Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would like to add a few words to the briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and look at the situation in Afghanistan from the particular angle of drugs and crime – twin threats to the country’s stability and development.
The Afghan opium problem is indeed both a cause and a consequence of crime, the inevitable result of weak rule of law, and of still lagging enforcement and judicial capabilities. Before looking at this bigger picture, let me first brief you on the latest trends in cultivation.
My Office (UNODC) has just completed its spring survey, combining aerial and ground observation. We estimate that in 2005 the opium cultivation in Afghanistan will decline. The total area under cultivation will still be enormous: possibly well over one hundred thousand hectares. Even so, when we will release the Annual Opium Survey in September, the data will most likely show a reverse trend over the past few years.
What are the reasons for this decline in opium cultivation in Afghanistan in 2005? Our surveyors have confirmed that the eradication campaign, conducted by the Government with foreign assistance, has yielded results. However, the decrease in cultivation must especially be attributed to the self-restraint of farmers who simply decided, for reasons I will touch on in a moment, to reduce the opium harvest in 2005. This good news is tempered by two concerns:
(i) the crop decline seems quite uneven nation-wide. In some provinces, UNODC has actually noted a strong increase in poppy cultivation in 2005,
(ii) good weather conditions this spring have increased productivity in the fields. We therefore expect higher opium yields (more kilos per hectare) than in 2004.
Several factors explain farmers’ self-restraint this year. We are, no doubt, seeing a market correction, at a time of abundant stocks and declining opium prices. Above all our surveyors have noted the growing impact of the government’s persuasion campaign, as well as of faith-based motivations.
It is time to reflect on the reality of present day Afghanistan, where poverty is still overwhelming. In the affected villages, the revenue previously derived from a main cash crop (opium) needs to be replaced by alternative sources of income. This will strengthen the Government’s credibility with farmers: it will also reduce the risk of a humanitarian crisis. In a recent meeting, President Karzai manifested the fear that his moral authority would be undermined in the villages if peaceful eradication and voluntary lower cultivation were not supported by development assistance. We both agreed that the current market correction (to lower opium output) could easily reverse itself, thus causing higher opium crops in 2006-07.
Before closing on this, Mr. Chairman, let me add that in today’s Afghanistan, development assistance does not only translate into survival for hundreds of thousands of poor villagers: it may mean the survival for the first democratically elected government in the nation’s history.
Stronger law enforcement
By and large, opium farming is driven by poverty. Traffickers, warlords and corrupt officials are instead motivated by greed and they should face retribution. This will do two things:
(i) it will free villagers from the bondage imposed by big profiteers and insurgents,
(ii) it will also help counter the perception held by many ordinary Afghans that counter narcotics measures are hitting the weakest links in the drug chain – the farmers – and not the fat cats.
Traffickers, warlords and insurgents in Afghanistan control quasi-military organizations, and run military-type operations. An effective response depends on the deployment of corresponding force. Not long ago, we saw a real-life example of this. The drugs bazaar in Helmand’s Garmser district, on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, has long been known as a major center for heroin processing and trafficking. When I was in Afghanistan a few weeks ago, the Special Narcotics Forces (ASNF) raided the bazaar deploying heavy artillery.
The local people welcomed the operation, and applauded the Afghan Minister of the Interior, who was obviously very pleased. “This operation demonstrates that ASNF has the ability to strike anywhere, at anytime,” said Mr. Jalali.
I agree. Operations of this complexity are the result of the growing collaboration between counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency forces, information-sharing, and mutual support against a common threat. I salute the tireless efforts of the lead nation on counter narcotics assistance, the United Kingdom. I also welcome the decision by some of the ISAF participating nations to consider embedding civilian drug expertise in their Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), so as to foster this inter-force collaboration.
Now I wish to look at the broader picture and place the Afghan drug problem within a suitable context. Despite the progress I have described, lawlessness still prevails in Afghanistan. State institutions are fragile and vulnerable: corruption and intimidation are rampant. Democracy and the rule of law are stymied by the absence of a viable criminal justice system.
The foundations of a credible administration of justice have been laid down, but the resources generated through drug trafficking (US$ 2.8 billion in 2004) are routinely used to undermine justice.
Warlords, inept provincial chiefs, corrupt officials make the Afghan opium industry more flexible and better prepared to evade controls. They help crops move into new areas, up in the mountains, where insurgents provide protection. They facilitate logistics for the import of chemical precursors (almost 10 000 tons in 2004), for the processing of heroin. They assist the money-laundering networks. In provinces where the eradication campaign failed (notably Kandahar) we see clear examples of corruption and profiteering by local officials.
It is impossible to oppose Afghanistan’s narco-industry when investigation, prosecution, the courts and detention systems are weak -- or non-existent. I therefore salute the assistance provided by Germany and Italy, lead nations in related sectors, and call upon all Member States to help address today’s priorities in the country: an adequate rule of law and a vigorous fight against corruption. We now have a window of opportunity, a chance to act, but it is closing fast, as some of the more dubious characters in the troublesome provinces will run for office in the forthcoming elections, seeking impunity from parliamentary immunity.
Mr. Chairman, I suggest that in Afghanistan we view drug control measures in conjunction with efforts to alleviate poverty in the countryside and to restore justice countrywide. This shall help move forward on other fronts as well, and remove major impediments to democracy, security and development at large.
I count on the support of, and guidance from the Council. Thank you for your attention.