"Drugs as a cross-cutting issue in Afghan reconstruction: Turning rhetoric into reality"
Wilton Park Conference 28 V 02
"Counter-narcotics: the silent war in Afghanistan"
Antonio Maria Costa
Executive Director
UN Office For Drug Control and Crime Prevention
Dear Friends
Dear Colleagues
Civil society in Afghanistan is fighting an historic conflict. Although counter-terrorism is the key battleground, the enemy has to be confronted on other fronts as well -- first and foremost on the drugs front. This will be a silent battle, fought mainly by the Afghan authorities who need, and deserve international assistance. We are gathered here today to review and strengthen that assistance to be provided.
Before entering into this discussion, however, I would like to introduce the UN Office in Vienna for which I am responsible, and briefly describe its work in relation to the theme under discussion.
The United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
Illicit drugs, crime and terrorism
-- which are at the centre of the Office's mandate -- are among our societies? major concerns. These concerns are serious from a social vantage-point. They are politically sensitive as well, as evidenced by their treacherous appeal to voters. How many government coalitions have recently been elected, or "dis-elected", because of controversy in regard to these issues?The UN is involved because narcotics, crime and terrorism pose one and the same threat to civilisation. Moreover, these are criminal activities spawn in the same murky waters; therefore, the battle against them must involve all nations, and be waged on the basis of comprehensive, consensus-based initiatives. Furthermore, since these criminal activities have been shown to sneak over national, even continental boundaries, no institution or country can cope with them in isolation. Therefore, given the complexity of the issues and their international dimension, the United Nations has a major role to play.
Just what role is the Vienna Office expected to play? Counting on a limited budget (about $150 m/y) and a small staff (about 400 highly motivated people), the Office is mandated to:
examine in depth and measure these problems, their manifestations and causes. In a few minutes I shall provide evidence of the Office's essential role as an international repository of data and know-how;
provide mechanisms for inter-governmental consultations and advice. Noteworthy in this regard are the UN Conventions that sanction governments' commitments in the areas of drugs, crime, and soon, corruption;
undertake initiatives (concrete projects, for example) to assist countries in greatest need, so as to help them set up adequate administrative structures. Finally,
evaluate the impact of our collective work, so as to turn the lessons from the past into guidelines for the future.
What is the UN Vienna Office planning to do, in the period just ahead, to meet these ambitious mandates? Earlier this month, on my first day in Vienna, my staff and I began to formulate a response to this question. Since then, I have raised the same questions to Ambassadors in Vienna and to the International Narcotics Control Board. Three priorities have been identified for the period ahead:
1) first and foremost, good governance -- both internal and external;
2) strategic clarity, in setting the framework for operations;
3) predictability of resources and commitment to deliver.
I like to represent these priorities by means of a metaphor, developed five centuries ago during the Italian Renaissance. You may be familiar with Ambrogio Lorenzetti's fresco in Il Palazzo de la Municipalita' in Siena. Il buon governo --"good government" is the name of Lorenzetti's fresco -- shows the beneficial impact of sound administration on society.
I conceive the administration of the UN City in Vienna exactly in the same terms: in other words, my first priority is good governance. As the Office carries out the mandates established by Member Countries, good governance means in this context permanent dialogue and transparent relations with stakeholders regarding the ways and means to discharge these mandates. Such an accountability requires appropriate instruments, and these are being put in place.
For example, in my first week in Vienna, we set up the Office's Executive Committee. This Committee, which consists of Department Heads, is empowered with all major management decisions. In the second week, we considered the establishment of an Independent Evaluation System to assess the effectiveness of our work, and the rigor in the use of resources. These instruments, and others to come, are key to the Office's credibility. In other words, they should help you determine that we are "good value for your money".
The Office?s next priority is to forge a realistic management framework, to guide operations in the medium-term. Despite the Office's clear institutional mandates, some earlier activities have been undertaken on an ad hoc basis. In this regard let me say that some member states are as guilty as management: in too many instances, national geo-political priorities have been imposed on the Office by means of exceedingly tight earmarking of funds.
To amend this opportunistic selection of projects, we are working on a road map to show how we intend to implement programmes and projects in the medium-term -- where they will take place, why and with what expected results. A dedicated Task Force, set up in the third week of May, has already started to work. I intend to discuss its conclusions with stakeholders in the autumn. This exercise should be seen as more than just producing another paper, loaded with bureaucratic jargon and far fetched promises. The process of developing such a management tool has already proved to motivate staff, enhance internal debate and improve the Programmes' credibility. It may even secure more stable funding.
The funding question, the third priority, should not to be dramatised. In fact, I am convinced that once we have demonstrated that resources made available to the Office in Vienna constitute a commitment to deliver rather than an entitlement to spend, adequate and predictable resources will be provided. I expect the resources will come not just from the traditional coffers of tax-payers. New sources will be tapped -- from the corporate sector, for example, and from foundations and civil organisations.
This, in short, is the work I see ahead for the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention. In the coming months, I hope our deeds will convince member states of the seriousness of our intents -- starting today at Wilton Park.
Countering Illicit Drugs in Afghanistan
There is no better place to demonstrate what the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention can do at the service of the world community than Afghanistan, a country which is facing enormous reconstruction and development tasks after decades of death and devastation.
Ownership of the reconstruction process is in the hands of the national authorities. Since they lack the resources and the administrative capacity to take necessary action, the United Nations has intervened. It co-ordinates global support through the Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) -- to which our Office is an active contributor.
The Office?s counter-narcotics work in the country has been a front-runner. In February 2002, the Office proposed to the national authorities, to the governments in neighbouring countries, to major donors and to other international institutions a Strategy for Drug Control and Crime Prevention in Afghanistan. This Strategy was in support of the 17 January 2002 decree by the Chairman of the Interim Administration (AIA) banning the cultivation, production, processing, illicit use and trafficking of narcotic drugs.
Building on a decade-long experience, the Office established short, as well as longer-term priorities. For the immediate period it decided to conduct an Opium Poppy Survey, on behalf of the Afghan and other authorities. It then proposed specific projects in order to strengthen the country's legal, judicial and law enforcement frameworks. For the longer term, the Office emphasises integrating drug-control activities into the broad context of development assistance. In collaboration with other UN Agencies and with International Financial Institutions (IFIs), this Strategy was meant to facilitate the Interim Administration's effort to promote conversion of current rural activity into licit cultivation. In March 2002, all major donors endorsed the Strategy, which was also agreed upon by the 45th Session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.
Building on these premises, the donor countries last month sanctioned the division of labour in international assistance. The resulting UK Strategy and Action Plans to Assist Afghanistan to Combat Drugs (towards the preparation of which my Office contributed greatly), are concrete and comprehensive. They represent an excellent effort to turn rhetoric into reality, covering all aspects of drug control. As my colleagues, Richard Will and David MacDonald, will be making presentations on drug abuse and trafficking issues, I will concentrate on the Office's work to help break dependence on the economics of narcotics.
(a) A worrisome evidence
The Interim Administration is committed to develop alternatives to opium poppy' cultivation. International aid is therefore targeted to Afghan areas where illegal cultivation takes place. Which are these areas, and what is the extent of the problem?
The Vienna Office, let me add, is well suited to uncover evidence of drug-related cultivation anywhere in the world. We started the monitoring in Afghanistan in 1994, conducting surveys ever since thanks to UK funding (along with countries like Finland, Belgium and France). Over time, techniques have changed in relation to circumstances, but the outcome has been generally robust and appreciated world-wide. Because of the security situation on the ground, surveying techniques were recently switched from human on-site checks to high-resolution satellite images, supplemented by field visits to confirm remote-sensing evidence.
I am sorry to disclose that the evidence is not encouraging. A 2-week sample ground survey was launched early this month, before the eradication campaign started in the north of the country. Ongoing analysis of the data point to a significant increase in the area under poppy cultivation. Although the survey results for the Northern region will be available later this week, preliminary estimates predict a worrisome 40% increase of the opium poppy cultivation in the Badakhshan province. The total area of the country estimated to be under illicit cultivation is between 45 and 65 thousand hectares, in line with the amounts measured in the mid?90?s (and before the Taliban ban).
(b) Assessing the broader picture
Knowledge about what happens in the field is necessary to design policies and operations. Yet, such knowledge is not sufficient. An additional piece of evidence is needed. We need to understand the workings of Afghan economic dependence on narcotics -- including the dimension of the Afghan opiate trade in recent years, with projections for the period ahead; the impact on neighbouring countries; opium as a cash crop and farmers borrowing before planting; the role of opium-based money lenders; the interest rate they charge (an estimated 500% over a 6 month period); the price of illegal (as against legal) cultures; the migrants and refugees work, including the importance of women and children in the opium harvest.
As in any war, knowledge of the enemy is essential. This exercise, of a practical nature, is intended to provide support to the design and planning of operations. An immediate operational program can be envisaged, linked to the economics of narcotic culture and trade: a project meant to provide to farmers alternative sources of credit, at lower interest rate, for the switch towards licit cultures. (Reference to this programme is contained in the UK Strategy document).
Such micro-credits have a long history of success, elsewhere. The Office is investigating lessons from past experience, in view of designing an approach appropriate to Afghanistan, in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank and UNDP. Breaking the credit cycle by creating alternative borrowing options to poor farmers, is a key component of the effective drug control policy in Afghanistan. And this is something that must be addressed well in advance of the next opium poppy planting season in autumn 2002.
(c) A road map for Drug Control in Afghanistan
The Office is engaged in several other operational programmes, most already under-way. A first set of initiatives concerns institution building, especially judicial reform. A number of countries (for example, Italy is co-ordinating efforts to improve the judiciary system in Afghanistan) have offered resources for projects. They range from helping authorities develop suitable drugs laws, to the establishment of a framework for controlling precursors, to the training of public prosecutors and law enforcement investigators.
These projects, already submitted to the national authorities, will last about two years and absorb over $2 millions.
Another set of initiatives (mostly with the support of Germany, which is co-ordinating the establishment of adequate police structures in Afghanistan), concern law enforcement. These projects (spanning a 2-year period, and costing another $2 million), are focussing on the re-building of a counternarcotics police force; the definition of measures against growing, trafficking and trading of illicit substances; and the development of advisory capacity to the Afghan intelligence services.
Under gestation are projects intended to support the development of alternative livelihoods. Donors are invited to target all areas affected by illicit opium poppy cultivation; to identify sectors that could be built up as alternative sources of income; to alleviate farmers' outstanding debts and establish comprehensive rural credit schemes. Work is similarly in progress regarding drug demand reduction efforts, especially in setting up the relevant rehabilitation centres.
In conclusion
Our Office's priority is to mainstream the drug control element in the rural development assistance provided to Afghanistan by countries and development organisations. Three aspects are important:
- Coordination of assistance: This aspect is being addressed under the leadership of the UK, especially in the papers submitted to this Conference;
- Expert advice on alternative livelihoods. My Office will share its experience with national counterpart agencies, international organizations and NGOs. This will include: participation in and advice to formulation missions, provision of workshops and training to government counterparts and project staff of other agencies, and sharing of reports and other relevant information.
- Impact assessment: The effectiveness of programmes should be assessed at regular intervals - starting from our study on poppy farmers? attitudes in the next planting season. It should identify the extent to which their planting decisions are affected by the international community?s assistance and what still needs to be done to encourage culture diversification. In the medium- and long-term, the Vienna Office's monitoring and evaluation will include in-depth studies and impact assessments in cultivation areas
I thank you all for you attention.