Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe

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# Table of Contents

**INTRODUCTION**

**PART 1: POTENTIAL DEMAND FOR MIGRANT SMUGGLING**

HOW BIG IS THE MARKET FOR MIGRANT SMUGGLING? ........................................3

WHICH NATIONS ARE MOST AFFECTED? ..................................................................6

HOW DO IRREGULAR MIGRANTS GET TO EUROPE? .............................................7

- Entry through the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla .............................................8
- Passage through Morocco to the Spanish mainland or the Canary Islands ........8
- Passage through Libya and Tunisia to the Pelagies .............................................8
- Passage from West Africa to the Canary Islands ..............................................9
- Other points of embarkation ..........................................................................10
- Getting to the embarkation points .................................................................10

**PART 2: THE ROLE OF ORGANIZED CRIME**

FULL PACKET OPERATORS .......................................................................................13

FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTS .....................................................................................15

LOCALLY-BASED OPPORTUNISTS ......................................................................15

- Smuggling across the Sahara ..........................................................................16
- Smuggling across the Mediterranean ...............................................................17
- Smuggling through the Atlantic .......................................................................18

POTENTIAL VALUE OF THE MIGRANT SMUGGLING MARKET ..........................19

**CONCLUSION** ......................................................................................................20

**ANNEX A: STATUS AS OF JUNE 13, 2006 PROTOCOL AGAINST THE SMUGGLING**

**ANNEX B: PRICE QUOTES FOR MIGRANT SMUGGLING SERVICES** ............23
INTRODUCTION

It should surprise no one that Europe is experiencing a large flow of undocumented migrants from Africa. According to the United Nations Development Programme, 15 of the 20 most developed countries in the world are in Europe. All 20 of the 20 least developed countries are in Africa, and more than half of these are in West Africa, not far from European borders. Africa’s population growth has exceeded its economic growth and, contrary to most of the rest of the developing world, has grown poorer in the last 20 years. Poverty, unemployment, and crime and violence have made many young people eager to leave the countries of their birth and seek out new opportunities in what has become their *El Dorado*: Western Europe.

Since it is exceedingly difficult for young Africans to work in Europe legally, every year tens of thousands attempt to cross the borders illegally. A recent study by the *Real Instituto Elcano* suggests that “this is only the beginning of an immigration phenomenon that could evolve into one of the largest in history.” Predictably, organized crime has stepped in to profit off this clandestine activity. The growing viability of this enterprise is demonstrated by the fact that even migrants from Asia are using Africa as their gateway to Europe.

The United Nations Secretary-General recently said “migration is not a zero-sum game” and indeed, when properly managed, all parties stand to gain: the countries of origin, the receiving countries, and the migrants themselves. On the other hand, irregular migration benefits primarily those who smuggle migrants. For those who travel north in search of a better life, the journey to Europe is, more often than not, a source of great tragedy. Untold numbers die in the desert or at sea, due to the indifference, if not the design, of the human smugglers. Desperately poor people are made even poorer as they are swindled or extorted of their assets and those of their extended families. Even if they reach their destination, the migrants face further marginalization and exploitation. Migrant smuggling from Africa to Europe is a crime crying out for justice.

It is actually remarkable that more migration from Africa to Europe, both legal and illegal, has not taken place to date. There is an obvious parallel between African migration to Europe and Latin American migration to the United States, but Latin Americans make up a large share of the US population, while, based on census data, Africans make up less than 1% of Europe’s population. More than three quarters of this number are from North Africa, with less than a quarter of a percent of Europe’s population coming from sub-Saharan Africa. This difference may be attributable to more formidable geographic and legal barriers in the case of African migration to Europe.

This situation provides an economic opportunity for organized crime, already well versed in smuggling a range of contraband from Africa to Europe. ‘Full packet solutions’ are offered by West African organized crime groups, which include transportation, fraudulent documentation, appropriate cover stories, and clandestine border crossings. These operations go largely undetected, so awareness about them is low. There are also opportunists along the way, some internationally coordinated, who specialise in evading controls in their native countries. These groups are far more visible, but are often not considered ‘organized crime’ in the countries in which they operate.

The crime of aiding irregular migration is known as ‘smuggling of migrants’, and is defined by the relevant United Nations protocol as the act of enabling the illegal entry of another person for gain. This crime is distinguished from human trafficking, in which the migration is not entirely voluntary and the intent invariably exploitative. But there are clearly a lot of practices that fall along a spectrum between these two poles, many of which are in evidence in Africa.

This document explores the extent to which irregular migration from Africa to Europe is mediated by organized crime. It is a rapid assessment based on open-source documents, interviews with government officials, and statements made at law enforcement conferences. It incorporates the findings of a recent UNODC mission conducted to Senegal, Mauritania, Gambia, Mali and Sierra Leone from 19 June to 1 July 2006. It is not intended as a comprehensive analysis of the issue, but rather to stimulate discussion.
This document opens with a look at the size of the potential market for organized crime: the number of irregular migrants, the nations most affected, and the specific routes used by the smugglers. It then looks at the smugglers themselves: their identities, their motivations, and the abuses they are willing to inflict on their human cargo. While the real extent of the profits to be made in smuggling human beings from Africa to Europe is only known to the smugglers themselves, the report includes a rough attempt to gauge the potential turnover of this market.
PART 1: POTENTIAL DEMAND FOR MIGRANT SMUGGLING

Organized crime is about profits. Given that it hosts the poorest countries in the world, Africa immediately south of the Sahara might seem like an unlikely place to find these profits. Every year, however, tens of thousands of African people draw on extended family networks to pool together sums that exceed their annual incomes by a considerable margin. They do so in hope of winning a chance of a better life in the affluent North. More often than not, they are bilked, abandoned, arrested or otherwise lost in the attempt to enter Europe illegally. Many die, or find themselves displaced and penniless far from their destination. But organized crime flourishes on this misery, like a parasite on the collective ambition of thousands of hopeful souls.

How big is the market for migrant smuggling?

Organized crime groups would not be interested in smuggling migrants to Europe if the flows were small or the migrants without resources. In the past, civil conflicts in a large number of African countries produced a torrent of asylum seekers. Most of these conflicts have ended or decreased greatly in their severity since 1990. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, during 2005 there were just under 90,000 asylum seekers ‘of concern’ in West, East, and Central Africa.

As is the case in most regions of the world, economic interests are a major driver for would-be immigrants from Africa. Most are young men striving to make a better life for themselves, rather than families fleeing persecution. Although the situation may be changing, very few women and children have been found in the groups of irregular migrants reaching the shores of the Spanish Canary Islands and Italian Lampedusa. Less than 5% of the total number of irregular migrants arriving in Sicily from North Africa during the period 2002-2004 were women. Since opportunities for legal migration are limited, this class of predominantly male migrants may see investment in illicit border crossing or false documents as essential in order to access income opportunities in Europe.

The exact numbers of irregular migrants and their precise origins are difficult to quantify, and estimates vary widely. The Italian authorities say there are one to one-and-a-half million people waiting to emigrate in Libya alone. One of the most commonly used means of estimating migrant flows is to add up national arrest figures and apply a multiplier based on an assumption about the share of migrants that are apprehended. This requires the comparison of data from different sources, and so any conclusions must be treated with caution.

Starting with Morocco, in 2005, just under 30,000 migrants were arrested, down from over 36,000 in 2003. The share of foreigners has increased since 2002, when more than half were Moroccan. If the ratios among foreigners remain the same, however, the bulk are from sub-Saharan Africa. Recent national breakdowns of the arrestee population by national group are not available, but figures released by the International Organization for Migration in 2005 showed a wide range of both Francophone and Anglophone countries represented in 2001.
Also in 2005, the Libyan authorities reported intercepting some 40,000 people seeking to enter Italy. This figure is actually down from 43,000 in 2003 and 54,000 in 2004. Between 2000 and 2003, the Libyan government apprehended and resettled around 3,000 to 7,000 people, including the nationals of West, East, and North Africa. Sudan, Niger, Chad, Mali, and Ghana contributed the most migrants during this period. The precise national shares vary greatly from year to year, as the figure below demonstrates.
Available figures from Algeria suggest a total of over 3000 arrests in 2005. No annual breakdown for these figures is available, but more than half of the 500 people arrested in September 2005 were from Niger and Mali.

Total arrests for the three countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco) were thus about 73,000 irregular migrants in 2005. Between 1998 and 2003, the Tunisian authorities also report apprehending an average of about 8,000 people per year attempting to make an illegal border crossing, of whom 70% were foreigners. If this level of apprehensions in Tunisia were maintained, as many as 80,000 migrants a year may be intercepted in the Maghreb countries.

According to the authorities in Mali, 6,505 illegal immigrants have been intercepted from January 2005 until mid-June 2006 transiting the country toward the Atlantic Ocean to reach Europe. Most of these migrants came from low income families in West African countries.

To this must be added the apprehensions made by the European countries. In 2002, the Spanish authorities intercepted just under 21,000 irregular migrants, of whom about 12,000 were Moroccan and just under 9,000 were from sub-Saharan Africa. In 2005, Italian authorities detected approximately 22,000 migrants arriving at the Italian island of Lampedusa alone. Based on these incomplete figures, the combined total of African and European enforcement efforts is in excess of 100,000 migrants a year.

As with all law enforcement seizures, the numbers apprehended are proportionate to the efforts invested in interdiction programme, and it is unclear what share of the total pool of migrants this figure comprises. Various multipliers have been suggested for extrapolating the total migrant flow from apprehension figures. Research in Germany regarding Iraqi asylum seekers found that only one fifth had been encountered by the police before registering their asylum applications, suggesting an apprehension multiplier of five. The same ratio has been given with regard to Tunisia. But more traditionally, a ratio of 1:2 is used (two migrants passing for every one apprehended), unless there are indications of substantial circular migration. Thus, arrest figures suggest that at least 200,000 Africans enter Europe illegally annually, while another 100,000 try and are intercepted and countless others lose their way or their lives.
Which nations are most affected?

The apprehension figures suggest a undocumented migrant pool largely comprised of nationals of some of the poorest countries in the region, such as Mali and Niger. But it is possible that nationals of certain countries are more likely to be apprehended than others. How do the apprehension figures compare to what is known about the African diaspora in Europe?

According to 2003 estimates of the International Organization on Migration (IOM), about 3.4 million Africans live in Europe, of whom about 2.2 million are from just three North African countries: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. France has the largest number of resident African non-citizens, some 1.4 million in 1999, of whom 1.1 million were from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Thus, an estimated one third or so of Europe’s African migrants are North Africans resident in France. North Africans generally comprise two thirds of the African population of Europe, according to the census figures. Setting the North Africans aside and using IOM census figures for nine destination countries, nine national group combinations comprise over half the total migrant population, all but one of which involve West Africans. Overall, Ghanaians, Senegalese, and Nigerians comprise the largest sub-Saharan African populations in Europe.

Figure 4: Breakdown of the major sub-Saharan African diasporas in European countries

Of course, these figures may not represent the current reality:

- The census figures may not include large numbers of undocumented migrants.
- These data mostly date from 2000 or 2001, and are thus relatively old in an area characterized by its dynamism.

It is probably safe to say that North Africans outnumber sub-Saharan Africans in Europe, and that West Africans comprise the largest share of the sub-Saharan Africans. It is also fair to assert that while Francophone Africans are most likely to migrate to France, for example, sub-Saharan Africans are no longer bound to emigrate exclusively to their respective former colonial powers, with Senegalese, Ghanaians, and Nigerians in particular showing remarkable flexibility in migrating to a wide range of countries.

When comparing these figures, however, it is immediately apparent that those nationalities in sub-Saharan Africa which are best represented in the census figures (Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria) are not
proportionately represented in the apprehension figures. The countries best represented in the census tend to be slightly wealthier than those who show more prominently among the migrants intercepted (such as Mali and Niger). These countries (Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria) are also home to some well-known organized crime groups.

It is possible that the profile of the African population in Europe is changing, and that the large African communities in Europe are not attracting a corresponding amount of illegal immigration. On the other hand, these figures might indicate that migrants coming from the poorest countries are more likely to be apprehended in transit than those migrants coming from countries where individuals are able to enlist the full battery of services offered by sophisticated organized crime groups. Thus, as is often the case with law enforcement data, the apprehension figures might not fully reflect the reality of clandestine migration, and more research would be needed to better map the true migrant flows and their interaction with organized crime.

**How do irregular migrants get to Europe?**

Not all irregular migration requires the assistance of organized crime. There are at least three ways to enter a country with intent to migrate illegally:

- Some migrants enter legally but ‘overstay’ their visas.
- Some migrants enter through a legal checkpoint but use false documentation or other forms of fraud to gain entry.
- Some migrants enter the country clandestinely, avoiding official points of entry.

Those would-be immigrants who are able to make a plausible case for a visa can enter the country without the help of organized crime. This does not mean, however, that organized crime is not involved in planned overstays. For example, research on the trafficking of Nigerian girls to Italy has indicated that, until 1991, nearly all the victims flew direct from Lagos to Rome and acquired a three to 15-day transit visa, but that stricter enforcement led to the use of clandestine entry.29

Those who can afford the airfare but lack the supporting documentation can purchase the required paperwork, and here organized crime also plays a role. West African organized crime groups are internationally known for their expertise in procuring legitimate documents fraudulently, as well as forging official papers.

Finally, while it is theoretically possible to travel clandestinely from Africa to Europe without the support of migrant smugglers, this is very difficult to manage in practice today, as will be discussed below.

While it is difficult to say which method of entry is most common, some indication comes from the pool of people who apply to the state to regularise their immigration status. For example, in Italy in 2002/2003, some 700,000 requests for regularization were submitted. Of these, 75% of the applicants fell into the first category: they overstayed their visas. Some 15% entered using false documents, and only 10% arrived clandestinely. In the first six months of 2005, these figures shifted slightly, with 61% being overstayers, 27% users of fraudulent travel documents, and 12% clandestine migrants.30

Of course, many visa overstays may not be due to an intent to immigrate, and the chances of regularisation are probably better for this class than for the others. This may lead to a greater propensity to apply for regularisation in this category, and a smaller share of these people may intend to permanently immigrate. Still, 75% (visa overstays) of 700,000 is over half a million people, a large number compared to most estimates of the scale of clandestine immigration. On the other hand, 15% (fraudulent documents) of 700,000 is over 100,000 people using fraudulent documents successfully to enter Italy alone. Under the definition of the Protocol, anyone involved in providing these documents is guilty of participating in migrant smuggling, but the level of organization of this activity is difficult to assess.

What is clear is that perhaps 300,000 Africans each year attempt to enter Europe clandestinely, crossing multiple borders and major geographic obstacles while evading official detection. There
are strong indications that organized crime is involved in much of this migration. Depending on the country of origin, there are several ways to get across the Mediterranean from Africa to Europe. For sub-Saharan Africans, the Saharan desert provides an additional geographic obstacle.

Traditionally, both sub-Saharan African and North Africans have attempted to cross into Europe from North Africa, particularly Morocco, which is only a few kilometres from mainland Spain and the Canary Islands. Even more directly, it is possible to enter Europe via the Spanish enclaves in Morocco: Ceuta and Melilla, where access to European soil is blocked only by a fence and attendant security. Efforts by Moroccan and Spanish law enforcement authorities have made this transit route less viable recently. Consequently, an increasing number of migrants have been favouring alternative routings, including attempts via the Canary Islands from West Africa, and attempts to reach Italy from Libya and Tunisia. Each of these routings is discussed further below.

**Entry through the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla**

There are two pockets of Europe, specifically Spain, in North Africa – the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Even among those detained, migrants who make their way on to this territory and are not repatriated within the 40-day maximum period of administrative detention are released into Spanish society and from there into Schengen Europe. It is not surprising that, despite tight security, these two cities have been high on the list of the key destinations of irregular migrants in the past.

The border between Melilla and Morocco is controlled by 10.5 km of double fencing, the outer fence being 3.5 metres tall and the inner fence up to six metres, topped with razor wire and monitored by 106 fixed cameras. Ceuta is similar, with 7.8 km of border fence with 37 movable cameras. In each enclave, approximately 1,000 policemen and Spanish Guardia Civil officers are stationed.

Migrants cross these borders in a variety of ways – hidden in vehicles, by swimming or boating around the barricade, or by directly scaling the fence. More recently, large groups of migrants, who are encamped in forests nearby the enclaves, have taken to storming the fence *en masse*. In October 2005, world media attention was drawn to the enclaves due to these attacks. The response from Spanish and Moroccan border forces left several migrants seriously injured and some dead. This event, and the subsequent further tightening of controls, appear to have provided a significant deterrent. It also prompted the donation of some 40 million Euros from Europe to Morocco to combat illegal immigration. Official figures from Spain indicate that the total number of attempts to cross into the enclaves has decreased sharply, from 55,000 in 2004 to 12,000 in 2005.

**Passage through Morocco to the Spanish mainland or the Canary Islands**

Given its proximity to mainland Europe, it is not surprising that Morocco has long been the favoured point of departure for those choosing to cross the Mediterranean by boat. But coordinated security responses between Spain and Morocco have greatly reduced the attractiveness of this routing. Moroccan figures have been declining since 2003, when Moroccan authorities intercepted a total of 23,851 irregular migrants of foreign nationalities, mainly from the Maghreb area and sub-Sahara (e.g. Mali and Gambia). The Spanish too have seen a decline, with the number of boats intercepted declining by 32% between the first eight month of 2004 and the corresponding period in 2005, from 412 to 279.

**Passage through Libya and Tunisia to the Pelagies**

For those departing from Libya and Tunisia, the Italian Pelagies (Lampedusa, Linosa and Lampione) and Pantelleria Island (Sicily) are very close. The journey to these islands requires a minimum of 2 to 3 days sailing, however. The number of irregular migrants intercepted in Sicily has increased almost 10-fold in the past five years.
Italy’s long coastline, over 8,000 km, makes it especially difficult to defend against smugglers. In some documented cases, ships targeting Sicily have strayed off their route and mistakenly landed in Malta.36

Until recently, the maritime flows of irregular migrants to Italy were light and comprised almost entirely of North Africans. Since 2002, however, there has been a sharp rise in the number of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, transiting Libya, while at the same time the number of North Africans decreased significantly.37 Additional security measures taken at Ceuta and Melilla in late 2005 further enhanced the popularity of this alternative routing, and has also seen a resurgence in the numbers of North Africans using this route.38 Approximately two thirds of the 22,824 African migrants landing in Italy in 2005 reportedly originated from either Egypt or Morocco, and, to a lesser extent, Algeria and Tunisia. Considerable numbers also came from countries such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. Additionally, reports from both media and national authorities indicate a growing use of the Mediterranean route for smuggling irregular migrants from Southwest Asia, and the Middle East.39

This routing has had a tremendous impact on the small nation of Malta, which, along with Cyprus, may be increasingly seen as a destination since gaining EU membership. With a population of less than 400,000, the arrival of some 6,000 migrants since 2002 has been likened to one million people entering Germany.40

In Tunisia, the ports of the east coast are the primary launching sites for a Mediterranean crossing. As in Libya, farming communities on the outskirts of Tunis provide a consolidation point for migrants before their crossing. Those headed for southern Sicily depart the ports north and south of Tunis, those headed for Pantelleria depart from Cap Bon, and those destined for Lampedusa and Linosa depart from the areas south of Monastir.41

**Passage from West Africa to the Canary Islands**

The sensitivity of the smugglers and the irregular migrants to law enforcement efforts can be seen in the dramatic escalation of migrant smuggling to the Canaries from the West African coast in the last six months. The Canaries had long been a target of irregular migrants, primarily from nearby Morocco. Following the crackdown in Morocco in late 2005, the number of migrants apprehended attempting this routing has skyrocketed. By March 2006, the Spanish authorities declared that irregular migration to the Canaries had reached alarming levels,42 and by mid-year some 10,000
irregular migrants had been apprehended. According to media sources and local authorities, between 6,000 to 14,000 potential irregular migrants are said to have gathered at the northern port of Nouadhibou in Mauritania with the intent of attempting the sea journey to the Canaries.\

Points of departure include coastal cities throughout Senegal, Mauritania, and the Western Sahara region. Senegalese migrants have been apprehended trying to depart directly from Gambia. There have been cases in which vessels from as far as Cameroon or Nigeria travelled along the West African Coast up to the cities of St. Louis in Senegal, Nouadhibou in Mauritania and points in the Western Sahara. Enforcement efforts have pushed the points of departure further south, so that, for example, migrants embark from Senegal not only from the northern city of St. Louis, but also from Dakar and Mbour.

For better resourced migrants choosing this routing, there is the option of taking a larger craft to close proximity of the Canary Islands. For poorer migrants, smaller craft (mainly the open wooden fishing vessels known as ‘pirogues’) are the only option.

The larger vessels often land in different inadequately controlled ports on the route or anchor off shore, with the migrants completing the final leg by one of two possible means:

- the migrants leave the vessel unaccompanied in small canoes.\
- small boats operating from the Canary Islands are dispatched to receive the passengers.

There is recent evidence that large vessels have been recovered from scrap yards and refurbished to make a one-way trip to the Canaries, carrying hundreds of migrants. For those who cannot afford passage on an ocean-going vessel, there is always the option of employing a pirogue, or a “cayuco”, a fiberglass boat 14 to 18 meters long used for the traffic of 50 to 70 migrants. Often these boats are equipped with two outboard motors, a global positioning system (GPS) and just sufficient food and fuel for the duration of the travel. As the smuggling is getting more professional, larger boats are being manufactured in the region that can accommodate 100 to 150 migrants. Smugglers have also started using zodiac inflatable boats.

The representative of the Red Crescent in Mauritania estimated that, typically, 40% of these small boats would sink and that in the period between November 2005 and April 2006, some 1200 to 1300 would-be migrants had lost their lives in the attempted crossing.

If the sea routes to the Canary Islands were shut down, this might push criminal syndicates to ferry their ships directly to Mediterranean shores, as has been attempted in the past. For example, recently the Spanish authorities rescued a ship carrying some 226 irregular migrants from Southeast Asia, supposedly destined for Malta or Cyprus.\n
Other points of embarkation

In the past, Egypt had simply been too far away to attract the volume of migrants seen by other North African countries, but this may be changing. Egyptian authorities are reporting a growing interest by smugglers in using the long Egyptian coast line as points of exit for their northbound maritime smuggling activities. Additionally, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of irregular migrants using Egypt as a transit area to nearby countries such as Israel.

Getting to the embarkation points

The precise route chosen clearly depends on the origin of the migrant. Those resident in North Africa need only worry about crossing the Mediterranean and landing undetected. For sub-Saharan Africans, however, the formidable geographic barrier of the Sahara Desert must be crossed first. According to interviews with migrants who made it to Europe, it is this leg of journey that is most perilous.

For West African migrants, which comprise the largest share of sub-Saharan migrants, the journey starts by getting to one of three primary staging countries, each with its own route to the north: Senegal, Mali and Niger.
Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe

- For those departing Senegal, the path leads through Mauritania to Morocco.
- For those departing from Mali, the route is direct to Algeria, and then possibly on to Morocco; or through Mauritania to the Canaries.
- For those leaving from Niger, the route goes through Algeria or Libya, and possibly Tunisia.

Along the three routes there are several important way stations where the migrants rest and traffickers consolidate their activities. For example, those departing from Mali from Bamako generally stop in the city of Gao (Mali). From there they proceed to Kidal and Tessalit (Mali) across the Algerian border to Tamanrasset, where they are transferred to vehicles with Algerian license plates. From here the route leads to Northern Algeria (usually Maghnia) and from there to Morocco. Tamanrasset is also accessed from Niger, from the city of Agadès, and then on to Libya. Alternatively, those departing Bamako can go via Gogui in Mali to the sister city of Gogui in Mauritania to Nouakchott (Mauritania) and finally to Noadhibou (Mauritania) before embarking for the Canary Islands.

Travel for West Africans in this region is facilitated by the fact that there is free movement between ECOWAS countries. Further, people with a Malian passport do not need a visa to enter Algeria. False Malian papers are easily obtained with the help of organized crime, so crossing into Algeria does not generally pose great difficulties. However, few irregular migrants depart Africa directly from Algeria, crossing instead into Morocco, Tunisia, or Libya before beginning their maritime journey.

African migrants often enter Libya via the cities of Shebha or Al Jalwf. Primary departure points in Libya include Zuwarah (56 km from the Tunisian border), Zilten and Misratah, as well as the region around Tripoli itself. For irregular migrants originating in the Horn of Africa, one main nexus point may be located in the Al-Kufrah area, 950 km south of Benghazi, along the route from Sudan to Libya.

Map 1: Migrant smuggling routes from Africa to Europe

Legend
- Capital cities
- Main transit points
- Main trafficking routes from Africa to Europe

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Morocco is usually accessed through its porous borders with Algeria, particularly via the Algerian city of Maghnia to the Moroccan border town of Oujda. From there they can proceed to staging areas north and south of Casablanca, to be transported South to El Aiun for departures to Fuerteventura in the Canary Islands. Alternatively, they can attempt Melilla or proceed to the area around Nador, from which a crossing to the Spanish mainland can be made, landing between Malaga and Almeria. The shortest route, though the best policed, is from the area between south Tangier and Tetouan. If this fails, Ceuta is nearby.58

Migrant smuggling routes in Africa are also being used by international criminal syndicates involved in the smuggling of irregular migrants from other continents, particularly East, South, and Southwest Asia. Irregular migrants from Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan have been found stranded in West or North Africa. Taking advantage of relative ease of securing visas to West African countries, migrants normally enter West African countries legally by air.59 Popular air destinations include Mali (Bamako), Conakry (Guinea) and Burkina Faso. From there illegal Asian migrants travel overland to Mauritania and Morocco before they attempt to reach Europe by boat. The full package solution (Pakistan–Europe) including three smuggling attempts costs 12,000 Euro.60

Excerpt from “Desperate voyage, destination Spain” by Meg Bortin:

Once Seck had made the decision to go, it took only a week to get ready. His family raised the sum required by the owner of the pirogue - 500,000 CFA francs, or about $900. Then he began what he called his "spiritual preparation" by consulting his marabout [personal spiritual advisor in West African Islam].

"Traveling by sea is not easy," Seck said. "The distance is extremely long" - about 1,500 kilometers, or 930 miles, a five- to seven-day Atlantic journey from Dakar. "When you leave, the marabout stays behind and prays for you."

Seck took ritual baths for three days under the marabout’s guidance and performed a sacrifice by giving his boubou - a light cotton tunic and pants - to a handicapped man. Then he turned over the money to the boat’s owner and waited for the call.

Taken in two buses to Joal, a seaside town 110 kilometers south of Dakar, the men boarded their pirogue before dawn on May 15 and headed to sea.

When the sun came up, Seck said, "I was astounded at how many people were on the boat. I counted; there were 102 of us."

The migrants, about 20 to 40 years old, sat elbow to elbow in the front of the boat under an awning. In the center was a cooking space and an area for bailing out the water that sloshed aboard. Supplies were stocked in the rear: fuel, water, rice, onions, biscuits and fish in an icebox.

The captain was a fisherman who was to get free passage in exchange for his services; the boat’s owner stayed ashore. The captain headed north to Dakar where, off Gorée, an island infamous for its role in the slave trade, he used a Global Positioning System to set the pirogue on a course for the Canaries.

The journey began well, but then the sea grew rough. With three-meter waves rocking the boat, the passengers sang and prayed for two days and nights to keep their spirits up. Then, as the pirogue neared Nouadhibou, at the northern edge of Mauritania, the captain shut off the motor, jolting the passengers from sleep.

"The captain said we didn’t have enough fuel to make it to the Canaries," Seck said. "We were upset. People started shouting. How could it be, we thought, that with all the money we paid they didn’t buy enough fuel?"

The passengers demanded answers. "The captain said he didn’t want to risk it, explaining that if fuel ran out, the boat would capsize and everyone would drown."

So they turned back.

Source: International Herald Tribune – 30 May 2006
PART 2: THE ROLE OF ORGANIZED CRIME

How significant is organized crime in the smuggling of African people to Europe? According to Europol, some 80% of irregular migration to Europe is ‘facilitated’. Based on the preceding description of the migrants and their journey, however, it is clear that there is a range of degrees of organization to migrant flows:

- Those who can afford it may buy the ‘full packet solution’, in which most or all aspects of their journey are pre-planned and coordinated, although local actors may be contracted to provide services within their own domains.
- Other migrants make use of organized crime assistance piecemeal, engaging with different groups at the various stages of their journey. Coordination between these actors may be due to simple market forces – those providing support to one leg of the journey offer their services at the terminus of the previous leg – or may be more formalised.
- Interviews with migrants suggest that many, particularly young men, initially attempt the movement north without the assistance of organized crime, only to encounter failure. These people may eventually have recourse to organized crime. It appears that migrants from the wealthier countries are less likely to be apprehended than those from the poorer countries – the difference may be due to the capacity to enlist organized crime.

The first of these best fits popular preconceptions about organized crime:

- The smuggling groups are a network of specialists spread transnationally and organized like a business;
- They are often involved in other criminal activity, including the corruption of officials,
- They actively market their services to bolster demand.

But the second category – the local smuggling groups that sell their services directly to the public at well-known gathering points – is also undeniably a form of organized crime. These are often dismissed as ‘artisanal’ activity by West African law enforcement officials, meaning that they run in a way similar to a small family business. But there is growing evidence that these activities are becoming more sophisticated in many areas. Some artisanal operators were involved, or are presently involved, in other forms of smuggling activity. Local papers say that ‘recruiting officers’ in Mbour (Senegal) and along other coastal towns are actively promoting irregular migration, an activity that transcends mere opportunism. There is also evidence that law enforcement pressure is weeding out the amateurs and channelling the trade into the hands of more organized groups.

Thus, two forms of organized crime activity are discussed below. Organizations offering ‘full packet solutions’ are generally professional criminal organizations based in the country of origin of the migrants. They sell a comprehensive irregular migration service, not just clandestine travel from one point to the next. The second category are the locally-based opportunists, whose services are generally limited to operations on their home turf. These include groups that specialise in crossing the Sahara, crossing the Mediterranean, or embarking from the West African coast.

Full packet operators

Those who can afford it can pay a single price to be delivered from their point of origin to their destination. This ‘packet’ of services can include falsified documents, transport, accommodation, bribery of border officials, advice etc. While these services are generally comprehensive, some variations leave parts or aspects of the journey to be organized by the migrant.

“The full packet solution” is most commonly associated with West African organized crime groups. West African (most often, Nigerian) organized crime groups are often described as ‘networks’, since individuals with expertise in a particular area can be associated with others on a transactional basis, rather than being locked into a rigid hierarchy. This ‘organic’ structuring is
extremely adaptable, and allows these groups to penetrate into niche markets more unwieldy organizations are unable to reach. Flexibility also makes these groups resilient to law enforcement countermeasures – it is impossible to ‘decapitate’ a typical West African organized crime network, since its structure is essentially horizontal.

West African organized crime groups have been detected in a wide range of countries, and are known for their involvement in drug trafficking, forgery and fraud, official corruption, and human trafficking. West African human trafficking groups have been found to be active in Europe and Africa, trafficking both West African nationals and citizens of other countries. For example, in 2004, the Moroccan police arrested 70 Nigerian traffickers and rescued 1,460 Nigerian victims hidden by traffickers near Mount Gourougou, outside the Spanish enclave of Melilla. They are also involved in migrant smuggling in other areas, such as the illegal movement of Nigerian nationals to South Africa.

Typically, the full packet solution includes the proactive recruitment of migrants, the journey to staging points in Senegal, Mali (Gao) and Niger (Agadès), and the crossing of the Sahara desert. If these networks do not control the route themselves, they at least coordinate with other networks to whom they outsource part of the transport along the route. After departure, irregular migrants use cell phones to receive instructions from the organized crime network.

Offering a full packet solution requires a certain degree of sophistication. These groups have contacts in several countries, have access to funds payable internationally, control or contract means of transport, and procure falsified documents. These networks sometimes work with associated criminal groups in Europe that are involved in the receipt of the smuggled migrants and in their onward movement to other EU states. In the south of Spain, for example, smuggling networks consisting of nationals from Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania are known to facilitate smuggling operations from Morocco. The groups operating from destination countries are sometimes involved in collecting money from relatives of the migrants in advance, which is subsequently transferred to smugglers in source or transit countries using hawala (traditional informal money transfer) networks. Sometimes pressure is put on families of migrants in their home countries to pay additional ‘transportation fees’.

Since Egyptians do not need a visa to enter Libya, they are able to access Europe for a single payment made in their home country. This transaction is arranged by a wasit (Arabic – ‘intermediary’) who is generally based in their village of residence. Since each wasit operates only in his own village, he must maintain his reputation, and there are accounts of these intermediaries intervening in Libya on their clients’ behalf. Migrants are instructed exactly where to go during their journey and remain in phone contact with the wasit.

Africans are not the only people taking advantage of full packet solutions to Europe. Italian authorities are reporting Chinese organized crime groups who provide Chinese economic migrants with airline tickets to Malta, a student visa and registration documents for local English courses. Once in Malta, the migrants are forced to pay additional fees to be smuggled to mainland Italy by powerful motorboats in a crossing that takes less than an hour.

Another set of migrants purchasing comprehensive irregular migration services for a single fee in their home country are people from South Asia (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) who, since late 2004, have in growing numbers chosen Africa as a transit route to Europe. Lax visa controls make West Africa easy to access, and Asian agents receive the migrants before directing them to smugglers who take them across the Sahara. Unfortunately, these migrants are among those frequently duped, and have been encountered abandoned in out-of-the way places like the desert town of Zouerat, Mauritania (population: 34,000).

According to the Malian authorities, Touareg and Arab criminal groups facilitate this smuggling, based on strong ties between these Asian nationals and Malians from the North, in particular from Kidal and Tombouctou. Pakistani and Bangladeshi men arriving in Mali form two distinctive groups: those who go to Mali to intensify the preaching of their “Dawa” and those who would try to enter Europe via the Canary Islands. The latter cross the Niger river in Didi near Ber (in Tombouctou) therefore going from Abdelbod via Taoudenni – Lahmeïmi - Zouerat in Mauritania.
and then direct their journey to Dahla in Western Sahara, where Sahrawi criminal groups would take clandestine migrants to the Atlantic Ocean and then to Spain.76

Médicins Sans Frontières in Morocco recently documented migrant smuggling practices among sub-Saharan African networks that border on human trafficking. Women, largely Nigerian, are transported in groups of up to 30 people and kept separately from other migrant groups. They are required to provide sexual services to their ‘protectors’ during transit, but it is unclear to what extent they are being trafficked into sexual servitude in Europe.77

Fraudulent documents

Even outside the full packet solution, migrants make use of fraudulent documents for specific border crossings in Africa. Fraudulent documentation comes in a variety of forms:

- Genuine travel documents, including passports and visas, are available from intermediaries with connections to corrupt officials.
- Genuine passports and visas are obtained through the provision of false information, including forged supporting documentation.
- Genuine passports, including stolen documents, are altered (by photo substitution or other means).
- Genuine passports are used by individuals resembling the true passport holder.
- Blank passports are stolen and details forged.
- Other forms of fictitious documentation and false testimony may be used to gain a visa at the border or to gain entry or transit a country without a visa.

Acquiring fraudulent documentation does not always require organized crime. For example, the so-called ‘vrai-faux’ scam involves the presentation of bio-data from another individual at a civil registry to fraudulently acquire identity documents.78 But organized crime, particularly West African organized crime, has concentrated on this area, as it is vital to a range of cross-border operations.

Those who purchase full-packet solutions may be required to return their fraudulent documents once they reach their destinations, so that these may be re-used by other migrants.79 This tactic is particularly common with look-alike passports.

Locally-based opportunists

Those migrants who cannot afford to purchase a comprehensive portfolio of services are compelled to make due with connections made en route. These can be extremely hazardous, as the migrants are bargaining from a position of great weakness. Exposure generally means detention in North Africa, an experience many migrant testimonies portray as extremely grim. This allows the smugglers to effectively extort payment and provides little incentive to deliver services of any quality. Indeed, in many cases, no services are delivered at all. Worse, it appears that some smugglers may actively work to ensure that migrants are either arrested or die in transit.

Unlike those who partake of full packet solutions, the trip to Europe for these à la carte migrants can take weeks, months, or even years. Before each major crossing, migrants pool in staging areas, where they meet the smugglers and purchase the needed services. Where these involve transport, migrants may have to wait for the smugglers to assemble sufficient numbers of clients to make the crossing worthwhile. Disasters along the way can cause the migrants to wash up penniless other transit cities, where they struggle to earn enough money to either continue the journey or return home.

One of the recurrent disasters migrants encounter is outright fraud. Some ostensible smugglers gather advance fees to pay for supplies, and then simply disappear with the proceeds. The migrant has no recourse to the law and very little clout of any sort, as their survival depends on not making
themselves noticed and their hope lies in eventually availing themselves of the smugglers’ services. Many migrants recount paying several times before they eventually gained passage, and many suffer extortionate demands for additional payments part way through the journey.

The smugglers are usually nationals of the country through which passage is sought or, in the case of sea journeys, of the point of departure. Expatriate nationals of the countries of origin may be involved as mediators. Most local law enforcement officials do not regard these activities as ‘organized crime’, although they clearly meet the criteria of the UN convention on the matter. Evidence is continuing to emerge from the field about the degree to which these operators are internationally coordinated. For example, analysis of the cell phone call registries of Senegalese smugglers arrested in Mauritania showed recent contact with both Senegal and Europe.

Some of these individuals may have criminal backgrounds, particularly in other smuggling activities. For example, it appears that cigarette smugglers in the Western Sahara region are using their old connections with corrupt Moroccan border guards to move human beings as well. According to the El Pais correspondent at Tenerife there are more than 45 organizations in Mauritania, Morocco and the Western Sahara involved in smuggling irregular migrants across borders. Originally involved in contraband (cigarettes, etc.), in the last five years these criminal organization have converted to the more lucrative and less risky business of smuggling irregular migrants.

Sea passage to Europe is conducted in a variety of small wood or inflatable boats, into which as many as 200 migrants may be packed, with little room remaining for food or water. Along some routes, such as the passage from Libya to Italy or most small craft attempts on the Canary Islands, these vessels are regarded as disposable, as they are scuttled on arrival. This is possible because no one tied to the smugglers is actually present for the crossing. Rather, a ‘driver’ is designated, from among the irregular migrants, receiving free passage in return. This person may or may not have maritime experience, and is generally equipped with only a compass and general directions.

The implications of this arrangement are obvious. The smugglers have no interest in the boat ever reaching its destination. In fact, it is probably to their advantage if the craft sinks – this ensures no survivors to inform the authorities or other potential customers about the abuses they have suffered. Not surprisingly, survivors’ accounts are painfully repetitive: the boat is launched, within hours it begins to leak or the engine fails, and the migrants drift until they are rescued or die of dehydration. If this turn of events is not planned, it is certainly foreseeable. One journey only ended when the corpse-filled boat washed up in Barbados in the Caribbean. Those who had left the craft at a stopover on the African mainland said the trip had been arranged by three Spanish men. In all, 47 migrants died in this failed attempt.

When smugglers do accompany their shipment, it is often for the purpose of defrauding their charges. For example, there are many reports of migrants being dumped at a local beach and told they had arrived at their destination. This practice has been reported for sea smugglers operating from both North Africa and West Africa.

Based on a variety of sources, there appear to be several discrete services purchased by the migrants:

- Clandestine passage across the Sahara desert to North Africa.
- Clandestine passage across the Mediterranean to Spain or Italy.
- Clandestine passage from West Africa to the Canary Islands or mainland Spain.

Each of these will be discussed in turn.

**Smuggling across the Sahara**

Most of those who smuggle people across the Sahara are nationals of the country where the bulk of the crossing occurs. Unlike those offering full-packet solutions, those involved in these local crossings are largely disorganized opportunists. For example, the Moroccan authorities say Moroccan smuggling groups are fragile and loosely structured, build around a strong central
‘boss’. In comparison, the sub-Saharan networks are much better organized and difficult to dismantle.84

Unlike the sea passage, the vehicles used to move the migrants across the desert are intended to be used again, so representatives of the smuggling network must accompany the migrants. This is not always a blessing. Like at sea, migrants may be dumped on the fringes of any urban area and told they have arrived at their destination. Smugglers routinely abandon migrants if they encounter law enforcement, or out of caprice. Migrants may also face extortionate demands for additional payment, which can hardly be refused in the middle of the Sahara.

The identities of the smugglers depends on the route covered. At Gao, migrants entrust themselves to the care of Touareg smugglers. As nomads, Touaregs are used to the harsh conditions in the desert and they are able to navigate through the desert while avoiding official border crossings. In Libya, the drivers are usually Libyan. Migrants are often piled elbow-to-elbow in the back of pickup trucks in convoys of two to three vehicles for a ten-day journey (mostly conducted at night) across the desert to Tripoli or Benghazi. Particularly worrying are allegations that local law enforcement is actively involved in selling smuggling services, routing arrested migrants with the means to purchase smuggling services to their own connections.85

Migrants are targeted by corrupt law enforcement officials because it is well known that they carry large quantities of cash on their persons. One Italian journalist, who followed the migrants’ path, was able to document this experience, as recounted in the box below.

**The road of desperation. In the Sahara with the irregular migrants to Italy.**86

> We traveled with the migrants, following them on the longest route (5,000 km) from Dakar, Senegal, to Libya. A backpack, some water and a Touareg shawl to hide our white skin if necessary. Migrants come from Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Benin, Togo, Nigeria and Cameroon, and gather at Agadez, Niger to cross the border with Libya. It is estimated that 15,000 people every month cross the desert to migrate. Some die on the road, either because of illness, or because of violent beating at the border controls.

Corruption related to irregular migration is the largest business for the police, gendarmerie and army of Niger, as well as Libyan forces patrolling the southern border and the Tumu passage. Every migrant has to pay a bribe of approximately 15 Euro (20 USD). If the migrants do not pay, they are beaten. Officers know that migrants carry the money to pay organized crime for transportation across the sea, so if they find the money, they steal it. It is estimated that this business generates approximately 20 million Euro per year.

Once they arrive on the coast, migrants generally must negotiate a new contract for the sea crossing. Migrants arriving in Morocco do not have to attempt the Mediterranean if they are able to enter the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Before the recent crackdowns, it was believed that thousands of Africans were hiding in forests close to the enclaves, waiting for the right time to climb the fences. Sometimes resident for months, these people of these camps began to display some self-organization. Migrants were organized into groups based on nationality. Each nationality has its own chairman and a ‘Counsel of Chairmen’, choose a “Supreme Chairman”. The Supreme Chairman had the role of authorising doctors, hairdressers and other trades people, as well as selecting areas for religious practices and sports.87 These groups merge for major attempts on the fences, which are usually conducted at night using crude rope and wooden ladders.88

**Smuggling across the Mediterranean**

While experiences differ depending on the point of embarkation, most migrant accounts of their attempts to cross the Mediterranean are filled with abuses. A waiting period is generally necessary as the smugglers gather sufficient clients and buy and restore a boat. During this time the migrants remain hidden, entirely dependent on the smugglers for their liberty, their food, and their future.
Promises are made and broken, more money is demanded, and the whole fiasco culminates in a
dramatic clandestine launch of a leaky craft overstuffed with frightened migrants.

Morocco appears to be in decline as a point of embarkation due to enhanced law enforcement.
Transport is typically in small boats known as pateras. The distances to be crossed are short but
well-policied, so secrecy and waiting characterise this launching point. The degrees of violence to
which the migrant populations are subject are well documented in a recent report of Médicins Sans
Frontières in Morocco. Between April 2003 and May 2005, out of a total of 9350 medical
consultations with sub-Saharan migrants, 2193 were treated for injuries due to violence, inflicted
by security officials, human smugglers, and other criminals. The incidence of these injuries shows
a clear upward trend. The report also documents the policy of returning irregular migrants to the
Algerian/Moroccan border, where they are abandoned in unpopulated areas.89

In Libya, contact with Libyan smugglers is generally made through an intermediary (wasit) of the
same country as the migrant who has been resident in Libya for several years. The migrants may
be shown a sample boat, which is invariably of better quality than the vessel in which they will be
transported. In fact, the actual boat is rarely in the possession of the smuggler at the time passage
is sold – the proceeds are used to purchase an appropriate craft for at least cosmetic restoration.
Once passage has been purchased, migrants are transported to clandestine lodgings (hawsh), often
located on farms in towns outside Tripoli, such as Zuwarrah and Zlitin, from which the sea
passage will commence. In Tunisia, the hawsh is known as a ‘gouna’. There appears to be some
cross-border trade with Libya in old Tunisian fishing boats, which are hastily restored to marginal
seaworthiness. Those who balk at entering the ramshackle craft offered may be compelled to
embark at gunpoint, so that no one remains in Libya to tell the tale. The trip to Lampedusa, which
can take just over a day under optimal conditions, can stretch out over weeks, and press reports
have recounted journeys of up to 23 days.

Smuggling through the Atlantic

The maritime movement of people towards the Canary Islands illustrates the spectrum of
organization found between professional criminals and market-organized opportunists. As
discussed above, both large and small craft are used to approach the Canaries, with those on the
larger craft being launched in smaller boats near the islands. The use of large ocean-going vessels
picking up migrants in several countries along the route to the Canaries suggests a coordinated and
well-resourced transnational activity. Nigerian, Ghanaian, Liberian and Senegalese organized
crime groups are believed to be involved.90

Even with the smaller vessels, there appears to be some degree of organization in some areas. One
key reason these attempts have increased is that they are greatly facilitated by the advent of
portable GPS systems and satellite phones, two technologies that imply some degree of capital
investment in the venture. In addition, there are accounts of Ghanaian groups buying and repairing
pirogues in Senegal for the purposes of migrant smuggling.

Recent reports in Senegal, however, indicate that most of the pirogues involved in attempts on the
Canary Islands were previously used for fishing, and that their owners and crews are sometimes
among the group of irregular migrants. Crossings are advertised by word of mouth and advance
fees are collected, ostensibly to be used for the procurement of GPS, engines, fuel, and the other
commodities required.91 In the end, however, fees from other passengers not only cover equipment
costs – the pirogues are typically scrapped upon arrival – but also exceed substantially the profits
made by fishing. This activity is ‘organized’ by simple market forces, with local workers who are
not, by nature, professional criminals, making optimal use of their operating capital and skills.
However, these ad hoc activities may have a hard time competing with more organized enterprises
in the long run, due to the increased attention by both media and law enforcement border control
agencies.
There is no doubt that irregular migration is a problem in Senegal. It is not a new phenomenon, it has been going on for years and poverty is at the root of it.

Like in Cape Verde, Gambia and Guinea Bissau, the smuggling of migrants is also organized from Senegal. West Africans from English speaking countries, like Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria, mostly organize this. Many of them have lived in Senegal for a long time already as they arrived as ordinary seamen who later on decided to engage themselves in the more lucrative smuggling of migrants. Senegalese nationals, who they call ‘sergents-recruteurs’, support them. People behind this illegal immigration are organized in a network in which everybody has his or her own separate tasks.

In a typical case of trafficking via maritime routes, an old trawler is bought. After the purchase, candidate migrants are recruited. They pay in between 1 and 2 million CFA (between 1500 and 3000 Euro). Migrants are not only from Senegal. Many West Africans arrive in Dakar by plane after which they try to get on a boat with Europe as a destination.

After payment of the fee, the candidate migrants are escorted to beaches in and around Dakar. From the beach fishermen take them by pirogues (dugout canoes) to the trawler at sea. Adding to the problem are the weak controls of the fisher trawlers in the port of Dakar.

The problem of migration is not easily solved. Living standards in West Africa are harsh and although there is economic growth, it cannot keep up with the population growth. Travelling in West Africa is easy, as citizens of ECOWAS member states can travel unregulated within the ECOWAS region, and finally, the remittances of migrants living abroad are very important for many Senegalese families. In 2004, remittances via official channels accounted for over 200 billion CFA (300 million Euros) for Senegal only. This is an important source of income for the country, and it can urge people to migrate.

Source: Senegalese Police – October 2005

### Potential value of the migrant smuggling market

The incentive for all this activity is money. Despite the poverty of the countries of origin, migrants are able to access, through extended family structures, considerable sums to finance what may be seen as a venture that could benefit both the migrant and his relatives.

The cost of the trip is dependent on a number of factors, including the origin of the migrant and the methods used. The tables in Annex B below give price quotes for various routings based on a variety of sources. Based on this information, a rough average of about US$1000 per migrant should give the right order of magnitude. If the calculations in Part 1 are correct, the great bulk of the 200,000 people who make it to Europe each year paid smugglers for assistance at some point in their journey. It is also likely that the 100,000 who were apprehended also paid, despite their misfortune. These calculations exclude those who died on the way, whose numbers may be considerable.

Using these crude figures, the market for smuggling human beings from Africa to Europe in these transfer fees alone could be on the order of US$300 million each year, a considerable sum given the poverty of the region.
CONCLUSION

The pressure to find solutions to the problem of unmanaged migration might be stronger if the consequences were more visible. Europe will never see the untold numbers who die in the Sahara or whose corpses are tossed overboard in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, who are left penniless in transit countries far from their homes, or who waste their lives in North African prisons. As the situation becomes untenable in places like Malta, Lampedusa, the Spanish enclaves, and the Canary Islands, the human face of the clandestine flow will become more widely disseminated, and the need for immediate intervention apparent to all.

Of course, the problem is not exclusively European. The recent UNODC mission to the region found that while most countries had engaged with the Protocol, only one of the five had legislation on migrant smuggling, which clearly limits the scope for enforcement. There a need for legislative assistance and advocacy to ensure that relevant laws are passed.

Given that migrant smuggling is not a crime in most countries, awareness of the scope and consequences of the problem is low among security officials. Here too, attention is needed to help under-resourced police services engage with the issue. As has been proven in Morocco, a little investment can have profound consequences.

Among the smugglers themselves, there appears to be very little sense of moral fault – aside, presumably, among those who swindle or abandon their charges. This is particularly true for those whose participation in the smuggling is peripheral, and therefore relatively open. There are clearly a large number of people who are complicit in the enterprise, who ‘enable’ migrant smuggling in the sense envisaged by the Protocol: those who maintain the safe houses, who offer direction and translation, who supply the boats and the pick-up trucks. It is unlikely that these people would see anything wrong with helping the poor access some of the world’s richest markets.

So long as the crime of migrant smuggling remains morally ambiguous for the Africans themselves, it will be difficult for law enforcement to control the problem. There is a need for consciousness-raising in Africa about the costs and consequences of entrusting life and money to organized crime. There is a need for demand reduction for migrant smuggling from Africa to Europe.

In this campaign, the greatest tool is the testimony of the migrants who have fallen prey to organized crime and survived to tell the tale. Based on their accounts, it becomes clear that the role of organized crime in this area is only superficially about migrant smuggling. It has become a racket, and one that often has lethal consequences. Clearly, the human smugglers do not sacrifice any more of their profits than necessary to assure that a pirogue is seaworthy, investing just enough to ensure that the passengers cannot swim back to extract revenge. The system of migrant smuggling, by the pressures of the market if not design, has become nothing more than a mechanism for robbing and murdering some of the poorest people in the world.

Organized crime operates along the path of least resistance, and it chooses its targets based on their vulnerability. There are many levels at which this problem must be approached and there is a need for an integrated effort to stop the exploitation of those who are seeking for a better life for themselves and their families.
ANNEX A: STATUS AS OF JUNE 13, 2006 PROTOCOL AGAINST THE SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS BY LAND, SEA AND AIR, SUPPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

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<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>European Community</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>12 December 2000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12 December 2000</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>14 June 2006</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>14 December 2000</td>
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<td>Netherlands t</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>21 Sep 2004</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
<td>14 December 2000</td>
<td>09 February 2006</td>
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## ANNEX B: PRICE QUOTES FOR MIGRANT SMUGGLING SERVICES

### WEST AFRICA TO CANARY ISLANDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Price in US $</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Date of publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nouadhibou – Canary Islands</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>200,000 CFA</td>
<td>US $ 385</td>
<td>Les clandestins Moussa et Oumar regrettent d’être parties a l’aventure - AFP</td>
<td>15.03.2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis (Senegal) – Canary Islands</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>300,000 – 500,000 CFA</td>
<td>US$ 575-960</td>
<td>Apres 11 jours de divagation en haute mer avec 77 candidats a l’émigration – L’observateur</td>
<td>17.03.2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nouadhibou – Canary Islands</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>500 - 1,000 Euro</td>
<td>US$ 630-1260</td>
<td>Immigration clandestine: La Mauritanie, nouvelle porte vers l’Europe - Le Messager</td>
<td>12.04.2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Mauritania – Canary Islands</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>1,000 – 1,500 Euro</td>
<td>US$ 1260-1890</td>
<td>Spanish delegation at the Joint ICMPD – EUROPOL MTM Meeting.</td>
<td>25 – 29.04.2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco – Canary Islands</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>1,500 Euro</td>
<td>US $ 1890</td>
<td>Moroccan delegation at the Joint ICMPD – EUROPOL MTM Meeting.</td>
<td>25 – 29.04.2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal – Canary Islands</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>1,200 – 1,500 Euro</td>
<td>US $ 1,540 – 1930</td>
<td>Death boat drifts from Africa to Barbados – CNN</td>
<td>01.06. 2006 (start date of travel: 29 December 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis – Canary Islands</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>250,000 – 400,000 CFA</td>
<td>US $ 480-760</td>
<td>Emigration – Justice – Deux convoyeurs écopent 15 mois de prison et un remboursement de quatre millions - APS</td>
<td>09.06. 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SEA ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Mode (sea/land/air)</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Price in US $</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Date of publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Morocco – Spain</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>US$ 1,260</td>
<td>Attacking Europe’s border fences – BBC News</td>
<td>18.05.2004 (description of a successful migrant smuggling attempt in 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya – Italy</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>1,500 – 2,000 Euro</td>
<td>US$ 1,930 – 2,520</td>
<td>Protests as Italy expels migrants – BBC News</td>
<td>22.07.2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### OVERLAND ROUTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Mode (sea/land/air)</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Price in US $</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Date of publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casablanca (Morocco) – Spanish Enclaves</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>US$ 600</td>
<td>US$ 600</td>
<td>Billy’s Journey: Crossing the Sahara – BBC News</td>
<td>22.03.2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamako (Mali) through Gao (Mali) - Morocco</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>US$ 430</td>
<td>US$ 430</td>
<td>Gao’s deadly Migrant trade – BBC News</td>
<td>07.04.2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From home country to Oujda (Morocco)</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>1,000 – 2,000 Euro</td>
<td>US$ 1,260 – 2,520</td>
<td>L’enquete: Clandestins; Voyage au bout de la honte - l’Intelligent / Jeune Afrique n. 2336</td>
<td>16 – 22.10.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through Mali</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>‘at least’ 1,000 Euro</td>
<td>‘at least’ US$ 1,260</td>
<td>Interpol General Secretariat ath the Interpol meeting on Migration Flows and Trends in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>20 – 23.05.2006</td>
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</table>
## FROM ASIA VIA AFRICA TO EUROPE

<table>
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<th>Date of publication</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh/India/Pakistan – Sub Saharan Africa – Europe</td>
<td>Air/Land/Sea</td>
<td>9,000 – 16,000 Euro</td>
<td>Assistance au retour pour des migrants abandonnés dans le desert</td>
<td>09.05.2006 (arrival Mauritania December 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia – via Africa – Europe</td>
<td>Air/Land/Sea</td>
<td>12,000 Euro</td>
<td>Moroccan delegation at the Joint ICMPD – EUROPOL MTM Meeting</td>
<td>25 – 29.04 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2 According to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, ‘organized crime’ is defined as a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crime (…) in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.

3 For the purpose of this study, the term “irregular migration” is used for migratory movements aimed at illegally entering a destination country.

4 The relative lack of economic migration is also evident in the low levels of remittances from Europe to Africa. Despite its desperate poverty, Africa was responsible for only 10% of global remittances in 2002, which is less than its share of the global population. There are exceptional countries, however, where remittances (mostly from Europe) constitute a large share of GDP, including Cape Verde (23%), Ghana (11%), Morocco (9%), Sudan (7%) and Ethiopia (7%). See OECD, International Migration Outlook 2006. Paris: OECD, 2006, p. 142-143.

5 According to the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, “smuggling of migrants” means “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.” In Article 6 of the convention, the precise act to be criminalized is further specified to include:

- (a) The smuggling of migrants;
- (b) When committed for the purpose of enabling the smuggling of migrants:
  - (i) Producing a fraudulent travel or identity document;
  - (ii) Procuring, providing or possessing such a document;
- (c) Enabling a person who is not a national or a permanent resident to remain in the State concerned without complying with the necessary requirements for legally remaining in the State…

6 The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defines “trafficking in persons” as the act of recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person. The purpose of trafficking in persons is exploitation. Such exploitation includes, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.


9 Italian contribution to UNODC MENA study, 27 September 2005.

Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe

11 Minister of Interior Moustpha Sahel, AFP, Maroc: plus de 28,000 clandestins arrêtés depuis le début de l’année, 12 October 2005
14 Statement of the Italian Minister of the Interior.
20 Statements made by the authorities in Mali during the joint UNODC-EU assessment mission to Bamako, Mali on 28 June 2006.
21 ICMPD, op cit.
33 IOM (2005), "Migration", IOM’s quarterly publication, December edition. In October 2005, the EC estimated the number of migrants waiting in Algeria and Morocco to target the enclaves to be 20,000 and 10,000 respectively.
34 Meeting with representatives of the Moroccan Ministry of Justice, 13 September 2005. Arrests of Moroccan would-be-migrants are displayed separately in Figure 2.
36 EUropol/Interpol, “Assessment on People Smuggling in the Eastern Mediterranean”. Generally, Malta, due to its situation directly between Libya and Italy, 350 km from the Libyan coast and almost 100 km from Sicily, has received increasing numbers of irregular migrants since its inclusion in the EU in 2004, although they do not yet form part of the Schengen area in which there is free cross-border movement of people. During the single month of September 2005, Malta received over 500 irregular migrants at its shores, which sparked a heated domestic debate over its capabilities to deal with migratory flows. Many migrants originate from Somalia.
38 Italian delegation at the Interpol Specialized Meeting on Irregular migration from Africa towards Europe, 20 – 23 May 2006, Casablanca, Morocco.

42 Spanish Minister of Interior told before radio Cadena Ser that “while hundreds of Africans have died in the past few months trying to make the trip, three or four boats reach the island every day. So far this year, more than 2,000 immigrants have made it to the islands” www.cnn.com Official: 300 African Migrants drown a month, Associated Press. In the first 5 months of 2006, the number had reached almost 9,000 irregular migrants (over 2005, 4,751 migrants landed on the Canary Islands). www.irinnews.com, Senegal: As Police crack down on irregular migrants, Spain takes diplomatic action, IRIN/PLUSNEWS, 31 May 2006.

43 Le Nouvel Observateur, Nouadhibou ; une pirogue pour l’au-delà, 28.04.2006. In this article it is mentioned that there are 6,000 irregular migrants are staying in Nouadhibou, of whom 45% are said to be Senegalese, 45% Malian and the rest from Gambia, Guinea, Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire. In contrast, an article at the CNN website speaks of 14,000 migrants. www.cnn.com, Death boat drifts from Africa to Barbados; Associated Press, 1 June 2006


46 Interview with Spanish Police Liaison Officer, Dakar, 26 June 2006.

47 Le Messager, Immigration clandestine: La Mauritanie, nouvelle port vers l’Europe?, 12 April 2006

48 Spanish delegation at the Interpol Specialized Meeting on Irregular migration from Africa towards Europe, 20 – 23 May 2006, Casablanca, Morocco.


50 Heraldo de Aragon, June 6, 2006. The ship without flag and register apparently departed from Guinea Conakry.

51 Meeting with representatives of the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, 16 January 2006. No data available.


54 Interpol General Secretariat at the Interpol Specialized Meeting on Irregular migration from Africa towards Europe, 20 – 23 May 2006, Casablanca, Morocco.

55 Statements made by the Mauritanian authorities in Mauritania during the joint UNODC-EU assessment mission to Nouakchott and Nouadhibou on 30 June and 1 July respectively.


59 First liaison officer meeting at regional field office of UNODC in Dakar, Senegal, 20 July 2005. In particular the meeting mention Guinea Conakry, and Burkina Faso

60 Moroccan delegation at the Joint ICMPD-Europol MTM meeting “Migrations Flows and Trends in the Mediterranean - Threat Assessment and Risk Analysis, Beirut, 25 – 29 April 2006


63 Serge Daniel for Radio France International, Gao, couloir de transit pour l’Europe, 17.10.05. (translated from French to English by UNODC Regional Office for West and Central Africa).

64 In South Africa, 79 Nigerian nationals were arrested in connection with running a child prostitution ring in 2005.


68 Interpol Specialized Meeting on Irregular migration from Africa towards Europe, 20 – 23 May 2006, Casablanca, Morocco.


70 Spanish contribution to this study, received 5 September 2005. In 2004, 33 such networks were reportedly dismantled by the Spanish authorities, leading to the arrest of 64 criminals. However, no information on the number of convictions was given.


Italian contribution to this study, received 27 September 2005.

Vogt, op cit.

Document prepared by the Malian authorities entitled “L’immigration clandestine et le trafic illegal”, provided to the joint UNODC-EU mission on 28 June 2006 in Bamako.


Statements made by the authorities in Mali during the joint UNODC-EU assessment mission to Bamako, Mali on 28 June 2006.


See endnote 2.

Information gathered during the UNODC mission on migrant smuggling to Mauritania, 1 July 2006.


Hamood, S. African transit migration through Libya to Europe: The human cost. Cairo: Department of Forced Migration and Refugee Studies, American University in Cairo, January 2006, p 47.


L’Intelligence/Jeune Afrique, Clandestins ; voyage au bout de la honte, n. 2336, 16-22 October 2005.


Interpol Specialized Meeting on Irregular migration from Africa towards Europe, 20 – 23 May 2006, Casablanca, Morocco.