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## **Subcommission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East**

### **Forty-ninth session**

Vienna, 10-13 November 2014

Item 4 of the provisional agenda\*\*

### **Implementation of the recommendations adopted by the Subcommission at its forty-seventh session**

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1. The Subcommission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East, at its forty-seventh session, held in Antalya, Turkey, from 19 to 23 November 2012, adopted a set of recommendations following the consideration by working groups of the issues listed below.
2. In accordance with established practice, the report of the forty-seventh session was forwarded to the Governments represented at the session. A questionnaire on the implementation of the recommendations adopted at the forty-seventh session was dispatched on 17 June 2014 for responses by 22 August 2014.
3. The present report was prepared on the basis of information provided to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) by Governments in response to the questionnaire. As at 22 October 2014, eight replies had been received from the Governments of Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Qatar, the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey.

### **Issue 1: Modi operandi of organized criminal groups involved in drug trafficking**

#### *Recommendation (a)*

Governments should take steps to ensure that information needed to respond quickly to requests for controlled deliveries, such as agency contact details and minimum

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\* Available only in Arabic, English and Russian, which are the working languages of the subsidiary body.

\*\* UNODC/SUBCOM/49/1.



legal and procedural requirements, is readily available to other competent national authorities who require support in undertaking joint operations.

4. The Government of Azerbaijan reported that such information was available to other competent national authorities.

5. The Government of Bahrain reported that article 16 of the Law No. 15 of 2007, concerning narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, stipulated that legal proceedings should be facilitated so that concerned authorities could take all necessary measures to contribute to joint security operations and the controlled delivery system, in cooperation with neighbouring countries.

6. The Government of Egypt reported that there was constant coordination between all relevant authorities to take all measures that helped in responding quickly to requests for controlled deliveries.

7. The Government of Jordan reported that during 2013 eight controlled delivery operations had been carried out in collaboration with neighbouring States.

8. The contact details for the national focal point of the Anti Narcotics Force were shared with other competent national authorities. The Force had designated a specialized unit to act as a focal point to interact with the drug liaison officers of other countries or embassies, to share operational information and coordinate international controlled delivery operations. Over the years, numerous successful controlled delivery operations conducted by the Force were the best example of its quick response regarding the issue.

9. In Qatar, such information was easily available to the competent national authorities, as a result of Criminal Procedures Law No. 23 of 2009 and its provisions 425 and 426, related to controlled deliveries. Full coordination was ensured in the undertaking of joint operations.

10. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reported that no controlled deliveries had been made in 2013 or 2014, as a result of the cessation of contact with the relevant agencies in neighbouring States.

11. In Turkey, there were three national focal points for controlled delivery operations: the Turkish National Police-Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime (KOM), the Gendarmerie-KOM and Customs Enforcement. Controlled delivery operations were carried out under article 250 of the Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the Turkish National Police, KOM was responsible for controlled deliveries. The Counter-Narcotics Division was the contact agency for the undertaking of controlled deliveries and joint operations.

#### *Recommendation (b)*

Governments should ensure that their national drug law enforcement authorities establish operational working relationships and regular communication with the following international and regional law enforcement support entities: International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) and the Gulf Criminal Intelligence Centre to Combat Drugs (GCIC). Those entities facilitate the coordination of multilateral investigations and cross-border operations and the collection, analysis and sharing

of information needed to target and respond to criminal groups engaged in the smuggling of drugs and precursors through the Near and Middle East.

12. Azerbaijan cooperated with INTERPOL, CARICC (of which it was a Member State) and the Economic Cooperation Organization.

13. Bahrain, through the Drug Enforcement Administration within the General Directorate of Criminal Investigation and Forensic Evidence, guaranteed the implementation of the recommendations of the relevant international and regional law enforcement entities. It exchanged information and coordinated with the competent authorities concerned, such as INTERPOL, on all issues related to the international drug problem. Bahrain was a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Criminal Information Centre to Combat Drugs.

14. The Government of Egypt reported that it had working relationships with INTERPOL and all other international bodies working in the field of international and regional law enforcement.

15. The Government of Jordan reported that communication with INTERPOL and exchange of information with foreign liaison officers based in Amman had taken place.

16. The Anti Narcotics Force of Pakistan fully utilized the channel of INTERPOL to interact with the drug law enforcement agencies of other countries. With regard to operational work, information was shared and queries were responded to on a regular basis.

17. In Qatar, continued and permanent relationships were established regarding information-sharing operations with the above-mentioned regional centres and organizations as an integral part of the work of Communication and International Relations Office in the Drug Enforcement Administration.

18. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic indicated that, during the previous two years, there had been no coordination between its administration and any other administrations in neighbouring States, as all ties had been severed, in particular with GCC.

19. Turkey had always devoted special efforts to initiating and maintaining active cooperation with the entities mentioned above. Within that framework, KOM attended meetings abroad and hosted meetings in Turkey.

#### *Recommendation (c)*

To contribute to the identification of new trends and the development of national response strategies, Governments should encourage their law enforcement authorities to contribute to the Paris Pact initiative online mapping tool, which indicates seizures of illicit drugs and precursors.

20. In Azerbaijan, law enforcement authorities were contributing to the development of the online mapping tool.

21. The Government of Bahrain indicated that the Drug Enforcement Administration was not registered as a user of the online mapping tool.

22. Egypt indicated that it was in the process of taking action with regard to the recommendation.

23. The Government of Jordan reported that contacts with the authorities concerned existed through the Jordan Food and Drug Administration, whenever seizures occurred.

24. The Anti Narcotics Force of Pakistan regularly carried out analysis of the latest drug trafficking trends, and its strategy evolved accordingly. Seizure data on illicit drugs and precursors was also shared with UNODC on a quarterly and an annual basis. However, the process of sharing that same information via the online mapping tool could not be initiated as yet.

25. The Syrian Arab Republic reported that no action had been taken, as it had not attended the forty-seventh session of the Subcommission.

**Issue 2: Emergence of West African drug trafficking networks and the threat they pose to the region covered by the Subcommission**

*Recommendation (a)*

Governments should undertake a threat assessment of the current activities of West African drug trafficking groups operating in their territory and, based on the outcome of that evaluation, develop an appropriate response strategy.

26. In Azerbaijan, incidents involving the transportation and sale of drugs by nationals of African countries had been identified.

27. In Bahrain, the current activities of West African drug trafficking groups did not represent a clear threat to the security and integrity of the country. The risk to security came more particularly from Asian groups, as Bahrain was geographically nearer to the drug-producing countries of Asia.

28. The Government of Egypt had an elaborate strategy in that regard, which was updated as needed to respond to such groups.

29. In Jordan, the response strategy involved exchanging information with liaison officers and the international agencies concerned.

30. The Government of Pakistan reported that a number of West African drug trafficking groups that operated within the country and in several other countries were involved in narcotics crimes. They were using Pakistan as a transit point for Afghan heroin, as well as a market and transit point for cocaine and amphetamine-type stimulants. For that purpose, they had strong operational networks that used West Africa as a major hub for the further trans-shipment of heroin to other parts of the world. Such groups kept on changing their modus operandi but in general used low-risk methodologies, such as the use of transit countries to conceal the point of origin and final destination; the use of carriers other than Africans, such as South-East Asians; the trafficking of cocaine and amphetamine-type stimulants/“ecstasy” into Pakistan; the use of busy airports; the use of multiple carriers using capsule ingestion, luggage and other concealment; and the use of courier companies and the International Mailing Office. The Anti Narcotics Force had already launched a crackdown against West African drug traffickers and made significant seizures, resulting in the arrests of key players and the dismantling of drug trafficking organizations within and outside Pakistan.

31. The activities of such groups presented no threat to Qatar.

32. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reported that meticulous studies on the current activities of West African drug trafficking groups had been carried out, in particular with regard to the related arrests of Syrian persons.

33. Turkey was undertaking a threat assessment of the current activities of West African drug trafficking groups, especially at airports.

*Recommendation (b)*

To ensure that their territory and transit zones (airports, seaports and land border crossings) are not used by West African drug trafficking syndicates in their illegal activities, Governments should take steps to raise awareness of the common *modi operandi* the syndicates employ among their drug law enforcement authorities and to encourage the vigilance of these authorities to any future threats.

34. Azerbaijani territory was not being used by West African drug trafficking syndicates.

35. In Bahrain, drug control officers working in the country's ports and customs offices issued and shared reports on the common *modi operandi* employed by the trafficking syndicates. In addition, all necessary measures were taken to raise the technical and academic qualifications of the staff members of those offices through courses, meetings and workshops to ensure that they kept abreast of relevant developments.

36. Egypt took such steps on a regular basis, and decisive measures were taken against such activities.

37. Jordan took such steps through participation in international conferences and forums.

38. The Anti Narcotics Force of Pakistan led an inter-agency task force consisting of 29 other law enforcement agencies, with whom threat assessments and emerging drug trends were regularly shared in order to ensure their awareness. Likewise, the strategy to counter the *modi operandi* of West African drug trafficking organizations was disseminated to counterparts to curb the flow of illicit drugs at airports, seaports and border crossings.

39. Training and awareness-raising courses were organized regularly for the staff members of the authorities concerned at the different entry points of Qatar. They were thus informed of the most recent *modi operandi* that such syndicates employed to traffic drugs. The local competent authorities kept a vigilant watch on any threats that might emerge in the future.

40. The Syrian Arab Republic undertook measures to increase control over and continually monitor such syndicates.

41. Turkey's efforts are explained under recommendation 2 (a) above.

*Recommendation (c)*

Governments should encourage their law enforcement authorities to collate information on the activities of West African drug trafficking groups operating in their territory in a national centre for statistics, and share that information on a regular basis with their international and regional counterparts INTERPOL,

CARICC, GCIC and the joint planning cell of the Triangular Initiative of Afghanistan, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan, to assist in identifying and mapping the activities of these networks across regions.

42. Azerbaijan did not currently have information on the activities of West African drug trafficking groups operating on its territory.

43. The Drug Enforcement Administration of Bahrain welcomed any initiative to coordinate or exchange information on the West African trafficking syndicates and groups operating on its territory in order to include such information in its records and statistics and thus be able to refer to that information as a way of gaining expertise and experience.

44. Egypt reported that information on the activities of those groups was collected and shared with the international agencies concerned through international cooperation.

45. The Government of Jordan indicated that such information was collected and shared through the completion of the annual questionnaires of international bodies.

46. Pakistan reported sharing data on drug-related cases involving West African drug trafficking groups with UNODC and INTERPOL on a regular basis. The data included *modi operandi* and the quantity of drugs seized, to enable the law enforcement agencies of other countries to develop their own counter-strategies.

47. Competent national authorities in Qatar were on high alert to detect any new criminal activity. No threat had yet been identified, and such trafficking groups had no activities in Qatar. If such activities were identified in the future, information about them would be shared with international and regional agencies.

48. The Government of Turkey indicated that it shared information on West African drug trafficking groups and other groups with the above-mentioned organizations.

**Issue 3: Trends in the illicit manufacture and use of and trafficking in synthetic drugs, pharmaceutical preparations and psychotropic substances**

*Recommendation (a)*

Governments should ensure that their competent national authorities make use of the Pre-Export Notification (PEN) Online system and the Precursor Incident Communication System (PICS) provided by the International Narcotics Control Board to prevent the illegal diversion of precursor chemicals when authorizing the shipment of controlled precursor chemicals.

49. The PEN Online system was not currently being used in Azerbaijan.

50. After the visit undertaken by the delegation of Bahrain to the United Nations Office at Vienna from 16 to 19 June 2013, to receive an introduction to PICS and the PEN Online system and learn how to implement them, the Drug Enforcement Administration and customs offices in Bahrain had been granted the authority to activate and implement those systems. Efforts were being coordinated with UNODC, and procedures were being finalized, with respect to granting such authority.

51. In Egypt, the Central Administration of Pharmaceutical Affairs of the Ministry of Health used the PEN Online system in close cooperation with the Anti-Narcotics General Administration.
52. Jordan was a subscriber, through the Jordan Food and Drug Administration, to both systems, and was using them on a daily basis. At present, the Administration had started to activate the system relating to precursor exportation shipments.
53. Pakistan reported that the PEN Online System was being utilized to authorize legitimate imports and exports of precursor chemicals, while PICS was utilized for monitoring and sharing information regarding illegal diversion and seizures of precursor chemicals.
54. Qatar was using the PEN Online System and constantly tracking the movement of precursors to prevent diversion.
55. In Turkey, PICS was actively being used.

*Recommendation (b)*

To determine the source, location and trafficking patterns of illicit drugs, and to increase the effectiveness of the response of their national drug law enforcement authorities, Governments should support the development of drug signature analysis programmes and encourage the sharing of this research through regional and international collaboration.

56. In Azerbaijan, the sharing of research among authorities was being encouraged through regional and international collaboration.
57. The Drug Enforcement Administration of Bahrain encouraged the development of drug signature analysis programmes and welcomed the sharing of such research through regional and international collaboration.
58. The Government of Egypt indicated that implementation of the recommendation was under way.
59. In Jordan, cooperation had been established with a programme on studying the feasibility of smuggling Captagon tablets, thereby providing the programme with samples and information. Cooperation would also be established with a similar programme, the implementation of which was being undertaken by the General Administration of Narcotics Control in Saudi Arabia.
60. The Government of Turkey reported that, following the seizure of illicit drugs, it launched an investigation to find the source of those drugs and, when needed, it shared that information through regional and international collaboration.

*Recommendation (c)*

In response to the actions of transnational organized criminal groups trafficking amphetamine-type stimulants into and across the region, Governments should actively support their drug law enforcement authorities in developing closer operational cooperation with one another through the proactive exchange of information, collaboration in joint targeting and interception operations against identified trafficking syndicates, and the development of bilateral procedures to

support and facilitate a rapid response to requests to carry out controlled delivery operations.

61. The Government of Azerbaijan reported that a State programme for the 2013-2018 period had been adopted on 24 June 2012.

62. The competent authorities of Bahrain did not hesitate to provide full support to law enforcement authorities to facilitate exchange of information with neighbouring countries, cooperation with them in interception operations, joint targeting of such syndicates and rapid response to requests for controlled delivery operations.

63. In Egypt, competent authorities were taking legal measures with regard to the recommendation.

64. Three controlled delivery operations had been carried out during 2014 in Jordan.

65. The Syrian Arab Republic reported that it had not implemented the recommendation, owing to the severing of ties by certain States.

66. In Turkey, acquired information had been shared via liaison officers. Sixty new substances, some of which were amphetamine-type stimulants, had been placed under legal control the previous year by the early warning system of the Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and reported to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction.

*Recommendation (d)*

Governments should provide details of clandestine laboratories dismantled in their territories.

67. No clandestine drug laboratories had been detected in Azerbaijan or Bahrain.

68. Egypt provided such information when a clandestine laboratory was discovered.

69. In Jordan, there were no manufacturing processes relating to narcotic substances.

70. Pakistan reported that no clandestine drug producing laboratory existed on its soil. A total of 255 laboratories operating within Pakistan had been destroyed; the last such laboratory had been destroyed in 2006.

71. To the knowledge of the Government and the competent agencies of the Syrian Arab Republic, there were currently no clandestine laboratories on Syrian territory.

72. Despite the fact that there were no clandestine laboratories on its territory, Turkey was obtaining information and details regarding laboratories on the territory of nearby States.