indication that OMCGs have any influence on the political process. Members are drawn from the same social background.



The scope of activities that OMCGs engage in has been adapted to both changes in risks and profits. These cover a wide range of crime types, including: trafficking in counterfeit goods, serious fraud, insurance scams, money laundering, armed robbery, illegal immigration, organized prostitution, extortion, manufacturing of firearms/ammunition, trafficking in explosives, trafficking in endangered species, murder, assault, arson, tax evasion, social security and licensing fraud and illegal fishing.

In Australia the phenomenon of OMCG consist of a cluster of about 30 different gangs with a total number of 3000-5000 full members and around 7000 associate members. The members are largely Australian nationals, although drawn from a variety of ethnic origins. Asians are excluded from membership. Only males are granted membership status. Women are however associated with the gang, serving among others as prostitutes, drug couriers and intelligence gatherers. While OMCG have no overriding ethnic identity, they are predominantly drawn from white, male and working class communities.


OMCGs have rigid and clearly defined hierarchical structures. The basic element of the structure is the Chapter, headed by an Executive, which operates in a specific area. The Executive comprises an elected president, a vice-president, a sergeant-at-arms, a secretary/treasurer and a road captain. The president has absolute control over the Chapter. The Chapter itself is made up of members. In addition, there are several categories of hierarchically ordered groups termed ‘prospects’, ‘associates’ and ‘hangers-on’. Most of the gangs are governed by a set of rules known as ‘the constitution’ or ‘by-laws’. In some cases the gangs have written codes of ethics.

Individual gangs traditionally use violence toward other clubs and individuals as well as within the gangs themselves. Competition between clubs has in the past led to territorial wars. There have been 10 publicized murders of OMCG members by rival gangs between 1997 and 2001. The threat of violence is widespread, and is essential to ensure group cohesion. The sergeant-at-arms is responsible for internal discipline and punishment.

The gangs have strongly penetrated the legitimate economy in Australia, owning and operating restaurants, hotels and security companies. In addition gangs are active in the construction and adult entertainment industries and have made some investments in both property and the stock market. Similar gangs are also present in the United States, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and New Zealand. Some cooperation between OMCGs in different countries occurs.

Group 11: The McLean Syndicate – Australia

The Lawrence McLean Syndicate is a criminal organization operating in Australia as well as in various other countries. The group is involved primarily in drug trafficking (mainly cannabis, but also cocaine), money laundering and illegal immigration. Key features of this group are a high degree of trans-border activities and cooperation with other criminal groups in Australia as well as abroad. The group makes use of occasional violence and corruption and invests a portion of its profits in the legitimate economy. Members are mostly drawn from the same social background.



Apart from drug trafficking, the group's activities have been diversified to include money laundering, armed robbery, theft of antiques, illegal immigration/smuggling, trafficking in women, prostitution, extortion, gambling, debt collection, murder and tax evasion. The average annual income of the group is estimated at US\$ 15 million.

The group was initiated in the early 1970s by organizing importation of cannabis into Australia from Singapore.

The McLean Syndicate consists of about 35 members drawn from Australia, the Philippines, Croatia, Sweden, Germany, China and the United Kingdom. The group does not have a strict hierarchical structure. Apart from the key players, the membership is relatively fluid and has adapted to new challenges and requirements. The group is controlled by the syndicate head who is responsible for the coordination and control of the various individual cells of the group. These cells each have defined roles, such as supply, transportation, distribution and money laundering.

The group makes use of only sporadic violence. Nevertheless, members have been linked to a number of murders, all related to failed drug deals. The group also has a designated enforcer, charged with collecting debts and settling internal disputes. The violent reputation of the McLean Syndicate provides protection from conflicts with other criminal groups.


The overall impact of the criminal group's activities on the legitimate economy is difficult to assess. However the syndicate invests the proceeds of crime into legitimate business.

There is evidence that corrupt officials have provided information allowing the group to keep one step ahead of law enforcement interventions.

Apart from Australia, the group operates in the Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand, Germany, United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Singapore. The McLean Syndicate has an extensive network of contacts with organized criminal groups abroad, facilitating the purchase and transportation of illicit narcotics.

Group 12: Japanese Yakuza – Australia

This hierarchically structured Japanese criminal group operates in Australia, being engaged predominantly in the investment of the proceeds of crime from elsewhere as well as money laundering. Key features of this group are a strong ethnic identity, a high degree of penetration into the legitimate economy, political influence abroad, cooperation with other organized criminal groups outside of Australia and occasional use of violence.



In Japan, as well as in a number of other states, Yakuza exert strong control over illegal activities such as: drug and arms trafficking; financial crimes such as gambling, extortion, money-laundering and loan-sharking; prostitution; and, labour racketeering. Having been a dominant force in Japan for decades, a growing anti-gang movement and increased law enforcement activity in the early 1990s has forced the group to expand its presence and activities abroad. In Australia reports of illegal activity by Yakuza members remain anecdotal. Nevertheless, there is significant evidence that the groups invest the proceeds of crime and launder money in Australia. There are allegations, for example, that Yakuza members have legitimately invested in nightclubs and restaurants, entertainment complexes and golf course developments in Australia. There is also some evidence of small-time Yakuza recruitment of Australian women to work as prostitutes in Japanese nightclubs.


The Yakuza has a hierarchical and well-established structure. All authority and wealth is concentrated on the 'oyabun' or the head of the group. This leader controls issues of personnel and territory together with other high-ranking members. Day-to-day matters are left to the discretion of sub-bosses who operate with relative autonomy. Criminal activities are committed by individuals at the lower tiers of the organizational structure, with the financial proceeds of those activities being filtered upwards. Such 'tribute payments' as well as loyalty and service to the senior leadership of the group are given in exchange for protection and the right to use the Yakuza name, the latter ensuring some respect (as well as fear) in the conduct of operations.

Most Yakuza members are Japanese, Korean and Chinese nationals with the large majority being male. New members are mainly recruited among young Japanese men, many from disadvantaged backgrounds. Recruits typically spend a number of months 'in training' as part of their induction into the group. On admittance, members are bound by unwritten laws, including to never reveal the secrets of the organization, cooperate with the police, disobey superiors or withhold money from the gang. When initiated into the group loyalty is emphasized and members become bound in a life-long contract with the group. Traditional rituals are still practiced in some syndicates, including the tattooing of members or the severing of fingers to indicate loyalty or to atone for failure.

Yakuza members are known for their willingness to use violence. However, particularly in Australia, and presumably because of the limited nature of their criminal activities here, there is little evidence of the use of systemic violence.

Group 13: The Orange Case – Caribbean

Group 13 is a loosely organized criminal group that smuggled cannabis and cocaine from the Netherlands Antilles to the Netherlands. In doing so, the group engaged in extensive trans-border activities and cooperated with other organized criminal groups. Drug smuggling activities were facilitated through extensive corruption. The group's members were drawn from a similar social background, and little use was made of violence.



The group bought drugs (cannabis and cocaine) from three Colombian individuals and transported the drugs by a Dutch navy ship to the Netherlands where the drugs were distributed and sold. The accumulated profits were then laundered.

The group comprised 12 persons, eight Dutchmen and four from the Netherlands Antilles. All of the group's members were male and were employed by the navy on a ship travelling between the Netherlands Antilles and the Netherlands. A junior officer acted as the leader of the group. The degree of professional know-how of the members was high, with the group's activities being carefully planned.


There is no indication of any use of violence by the group's members. Though individual members possessed weapons, those were not used in the course of the group's trafficking activities. Instead the group made extensive use of bribery to facilitate their activities. This applied less to law enforcement officials than other members of the navy. When the case was made public, the revelations were greeted with disbelief, largely because the navy had a relatively high status and reputation.

The operations of the group appear to have been relatively extensive, some activities also reputedly taking place in the United Kingdom and Venezuela.

All 12 persons active in the network have been arrested, prosecuted and convicted for illegal drug trafficking.

Group 14: Dream House Case – Caribbean

The Dream House Case refers to a criminal organization that operated in Curaçao (Netherlands Antilles) and Rotterdam. The group was involved primarily in cocaine smuggling from Curaçao to the Netherlands. Extensive use was made of violence and corruption and strong links were forged with other organized criminal groups. The profits of illegal activities were invested in the legitimate economy.



The smuggling activities of the group were relatively sophisticated with couriers transporting drugs on planes or ships. For a period of at least one year the group had a courier on the majority of flights from Curaçao to the Netherlands.

This group consisted of approximately 80 persons from Surinam, the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles. The majority of members were male, although extensive use was made of female couriers. The group engaged the services of a lawyer and included among its members four police officers. Most of the individuals involved held ordinary jobs in the legitimate economy.

While the group possessed a sophisticated organizational structure with a defined leader and division of tasks, there existed no special membership conditions or codes of conduct. Over time, a number of new members, who were mainly used as couriers, were recruited into the group.

The group made extensive use of violence to maintain internal order with specific individuals being designated for 'enforcement' tasks.


The group invested in a variety of businesses in different countries. The leader, for example, invested money in a department store in the Netherlands Antilles, but was also involved in legal commercial activities in Surinam and Hong Kong. The annual income of the group from its illicit activities only is estimated at US\$ 120 million. It is estimated that 90% of the profits from drug smuggling were invested in legitimate businesses.

The network established close links to Colombian organized criminal groups, both in Colombia and elsewhere.

The majority of the members involved have been arrested and convicted.

Group 15: The Meij Case – Caribbean

The Meij Case describes a group of cooperating individuals who were involved in political corruption in Curaçao in the Netherlands Antilles. The activities of the group resulted in extensive penetration into the legal economy, wide spread use of corruption and consequently significant political influence in the Netherlands Antilles. The group is reported to have made use of occasional violence. On the basis of current evidence it is not possible to assess the size of the group.



The main-suspect was a representative of a political party and thus tried to influence the political process in order to further his own interests. This individual was surrounded by a loose network of people who provided money and services in exchange for political influence. In addition, in a number of instances, forgery, fraud and embezzlement were committed by the group. The key individual in particular had extensive contacts with a variety of people in a range of positions. The annual income from illegal activities in this case is estimated at US\$ 125,000.

Three members of the group were from the Netherlands Antilles, one from Aruba and one from the United States. With the exception of one member's wife and one member's girlfriend, the group was exclusively male. Given the loose nature of the organization, special membership conditions or internal rules of conduct did not exist.


The group's members engaged in violence by intimidating individuals and destroying property.

An important feature of this case is that the group's activity continually crossed the boundary between the licit and illicit. In his role as a politician the main suspect legitimately earned a salary of about US\$ 60,000 a year. In addition, almost all the other members were working in the legitimate economy. A lawyer and a journalist were also involved in the activities, the latter receiving payment to publicly promote the activities of key group members.

Five individuals involved in the network have been arrested and convicted.

Group 16: The Fuk Ching – United States

The Fuk Ching has a sophisticated hierarchical structure and is primarily involved in smuggling illegal migrants, human trafficking and kidnapping. The group is based on strong ethnic ties and, apart from the core areas mentioned above, engages in a wide range of activities. Violence (or the threat thereof) is an essential component of the group's operations, both to ensure internal discipline but also in relation to activities such as extortion. The group is reputed to have some political influence in China, has made relatively significant investments in the economy of the United States and cooperates with a number of other criminal groups.



In the United States the group is predominantly involved in extortion. Victims are largely business owners in New York's Chinatown. The group also smuggles Chinese migrants from Fujian Province to the United States and engages in drug trafficking and kidnapping for ransom. In addition, the Fuk Ching is involved in armed robberies, money laundering, organized prostitution and environmental crimes.

The Fuk Ching in New York comprises 35 members, all of whom are male. Another 20 members are currently in prison. Most of the members are of Chinese origin. In the mid-1980s young men from Fujian province in China, many of whom had criminal records, founded Fuk Ching in New York. New members are still recruited among Fujianese teenagers. Similar to other Chinese criminal groups, street gangs such as the Fuk Ching are affiliated to an organization or tong (in this case the Fukien American Association), which provides a venue to operate from, criminal opportunities (for example by protecting gambling operations) and, where necessary, money and guns. Behavior within the group is governed by strict rules, such as respect for seniors, not using drugs, following orders without question and not betraying the gang. Violators of these rules are punished, sometimes severely, by physical assault or even death.


Violence within the group and against other criminal groups is common, although the available evidence suggests that such incidents are often more likely to be random street level violence than targeted attacks. Disputes over territory and market access with other criminal groups are typically resolved using 'kong so', a process of peaceful negotiation. If this fails, resolution is sought through violence.

Although gang members are involved in legitimate business activities in New York's Chinatown they have no significant role in the broader economy. At a local level some gang members own or operate restaurants, retail stores or car services, while at more senior levels members own wholesale supply firms, factories and banks.

The gang is closely connected to criminal groups in China and Hong Kong. Although the Fuk Ching is regarded to have political connections in China's Fujian Province, there is little evidence that such activities are a significant feature of the gang's activities in the United States.

Group 17: La Cosa Nostra – United States

La Cosa Nostra is active in the New York metropolitan area engaging in a wide range of activities. The group also operates in several countries, cooperating with other organized criminal groups both in the United States and abroad. The level of corrupt practices used by the group is relatively high. While once extensive, the use of violence (or the threat thereof) is now the exception rather than the rule. Money from illegal activities is invested in the legitimate economy. There is evidence that the group has exerted political influence both in the United States and abroad. The group has a strong ethnic identity.



Over time, the criminal activities of La Cosa Nostra have become more specialized and diversified. In addition to gambling, loan sharking, extortion, trafficking in drugs (heroin, cocaine and synthetic drugs), prostitution and murder, they now span fraud, insurance scams, air cargo theft and environmental crimes. La Cosa Nostra is also involved in a set of crimes that are unique to the United States. These include racketeering in labour unions, the construction, music and garbage industries, where the group demonstrates its most effective penetration into the legitimate economy. La Cosa Nostra is also present in Canada, Italy, the Caribbean and Latin America.


La Cosa Nostra comprises a diversity of Italian-American organized crime 'families' and has been the most prominent criminal organization in the United States since the 1920s. In recent years it has been severely weakened by law enforcement and challenged by other emerging organized crime groups. Nevertheless La Cosa Nostra is still regarded as having greater capacities than its competitors. Each of the 'families' has roughly the same organizational structure. At the highest level is a boss who controls the family and makes executive decisions. There is an underboss and a senior advisor. And there are a number of 'capos' (caporegimes) who control 'made members' of La Cosa Nostra. The capos and those above them receive shares of the proceeds from crimes committed by the 'soldiers' and associates. The 'made members' are largely male and of Italian descent. The estimated 'made membership' of La Cosa Nostra is about 1,100 nationwide. In addition, there are approximately 10,000 associate members who work for the families. Associates can be of any nationality. Becoming a made member of La Cosa Nostra requires serving an apprenticeship, being proposed by a boss and then approved by all the other families. This is followed by a secret, ritualized induction ceremony. La Cosa Nostra is governed by a strong but unwritten internal code. The oath of 'omerta' demands silence to the outside world about the affairs of the group, a promise to never betray anyone in the family and to never reveal anything that might incriminate other members. The penalty for violating this oath is death. More recently, strengthened law enforcement and lower levels of social acceptance have made recruitment difficult.

Violence, mainly in the form of beatings and killings (and subsequently just the threat of violence), lies at the heart of La Cosa Nostra's activities and is the means by which the group has gained monopoly control over its various criminal enterprises.

In recent years, La Cosa Nostra have been significantly weakened through law enforcement interventions. Nevertheless, some level of limited political influence and related cases of corruption are reported to occur. These activities, however, are generally limited to furthering particular 'business' objectives.

Group 18: Clan Paviglianiti – Italy

The Clan Paviglianiti is organized on a hierarchical basis and operates mainly in Lombardia and Calabria, specifically in the cities of Cermenate and San Lorenzo. The group is involved primarily in the trafficking of drugs, especially cocaine. Clan Paviglianiti has a strong regional ethnic identity. The group makes use of violence (or the threat thereof) and is involved in significant levels of trans-border activity, cooperating closely with a variety of other criminal groups.



The group has achieved a dominant role in the drug market in the regions where it is active. Other illicit activities include forgery, large scale fraud and embezzlement, armed robbery, vehicle theft and trafficking, manufacturing of firearms and ammunition as well as illegal trafficking in explosives.

Clan Paviglianiti consists of about 200 to 300 members, the majority of whom are male. Although there are some female members, they play a limited role in the operations of the Clan. The group has a strong but complex hierarchical structure. This could best be described as resembling several interconnected layers but with a single summit. The Clan is headed by a 'chief' with a 'lieutenant' subordinate to him, although the latter is typically from a different clan. At the same level as the 'lieutenant' is a 'right hand man'. Below these two individuals is a network of drug traffickers, some of whom do not belong to the clan.


Group members are said to be skilled in recruiting new members and adapting their own functions to changing needs. Should the top structure of the group be arrested, it is likely to be immediately replaced by subordinate members. Potential members must meet a series of requirements. They are supposed to have the same ethnic origin and originate from a 'respectable family', being introduced by at least one member. An internal code of conduct includes the requirement to obey the orders of seniors and when necessary to commit murders. Clan Paviglianiti specializes in the use of violence and has easy access to various kinds of weapons. In reality, however, the internal use of violence is relatively rare.

Clan Paviglianiti's operations are dominated by a significant crossover between legitimate and illegitimate activities. The group has an estimated average annual income of about US\$ 150 million. About US\$ 100 million is gained through illegal activities. Illegal profits that mainly derive from proceeds in drug trafficking are reinvested in property and legitimate business activities such as pubs, restaurants, discos and bars. All the affiliates run entrepreneurial and commercial businesses alongside their illegal activities, and it is reported that some individuals have expanded business activities to developing countries.

Clan Paviglianiti obtains information and exerts influence through the corruption of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary at a local level. Some of the members are reputed to be former police officers. The group is also present in Spain, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Venezuela, Former-Yugoslavia and Austria. Money is laundered in Switzerland, Monaco, Spain, the Netherlands and France. The group also has links with Turkish and Colombian organized crime groups that are used to both buy various commodities and to share expertise.

Group 19: Syzranskaya Groopirovka - Russia

Group 19 operated in the Samara region of the Russian Federation, being primarily involved in trafficking in drugs (heroin, cannabis and opium). The group was hierarchically organized and made use of occasional violence and corruption.



Syzranskaya Groopirovka gained a monopoly over the drug market in the Samara region. Profits from the trade in illegal narcotics were laundered.

The core of the group consisted of 18 members, 15 of whom were nationals of Tajikistan, the remaining three being from Tatar, Bashkir and the Russia Federation respectively. Thus the group had a relatively strong ethnic identity and recruited from among a network of known and trusted associates. The organization itself was characterized by a clear hierarchical structure with emphasis being placed on high levels of internal discipline. The core members were in charge of managing the purchase, distribution and sale of narcotics as well as ensuring the necessary security precautions. The majority of the group's members were male.

Syzranskaya Groopirovka used moderate levels of violence. The available evidence however suggests that most of the violent conflicts occurred within the organization itself, specifically in cases where the internal code of conduct had been violated.


The group's average annual income was estimated at about US\$ 15 million. One third of this sum however being generated legally at the local food market in Syzran. Despite this commercial enterprise in the licit sector, there appears to have been little cross-over between licit and illicit activity and the criminal activities of the group are said to have had little impact on the region's legitimate economy.

The group had a sophisticated system of intelligence gathering, including both the identification of prospective markets and the monitoring of law enforcement activities. One interesting feature of the operations of the group, however, was its apparent coalescence with an armed political group in Afghanistan, the latter providing support and shelter for group members.

Syzranskaya Groopirovka also operated in other parts of the former Soviet Union, namely Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Drugs were mostly procured in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and sold in Russia and a number of Western European countries. To minimize the chance of detection by law enforcement agencies, both the routes and methods of smuggling were changed frequently.

Group 20: Group with no name – Russia

Group 20 operated in Cherkessk in Northern Caucasus. The group was involved primarily in trafficking in cannabis, opium and hashish. Key characteristics of the group were a relatively strong ethnic identity and a hierarchically structured organization. While violence was used periodically, there is little evidence that any use was made of corruption.



The group sought a monopolist role on the regional drug market and so absorbed smaller criminal groups engaged in the illegal drug trade. The group's average annual income from illicit activities was estimated at approximately US\$ 700,000.

The group consisted of 23 members originating predominantly from the Northern Caucasus, Russia, Georgia and Tajikistan. Ethnic and regional identity are said to be of importance in the recruitment of new members. Internal cohesion was maintained through clear lines of command and a code of conduct that included the total subordination to the group's leadership and the delivery of all proceeds of crime to them.

The unusual feature of this group was that half of the members were female. The group had a hierarchical structure, and although four key individuals occupied leadership positions, one was regarded to be in charge. The leaders were primarily engaged in organizing wholesale deliveries and then distributing the drugs among groups of salespersons. Two of the leaders were middle-ranking managers of legal enterprises. Next in the hierarchy were the leaders of smaller groups of suppliers and salespersons. These 'middle managers' being the only members of the group who knew the leaders and were in direct contact with them. A key factor maintaining the cohesion of the group was that the lower order members had a high degree of economic dependence on more senior members of the group.


The group made use of violence both to maintain internal discipline and to protect market share. The members possessed weapons such as automatic guns, pistols and ammunition. Intimidation and threats of violence were however more common than its actual use and the available evidence suggests that excessive levels of violence was never used by the group. This was partly due to the fact that the group did not want to attract the attention of law enforcement agencies. Group members were expected to conceal their involvement in the group by living a seemingly normal life.

While the leaders were employed in legitimate commercial enterprises, the level of crossover of legal and illegal activities does not appear to have been significant.

All the goods were procured in Tajikistan and marketed in Russia. There was no connection to other criminal groups in the country or abroad. Nevertheless, there are indications that the group provided some support to terrorist groups which targeted the Russian Federation.

*** Group 21: Ziberman Group – Russia

The Ziberman Group operated in the Kalyningradskaya region of the Russian Federation. The group's main illegal activities are the smuggling of cigarettes and alcohol, theft of vehicles and illegal gambling schemes. The Ziberman Group itself is composed of six criminal groups, all characterized by the use of high levels of violence and corruption. The group is said to have achieved a significant degree of political influence at a local level.



The Ziberman Group began its activities with the illegal smuggling of tobacco, later turning also to the smuggling of illegal alcohol and stolen motor vehicles in response to market demands. Nevertheless, the smuggling of tobacco has remained one of the key activities of the group, the whole tobacco business in the region now being monopolized. In this regard, special economic zones, established to provide tax incentives to legitimate businesses, have been exploited by the group for their smuggling activities. Other activities of the Ziberman Group include large-scale fraud and embezzlement, money laundering, armed robbery, extortion and murder.

The six criminal organizations that make up the group consist of approximately 90 members. The group has no strong ethnic or regional identity, with members having a wide array of nationalities, including Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, German and Lithuanian. The majority of members are male. The Ziberman Group is regarded as highly professional, making use of outside experts such as lawyers and accountants in the course of their criminal activities. The group has a hierarchical structure with clearly defined roles, comprising leaders as well as salespeople and security. Members regarded to have disobeyed orders have been threatened with physical punishment.

Unlike many other criminal groups, which usually use corrupt judicial or police officers, the Ziberman Group has succeeded in getting at least one of their members elected to the municipal council. In addition, connections with corrupt customs officers and tax administration have been an essential part of facilitating illegal activities.


The group's average annual income from illegal activities is estimated at about US\$ 180 million. The majority of the illegally acquired capital has been invested in legitimate businesses. These businesses are located predominantly outside of the Russian Federation and vary from shipping and jewelry production to fish refinery.

The operations of the group have been characterized by a high level of violence, particularly towards competing criminal organizations. Specialized units have been created within the group to engage in such activities. The group's members have committed a number of murders and violent robberies.

The group has been present in Poland, Germany and Israel. The illegal commodities marketed by the group all being procured in Russia, and then sold in several European countries and the United States. Money has been laundered in Israel and Germany.

Group 22: Group with no name – Russia

Group 22 operates in St. Petersburg, being involved primarily in trafficking in cocaine from Latin American countries to Russia as well as in illegal trafficking in firearms. The group is characterized by a clear hierarchical structure, the extensive use of violence and high levels of cooperation with other criminal groups. In addition, the group's activities have resulted in extensive penetration into the legitimate economy.



Organized in a strictly hierarchical manner, the group comprises several separate cells each with specialized tasks such as purchasing of raw material, sending it to clandestine laboratories, the transportation and finally the distribution of the end product.

The core group consists of 11 members, mainly Italian and Russian nationals. The majority of the members are male. The group makes use of professionals, such as lawyers and accountants for their illicit activities. Conduct within the group is governed by a code of discipline based on strict obedience to the leader. Those who violate the rules face violent punishment.

The group has access to firearms and readily uses violence against both its members and competing criminal groups. Specially selected individuals carry out these activities.


Apart from drug trafficking, the group has been able to adapt to changing market conditions and has shifted to new activities quickly and effectively. Such additional activities include counterfeiting, money laundering and prostitution. The group's average annual income from illegal activities is estimated at US\$ 500,000. Capital to fund the initial entry into the illicit drugs market came from a legitimate commercial enterprise. Profits accumulated from the illegal drugs market have been reinvested in this legal commercial enterprise.

The group made use of a sophisticated intelligence gathering network which collected information on, among other things, potential new markets, law enforcement activities and alternative sources of transport for illegal goods.

Group 22 has operated also in Italy, Austria, Germany, Columbia, Turkey, Switzerland and some African states. Its goods have generally been procured in Columbia, Italy and Switzerland and marketed in Russia and Byelorussia. Columbia, Italy, Switzerland and Austria have been used for money laundering. There is evidence that the group cooperated with Italian organized crime groups, buying and selling commodities and making use of these groups' expertise, facilities and personnel.

Group 23: Vasi Iliev Security-2 – Bulgaria

VIS-2 is a criminal group operating in the southeastern region of Bulgaria. The group is involved primarily in insurance scams, illegal gambling, illegal import and export of food, equipment, alcohol and cigarettes. The group has a hierarchical structure and is characterized by a high level of violence. The group has made extensive use of corruption and is regarded as having some political influence at a local level. VIS-2 has achieved substantial penetration into the legal economic sector. Its activities are facilitated through extensive contacts with other criminal groups.



Apart from its core activities VIS-2 is engaged in numerous other activities. These include counterfeiting, forgery, large scale fraud and embezzlement, money laundering, armed robbery, vehicle theft and trafficking, theft of antiques and jewelry, smuggling of cultural artifacts, trafficking in women/children for sexual exploitation and forced labour, illegal immigration, illegal activities surrounding prostitution, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, smuggling of firearms and the illegal trafficking of explosives. This diversity of activities suggests not only that VIS-2 can rapidly enter new markets, but also is not vulnerable to over reliance on any single source of income.

VIS-2 employs individuals from a wide range of backgrounds. For example, former athletes provide security and, where necessary, the application of violence. The group has a pyramidal structure with role differentiation and a system of ranks. The group is not known to employ any women.

The group makes use of a high level of violence, focussed both internally and externally. Physical assaults, murder and the threat of violence are common practice.


Almost all the illegal activities carried out by this group take place in the gray area between legitimate and illegitimate business enterprise. For example, members act as sponsors of football clubs, and openly market their protection services and clientele by putting stickers on offices, cars or other property.

Despite its prominence, however, law enforcement agencies have had significant difficulties in penetrating the organization given its strict code of secrecy. Other factors that enable the group to operate without obstruction, however, is widespread police corruption as well as actual participation of police officers in the activities of the group. The group's penetration into the legitimate economy and the influence it has secured, including suspected political links, suggests that there is little fear of prosecution.

Apart from its core activities in Bulgaria, VIS-2 also operates in Macedonia, Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia and Turkey. There are links to criminal organizations from most of these countries, as well as to Kosovar, Iranian and Syrian groups. Close connections to other criminal organizations are linked to the fact that VIS-2 provides security on the routes where drugs, arms and people are trafficked.

Group 24: The Cock Group – Lithuania

The Cock Group operates mainly in the western part of Lithuania, is hierarchically organized and has a distinct social identity. The group is engaged in various activities, predominantly extortion, trafficking in heroin, vehicle theft and organized prostitution. These activities extend to at least three other countries and involve other organized criminal groups. Key features of the group are an extensive use of violence and corruption, a high degree of penetration into the legitimate economy and some political influence at both local and regional levels.



Apart from the activities outlined above, the Cock group is engaged in counterfeiting, forgery, large scale fraud and embezzlement, bank fraud, money laundering, armed robbery, trafficking in women and children for the sex industry, loan sharking and usury, smuggling of firearms, illegal traffic of explosives and illegal gambling schemes.

The group was founded in 1990 by a small number of former prisoners. The initial activities of the group included speculation, fraud and violations of foreign currency regulations. In a relatively short space of time the members grew to over 50 members. The group's rapid growth led to internal competition and conflict and by 1993 the organization split into several small groups. After a period of conflict, these smaller groups coalesced into two larger ones.

The group has a hierarchical structure with a single leader in charge. Two deputies are responsible for the organization of illicit activities, one for smuggling a range of commodities and the other for drug trafficking. A security group is in charge of the leader's personal protection. The members are Lithuanians and Russians. All of them are male. Membership is only open to former prisoners, with new members having to undergo an initiation test. The group is governed by an unwritten code of conduct.

Until 1997 violation of the internal rules resulted in severe physical punishment. Now, conflicts are resolved peacefully to avoid the attention of law enforcement agencies. Considerable violence is used in conflicts with other criminal organizations, but also in racketeering cases. Specialists are used to conduct violent activities that have ranged from bombings to murders.


The Cock Group's level of penetration into the legitimate economy is high, largely due to the fact that the group was founded in the wake of the privatization of state property in Lithuania. Brutal violence, intimidation and other illegal methods have been used to influence the process of privatization of a large number of former state enterprises.

The Cock Group exerts a strong influence on customs, police and border officers as well as on criminal justice institutions.

Over time, the group has extended its operations to Germany, Russia and Spain, and has connections to other criminal groups in the region, namely groups from Moscow, St. Petersburg and Riga. Cooperation with these criminal groups takes the form of the buying and selling of various commodities and the exchange of personnel and expertise.

Group 25: Savlokhov Group – Ukraine

The main activities of Savlokhov Group are extortion, gambling and money laundering. The activities extend to at least three foreign countries and involve cooperation with other organized criminal groups. The group is hierarchically organized, makes use of violence and has a strong ethnic identity. A high level of penetration into the legitimate economy has been achieved, and political influence at both local and regional levels facilitate the group's activities.



Apart from the core activities outlined above, the Savlokhov Group is also involved in forgery, fraud, loan sharking, usury, trafficking in illicit goods, illegal activities surrounding prostitution, kidnapping for ransom and armed robbery. The annual profits from this diverse set of activities are estimated at US\$ 25-33 million. Profits are laundered through foreign banks. The group cooperates with other criminal groups, many active throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The Savlokhov Group comprises 25 to 30 individuals, the vast majority of whom are male. The core of the group consists of the leaders and those who are responsible for controlling both legal and illegal businesses. The group is named after two of the leaders, the brothers Savlokhov. Every member knows only his direct superior. Inside information given to members is limited to the extent needed to fulfill their immediate functions. The members' nationalities are Ukrainian, Russian and Latvian. A strict code of conduct governs the group. Members are expected to submit totally to their leaders, obey their orders and support each other. There is a constant threat of violence should these rules be violated. Such enforced solidarity against external threats ensures internal conflicts are rare. All members are ready to use violence. Nevertheless a special squad is established that carries out physical punishment.


The activities of the group are situated in the gray area between legitimate and illegitimate commercial activities. The leaders own a series of licit businesses, mainly gambling establishments, restaurants, car sale operations and a number of filling stations in Ukrainian cities. While the group dominates the gambling business, it competes with other criminal groups in other commercial sectors. The Savlokhov brothers are not businessmen themselves, but well-known and respected sponsors of sport teams and other social activities.

The profits from licit activities are estimated at up to US\$ 10 million. A significant portion of this income is not declared in order to avoid taxation. About 20-25 % of the group's total assets are invested in the legal national economy, another 10 % in the legal economy abroad.

Although there is no concrete evidence to prove this, it is believed that the group has connections to both law enforcement agencies and the political arena.

Group 26: Juvenal Group – Colombia

The Juvenal Group operated in Colombia in the area of Cali, Medellin, and Bogota. The group was mainly involved in drug trafficking from Colombia to the United States. The group had no strong ethnic or social identity, and made surprisingly little use of violence. In contrast, extensive use was made of corruption and significant levels of political influence were achieved at a local level. In order to facilitate its activities, the group developed strong links with other organized crime groups.




Apart from its core activity of drug smuggling, the group was also involved on a smaller scale in the smuggling of migrants and money laundering. The organizational structure may be described best as horizontal, although under the clear leadership of the chief, Alejandro Bernal Madrigal. Despite the fact that some participants were part of the cartels before joining the group, most of the members did not have previous criminal records and were professionals or businessmen drawn from the upper middle class. The group was composed of approximately 260 persons resident in different Colombian cities. The internal cohesion of the group relied to some degree on familial links between some of the members. The group was not exclusively Colombian, some members being nationals of Mexico, Guatemala and Ecuador. The group was regarded as having a high level of sophistication and employed professionals such as lawyers. The group made use of satellite phones, mobile phone and e-mails with secret codes to ensure secure communication between members.

The Juvenal Group represented the new model of narco-trafficking organizations which appeared in Colombia after the cartels. These organizations avoided law enforcement attention by using the cover of legal commercial activities, ensuring that members did not overtly display their new found wealth. The Juvenal Groups minimized the use of violence in order to avoid police detection. An internal code of conduct existed within the group, the emphasis being on the discretion of the members to ensure the survival of the group.

Unlike the cartels who attempted to control all the different phases of trafficking activities, the Juvenal group subcontracted various activities to other criminal groups. Thus, the group cooperated with Mexican, Venezuelan and Ecuadorian groups. Significantly, the Juvenal Group did not try to control territory or enter into conflict with other groups for control of routes, as was the case with the cartels in the past. The Juvenal group bought drugs in Colombia, stored it in various locations before exporting it to Venezuela, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Mexico, Australia and Ghana. Such drug consignments were hidden mainly in bulk exports of fruit concentrate. The police assessed that the amount of drugs exported reached 30 tons per year at the peak of the group's operations. If we assume that the group was receiving around US\$ 10,000 per kilogram, its annual income reached approximately US\$ 300 million per year. The majority of these profits were invested in the legal economy.

Group 27: Hells Angels – Canada

The Hells Angels is a large, hierarchically structured motorcycle gang, mainly involved in drug manufacturing and trafficking. Hells Angels make use of extensive violence and are characterized by a relatively strong social identity. While the group is said to be able to exert some political influence at a local and regional level, there is no evidence of wide spread corruption emanating from its activities. A significant portion of profits from illegal activities are invested in the legal economy.



Hells Angels manufacture a variety of synthetic drugs and distribute heroin, cannabis and cocaine. In recent years the activities of the Hells Angels have diversified and become more specialized, now including involvement in such activities as prostitution, money laundering, insurance scams, vehicle theft and trafficking, extortion and gun running.


As in the case of other motorcycle gangs (see Group 10), the structure of the gang is based on a division into several chapters. A national president heads all chapters, although day to day operational decisions are the responsibility of the chapters themselves. Each chapter is itself led by a president who has dictatorial powers. The chapter secretary attends to financial and organizational tasks including posting bail for arrested members. The sergeant at arms takes care of the group's security, stores firearms and plans any violent interventions against enemies. The road captain is responsible for the performance of races. Potential members ('prospects') are required to spend a period of probation with the group. 'Hangarounds' and friends are persons who are more loosely linked to the gang. Women are only admitted on the periphery. There are about 280 Hells Angel gangs in Canada. Groups control and absorb other motorcycle gangs in their territory. The gang cooperates with Hells Angels gangs abroad and other organized crime groups. Members are expected to be absolutely loyal to the gang, respect the President's power, obey orders and support each other. Members use drugs, but severe addiction is generally regarded as unacceptable. Conflicts are often resolved using violence or the threat thereof. Deviation from the rules is punished, on occasion by death. The Hells Angels are regarded as one of the most violent organized criminal groups in Canada. In the conflict with a rival motorcycle gang, for example, there have been 103 homicides since 1994. Witnesses and justice officials are intimidated and two prison guards have been killed by Hells Angels members.

The group or its members are involved in a wide range of legitimate businesses such as strip clubs, escort agencies, bars and restaurants. Many of these businesses are used for money laundering. Some members do part time work in a variety of jobs in the legitimate commercial sector, but their primary activities remain criminal. Where Chapters are active they seek to dominate the criminal market, particularly in the field of drug manufacturing, drug distribution and prostitution. Rival gangs are violently excluded.

The gang collects intelligence on police activities, including progress in respect of ongoing investigations. There is evidence that the Hells Angels try to infiltrate and corrupt law enforcement and local government officials both by offering money and threatening violence. Given the well-known use of violence by Hells Angels, the group is feared and despised by the population. The gang is now trying to alter this reputation by, among other means, changing dress codes and contributing to various social causes and activities.

Group 28: The 28s Prison Gang – South Africa

The 28s Gang, operating mainly in the Western Cape region, is predominantly involved in trafficking in drugs, illegal trading in firearms and organized prostitution. A key feature of the gang is a strong social identity, members being drawn largely from a single ethnic group and mainly being recruited in prison. The gang makes frequent use of violence and corruption and has achieved a high degree of penetration into the legitimate economy. Over time significant links have been established with other criminal groups, both in and outside South Africa. Despite its prominence, the group is regarded as having little political influence.




The 28s are engaged in trafficking heroin, cannabis, cocaine and synthetic drugs. In addition, the gang is involved in burglary, money laundering, gambling, vehicle theft and trafficking, armed robbery, extortion and trafficking in women and children for the sex industry.

The 28s were founded more than a hundred years ago as a ruthless prison gang, which over time expanded its scope to criminal activities outside of prison. The group operates in a decentralized way being composed of numerous junior and senior crime groups each with their own leaders. More recently the gang has gained increased influence by recruiting members from outside prison. Currently, there are estimated to be about 800 to 1600 members. The 28s have continued to rely on the disciplined and hierarchical structure common within prisons. The leader is often referred to as 'general'. A second-in-command acts as an intermediary between the 'general' and ordinary gang members. The leader controls the gang's activities and reaps the financial benefits. The group provides a powerful protective network both inside and outside prison. New members have to prove themselves by committing criminal acts and passing a ritual, including being tattooed with the group's symbol. The group is characterized by a strong ethnic and social identity, the vast majority of members being drawn from the so-called 'coloured' or 'mixed race' community. The majority of members are male, although female members provide safe places to stay or are involved in prostitution and drug dealing.

Specially selected members discipline those that deviate from the rules. Many members possess firearms, mostly illegally. Conflicts with rival criminal organizations and gangs are common, usually involve firearms and have resulted in a significant number of fatalities. Senior members of the 28s joined a cartel of drug dealers formed to monopolize the acquisition and distribution of drugs in the Western Cape. By 2000 the leader of the 28s had become the dominant figure in the cartel. The group's profits from illegal activities are both laundered and invested in legitimate enterprises such as tow truck companies, nightclubs and petrol filling stations. In addition, the 28s have now expanded their operations into rural areas, establishing themselves as the dominant force in a number of small towns. Given the violent reputation of the 28s, these communities offer little resistance, this being particularly so in cases where the group provides resources to the poor. However, in communities where the 28s are not yet firmly established, there has been considerable opposition to their expansion, including the killing of several group members. Although corruption of local members of the police plays an important role, there has been no indication of the judiciary or political process being corrupted or infiltrated.

Group 29: The Trapani Cosa Nostra – Italy

La Cosa Nostra is primarily concentrated in the Trapani Province of Sicily. The group engages in extortion, money laundering and trafficking in firearms. The activities of the group are defined by extensive trans-border activities, external cooperation with other organized criminal groups and the use of corruption and violence to facilitate illegal activities. The group is reputed to have political influence at local, regional and national level.



The Trapani Cosa Nostra evolved in the wake of the Palermo Cosa Nostra. Although it has developed into a group in its own right, it maintains close links with the Palermo group and shares a number of similarities. Like the Palermo group a core of new leaders transformed the traditional collective approach to decision-making into a highly centralized system in the 1980s. Such a change was supposed to ensure greater consistency and unity in the group's policies. Similar to the Palermo Cosa Nostra it has a three-tiered organization: on the lower level there are 'families' that control their own territories; in the middle is 'mandamento', essentially a group of families; finally at a higher level a senior leadership controls activities in the province and the region.

Secrecy is expected from all members both in internal and external contacts. Members are required to report information exclusively to superiors, this rule being designed to safeguard links between the group and leading figures in politics and business. The group's members are provided with a variety of forms of support. The overall size of the group is estimated at several hundred, including confidential associates. The majority of members are male and originate from Southern Italy.


The group is also involved in drug manufacturing and trafficking. Given the opportunities for smuggling offered by a rugged and inaccessible coastline as well as a largely undeveloped hinterland for the establishment of refineries, the Trapani area has become a centre of international drug trafficking. La Cosa Nostra has penetrated a range of economic sectors in the region, including the construction, waste disposal, wine, abattoir and fishing industries. The group has an estimated average annual income of about US\$ 6 million, about half of which is accumulated through illegal activities.

These more modern business-oriented aims of the organization have not weakened the traditional militaristic nature of La Cosa Nostra. On the contrary, the group does not hesitate to employ violence to achieve criminal objectives. This policy culminated in a 1993 bombing campaign. More recently, however, and to avoid the attention of law enforcement agencies, the organization has adopted a lower profile, including engaging in lower levels of violence.

Since 1993 external contacts to entrepreneurs and politicians who support and protect the group have been extended. This ensures the group's monopoly on the most lucrative business activities, allowing La Cosa Nostra to become a major enterprise with huge financial resources and diverse economic activities.

Group 30: The Licciardi Clan – Italy

The Licciardi Clan is a traditional Mafia-type association operating mainly in the Campania region, primarily in Naples. The Clan has long been involved in international drug trafficking and to lesser extent in extortion rackets. In the past it was also engaged in cigarette smuggling. The Clan has a strong ethnic identity and relies heavily on the use of violence and corruption.



Apart from the core activities as outlined above, the Clan engages also in loan sharking, counterfeiting, forgery, insurance scams, money laundering, armed robbery, organized prostitution, smuggling of firearms, trafficking of explosives and illegal gambling schemes.

The Clan consists of approximately 70 members, all of whom are Italian nationals. It is based in Secondigliano, a district in the northern part of Naples. The Clan is hierarchically structured, always headed by members of the Licciardi family. Although the vast majority of the members are male, the clan is exceptional in that it has been headed by a woman, Maria Licciardi, until her arrest in June 2001. Subsequently, it is assumed that the leadership was inherited by her brother, Gennaro Licciardi. The group is part of a larger criminal organization, Alleanza, that has gained control over a part of illegal activities (primarily drug trafficking) in the metropolitan area of Naples. This broader organization functions to maintain order and settle disputes between criminal clans.

While violence has often been resorted to in the past, there is increasingly an attempt to limit levels of conflict so as not to attract the attention of the law enforcement authorities. As a result, members try to settle conflicts peacefully. Nevertheless, the Clan has been involved in fierce clashes, showing a surprisingly high level of military capacity and operating a logistics network far exceeding those of any other criminal organization in the region.

Alongside the criminal organization, an 'entrepreneurial' structure has been established to pursue opportunities in the legal economy. Thus, this structure has branched out into various business sectors, in particular the clothing trade. The Clan has now a monopoly over street vending in Italy and in selected cities elsewhere. All the profits from illegal activities is invested in legal businesses. The group's annual income from illegal activities is estimated at over US\$ 2 million.


The wealth available to the Licciardi Clan has ensured that it has considerable ability to influence others with money. In particular, there is evidence that the Clan has achieved significant levels of corruption of officials in the criminal justice system.

The Clan has a well established network with an active presence in a number of states, including Germany, the Czech Republic, Greece, the United States, Brazil, Spain, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Australia, China and Denmark.

In 2001 ten bosses as well as dozens of other members of the Licciardi Clan were convicted. The convictions were for a range of crimes, including murder, extortion and Mafia-type association.

Group 31: Group with no name - Italy

Group 31 operates in the regions of Puglia, Lazio and Lombardia, especially in the cities of Brindisi, Bari, Roma and Milano. The group's main activities are trafficking in drugs and firearms as well as illegal immigration. These activities extend to at least five other countries and involve significant levels of cooperation with other organized criminal groups in Italy and abroad. Extensive use is made of violence and corruption. The group is made up of nationals from a number of countries, and as such does not have a strong ethnic identity.



Apart from its core activities as outlined above, the group also engages in drug manufacturing, money laundering, armed robbery, vehicle theft and trafficking, trafficking in women and children sexual exploitation and forced labour, organized prostitution, smuggling of firearms, trafficking of explosives as well as the smuggling of contraband cigarettes.

The group comprises individuals of Italian, Albanian and Montenegrin nationality. The vast majority of the group's members are male. The group's structure is hierarchical with a single leader or a small group of leaders in control at the top. There is a specialized division of labour between various components of the group. The criminal structure is determined by a strict code of conduct that regulates the role and position of every member of the group. Disobedience leads to a violent response by other members of the organization. New members are easily recruited from the socially disadvantaged, including unemployed youths or migrants.

The group makes considerable use of violence, which is both externally and internally focussed. Violence is primarily used in territorial disputes with other organized crime groups, some of which have taken the form of large-scale conflicts. While in recent years there have been three cases of murders of police officials, the group now largely refrains from unnecessary violence to avoid the attention of the authorities. Weapons however remain easily accessible to group members.


All of the group's profits from illegal activities is laundered, mainly in Italy, Albania and Switzerland. A portion of the profits is also reinvested into the legitimate economy in Italy.

Police corruption is one of the methods frequently utilized by this group to facilitate criminal activities. The group has demonstrated the ability to infiltrate the political sphere, most particularly at local level. There is evidence of links to several other criminal groups with whom both expertise and illegal commodities are exchanged.

Group 31 also has a presence in Albania, Germany, France and Switzerland.

Group 32: Yamaguchi-Gumi - Japan

Yamaguchi-Gumi is a large, hierarchically structured group engaged in a wide range of criminal activities. The group's activities extend to a number of countries and there is evidence of cooperation with other organized criminal groups. The group makes extensive use of violence and it is assumed that the group exerts at least some political influence at a national level. Nevertheless, the group is regarded to only have a limited penetration into the legitimate economy and to only make use of corruption occasionally.



The group's activities have diversified in the last decades. In addition to trafficking in drugs, extortion, gambling and organized prostitution, they now span crimes such as insurance scams, money laundering, armed robbery, trafficking in stolen goods, kidnapping for ransom and trafficking in firearms.


Yamaguchi-Gumi has a tree-like structure in which semi independent units (Kumi) are arranged in layers. The headquarters of the group are located in Kobe, in the western part of Japan, with Kumi being scattered across the country. Heading the organization is the Honke (head family) that consists of more than 100 members. Each of these members organizes their own families that form a layer of secondary groups. Major members of secondary groups organize a third layer of groups and so on. Although these units are relatively independent, the Honke can control even the smallest unit members. The head family is organized in a very differentiated and hierarchical way. The Kumicho is the leader and representative. The Wakagashira occupies the senior position in the organization's management. Other functions of management and administration are distributed to various members. The lower ranking groups usually have a simpler structure and comprise a leader, a manager and members. In addition there are several associated members that are active both in legal and illegal activities. These associates range from petty street criminals to managers of companies. In 1999 the total size of Boryokudan organizations (organized criminal groups, including the Yamaguchi-Gumi) was estimated at 83,100. The members are predominantly Japanese with the overwhelming majority being male.

Although the power and influence of Yamaguchi-Gumi are now in decline, the group is still recruiting new members, mainly juvenile delinquents. The traditional ceremony of establishing a ritual father-son relationship is however waning. Promotion to higher ranks can be achieved through repeated committal of violent crimes. While an attempt is made to settle internal conflicts by peaceful means, violence remains key to the activities of Yamaguchi-Gumi. If there is the prospect of making profits the group is ready to use violence against members of competing groups or businessmen who refuse cooperation. At present, even ordinary members illegally possess handguns.

The group can be characterized as a professional, primarily profit-oriented organization. Since 1965 the group has been engaged in legal enterprises such as entertainment, real estate and construction. Several members or associates manage companies that conceal illegal activities. Although there is some indications that it has occurred, there is no clear proof that law enforcement agencies or political parties have been corrupted or infiltrated. Traditionally the Boryokudan have enjoyed at least some degree of acceptance. However, they are now regarded as anti-social organizations that are vigorously opposed by public agencies and community activists.

Group 33: The Liu Yong Syndicate – China

Like other ‘Black Societies’ or Chinese organized crime groups the Liu Yong Syndicate was structured in a hierarchical way and was predominantly involved in trafficking in illicit goods and services as well as racketeering. Its main characteristics included an extensive use of violence and corruption and a significant degree of penetration into the legitimate economy. The Liu Yong Syndicate had a clear social identity, members being largely recruited from a particular region. There is evidence that the group exerted considerable political influence in the local areas and region where it operated. The group however had little external influence beyond this region and did not apparently cooperate with other organized criminal groups.



In addition to the primary activities outlined above, the syndicate was engaged in a diversity of other criminal activities. These included the smuggling of human beings, organized prostitution, armed robbery, gambling and extortion. The group operated predominantly in Shang Yang, the Capital of the province Liaoning in northeastern China.

The history of the group is strongly linked to the criminal career of a single individual. In 1994 Liu Yong was arrested and convicted of having shot and injured an official in a police station. In 1995 he bribed his way out of prison and began building up his own syndicate, recruiting several former convicts as well as policemen to gain access to both the criminal world and mainstream society. Similar to other ‘Black Societies’ the Liu Yong Syndicate acted in an extremely violent way, specifically purchasing arms to increase its influence. Through murders, assaults and threats, the syndicate achieved a monopoly in the cigarette wholesale market and exerted high levels of control over other business activities in Shang Yang. Liu Yong became the area’s most influential individual, brutally dispensing with other commercial competitors. For example, Liu Yong ordered his men to beat up an unwilling lessor to force him to sign a contract on a building Liu Yong planned to open a supermarket in. In order to monopolize the cigarette wholesale market he told his men to kill a competing agent who acted for the same brand as himself. In these and other ways, the group blurred the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate economic activities. Illegal activities were disguised as legitimate businesses and profits were concealed from revenue authorities. Liu Yong claimed that he had accumulated about US\$ 60,500,000 in assets.


The Liu Yong Syndicate comprised 45 members, was hierarchically structured and governed by a strict code of conduct. Apart from its investments the group owned or had access to a variety of resources, such as firearms and trucks, that facilitated the conduct of illegal activities.

Liu Yong had close connections to influential personalities in local and regional society. He bribed several governmental officials and created a false life history to obtain public honorary titles such as “outstanding entrepreneur” or “philanthropist helping the poor”. Moreover, he served as an elected local politician and was a ranking member of the city’s Communist Party cell. In his official capacity as a People’s Representative he was even assigned to inspect law enforcement departments.

Liu Yong has since been arrested and the operations of his syndicate shut down.

Group 34: The Zhang Wei Syndicate – China

The Zhang Wei Syndicate was predominantly involved in trafficking in illicit goods and services as well as racketeering. This hierarchically structured group operated in Wen Ling, a city in Zhejiang Province in eastern China. The group made use of extensive violence and corruption, achieved a high level of penetration into the legitimate economy and garnered political influence at both local and regional level. Members of the group were mostly drawn from the same region and social background, and reflecting this, the group's activities did not extend far outside of Wen Ling. There was no evidence of cooperation with other organized criminal groups.



The Zhang Wei syndicate was engaged in a diverse array of criminal activity, including smuggling of human beings, prostitution, gambling, extortion and armed robbery. From 1995 to the end of 2000, the syndicate committed over 50 known serious crimes, including at least one incident of murder. Over the same period the group accumulated more than US\$ 10.2 million in illegal profits.

The Zhang Wei Syndicate comprised 184 members of whom 67 were either Communist Party or local government officials. Similar to other 'Black Society' groups it was hierarchically structured and governed by a sophisticated system of rules, giving the group a highly militarized nature. Syndicate members had to live together and were given uniforms. They were divided into hierarchical levels and treated accordingly. All members within one level had identical cell phones, pagers and even cars. They were paid salaries from US\$ 2,400 to 18,100 a month. These arrangements attracted many new members from the surrounding areas in search of employment.


Zhang Wei himself held various senior social and political positions. He was praised by senior local government officials as a "new political star" and was one of the most trusted of the mayor's advisors. To the public he was known as "Leader Zhang". He gave huge sums in bribes to local government officials and staff in banks to facilitate criminal activities. Despite this, however, and in contrast to other criminal groups, the Zhang Wei Syndicate did not always have to bribe or force officials to cooperate but was approached by officials themselves who were willing to assist and protect the syndicate in exchange for material resources.

Initially, however, Zhang Wei used force to persuade the local bank to grant him loans. Subsequently he was able to establish his own illegal bank and transfer large amounts of money from state-owned banks to his personal bank. The money was then used to finance the syndicate's activities. Using these and other methods, the syndicate grew to be one of the most powerful and richest in China.

In 2001 Zhang Wei and other major members of the syndicate were sentenced to death. Thirty other members were sentenced to periods of imprisonment.

Group 35: The Liang Xiao Min Syndicate - China

Similar to other 'Black Societies' in China the Liang Xiao Min Syndicate was involved in crimes such as gambling, kidnapping, extortion and organized prostitution. It was active mainly in Chang Chin, a city in northeastern China. Key features of this syndicate were extensive use of violence and corruption, a high degree of penetration into the legitimate economy and a relatively strong social identity based on the fact that members were all recruited in a particular area. While the syndicate could exert political influence at a local and regional level, its activities did not extend outside of this geographic area. There is little evidence that the syndicate engaged in cooperation with other organized criminal groups.



Apart from the core activities outlined above, the syndicate was also engaged in armed robbery, racketeering and trafficking in illicit goods and services. Violence used in respect of these activities left at least four people dead and are estimated to have injured over 30. During his criminal career, Liang, the leader of the syndicate, is reputed to have obtained more than US\$ 2.42 million by illegal means.


As in the case of the other two 'Black Society' groups, the history of the syndicate is closely tied to the activities of a single individual (see Groups 33 and 34). In 1993, Liang Xiao Min, a policeman in the Public Security Bureau of Chang Chin, established the syndicate with about a dozen local supporters and three of his police colleagues. By 1994 the syndicate expanded to more than 20 members and armed itself with illegal guns. In less than seven years, the syndicate purchased or opened several businesses, including casinos, nightclubs, sauna baths, fast food restaurants and garages. While the businesses were all legitimately registered, some were used as cover for underground gambling houses and prostitution. To finance his growing commercial interests Liang utilized his position as police officer and forced banks to grant him loans through use of violence and intimidation. In one case, when a bank manager refused to loan Liang about US\$ 220,000, Liang's men attacked her and broke her leg. It is said that Liang once boasted: "I have three magic weapons: First, I am a policeman. Who is not afraid of me? Second, I am the head of a 'Black Society' syndicate. Who dares to offend me? Third, I have connections to the people with power. Who can do anything about me?"

Liang called his syndicate a 'family', set up 'house rules', and headed the 'household'. His control over the syndicate relied on two factors. First, the members were bound by generous and regularly paid salaries. Second the 'house rules' were rigorously enforced. The rules obliged the members, among other things, to report everything to Liang, be absolutely loyal to him and never to leave the syndicate. If a member violated a rule, the punishment could include cutting off a finger or breaking a leg, depending on the severity of the transgression.

The Liang Xiao Min Syndicate was one of the largest 'Black Society' groups ever brought to justice in China. In 2000, 35 members were convicted of several serious crimes, with the seven leading syndicate members being sentenced to death and the remainder being sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.

Group 36: Family group with no name – Mexico

This relatively small and close knit organization was primarily involved in alien smuggling across the Mexican-United States border. Illegal immigrants were subsequently forced to work. Both violence and the threat of violence were used to facilitate the process of smuggling. The group focussed primarily on its smuggling activities, neither exerting political influence nor engaging in extensive corruption. There is no evidence that cooperation occurred with other criminal groups or that any significant level of illicit profits were invested in legal commercial activities.



The group recruited its victims, who were primarily deaf and mute, in special homes and schools for deaf and mute persons in Mexico, promising them a better life in the US. The victims were then smuggled from Mexico into California and transported from Los Angeles to New York. On arrival, they were forced to beg and sell trinkets such as key chains, baseballs or pens on the streets and subways of New York City for up to 18 hours a day. The victims were allowed to take only a small percentage of their earnings, delivering the remainder to the individuals running the operation. The victims lived in a cramped apartment, sleeping on the floor.

The criminal group comprised eight persons, some of them deaf themselves. The members were mostly Mexican illegal immigrants that were connected with one another through family ties. There are no indications that there existed a special code of conduct within the group.


Violence and intimidation was apparently used against the victims, they being threatened with physical harm or loss of food.

When the ring was exposed, police seized US\$ 35,000 in one of the group's apartments. There is no evidence that significant sums had already been invested in legitimate commercial enterprises.

The organization was exposed when some of the victims approached police using sign language and a letter describing the situation they were in. On following-up investigators found 57 victims living in one apartment, 12 of which were children from the age of six months to 12 years. The members of the group were charged with alien smuggling, extortion and grand larceny.

Group 37: Amezcua Contreras Organization – Mexico

The Amezcua Contreras Organization was mainly involved in producing and trafficking methamphetamine and supplying of various chemicals to other trafficking organizations in Mexico and the United States. The organization had more than one hundred members and was divided into several groups. Given its core activity, the organization engaged in high levels of trans-border activity and established a variety of links to organized criminal groups in both Mexico and other countries. To facilitate its illegal activities it made occasional use of violence and corrupt practices. There is evidence that at least some of the profits of drug smuggling activities were invested in the legitimate economy.



The Amezcua Contreras organization was one of the leading smuggler of ephedrine as well as the largest producer and trafficker of methamphetamine in the world, also supplying chemicals to other trafficking organizations during the late 1980's and early 1990's. The organization operated out of Guadalajara and was run by the brothers Luis, Jesus and Adan Amezcua Contreras. The brothers were arrested in 1998 and the group dismantled.


While trafficking cocaine for the Colombian organizations, the Amezcua brothers learned to market and structure their smuggling activities as an international business and to avoid violent clashes for territory and markets. In the late 1980's when the major organized crime leaders in Mexico dominated the cocaine trade, the Amezcua brothers exploited the underdeveloped methamphetamine business in the United States by producing methamphetamine on a larger and more structured scale than any of their competitors. In this way, they managed to control a business that had since the 1960s been dominated by outlaw motorcycle gangs and small independent traffickers. By 1992, the Amezcua brothers had established their own international chemical contacts in, among other countries, Switzerland, India, Germany and the Czech Republic. In less than ten years, the organization had grown from a low level cocaine trafficking group in Southern California to the most prolific methamphetamine and precursor chemical trafficking organization in North America.

The Amezcua Organization obtained large quantities of the precursor ephedrine in Thailand and India, which they supplied to methamphetamine labs in Mexico and the United States. The organization placed trusted associates in the United States to move ephedrine to Mexican methamphetamine traffickers operating in the United States.

In contrast to the cocaine business, where the traffickers from Mexico got a percentage of the profits for distributing the drug, in respect of the methamphetamine trade the group did not act as a 'middleman' and all profits could be retained. Resources accumulated in this way allowed the expansion of the illicit businesses. Another key to the success and longevity of this organization was the tightly knit structure that developed. The Amezcua brothers recruited heavily amongst relatives as well as very close friends. In turn, those members recruited individuals to engage in the production of methamphetamine and in smuggling both chemicals and methamphetamine into the United States.

Group 38: Mocha Orejas Organization – Mexico

This hierarchically structured group was primarily involved in kidnapping members of wealthy families. In doing so, the group made extensive use of violence and, although to a lesser extent, corruption. While there is no evidence that the group penetrated the legitimate economy or engaged in extensive cooperation with other organized criminal groups, the group did have some limited political influence at a local level.



The Mocha Orejas Organization was one of the most dangerous and most violent in Mexico during the 1990's, until its activities were stopped by law enforcement in July 1998. The group concentrated on the centre and south of the country, its activities focussed on kidnapping members of wealthy families, using blackmail to ensure the payment of ransoms. Most of the hostages were mutilated by cutting off their ears and other parts of their bodies. The parts of the bodies were sent to the relatives in order to prove not only that the victim was alive but also the gravity of their plight. Some of the hostages were killed and several female victims were raped, this despite the payment of large ransoms.


The group comprised approximately 20 members, organized in a strict hierarchy. The leader of the group was Daniel Arizmendi, a former policeman who began his criminal career as a car thief.

Until his arrest, Mexican authorities believe that Arizmendi and his group, including his brother Aurelio, were responsible for about 200 abductions. Nevertheless, after being caught Arizmendi only admitted guilt for 21 cases of kidnapping and three homicides. On the basis of receiving ransoms from kidnappings alone, the group was able to collect tens of millions of dollars during the 1990s. Arizmendi's earnings were officially estimated at more than US\$ 40 million, the majority of which was gained targeting affluent businesspeople in a series of high profile kidnapping cases.

The main reason Arizmendi could elude capture and operate with such brazenness was that he bribed various law enforcement authorities to ensure his protection. Many policemen are said to have carried out abductions and torture in collusion with the group. Such involvement combined with high levels of corruption in the country's criminal justice system ensured that profitable kidnappings could be carried out at minimal risk.

Group 39: Carillo Fuentes Organization – Mexico

This hierarchically structured group is primarily involved in transporting large cocaine shipments from Colombia to the United States, as well as in trafficking heroin and marijuana. The organization has more than five hundred members and is divided into several cells. The group is distinguished by having significant political influence at regional, national and international level and significant investments in the legitimate economy. Extensive cross-border activities are facilitated by cooperation with a large variety of criminal groups.



The Carrillo Fuentes Organization is based in Ciudad Juarez, and is associated with the Cali Rodriguez Orejuela organization and the Ochoa brothers of Medellin. The regional bases of the organization in Guadalajara, Hermosillo, and Torreon serve as storage locations from where the drugs are moved closer to the Mexican-United States border for eventual shipment north. The group is capable of sending US\$ 20 to US\$ 30 million to Colombia for each major operation, and generating tens of millions of dollars in profits per week. Investigations have shown that just one cell of the organization based in Ciudad Juarez shipped over 30 tons of cocaine into the United States and returned over US\$ 100 million in profits to Mexico in less than two years. By this means, the distribution of large amounts of cocaine in many US cities that had once been dominated by the Colombian Cali Cartel, is now controlled from Mexico.


Amado Carrillo Fuentes, the leading figure of the organization, was known as ‘Lord of the Skies’ given his reputation for transporting large loads of cocaine for Colombian traffickers by airplane across the Mexican-United States border. With his very business-like way of organizing drug trafficking, along with his extensive connections, including with senior law enforcement officials, he managed not only to head his own cell based in Ciudad Juarez but created the Mexican Federation of Drug Cartels. It was from this position that he began to build up joint ventures with Colombian cartels, sharing risks as well as profits in the early 1990s. In contrast to other drug trafficking organizations like the Arellano Felix, the Carillo Fuentes organization attempts to settle disputes peacefully, resorting to violence only if this is considered to be necessary to protect the principal interests of the group.

Amado Carrillo Fuentes had extensive ties with a number of officials in law enforcement and the military, including the former Commissioner of the National Institute to Combat Drugs. Like their Colombian counterparts, the Carillo Fuentes Organization uses sophisticated technology and counter surveillance methods and employs state of the art communication equipment.

When Amado Carrillo Fuentes died in July 1997 from the consequences of a surgery carried out to change his appearance, his brother took over the command of the Carillo Fuentes Organization. The transition however did not occur smoothly and in the aftermath a violent struggle over the control of the lucrative Juarez smuggling corridor developed. Since then the Mexican Federation of Drug Cartels has fragmented into several cells.

Group 40: Arellano-Felix Organization – Mexico

The Arellano-Felix Organization is one of North America's most violent drug trafficking cartels. The group engages in extensive cooperation with other criminal organizations, has achieved a high degree of penetration into the legitimate economy and exerts considerable political influence.



The Arellano-Felix Organization controlled the flow of drugs (cocaine, heroin, cannabis and methamphetamine) across the San Diego-Tijuana border for more than a decade. When in 1989 Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo was arrested for his involvement in the murder of a DEA Special Agent, Benjamin, the oldest of seven brothers and four sisters, inherited what was then the number two trafficking organization in Mexico. Since the early 1990's, Benjamin, along with his brothers, has altered the former Tijuana cartel into the most dominant and dangerous of seven organizations in Mexico that control the illegal drug market.

The Arellano-Felix Organization, like other Mexican drug cartels, no longer has a large pyramid type structure under the control of a single person. Such organizations now consist of a series of cells, each under the protection of the criminal organization, but managing their finances with a certain degree of independence. While there used to be confrontations between competing cartels, they have sought new ways of interacting in the same markets. Consequently, cells may share the same territory and routes with those of other organizations without having connections with one another. The unique aspect of the Arellano-Felix Organization is that it is highly organized and could continue to operate under the leadership of second string players, when the current leaders were arrested. The organization is recruiting 'narco-juniors', young, educated men of middle and upper class families living on both sides of the San Diego-Tijuana border. They are used as drug runners and hit men. In other cases, the organization has hired Hispanic gang members from San Diego as assassins. Both groups ('narco-juniors' and gang members) are valued commodities because they have the United States' citizenship and can travel between countries at will.

The organization has a reputation for making use of extensive violence, Ramon Eduardo being the most notorious of the Arellano Felix brothers in this regard. A large number of rivals, enemies and potential witnesses have been killed by the group. In addition, internal feuding between two factions within the organization itself, resulted in several hundred deaths.

One of the key reasons why the cartel operated for as long as it did, was that it was protected by a network of corrupt law enforcement officials. It has been reported that corrupt policemen have carried out many kidnappings tied to the organization. The group also employed a sophisticated system of counter-surveillance to protect its operations.

In February 2002 members of the Mexican Federal Police shot Ramon dead. On March 9 of the same year Mexican authorities arrested Benjamin Arellano Felix.