Lecture by Prof. Dr. Jan van Dijk
Chief, Crime Reduction and Analysis Branch,
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
XI International Symposium on Victimology, University of Stellenbosch
Stellenbosch, South Africa, 17 July 2003
I wish to thank the organizers for the kind invitation to address this the Eleventh International Symposium on Victimology held here in Africa for the first time. As somebody who has spent many years participating in the debate on victims of crime, let me state at the outset that it is long overdue that a greater focus should fall on victims in the developing world, and particularly in Africa.
The purpose of my address today is to briefly sketch the differing burdens of victimization in the developed and developing world to illustrate that there is a very real and deepening criminal divide in the global community today. But, I wish also to push the boundaries of the current victimology debate a little further, by demonstrating that we should not only be concerned with the impact of conventional forms of crime (such as murder or rape), but also with the impact of organized crime and corruption which victimize countries, and by implication have critical impacts on individual citizens.
Violent inequalities
Let me begin by demonstrating using a series of slides the unequal impact of conventional forms of crime between the developed and the developing worlds. I will then present some of UNODCs new findings in respect of unconventional crimes, such as organized crime.
It is worth prefacing a discussion on comparative international crime statistics and victim survey data by admitting that the data available for the developed world is much more comprehensive than for the developing world. The numbers for the developing world that I will show you (and this applies most clearly to Africa) are often only a reflection of a few sources or proxy countries from which conclusions about continental trends are drawn. While this is unfortunate, the existing data does demonstrate some useful trends that are difficult to dispute.
The first slide (slide 1) shows a composite measure of two violent crimes assault (including threats) and robbery as measured by the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS), a fully standardized survey among samples of the general population about experiences of crime. Slide 1 depicts the percentage of the public victimised by such crimes in the course of a year. It is clear from the slide that the position of Latin America and of Africa is serious. Both continents displaying the highest (and by a considerable degree) level of these crimes. Moreover, in respect of regional homicide trends and based on data reported by criminal justice authorities to the United Nations, Latin America and Africa again show astonishing high levels of homicide (slide 2).
Given that homicide is generally regarded as a proxy crime for other forms of violence, it must be concluded that overall levels of violence in these societies is extremely high, perhaps three or four times that of the global average. More detailed homicide statistics, given in the World Report on Violence and Health of the WHO (WHO, Geneva, 2002 1) confirm this sad pattern.
Some comments must be made about the soundness of these comparative data. For several reasons the trends illustrated are likely to undercount rather than overcount actual levels of homicide in both Africa and Latin America. Firstly, the data excludes some important high crime countries such as Nigeria in the case of Africa, and Brazil in the case of Latin America. Secondly, our own comparative analysis using the hospital based data of the World Health Organization shows that in less developed countries a smaller proportion of homicides is recorded in official police statistics than in more developed ones 2. For these reasons, the degree of difference between homicide levels in the European Union (the data for which should be regarded as accurate) and Africa and Latin America is only too clear.
Unequal costs
It is important to note too that the impact of these levels of violence is greatest on those least able to absorb the costs of victimization the poor and vulnerable, those with no insurance and little if any access to health and other services.
In the developing world, perhaps the most important impact of violent crime is the loss associated with the victim being unable to work. In a context where many people may rely on the income or labour of only a few, the costs and consequences of violent crime can be particularly harsh. In particular, women and children often bear the burden of victimization when breadwinners and family heads are injured or killed.
What is so striking about the position of Africa and Latin America is that vulnerable groups like women suffer higher levels of victimization than anywhere else in the world (slide 3).
Data from police records shows higher rates of victimisation by violent crime among males. Data from the ICVS, however, which include violence not reported to the police, shows that African and Latin-American women are almost twice as likely to be victimized than men. In Asia too women are more vulnerable to victimisation by violent crime than men. The impact of such levels of violence are incalculable; their social, economic and psychological costs severe. To give just one statistical illustration, according to a World Bank study, rape and domestic violence cause more life/disability years lost annually in the world than the total for all types of cancer and more than double the total lost by women in motor vehicle accidents (World Bank, 1993)3 .
What are the causes of these comparatively high levels of victimization by violence in developing countries as illustrated by these three slides? The list is long, but perhaps some key issues can be briefly highlighted. For example, a series of World Bank studies on the comparative causes of violent crime show a strong correlation between incidents of violent crime and high levels of inequality, with this applying particularly to Latin America 4. In addition to inequality, poverty, marginalisation, the position of women in society, the availability of firearms, abuse of alcohol and drugs, and the demographic profile of some countries, are all contributing factors. So too of course are the legacies of brutality and violence that characterize many of these societies, particularly those like South Africa emerging from periods of authoritarian rule. As Nelson Mandela says in the foreword to the WHO report : We often talk about how a culture of violence can take root. This is indeed true- as a South African who has lived through apartheid and is living through its aftermath, I have seen and experienced it.
Organised crime and corruption
The disparity between the developed and developing world can be demonstrated not only in respect of conventional types of crime as recorded in victimization surveys or police data, but also in measures of unconventional crime. UNODC has recently developed a composite index of organized crime by combining data on over ten factors including perceptions of organized crime and high level corruption by business leaders, the extent of the grey economy in any society, the degree of arms and cigarette smuggling as well as levels of human trafficking, car theft and money-laundering, recorded from sources independent from the police. We have tested and refined the index in a number of ways. Data has now been collected for over 100 countries in all stages of development.
The following slide (slide 4) demonstrates the organized crime index when compared across various of the worlds regions. The index suggests that Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest levels of organized crime in the world, followed by Eastern Europe and then Latin America and the Caribbean. Non-conventional crime, such as organized criminal activity and related high level corruption, impacts the same areas of the world heavily affected by conventional violent crime.
The point can also be made in respect of the trafficking of human beings, which is often organized and given its close connection to sexual exploitation causes severe distress to victims who are generally women and children, UNODC has developed a database of human trafficking flows around the globe (slide 5). The conclusions from the data accumulated to date are unequivocal: states in transition and developing societies clearly bear the highest costs.
Eastern Europe and the CIS countries in particular display severe levels of human trafficking as countries of origin and transit while the industrialized world is the primary point of destination. Several countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America are also among the main countries of origin. It is clear that countries of origin have relatively low levels of human development, and destination countries (with some exceptions) generally have high levels of development . The flows of trafficked human beings therefore are from the developing to the developed world, with the greatest impact being felt by citizens of the former (slide 6).
The growing security divide
One additional and important observation should be made about global crime levels. That is, while significant parts of the developing world are experiencing high and potentially increasing levels of crime and violence, the developed world is showing stable and declining levels of crime.
The following slide (slide 7) demonstrates the decline and stabilization in crime levels in the developed world.
This is most noticeable for North America where the decline in the number of recorded crimes has been very significant since the early 1990s. Europe has shown no declines in police figures, but at least since the early 1980s, no dramatic increases either. In several European countries the latest victimisation surveys signal the beginning of a downward trend.
We must conclude therefore that there is a widening security divide between the rich and the poor in the current global context. In short, poorer countries are increasingly affected by (violent) crime and yet have fewer resources to cope with its adverse consequences. In developing countries crime hits not only more often but harder too. Key to this growing divide is evidence which suggests that urban crime is worsening in the mega-cities of the developing world, while in contrast urban crime is stabilizing or even declining due to, among other reasons, better security measures and perhaps more effective policing in many developed societies.
Unfortunately there is every reason to expect a further deepening of the criminal divide in coming years. The very countries where crime is severe and increasing seem least well equipped to bring crime under control. The security gap in terms of victimisation is mirrored by data on the effectiveness of official responses to the crime problem. I will use three slides to illustrate the point.
The first slide (slide 8) illustrates regional comparisons in respect of the proportion of homicide cases where a conviction was obtained as compared to the overall number of homicide cases recorded. The data shows Sub-Saharan Africa to be in a poor position, with a conviction being obtained in only one of every eighteen cases of homicide that are recorded by the police 5. In Europe by comparison every other police-recorded homicide resulted in a conviction. In short, law enforcement agencies in many developing countries lag far behind in the effectiveness of their investigations.
The second slide (slide 9), based on ICVS data, illustrates the percentage of those who reported crimes to the police across various regions and who were ultimately satisfied or fairly satisfied with the service that they received. In Africa, Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe less than half of the respondents reported themselves to be satisfied. Law enforcement in these regions is often suboptimal and this is duly noted by citizens reporting criminal victimizations. As is to be expected confidence in the police in such regions is generally low. The next slide (slide 10) shows the proportion of victimizations reported to the police per region. For robberies and other contact crimes in particular the proportion of victimization which are never reported to the police is much larger in the developing than in the industrialised world.
What do these three brief illustrations suggest? Primarily, that in regions of the world with high levels of crime, citizens who are victimised believe the police to be doing rather a poor job, and this assessment is confirmed by using one key measure of criminal justice effectiveness that is, the success of criminal justice systems in prosecuting and convicting those guilty of murder. As a consequence citizens victimised by crime refrain from reporting their victimisation to the police, thereby further undermining official crime control. The growing security divide that I pointed to earlier is therefore replicated in the performance of criminal justice systems themselves. In many parts of Africa and Latin America crime problems are severe and the institutions which should be addressing these problems are underperforming due to lack of resources or otherwise.
It is not enough, however, to argue simply that the developing world is plagued by high levels of crime and insecurity and that state responses are inadequate. Cannot a link be drawn between such levels of insecurity and the very failure of governance and development to take hold in these societies? In our view this is so, and it applies most particularly in the case of the organized crime-corruption nexus.
UNODC has become increasingly interested in the links between development, the presence of effective state institutions (or the lack thereof) and the growth of organized crime and associated high-level corruption. Our analysis suggests a clear link between the failure of some countries to achieve sustainable economic development that benefits all citizens and the growth of organized crime. When country performance on organized crime measured by our composite index of organized crime explained earlier is measured against performance in UNDPs Human Development Index, it is clear that those countries with high levels of organized crime have low levels of human development (slide 11). Economic winners like Botswana, Singapore, Hong Kong/China and Taiwan are also leaders in the fight against syndicates and high level corruption. At the macro level crime does not pay. Effective crime control apparently does.
In our view, organized crime, with its close relation to corruption, and lack of development, are mutually reinforcing evils. States characterized by these twin problems have little prospect of developing into prosperous democracies. In turn, the lack of development and the weakness of institutions provide the context in which organized crime and corruption thrive. Many developing countries are locked in a double bind of lawlessness and poverty. There are no easy ways out of this vicious circle.
Analyses by the World Bank Institute and others point to a clear link between corruption and economic stagnation in many societies. Our cross-national analysis of over 70 countries, representing all regions of the world, suggests that the level of organized crime and corruption is closely linked to the ability of states to both enforce the rule of law and ensure acceptable levels of governance. If, for example, an index for the rule of law, developed by the World Bank, is measured against our organized crime index, the results show only too clearly that countries with high levels of organized crime measure poorly on the rule of law index (slide 12).
It should be emphasized here that our work shows that the single most important predictor of economic growth appears to be the presence of an independent and professional judiciary 6. In short, the rule of law emerges as a critical success factor for creating an institutional environment conducive to sustainable development.
New frontiers of victimology
The data that has been presented illustrates the emerging divide in respect of citizen security in the current global context. In the developed world citizens are arguably increasingly safer than ever before. In the developing world citizens are experiencing perhaps unprecedented levels of urban insecurity.
Yet, it must be emphasised, that the problems of the developing world in respect of crime and security cannot be isolated from the developed world. The growth of organized crime, the decline of personal security and the weakening of state institutions in the South will have (indeed, already have had) profound impacts on the North. In the age of globalisation, it is true too that the developed world also holds some responsibility for the growth of insecurity in the South the main sex markets for trafficked human beings (as an earlier graph illustrated) as well as drugs is in the industrialized world; criminal profits are invested where they will get the best returns, in established banking systems in the North; and the corporate world of some developed countries directly contributes to institutional failure as unscrupulous providers of bribes to high ranking public officials, as illustrated by the bribe-givers ratings of Transparency International.
This is not the place to apportion blame for these interrelated problems to individual countries or to regions. But, it is to emphasize that, as never before, there is a global community of interests in addressing the nexus between citizen insecurity, organized crime, corruption, institutional failure, lack of development, irregular immigration and indeed terrorism which prospers in weak states. Sustainable solutions should therefore largely come from better international coordination and cooperation.
International organisations like the United Nations of course have a key role to play in this regard. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, which will enter into force later this year, provides the normative framework for the required upgrading of national systems and for better international cooperation. Developed countries are challenged by special Treaty obligations to provide technical assistance to help developing countries to build capacity to reduce the security gap.
But, it must be emphasised in a gathering like this that the academic community also has a critical role. Much more debate is required in respect of this emerging security divide that I have outlined. The first step in this regard is to increase our efforts to collect data on victimization patterns in developing countries, particularly in the poorest societies. Never before has there been such an urgent requirement to provide international policy makers with accurate and current data on global patterns of victimization. We must increase our ability to provide such measures. In this respect, UNODC hopes to conduct another sweep of the ICVS next year, with a greater representation of developing countries.
To conclude, the debate on criminal victimization has advanced rapidly over the last few decades. Crime problems are generally acknowledged as social and health problems for which effective solutions must be sought. That shift, however, has occurred largely in the developed world. Now, as new global patterns and inequalities in victimization are becoming clearer, there is space to renew the debate pushing forward the frontiers of victimization studies talking in greater detail about the security disparities that increasingly mark the boundary between those who live in the developed and developing worlds, and seeking policy interventions that will undermine and end this criminal divide.
1 Krug, EG et al. Eds, World Report on Violence and Health, WHO, Geneva, 2002
2 See Mark Shaw, Jan van Dijk and Wolfgang Rhomberg, Determining global crime and justice trends: An overview of results from the United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, FORUM, Vol 3, No1-2, (forthcoming), 2003.
3 See Mayra Buvinic, Andrew Morrision and Michael Shifter, Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean : A Framework for Action, Inter-American Development Bank.
4 See, for example, Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman and Norman Loayza, Inequality and Violent Crime, August 2001 (http://poverty.worldbank.org/library/topic/3362/12830/).
5 Of interest in this slide is the apparent poor performance of North America, where the conviction rate, when compared to the number of recorded cases is low and below the global average. One possible explanation is a relatively high acquittal rate for homicide prosecutions as well as the higher proportion of cases in the United States where plea bargaining occurs.
6 E. Buscaglia and Jan van Dijk, Controlling Organized Crime and Public Sector Corruption: preliminary results of global trends study, FORUM on Crime and Society, Vol 3, number 1-2, Vienna. UNODC ( forthcoming)