New York, 17 June 2003
by
Antonio Maria Costa
Executive Director
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Mr. President, it is a great honour to address the Council and I thank you for the invitation to speak about the global drug threat originating in Afghanistan. Actually, I pondered a lot on the wording of this agenda item, coming to the conclusion that a small change would capture better the essence of things. Of course, opium originates from Afghanistan. But the globality of the threat comes also from the rest of the world (especially Europe), hooked on it. In other words, should the Afghans claim that reduction of import demand from consuming countries is as vital as reduction of their own export -- well, I think they would have a point.
In any event, the problem of Afghan narcotics (opium, heroin and morphine) is serious. As a premise, I would like to stress three points:
1. During the past quarter century Afghanistan has found itself at the crossroad of violence and, as a consequence, of illegal activity. War and lawlessness have been the forces that have driven opium production to present levels, and not the other way around.
2. Afghanistan now faces an historic challenge: the establishment of an effective rule of law. The Government's commitment to controlling cultivation, trade and abuse of narcotics can be turned into real progress only if stability and security spread throughout the country.
3. Reference is frequently made to Afghanistan's drug problem. This needs a qualification: it is not true that the whole country is involved in illegal activity. Less than 1% of its land is cultivated for opium poppies, and no more than 6% of families derive the resulting illicit livelihood. Also note that only 5 of the country's 31 provinces produce opium on a large scale.
The Afghan Transitional Administration is gradually rebuilding the country's government. National policies, consistent with the emerging democracy, are being developed. The generous support by the international community, particularly by the nations that have taken the lead in different sectors of the government administration (several of these countries are seated at this table), is indispensable for further consolidation. Mr. President, allow me to thank in particular the government of the United Kingdom, for its generous and relentless role in leading the counter-narcotics work.
While the opium economy undermines current institution-building efforts, the argument could be turned around: namely, the slow progress in the re-establishment of the rule of law is hurting the authority's ability to reduce the drug economy. It is a vicious circle of sort.
Let's begin from the facts: the Crop Survey 2002-03
In 2002, poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 74,000 hectares, resulting in 3,400 tons of output from 5 provinces in the northern, eastern and southern parts of the country,
What about 2003? According to our recent pre-assessment current opium cultivation appears to have spread to new areas, while a decrease has taken place in the traditional provinces of Helmand, Qandahar, Nangarhar and Oruzgan. Therefore, on balance, neither the surface under cultivation nor the volume of output are likely to change significantly.
The Afghan Economy: the way out of illegality
Despite current efforts by the Transitional Administration, in the coming years Afghanistan will continue to be the world largest opium producer (at a time when in the Golden Triangle such cultivation is declining).
This projection is based on a simple consideration: over the past 20 years the Afghan agriculture, actually the country's entire infrastructure was destroyed, resulting in a war economy in which arms, drugs, smuggling and opium provided livelihood, saving, credit, and the means of exchange for almost 20% of GDP.
In order to rid Afghanistan of its dependence on illegal activities, starting from opium, it is necessary to create ample and easily accessible opportunities for alternative, licit sources of income. This task, however, is rendered complicated by economic and political (security) factors - interrelated as they are. Let's look at them.
First, the economic factors. On the surface of it, the country seems to defy a basic law of economics, according to which price and risk trends are correlated. Opium prices, which used to be at about $35-50/kg, have recently shot up to about $550-600/kg. In macro-economic terms, while the value of the opium harvest in 1990s was about $150 million a year, in 2002 such revenue reached $1.2 billions. (an amount that matches the total assistance provided last year by the international community). Why is a basic economic law challenged here? Because the price of opium has gone up at a time when the risks associated to its cultivation have not increased comparatively.
In order to understand how important is to redress the risk/reward balance in the Afghan country-side, let me make another point - this one regarding the security and the political factors. The task to rid Afghanistan of the drug economy requires much greater political, security and financial capital than presently available, to assist the rural areas affected by opium production and, above all, to improve the central government's ability to implement the opium production ban.
The threat to stability
Drugs originating in Afghanistan provide resources to crime and terrorism, and pose a major health threat. They ruin the life of entire communities. They corrupt. Let's take these points one at the time.
The drug dealers, among them the remnants of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, have a vested interest in ensuring that the state remains weak in Afghanistan. They ensure further flourishing of the drug economy with huge profits, recycled in violence and death. In pursuing this goal, they influence politics, foment regional strife, nourish separatist ambitions and armed conflicts to destabilize the government and challenge the national unity.
Corruption is both a cause and a consequence of narco-traffic. My UN-ODC Office has studied extensively the drug trafficking routes: a common element among them is the presence of corrupted government officials, corrupted port and airport staff, and corrupted customs employees. The old Silk Road, now turned into an opium-paved road, is riddled with such evidence.
Perhaps the most serious threat has come from the spreading of HIV/AIDS because of drug injections. In some of the countries neighbouring Afghanistan 4 out of 5 new cases of the blood infection have been determined by drug addiction. Unless the problem is brought under control, the risk of a pandemic in the region cannot be excluded.
Finally, the massive drug traffic from Afghanistan endangers the economic and social stability in the countries located along the trafficking routes, fuelling crime, money laundering and terrorist activities. Unless we reinforce our efforts to strengthen the criminal justice system in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries the crime threat to stability will persist.
A New Partnership
The Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan last month adopted its first National Drug Control Strategy. It foresees the elimination of opium within 10 years through law enforcement and rural development. It also aims to counter domestic processing and trafficking, to fight money laundering, reduce abuse and enhance international cooperation in drug control.
The Afghan drug economy can be reconverted to peace and growth if the government is assisted to address the roots of the matter. A report recently prepared by my Office (copies are available) has exposed these roots. First, the report has de-constructed Afghanistan's drug economy into its main components: production, financing, trafficking, refining and abuse. Second, the report has re-constructed the country's development processes piece by piece, showing that it is essential (i) to help poor farmers decide in favour of licit crops; (ii) to replace local narco-usurers with micro-lending; (iii) to provide jobs and education to women and their children; (iv) to turn bazaars into modern trading places; and (v) to neutralize warlords' efforts to keep the drug trade alive.
As said earlier, national efforts are not enough. Afghanistan's opium cultivation, trafficking and abuse have ramifications that reach deeply into the country's (and Central Asia's) recent history, and widely into contemporary geo-politics of terrorism and violence. Hence convergent efforts by neighbouring countries (through which narcotics are exported), and by Europe and Russia (where heroin abuse helps nourish opium cultivation in Afghanistan), are needed.
In particular, the international community could develop, under the UN auspices, a comprehensive approach aimed at:
(i) assisting Afghanistan to implement its Drug Control Strategy;
(ii) promoting in Afghanistan and its neighbours concerted measures against drug trafficking, stock-piles, clandestine laboratories and supply of precursors;
(iii) mainstreaming the drug issue into the overall reconstruction programmes for Afghanistan, inviting IFIs, MDBs and bilateral donors to channel resources accordingly;
(iv) promoting alternative development in the opium growing areas, through partnership with the specialized United Nations agencies;
(v) assisting Afghanistan in their criminal justice reform efforts;
(vi) providing a follow-up to the recent Paris Conference on Drug Routes from Afghanistan, with the proposed Consultative Groups.
UNODC will contribute to the largest possible extent, stretching our work beyond Afghanistan's own borders. While the demand for opiates is rising inside Afghanistan and in the neighbouring countries, the main lucrative market for Afghan heroin remains Europe, where demand reduction efforts should be intensified. This was the view of Ministers who met in April in the framework of the Commission of Narcotic Drugs -- I strongly second this assessment. It would make a significant impact on the Afghan drug threat.
Thank you, Mr. President.