Director-General/Executive Director
Monsieur le Président,
RSSG Salvador,
Excellences,
Mesdames et Messieurs,
Je vous remercie de me donner l’occasion d’intervenir sur la situation en Haïti, conformément à la résolution du Conseil de sécurité 2692 de 2023, et renouvelé par la résolution 2743 de 2024.
Depuis ma dernière intervention devant ce Conseil, la violence en Haïti n’a cessé de s’intensifier.
Les différentes coalitions de gangs poursuivent leurs efforts pour étendre leur contrôle sur des territoires stratégiques et mènent des confrontations mortelles entre elles, contre la population et contre les forces de l’ordre.
Les gangs recourent également à des tactiques de plus en plus brutales, comme l’attestent des massacres horribles, notamment celui de 115 personnes par le gang Gran Grif en octobre dans le département d’Artibonite, ainsi que l’exécution de plus de 200 personnes dans le quartier de Wharf Jérémie en décembre.
En parallèle, l’expansion territoriale de ces gangs reflète une action calculée, plutôt qu’une violence arbitraire, favorisant le contrôle des ressources et la collaboration avec les élites politiques et économiques.
À l’heure actuelle, les gangs contrôlent environ 85 % de Port-au-Prince, dont la majeure partie est maintenant divisée entre les différentes coalitions de gangs.
Et leur emprise sur le pays continue d’être facilitée par le trafic illicite et la corruption, comme le démontre le 6e rapport de l’ONUDC sous le mandat du Conseil de sécurité, que j'ai l’honneur de vous présenter aujourd’hui.
Excellencies,
The picture presented by the report shows that the reduction in violence seen between May and September of 2024 was reversed during the three months that followed.
Among the most notable developments, the Viv Ansanm Gang coalition intensified attacks and seized control of key areas in and around Port-au-Prince, including chokepoints outside the city which they are using to pressure and strangle the areas that remain outside their control, like Petion-Ville.
The ongoing violence and instability is compounded by illicit arms flows, drug trafficking, and other illicit markets, and underpinned by corruption and money-laundering.
Despite the reinforcement of the arms embargo, weapons and ammunition trafficking continue to flow into Haiti and into the hands of gangs. Reports suggest that this includes high-calibre firearms and ammunition, including multiple high-powered Barrett M82A1 precision rifles, which are used as anti-vehicle weapons.
Firearm trafficking routes are also shifting at both source and destination.
During the reporting period, firearms seizures linked to Haiti in the United States were primarily reported in Port Everglades, and not Miami. And in Haiti, most seizures were reported in Cap-Haïtien, and not Port-au-Prince. This may suggest that successful interdiction efforts have caused traffickers to explore other routes.
We also saw firearms and ammunition being diverted from public and private stockpiles in Haiti and in the region, falling into the hands of gangs.
An example of that is the recent Pandora Operation in the Dominican Republic.
Authorities discovered and dismantled a network that diverted at least 900,000 rounds of ammunition from Dominican Republic police stockpiles into illegal markets, including in border areas.
Investigations are ongoing in this case, and we are awaiting the findings to understand the quantities of ammunition that may have been trafficked into Haiti.
I want to commend the authorities in the Dominican Republic for this effort, which showcases that illicit flows of weapons in the region can be detected and halted.
Nevertheless, weapons and ammunition continue to reach Haiti.
Haiti needs stronger capacities to register, control, and trace firearms and ammunition, including seized weapons and private stockpiles, as well as to collect, request, and analyse firearms seizure data.
And maritime and land border control on the Haiti-Dominican Republic border need to be enhanced with equipment, human resources, and improved information-sharing.
In addition, stronger controls are needed for ships departing Florida for Haiti, but also for the Bahamas and Turks and Caicos, which traffickers are now using as transit destinations.
Distinguished members of the Council,
The violence in Haiti continues to be compounded and fuelled by illicit markets, and the drug trade is key among them.
Over the past decades, criminal actors have turned Haiti into a drug trafficking node, and evidence suggests that a small group of individuals has maintained considerable influence over Haiti’s drug trade from the 1980s until today.
A review of documents and informant accounts reveals that this group includes Haitian former military personnel, law enforcement officers, members of parliament, and businessmen, operating in Haiti and the United States, as well as other countries in the region.
Breaking up this long-standing and deeply entrenched network is key to stemming the flow of drugs through Haiti.
Moreover, there are also other illicit markets that are booming in Haiti alongside the drug trade, including wildlife crime.
There is growing evidence that several Haitian nationals are part of a wider criminal network connected to lucrative eel trafficking, operating in Haiti and beyond.
Some reports indicate that powerful political and economic figures in Haiti use the eel industry to launder drug profits.
Haitian authorities need support to start analyzing and investigating money laundering linked to the illegal wildlife trade.
Mister President,
Insecurity, instability, and economic hardship continue to drive people to flee Haiti, while regional migration policies and dynamics are affecting the nature of their journeys.
Airspace closures and hardline anti-migration policies in the region, as well as stricter controls in the Darien Gap and the shut-down of the international airport in Port-au-Prince are leading Haitians to take more risk to escape, using the services of migrant smugglers who are ready to put them at risk.
Haitian nationals are increasingly being smuggled through dangerous routes by sea, to countries such as the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Turks and Caicos, looking to make it onwards to the US and Canada.
Haiti is also witnessing an alarming surge in human trafficking, and particularly child trafficking by gangs.
Gangs like 400 Mawozo, Nan Brooklyn, Baz Taliban, and Village de Dieu are exploiting malnourishment as well as lack of education and parental supervision to coerce and deceive children into joining their ranks.
They are also using social media for recruitment, reportedly offering payments of up to 200 dollars for prospective members.
In 2024, UNICEF estimated that children account for 30 to 50 per cent of gang members in Haiti, after their recruitment increased by 70 per cent last year.
Laws against human trafficking need to be implemented more effectively, through law enforcement units that are trained and equipped to address human trafficking and gang-related crimes involving children.
And measures need to be in place for the eventual reintegration of children and youth leaving these groups.
Members of the Council,
Corruption and money-laundering continue to undermine prospects for stability in Haiti, while enabling trafficking and organized crime.
In December, Haiti took an important step in the fight against corruption, with the establishment of the Interinstitutional Anti-Corruption Task Force, supported by UNODC, in partnership with UNDP and the OAS.
We hope that this Task Force can inject new energy in the pursuit of integrity and accountability.
Haiti’s Anti-Corruption Unit – the ULCC – is already working with other Haitian authorities to crack down on corruption, even in these difficult circumstances.
In November, the criminal court of Hinche sentenced an inspector at the Directorate General of Taxes to four years in prison for embezzlement of public funds, after an investigation by the ULCC. The court also ordered the restitution of the embezzled funds.
This marks the second corruption conviction in Haiti in 20 years, and offers a vital glimmer of hope.
We must build on this achievement by helping to improve capacities in Haiti’s judiciary, to enable them to act on reports from oversight bodies like ULCC.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Before I conclude, I want to reiterate the recommendations of UNODC’s latest report, as well as the ones that preceded it.
In particular, I want to underline the importance of enhancing Haitian operational capacities against trafficking, improving regional cooperation and information-sharing, and strengthening Haiti’s institutions.
I also want to reaffirm UNODC’s commitment to working with Haitian authorities and partners to tackle the underlying structures of organized crime and corruption destabilizing Haiti.
And I would like to reemphasize the robust partnership between UNODC and BINUH, and our strong collaboration on logistics and operations.
I also would like to thank Kenya for its leadership on this matter.
Together, we must stand with Haiti in confronting violence, corruption, and chaos, for a more stable and secure future for the Haitian people.
Thank you.